95. Mode of giving notice.-Every notice by
this Act required to be given to any person shall
be served personally, or sent through the post in
a registered letter, marked outside "Land Regis.
try Office," and directed to such person at the
address furnished to the registrar, and every such
notice so sent through the post, unless returned,
shall be deemed to have been received by the
person addressed when it would be delivered to
him in the ordinary course of post, or within such
period as may be prescribed by general order.
96. Notices to be returned by post office.-Her
Majesty's Postmaster General shall give direc-estates and call for transfers. When more than
tions for the immediate return to the registrar of
all letters marked as aforesaid, and addressed to
any person who cannot be found, and on the
return of any letter containing any notice, the
registrar shall give such (if any) directions as he
may think requisite or proper under the circum-

98. If any general orders or any rules be made as to applications, &c., and are not complied with, application, &c., need not be granted by registrar.-If there shall be made any general 106. Court may direct transfer on the register. 88. Efect of caveat.-After any such caveat has orders, or any rules regulating the mode of apply--The court, upon the application of any regis been lodged in respect of any land, rent, lease, or ing for registration and transfer, such orders and tered proprietor for the time being, or of any charge, the registrar shall not register any deal-rules shall be complied with; and the registrar person being, or claiming to be, beneficially ing with such land, lease, or charge until there may refuse to act unless and until they shall have interested in any land, lease, or charge, or of the has been served on the cautioner notice warning been complied with, and he may, as between two registrar, and that, notwithstanding any previous him that his caveat will cease to have any effect or more applicants for original or subsequent order, may order any new proprietor or proafter the expiration of twenty-one days, or such registration, disregard the applications of those prietors, solely or jointly with or in the place of other number of days as may by general order be who shall not have so complied. any existing proprietor or proprietors, or any prescribed in that behalf next ensuing the date at one or more of the proprietors, or any person which such notice is served; and after the expiraor persons to be entered on the register as protion of such period the caveat shall cease unless prietor or proprietors, and the proper entry on an order to the contrary is made by the court; the register to give effect to such order shall and upon the caveat so ceasing the land, lease, or thereupon be made, or the court may make such charge may be dealt with in the same manner as order in the premises as it thinks just. if no caveat had been lodged.

SOLICITORS' JOURNAL.

We have received a short report of a meeting of junior members of both branches of the legal profession, which took place at the rooms of the Union Society of London, on Tuesday last. We regret that want of space prevents our publishing this report, but in another column we have furnished our readers with the nature of the subject discussed at the meeting of the Union Society, and the decision arrived at, namely, that greater facilities should be afforded members of the Profession for passing from one branch to the other. As is well known, a barrister-at-law is required (with some exceptions) to be disbarred and then to serve in the office of an attorney at law for three years as an articled clerk before he can be admitted on the roll of attorneys; this is so provided by sect. 3 of 23 & 24 Vict. c. 127, commonly known as the Attorneys' Act 1860. That a member of the higher branch of the legal profession should be called upon to subject himself to such conditions is simply unreasonable, and that such a provision remains on the statute book is only to be accounted for by the fact that the cases are very few and far between in which a barrister is found desirous of becoming a solicitor. It is worthy of observation that a clerk who has been in an attorney's office for ten years is placed, as regards the period of articles, on the same footing with a barrister. This is so provided by sect. 4 of the same Act. Sect. 16 of this Act provides that where, by custom or statutory provision, the qualification of a solicitor for any office is his having been a solicitor for so many years, then that a barrister-at-law having been such for an equal length of time, shall be considered as qualified equally with such a solicitor. If this is not a complete contradiction to the spirit of sect. 3, it is very nearly so, and indeed, to read these sections, three and sixteen, side by side, is to find that the spirit of the one cannot be reconciled to the spirit of the other. We must confess it seems to us that to require a barrister to enter into articles of clerkship before he can become a solicitor is a degrading ceremony, and such a position cannot be defended for a moment, for, supposing after passing an examination he was admitted on the roll of attorneys, he is at once liable in an action of negligence, at the suit of any aggrieved client. This is the protection afforded to the public against incompetent persons, and they ought to have the same protection as regards the Bar. A liberal profession existing for the public must advance with the times, and will advance. The doors by which the public can gain admission to it must be thrown open, and the criterion by which to judge of a man's fitness for membership of such a profession must be a high standard of general education and legal knowledge. We hope that the consideration of these questions by the Union Society will lead to their being debated elsewhere.

ON the 25th inst. a special number of the LAW
TIMES will be forwarded to every solicitor in the
Profession who is not at present a subscriber to
the journal. The Editor of this department
hopes that his professional brethren will not lose
this unusual opportunity of ventilating new ideas
and giving a fresh impetus to those not new which
is thus offered.

SEVERAL Subscribers have called our attention to
the fact, not however by any means lost sight
of by us, that the Land Transfer and Title Bill
now before Parliament, provides for the ap-
pointment of barristers to the several offices
that will be created by this measure, such
as registrars, assistant registrars, and examiners
of title.
That these posts should be reserved
exclusively for members of the higher branch
seems most unjust. Here we have a measure
which will surely sooner or later operate to curtail
the accustomed profits of this branch of the Pro-
fession, and yet we are to fill none of the offices
which are created for the purposes of such cur-
tailments. We hope not only the Council of the
Incorporated Law Society will make to the Lord
Chancellor the necessary representations on this
point, but, also and we may say more especially,
that the thirteen or fourteen solicitors in the
House of Commons will not so far forget the duty
which each owes to his profession as to allow the
sections in question to pass unchallenged. It is
a question upon which the House ought certainly
to be divided, no matter with what result, Soli-
citors have a right to know what view the Bar, as
represented in the House of Commons, takes of
the matter. We publish one of several letters
received upon the subject.

A COUNTRY Solicitor writes to us that he has not seen any announcement of the appointment of a chief clerk at the Mansion House, and that he has been informed that the Court of Aldermen were surprised and disappointed at there being only

three applicants. The reason is obvious, he adds; whether a proof should be rejected or not; and
first-class men will not entertain the illiberal terms we are by no means sure that it would not have
which are offered. We are not aware that up to been a wise provision in the last Bankruptcy Act
the time of going to press any appointment has that the chairmen of such meetings as those in
been made to this vacant office. The office, how-question should be required to submit each proof
ever, is not one for which very many candidates
are likely to present themselves.

THE registrar of a country County Court near
London writes to us as follows: "I shall join the
Legal Practitioners' Society, in the hope that it
may be able to deal with the encroachments on the
Profession. I send a set of papers issued by one
of our many sets of invaders, and I may say that
both in practice and as registrar of the County
Court here I see abundant scope for the operation
of the society, the establishment of which you
very properly seem to have favoured." We are
sorry we cannot publish the whole of the docu-
ments sent, some of which are similar to those
which we have over and over again reproduced.
All those before us emanate from "The United
Kingdom Mercantile Offices," Holborn, and they
threaten executions and imprisonment to an
alarming extent. These documents are signed
So and So and Co., "accountants."

We understand, and are glad to hear it, that,
following the practice adopted at the common law
judges' chambers, many of the chief clerks in
Chancery are now in the habit of referring to the
subordinates in their chambers much of the routine
work which the chief formerly disposed of. This
step is of great consequence to suitors and the
Profession, as it tends to the despatch of business.
The subordinates being incompetently dealt with,
possessed of long and thoroughly practical ex-
as they are, in many cases, solicitors, and all
perience. We hope this practice will be univer-
sally adopted by the chief clerks in Chancery,
who are always most ready to facilitate the de-
spatch of all business that comes before them.

We publish elsewhere a letter from an articled
clerk upon the subject of the inducements offered
by the Council of the Incorporated Law Society
to students to seek, by unusual study and exer-
tion, to obtain distinction at the Final Exami
tion. Although we do not indorse all the views
propounded by our correspondent, we are de-
cidedly of opinion that the prizes at the Final
Examination ought to be of greater value, and
take a different form; in fact the system adopted
by the Council of Legal Education, as applied to
Bar students, ought to be followed in a more
modified form, and the inducements of reward
and distinction should also be held out to students
who present themselves for preliminary and inter-
mediate examinations. We feel confident that
the adoption of such a plan would be productive
of much good.

to a solicitor before receiving the same. It is at all events a matter of notoriety that a very large number of bankruptcy proofs are prepared very inaccurately, and it would be well, therefore, in the interests of the public, not to say the bankrupt's estate, that the preparation of such documents should be secured to properly qualified practitioners.

REFERRING to the third report of the Judicature Commission, which has just been presented and published, the following portions are of especial interest to solicitors. The paragraph which recom mends that the judges should have power to call in assessors in commercial cases, the remuneration to be received by whom to be regarded as costs in the cause. This latter provision we regard with some concern. It is making this and that expense costs in the cause which is continually increasing the amount of our bills, without really any advantage to solicitors themselves. The Profession will consider Mr. Ayrton's objection that a more summary mode of procedure is necessary, which he thinks is to be found in the establishment of tribunals of commerce, as to which he observes that it will be better to have these than to be obliged to wait in order to have every representation to the court filtered and perhaps mystified through a single or even double legal agency. Sir Sydney Waterlow also observes in reference to our present system, that at times it works a denial of justice or inflicts on the suitor a long pending worrying law suit, the solicitors on either side pleading in their client's interests every technical point, and he adds: "if the summary jurisdiction conferred on justices of the peace in criminal cases when exercised by gentlemen who are not lawyers, gives satisfaction, it can scarcely be doubted that a similar jurisdiction in civil cases would be equally acceptable.' We offer no opinion on this view beyond saying that we cannot agree with it, and coming as it does, from Sir Sidney Waterlow, we are the more surprised to find such a view propounded.

THERE seems to be a growing feeling amongst solicitors, that when the several legal measures now in Parliament become law, and are in full working order, there will be a considerable diminution of business, especially in London, where the work of the advocate is undertaken in the main by barristers, while in the country it still remains almost entirely in the hands of solicitors. Our own opinion is, that although the amount of professional work may fluctuate and be at times dimin shed by legislation, yet, that by reason of the constitution of society, solicitors must always remain in considerable request. No WE publish in another column a letter from a doubt a somewhat alarming number of gentlemen Managing Clerk " upon the subject of the mea- are still admitted every term, and we quite think sure now before Parliament, having for its object that parents, whether solicitors or not, will do to amend 17 & 18 Vict. c. 36, and we hope the im- well to consider twice before they determine to portance of the subject to which our correspon-article their sons. The total number of solicitors dent directs attention will be brought to the notice is now so large as to constitute a considerable of those members of the House of Commons community of themselves. having charge of the Bill in question. We also publish a short letter from "A Solicitor" in reference to this measure, and we are quite sure that if the several suggestions contained in this correspondence are brought prominently before the House of Commons, and are supported there by those members who belong to the Profession, they will certainly be adopted for the better protection of the public against the dishonesty of unscrupulous persons. We understand that the sections as to bills of sale included in the Legal Practitioners' Bill have been brought prominently under the notice of Mr. C. E. Lewis, M.P., who has charge of the Bills of Sale Bill.

before the Judge of the Wandsworth County
IN a case of Re Sykes, ex parte Gosnold, heard
Court on the 31st ult., his Honour, in delivering
judgment, observed as follows in reference to a
proof in bankruptcy: "The proof is filled up very
been rejected by the chairman." For this and
ignorantly and inaccurately, and ought to have
other reasons, "I think," said the Judge, "that
the execution' creditor ought to have an oppor-
tunity afforded him of amending his proof." We
quite agree, and his Honour's decision points to
the necessity of checking the encroachments of
accountants in reference to bankruptcy business.
It is well known that large numbers of proofs in
bankruptcy are prepared by accountants and
agents, and that they are frequently most in-
accurate in their form. The Profession will hail
with satisfaction a systematic rejection of all in-
accurate proofs by County Court Judges and their
registrars, as well as by the chairmen of meetings
at which such proofs are presented. As to such
chairmen, however, the misfortune is that they
are not, as a rule, competent to judge as to

WE publish with pleasure, in another column, a letter from "A Certificated Managing Clerk," upon the subject whether solicitors who act as clerks to other attorneys should have a right of audience in County Courts and before justices of the peace, on behalf of clients of their principal. Much diversity of opinion exists, and many different rules obtain in the country upon this not unimportant subject. To our mind the matter is a very simple one. What County Court judges, and magistrates, and registrars, and magistrates' clerks must look to is that none but certified solicitors or, of course, barristers, appear before them. The fact that an advocate (properly of a partner of another solicitor, should be no qualified) happens to be a managing clerk, instead hindrance whatever to the former appearing on behalf of a client of the latter. There is practically no difference between a managing firm, as regards the relations of each with the clerk who is a solicitor and a junior partner in a senior. We must, however, remind our correspondent that many benches of magistrates, and some County Court judges, refuse to hear managing clerks under such circumstances as above stated, although it has always seemed to us unreason. was not long since reported in our columns, in able. A case identical with that here suggested which a bench of borough magistrates so refused.

ON the occasion of the committal of a police serjeant for perjury at the Marlborough-street Police Court, the following is reported to have occurred, and as to which it is sufficient to observe that the thanks of the Profession are due to Mr. Knox for his prompt action in the matter. If all "agents

Serjeant Brennan was finally examined before Mr. Knox yesterday, at the Marlborough-street Policecourt, on a charge of having committed wilful and corrupt perjury in the evidence he gave against Thomas Parrock, formerly a constable of the X division, when charged with stealing a portmanteau, the property of Sir George Jenkinson, M.P., trom the roof of a cab. Mr. Edward Lewis appeared for the prosecution, and Mr. W. Sleigh for the defence.

Mr. W. Sleigh said, in consequence of certain information he had received, he wished to recall Policeconstable Young to put some further questions to him. Mr. Knox, before this was done, would put a few questions to Parrock relative to a statement made to him respecting a person then sitting at the solicitor's table. Parrock, in reply to Mr. Knox, said the person alluded to was a Mr. Hills, who had called on him on two or three occasions and offered him money not to appear against Brennan. On one occasion a £5 note was offered, but he refused to have anything to do with the proposal.

to solicitors" (the meaning of which expression which the law has established for the general
we are unable to explain) were similarly treated benefit of the public. Quare, whether, if a
by County Court Judges and magistrates, competition had been filed, or contemplated against
plaints on this head would be less numerous than B.'s return, the twenty-one days during which it
they are, and the number of such agents would might be filed under the Act, not having expired,
decrease instead of multiply, as we fear is the the libel would have been privileged. Per
case at present:
Pollock, B.-The parties cannot, by their own
acts, constitute circumstances which shall give
them any right to privilege in a matter of libel
which they do not possess according to natural,
social, or legal position in which they stand with
regard to each other; and the mere fact of a person
having an interest in the conduct of people around
him, is not of itself alone sufficient to clothe with
privilege any communication, with regard to the
conduct of such people, which he may make to
them or others. At the trial, the following evi.
dence, tendered on the part of the defendants,
was rejected by the learned judge as inadmissible,
viz. 1. The evidence of the defendant Hilliard
as to what was said to him by his co-defendant
Hare on the occasion of the certificate being
drawn up by Hare and signed by both the defen-
dants. 2. A letter of the 17th Sept. from Hall to
Hare, embodying the terms of the arrangement
between them as to the mode of conducting the
election. 3. A letter written to the defendant
Hare by a third person, who had been in communi-
cation with the plaintiffs, in which letter it was
suggested, on the part of the defendants, that the
writer mentioned that the defendants had ad-
mitted the truth of the charge. Held, per totam
curiam (refusing a rule for a new trial on the
ground of the improper rejection of evidence),
that the evidence was inadmissible and irrelevant,
and was therefore rightly rejected: (Dickeson v.
Hilliard and Hare; Robinson v. The Same, 30
L. T. Rep. N. S. 197. Ex.)
PRACTICE PRIVATE HEARING. The court
will direct a case to be heard in private upon an
assurance by counsel that in his opinion it is a
proper case to be so heard, notwithstanding the
objection of other parties: (Anonymous, 30 L. T.
Rep. N. S. 153. V.C. B.)

Mr. Hills said he did call on Parrock, and had offered to pay the expenses he had been put to, and undertake to conduct his case as a civil action, and Parrock said he wanted £300 to settle the matter. He never said a word to Parrock about a £5 note.

Parrock asserted that he did. He denied asking for 2300. He said he would not take £300 to settle the matter.

In reply to Mr. Knox, Mr. Hills said he was an agent to a solicitor. He considered his conduct was proper under the circum

stances.

Mr. Knox did not, and he must request him at once to

leave the solicitors' table.

Mr. W. Sleigh, on behalf of Brennan, repudiated the conduct of Hills.

Mr. E. Lewis would remind the magistrates that Hills on the last occasion said he was acting for the defendant.

Mr. Knox believed that what Hills said was that he was a friend of the Brennan family.

NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS. LIBEL-PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION-AGENTS OF THE RIVAL CANDIDATES.-On the 17th Sept., a few days before a Parliamentary election for the borough of D., the defendant Hare, as agent for B., one of the candidates, came to an arrangement with a Mr. Hall, the agent of F., the other candidate, that the election should be conducted on principles of purity, and that no bribery should be permitted on either side during the election. On the morning of the polling day, the 22nd Sept., the defendant Hare being informed by a man called Fraser, who stated that he was a voter, that the plaintiffs, who were members of F.'s committee, had offered him money if he would vote for F., wrote to Hall telling him that bribery on the part of some members of F.'s committee had been discovered, and at an interview which immediately took place between Hall and Hare, the names of the plaintiffs, as the persons charged with the bribery, were mentioned by Hare to Hall. The election resulted in favour of B., and on the following day, the 23rd Sept., Hare called on Hall, at the latter's request, and it was then arranged between them that if a certificate, affirming the fact of the bribery, and signed by Hare, and the other defendant Hilliard (the chairman of B.'s committee), were sent to Hall, the latter would recommend the plaintiffs to tender an apology to B.'s committee, and to retire from public life for two years, in consideration of which no prosecution against them for bribery should be instituted. Thereupon the following document was, on the following day, the 24th Sept., drawn up by Hare, and was signed by him and the other defendant Hilliard :- We certify that we have discovered that Mr. D. and Mr. R., two prominent members of Mr. F.'s committee, have been personally guilty of offering £1 10s. to a voter for his vote, and £1 10s. for every vote he could procure for Mr. F. The elector referred to has been personally examined by one of us, and the evidence he will give on oath is clear and distinct." This certificate, together with a form of apology for the plaintiff to sign, was then sent by Hare to Hall, by whom it was handed to the chairman of F.'s committee, who communicated it to the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs denied the truth of the charge, refused to sign the apology, and brought these actions respectively against the defendants for the libel contained in the above certificate, and it was Held by the Court of Exchequer (Kelly, C.B., and Pigott and Pollock, BB.) refusing a new trial on the ground of misdirection), that the certificate in question was not a privileged communication; and that there was nothing in the character or position of Hall, or of either of the defendants, which clothed the document with a privilege such as that which existed in the cases of Harrison v. Bush (5 E. & B. 344; 25 L. J. 28, Q. B.); Beatson v. Skene (2 L. T. Rep. N. S. 378; 29 L. J. 430, Ex.; 5 H. & N. 838,; Whiteley v. Adams (9 L. T. Rep. N. S. 483; 5 C. B., N. S., 392; 33 L. J. 89, C, B.), and other cases of that character, and

PRACTICE-TRANSFER OF CAUSE-COSTS.Where the plaintiff in a suit relating to the same matter, with respect to which a previous suit was existing in another branch of the court, offered (in answer to a notice of motion for a transfer of the second suit to the branch of the court to which the first suit was attached) to consent to the transfer if the costs were made costs in the cause, which offer the plaintiffs in the first suit refused, it was ordered that the costs up to the time of the offer should be costs in the cause, and that the plaintiff in the first suit should pay the subsequent costs of the transfer: (Lyall v. Weldhen, 30 L. T. Rep. N. S. 146. Chan.)

of the court, and the Court of Appeal will not entertain an appeal from an order of the court below, granting such an extension of time: (The Republic of Peru v. Ruzo, 30 L. T. Rep. N. S. 190. Chan.)

COURT OF COMMON PLEAS (IRELAND). (Before the Full Court).

ARKINS v. MAGBATH.

Practice-177 & 178 Gen. Ord. 1854-Consent for judgment, with date in blank-Contracting to enable proceedings to be had without regard to the General Orders-Proceedings after a year and a day-Debtors' Act (Ireland) 1872—Substi tuted debt-New security-Interest after, on debt contracted before the Act-Interest on interest-Discharge from arrest.

It is competent to the parties to an action to contract themselves out of the operation of the 178th Gen. Ord. 1854, so that no rule need be entered before proceeding in the action, though no proceeding be taken for a year and a day after defence and before judgment.

Where, after the passing of the Debtors' Act (Ireland) 1872, an agreement is concluded between a debtor and creditor, by virtue of which a principal debt due before the passing of the Act, and interest computed thereon up to the date of the agreement are constituted one integral debt, and made a new starting point as such in the dealings between the parties, bearing interest on the gross amount, it is not competent to the creditor to arrest the debtor under a ca. sa., on foot of a judgment in respect of the liability so incurred.

APPEAL from an order in Consolidated Chamber, refusing a motion made, on behalf of the defendant, that the judgment in this cause and the writ of ca. sa. issued thereon be set aside, and the defendant discharged from custody.

The facts appearing, so far as necessary for the purposes of this report, were as follows:-The action was brought 29th Oct. 1872, to recover £603 6s. 10d., with accruing interest thereon, on foot of three promissory notes; and for money paid for the defendant's use, and for interest on money due, and on accounts stated. Of two of these notes, dated respectively 24th April 1869, and 28th April 1869, for £200 and £300, payable in three months, O'L. was the maker and Treacy the payee; and they were endorsed by Treacy to the defendant, who endorsed them to the plaintiff. Of the third note, date 2nd May 1871, for £40, payable at one month, Mooney was the maker, and B. the payee, by whom it was endorsed to the defendant, who endorsed it to the plaintiff. the particulars endorsed were as follows:

1869, July 27-To promissory note this day
due....
Interest thereon to 29th Oct.
1872

July 31-To promissory note this day
due...
Interest thereon to 29th Oct.
1872

PRACTICE-INROLMENT OF DECREE-CONS.
ORD. 23, RULE 28-ENLARGEMENT OF TIME.-
Within a month of five years after his bill had
been dismissed, the plaintiff applied for and ob-
tained an order of inrolment. On proceeding to
get the order drawn up, he discovered that one
of the defendants had died. He then revived the
suit against the executors of the deceased defen-
dant, and moved that the decree might be 1871, June 5-To promissory note this day
inrolled, notwithstanding the five years had
elapsed: Held, that the circumstances of the case
were not such as to render it just and expedient
to enlarge the time. Motion accordingly refused
with costs: (Patch v. Ward, 30 L. T. Rep. N. S.
152. Chan.)

PARLIAMENTARY POWERS-STREET IMPROVE-
MENT- - COMPULSORY SALE-LANDS CLAUSES
CONSOLIDATION ACT 1845.-A corporation were
authorised by Parliament to take lands compul-
sorily, for the purpose of widening and improving
a street. They gave notice of their intention to
take certain houses which occupied a site larger
than that required for the actual width of the
proposed improved street, though part only of the
houses would necessarily be required. Held, that
the owners of the houses could not require the
corporation to take that part only of the site of
the houses, which would form part of the street:
(Quinton v. Mayor and Corporation of Bristol, 30
L. T. Rep. N. S. 112. V.C. M.)

PRACTICE SERVICE OUT OF THE JURISDICTION-IRREGULARITY IN ORDER-GEN. ORD. 10, R. 7-SUBJECT-MATTER OF SUIT SHARES IN ENGLISH JOINT-STOCK COMPANY - JURISDICTION.-Where an order directed service of copy, bill, and interrogatories upon a defendant "in Scotland or elsewhere, out of the jurisdiction," and the defendant was duly served in Scotland, the court refused to discharge the order, but, on account of the irregularity, made no order as to costs. Where the subject-matter of a suit was shares in an English joint-stock company, the court refused to discharge an order directing service of copy, bill, and interrrogatories upon a sole defendant resident out of the jurisdiction: (Phospho Guano Company v. Guild, 30 L. T. Rep. N. S. 117. V.C. B.)

PRACTICE-PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS-EXTENSION OF TIME-DISCRETION-APPEAL.-The extension of time under an order for the production of documents is a matter within the discretion

due..

Interest thereon from 15th
June 1871, to 19th Feb. 1872
Interest on £20, balance of
said note, from 19th Feb.
1872, to 29th Oct. 1872........

1872, Feb. 19-By cash paid on account......

0 13 10. 623 6 10 20 0 0

603 6 10

With accruing interest on said principal
sums until paid or judgment.
After a defence and replication filed, negotia-
tions were entered into, which resulted in a com-
promise, in pursuance of which the following
agreement, dated 18th Nov. 1872, was signed by
the plaintiff, defendant, and B. (the payee of the
third note sued on): "Minutes of agreement.
All proceedings in this case to stop on the carry.
ing out of the following: Mr. Magrath to procure
for Mr. Arkins Mr. B.'s acceptance at three
months for £256 to the draft of Captain D., and
endorsed by Mr. R. B., and also by Mr. Magrath;
and also to hand to Mr. Arkins Mr. B.'s accept-
ance to Mr. Magrath's own draft for £325 18s. 8d.
at three months. Mr. Arkins to bind himself to
all parties signing these bills not to take any pro-
ceedings upon them if £25 is paid on them every
three months until the amount of the bills, with
interest at 6 per cent., is fully paid off. But Mr.
Arkins is to be at liberty to proceed for the entire
amount remaining due on default, for a week, in
any of the quarterly payments. A consent for
judgment to be given in this action, Mr. Arkins
undertaking not to move, or register, or in any-
wise act on it until such default occurs. It is
also agreed that Mr. Magrath shall pay in cash
the sum of £20 principal, and £1 8s. 2d. interest,
and £9 14s. 6d. costs, as agreed upon, said sum of
£21 8s. 2d. having been deducted from the amount
of debt as endorsed on the summons and plaint,
and leaving £581 188. 8d. the amount of the above.
two sums of £256 and £325 18s. 8d. due." In

pursuance of this agreement, the defendant's
attorney, on Nov. 20, gave plaintiff's attorney a
consent for judgment, that judgment be
forthwith entered for plaintiff for the sum of
£581 18s. 8d., and £3 for costs," no date being
inserted therein; the plaintiff's attorney, at the
same time, giving an undertaking, addressed to
the defendant, as follows: You having this day
given me a consent for judgment for the sums of
£581 188. 8d., and £3 for costs, I undertake not
to enter any judgment thereon, or otherwise
move thereon until default be made in the
payments, as provided for in the minutes of
the agreement, dated Nov. 18, and I am to
be at liberty to date the consent at any time
it may be necessary to do so." The defondant
on the
same day paid plaintiff's attorney
pursuant to the agreement, £21 8s. 2d., on account
of the debt, with £9 148. 6d. for costs, leaving
£581 18s. 8d. due. Between the 18th and 20th
Nov. the defendant procured and handed over the
bills mentioned in the agreement, and on the 21st
received the first two promissory notes, the third
having been previously paid and handed over by
the plaintiff. The instalments which fell due 21st
Feb. 1873, and 21st May 1873, were duly paid, but,
notwithstanding several applications, the third
and fourth instalments were not paid, in conse-
quence of which plaintiff's attorney, on 25th
Sept., 16th Oct., and 1st Dec. 1873, wrote to the
defendant, stating that he would mark judgment,
adding in the last letter that he would do so
without further notice. Accordingly, on 12th
Dec. 1873, without entering any rule, however,
under either the 177th or 178th General Orders,
the plaintiff marked final judgment upon the con-
sent for judgment, having first, at that time, in-
serted therein the date thereof as 12th Dec. 1873.
The judgment was entered for £567 18s. 6d. debt,
and £3 costs. On 13th Dec. 1873, the defendant
was arrested under a ca. sa. on foot of the judg-
ment, for £570 18s. 6d.

Subsequently, the defendant moved in Consolidated Chamber that the proceedings be set aside, and that he be discharged from custody. Fitzgerald, J., refused the application, from which order the defendant now appealed.

and the judgment has been marked for inte-
rest calculated up to 1873. Even if the debt
is not to be considered as created by the
agreement, the £3 costs was certainly so, and
was not incidental to the original demand. Costs
are regarded as a distinct debt, and are provable
as such in bankruptcy, and as such will support
a petition in bankruptcy. The amount ascer-
tained by the agreement comprises two compo-
nent parts-principal and interest: the latter
would not of itself bear interest. But judgment
is marked for interest on both of these component
parts; and for a portion of that the defendant
could not have been arrested. M'Carthy v.
M'Carthy (7 Ir. L. T. Rep. 177), is undistinguish.
able from this case, but was not cited when the
motion was before Fitzgerald, J. Before him the
entire of these points were not advanced at all;
there was only a brief reference to the Debtors'
Act, as preventing the arrest, because the com-
promise was entered into after its passing, to
which it was replied that the Act did not apply,
as the notes were made antecedently. The ques
tion was not decided by Fitzgerald, J. [MORRIS,
J.-Your argument goes to this, that if any por-
tion, however small, of the amount for which the
defendant was arrested was a debt within that
Act, the defendant could not be arrested.] Cer-
tainly; M'Carthy v. M'Carthy. [MORRIS, J.-
Even if the Act had not passed, how was the
plaintiff entitled to charge interest on interest
unless by specific agreement?] In that respect,
the judgment was clearly overmarked. The plain-
tiff seems to have treated the agreement as a new
starting point, and to have considered himself
entitled to deal with the amount ascertained, as if
a judgment had then been marked.

Purcell, Q.C. (with him Carton) contra.-The parties were entitled to contract themselves out of the operation of the 178th G. O., and did so. Any doubt as to their intention arising on the agreement is removed by the terms of the undertaking of 20th Nov., and by the fact of the consent having been given without a date, so as to be available at any time. The rules were intended merely for the benefit of suitors; and suitors may settle their differences without reference to them. It now, however, further appeared, as the result So, the parties might agree to extend the time for of a calculation made on behalf of the plaintiff, pleading beyond the statutable period. Fitzthat the amount of £570 183. 6d., for which gerald, J., during the argument in chamber, apjudgment was marked, was arrived at in this man-peared disposed to hold that the defendant might - the starting point was the £581 18s. 8d. be arrested for interest on the original debt, and mentioned in the minutes of agreement, which was directed that we should confine the argument to composed of the balance of the principal debt and the question whether a rule should have been interest included up to November 1872. As entered under 178th G. O. The interest is calcuagainst this, credits were given for the subsequent payments on the general account, striking the balances accordingly, but upon such balances (although partly composed of interest upon the original debt) further interest was charged up to 1873. The balance was thus brought out £567 18s. 6d., to which was added the £3 costs given by the consent for judgment, making in all £570 18s. 6d., for which the defendant was

ner

arrested.

G. Fitzgibbon, Q.C. (with him Keogh), in support of the motion. The agreement and undertaking are to be read in connection with 177 & 178 G. O. 1854. Either there was a compromise pending, and, if so, a rule should have been entered under the 177th, or, assuming that the transaction did not amount to a compromise, a rule should have been entered under the 178th. A reduction of the amount of the debt was provided for, but a new security was given for the whole. The plaintiff was not to move upon the consent until a particular event should have occurred; but he should, thereupon, move according to the course of law and the practice of the court. Here after defence and

before judgment, no proceeding had been taken for a year and a day by either party. All the proceed. ings provided for were of a negative character-the plaintiff was not to move, proceed, or act-but there is nothing to show that the General Orders were to be dispensed with. Even if they could be dispensed with, that could only be by express provision. On the contrary, the intention of the parties, as shown by the documents, was not to contract themselves out of the general orders, for the words" or in anywise move," and "or other. wise move," taken in connection with the context, can receive no application unless by reference to the rules. The insertion of the date was a step taken-one without which the judgment could not have been marked, and this should not have been done without a rule entered; and, at all events, the judgment could not have been marked. In the next place, the arrest was contrary to the Debtors' Act 1872. The compromise was entered into atter that Act came into operation. The new security (i.e., the consent for judgment, and the agreement, which was signed by a third party, and in pursuance of which the bills were given), merged the original debt, just as if a mortgage or bond had been taken; and the arrest is in respect of default in payment of the instalments on the new security. But the writ itself shows that interest was included after Aug. 1872; the agreement included interest up to Nov. 1872;

lated, not on the judgment, but on the existing
debt arising upon the promissory notes and ascer-
tained by the agreement. M'Carthy v. M'Carthy
is distinguishable, as there the judgment was
entered after the passing of the Act; the simple
contract debt was merged in the judgment; and
the interest was charged upon the judgment debt.
The original liability is the point to be regarded:
(Re O'Connell, 7 Ir. L. T. Rep. 51.) That liability
was on foot of the notes, and the interest was an
accessory incident attached to that liability by
operation of law. The agreement did not create
the debt, nor was the agreement carried out.
Where bills are taken for a debt, and a default
takes place, the creditor may fall back on his
original rights. The plaintiff was entitled to deal
with the agreement, and to charge interest upon
the sum thereby ascertained, as if judgment had
then been marked, in consideration of the forbear-
ance granted.

Keogh in reply.

MORRIS, J.-Previous to 6th Aug. 1872, the date of the passing of the Debtors' Act (Ir.), 1872, the defendant was liable to the plaintiff on three promissory notes, for the aggregate amount of £540. Proceedings were taken against him to recover the amount; and in November 1872, some months after the passing of the Debtors' Act, an agreement was come to between the parties by which, as I read it, the amount due up to that date was ascertained to be £581 188. 8d. and £3 costs, as due to the plaintiff. A consent for judgment with no date was given to the plaintiff, upon which he was to be at liberty to act at any time he might think proper. The court are of opinion that, if the motion rested alone upon the first ground upon which it has been based namely, that before marking judgment the plaintiff should have entered a rule under the 178th General Order-it should fail, because the meaning of the arrangement agreed upon was, that the parties had contracted themselves out of the operation of the 178th General Order, the effect of giving the consent for judgment with a power to insert any date being to make the transaction as it were always a new one. Therefore, if the motion depended on this ground alone, the defendant should fail. But upon the far more serious question involved, the determination of which might affect many other cases, we are of opinion that the defendant is entitled substantially to succeed. The liability on foot of which he has been arrested must be treated in either of two points of view. That liability having been as

certained in November 1872, to amount to
£581 18s. 8d., either that amount must be regarded
as the original debt of £540, with the addition of
£41 18s. 8d. for interest, and if so the plaintiff would
have no right to charge interest upon interest,
and consequently the judgment would be over-
marked. Or else, as has been suggested, accord-
ing to the true meaning of the agreement, the
£581 18s. 8d., composed of principal and interest
was made a bulk debt and a new starting point-
and if so, the plaintiff is put out of court by the
Debtors' Act, because the debt was created after
the passing of that Act, and on that debt he has
calculated interest until the judgment was marked.
The plaintiff, therefore, appears to us to be in this
dilemma. If he admits that he is only entitled
to charge interest on the original notes, and says
that the £581 18s. 8d. is the original debt of
£540, plus the interest up to the date of the
agreement, in such case the judgment is over-
marked, as he has calculated interest upon the
gross amount subsequent to Nov. 1872, and he
had clearly no right to charge interest upon
interest. If, on the other hand, he says that the
£581 18s. 8d., the sum agreed on by the parties in
Nov. 1872, as a bulk debt, was a new debt from
that starting point-which, probably, is the
opinion we would be disposed to come to-in such
case he would have no right to issue execution
against the defendant's person. We shall, there-
fore, order the defendant to be discharged from
custody; but as the judgment appears to have
been bond fide, we shall not set it or the writ
aside. He has asked, by his notice, for the costs
of the motion, which we will give, putting him on
terms to undertake to bring no action.
Order accordingly.

Correspondence.

ATTORNEYS' PROTECTION BILL.-With reference to the Attorneys' Protection Bill, could not a stop be put to rent and debt collectors by a clause to the following effect ?-"That any person, except a solicitor, in writing, demanding money with threat of legal proceedings from another person, such first person not being entitled thereto in his own interest, should be punishable summarily before a justice of the peace by fine. The production of the letter demanding payment,. with proof of authorship, to be sufficient proof, without any evidence that the party so demanding payment did so for reward." A. B.

[We are afraid this is hardly practicable, but some tion of those debt-collecting firms (there are many such measure would certainly put a stop to the acments of real or imaginary debts, and then issue nests of them in all large towns), who take assignfrightening poor ignorant people into payment.all kinds of alarming circulars, with a view of ED. SOLS. DEPT.]

last week two clauses to be added to the Bill now
UNQUALIFIED PRACTITIONERS.-I sent you
be worthless, unless you can enact that all deeds
in Parliament. All your intended legislation will
under hand and seal shall be invalid if drawn by
any other person than a duly qualified attorney,
solicitor, &c. Such a clause as that which I sent
would and must stop all invaders instantly from
myself who has been convicted of larceny and
the passing of the Act. I know an articled clerk
fined £10, who will apply to be admitted. Is
this not a scandal to our profession? And, if
necessary, I can send a report of the trial in the
newspaper.
A SOLICITOR.

[Our correspondent should certainly communicate with the Council of the Incorporated Law above letter.-ED. SOLS. DEPT.]

Society, upon the subject of the last topic in the

MANAGING CLERKS AS ADVOCATES.-Referring to the letter of "A Country Solicitor," in your issue of to-day, I must confess I cannot see the reason of the first clause which he suggests for insertion in the new Act of Parliament. It seems to me altogether absurd to say that because an attorney, properly qualified as I am, with his name in the Law List, instead of setting up in practice for himself, chooses to take a situation with another attorney or firm of attorneys, that he should be debarred from appearing before justices or at a County Court for a client of his firm or principal; and that being the effect of this clause, if inserted in the Act, I must protest most strongly against its insertion. It is a very common thing for admitted and certificated men to conduct the advocacy of firms, when they are only managing clerks to such firms, and in fact they take out their annual certificate for that purpose, and I confess I can see no harm in it, but rather the reverse. I am quite of opinion that none but certificated attorneys should be heard by justices, or in the County Courts, but to exclude a certificated attorney because he is acting as clerk instead of principal, in my opinion cannot quite be reconciled with common sense. What "A Country Solicitor" says about clerks

MAGISTRATES' LAW.

BOROUGH QUARTER SESSIONS.