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not followed. The court refused to make any order as to the costs of an unsuccessful claim made by the plaintiff against the testator's estate: (Lancefield v. Iggulden, 30 L. T. Rep. N. S. 156. V.C. B.)

PRACTICE-MONEY ADVANCED BY TRUSTEEINTEREST. A trustee will be allowed interest upon money advanced by him, and applied in payment of his testator's debts, or otherwise on account of his personal estate :'(Finch v. Prescott, 30 L. T. Rep. N. S. 156. V.C.B.)

INJUNCTION-TRESPASS-WASTE.-The defendant to an action of ejectment to recover a piece of woodland, adduced evidence of adverse possession for more than twenty years, and the action was discontinued. Subsequently the plaintiff in the action from time to time walked in the wood, and turned his cattle into it, in order to assert his alleged right, and to bar the Statute of Limitations. At length he cut down a tree in the wood, whereupon the defendant to the action filed his bill for an injunction: Held (affirming the decision of the Master of the Rolls) that as the result of the action of ejectment showed the defendant to that action to be in possession of the wood, he was entitled to the injunction. Lowndes v. Bettle (10 L. T. Rep. N. S. 55; 33 L. J. 431, Ch.) approved and followed: (Stanford v. Hurlstone, 30 L. T. Rep. N. S. 140. Chan.)

WILL GIFT OVER ON BANKRUPTCY-PERSONAL ENJOYMENT FORFEITURE OF LIFE ESTATE. Testator gave specific legacies, and gave all his residuary real and personal estate to S. and C. upon trust for conversion and investment, and to pay thereout an annuity of £250 to S. and also an annuity to E., and subject thereto and to his debts, the remainder of his real and personal estate to be held in trust for C. for life, or until he should become bankrupt or insolvent, or do or suffer anything which but for that provision would deprive him of the personal enjoy: ment, in which case there was a gift over. S. and C. were appointed executors. Testator died in June 1870 considerably indebted. His personal estate not specifically bequeathed was under £20. C. was adjudicated bankrupt in July 1871. In January 1872, a scheme for arrangement of the bankrupt's affairs by paying 20s. in the pound was made, and the bankruptcy was annulled and an order was made vesting his property in S. In January 1873, the order vesting the bankrupt's property in S. was rescinded. Prior to his bankruptcy C. had received the rents of the testator's real estate, but since then S. had received them. The rents had been applied towards paying the testator's debts, and the annuities so far as they would extend, but S.'s own annuity was in arrear, as the rents were not sufficient to pay it in full. C. had received nothing for his own use. Held that as C. had not been deprived of the personal enjoyment of the residuary estate, there had been no forfeiture of his life interest: (Robins v. Rose, 30 L. T. Rep. N. S. 152. V.C. B.)

WILL-DEVISE OF ALL LANDS AND HEREDITAMENTS-STRICT SETTLEMENT-LEASEHOLDS CONTRARY INTENTION.-The 26th section of the Wills Act throws the onus probandi upon those who assert that a devise of "lands' does not include leasehold estates in land, but that onus is satisfied by showing from the whole will sufficient grounds to satisfy a reasonable man that the testator did not intend by the word "lands" to pass leasehold estates. A testator, by his will made in 1861, devised all his messuages, lands, and hereditaments in the county of Middlesex, and all other lands and hereditaments in England belonging to him, to the use of his eldest son for life, with remainder to his eldest son's issue in tail male, with an ultimate remainder to his own right heirs. He also bequeathed all his money, securities for money, goods, chattels, and personal estate to trustees upon trusts corresponding with the trusts of the hereditaments therein before devised in strict settlement, but so that the same should not vest absolutely in any person thereby made tenant in tail by purchase unless such person should attain twenty-one. As to the devised realty, the will contained a power of sale, empowering the trustees to invest the proceeds of any sale in the purchase of freeholds or leaseholds convenient to be held therewith. The will also contained a bequest of certain chattels and heirlooms in strict settlement, so far as the rules of law and equity would permit. The testator, both as to any leaseholds to be purchased under the power, and as to the chattels, repeated the proviso that the same should not vest absolutely in any person thereby made tenant in tail by purchase, unless such person should attain twenty-one. At the time of his death, the testator was possessed of both freehold and leasehold estates in the county of Middlesex: Held (affirming the decision of Malins, V.C.) that the leaseholds did not pass under the devise of lands and hereditaments by virtue of the 26th section of the Wills Act, inasmuch as there was sufficient indication of a contrary intention appearing on the face of the will; but that they passed under the ultimate bequest

of personal estate: (Prescott v. Barker, 30 L. T. Rep. N.S. 149. Chan.)


delivered to him as trustee for the creditors. He

his remuneration, and made no provision as to it. The plaintiff might have refused to become WILL-CONSTRUCTION-BEQUEST OF RESIDUE either receiver or trustee, unless he had payTO CHARITIES-PURE AND IMPURE PERSONALTY ment of his charges in some way secured to -MARSHALLING-MORTMAIN ACT.-J. M., who him; but he accepted such office without died in March 1866, by will, in July 1855, after any stipulation on the subject, and without taking appointing executors and trustees, and bequeath-care to see that the value of the assets which ing legacies specific and pecuniary, and giving would come to his hands, as receiver or trustee, certain annuities, said, as to all the residue and would cover his costs and expenses. He must remainder of my personal estate and effects either have relied on the expectation that the whatsoever and wheresoever, which I may be estate coming to his hands would be sufficient, or, possessed of or entitled to at the time of my by inadvertence, he forgot the subject altogether. decease, I give and bequeath the same as follows: He did not appear to have asserted any claim to a namely, one equal third part or share thereof to lien on the promissory notes, which were to be St. Mary's Hospital, Paddington, aforesaid, one other equal third part or share thereof to the handed over these promissory notes to the crediSociety for the Propagation of the Gospel in tors, without stipulating that his costs and exForeign Parts, and the remaining one equal third penses should be first paid. But now, upon findpart or share thereof to the Society for Promoting ing that the estate in his hands was deficient, he had brought this action against the defendant for Christian Knowledge, and my will is, and I expressly direct, that the three last mentioned legacies that deficiency. No authority had been cited to or bequests shall respectively be paid and satisfied him (the judge) which supported the plaintiff's out of such part of my personal estate as can claim, nor had any principle been stated, which lawfully be applied to the payment thereof, and appeared to him to apply to the present case, and which shall be reserved by my trustees or trustee entitle the plaintiff to maintain the action. There for the time being for that purpose, and that such was no express contract between the plaintiff and legacies and shares of residue shall respectively be the defendant, and he was unable to imply one. applied to the purposes of the said hospital and The plaintiff as receiver was an officer of the Court societies respectively, and the receipts of the re- of Bankruptcy which appointed him. As trustee spective treasurers of the said hospital and he was appointed by the creditors, and he was a Societies respectively shall be sufficient discharges trustee for them. But neither as receiver nor as for the same respectively." The suit was one for trustee was the plaintiff in his opinion entitled to administration, and the question raised was as to compel the defendant to pay his charges. There the marshalling of debts, legacies, and annuities. must, therefore, be a verdict for the defendant. Held, that the direction that the charitable bequests were to be satisfied out of such part of the applied to the payment thereof, and which should testator's personal estate as could lawfully be be reserved for that purpose, was a plain direction to marshal the assets, so as to give the charities the fullest benefit they were capable of taking: (Miles v. Harrison, 30 L. T. Rep. N. S. 152. Chan.).


BIRMINGHAM COUNTY COURT. Wednesday, April 1. (Before Mr. H. W. COLE, Q.C., Judge.) HARRISON v. JOHNSON.

Accountant's charges.

In reply to Wilkinson, his Honour said he should be willing to grant a case for the Superior Court.

Wednesday, April 8.



Carriage of goods-Owner's risk-Loss of market -Delay.

Burton, of Huntingdon, for the plaintiff. This case was partly heard at the last court, and was of great importance to fishmongers and other tradesmen.

Burton said that the action was brought to recover the sum of £6 17s. 9d., damage sustained by the plaintiff, a fishmonger, by reason of the non-delivery, in reasonable time and in due course, THE plaintiff in this case was an accountant, of a quantity of fish consigned to him on the carrying on business in Birmingham, and the de- defendants' railway from Yarmouth to Huntingfendant a person who, on the 19th Sept. 1871, don. On 10th Oct. last a quantity of fish was presented his petition to the Court of Bankruptcy sent from Yarmouth, but was not tendered to the for a liquidation of his estate by arrangement or plaintiff until a little before 4 p.m. on the followcomposition. The action was brought to recovering day, when the market was over, and he was £22 15s. 4d. as the balance of the accounts of the then unable to dispose of the fish. The fish plaintiff's receipts and payments as receiver and should have been delivered in the usual course at trustee in the proceedings under the Bankruptcy 9 a.m. He admitted that the fish were consigned Act, which terminated in the defendant's creditors at owner's risk, but that from the very fact of the accepting a composition. By an order of the delay the company had been guilty of wilful Court, dated Sept. 19th, the plaintiff, who had negligence. previously rendered assistance to the defendant in his attempt to arrange his affairs, was appointed receiver. A meeting of the creditors took place on the 5th Oct., who passed resolutions under the Act of 1860 to accept a composition of 5s. in the pound, payable as therein mentioned, and it was resolved that promissory notes for the composition required, and payable as agreed, should be handed to the trustee within seven days of the date of the confirmation. The plaintiff also received his appointment as trustee. The composition had since been paid.

His HONOUR, in delivering judgment, said that under such circumstances, if any of the debtor's estate were now in the hands of the plaintiff, as receiver or trustee, the defendant might call upon him to hand the same over to him; but the defendant could not do so except on the terms of the amount of the plaintiff's charges for which he would have a lien on the estate in his hands, being first ascertained by the Court of Bankruptcy, and paid by the defendant: (Ex parte Lyons, re Lyons, L. Rep. 7 Ch. 494; 26 L. T. Rep. N. S. 491.). But in the present case there was no such estate, and the defendant therefore made no demand. On the contrary, however, there was a deficiency of the estate to meet the plaintiff's charges and he had therefore insisted that the defendant was personally liable to pay such deficiency, and he had brought this action to recover it. The charges of the plaintiff as receiver and trustee amounted altogether to £23 19s. 9d. He made other demands, but the property and money received by him had been slightly more than sufficient to satisfy every demand, except his costs and charges as receiver and trustee. This claim of £22 15s. 4d. consisted in part of the unsatisfied portion of the £23 198. 9d., and the question was whether the plaintiff was entitled to recover the same by this action against the defendant. The resolutions of the creditors, under which the plaintiff was appointed trustee, were silent on the subject of

Moore, for the company, said that the company was not liable, inasmuch as the fish was conveyed at owner's risk, and a special low rate was charged, in consideration of which the plaintiff had agreed to take the risk of delay. By paying an extra rate the plaintiff could have held the company to be liable. It had been decided in several cases in the superior courts, and also by his Honour, that damages for loss of market could not be recovered, in the absence of notice having been given to the company that goods were required for market.

His HONOUR.-I agree with the common law principle that the company are the insurers of the goods they convey, and that they have no right to get rid of their liability by any difference in the rate.

Moore. The company lose thousands a year by carrying the fish at a lower rate, which all goes into the fish merchants' pockets; and although, by taking advantage of the low rate, they save a vast amount of money in the course of a year, they still, when they have any small loss, require the company to pay their claims. They could not expect to have the advantages of the low rate and also have the claims paid.

Burton characterised the lower rate as a delusion and a snare, and a lasting disgrace to all the railway companies.

His HONOUR said that he thought the law as to this point of owner's risk was in a most unsatis. factory state, and had never been definitely decided.

The plaintiff's case was stopped at an early stage by his inability to produce the receipt for the payment of the fish, which were the subject of the action.

His HONOUR said that he could not sue for loss of market. He should have accepted the fish and sold them for what they were worth and then brought his action to recover the difference. He nonsuited the plaintiff, but would not allow any costs to the company.

Moore I must press upon your Honour the necessity of allowing costs. In all cases where the company have a verdict against them costs are allowed.

His HONOUR.-The plaintiff has lost sufficient. If he had not sustained any loss he would have allowed costs.

Moore.-If the plaintiff had not sustained any loss I do not suppose he would have brought an action. I think it a very hard case that I cannot have my costs allowed in cases in which the company obtain a verdict.

Plaintiff nonsuited without costs.


Friday, March 27.

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that "every attention will be paid to ensure
punctuality as far as is practicable." I am of
opinion that the facts proved show that "punctu-
ality was not "practicable" in this instance,
and although I was much pressed with Mr.
Clough's contention that the train at Brighouse
should have been detained in order to carry on-
ward the Huddersfield passenger trafic, this could
only have been done at the cost of delaying the
passengers who had booked there, and who had
acquired the right to go on without delay. In
the case of Prevost v. The Great Eastern Railway
Company (13 L. T. Rep. N. S. 20), the facts of
which were very similar to the present, it was
held by Crompton J. that the contract of the
company is that they will use proper care and not
be negligent. I cannot find in the facts before me

(Before Mr Serjeant TINDAL ATKINSON, Judge.) any want of proper care, or any negligence, and



A railway company notwithstanding a notice in their time bill, that "they will not be accountable for any loss, inconvenience, or injury, which may arise from delays or detention," are not protected from negligence or want of proper care, but where a fog had impeded the traffic and thereby caused delay:

Held that the company are protected by the terms of their notice.

Clough, plaintiff, in person. John Sykes for defendants. His HONOUR delivered judgment herein as follows: In this case, which was tried before me on 27th Feb., the plaintiff claims damages from the defendants for a breach of contract in not having on the 11th 11th Dec., 1873, conveyed him (the plaintiff) from Huddersfield to Halifax, he having purchased from the defendants a through ticket for that purpose. The train by which the plaintiff was to travel was advertised in the company's time tables to leave Huddersfield at 10 o'clock, arriving at Halifax at 10.33. A fog prevailed during the morning, which seriously impeded the traffic on the railway, and the train which was to take the plaintiff to Halifax was, when it arrrived to take up the passengers at Huddersfield, twentyfour minutes late, and did not leave the station until ten minutes after the appointed time, and on arriving at Brighouse, owing to the obstruction caused by the fog, it was forty-five minutes after its time. The passengers for Halifax by this train are obliged to change on their arrival at Brighouse, and are sent on by a train which awaits them thero; but no notice of this change is found in the company's time tables. After waiting twenty-seven minutes beyond the usual time the train, which should have taken the plaintiff forward, left Brighouse, and on the plaintiff's arriving he found that there was no other train for Halifax until 12.14. The plaintiff having an important engagement, hired a carriage, and reached Halifax at 12.30, too late to keep his appointment. The company's time tables were put in, and contained the following announcement: "Time bills. The published train bills of this company are only intended to fix the time at which passengers may be certain to obtain their tickets for any journey from the various stations, it being understood that the trains shall not start before the appointed time. Every attention will be paid to insure punctuality as far as it is practicable. But the directors give notice that the company do not undertake that the train shall start or arrive at the time specified in the bills, nor will they be accountable for any loss, inconvenience, or injury which may arise from delays or detention." It is contended by Mr. Sykes, on behalf of the company, that there ought to be a nonsuit on the ground that the notice in the time tables, which have been put in evidence, forms a special contract, the terms of which are binding on the plaintiff, and the defendants are not liable for the delay. Under ordinary circumstances the company are bound to carry out the contract they make with the passenger, and must use such diligence, and bring to bear such appliances as they may have at their disposal to perform the promise contained in their time tables, namely, that the train will leave at a certain time and arrive at the terminus at the time stated; but in this case the delay arose from causes entirely beyond the company's control. In the language of Lord Campbell, in giving judgment in Denton v. The Great Northern Railway Com pany (25 L. J. 134, Q. B.), "Looking at the nature of the contract there may be certain implied exceptions from perils of the land, as there is in the case of a policy of marine insurance from the perils of the sea, as if a train without any fault of the company, should be prevented from going by an inundation, or by some convulsion of nature. There they might be discharged." Here the delay was caused by a fog, which imposed upon the company's servants the utmost care and caution in the conduct of the traffic, a caution which was necessary for the protection of life and of property, and brings the case within the promise on the part of the company contained in the notice

there must, therefore, be a nonsuit entered in
favour of the defendants, but in this case without

(Before Mr. Serjt. WHEELER.)


Railway unpunctuality.

MR. C. H. TURNER, of the Chancery Bar, sued
the Great Western Railway Company for not con-
veying him from London to Micheldean, on the
7th Feb., in time to vote at the West Gloucester-
shire election, and he assessed his damages at
£9 19s.

The plaintiff conducted his case in person.
The defendants were represented by Wightman
Wood, barrister, of the Home Circuit.

It appeared from the plaintiff's statement that
he left Paddington at 10.15 a.m. on Saturday, the
7th Feb., having previously obtained a first-class
express return ticket to Micheldean, which was
given to him gratis on his producing a "candi-
date's order." According to the train bills, the
10.15 train should arrive at Gloucester at 1.37,
after stopping at five stations en route; but on
this day the train was detained at a great many
places not specified in the bills, commencing at
West Drayton (where the plaintiff observed indi-
cations of a collision having recently occurred),
and eventually it arrived at Gloucester at three
o'clock. In consequence the plaintiff lost a train
timed to leave Gloucester for Micheldean at 1.48,
by which he had expected to travel, and was
unable to proceed until 3.50. By this train he
reached Micheldean at 4.40, but though a carriage
was in waiting for him, in which he was driven
four and a half miles in twenty-two minutes, he
arrived at the poll two minutes too late to record
his vote. As there was no train by which he
could get home that night, he went to an hotel,
and he now sued the company for compensation
for his expenses, his useless loss of time, and the
"loss of his franchise." The ticket and the train
bill were put in as evidence. On the former was
printed, "This ticket is issued subject to the con-
ditions on the company's train bills;" and on the
latter the following notice appeared on the
outer sheet, "The train bills are only intended
to fix the time at which passengers may be
certain to obtain their tickets for any journey
from the various stations (it being under-
stood that the trains shall not start before the
appointed time), but the directors give notice that
the company do not undertake that the trains
shall start or arrive at the time specified in the
bills, nor will they be accountable for any loss
which may arise from delays or detention, except
upon proof that such delay was caused by the
wilful misconduct of the company's servants."

Turner contended that the company had contracted to take him to Micheldean by the time mentioned in their bills-2.25 p.m.-and also to take him there in time to vote, or at least within a reasonable time. With regard to the damages he quoted the case of Ashby v. Wright, in the time of Chief Justice Holt, where the plaintiff obtained £200 damages from a returning officer for refusing to receive his vote.

Wood for the defendant, in the first place called
upon the judge to nonsuit the plaintiff on the
ground that the action should have been brought
by "the candidate," who had paid for the ticket,
but immediately afterwards he withdrew this
objection, saying that his clients had no desire to
escape by a side door. The principle involved was
of very great importance to railways, as if they
were liable to pay compensation in such cases as
this, or to prove that the delay was unavoidable,
the cost would be incalculable, and the public
would be in a far worse position than now, as the
companies would have to reduce the usual rate of
speed of all their trains, so as to insure punctuality,
even under adverse circumstances. There was a

notion that the defendants had acquiesced in the
decision given against them in Forsyth's case, but
that was not so; on the contrary, they were
desirous to appeal, but were prevented from doing
so by a technical informality. Counsel then argued
at considerable length that the plaintiff had not

proved the contract he set up; that the true
contract was contained in the ticket and the bills,
and that it was for the plaintiff to prove
misconduct" on the part of the company, and
that as he had given no evidence to that effect,
there was nothing for the defendants to answer.
He referred to several cases, and especially to
Hurst v. The Great Western Railway Company
(34 L. J.), and to Taylor v. Great Eastern Railway
Company, reported in the LAW TIMES of Feb. 7.
In any event, no damages could be recovered for
the loss of the vote.

His HONOUR said that the point raised as to the liability of the company for delays was no doubt one of great importance, and that he would reserve his judgment until April 14.

Wednesday, April 1.


Railway companies agents for one another-
Carriage of goods-Property in the goods-
Liability for loss.

MESSRS. ROWLAND and Makinson, ironmongers,
Market-place, Wigan, sued the London and North-
Western Railway Company for two sums of
£21 5s. 6d. and £17 10s.

Ellis appeared for the plaintiffs.

Adcock (of the firm of Mayhew and Adcock), appeared for the defendants.

Ellis stated that at the time of the Wigan Exhibition arrangements were made to have a very elegant plate glass case sent from Sheffield to the Exhibition. Mr. Makinson went to the railway and saw Mr. Dixon, the manager, and asked what it would cost to bring the case from Sheffield to Wigan. Mr. Dixon named the rate, which included the insurance and delivery of the parcel at the Wigan Infirmary, whereupon the sender at Sheffield was instructed to forward the case, which, when dispatched, was in a perfectly sound condition. It was in due course delivered in Wigan by the defendants at the infirmary, and it was there kept in a perfectly safe place for about a week, at the expiration of which time it was opened and the glass was found to be smashed so that it was altogether useless for the purpose it was intended for. The plaintiffs complained to one of the railway officials, who suggested that the plaintiffs should get it repaired, and send a claim for the amount to the defendants. The case was repaired at an expense of £21 5s. 6d. About three months afterwards the plaintiffs returned the case to Sheffield, and it was delivered safely to the company, carriage paid, and insured, but when it arrived at Sheffield it was found to have been again broken, and the item of £17 108. was on account of the loss sustained by the second breakage. Evidence was given by Mr. Ellis in support of these facts.

Adcock then addressed the judge and jury, and raised the following questions of law: First, that as the contract was with the Manchester, Sheffield, and Lincolnshire Railway Company, the defendants, the London and North-Western Railway Company, were not liable to pay the loss, as all they did was simply as agents for the Manchester, Sheffield, and Lincolnshire Railway Company, who were the contractors in the matter; secondly, the plaintiffs had no property in the goods, inasmuch as they were only borrowed, and when placed upon the railway company's premises it was a constructive delivery to the person from whom they borrowed the goods, and having no property in them, they could not recover them.

In reply to these points, Ellis contended that the contract was not with the Manchester, Sheffield, and Lincolnshire Railway Company, but with the London and North-Western Railway Company, and that they were the persons responsible for the loss. As to the second point raised by Mr. Adcock, it was proved by Mr. Makinson that the plaintiffs were responsible to the persons from whom the case was borrowed for any damage that might be occasioned by it. He contended that Mr. Makinson having paid the return freight from Wigan to Sheffield clearly proved that he did not part with possession of the goods until they were delivered at the point where he had paid for them to be delivered at-namely, Shef


His HONOUR said that in this case a great deal was to be said on both sides, and that he should submit to the jury the question of the amount to be given on both counts, and that he should order that execution be stayed. The effect of this would be that an application could be made to a superior court of law for a mandamus to compel him to issue execution, and the law of the matter

could be ascertained.

The jury gave a verdict for the plaintiffs for £17 15s. 6d. ou the first count, and £14 on the second count.


NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS. PROOF ON BILLS-PRODUCTION OF-PRACTICE. -A creditor who seeks to prove upon bills of exchange or promissory notes must, on tendering his proof, exhibit his securities in like manner as under the old law, which in this respect is not altered by the late Act: (Ex parte Jacobs; Re Carter, 30 L. T. Rep. N. S. 133. ~Bank.)



RIGHTS OF CREDITORS.-By a partnership deed it was stipulated that in case of the death of any partner, the partnership should not be dissolved, but that the surviving partners should carry on the business, and that the share of the deceased partner should be ascertained, and the payment thereof secured to his representatives in manner therein provided. The firm consisted of four partners, two of whom died during the partner. ship, and first the three and afterwards the two surviving partners continued the business for a

session of 1866, when every committee-room was occupied.

WITHDRAWAL OF ELECTION PETITIONS.Notice has been given to withdraw the election petitions relating to Kidderminster, Stockport, and Isle of Wight.

STYLE in which an oath was administered by a German justice of the peace in Lincoln, Wis. : "You as awfully swear you will tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, the best what you can."

CASES IN THE PROBATE COURT.-There are 20 itself, and 12 special juries, and only one common cases in the list for the term before the court jury case, making 33. Last Term there were 9 cases without juries, 20 special juries, and 13 comis still retained in the cause paper. mon juries. The case of Tichborne v. Tichborne

TRIAL OF ELECTION PETITIONS.-Three more election petitions have just been appointed for hearing. The Barnstaple petition will be taken before Mr. Justice Mellor on the 27th inst., and the Stroud petition on the same day before Mr.

rulings he owned he thought the Lord Chancellor should be made aware of it. Without discussing the particular point before the Court of Queen's Bench in the case alluded to or presuming in any way to question the correctness of the view taken by that eminent judge, we think it due to you to state that we have been perfectly satisfied with your rulings generally, that we consider you bestow more than usual attention and care on all cases coming before you, that your judicial conduct during the whole time you have been the Judge of this circuit has commanded our high respect and esteem, and that we have the fullest confidence in your able and impartial administration of the law in your several courts." This address was signed by four barristers and thirty attorneys practising in the several courts. His Honour returned thanks at some length. He said he had read with great indignation what Mr. Justice Blackburn was reported to have said, but upon reflection he deemed it the best thing to attribute the remarks to some mistake or exaggeration in the report, or to some grave misapprehension as to the real facts of the case. On one point-the conditions under which

few months. The latter then filed a petition for Baron Bramwell. On the 28th inst. Mr. Justice the company had been allowed to appeal-the

of the deceased partners had not been paid or secured to their representatives. There had been no stock taking, but a great part of the stock-intrade, consisting of machinery, which was in existence when the partnership was first constituted, still remained in specie: part, however, had been disposed of, and replaced by the three, and other part by the two partners. Held, that the creditors of the four were not entitled as against the creditors of the three and of the two to have the proceeds of such portion of the machinery as could be distinguished as having existed when the partnership was first constituted, and which still remained in specie, applied in satisfaction of their claims in priority to the claims of all the other creditors: (Ex parte Furness; Re Simpson and Co., 30 L. T. Rep. N. S. 134. Bank.)


Grove will hear the Dudley petition. The Hackney Petition is disposed of. HIGHWAY LEGISLATION. Considerable discussion took place at the Devonshire Chamber of Agriculture on legislation affecting highways consequent on the abolition of turnpikes, and resolutions were carried that it was expedient that the expense of the repairs of all roads should be paid by the persons using them, and that the expense could in part be raised by a license tax on all horses and carriages using such roads; that it was expedient that the expense of principal improvements of main roads in highway districts should be defrayed from the common fund; and that the whole of the expense of permanent improving should not be thrown solely on the occupier. We may mention that some of the above suggestions are at the present time adopted in the north of France, and we believe successfully.

coln's-inn have now been completed, and most of LINCOLN'S-INN.-The new buildings in Linthe chambers are occupied. They form the west side of Old-square, fronting the hall, library, and garden. The block is divided into four sub-divisions, each of which consists of five floors, with

(32 & 33 VICT. c. 71), ss. 12 AND 16.—A garnishee order obtained and served by an execution creditor, especially when made absolute before the bankruptcy, constitutes the execution creditor a creditor "holding a security on the property of the bankrupt" within sect. 12 of the Bankruptcy Act 1869. An execution creditor who has ob-five sets of chainbers on each. The style is semitained, served, and made absolute a garnishee order befere the bankruptcy, is also a creditor holding a "charge on the bankrupt's estate, as a security for a debt due to him" within sect. 16, sub-sect. 5, of the Bankruptcy Act 1869. The word "charge," in sect. 16, sub-sect. 5, has a wider meaning than the word "mortgage" "lien" contained in the same section: (Emanuel Bridger; Roberts (garnishee), 30 L. T. Rep. N. S. 194. Q. B.)

COURT OF BANKRUPTCY. Tuesday, April 14.


(Before Mr. Registrar PEPYS.) Re H. J. WELCH. Proof-Bankruptcy Act 1869, s. 31-Wife's allow ance under separation deed-Trustee of deed allowed to prove. THE question in this case, which arose under the 31st section of the Act, was whether the trustee under a deed of separation, executed by the bankrupt and his wife, was entitled to prove against the bankrupt's estate in respect of the estimated value of the allowance agreed to be made to the wife for the support of herself and family.

Bagley appeared for the creditor, who appealed from the rejection of the proof by the trustee. E. C. Willis for the trustee.

By the deed, which was dated in 1869, the husband and wife agreed to live separate and apart from each other, an allowance of 10s. per week being made to the latter. The trustee under the deed claimed to rank as a creditor for £407, which was sworn to as being the value of the


His HONOUR thought the appellant was entitled to prove for the sum claimed. But for the bank. ruptcy he could have sued the husband for the husband for the arrears of the allowance, and no reason existed why the wife should be deprived of the benefit of the deed. The proof must be admitted.


PRIVATE BILLS IN PARLIAMENT.-The first of several groups of private Bills will be taken on or about the 21st instant, when it is expected that several committees will, for the purpose, be appointed. It is believed that there will be a great pressure of private Bill work this session, Owing to the short time within which the business must be got through. Old parliamentarians anticipate a repetition for a brief period of the

Gothic, with gables at each end. The block is 140ft. in length and 80ft. in height. The internal arrangements have been very carefully attended to, and rooms have been arranged for barristers, pupils, and clerks, with the usual offices and cellars. The external aspect of the building is in strange contrast with its quaint and smokebegrimed neighbours, the materials used in the brick facing. The entire cost has been £10,000, construction being Ancaster dressing with red and the work has been executed by Messrs. Jack son and Shaw.

A LEGAL ANOMALY.-Without the least reflection either on the magistrate or the clerk-both of whom are gentlemen of considerable experience, and are, indeed, helpless in the matter-it cau court into the manslaughter at Flathouse was a scarcely be denied that the inquiry at the police deplorable waste of time. We are fully aware that some of the judges strongly object to trying the fact that it is not every community which has prisoners on coroners' inquisitions, probably from secured the services of so competent and careful a coroner as Portsmouth has, and depositions taken before a magistrate, under the advice of a legally qualified clerk, are generally superior to those taken under less favourable circumstances. But the fact remains that after the fullest inquiry before the coroner, precisely the same ground was traversed by the magistrate, and that, in fact, the depositions sworn to before the latter are almost a literal copy of those taken before the former. This might have been pardonable enough in the last century; but we are accustomed to value time more highly than our great grandfathers were wont to do, and are somewhat impatient under the repetition of a task the necessity for which is not very obvious. So long, however, as the judges adhere to a decision repeatedly expressed, the case is, apparently, beyond remedy.— Hampshire Telegraph.


on Wednesday, at the April sitting of the Cambridge County Court, Mr. Beales, the judge, acknowledged the receipt of an address which had been presented to him in consequence of some remarks made upon him by Blackburn, J. in the Court of Queen's Bench. The address was as follows:-"Dear Sir,-We, the undersigned barristers-at-law or attorneys practising before you in the courts of which you are the judge, have read with much pain and regret a report in the LAW TIMES of the 7th Feb. 1874, of a remark alleged to have been made by Blackburn, J. in reversing a decision given by you in the case of Taylor v. The Great Eastern Railway Company, that if you were in the habit of making such

said, as the solicitor of the company himself would admit. So far as he could gather from the report his decision was reversed without the shadow of or an attempt at argument, and in no very courte.

ous terms. He was borne out in his views on the main point in the case by one of the most eminent courts of jurisprudence in the world-the Supreme Court of the United States-in which the very question at issue here had been made the subject of an elaborate and exhaustive argument.

FIRST DAY OF TERM.-Wednesday being the first day of Easter Term, the Lord Chancellor entertained the Judges, Queen's Counsel, Serjeants, &c., at his Lordship's residence, 5, Cromwell Houses. This being the first levée of Lord Cairns since his appointment for the second time as Lord Chancellor, it was very numerously attended. All the Chancery and nearly all the common law judges were present. The only common law Justice of the Common Pleas (who was absent on judges who were absent were the Lord Chief account of the death of his mother), Mr. Justice Lush, and Mr. Justice Quain. The judge of the Court of Admiralty (Sir R. Phillimore) was also absent. The judges who attended were-Lord Justice James, Lord Chief Baron Kelly, ViceChancellor Hall, Lord Ardmillan, Baron Pigott, Justice Denman, Vice-Chancellor Bacon, Baron Amphlett, Justice Blackburn, Baron Cleasby, Lord Justice Mellish, Lord Chief Justice Cockburn, Vice Chancellor Malins, the Master of the Rolls, Justice Brett, Justice Archibald, Baron Pollock, Justice Keating, Sir Montague Smith, Justice Grove, Justice Mellor, and Baron Bramwell. Among the Queen's Counsel were the Attorney-General (Sir R. Baggallay). the Lord Advocate, and the Solicitor General of Scotland, James Anderson, F. Roxburgh, John Gray, Holker, A. E. Miller, Montagu Chambers, Serjeant Simon, George Little, W. Huddleston, Inderwick, R. G. Williams, H. Hawkins, Gates, Watkin Williams, Joseph Shee, Dickinson, Lumley, Westlake, H. Cotton, Brown, Eddis, Fry, Higgins, Renshaw, Archer Joseph Kay, W. T. S. Daniell, T. E. Winslow, Locke, Swanston, Prentice, Day, J. Shapter, Phil. Lopes, E. E. Kay, E. J. M'Intyre, Fitzjames, brick, James Fleming, F. Waller, Dr. Deane, Stephen, Bristowe, John Pearson, P. H. Edlin, Prideaux, H. M. Jackson, B. S. Follett, Joseph Chitty, N. Lindley, Osborne Morgan, Sir H. James, Bazalgette, Marten, T. Southgate, and J. R. Kenyon (Treasurer of the Middle Temple). The Lord Chancellor, at the conclusion of the "breakfast," proceeded with the other judges to open the courts at

Westminster, where they arrived shortly before two. There was a considerable crowd assembled in Westminster Hall and about the neighbourhood to witness the procession, but not nearly so large aз is customary when the courts are opened in November. There was moderate cheering as Lord Cairns and the other judges passed up the hall.



NOTE.-This Department of the LAW TIMES being open to free discussion on all professional topics, the Editor is not responsible for any opinions or statements contained in it.

BILLS OF SALE ACT 1874.-There is now an opportunity before the second reading of this Bill of inserting a clause to remedy what I believe is generally acknowledged, certainly in text books, and by some of the judges, to be a defect in the Bills of Sale Act (17 & 18 Vict. c. 36), sect. 1-I mean the priority of an unregistered bill of sale over a subsequently registered one. At present registration is useless as against an unregistered security. Although a grantee takes the precaution to register his bill of sale, he often finds, when he attempts to enforce it, that he is defeated by some

prior bill-perhaps a clandestine one-of which he could possibly know nothing. A prudent man, before advancing money on the security of a bill of sale, searches at the Queen's Bench office for prior bills, and, if he finds none, is generally satisfied; but I have known cases in which necessitous grantors have concealed the fact that there was an unregistered charge already on their goods, and the further duly registered security was worthless. Surely registration ought to give a security preference to one secretly given, and of which the public may know nothing, or what is the value of registration? As the law stands, to give a registered bill priority over a bill of anterior date, but not registered, one of two things must happen-either the grantee must sue his grantor, obtain a judgment, issue execution, and thus rank with ordinary execution creditors; or the goods must be seized by the sheriff under fi. fa., which has the effect of avoiding the first bill entirely, and the second registered bill then takes its true position, although, if there had been no execution, the unregistered bill would have prevailed over the registered one: (See Richards v. James, 15 W. R. 580; Begbie v. Fenwick, 24 L. T. Rep. N. S. 62; Nicholson v. Cooper, 3 H. & N. 384.) The latter alternative has occurred within my experience, and I heard it publicly stated from the bench the other day by one of our Vice-Chancellors that he could not see why the Act of 1854 did not go on to make an unregistered bill of sale void as against a subsequently registered one. If such a clause be inserted, it would settle the law on that point, which at present gives rise to a good deal of litigation. Let unregistered bills of sale take precedence to one another according to date, but be void in relation to registered bills of sale.


Will you allow me to suggest that the schedule to the Bills of Sale Amendment Bill should require the name and address of the solicitor who prepared the bill of sale to be stated therein. Small auctioneers often lend money on bills of sale, which they prepare themselves, charging an exorbitant sum for doing so.

of the Bill,

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Upon reading your comment upon the Bills of Sale Act (1854) Amendment Bill, and the substance of the proposed measure in your columns, it has occured to us whether the words in sect. 4 any mortgage of or security or charge upon any personal chattel," would include a species of security upon personal chattels, commonly known as a 66 Bad luck deed," or deed of attornment, whereby a debtor is enabled, without the publicity of a bill of sale, to give a valid security upon his chattels, and thus evade the spirit of the Bills of Sale Act. We have found these deeds of attornment of frequent occurrence of late, and we shall be glad to know whether the proposed amendment Bill of Mr. Lopes will meet

their case.


Seeing by your publication of the 11th inst. that you invite suggestions upon this measure, I beg to offer the following observations upon sect. 3: I apprehend this section is intended amongst other things to remedy the evil which has resulted in consequence of the execution by

upon the premises, for a debt which was preexisting at the date of the deed. Acting on behalf of the trustee under the liquidation, I gave notice of motion to set aside the deed, but as the estate was a small one, and looking at the decisions in Morton v. Woods and Jolly v. Arbuthnot, and a decision of the learned judge of the Exeter County Court, I consented, although with much reluctance, to compromise the matter by payment out of the estate of a sum equal to about one-half the claim, and the attornment deed was given up. I think in the proposed Act it should be enacted "that where by any deed or other instrument in writing a rent is reserved for the purpose of securing any principal sum of money to the person in whose favour such rent is reserved, or any person or persons in trust for him, so that any personal chattel may be liable to be distrained for payment of such principal sum, then that such deed or instrument in writing shall be null and void unless the requirements of the 17 & 18 Vict. c. 25, or of this Act, be complied with." It may be that the 3rd section will have the effect of rendering deeds of the above description void, but as the measure is a most important one I think it desirable the Bill should not pass without its provisions being well considered, and I hope to see in your columns the views of other members of the Profession upon the point I have raised.


OFFICIALS UNDER THE LAND TRANSFER has a right to complain of the Land Titles and BILL.-I think our branch of the legal profession Transfer Bill, that the appointments proposed to be made of registrar, assistant registrars, and examiners of title, both in the London and district registries, are reserved exclusively for barristers. This reservation it is difficult to justify. It cannot be said that solicitors are excluded on the ground of incompetency; for it requires little acquaintance with the facts to be aware that there are a vastly larger number of competent conveyancers among solicitors than among barristers. can see no other ground for the exclusion of solicitors than the precedents which have the other branch of the Profession. These preceso often made legal appointments a monopoly of dents are not founded on justice, and it cannot be the interest of the public or the aim of the Legislature to perpetuate injustice. The main object of the Bill is to simplify conveyancing by the abolition of the time-honoured abstract of title. It is childish

to suppose that when this abolition is effected the profits of solicitors will not be enormously dimi. nished, or that the increase in the number of transactions will be sufficient to compensate for such diminution. No compensation is provided by the Bill, and doubtless none is contemplated by its promoters. The branch of the Profession which it is especially proposed to injure by the Bill has an especial claim to a share in the appointbe hoped that members of Parliament who are also ments which are to be created thereby, and it is to tion of the clauses objected to. I cannot see why solicitors will do their best to obtain a modificaall the appointments referred to should not be thrown open to barristers and solicitors of ten years' standing indiscriminately. The effect of

foolscap. It is, in point of style and lucidity, a very creditable production. The arbitrator's fees for a complicated reference amounted to only 400francs. The official arbitrator being "unable to reconcile the parties" transmitted his report to the court "closed and sealed." The matter came before the tribunal on 2nd July 1873, when the report of the arbitrator was opened and the case adjourned. On 13th Aug. 1873 the case was fully heard and argued, and judgment was given in favour of our clients on all points in all the actions. The final order of the tribunal is a most singular document, and is considerably longer than the report of the arbitrator to which, as well as to the orders of our own courts, in point of style, &c., it forms a decided contrast. Our opponent appealed from the decision of the tri bunal, and, although the appeal has been appointed and placed on the list for hearing on many occasions, it has invariably been adjourned, and still remains unheard. Our correspondent in Paris, who is a solicitor, and who has the conduct of the case on behalf of our clients, is evidently wearied out with the repeated adjournments and the unsatisfactory nature of the proceedings. In advising us, towards the end of February, of a further adjournment, he writes as follows:"What one sees of the working of Tribunals of Commerce in this country makes one sincerely hope that they may never be introduced into England." We confine our letter purposely to a simple statement of facts.


THE ASSIZES-JUDGES AND SOLICITORS.-A raises a question of great importance to the Procase occurred on the last Norfolk circuit which fession. A prisoner was being tried for perjury before Mr. Justice Brett. The counsel retained for the defence was engaged in the Civil Court; he handed his brief to another learned gentleman until the first witness for the prosecution had who was not able to get into the Crown Court been partially examined; he had not opened his brief, and knew nothing of the case. The attorney whereupon the judge in a brusque and offensive engaged for the defence made some suggestion to the counsel as to the line of cross-examination, he would not allow any suggestion to be made to manner, ordered the attorney to sit down, and said counsel. The facts were explained to the judge, but he repeated his determination not to permit any interference by the attorney, and stated if any such attempt were made he should know how to deal with it. For all practical purposes, therefore, the man was undeand, whether or no, his decision in the parfended. Mr. Justice Brett was the judge, ticular case was governed by a sound discretion useful, but the general rule laid down by his is not a question on which comment would be great importance. I am old enough to remember Lordship is one which appears to me to be of most of the great judges, and I have ever been. tion by every judge before whom I have had treated with the utmost courtesy and consideraoccasion to appear. It has never been my fortune to appear before Mr. Justice Brett. I have con

debtors of secret deeds of attornment. The ques- this would be that the best men could be appointed/stantly heard judges say that it is the duty of

tion which I wish to raise for the consideration

of the Profession is whether sect. 3 will really hit the blot, and operate to destroy the effect of these secret deeds. A deed of attornment does not profess "to effect a mortgage for a security or charge on any personal chattel," neither is it "of such a character as that it might have been complain of the excision from the Bill of what is acquainted as he ought to be, with all the details,

effected by means of a bill of sale." The scheme of the attornment may be stated as follows: A. is in possession of a shop and premises which he occupies from year to year at rack rent. He desires to give to his creditor B. such a security as that by the exercise of the common law right of distress B. can enter upon his premises even after bankruptcy and distrain upon the goods therein for the payment of a debt amounting, say, to £1000. A deed is prepared between A. of the one part, and B. of the other part, whereby A. demises to B. all his interest in the shop and premises for the residue of his tenancy, save the last few days, subject to redemption upon payment of the £1000. By this means B. has a term in the premises. A. then by the same instrument attorns tenant to B. of the premises, at a weekly or monthly rent of say £1000, payable in advance. There is no assignment of A.'s personal chattels upon the premises, but B., wishing to recover his money, levies a distress for his arrears of rent. The creditor, by virtue of the distress, obtains a security upon the personal chattels, but he does not directly do so by the terms of the deed, and there is nothing to prevent the debtor at any time before distress removing the goods from the premises. A case came under my notice a short time since, where a deed of the above description had been executed. The debtor filed a petition for a liquidation, and afterwards the holder of the attornment deed (a Bristol merchant) distrained

irrespective of the branch of the Profession to which they belong. Doubtless the superior poliBar would secure the lion's share of appointments tical influence and compact organisation of the for barristers, and they could not reasonably an injustice to, and a slur upon an honourable and learned profession. GREGORY W. BYRNE.

JUSTICES' CLERKS.-I would suggest that a clause prohibiting clerks to justices of counties, divisions, liberties, or franchises, from being employed in any prosecution at the quarter sessions, in short, a similar clause to that contained in the late Mr. Oke's Justices' Procedure Bill, sect. 16, and Sir David Salomons' Justices' Clerks Bill, s. 13, introduced into Parliament last session, should be incorporated in one of the Bills now before Parliament relating to solicitors, unless there is some certainty of a Bill relating more particularly to justices' clerks being also brought forward.


THE WORKING OF TRIBUNALS OF COMMERCE. As the late report of the Judicature Commission has drawn special attention to the subject of tribunals of commerce, it may not be uninteresting to members of the Profession if we say that for some time back we have been concerned in a matter depending before the Tribunal of Commerce of the Department of the Seine. The matters in dispute formed the subject of two cross actions, and of a supplementary action, and were, by orders made in December 1872 and January 1873, referred to an official arbitrator, who made his report in due course in June 1873. This report goes fully into the details of the case, without technicality, and covers eleven sides of

attorneys to be present to assist counsel. I have for discharging this duty. In the course of thirty never before heard any judge attack an attorney well up in the facts of the case as to be able to years' practice, I have never found any counsel so dispense with those suggestions that the attorney is able to afford him. In the hurry of the assize this is not to be expected. There are in every complicated case incidents arising, the importance of which the most careful and experienced practitioner cannot have foreseen. If it be the duty of attorneys in their instructions to counsel to exhaust every topic, to go into every detail, the costs of litigation would be greatly increased. The mass of papers would be such as to prevent the possibility of counsel mastering their contents; but this must either be done or the attorney must have a discretionary power to communicate with his counsel as the trial goes on. If the rule laid down by Mr. Justice Brett is to be adopted, it should be well known to the Profession; the attorney may then cease to attend the court, sending a clerk to produce papers, and counsel must have to master all the details of the case. Whatever rule may be laid down by the judges as a body will, I am sure, be honestly and faithfully carried out by the Profession. I protest against the chance of an attorney being upbraided by one judge for doing the very thing which other judges say it is his duty to do. None can deprecate more strongly than I the line adopted by some over-anxious practitioners in constantly interfering with counsel in the exercise of their duties-this is as injudicious as it is unbecoming; but counsel surely know how to protect themselves from this. A judge can rarely have the means of knowing whether the interference of the attorney is well timed or otherwise. AN OLD SOLICITOR.

DISTINCTION AT THE FINAL EXAMINATION.Although personally I have not seen any letters or other communication touching upon the subject on which I am about to make a few suggestions, yet I feel almost sure it is a well worn

that this might with advantage be done whilst the affidavit sworn before him, and he in no case
Bill is in committee in the Lords.
vouches for its accuracy. On the other hand a
A LANCASHIRE SOLICITOR. solicitor constantly attests his client's execution of
deeds involving matters of the greatest import-
He may prepare a security of £100,000

BANKRUPTCY RULES.-I think there is an error


his client to be sworn before a specially appointed commissioner who has no interest in the matter. the difference between attesting a deed and auCan anybody say why this should be? What is thenticating an affidavit ? CHAS. GRUNDY.

string. It is: Why are the prizes and rewards in Rule 44 made under the Bankruptcy Act 1869 and attest his client's signature to it, but if he given to the prize men at the final examination so The rule refers to an application by a debtor to prepares an affidavit of debt for £10 he must take inadequate; indeed, I may say so paltry (£5 dismiss a petition on the ground that upon the worth of books)? That is the reward of years of trial of the validity of the creditor's debt it has hard and difficult work and study. For my part, been decided against. The rule states that the I think it no stimulus, and when I tell people so, registrar shall give notice for the hearing of the they merely answer "but consider the honour of application "on the production of a copy of the being a prizeman at all." Quite right, it is an honour, and if that honour fall to the deserving judgment of the court in which the question was one, I say give that deserving one a substantial tried, or an office copy thereof." Doubtless the recollection of that great praise that is due to rule was intended to be similar in form to Rule 43, him. Why, I ask, do not the Incorporated Law and the words "of a copy," which I have italicised, Society at least cancel the stamp by giving £80 were inadvertently inserted. in coin, or howsoever otherwise the first prizeman may desire; then to the second man surely £40 is not too much; and let £20 fall to the share of the third man? and even then it is not too much. Are law students in any one point, as a class,

H. S.

made to remove some of the difficulties which

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LEGAL PRACTITIONERS' SOCIETY. With reference to the letter of a Disappointed Member" in your impression of the 28th ult., and that of "X. Y. Z.," published by you on the 4th inst., I should like, with your permission, to say a few words. I am not prepared to acquiesce in your first correspondent's view of the proposed Bill as a "feeble bantling." It seems to me, with inferior to the university students? Some say clerks, who have accepted offices or held employ- which will facilitate its passing into law (perhaps "X. Y. Z.," that its shortness is, in fact, a merit incorporated with another measure), and is no proof of feebleness; but I venture to complain its merit or demerit before it was introduced into that the society had no opportunity of discussing the House of Commons, and of making in their proper place many of the suggestions which general meeting of the society has been held since have since appeared in your columns. No the 7th Jan. last, and two committees were legislation. The latter committee met on several appointed, one for the purpose of framing the rules of the body, and the other to initiate certain occasions, and the result is the draft Bill which you were good enough to publish. I think it was generally understood by the members of the society at the last meeting, that when the rules of the society had been framed, and the draft of the should be called to approve both, and had this proposed Bill had been prepared, another meeting course been followed I cannot but think that the

yes; and for the sake of controversy only I admit
that and will apply to them: "Give great honour
where honour is due." Merely a glance will
suffice to show you the almost numberless scholar-
ships, prizes, &c., of real honour to the obtainer,
which at the same time carries with it a very
enticing sterling quality in the shape of £ s. d.
Admitting, as before, the superiority of university
students, I shall not be too presumptuous by
applying to the law students:
honour where equal honour is due," and would
"Give little
that slight admitted inferiority sweep away a
share of those prizes, &c. ? Certainly not.
Give, as I say, little honour to the law students
and only a suitable ratio of university honours,
and then even my classification of rewards would
die away to worthless insignificance. E. T. C.

THE NEW LAND TRANSFER BILL. I am glad to find, from a paragraph in your last issue, that you so thoroughly agree with the statement I made a fortnight ago through your columns, that the excessive stamp duty now charged on conveyances is really one of the most serious obstacles to the free transfer of land, and that you consider a short clause might advantageously be introduced into the new Land Transfer Bill to reduce the duty to the same amount as that charged on mortgages. A perusal of the provisions of the Bill as printed in your last impression leads me to think that such a clause would find a most appropriate place in it, as it seems to me that the necessity of obtaining certificates of title will increase very considerably the expense of convey; ancing during the next few years, and it would be some encouragement to purchasers of land to incur the expense of obtaining such certificates if they were relieved from an impost which would swell the expense of the transaction to a very considerable total. There is no doubt that the effect of such a provision, especially under the new Land Transfer Act, would be largely to increase the number of conveyances on which duty would be paid, as at the present time all kinds of expedients are resorted to for the purpose of avoiding the payment of stamp duties in large transactions. The duty on conveyances at present is in many cases almost a prohibitory one, and prevents many dealings with land from being carried out in a legal and business-like manner. Take, for instance, the case of a cotton spinner whose mill is worth £40,000, and is mortgaged for £30,000 (by no means an uncommon circumstance in Lancashire), such a man cannot in any way deal with his equity of redemption in this perty (which is only worth to him £10,000), even by taking in a partner, for instance, without the payment of a stamp duty of £200, i.e., 10s. per cent. on the full value of the mill, unless some expedient is resorted to for the purpose of avoiding the stamp duty payable by law on the transaction. It seems to me that on the conveyance of an equity of redemption, stamp duty ought only to be charged on the purchase money actually paid, as in all other cases, because as a rule the heavier the mortgage is, the less is the purchaser able to pay a tax on the full value of the estate. As the result of some practical experience in conveyancing in this part of the country, I am of opinion that if the Government were to introduce into their Land Transfer Bill a clause reducing the stamp duty on conveyances to the same amount as the duty on mortgages, and providing that the duty should be paid in all cases on the actual purchase money only; it would do more to lessen the expense of conveyancing," and remove a more serious "obstacle to dealings with real property," than any other provision of the measure, and at the same time I do not believe that the revenue would suffer to any appreciable extent from the change. I trust that the president and council of the Legal Practitioners' Society will lose no time in having such a clause introduced into the Bill and I think


ARTICLED CLERKS.-I am pleased to find from
your paper of the 4th inst., that an effort is being
recent decisions have placed in the way of articled
ments during the term of their articles. The
Bill printed in your columns applies only to clerks
who may accept office after the passing of the
measure. Permit me to call your attention to
the case of many gentlemen who have taken
commissions in the militia or volunteers, or have
accepted small offices as secretaries to societies,
committeemen in public institutions, and other
employments. I have had many articled clerks, I
missions in the volunteers, and have always
have encouraged every one of them to apply for com-
advised those who have attained twenty-one to
business. I believe the knowledge of men, and
serve on committees, and to take part in public
the business training they thus attain, to be a most
important element in their education, a step to
their future success in life. The cases decided
under the 6 & 7, Vict. c. 73, and that of Re Pepper:
the true question was whether the employment
corn (L. Rep. 1 C. P. 473) induced me to think that
undertaken was of such a nature as to occupy
an undue portion of the clerk's time, and so
prevent his acquiring a practical knowledge of
his profession. The recent cases proceed on an
entirely different footing. The decision in Re
Peppercorn is questioned. The result is that
several clerks have been refused admission, and
one gentleman has applied to have his articles
vacated, on the ground that he has been advised
that his having held a commission in a militia
regiment during his articles will prevent his
being admitted. If this be good law I know
many attorneys who have been improperly ad-
mitted; I know many articled clerks who may
reasonably anticipate an objection to their ad-
mission. The principle recognised in the Bill
principle. If so, is it not fair that it should be
now before Parliament is, I submit, the true
made to apply to the cases of gentlemen who are
now serving under articles, and who, with the
consent of their employers, have already occupied
sistent with the tenor of their articles?
a portion of their leisure in pursuits not incon-


THE ADMINISTRATION OF OATHS.-As the subject of the administration of oaths is attracting attention, I beg leave to renew a suggestion which I made in your columns more than twenty years ago-namely, that every attorney or solicitor should ex officio be authorised to administer oaths and take declarations and acknowledgments of deeds by married women. The power to administer an oath is merely a matter of public convenience. All that is wanted is that the oath shall be administered by someone whose authority can be ascertained, and who can be found, if required, to vouch his signature, or to answer for any irregularity. The notion that a man must be in practice ten years, or that he should be specially appointed a commissioner before he can properly administer an oath is mere chamber nonsense. Judges' clerks, County Court bailiffs, and other subordinate officers are daily adminis tering oaths all over the kingdom. The rule that I propose would save much time and trouble. Even in the City, where we have many commissioners, our clerks have to ramble about from office to office sometimes for the best part of an hour before they can get sworn. In important matters where clients have to be sworn, we generally make a previous appointment with a commissioner so as to avoid having to run about for one when wanted. Then, again, I would abolish the rule which prevents an attorney or solicitor administering an oath to his client. What the foundation of this rule is I cannot tell. No doubt those who made it had some dim notion that it would prevent fraud, but after much experience in the preparation of affidavits, I am unable to perceive that the rule has any such effect. Except in the case of a deponent who cannot read, the commissioner knows nothing whatever of the contents of an

Bill, though still confining itself to its present object, might have been rendered by the collective consideration of the members of the society


more complete and effective. It may be urged
and the Bill would not, in consequence, have been
that time would by this means have been lost,
introduced this session into Parliament. As it is,
however, it stands but small chance of being
passed this session, and would scarcely have
been retarded by another meeting and discus-
with me that a perfect Bill for next session is
and I think most members will agree
better than a prematurely-born measure for this,
doomed in all probability to perish in the
autumnal massacre of the innocents.
from the subject-matter of this Bill, however, I
submit that frequent periodical meetings of the
existence is purely nominal. The motion made
society should take place, without which its
by a member of the Incorporated Law Society, as
referred to in your paper of the 4th April, would
apply with equal force to this society, and I, for
one, can see no advantage in occult individual
workings in the background.



POINTS OF PRACTICE. NOTICE.-We must remind our correspondents that this column is not open to questions involving points of law such as a solicitor should be consulted upon. Queries will be excluded which go beyond our limits. N.B.-None are inserted unless the name and address of the writers are sent, not necessarily for publication, but as a guarantee for bona fides.


94. WINDING-UP.-The members of a small but


unsuccessful society, registered with limited liability,
under the Industrial and Provident Societies Acts
1862 and 1867, are about to wind-up the concern volun-
tarily according to resolution passed and signed at a
general meeting called for that purpose. The members
are all working men and most of them poor.
trade debts and liabilities can be at once paid, and the
business closed, but the members will have to lose the
amount of their shares, which they are all willing to
do, and I beg to inquire (there being no creditors), is
a notice in the Gazette of winding-up and dissolution
sufficient; or, can the society be wound-up without
the intervention of the court to sanction its proceedings,
and in what way?

[The intervention of the court is not necessary, simply
resolutions, as required, by statute, which must be filed
with accounts at the Joint Stock Companies office.-ED.

95. SHOP WINDOW.-A., a shop keeper, has his shop window made of glass of large size, each plate of the value of £10, in lieu of small panes of glass. B. is engaged on some work in the street, and accidentally breaks one of these large panes of glass. Is B. liable for the full extent of the value of the glass, viz., £10P I have some recollection of a case some time ago in a County Court, but cannot just find it, where the judge decided that the person was not liable beyond the price of an ordinary pane of glass.

A. B.

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