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As to many of the encroachments of the Bar apon the privileges of solicitors, some of a direct and others of an indirect kind, the author has been unable to discover, or at all events satisfactorily to settle, their origin; yet sufficient is known of them to justify the belief that they have come from the deliberate action of the Government from time to time under the influence of the Bar, or else at the instigation of the Bar direct. Amongst these must be included the offices of Attorneys and Solicitors-General, posts now filled as well in the colonies and our foreign dominions as at home, by members of the Bar. Although as to our colonies there is now no distinction between members of the Profession, each exercising every function of a lawyer, yet the monopoly of the English Bar is greatly felt and much complained of there, the practice being to pass over all competent colonial lawyers for the purpose of supplying to English barristers having influence & responsible post such as judge, which, it may be, his want of capability rendered him unfit for at home. Compared with the origin of the office or profession of attorney-at-law, the designation of Attorney-General is of somewhat recent date, and was adopted, as also that of Solicitor-General about the same time, by members of the Bar, possibly for the purpose of misleading the ignorant public of those times as to the duties of these public officers; adopted, too, at a time when the common attorney was utterly helpless to resist what some will call nominal encroachments, and when the expression "solicitor" was only in use to a limited extent, in relation to the business of those tribunals now known as the Courts of Chancery.

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It will be complained that the writer does not furnish some precise data as to the origin of the names Attorney and Solicitor-General, which would entail a large amount of research from sources not altogether dependable; hence the author is content to leave these names or designations to speak for themselves.

An encroachment of a far more substantial kind is that which led to the exclusion of attorneys-atlaw from the right of audience in the higher tribunals of the country. This is exhaustively dealt with in the works of Mr. Charley and Mr. Marshall before referred to, and needs no further comment here, as it is admitted on all hands to be the fact, or at all events, such only can be inferred from the Statute of Carlisle, which, read by the light of the procedure of the time, says Mr. Marshall, points to the conclusion that in the 14th century attorneys enjoyed a right of audience in the Superior Courts at Westminster. It is certain that in those times attorneys could and did conduct the entire suit of the client, which Sir Sidney Waterlow and Mr Ayrton would again welcome-at least,


the writer gathers from the last published report of the Judicature Commissioners. The opinion of Mr. Ayrton in favour of allowing the public to have the opportunity-if they choose -of instructing one lawyer, and one only, to carry on a suit to its terminatios, is evident from his observations on the establiment of Tribunals of Commerce, in which he complains of the delay necessary "in order to have every representation to the court, it may be said, filtered, and perhaps mystified, through a single, or even double, legal agency."

Sir Sydney

Waterlow on the same subject expresses himself in favour of Tribunals of Commerce, because "suitors should be able to obtain a deci

sion more promptly and much less expensively than in the Superior Courts, as now constituted and regulated. The present system, too," he adds, "frequently inflicts on the suitor a long pending, worrying law suit, the solicitors on either side pleading in their client's interests every technical point," and so on. These are the opinions of laymen, which, though not correctly describing the actual working of the present system, point to a feeling in the public mind that the present modus operandi of conducting an action at law or a suit in Chancery is not suited to modern ideas upon the subject. It should perhaps be observed in passing that Sir Sydney sails wide of the mark when he complains of "solicitors pleading every technical point," &c. It is the expensive and now obsolete system of ing, which, with counsel's fees and other disbursements, so much increases a bill of costs, that soli. citors complain of. If important cases can be dealt with in County Courts without pleadings, why not so in the Superior Courts? It is to be hoped that the Judicature Act will give to this practice the necessary quietus which the terms of the Act promise.

to which the writer is directing attention. The best guarantee for the reform which is wanted would be found in the public press taking up the question in the interests of the public; but unfortunately for the public, the editorship of lay as well as legal journals is largely in the hands of members of the higher branch of the Profession, who, while they, and many others filling all kinds of offices, cannot be designated lawyers, yet very properly stick to their cloth and the so-called dignity, honour, and independence of the Bar," which let no one impugn, but as to which let all admit that members of other professions can be and are possessed of equal virtues.


Let us pass from the subject of the exclusion of attorneys from a right of audience in the Superior Courts, a question more for the public than solicitors, although essentially an encroachment upon our rights, to a consideration of the so-called offices of "Solicitor to the Treasury," and similar positions filled by members of the Bar in the other public departments of the State.

(To be continued.)


[Transferred to the Commissioners for the Reduction of the National Debt, and which will be paid to the persons respectively whose names are prefixed to each in three months, unless other claimants sooner appear.] BREEZE (Jas.), Aylsham, Norfolk, clothier, £528 198. 7d. New Three per Cent. Annuities. Claimant, Jas. Breeze. CRESSWELL (Right. Hon. Sir Cresswell), Prince's-gate, Hyde-park, Middlesex; £6000 Three per Cent. Annuities. Claimant, said Right Hon. Sir C. Cresswell, knight. EATON (Rev. Thos.), Eastham; BRYANS (Rev. Francis), Backford; and GLEADOWE (Rev. Richard Wm.), Neston, all in Cheshire; £31 78. 7d. Three per Cent. annuities. Claimants, said Rev. Thos Eaton, Rev. Francis Bryans, and Rev. Richard W. Gleadowe.

HEIRS-AT-LAW AND NEXT OF KIN. ROSE (Geo. Frederick), formerly of Pickett-street, Strand, cheesemonger, late of 28, North Bank, St. John's Wood, Middlesex. Next of kin to come in by May 22, at the chambers of V.C. M.; June 2, at the said chambers at twelve o'clock, is the time appointed for hearing and adju. dicating upon such claims.


INTERNATIONAL LIFE ASSURANCE SOCIETY.-Creditors to send in by May 30 their names and addresses, and the particulars of their claims and the names and addresses of their solicitors (if any), to F. Maynard, 55, Old Broadstreet, London. June 8, at the chambers of V.C. M., at two o'clock, is the time appointed for hearing and adjudicating upon such claims. TAHITI COTTON AND COFFEE PLANTATION COMPANY (LIMITED). Petition for winding-up to be heard May:1, before V.C. M.


DURRAN (Thos.), King-street, Hammersmith, Middlesex,
wine merchant. May 20; T. A. Jones, solicitor, 40, Chan-
cery-lane, Middlesex. June 10; V.C. B., at twelve o'clock.
GUNTER (John), Colehill, Fulham, Middlesex, gentleman.
May 18; F. Robinson, solicitor, 36. Jermyn-street, St.
James's, Middlesex. May 22; V.C. M., at twelve o'clock.
KING (Sarah), Great Grimsby, Lincoln. May 16; Grange
and Wintringham, solicitors, Great Grimsby. May 29;
M.R., at twelve o'clock.

LYONS (Elizabeth), 10, Artillery-place, City-road, and 128,
Alexandra-road, St. John's-wood, Middlesex, and of 14,
16, and 18, Wilson street, Finsbury, Middlesex. May 25;
A. E. Sydney, solicitor, 46, Finsbury-circus, London.
June 8; V.C. H., at twelve o'clock.

TAYLOR (Harrlet H.), late of Rockleaze, Westbury-upon-
Trym, Gloucester. April 30; E. A. Harley, solicitor, St.
Werburgh's-chambers, Small-street, Bristol. May 7;
V.C. M., at twelve o'clock.

WADMAN (Peter), Leeds, flour dealer. May 16; A. G.
Ditton, solicitor, 9, Ironmonger-lane, London. May 29;
M.R., at twelve o'clock.

CREDITORS UNDER 22 & 23 VICT. c. 35.
Last Day of Claim, and to whom Particulars to be sent.

ALLEN (Wm. P.). Hamlet of Eaton, Norwich, gentleman.

June 12; Whites and Co., solicitors, Wymondham.
ARMSWORTH (Elizabeth), 6A, Belvedere-road, Lambeth,
Surrey, widow. May 18: G. W. Barnard, solicitor, 167,
BAILY (Richard), late of 'Rose-villa, Terrace-road, Cal-
Westminster Bridge-road, Lambeth.
thorpe-road, Banbury, Oxford, formerly of 23, Cornhill,
Banbury, woollen draper and tailor. May 23; Wm.
Newman, solicitor, 24, Bucklersbury, Londen.
BARNES (Jas.), Ewood-bridge, near Haslingden, carrier.
May 16 Samuel and S. Woodcock, solicitors, 9, Henry-
street, Bury, Lancashire.

BARNETT (Thos. Wm.), 72, Fore-street, Limehouse, Middle-
sex, surgeon. June 1; P. Johnston, solicitor, 35, Bed-
ford-row, London.

BERRY (Arthur F.), formerly of the Wheatsheaf, Edgwareroad, Middlesex, licensed victualler, late of 217, Maidavale, Middlesex, gentleman. May 10; Fielder and Sumner, solicitors, 14, Godliman-street, Doctors'-commons, London.

BASS (Isaac A.), 107, Gower-street, Bedford-square, Middlesex, umbrella manufacturer. July 11; Beyfus and Beyfus, solicitors, 69, Lincoln's-inn-fields, London.

plead-BRADLEY (Wm.). Sheffield, common brewer. May 21; J.

The writer has stepped aside to consider for a moment the latest expressed views of laymen on the subject of the "double legal agency" question, not so much because he himself may incline to the opinion that solicitors should have restored to them their former right of audience in the Superior Courts, as because there is an undoubted feeling on the part of the public that to pay one lawyer in one matter is quite enough; and there is a close relation between this subject and that

and G. E. Webster, solicitors, 3, Hartshead, Sheffield. BROWN (Horace C.), Captain in the R. A. May 1; M. and F. Davidson, solicitors, 35, Spring-gardens, London, S.W. BUDGEN (Capt. John), R.N., 123, Ball's-pond-road, Middlesex. June 10; Loxley and Morley, solicitors, 80, Cheapside, London.

BUTCHER (Wm.), Five Oaks, Broomhill, Sheffield, merchant. June 25; A Smith and Son, solicitors, 26, Castlestreet, Sheffield.

CALDECOTT (Celia), Wibtoft, Leicester, widow. June 24; E. Harris, solicitor, Rugby.

CARTER (James), formerly of Thornhill-road, Islington, late of St. Paul's-road, Canonbury, Middlesex, gentleman. May 12; Depree, Austen, and Justsum, solicitors, 8, Church-court, Old Jewry, London. CHAFY (Wm. W.), Bowes House, Ongar, Essex, and 3 Brunswick-terrace, Brighton, Esq. June 1; Currie and Williams, solicitors, 82, Lincoln's-inn-fields, London. COLE (James), Gateliff, Godshill, Isie of Wight, yeoman. June 18: J. A. Mew, solicitor, Newport, Isle of Wight. COONEY (Edmond), 13, Gower-street, Bedford-square, Middlesex, gentleman. May 11; Beyfus and Beyfus, solicitors, 69, Lincoln's-inn-fields, London.

De Ros (Right Hon. Wm. Lennox Lascelles Baron). May 1; Grover and Humphreys, solicitors, 4, King's Benchwalk. Temple, London.

DIAS (Rebecca), Barrow's-almshouses, Barrow's-buildings, Devonshire-street, Mile-end, Middlesex, spinster. May 20; G. and A. Lindo, solicitors, 12, King's Arms-yard, Moorgate-street, London.

DIGBY Charles W.), Studland Manor, Wareham, Dorset,
and 13, Eaton-square, Middlesex, Esq. July 15; Routh
and Stacey, solicitors, 14, Southampton-street, Blooms-
bury, London.
DILLOW (Thomas), High-street, Chingford, Essex, gentle-
man. June 1; F. W. J. Terry, solicitor, 27, Gresham-
street, London.

DowSETT (Frederick R.), Severn Lodge, Berkeley, Glou-
cester, contractors' agent. May 14; Wm. T. Elliott, 5,
Verulam-buildings, Gray's-inn, London.
DUDLEY (John C.), 6, Broad-street, Oxford, gentleman.
June 1; R. S. Hawkins, solicitor, 7, Broad-street,

EMERY (Mary), formerly of Southsea, late of Fir Grove,
West-end, South Stoneham, Southampton, spinster.
June 15; W. and H. G. Best, solicitors, Southampton.
EVANS (Josiah), Heyes-within-Haydock, Lancaster, Esq.
May 16; Davies and Brook, solicitors, Market-place,
EVEREST (Rev. Robert), formerly of Park-street, Grosvenor-
square, afterwards of 50, Cleveland-square, Hyde-park,
Middlesex, and late of Westwick House. Ascot, Berks.
May 17; Styan_and_Neilson, solicitors, 4, Stone-buildings,
Lincoln's-inn, London.
FELLOWES (John), Beeston Field, Beeston, Nottingham,
banker. July 1; Enfield and Dowson, solicitors, Notting-
FOWNES (Henry G.), formerly of Clifton, Gloucester, late of
Redcliffe-road, West Brompton, Middlesex, barrister-at-
law. June 20; G. Carew, solicitor, 9, Lincoln's-inn-fields,

FRENCH (Lieut.-Gen. Henry J.), 17, Belgrave-road, Pim-
lico, Middlesex. June 17; Carlisle and Odell, solicitors,
8, New-square, Lincoln's-inn, London.
GARRAD (Mary), Rotchetts, near Brentwood, Essex,
domestic servant. May 31; G. Lucas, solicitor, 186, Stoke
Newington-road, Middlesex.

GOEZ (Henry John A.), formerly of the Crystal Palace Hotel, Norwood, Surrey, late of Connaught House, Montpelier-road, Brighton, gentleman. May 11; R. and A. Russell, solicitors, 59, Coleman-street, London, GREEN (Mary A.). 5, Paulton-square, Chelsea, Middlesex, spinster. June 1: F. Robinson, solicitor, 36, Jermynstreet, St. James's, Westminster, S.W.

GREENWOOD (Thos.), Strawberry-hill. Pendleton, Manchester, cotton manufacturer. May 30; J. P. and J. T. Sutcliffe, solicitors, Hebden Bridge.

GUSTARD (Ralph), late of Heddon-on-the-Wall, Northum berland, farmer; formerly of Newcastle-upon-Tyne, grocer. May 20; Allan and Davies, solicitors, 23, Graingerstreet, Newcastle-upon-Tyne.

HALSTED (Vice-Admiral Edward P.), formerly of 85, Eburystreet, Pimlico, Middlesex, late of Haslar Hospital, Goport. May 1; Currie and Williams, solicitors, 32, Lincoln's-inn-fields, Middlesex.

HAMBLETON, Elizabeth Ann (and not Humbleton, as inaccurately described in Law TIMES April 11), No. 1, York-ter race, Nottingham-gate, Regent's-park, Middlesex, widow. May 30; Mason and Withall, 18, Bedford-row; Ayerst Francis, 2, Great College-street, Manchester. HARRIS (Hon. and Rev. Chas. A. Bishop), Torquay. June 1; Rev. H. O'Brien, Cordoagh, Cootehill, Ireland. HERRON (Maria), late of the Clock House, Beckenham, Kent, formerly of Clarendon Lodge, Tulse-hill, Surrey, spinster. June 24; Cowdell, Grundy, and Browne, solicitors, 26, Budge-row, London. HOLLYER (Anna), Penzance, widow. May 11; Rodd and Cornish, solicitors, Penzance.

HOLMES (Rachel), 17, Thornhill-square, Islington, Middlesex, widow. May 25; Geo. Wm. Hussey, solicitor, 5, Knightrider-street, Doctors' commons, London. HOLMES (Samuel), formerly of 3, Great Knightrider-street, Doctors'-commons, London, and 23, Stonefield-street, Cloudesley-square. Islington; and late of 7, Staple-inn, London, and 17, Thornhill-square, Islington, Middlesex, solicitor. May 26; Geo. W. Hussey, solicitor, 5, Knigh rider-street. Doctors'-commons.

JAMES (Thomas), 21, Threadneedle-street, and of Haven Green, Ealing, London, stockbroker. May 29; H. W. M. Jackson, solicitor, 25, Lincoln's-inn-fields, London. LARARD (Henry), 22, Clapham-road, Surrey, watchmaker. May 80; F. Norton, solicitor, 10, Clifford's-inn, Fleetstreet, London.

LIPSCOMBE (Samuel), 29, Marlborough-road,


Middlesex, carpenter. May 12; T. H. T. Rogers, solicitor, 6, Dane's Inn, Strand, London.

MORTIBOY (Thos.), St. Helier's-park-road, Southborough, Kent, gentleman. May 14; Wm. T. Elliott, 5, Verulambuildings, Gray's-inn, London.

MURGATROYD (Wm.), Horton Bank, Top Horton, Bradford, gentleman. May 13; J. Green, solicitor, 2, Aldermanbury, Yorks.

NUNN (John), 23, Euston-square, and 44, Lamb's Conduit street, Middlesex, gentleman. May 30; Hume, Bird, and Bird, solicitors, 10, Great James-street, Bedford-row, London.

O'MEARA (Bernard), formerly of the Island of St. Thomas West Indies, late of Southampton, inspector of inter colonial ships' accounts in the service of the Royal Mai Steam Packet Company. June 15; Reep, Lane, and Co. solicitors, 9, Bush-lane, Cannon-street, London. POOLE (Jane D.), The Ferns, Holmesdale-road, South Nor wood, Surrey, widow. May 23: A. F. and R. W. Tweedie, solicitors, 5, Lincoln's-inn-fields, London.

RAINES (Robert), 5, Granville-terrace, Beverley-road, King. ston-upon-Hull, oil and tallow merchant. June 9; J. A. Jackson and Son, solicitors, 22, Parliament-street. Hull. RODER (Johann G.), late of Grand Ducal, Saxe Weimar, Germany, citizen and gentleman, and formerly Grand Ducal Court musician. June 1; Wm. J. Myatt, solicitor, 2, Abchurch-yard, Cannon-street, London. ROSSITER (Chas.), Brookfield House, Cheltenham-road, Bristol, gentleman. June 1; Stanley and Wasbrough, solicitors, 12, Royal Insurance buildings, Corn-street, Bristol. SCHALCH (Major Andrew O. Wm.), Woolwich, Kent. May 1; Grover and Humphreys, solicitors, 4, King's Benchwalk, Temple, London.

SEWARD (Henrietta S. C.), 20, Portsea-place, Middlesex, widow. June 1; J. Crowdy, solicitor, 17, Serjeant's-inn, Fleet-street, London.

SILSON (John), formerly of Bradford, late of Providence Cottage, Boston Spa, Tadcaster, York, gentleman. Mas 25; J. Green, solicitor, 2, Aldermanbury, Bradford. SNEYD (Rev. John), formerly of Ashcombe-park, Stafford, late of Woodlands. June 7; Challinor and Co., solicitors. Stafford.

SOMERVILLE (Henry), 90, New Bond-street, Middlesex, merchant. May 10; J. H. Somerville, surgeon, Bloxwich, near Walsall, Staffs.

SPEAKMAN (John), Pennington, Leigh, Lancaster, colliery proprietor. June 24; Marsh, Buckton, and Jeans, solicitors, Warrington.

STEVENS (Martha), Broadlands, St. John's, Ryde, Isle of Wight, widow. July 1; H. A. Dowse, solicitor, 6, New Inn, Strand, Middlesex.

STIRLING (Edwd., otherwise Edwd. Hamilton), Stirling Castle, Mont au Prêter, Island of Jersey, Esq. June 1: W. and J. Flower and Nursey, solicitors, 1, Great Winchester-street-buildings, London.

STOCKS (John, Moor Grange, Beeford, York, gentleman. June 10; Foster and Co., solicitors, Great Driffield.

TEEVAN (Michael), formerly of 22, Kensington-crescent,
late of 2, Stanhope-terrace, Gloucester-road, South Ken-
sington, Middlesex, Esq. May 26; Ward. Mills, and
Witham, solicitors, 1, Gray's-inn-square, Middlesex.
VENESS (Rebecca), 92, Albert-road, Norbiton, Surrey,
widow. May 21; Wordsworth, Blake, and Co., solicitors,
South Sea House, Threadneedle-street, London,
WHITE (Eliza), 26, Woburn-square. Middlesex, widow.
June 8: Norton and Co., solicitors, 6, Victoria-street,

WHITEHEAD (Wm.), formerly of Queen's Hotel, Alfreton-
road, Nottingham, licensed victualler, afterwards of 28,
Forest-road, late of Buttery-terrace, Nottingham, gentle-
man. June 1: Towle and Gilbert, solicitors, 17, Low
Pavement, Nottingham.
WINDER (John), formerly of Wavertree, Lancaster, late of
Ulverston, gentleman, May 7; G. Remington, solicitor,
WRIGHT (John), Barnsley, York, rent collector. July 1;
Dibb and Raley, solicitors, Barnsley.
WRIGHT (Simeon), Manor Farm, East Acton, Middlesex,
farmer. July 31; Charles Rogers and Son, solicitors, 7,
Westminster-chambers, Victoria-street, Westminster.


Thursday, April 16.

By Messrs. WINSTANLEY and HORWOOD, at the Mart. Kingston-on-Thames.-A freehold house, with shop-sold for £2120. Buckhurst Hill-Residence called Fern Bank, and 2a. Or. 25p., copy hold-sold for £1400.

By Messrs. NEWBON and HARDING, at the Mart. Barnsbury, No. 10, Brunswick-street, term 45 years-sold for £295.

Camberwell.-No. 17, De Crespigny-park, term 76 yearssold for £560. Hackney.-No. 4, Sheldon Villas, term 88 years-sold for £335.

Hackney.-Warwick Lodge, term 71 years-sold for £950. Tudor House-sold for £650.

Nos and 5, Sheldon Villas, term 88 years-sold for £525. Dalston.-No. 20, Acacia Villas, term 78 years-sold for £45.

Aldersgate-street.-Nos. 17, 18, and 19, Edmund-place, term 5 years-sold for £0.

No. 103, London Wall, term 9 rears-sold for £480. Upper Thames-street.-Nos. 12 to 16, College Hill, term year-sold for £72.

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King's Cross.-No. 6, Manchester-street, term 30 yearssold for £375. Cripplegate.-A fee farm rent of £2 per annum-sold for By Messrs. HARDS, VAUGHAN, and JENKINSON, at the Mart. Lewisham, South End.-Freehold house and cottages-sold for e1110. Dorking.-Five freehold cottages-sold for £140, Caledonian-road.-Nos. 52 and 53, Gifford-street, term 75 years-sold for £500.

Nos. 4, 30, and 34, Nailour-street, term 77 years-sold for
Bari bury.-Nos. 30 and 34, Wellington-road, term 70 years
od for £140.

Nos. 3 to 10. Hides-street, term 83 years-sold for £1250.
Nos. 11 to 16, Mid-s-street, term 85 years-sold for £100.
Holloway.-No, 28, Hornsey-road, term 68 years-soli for
Eltham, High-strcet.-Three freehold houses-sold for



Nos 1, 2, and 3, Park View-cottages, freehold-sold for

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Thuty-six shares in the Eltham Gas Company-sold for £INS.

By Messrs. DEBENHAM, TEWSON, 2nd FARMER, at the Mart. Hyde park.-No. 11, Goucester-square, with stabiing, term 62 years-old for £6700.

Friday, April 17.

By Messrs. NORTON. TRIST, WATNEY, and Co., at the Mart. Soho sa are.-No. 1, Greek-strest, freehold-sold for £1720. Stoke Newingto-grein.-A freehold house, with gardensold for £0.

Brixton-road.-No. 145 and improved ground rents of £60 per annum, term 25 years-sor for £550. Nos. 10, 12, 14, and 16, Vassal-road, term 23 years-sold for


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Wednesday, April 22.

By Messrs HARDS, VAUGHAN, and JENKINSON. at the Mart. Tobago.-The Hope Estate, containing about 1070 acressold for £1200.

By Messrs FLEURET and SON, at the London Tavern. Erith-The lease and goodwill of the Royal Alfred Wine Vaults, term 90 years-sold for £1950.

By Messrs EDWIN Fox and BOUSFIELD, at the Mart. Cavendish square.-No. 11, Harley-street, term 17 yearssold for £1700.

Wandsworth.-Freehold ground rent of £6 13s. 4d. per annum-sold for £210.

Wandsworth.-High-street, copyhold premises-sold for Tottenham-court-road.-No. 1, Percy-street, copyhold-sold


for £1140.

By Mr. E. W. RICHARDSON, at the Mart. Brixton-road.-No. 31, Holland-street, term 22 years-sold for £155. Kennington-Bolton-street, a plot of land-sold for £90. New Peckham.-Nos. 9, 11, and 12, Nelson-square, term 66 years- sold for £365,

Battersea.-Nos. 1, 2, and 3, Newcomen-road, term 85 years -sold for £300.

Nos. 3 and 4. Magdala-terrace, freehold-sold for £1050. Clapham.-Nos. 1 to 4, Cairns-road, freehold-sold for

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Nos, 5 and 6, same road, freehold-sold for £630.

Notting-hill, Nos. 10, 11, and 12, St. James's-place, term 78

years-sold for £310.

Norwood.-Nos. 1, 2, and 3, Grandacre-terrace, term 83 years-sold for £1230.

South Penge.--Nos. 1 and 2, Cambridge-villas, term 93 years -sold for £620,

No. 1, Oxford-villas, same term-sold for £205.
No. 4, Cambridge-road, term 87 years-sold for £310,
New-cross.-Nos. 1 to 3, Osborn-terrace, term 77 years-sold
for £600.

MR. CHILD, solicitor, has been returning officer of Hackney for thirty-five years in that borough and in the old borough of the Tower Hamlets. Since the election his appointment has been cancelled.

MR. W. T. CHARLEY, M. P., has given notice that on the second reading of the Attorneys' and Solicitors' Bill in the House of Commons, he shall move that it be referred to a Select Committee, we thoroughly approve of this course and hope it will be adopted, for the measure is crude, and in its present form is likely to produce changes not contemplated by the framer of it.

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De la Rue v. Dickenson. 1857.-In an action for the infringement of a patent, the question of infringement is for the jury and not for the judge, although there be no question with respect to whether the defendant has or has not used the particular machine or process which is alleged to be an infringement. Campbell, C.J., in delivering the judgment of the court, said: 66 There may well be a case where the judge may and ought to take upon himself to say that the plaintiff had offered no evidence to be left to the jury to prove infringement, as if there were a patent for a chemical composition, and the evidence was that the defendant had constructed and used a machine for combing wool. But, if the evidence has a tendency to show that the defendant has used substantially the same means, to obtain the same result as specified by the plaintiff, and scientific witnesses have sworn that the defendant actually has used such means, the question becomes one of fact, or of fact mixed with law, which the judge is bound to submit to the jury." (7 Ell. & Bl. 738; 3 Jur. N. S. 841.)

Bovill v. Keyworth. 1857.-A patent obtained for a new combination of a blast and an exhaust in connection with a mill, in which only the lower stone rotates, is infringed by the use of the same combination in connection with a mill in which the upper stone rotates. Campbell, C.J., in delivering the judgment of the court, said: "Supposing the patent to be for a combination, consisting of several parts, for one process, we are of opinion that the defendants are liable in this action for having used a material part of the process, which was new, for the same purpose as that mentioned in the specification, although they did not at the same time use all the parts of the process as specified." (7 Ell. & B. 725.)

The Patent Bottle Envelope Company v. Sey. mour. 1858.-The plaintiff obtained a patent for "improvements in the manufacture of cases or envelopes for covering bottles," and in the specification the invention was stated to consist "in an arrangement of apparatus by which lengths of rush, straw, or other suitable material, may be readily tied together, so as to form cases or packed." It then proceeded: "For this purpose covers to protect bottles from breakage when I take equal lengths of rush, straw, or other suitable material, and confine them at one end within a ring or cap, which I then place over the neck end of a mould or mandril, corresponding in form to the bottle for which the case or cover is intended. The mould is fixed to a frame," &c. The defendant made bottle envelopes out of similar materials somewhat differently applied, placing fastening the material in a manner somewhat like them upon a model of a bottle, or mandril, and the plaintiff's method. Held, that the use of the mandril, which was admitted to have been long commonly used for producing given forms of pliable materials, and the application of which to work previously untried materials or to produce new forms, was held not to be the subject of a patent, was not an infringement of the plaintiff's patent. Willes, J., in delivering the judgment of the court, said: "The infringement of any part of a patent process is actionable, if that part is of itself new and useful, so as that it might be infringer to effect the object, or part of the object, the subject matter of a patent, and is used by the proposed by the patentee." (5 C. B., N. S., 161;

5 Jur. N. S. 174.)

Higgs v. Godwin. 1858.-The invention for which the patent was granted was "treating chemically the collected contents of sewers and drains in cities, towns, and villages, so that the same may be applicable to agricultural and other useful purposes." In the specification the patentee said: "for the purpose of precipitating the animal and vegetable matter contained in the commonly termed 'slacked lime.' sewage water, I prefer to employ hydrate of lime, The patentee claimed the precipitation of animal and vege table matter from sewage water by means of the chemical agent hereinbefore described." Held, that the defendant, by using the patented process, not with the object of making a saleable mercantile article, but merely to purify the (27 L. J., N. S., Q. B., 421; 5 Jur. N. S. 97.) water, did not infringe the plaintiff's patent.

Lister v. Leather. 1853.-A valid patent for an entire combination for a process gives protection to each part thereof that is new and material for that process, without any express claim of par ticular parts, and notwithstanding that parts of the combination are old. Affirmed in the Exchequer Chamber. Williams, J., in delivering the judgment of that ecurt, said: "It was argued before us, on behalf of the appellants, that, if a patent be taken out for a combination of a, b, and c, it could not be infringed by using a combination of b and c only. We are of opinion that

the answer to this inquiry turns altogether upon what a, b, and c are, how they contribute to the object of the invention, and what relation they bear to each other. Cases may possibly be suggested where the use of b and c might not be an infringment of the patent. But more easily cases may be put where the use of b and e would be an infringement of the patent. Whether in this case it was so or not would depend upon the facts of the case, and may be more a question of fact for the jury than of law for a court of appeal But the facts are not before us; and we think the court below was right in deciding that the use of a subordinate part of a combination might be an infringement of the patent if the part so used was new (by which we understand new in itself or in its effects, not merely in its application) and material." (8 Ell. & B. 1004.)

Thomas v. Foxwell. 1859.-Evidence may be admitted of an infringement by an imitation of a material part of a general combination, notwithstanding the disclaimer of the mechanical parts separately, of which the combination consists, and although there be no separate and specific claim in respect of the part imitated, while there other subordinate combinations. (5 Jur. N.S. 39.) are separate and distinct claims in respect of

Walton v. Lavater. 1860.-The importation and fringement. Erle, C.J., in delivering his judgsale of a patented article is evidence of an inment, said: "The next point contended for is that there has been no infringement by the defensale, moreover, being only a sale of articles imdant, because he had only sold the articles, the of the learned counsel on both sides, derived from ported from abroad. I have heard the arguments the original statute, which uses the words 'working and making,' and from the form of the expres using, or putting in practice the invention, and sion in the letters patent prohibiting the making, the words granting to the patentee the privilege words are capable of some of the constructions to make, use, exercise, and vend.' All these which have been contended for; but it appears to me that the main purpose of the patent is to give the profit to the patentee, and that the main mode of defeating that purpose would be by selling the patented article; and it seems to me that without proof of the making of the article by the infringer, evidence that he sold the patented article for profit would be good evidence upon which a jury might find that he had infringed the patent.

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With respect to the defendant imported from abroad, I should say that, even not being liable, because the articles were if it was a simple case of importation, without any proof of knowledge of the article being patented, or of the infringement, it would be fendant had imported and sold." Keating, J.sufficient evidence of infringement that the desuch a use of the article as would constitute an "What we have to see is, whether there has been And it seems to me that the selling an article and infringement within the meaning of the statute. converting it into money is about the most effectual use that can well be made of it." (2) L. J., N. S., C. P., 275; 8 C. B., N. S., 162; 6 Jur. N. S., 1251; 3 L. T. Rep. N. S. 272.)

Hills v. The Liverpool United Gaslight Company. 1863.-A patent was granted for an invention for the purification of gas by means of precipitated or hydrated oxides of iron. The specification was held to include such precipitated or hydrated oxides only as were obtained tated oxide of iron, so long as it was used in its by artificial means. The use of a natural substance, such as bog ochre, containing precipinative condition, was held not to be an infringe ment of the patent; but upon this substance being re-oxidized or renovated in the manner described in the specification, or in any other manner, it was brought into the condition of being one of the plaintiff's patented purifying materials, that is, a hydrated or precipitated oxide artificially obtained, and an injunction to restrain the use of the substance as renovated was granted. (32 L. J., N.S., Ch.. 28.)

Lister v. Eastwood. 1861.-Where a patent is for a combination, a person who takes a new and material part of the combination, but does not apply it to a similar or analogous purpose to that to which it was applied in the patent, does not infringe the patent. (9 L T. Rep. N. S. 766.)

Thomas v. Hunt. 1864.-A licence to A. to manufacture a patent article is an authority to his vendees to vend it without the consent of the patentee. (17 C. B., N. S., 183).

THE Maidstone Journal announces the death of Major C. W. Bannister, who has for more than thirteen years held the post of Governor of the County Prison, Maidstone.. Previously to entering upon the governorship of the Maidstone governor at the convict prison, Dartmouth, and gaol, Major Bannister had acted as deputy had seen service in India as captain of the 2nd Light Infantry (Bombay).


Saturday, April 18.

(Before BRETT, GROVE, and DENMAN, JJ.)

Parliamentary Election-Ballot papers and
THIS was an application arising out of the Peters.
field election petition, which was moved as a rule
for a mandamus to the clerk of the Crown, but
which on the argument took the form of a rule
nisi, calling on the respondent to show cause why
the marked register of voters, the counterfoils of
the ballot papers, and the backs of the rejected
ballot papers should not be shown to the peti.

egister would give approximately all the required

DENMAN, J., agreed that the marked register
hould be produced, but also thought that inspec-
tion of the rejected ballot papers and counter oils
should not be allowed in the present case. The
word "required" meant not only wanted, but
reasonably necessary, and the court should be
atisfied by affidavit on that point before granting
inspection. The court had the power to make
he order asked for, but this was not a case in
which it should be exercised.

Monday, April 20.

HURDLE AND ANOTHER v. WARING. Election petition-Return of writ-Time. THIS case came on upon cause being shown W. G. Harrison (with him Couch) showed cause gainst a rule to have the petition taken off the against the rule.-The marked register would give ile, upon the ground that it had not been preapproximately all the information required by the sented in time. The Poole election took place on petitioners, and they would have been entitled to 3rd Feb. last, and some time before noon on the see it had it not been inclosed in the same sealed following day the returning officer endorsed upon packet with the counterfoils, which should not be the writ that Mr. Charles Waring was duly shown. The required order, if made, would inter-elected, and he also delivered the document to the fere with the secrecy of the ballot, and, even if the court had power to grant it, should not be made without strong grounds shown on affidavit. J. O. Griffits (with him Lumley Smith) supported the rule.-The court had clearly power to make the order, and inspection of the marked register should be granted as a matter of right. It would, however, only show who received ballot papers, and in order to discover who actually voted, it would be necessary to have the desired inspec. tion of the rejected ballot papers with the sequence number upon them and the counterfoils corre sponding with them. This would not show how anyone had voted, but would merely disclose the fact that certain electors had given votes, which could then be attacked on the scrutiny. If the inspection were refused, a great number of useless witnesses would have to be in attendance on speculation, and unnecessary expense would be incurred. The majority at the election was only nine.

The court differed in opinion.

BRETT, J. thought the petitioners were entitled to the limited inspection asked for. In ordinary cases both parties were entitled to see any document in which they had such an interest as to make it useful in the case litigated. In petitions, therefore, were it not for the Ballot Act, parties would be entitled to inspection of any document at the earliest possible time. The Ballot Ac however, was passed for the purpose of maintaining the most complete secrecy as to how any man voted, and had incidentally thrown difficulties in the way of petitioners. It was, however, for the public advantage that all facili ties for inspection consistent with the spirit of the Act should be given, as the public, as well as parties and constituencies, were highly interested in the prevention of bribery and in seeing that no avoidable difficulties were thrown in the way of bona fide litigation. Acting on that principle, he thought that all reasonable facilities for inspection should be given consistent with the secrecy of the ballot. He did not think under the Act that the marked register and the counterfoils should have been sealed in one packet, but as they were he thought the packet should be opened and inspection given of the marked register. As to the rest of the order, he thought the packet of rejected ballot papers should also be opened and the backs of them shown to the petitioners to show the sequence number. This alone, however, without the counterfoils would not show whose vote had been rejected, therefore the counterfoils corresponding to the rejected ballot papers should also be inspected. Such an inspection would not show how any one hai voted, but would facilitate the case and diminish expense. Unless the most perverse ingenuity was displayed it would give no one the opportunity of discovering how anyone had voted. He thought that justice required that the information should be given.

GROVE, J., agreed that inspection of the marked register should be given, but with some doubt, as it would necessitate opening the packet containing the counterfoils as well. He thought such an order could be made by the court, but could not have been made by a judge at chambers. With reference to the two other branches of inspection asked, he differed from Brett, J., and thought no case had been made out for inspection of the rejected ballot papers and counterfoils. The question was, whether the court should make such an order as a matter of course in cases of scrutiny, and such a provision could have been made in two lines instead of the guarded sections which the Act contained. The Act did not intend even the Clerk of the Crown and his assistants to see these papers without strong grounds. The order required should not be made without strong grounds shown on oath, though he did not deny the power of the court to make it. The hardship of the case was very slight, as the marked

Clerk of the Crown himself, or the hands of one his clerks.

McIntyre, Q.C. (with him Chandos Leigh and C. Bowen), in support of the rule, referred to aflidavits which stated that office hours were by no means strictly kept during the general election, that the person who received the letter and gave a receipt had authority to do so, and that in the ordinary course a writ received in the evening would be returned as of that day. It was argued that the return was really made when the returning officer posted with the endorsed copy to some person who was authorised to receive it.

Lord COLERIDGE said that the statute required that a petition should be presented "within twenty-one days after the return has been made to the Clerk of the Crown in Chancery," and it seemed to him that the true meaning of this was that the return was to be made in such a sense that the Clerk of the Crown could act upon it, and that the return was not completed until it had reached the authority who was capable of acting upon it. Whilst arriving at this conclusion, however, he must admit that the question was one which was by no means free from difficulty. Rule discharged.

Postmaster, addressed to the Clerk of the Crown
in Chancery. The duty imposed by statute was
that the returning officer should forthwith
transmit the writ and return through the Post-
office to the Clerk of the Crown in Chancery.
The writ was in a registered letter, and it
arrived at the office of the Clerk of the Crown-GOVERNING BODY-POWER TO DISMISS HEAD
soon after eight in the evening, with five
other registered letters, which referred to other
elections. The ordinary office hours were from
ten to two. The person who received the letters
was Kate Phipps, a woman who was in the employ
of Mrs. T. Lovegrove, the housekeeper. Mrs.
Lovegrove herself was appointed by the Lord
Great Chamberlain, and was not a servant of the
Clerk of the Crown. Kato Phipps gave the
ordinary receipt for these letters, but the Poole
return did not reach the hand of any clerk in the
office until the 5th. The entry in the office book
was first that the return was received on the 4th;
but this date was afterwards struck through and the
5th inserted, and the 5th was the date transmitted
to the House of Commons. The Corrupt Prac-
tices at Elections Act said that any petition
against a return must be presented within twenty-
one days after the return, and if the return now
in question was to be taken as having been made
on the 4th the petition was too late, whilst if the
return was on the 5th the then petition was in

Giffard. Q.C. (with him Harrison), contended that Kate Phipps was only an animated letter-box, whose duty was simply to receive the letter and place it on the table, and that the return was not made until the writ had reached the hands of the





MAGISTRATES' LAW. NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS. DEMURRER-PUBLIC SCHOOLS ACT 1863, s. 13 MASTER.-The Public Schools Act 1863, which applies to (amongst other schools) Rugby School, by sect. 13 enacts that "the head master of every school to which this Act applies, shall be appointed by and hold his office at the pleasure of the new governing body." The plaintiff was appointed head master of the school in Nov. 1869, by the then existing governing body. In Dec. 1873, the new governing body (which had been duly constituted in Dec. 1871, under the powera of the Act of 1868) passed a resolution that upon a review of the administration of the school" from the time when they came into office to the then present time, they were of opinion that the plaintiff was not" a fit and proper person to be head master, and dismissed him accordingly:" Held (on demurrer to a bill by the plaintiff praying for a declaration that, under the circumstances in the bill stated, the above resolution was invalid), that, under the above section, the new governing body had power to dismiss the plaintiff without notice, and without assigning any reason; and that, as they had exercised their power of dismissal fairly and honestly, not corruptly, nor for the purpose of effecting some collateral object, their decision was not liable to be controlled by the court: (Hauman v. The Governing Body of Rugby School, 30 L. T. Rep. N. S. 217. V.C. M


When holden.

Friday, July 10
Tuesday, April 28......

Wednesday, April 29.
Wednesday, April 29.



H. T. Cole, Esq., Q.C..
James J. Lonsdale, Esq....
W. D. Seymur, Esq., Q.C..
Thomas H. Naylor, Esq.
Joseph Catterall, Esq.

NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS. NAVIGABLE RIVER-OBSTRUCTION. Where the owner of a wharf abutting on a navigable river drove piles into the bed of the river, and thus caused an obstruction which diminished by three feet the navigable breadth of the river in the front of the wharf, such navigable breadth having been sixty feet prior to the erection of the obstruction: Held (affirming the decision of the Master of the Rolls) that this was a substantial interference with the free navigation of the river, and that it ought to be restrained by injunction: (Attorney-General v. Terry, 30 L.T. Rep. N. S. 215. L. C. & L. JJ.)

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EFFECT OF RIVER BYELAWS-DUTY IN FOG.In an appeal to the High Court of Admiralty from a County Court where there is a conflict between the transcript of the notes of evidence and judg ment taken by a shorthand writer in the Cony Court under the County Court Rules No. 32, and the County Court judge's own notes, the version given by the County Court judge must be accepted as binding, and if the County Court judge alters the shorthand writer's notes so as to correspond with his own version, the Court of Admiralty will order the alterations so made to be carried into effect in the printed copies of the appendix. Byelaws made by a local authority governing the navigation of a river are to be taken as evidence of what it is the duty of vessels to do in the eircumstances named therein, and although the mere breach of one or any of them will not be sufficient reason for holding a ship to blame for a collision, yet if that breach occasions or contributes to the collision, the existence of the byelaw will afford the best reason for holding the ship violating the byelaw to be guilty of a breach of duty, and, consequently to blame for the collision. Where a byelaw regulating the navigation of a river prescribes the side of the river upon which a ship is to navigate going up or down the river, the observance of this byelaw is doubly necessary during a fog, when vessels can only be made out at short distances; and the breach of the byelaw cannot be excused by the plea that it was u ual during foggy weather to navigate on the wrong COLLISION-COUNTY COURT APPEAL-SHORT- side of the river in order to insure greater safety HAND WRITERS' NOTES - CORRECTIONS BY for the vessel so doing: (The Baithwaite Hall, 30 COUNTY COURT JUDGE-RIVER NAVIGATION-L. T. Rep. N. S. 233. Adm.)

CHARTER-PARTY-DEMURRAGE EXCEPTION -CIVIL COMMOTION.-Where a charterer by his charter-party undertakes to load a ship within certain given lay days, "accidents or causes occurring beyond the control of the shippers or affreighters, which may prevent or delay her loading or discharging, including civil commotion, strikes, riots, stoppage of trains, &c., always excepted," or to pay demurrage, he cannot excuse default in loading within the lay days by giving evidence of general disturbance and cessation of work in the district about the time; but to exempt himself from liability must show a disturbing cause, actually preventing the loading of the particular ship: (The Village Belle, 30 L. T. Rep. N. S. 232. Adm.)

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In the absence of a formal appointment it is a question of evidence whether surrounding cir

cumstances prove agency.

Neal v. Ewing, 1 Esp. 61; Courteen v. Touse, 1 Camp. 43; Brocklebank v. Sugrue, 5 Car. & P. 21; 1 M. & Rob. 102; 1 B. & Ad. 81; 2 Duer. 341 n. a.

Extent and Execution of Powers. The purpose of the agency is to solicit applica tions for insurance, make surveys or examinations of the subjects proposed to be insured, subscribe or deliver policies, receive notice of other insurances or of compliances with stipulations on the part of the assured, receive premiums, adjust losses, and return of premium, and make payments.

Phillips, sect. 1878.

The authority must not be exceeded :

Baines v. Ewing, L. Rep. 1 Ex. 320.

Authority to subscribe policies does not necessarily authorise the agent to settle and pay Josses.

NOTE.-It must depend wholly upon the custom of

the place and the relation of the principal and agent to each other in business and correspondeuce: (Phillips, s. 1873.)

It is, however, one circumstance tending to show such authority.

Such authority is revoked by the bankruptcy of the underwriter.

Parker v. Smith, 16 East, 382.

An agent in a foreign port to communicate information to insurers respecting marine risks, and advise them generally of matters affecting their interests, is not authorised to receive notice of abandonment so as to bind them:

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By (a) for commissions or premiums which they have paid, or are responsible for, and their general balance of insurance account against the principal.

By (b) for commissions and premiums and general balance of account against the principal when the insurance is effected in the course of the mercantile agency.

By (c) for commissions and premiums, and for their general balance of account as against the agents who, as principals, instruct them if without notice that they are agents.

NOTE.-The latter clause of this last proposition has been objected to as giving an agent power to pledge the goods of his principal, and Mr. Phillips seems to think it unsound: (See sect. 1916, Arn. 4th edit. 196 et seq. Observations.

Usage or agreement, or the previous course of business between the parties, may give a right of set-off, where it otherwise would not exist:

Green v. Farmer, 4 Burr. 2214.
NOTE.-Mr. Phillips says: "It is adjudged or im-
plied in some cases, that an insurance broker has,
by virtue of the general usage of the place,
especially in London, a right to retain any policy
he may effect for the principal, on account of his
demands against him for previous advances and
charges, in case of the principal having notice, or
being bound to take notice of the usage:" (Sect.
1912, par. 2.)

See James v. Rodgers, 15 M. & W. 375; Oliver v.
Smith, 5 Taunt. 56.

A general agent with whom a policy is left has no lien upon it for money advanced independently of the policy:

Muir v. Fleming, Dowl. & Ry. N.C. 29.

An agent effecting a policy on goods to be shipped by a correspondent has a lien on the proceeds after a loss for his general balance against the shipper, although the goods are consigned to

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A broker of an underwriter who pays losses on policies for his principal, retaining the policies, has a lien upon the salvages for his general balance against the underwriters:

Ph., sect. 1923; Moody v. Webster, 3 Pick. Mass. 424
(amounts allowed by a foreign state for captures
of her subjects insured by the policies).
Loss and Revival.

Lien is lost-
By parting with possession of the policy.
By holder pledging the policy as his own.
NOTE.-An assignment of a policy to keep for the
transferor, subject to his lien, is not a pledge
forfeiting the lien.

McCombie v. Davies, 7 East, 52; Urquhart v. McIver, 4 Johns, N. Y. 103.

By taking a security payable in the future. Hewison v. Guthrie, 2 Bing. N. C. 755; Cowell v. Simpson, 16 Ves. 276.

The lien is revived:

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The debts which can be set-off as between an agent and an underwriter must be mutual. Wilson v. Creighton, 3 Doug. 132; Houston v. Robert son. 4 Camp. 342; 6 Taunt. 648; Shee v. Clarkson, 12 East, 507.

writer to the assured cannot be set-off by the Therefore, losses which are due by the underbroker against a claim for premiums payable to

the underwriter.

NOTE.-A broker, however, having a lien on the policy, may insist on an underwriter paying the foss on the latter demanding the premiums. Parker v. Beasley, 2 M. & S. 423; Davies v. Wilkinson, 4 Bing. 573; Shee v. Clarkson, 12 East, 507; Wienholt v. Roberts, 2 Camp. 586.

A broker acting del credere does not acquire any additional right of set-off.

Goldschmidt v. Lyon, 4 Taunt. 534; Houston v. Bordenave, 6 Id. 451; Baker v. Langhorn, 4 Camp. 396; Peele v. Northcote, 7 Taunt. 478; Marnett v. For rester, 4 Taunt. 541.

The right of the agent to retain and set-off sums received from underwriters on account of any liability he may have assumed for the future for the principal, will depend on his having a lien on his policy for his commissions, or his having made advances upon the credit of the policy.

Godin v. London Assurance Company, 1 Burr. 489; Kinloch v. Craig, 3 Term 783; Hammond v. Barclay, 2 East, 227; Castling v. Aubert, 2 East, 325. Bankruptcy of the Underwriter. In case of a broker being agent of both parties to a policy, the underwriter on which becomes bankrupt, the underwriter is discharged from the claims of the assured for losses and returns of premiums, and the broker, being debtor for premiums, is discharged therefor, so far as they have been passed and settled by the broker and underwriter in account, previously to the act of bankruptcy of the latter.

So far as the premiums and losses have not been so settled, they are not set-off, whether the policies on which they accrue had been subscribed or the losses known before the bankruptcy or not:

Phillips, s. 1927.

Recovering back Money paid.

In case of payment by the underwriter to the agent of the assured through mistake, or for loss on a policy that is illegal as between the parties to it where the agent is not a party to the illegality, the money may be recovered back, if demanded in time:

Phillips, s. 1927; Jameson v. Swainstone, 2 Camp. 546, n.; Ed ar v. Fowler, 3 East, 222; Buller v. Harrison, Cowp. 565.

A policy being void by misrepresentation without fraud, the underwriter cannot recover back from the agent of the assured money which he had paid over to his principal in ignorance of the misrepresentation:

Holland v. Russell, 1 B. & S. 424.
Miscellaneous Duties.

The agent must keep his principal advised of the business of the agency;

Must keep and duly render accounts of the business of the agency;

And select brokers and other sub-agents with proper vigilance and discretion;

and preserve the evidence, if his agency is for And give them proper instructions to collect making an abandonment or adjusting or prosecuting for a claim :

Phillips, s. 1901.

Discharging the Underwriter.

The underwriter is not discharged from the claim of the assured, except by actual payment to the agent:

Russell v. Bangley, 4 B. & Ald. 395; Todd v. Reid, 4 B. & Ald. 210; Scott v. Irving, 1 B. & A. 605; Bartlett v. Pentland, 10 B. & C. 760; Ovington v. Bell, 3 Camp. 237; Jell v. Pratt, 2 Stark. 67. Under authority to an agent of the assured to receive payment of a loss, or a return of premium, he is not authorised to discharge the underwriter by merely crediting the loss or including such a credit in the settlement of his account with the underwriter:

Phillips, sect. 1883.

The fact of the name of the underwriter having been struck off the policy may discharge him if it be shown to have been done with the consent of the assured:

Bartlett v. Pentland, 10 B. & C. 760; Scott v. Irving, 1 B. & Ad. 605; and other cases, sup.


NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS. CONTRIBUTORY-TRANSFER OF SHARES-UNPAID CALLS-ACQUIESCENCE.-The 16th section which provides that "no shareholder shall be of the Companies Clauses Consolidation Act 1845, entitled to transfer any shares, after any call shall have been made in respect thereof, until he shall have paid such call, nor until he shall have paid all calls for the time being due on every share held by him," is intended for the protection of companies and not of their creditors; and if the directors of a company assent to a transfer of shares on which calls are due, the property in the shares passes to the transferee, and the transferor cannot be placed on the list of contributories in respect of the shares so transferred, though he may be sued at law for the amount of the calls due at the date of the transfer. Decision of

Malins, V.C., affirmed: (Littledale's case, 30 L. T. Rep. N. S. 213. L.JJ.).

BILL BY ONE SHAREHOLDER ON BEHALF OF ALL-RIGHT OF MINORITY.-The majority of the shareholders in a company have no right to use their votes in such a way as to compromise a suit instituted for the benefit of the company, and to retain the benefits obtained by the compromise for themselves as to the exclusion of the minority. Where an attempt is made to do so by the majority of the shareholders, a bill filed by one shareholder on behalf of himself and the other shareholders to enforce the rights of the minority will be entertained. Demurrer for want of equity to such a bill overruled. Decision of Bacon, V.C. confirmed: (Menier v. Hooper's Telegraph Works 30 L. T. Rep. N. S. 209. L.JJ.)


KITE V. METROPOLITAN Board of WorkS THIS was a compensation claim, tried before a jury, at Red Lion-square, on the 15th inst., in respect of a short leasehold house in High-street, Shoreditch, required for the new street now forming from Oxford-street to Shoreditch.

The Board of Works were represented by Hawkins, Q.C., and Philbrick, Q.C. and the claimant by Huddleston, Q.C.; Mr. George Fuller, of Fuller and Fuller, acted as surveyor for Mr. Kite, instructed by Whitwell.

The jury, after viewing the premises, returned a verdict by consent for £1200, for the leasehold and trade.


THIS was another compensation claim, tried at The Red Lion-square, on the 17th and 18th. claimants are ship chandlers and sail makers, carrying on business at 43 and 44, High-street, Wapping, of which premises they were lessees of the one moiety, and freeholders of the other. The property was required for the widening of High-street, Wapping.

Hawkins, Q.C., and Philbrick, Q.C., appeared for the Board of Works; and the Hon. A. Thesiger, Q.C., and Robins, on behalf of the claimants, under instructions from Lowless, Nelson, Jones and Co.

Mr. G. Fuller, of the firm of Fuller and Fuller, surveyors, gave evidence in support of the claim, as did also Mr. Murrell, Mr. Farmer, and two architects; the Board's witnesses being Mr. Clifton, Mr. Horsey, and Mr. Trist.

After the jury had heard the evidence on both sides

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Hawkins put the case before them as one in
which they should give £2519 for the property,
£500 the amount agreed upon for the fixtures, and
£1500 as the outside for any supposed loss to
trade-in all £4519.

The Hon. Mr. Thesiger followed on the other
The jury, in the end, returned a verdict for
£3500 for the premises under notice to treat, £500
for the fixtures, and £3000 for compulsory re-
moval, making a total of £7000.


· Thursday, April 9.

(Before J. St. J. YATES, Esq., Judge.)
Railway company-Liability for want of punc-
tuality in arrival of trains-Damages.
A. took a return ticket from B. to C. by one line, and
then another from D. by the defendants' line.
On returning from D. in the evening the train by
which he travelled was fifty minutes late in
arriving at D., having lost that time in going
from D. to the terminus E. (whence the same
train returned towards C. calling at D.)-a
distance usually travelled in fourteen minutes.
In consequence of this delay A. lost the return
train from C. to B., and had to put up for the
night, getting home to B. next morning:
Held that the defendants were liable for negli-
gence in not providing sufficient engine power
or allowing the steam to get too low no satis-
factory explanation of the delay having been
offered by them.

THE facts of the case will appear from the judg-

arise from delays or detention. The right to
stop the trains at any station on the line, although
not marked as a stopping station, is reserved.".
which their advocate contended was incorporated
with and formed part of their contract with the
plaintiff and so far I agree with him. But they
do not and cannot by any such regulation divest
themselves of their responsibility for negligence
or want of due diligence in the discharge of
their duties towards those with whom they have
entered into the contract. The question is, there-
fore, whether the defendants acted so negligently,
or with such want of diligence in the matter, as
to entitle the plaintiff to recover. I am of opinion
that they did. The only explanation of the delay
which was attempted was that the rails were
slippery and the gradient heavy. It was, how-mate that I had exceeded my jurisdiction. Now,
ever, admitted that the train was not above the
usual weight, and that the engine was one which
was habitually used for this journey. But this is
by no means a satisfactory explanation of a delay
of forty minutes in a journey which usually occu-
pies fourteen-that is to say, fifty-four minutes
were necessary for a distance usually traversed
in fourteen; an excess not to be accounted for by
mere greasiness of the rails, and, as there was no
accident to the machinery, either the engine was
in itself of insufficient power, except when the
rails were perfectly dry (which is not always the
case in that country), or the driver had allowed
his steam to get too low. The latter appears to
me the probable reason, as the return journey
being all downhill less steam would be required,
and there would be twenty minutes at Buxton to
get it up to proper pressure. But whichever be
the case the defendants are, in my opinion, re-
sponsible to the plaintiff for the damages which
he has sustained by the delay, and I assess them
at 15s., being the expense of staying all night at
Macclesfield, and a fresh ticket to Congleton in
the morning.

The defendants asked for leave to appeal upon the ground that the expense of staying all night in Macclesfield was not recoverable. Leave was granted on that point.



WE extract from the Cambridge Independent
Press of 18th April the following full report of
Judge Beales' reply to the remarks of Mr. Justice
Blackburn, reported in this journal on Feb. 7 :

by the learned judge, with such great surprise and indignation that I might, if I had acted on the impulse of the moment, have been disposed to express as strongly as I felt it; but upon reflection Ideen it more befitting what is due to and from me in the position which I have the honour to hold, to att ibute these remarks either to some mistake or exaggeration in the report, or to some grave misapprehension of the real facts of the case and of the grounds of my decision. That there was great misunderstanding as to one of the points on which it was thought proper to subject me to animadversion is most certain, for on the faith of a statement that I allowed the company to appeal only on condition that they paid the costs of the appeal, the learned judge thought proper to intiwithout discussing the question whether I should have exceeded my jurisdiction if I had imposed such a condition, the case being, by reason of the small amount of damages claimed, one in which the company could not have appealed without my permission, the fact is I imposed no such condi tion. The solicitor of the company himself stated openly at the last Haverhill Court, and in very frank and manly terms, that he was as much surprised as I could be at any such statement having been made in the court above, as no such condition had been made by me. On this point, therefore, the offensive remarks in the court above were wholly unjustified by anything that took place in my court; and hence I am the more inclined to suppose that there was in other respects some such misapprehension of the real facts of the case, and of the grounds of my decision. These facts and grounds briefly were that furniture of which the company had undertaken the carriage was completely smashed in the transit, and nothing but the fragments were delivered to Mr Taylor, the consignee and plaintiff, and I held the company liable for the damage on the old common law principle that they were insurers of His HONOUR said: In this case the plaintiff, the goods for their safe and secure delivery, Cooper, took a return ticket between Congleton and notwithstanding a special contract entered into Macclesfield by the North Staffordshire Railway, by them with the consignee, exempting them in and thence a return ticket by the defendants' lines consideration of their carrying the goods at a between Macclesfield and Chapel-en-le-Frith. lower rate from all risk and responsibility, except Passengers from Macclesfield to Chapel-en-lefrom any wilful act or default if proved. I conFrith and Buxton change trains at Stockport, sidered that such a contract was null and void whence they are forwarded by the Manchester under the seventh section of the Railway and and Buxton line, which is worked by or belongs Canal Traffic Act, by which it was enacted, as it to the defendants. The return journey is perappeared to me in confirmation of the old formed in the same manner. The plaintiff arrived common law principle that companies should at Chapel-en-le-Frith in due course, and having be liable for loss of or injury to animals spent the day, went to the railway station in His HONOUR, addressing the senior barrister or goods occasioned by the neglect or deproper time to travel by the train advertised in present, said: Mr. Cockerell, I should be very fault of the company or its servants, notwiththe defendants' time bills to leave Chapel-en-le- ungrateful, as well as uncourteous, if I were to standing any notice, condition, or declaration Frith at 5.47 p.m. for Stockport, where it should allow the day to pass without publicly acknow. made and given by such company contrary arrive at 6.25 p.m. in time for him to catch the ledging the address you were kind enough to for- thereto, or in anywise limiting such liability; and train leaving Stockport at 7.2 p.m., due in Mac- ward to me a few days ago, signed by thirty-three every such notice, condition, or declaration was elesfield at 7.45, being the last train by which he gentlemen, besides yourself, practising either as declared to be null and void, a proviso being could arrive in Congleton that night. This was barristers-at-law or attorneys and solicitors in added, that nothing therein should be construed to shown on the defendant's time bills. The train courts on my circuit, an address expressing pain prevent companies from making such conditions was fifty minutes late in leaving Chapel-en-le- and regret at a remark reported in the Law Times as should be adjudged by the court or judge, Frith. This delay arose as follows: The traffic of the 7th of February last, to have been made by before whom any question relating thereto should between Manchester and Buxton is worked by one Mr. Justice Blackburn in the Court of Queen's be tried, to be just and reasonable. It seemed to engine and one set of carriages, which perform Bench, as to my ruling in the case of Taylor v me, having regard to the interests and welfare the journey backwards and forwards. At the The Great Eastern Railway Company, which of the public, that railway companies had gone Buxton end there is no spare engine. Chapel-en- came before that court on appeal from the Haver. too far in availing themselves of this proviso, that le-Frith is an intermediate station between Man-hill County Court, and expressing also the perfect they had availed themselves of it to an extent chester and Buxton, about five miles from the satisfaction of the gentlemen signing the address which with the additional contrivance of charging latter. The trains from Manchester go on from with my rulings generally which were involved in a lower carriage-rate, purported to exempt them Chapel-en-le-Frith to Buxton, where, in this the same ungracious remarks; and expressing altogether from that liability for loss or injury instance, twenty minutes were allowed for unload- further their high respect and esteem for my occasioned by the neglect or default of themselves ing and reloading the train, which then starts judicial conduct during the whole time I have or their servants, to which the Act expressly deback to Manchester. The journey from Chapel- been the judge of this circuit, and their full confi- clared and intended they should be liable, and to en-le-Frith to Buxton usually occupies fourteen dence in my "able and impartial administration" which they were liable at common law as insurers minutes, but on the occasion now under considera- of the law. It is impossible that anything could there being nothing in the Act limiting their lia. tion the down train lost ten minutes between have occurred more gratifying to my feelings, or bility any more than at common law to negligence Whaley Bridge and Chapel-en-le-Frith (four miles), to which, under the circumstances, I could attach or default proved to be wilful, and it being besides, and forty minutes between Chapel-en-le-Frith and greater value, than this warm and spontaneous in almost all cases, quite out of the power of the Buxton. The result was that it was fifty minutes expression of sympathy, esteem, and confidence customer to obtain or give proof of such wilfullate on arriving at Buxton, and fifty minutes late by so many of the gentlemen practising before ness. The case of Taylor v. The Great Eastern en leaving on the return journey. It further me, an expression I may regard as almost Company appeared to me a peculiarly proper ono appears that in consequence of this delay, the unanimous from my courts, as several gentlemen for having this, as it seemed to me, important plaintiff, on arriving at Stockport, found that the whose names are not attached to the address in question decided by a Superior Court, as negli last train to Congleton had left. After waiting consequence of the delay which would necessarily gence was not denied, and the defence was, that three hours at Stockport he caught a train which have arisen from sending it round to all the negligence of any degree, or to any extent, was took him as far as Macclesfield, where he arrived sixteen courts, or from their absence at the time immaterial, unless it could be proved to be wilful; at 10.48 p.m. and was compelled to remain all of its being sent to their court, or other accidental a defence which appeared to me to be not admisnight, going on to Congleton next morning, and circumstances, have personally expressed to me sible, within either the spirit or letter of the he now sues the company for damages for their regret at their not having had the oppor- Railway and Canal Traffic Act. Had my decision his detention and also for the expenses he was tunity of signing it, and their entire concurrence on this point, to which everything else in the put to in stopping at the hotel in Macclesfield, with every word it contains. I profoundly and decision was merely subordinate, been reversed and the cost of his journey the next morning to from my inmost heart thank all for it. The after full discussion and argument, I should have Congleton. The defendants relied on the general address, with considerate delicacy, refrains from bowed with the utmost respect to the judgment of regulation set forth in their time tables, which is any discussion of the case reported on appeal in the Superior Court; but, so far as I can gather as follows:-"Time Bills.-The published train the Law Times; but I consider it my duty, both from the report, my decision was reversed, and in bills of this company are only intended to fix the to myself and to those who have presented and no very courteous terms, without the shadow of time at which passengers may be certain to concurred in this highly complimentary address, to an argument, or the least attempt of an argu. obtain their tickets for any journey from the make some remarks on that report. The address ex-ment controverting the grounds of my decision, as various stations, it being understood that the presses pain and regret at the particular remark here referred to, and relied on by me in the court trains shall not start before the appointed time. which is quoted as alleged in the report to have below, and without any reason whatever being Every attention will be paid to ensure punctuality, been made by Mr Justice Blackburn in reversing given for adjudging those grounds to be erroneous. as far as it is practicable; but the directors give my decision. I am deeply sensible of this very However much I may regret this result of the notice that the company do not undertake that kindly feeling on my behalf, but I cannot but appeal which I allowed to be made, and however the trains shall start or arrive at the time add, and perhaps many will anticipate what I am indignant I may feel at the language reported to specified in the bills; nor will they be accountable about to say, that I read that remark, and the have been used towards myself, I have the large for any loss, inconvenience, or injury, which may other unseemly remarks alleged to have been made consolation of being countenanced in my views, as

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