As to many of the encroachments of the Bar npon the privileges of solicitors, some of a direct and others of an indirect kind, the author has been unable to discover, or at all events satisfactorily to settle, their origin; yet sufficient is known of them to justify the belief that they have come from the deliberate action of the Government from time to time under the influence of the Bar, or else at the instigation of the Bar direct. Amongst these must be included the offices of Attorneys and Solicitors-General, posts now filled as well in the colonies and our foreign dominions as at home, by members of the Bar. Although as to our colonies there is now no distinction between members of the Profession, each exercising every function of a lawyer, yet the monopoly of the English Bar is greatly felt and much complained of there, the practice being to pass over all competent colonial lawyers for the purpose of supplying to English barristers having influence responsible post such as judge, which, it may be, his want of capability rendered him unfit for at home. Compared with the origin of the office or profession of attorney-at-law, the designation of Attorney-General is of somewhat recent date, and was adopted, as also that of Solicitor-General about the same time, by members of the Bar, possibly for the purpose of misleading the ignorant public of those times as to the duties of these public officers; adopted, too, at a time when the common attorney was utterly helpless to resist what some will call nominal encroachments, and when the expression "solicitor" was only in use to a limited extent, in relation to the business of those tribunals now known as the Courts of Chancery. It will be complained that the writer does not furnish some precise data as to the origin of the names Attorney and Solicitor-General, which would entail a large amount of research from sources not altogether dependable; hence the author is content to leave these names or designations to speak for themselves. to which the writer is directing attention. The (To be continued.) UNCLAIMED STOCK AND DIVIDENDS IN THE [Transferred to the Commissioners for the Reduction of the HEIRS-AT-LAW AND NEXT OF KIN. APPOINTMENTS UNDER THE JOINT-STOCK An encroachment of a far more substantial kind is that which led to the exclusion of attorneys-atlaw from the right of audience in the higher tribunals of the country. This is exhaustively dealt INTERNATIONAL LIFE ASSURANCE SOCIETY.-Creditors to send in by May 30 their names and addresses, and the particu- CREDITORS UNDER ESTATES IN CHANCERY. DURRAN (Thos.), King-street, Hammersmith, Middlesex, LYONS (Elizabeth), 10, Artillery-place, City-road, and 128, with in the works of Mr. Charley and Mr. Marshall The writer has stepped aside to consider for a moment the latest expressed views of laymen on the subject of the "double legal agency" question, not so much because he himself may incline to the opinion that solicitors should have restored to them their former right of audience in the Superior Courts, as because there is an undoubted feeling on the part of the public that to pay one lawyer in one matter is quite enough; and there is a close relation between this subject and that CREDITORS UNDER 22 & 23 VICT. c. 35. BARNETT (Thos. Wm.), 72, Fore-street, Limehouse, Middle- BERRY (Arthur F.), formerly of the Wheatsheaf, Edgware- BASS (Isaac A.), 107, Gower-street, Bedford-square, Middle- BUTCHER (Wm.), Five Oaks, Broomhill, Sheffield, mer- CALDECOTT (Celia), Wibtoft, Leicester, widow. June 24; CARTER (James), formerly of Thornhill-road, Islington, De Ros (Right Hon. Wm. Lennox Lascelles Baron). May DIAS (Rebecca), Barrow's-almshouses, Barrow's-buildings, DowSETT (Frederick R.), Severn Lodge, Berkeley, Glou- EMERY (Mary), formerly of Southsea, late of Fir Grove, West-end, South Stoneham, Southampton, spinster. GOEZ (Henry John A.), formerly of the Crystal Palace GUSTARD (Ralph), late of Heddon-on-the-Wall, Northum HALSTED (Vice-Admiral Edward P.), formerly of 85, Ebury- HAMBLETON, Elizabeth Ann (and not Humbleton, as inaccu- HOLLYER (Anna) Penzance, widow. May 11; Rodd and HOLMES (Rachel), 17, Thornhill-square, Islington, Middle- JAMES (Thomas), 21, Threadneedle-strect, and of Haven Chelsea, LIPSCOMBE (Samuel), 29, Marlborough-road, MORTIBOY (Thos.), St. Helier's-park-road, Southborough, MURGATROYD (Wm.), Horton Bank, Top Horton, Bradford, NUNN (John), 23, Euston-square, and 44, Lamb's Conduit O'MEARA (Bernard), formerly of the Island of St. Thomas SEWARD (Henrietta S. C.), 20, Portsea-place, Middlesex, SILSON (John), formerly of Bradford, late of Providence Cottage, Boston Spa, Tadcaster, York, gentleman. Mas 25; J. Green, solicitor, 2, Aldermanbury, Bradford. SNEYD (Rev. John), formerly of Ashcombe-park, Stafford, late of Woodlands. June 7; Challinor and Co., solicitors. Stafford. SOMERVILLE (Henry), 90, New Bond-street, Middlesex, merchant. May 10; J. H. Somerville, surgeon, Bloxwich, near Walsall, Staffs. SPEAKMAN (John), Pennington, Leigh, Lancaster, colliery STEVENS (Martha), Broadlands, St. John's, Ryde, Isle of STIRLING (Edwd., otherwise Edwd. Hamilton), Stirling STOCKS (John, Moor Grange, Beeford, York, gentleman, TEEVAN (Michael), formerly of 22, Kensington-crescent, WHITEHEAD (Wm.), formerly of Queen's Hotel, Alfreton- REPORTS OF SALES. Thursday, April 16. By Messrs. WINSTANLEY and HORWOOD, at the Mart. Kingston-on-Thames.-A freehold house, with shop-sold Buckhurst Hill.-Residence called Fern Bank, and 2a. Or. 2 p., copyhold-sold for £140. for £2120. By Messrs, NEWBON and HARDING, at the Mart. Barnsbury.-No. 10, Brunswick-street, term 45 years-sold for £295. Camberwell.-No. 17, De Crespigny-park, term 76 yearssold for £560. Hackney.-No. 4, Sheldon Villas, term 88 years-sold for £335. Hackney.-Warwick Lodge, term 71 years-sold for £950. Tudor House-sold for £650. Nos and 5, Sheldon Villas, term 88 years-sold for £525. Dalston.-No. 20, Acacia Villas, term 78 years-sold for £5. Aldersgate-street.-Nos. 17, 18, and 19, Edmund-place, term 5 years-sold for £204. No. 10, London Wall, term 9 rears-sold for £480. Upper Thames-street.-Nos. 12 to 16, College Hill, term year-sold for £72. King' Cross.-No. 6, Manchester-street, term 30 yearssold for £375. Cripplegate.-A fee farm rent of £2 per annum-sold for By Messrs. HARDS, VAUGHAN, and JENKINSON, at the Mart. Lewisham, South End.-Freehold house and cottages-sold for 21110. Dorking.-Five freehold cottages-sold for £140. Caledonian-road.--Nos. 52 and 58, Gifford-street, term 75 years-sold for £500. Nos. 1, 30, and 34, Nailour-street, term 77 years-sold for 2570 Bari bury.-Nos. 30 and 34, Wellington-road, term 70 years od for £UP. Nos. 3 to 10. Hides-street, term 83 years-sold for £1250. £700 Nos 1, 2, and 3, Park View-cottages, freehold-sold for Thirty-six shares in the Eltham Gas Company-sold for £38. By Messrs. DEBENHAM, TEWSON, and FARMER, at the Mart. Hyde park. No. 11, Gencester-square, with stabling, term 62 years-old for £6700, Friday, April 17. By Mossrs. NORTON. TRIST, WATNEY, and Co., at the Mart. Soho snare.-No. 1, Greek-street, freehold-sold for £1720. Stoke Newingto-gre n.-A freehold house, with gardensld for £0. Brixton-road.-No. 145 and improved ground rents of £60 per annum, term 25 yea: s-soid for £550, Nos. 10, 12, 11, and 16, Vassal-road, term 23 years-sold for £360 Portman-square.-Improved ground rents of £75 per annum, term 14 years-sold for £260. Chelsea.-No. 11, Moor Park-road, term 77 years-sold for £300. Wednesday, April 29. By Messrs HARDS, VAUGHAN, and JENKINSON. at the Mart. Tobago. The Hope Estate, containing about 1070 acressolitor £1200. By Messrs FLEURET and SON, at the London Tavern. Erit-The lease and goodwill of the Royal Alfred Wine Vault, term 90 years-sold for £19-0. By Messrs EDWIN Fox and BOUSFIELD, at the Mart. Cavendish square.-No. 11, Harley-street, term 17 years— sold for £1700. Wandsworth.--Freehold ground rent of £6 13s. 4d. per £770. for £1140. for £155. By Mr. E. W. RICHARDSON, at the Mart. Brixton-road.-No. 31, Holland-street, termn 22 years-sold Kennington-Bolton-street, a plot of land-sold for £90. New Peckham.-Nos. 3, 11, and 12, Nelson-square, term 66 years- sold for £365, Batter oa.-Nos. 1, 2, and 3, Newcomen-road, term 85 years -sold for £0. Nos. 3 and 4. Magdala-terrace, freehold-sold for £1080. Clapham.-Nos. 1 to 4, Cairns-road, freehold-sold for No. 5 and 6, same road, freehold-sold for £630. Notting-hill. Nos, 10, 11, and 12, St. James's-place, term 78 Norwood.--Nos. 1, 2, and 3, Grandacre-terrace, term 8s years-sold for £310. years-sold for £1230. South Penge.-Nos. 1 and 2, Cambridge-villas, term 93 years -old for 4620. No. 1, Oxford-villas, same term-sold for £205. No. 4, Cambridge-road, term 87 years-sold for £310, New-cro s.-Nos. 1 to 8, Osborn-terrace, term 77 years-sold for £600. MR. CHILD, solicitor, has been returning officer of Hackney for thirty-five years in that borough and in the old borough of the Tower Hamlets. Since the election his appointment has been cancelled. MR. W. T. CHARLEY, M. P., has given notice that on the second reading of the Attorneys' and Solicitors' Bill in the House of Commons, ho ehall move that it be referred to a Select Committee, we thoroughly approve of this course and hope it will be adopted, for the measure is crude, and in its present form is likely to produce changes not contemplated by the framer of it. De la Rue v. Dickenson. 1857.-In an action for the infringement of a patent, the question of infringement is for the jury and not for the judge, although there be no question with respect to whether the defendant has or has not used the particular machine or process which is alleged to be an infringement. Campbell, C.J., in delivering the judgment of the court, said: There may well be a case where the judge may and ought to take upon himself to say that the plaintiff had offered no evidence to be left to the jury to prove infringement, as if there were a patent for a chemical composition, and the evidence was that the defendant had constructed and used a machine for combing wool. But, if the evidence has a tendency to show that the defendant has used substantially the same means, to obtain the same result as specified by the plaintiff, and scientific witnesses have sworn that the defendant actually has used such means, the question becomes one of fact, or of fact mixed with law, which the judge is bound to submit to the jury." (7 Ell. & Bl. 738; 3 Jur. N. S. 841.) Bovill v. Keyworth. 1857.-A patent obtained for a new combination of a blast and an exhaust in connection with a mill, in which only the lower stone rotates, is infringed by the use of the same combination in connection with a mill in which the upper stone rotates. Campbell, C.J., in delivering the judgment of the court, said: "Supposing the patent to be for a combination, consisting of several parts, for one process, we are of opinion that the defendants are liable in this action for having used a material part of the process, which was new, for the same purpose as that mentioned in the specification, although they did not at the same time use all the parts of the process as specified." (7 Ell. & B. 725.) The Patent Bottle Envelope Company v. Seymour. 1858.-The plaintiff obtained a patent for "improvements in the manufacture of cases or envelopes for covering bottles," and in the specification the invention was stated to consist "in an arrangement of apparatus by which lengths of rush, straw, or other suitable material, may be readily tied together, so as to form cases or packed." It then proceeded: "For this purpose covers to protect bottles from breakage when I take equal lengths of rush, straw, or other suitable material, and confine them at one end within a ring or cap, which I then place over the neck end of a mould or mandril, corresponding in form to the bottle for which the case or cover is intended. The mould is fixed to a frame," &c. The defendant made bottle envelopes out of similar materials somewhat differently applied, placing them upon a model of a bottle, or mandril, and fastening the material in a manner somewhat like the plaintiff's method. Held, that the use of the mandril, which was admitted to have been long commonly used for producing given forms of pliable materials, and the application of which to work previously untried materials or to produce new forms, was held not to be the subject of a patent, was not an infringement of the plaintiff's patent. Willes, J., in delivering the judgment of the court, said: "The infringement of any part of a patent process is actionable, if that part is of itself new and useful, so as that it might be the subject matter of a patent, and is used by the infringer to effect the object, or part of the object, proposed by the patentee." (5 C. B., N. S., 161; 5 Jur. N. S. 174.) Higgs v. Godwin. 1858.-The invention for which the patent was granted was "treating chemically the collected contents of sewers and drains in cities, towns, and villages, so that the same may be applicable to agricultural and other useful purposes." In the specification the patentee said: "for the purpose of precipitating the animal and vegetable matter contained in the commonly termed 'slacked lime." The patentee sewage water, I prefer to employ hydrate of lime, claimed "the precipitation of animal and vegetable matter from sewage water by means of the chemical agent hereinbefore described." Held, that the defendant, by using the patented process, not with the object of making a saleable mercantile article, but merely to purify the water, did not infringe the plaintiff's patent. (27 L. J., N. S., Q. B., 421; 5 Jur. N. S. 97.) Lister v. Leather. 1858.-A valid patent for an entire combination for a process gives protection to each part thereof that is new and material for that process, without any express claim of par· ticular parts, and notwithstand ng that parts of the combination are old. Affirmed in the Exchequer Chamber. Williams, J., in delivering the judgment of that ecurt, said: "It was argued before us, on behalf of the appellants, that, if a patent be taken out for a combination of a, b, and c, it could not be infringed by using a com bination of b and c only. We are of opinion that the answer to this inquiry turns altogether upon what a, b, and c are, how they contribute to the object of the invention, and what relation they bear to each other. Cases may possibly be suggested where the use of b and c might not be an intringment of the patent. But more easily cases may be put where the use of b and e would be an infringement of the patent. Whether in this case it was so or not would depend upon the facts of the case, and may be more a question of fact for the jury than of law for a court of appeal But the facts are not before us; and we think the court below was right in deciding that the use of a subordinate part of a combination might be an infringement of the patent if the part so used was new (by which we understand new in itself or in its effects, not merely in its application) and material." (8 Ell. & B. 1004.) Thomas v. Foxwell. 1859.-Evidence may be admitted of an infringement by an imitation of a material part of a general combination, notwithstanding the disclaimer of the mechanical parts separately, of which the combination consists, and although there be no separate and specific claim in respect of the part imitated, while there are separate and distinct claims in respect of other subordinate combinations. (5 Jur. N.S. 39.) Walton v. Lavater. 1860.-The importation and sale of a patented article is evidence of an infringement. Erle, C.J., in delivering his judg ment, said: "The next point contended for is that there has been no infringement by the defendant, because he had only sold the articles, the sale, moreover, being only a sale of articles imof the learned counsel on both sides, derived from ported from abroad. I have heard the arguments the original statute, which uses the words 'working and making,' and from the form of the expres using, or putting in practice the invention, and sion in the letters patent prohibiting the making, the words granting to the patentee the privilege to make, use, exercise, and vend.' All these words are capable of some of the constructions which have been contended for; but it appears to me that the main purpose of the patent is to give the profit to the patentee, and that the main mode of defeating that purpose would be by selling the patented article; and it seems to me that without proof of the making of the article by the infringer, evidence that he sold the patented article for profit would be good evidence upon the patent. which a jury might find that he had infringed With respect to the defendant not being liable, because the articles were imported from abroad, I should say that, even if it was a simple case of importation, without any proof of knowledge of the article being patented, or of the infringement, it would be fendant had imported and sold." Keating, J.sufficient evidence of infringement that the de Hills v. The Liverpool United Gaslight Com pany. 1863.-A patent was granted for an invention for the purification of gas by means of precipitated or hydrated oxides of iron. The specification was held to include such precipitated or hydrated oxides only as were obtained by artificial means. stance, such as bog ochre, containing precipi tated oxide of iron, so long as it was used in its native condition, was held not to be an infringement of the patent; but upon this substance being re-oxidized or renovated in the manner described in the specification, or in any other manner, it was brought into the condition of being one of the plaintiff's patented purifying materials, that is, a hydrated or precipitated oxide artificially obtained, and an injunction to restrain the use of the substance as renovated for a combination, a person who takes a new and was granted. (32 L. J., N.S., Ch.. 28.) Lister v. Eastwood. 1861.-Where a patent is material part of the combination, but does not apply it to a similar or analogous purpose to that to which it was applied in the patent, does not infringe the patent. (9 L T. Rep. N. S. 766.) The use of a natural sub Thomas v. Hunt. 1864.-A licence to A. to his vendees to vend it without the consent of the manufacture a patent article is an authority to patentee. (17 C. B., N. S., 183). THE Maidstone Journal announces the death of Major C. W. Bannister, who has for more than thirteen years held the post of Governor of the County Prison, Maidstone. Previously to entering upon the governorship of the Maidstone gaol, Major Bannister had acted as deputy governor at the convict prison, Dartmouth, and had seen service in India as captain of the 2nd Light Infantry (Bombay). ELECTION LAW. COURT OF COMMON PLEAS. Saturday, April 18. (Before BRETT, GROVE, and DENMAN, JJ.) Parliamentary Election-Ballot papers and W. G. Harrison (with him Couch) showed cause against the rule.-The marked register would give approximately all the information required by the petitioners, and they would have been entitled to see it had it not been inclosed in the same sealed packet with the counterfoils, which should not be shown. The required order, if made, would interfere with the secrecy of the ballot, and, even if the court had power to grant it, should not be made without strong grounds shown on affidavit. J. O. Griffits (with him Lumley Smith) supported the rule.-The court had clearly power to make the order, and inspection of the marked register should be granted as a matter of right. It would, however, only show who received ballot papers, and in order to discover who actually voted, it would be necessary to have the desired inspec. tion of the rejected ballot papers with the sequence number upon them and the counterfoils corre sponding with them. This would not show how anyone had voted, but would merely disclose the fact that certain electors had given votes, which could then be attacked on the scrutiny. If the inspection were refused, a great number of useless witnesses would have to be in attendance on speculation, and unnecessary expense would be incurred. The majority at the election was only nine. The court differed in opinion. It was, BRETT, J. thought the petitioners were entitled to the limited inspection asked for. In ordinary cases both parties were entitled to see any document in which they had such an interest as to make it useful in the case litigated. In petitions, therefore, were it not for the Ballot Act, parties would be entitled to inspection of any document at the earliest possible time. The Ballot Act however, was passed for the purpose of maintaining the most complete secrecy as to how any man voted, and had incidentally thrown difficulties in the way of petitioners. however, for the public advantage that all facili. ties for inspection consistent with the spirit of the Act should be given, as the public, as well as parties and constituencies, were highly interested in the prevention of bribery and in seeing that no avoidable difficulties were thrown in the way of bona fide litigation. Acting on that principle, he thought that all reasonable facilities for inspection should be given consistent with the secrecy of the ballot. He did not think under the Act that the marked register and the counterfoils should have been sealed in one packet, but as they were he thought the packet should be opened and inspection given of the marked register. As to the rest of the order, he thought the packet of rejected ballot papers should also be opened and the backs of them shown to the petitioners to show the sequence number. This alone, however, without the counterfoils would not show whose vote had been rejected, therefore the counterfoils corresponding to the rejected ballot papers should also be inspected. Such an inspection would not show how any one ha i voted, but would facilitate the case and diminish expense. Unless the most perverse ingenuity was displayed it would give no one the opportunity of discovering how anyone had voted. He thought that justice required that the information should be given. GROVE, J., agreed that inspection of the marked register should be given, but with some doubt, as it would necessitate opening the packet containing the counterfoils as well. He thought such an order could be made by the court, but could not have been made by a judge at chambers. With reference to the two other branches of inspection asked, he differed from Brett, J., and thought no case had been made out for inspection of the rejected ballot papers and counterfoils. The question was, whether the court should make such an order as a matter of course in cases of scrutiny, and such a provision could have been made in two lines instead of the guarded sections which the Act contained. The Act did not intend even the Clerk of the Crown and his assistants to see these papers without strong grounds. The order required should not be made without strong grounds shown on oath, though he did not deny the power of the court to make it. The hardship of the case was very slight, as the marked egister would give approximately all the required Clerk of the Crown himself, or the hands of one DENMAN, J., agreed that the marked register Monday, April 20. HURDLE AND ANOTHER v. WARING. McIntyre, Q.C. (with him Chandos Leigh and C. Bowen), in support of the rule, referred to aflidavits which stated that office hours were by no means strictly kept during the general election, that the person who received the letter and gave a receipt had authority to do so, and that in the ordinary course a writ received in the evening would be returned as of that day. It was argued that the return was really made when the returning officer posted with the endorsed copy to some person who was authorised to receive it." Lord COLERIDGE said that the statute required that a petition should be presented "within twenty-one days after the return has been made to the Clerk of the Crown in Chancery," and it seemed to him that the true meaning of this was that the return was to be made in such a sense that the Clerk of the Crown could act upon it, and that the return was not completed until it had reached the authority who was capable of acting upon it. Whilst arriving at this conclusion, however, he must admit that the question was one which was by no means free from difficulty. Rule discharged. MAGISTRATES' LAW. Election petition-Return of writ-Time. THIS case came on upon cause being shown gainst a rule to have the petition taken off the ile, upon the ground that it had not been presented in time. The Poole election took place on 3rd Feb. last, and some time before noon on the following day the returning officer endorsed upon the writ that Mr. Charles Waring was duly elected, and he also delivered the document to the Postmaster, addressed to the Clerk of the Crown in Chancery. The duty imposed by statute was that the returning officer should forthwith transmit the writ and return through the Postoffice to the Clerk of the Crown in Chancery. The writ was in a registered letter, and it arrived at the office of the Clerk of the Crown-GOVERNING BODY-POWER TO DISMISS HEAD 300n after eight in the evening, with five other registered letters, which referred to other elections. The ordinary office hours were from ten to two. The person who received the letters was Kate Phipps, a woman who was in the employ of Mrs. T. Lovegrove, the housekeeper. Mrs. Lovegrove herself was appointed by the Lord Great Chamberlain, and was not a servant of the Clerk of the Crown. Kate Phipps gave the ordinary receipt for these letters, but the Poole return did not reach the hand of any clerk in the office until the 5th. The entry in the office book was first that the return was received on the 4th; but this date was afterwards struck through and the 5th inserted, and the 5th was the date transmitted to the House of Commons. The Corrupt Practices at Elections Act said that any petition against a return must be presented within twentyone days after the return, and if the return now in question was to be taken as having been made on the 4th the petition was too late, whilst if the return was on the 5th the then petition was in time. Giffard. Q.C. (with him Harrison), contended that Kate Phipps was only an animated letter-box, whose duty was simply to receive the letter and place it on the table, and that the return was not made until the writ had reached the hands of the Borough. Devonnort. NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS. DEMURRER-PUBLIC SCHOOLS ACT 1863, s. 13 MASTER.-The Public Schools Act 1863, which applies to (amongst other schools) Rugby School, by sect. 13 enacts that "the head master of every school to which this Act applies, shall be appointed by and hold his office at the pleasure of the new governing body." The plaintiff was appointed head master of the school in Nov. 1869, by the then existing governing body. In Dec. 1873, the new governing body (which had been duly constituted in Dec. 1871, under the powers of the Act of 1868) passed a resolution that 66 upon a review of the administration of the school" from the time when they came into office to the then present time, they were of opinion that the plaintiff was not "a fit and proper person to be head master, and dismissed him accordingly:" Held (on demurrer to a bill by the plaintiff praying for a declaration that, under the circumstances in the bill stated, the above resolution was invalid), that, under the above section, the new governing body had power to dismiss the plaintiff without notice, and without assigning any reason; and that, as they had exercised their power of dismissal fairly and honestly, not corruptly, nor for the purpose of effecting some collateral object, their decision was not liable to be controlled by the court: (Hauman v. The Governing Body of Rugby School, 30 L. T. Rep. N. S. 217. V.C. M.) BOROUGH QUARTER SESSIONS. When holden. Friday, July 10 MARITIME LAW. Recorder. H. T. Cole, Esq., Q.C.... NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS. NAVIGABLE RIVER-OBSTRUCTION. - Where the owner of a wharf abutting on a navigable river drove piles into the bed of the river, and thus caused an obstruction which diminished by three feet the navigable breadth of the river in the front of the wharf, such navigable breadth having been sixty feet prior to the erection of the obstruction: Held (affirming the decision of the Master of the Rolls) that this was a substantial interference with the free navigation of the river, and that it ought to be restrained by injunction: (Attorney-General v. Terry, 30 L.T. Rep. N. S. 215. L. C. & L. JJ.) EFFECT OF RIVER BYELAWS-DUTY IN FOG.In an appeal to the High Court of Admiralty from a County Court where there is a conflict between the transcript of the notes of evidence and judg ment taken by a shorthand writer in the Co ny Court under the County Court Rules No. 32, and the County Court judge's own notes, the version given by the County Court judge must be acce; teď as binding, and if the County Court judge alters the shorthand writer's notes so as to correspond with his own version, the Court of Admiralty will order the alterations so made to be carried into effect in the printed copies of the appendix. Byelaws made by a local authority governing the navigation of a river are to be taken as evidence of what it is the duty of vessels to do in the eirCHARTER-PARTY-Demurrage — EXCEPTION cumstances named therein, and although the mere -CIVIL COMMOTION.-Where a charterer by his breach of one or any of them will not be sufficient charter-party undertakes to load a ship within reason for holding a ship to blame for a collision, certain given lay days, "accidents or causes yet if that breach occasions or contributes to the occurring beyond the control of the shippers or collision, the existence of the byelaw will afford affreighters, which may prevent or delay her the best reason for holding the ship violating the loading or discharging, including civil commotion, byelaw to be guilty of a breach of duty, and, con strikes, riots, stoppage of trains, &c., always sequently to blame for the collision. Where a excepted," or to pay demurrage, he cannot excuse byelaw regulating the navigation of a river predefault in loading within the lay days by giving scribes the side of the river upon which a ship is evidence of general disturbance and cessation of to navigate going up or down the river, the work in the district about the time; but to exempt observance of this byelaw is doubly necessary himself from liability must show a disturbing during a fog, when vessels can only be made out cause, actually preventing the loading of the at short distances; and the breach of the byelaw particular ship: (The Village Belle, 30 L. T. Rep. cannot be excused by the plea that it was u ual N. S. 232. Adm.) during foggy weather to navigate on the wrong COLLISION-COUNTY COURT APPEAL-SHORT-side of the river in order to insure greater safety WRITERS' NOTES CORRECTIONS BY for the vessel so doing: (The Baithwaite Hall, COUNTY COURT JUDGE-RIVER NAVIGATION-IL. T. Rep. N. S. 233. Adm.) HAND SPECIMENS OF A CODE OF MARINE By F. O. CRUMP, Barrister-at-Law.) (Continued from p. 382.) AGENTS (OF UNDERWRITERS). THE appointment of agents to subscribe policies NOTE.-The ordinary principle applies that a contract made without authority may bind one who by his act or neglect has led third persons to believe that an agent acting for him was duly authorised. In the absence of a formal appointment it is a question of evidence whether surrounding circumstances prove agency. Neal v. Ewing, 1 Esp. 61; Courteen v. Touse, 1 Camp. 43; Brocklebank v. Sugrue, 5 Car. & P. 21; 1 M. & Rob. 102; 1 B. & Ad. 81; 2 Duer. 341 n. a. Extent and Execution of Powers. The purpose of the agency is to solicit applications for insurance, make surveys or examinations of the subjects proposed to be insured, subscribe or deliver policies, receive notice of other insurances or of compliances with stipulations on the part of the assured, receive premiums, adjust losses, and return of premium, and make payments. Phillips, sect. 1878. The authority must not be exceeded : Baines v. Ewing, L. Rep. 1 Ex. 320. Authority to subscribe policies does not necessarily authorise the agent to settle and pay losses. NOTE-It must depend wholly upon the custom of the place and the relation of the principal and agent to each other in business and correspondeuce: (Phillips, s. 1873.) It is, however, one circumstance tending to show such authority. Such authority is revoked by the bankruptcy of the underwriter. Parker v. Smith, 16 East, 382. An agent in a foreign port to communicate information to insurers respecting marine risks, and advise them generally of matters affecting their interests, is not authorised to receive notice of abandonment so as to bind them: By (a) for commissions or premiums which they have paid, or are responsible for, and their general balance of insurance account against the principal. By (b) for commissions and premiums and general balance of account against the principal when the insurance is effected in the course of the mercantile agency. By (c) for commissions and premiums, and for their general balance of account as against the agents who, as principals, instruct them if without notice that they are agents. NOTE.-The latter clause of this last proposition has Usage or agreement, or the previous course of business between the parties, may give a right of set-off, where it otherwise would not exist : Green v. Farmer, 4 Burr. 2214. demands against him for previous advances and A general agent with whom a policy is left has no lien upon it for money advanced independently of the policy: Muir v. Fleming, Dowl. & Ry. N.C. 29. An agent effecting a policy on goods to be shipped by a correspondent has a lien on the proceeds after a loss for his general balance against the shipper, although the goods are consigned to On the policy again coming to the hands of the Whitehead v. Vaughan, Cooke's B. L. 579. Spring v. South Carolina Insurance Company, SET-OFF. All premiums returned and all losses accruing on the policy may be retained and set-off until a lien is satisfied. Phillips, sect. 1909. The debts which can be set-off as between an 12 East, 507. writer to the assured cannot be set-off by the Must keep and duly render accounts of the business of the agency; And select brokers and other sub-agents with proper vigilance and discretion; And give them proper instructions to collect and preserve the evidence, if his agency is for making an abandonment or adjusting or prosecuting for a claim : Phillips, s. 1901. Discharging the Underwriter. claim of the assured, except by actual payment to The underwriter is not discharged from the the agent: Russell v. Bangley, 4 B. & Ald. 395; Todd v. Reid, 4 B. & Ald. 210; Scott v. Irving, 1 B. & A. 605; Bartlett v. Pentland, 10 B. & C. 760; Ovington v. Bell, 3 Camp. 237; Jell v. Pratt, 2 Stark. 67. Under authority to an agent of the assured to receive payment of a loss, or a return of premium, he is not authorised to discharge the underwriter by merely crediting the loss or including such a credit in the settlement of his account with the underwriter : Phillips, sect. 1883. The fact of the name of the underwriter having been struck off the policy may discharge him if it be shown to have been done with the consent of the assured: Bartlett v. Pentland, 10 B. & C. 760; Scott v. Irving, 1 B. & Ad. 605; and other cases, sup. COMPANY LAW. NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS. CONTRIBUTORY-TRANSFER OF SHARES-UNPAID CALLS-ACQUIESCENCE.-The 16th section which provides that "no shareholder shall be of the Companies Clauses Consolidation Act 1845, entitled to transfer any shares, after any call shall have been made in respect thereof, until he shall have paid such call, nor until he shall have paid all calls for the time being due on every share held by him," is intended for the protection of companies and not of their creditors; and if the directors of a company assent to a transfer of shares on which calls are due, the property in the shares passes to the transferee, and the transferor cannot be placed on the list of contributories in respect of the shares so transferred, though he Malins, V.C., affirmed: (Littledale's case, 30 may be sued at law for the amount of the calls due at the date of the transfer. Decision of L. T. Rep. N. S. 213. L.JJ.). NOTE.-A broker, however, having a lien on the A broker acting del credere does not acquire Goldschmidt v. Lyon, 4 Taunt. 534; Houston v. Bor- The right of the agent to retain and set-off Godin v. London Assurance Company, 1 Burr. 489; In case of a broker being agent of both parties So far as the premiums and losses have not been so settled, they are not set-off, whether the policies on which they accrue had been subscribed or the losses known before the bankruptcy or not: Phillips, s. 1927. Recovering back Money paid. In case of payment by the underwriter to the agent of the assured through mistake, or for loss on a policy that is illegal as between the parties to it where the agent is not a party to the illegality, the money may be recovered back, if de manded in time: Phillips, s. 1927; Jameson v. Swainstone, 2 Camp. A policy being void by misrepresentation without Holland v. Russell, 1 B. & S. 424. for themselves as to the exclusion of the minority. retain the benefits obtained by the compromise Where an attempt is made to do so by the majority of the shareholders, a bill filed by one shareholder on behalf of himself and the other shareholders to enforce the rights of the minority will be entertained. Demurrer for want of equity to such a bill overruled. Decision of Bacon, V.C. confirmed: (Menier v. Hooper's Telegraph Works 30 L. T. Rep. N. S. 209. L.JJ.) SHERIFFS COURT. KITE v. METROPOLITAN BOard of Works THIS was a compensation claim, tried before a jury, at Red Lion-square, on the 15th inst., in respect of a short leasehold house in High-street, Shoreditch, required for the new street now forming from Oxford-street to Shoreditch. The Board of Works were represented by Hawkins, Q.C., and Philbrick, Q.C. and the claimant by Huddleston, Q.C.; Mr. George Fuller, of Fuller and Fuller, acted as surveyor for Mr. Kite, instructed by Whitwell. The jury, after viewing the premises, returned a verdict by consent for £1200, for the leasehold and trade. TRAILL AND SON v. METROPOLITAN BOARD OF WORKS. THIS was another compensation claim, tried at Red Lion-square, on the 17th and 18th. The claimants are ship chandlers and sail makers, carrying on business at 43 and 44, High-street, Wapping, of which premises they were lessees of the one moiety, and freeholders of the other. The property was required for the widening of High-street, Wapping. Hawkins, Q.C., and Philbrick, Q.C., appeared for the Board of Works; and the Hon. A. Thesiger, Q.C., and Robins, on behalf of the claimants, under instructions from Lowless, Nelson, Jones and Co. Mr. G. Fuller, of the firm of Fuller and Fuller, surveyors, gave evidence in support of the claim, as did also Mr. Murrell, Mr. Farmer, and two architects; the Board's witnesses being Mr. Clifton, Mr. Horsey, and Mr. Trist. After the jury had heard the evidence on both sides RAILWAY COMPANY. (Before J. St. J. YATES, Esq., Judge.) COOPER v. LONDON AND NORTH-WESTERN Railway company-Liability for want of punctuality in arrival of trains-Damages. A. took a return ticket from B. to C. by one line, and then another from C.to D. by the defendants' line. On returning from D. in the evening the train by which he travelled was fifty minutes late in arriving at D., having lost that time in going from D. to the terminus E. (whence the same train returned towards C. calling at D.)-a distance usually travelled in fourteen minutes. In consequence of this delay A. lost the return train from C. to B., and had to put up for the night, getting home to B. next morning: Held that the defendants were liable for negligence in not providing sufficient engine power or allowing the steam to get too low no satisfactory explanation of the delay having been offered by them. THE facts of the case will appear from the judgment. His HONOUR said: In this case the plaintiff, Cooper, took a return ticket between Congleton and Macclesfield by the North Staffordshire Railway, and thence a return ticket by the defendants' lines between Macclesfield and Chapel-en-le-Frith. Passengers from Macclesfield to Chapel-en-leFrith and Buxton change trains at Stockport, whence they are forwarded by the Manchester and Buxton line, which is worked by or belongs to the defendants. The return journey is performed in the same manner. The plaintiff arrived at Chapel-en-le-Frith in due course, and having spent the day, went to the railway station in proper time to travel by the train advertised in the defendants' time bills to leave Chapel-en-leFrith at 5.47 p.m. for Stockport, where it should arrive at 6.25 p.m. in time for him to catch the train leaving Stockport at 7.2 p.m., due in Macelesfield at 7.45, being the last train by which he could arrive in Congleton that night. This was shown on the defendant's time bills. The train was fifty minutes late in leaving Chapel-en-leFrith. This delay arose as follows: The traffic between Manchester and Buxton is worked by one engine and one set of carriages, which perform the journey backwards and forwards. At the Buxton end there is no spare engine. Chapel-enle-Frith is an intermediate station between Man. chester and Buxton, about five miles from the latter. The trains from Manchester go on from Chapel-en-le-Frith to Buxton, where, in this instance, twenty minutes were allowed for unloading and reloading the train, which then starts back to Manchester. The journey from Chapelen-le-Frith to Buxton usually occupies fourteen minutes, but on the occasion now under consideration the down train lost ten minutes between Whaley Bridge and Chapel-en-le-Frith (four miles), and forty minutes between Chapel-en-le-Frith and Buxton. The result was that it was fifty minutes late on arriving at Buxton, and fifty minutes late en leaving on the return journey. It further appears that in consequence of this delay, the plaintiff, on arriving at Stockport, found that the last train to Congleton had left. After waiting three hours at Stockport he caught a train which took him as far as Macclesfield, where he arrived at 10.48 p.m. and was compelled to remain all night, going on to Congleton next morning, and he now sues the company for damages for his detention and also for the expenses he was put to in stopping at the hotel in Macclesfield, and the cost of his journey the next morning to Congleton. The defendants relied on the general regulation set forth in their time tables, which is as follows:-" Time Bills.-The published train bills of this company are only intended to fix the time at which passengers may be certain to obtain their tickets for any journey from the various stations, it being understood that the trains shall not start before the appointed time. Every attention will be paid to ensure punctuality, as far as it is practicable; but the directors give notice that the company do not undertake that the trains shall start or arrive at the time specified in the bills; nor will they be accountable for any loss, inconvenience, or injury, which may The defendants asked for leave to appeal upon the ground that the expense of staying all night in Macclesfield was not recoverable. Leave was granted on that point. MR. JUSTICE BLACKBURN AND THE WE extract from the Cambridge Independent arise from delays or detention. The right to by the learned judge, with such great surprise and |