ALTHOUGH the elevation of Mr. Hall to the Chancery Bench meets with undoubted approval, yet there is a somewhat strong feeling amongst solicitors that the claims of older and equally competent men have been overlooked. Mr. Glasse, Q.C., Mr. Amphlett, Q.C., and Mr. Southgate, Q.C., are named as such. There is a report, for which we cannot vouch, that Mr. Hall, during the vacation, was occupied, at the country seat of the Lord Chancellor, with laborious work connected with legal measures which have been or will be submitted to the Legislature.

in the constitution of the society brought about | the law at present stands, a magistrate has no
by the new charter and bye-laws proceeds, "your power to order the production of the prisoner
It is, however, very hard on
committee have no doubt that henceforward the before the coroner.
council will take a much more active lead in all
an accused person that to the double expense of a
matters that interest the Profession throughout defence in the two courts he must add that of an
the kingdom." The Vice-President on the occa- application to the Superior Court for a writ of
sion in question expressed "his gratification that habeas corpus, and very embarrassing to his soli-
the tendency of recent imperial measures had
been in the direction of placing solicitors on an
equality in regard to public appointments with
barristers of seven years' standing." We are
glad to hear it, and trust that such tendency may
become more perceptible.

THE delay in issuing commissions for oaths in the
common law courts has always been somewhat
excessive, and we are sorry to hear, that with a
number of London and country applications to the
judges to be so appointed, more delay than ever
may be expected, owing to the greater demand than
usual on the time of their Lordships. In applica.
tions made during the present week, we are told
that the commissions will not be ready for a
month at the least, perhaps two. This delay is the
more unfortunate, as when the Supreme Court of
Judicature Act comes into operation the mode of
issuing commissions for oaths generally, is likely
to undergo some material alterations.

citor to feel that he cannot have his client before the coroner under the above circumstances except by virtue of such writ.

A COMPLAINT reaches us that the copies of affi davits now issued from the chambers of the Common Law Judges are in many cases so badly written as to be hardly legible. A country solicitor has forwarded one of these, and we certainly think the complaint is very well founded if what is before us may be taken as a specimen. The idea conveyed to our minds is that some incompetent youth is set to work to copy affidavits at so much a day or week instead of their being entrusted to law stationers or writers. Solicitors have a right to expect that they should be so copied as to facilitate the despatch of business, not to impede it.

THE Master of the Rolls on a recent occasion

dealt somewhat summarily with the parties to a suit which, being the last cause on the paper on the day in question, was ordered to be struck out because neither counsel nor solicitors was present. His Honour added that he should require very

TE inconvenience which country solicitors experience who are in the habit of appearing in cogent reasons before he would consent to restore a magistrates' courts is very great in connection with the practice which often obtains of an accused person being committed to custody under remand, or for trial, before the finding of the Ar the annual meeting of the Incorporated Law coroner's jury. A very strong illustration of this Society of Liverpool held on the 5th inst., the is to be found in the case of Re Reardon, referred report, which was taken as read, after stating to by us in our last issue, page 36, where the that the number of members was 191, and after prisoner was by such committal prevented from referring to the legislation of the session, contained attending the inquiry before the coroner, although the following, on the subject of the organisation it was desired by the coroner himself that the of the Profession. "Your committee think it right to refer to the great advance made by the Incorporated Law Society of England towards this object." The report, after stating the alteration

prisoner should be called as a witness, and where
the prisoner's attorney swore that he was advised
and believed that it was necessary that his client
should be tendered as a witness. No doubt, as

cause to the paper struck out under such circumstances. No doubt his Honour has, since the commencement of Term, made great progress with his list, but the altered state of things in his court, as regards despatch of business, takes the Profession somewhat by surprise, and as it is probable that the parties to the cause in question have been long waiting for a hearing, and as, if not restored to the paper, it will probably be very many months before the cause is again reached, it is to be hoped that the suitors will not be thus severely dealt with owing to the neglect (if any) of their professional advisers. Solicitors will do well to watch more closely the cause list.

NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS. RENTCHARGE IN FEE-REAL ACTION-3 & 4 WILL. 4, c. 27, s. 36.-The old remedy by real action for the recovery of a rentcharge in fee having been abolished by s. 36 of 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 27, an action of debt is now maintainable therefor: (Thomas v. Sylvester and others, 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 290. Q. B.) SPECIFIC LEGACY-DIVIDEND - APPORTION. MENT ACT 1870.-The dividend on shares in a public company, partly earned before the testator's death, but declared afterwards, belongs entirely to the specific legatee of the shares; and the Apportionment Act 1870 does not introduce any new rule in this respect: (Whitehead v. Whitehead, 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 289. V.C. M.) PRACTICE-REVIVOR-BILL DISMISSED-PETITION OF APPEAL-SUBSEQUENT DEATH OF PLAIN. TIFF.-In a suit to obtain a declaration that the defendant was a trustee of certain real estate for the plaintiff, the bill was dismissed. The plaintiff presented a petition of appeal, but died before the appeal was heard. On the application of a person claiming to be a devisee of the plaintiff, that the sait might stand revived against the defendant, and that the petition of appeal might, if necessary, be amended, order made: (Chadwick v. Chardwick, 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 284. Chan.) LANDLORD AND TENANT LEASEHOLD INTEREST-YEARLY TENANCY.-Agreement entered into between A. and B., and signed by them, whereby A. "agreed to let" to B. a certain shop, at the yearly rental of £36;" and A. further agreed "not to give B. notice to quit as long as he continued to pay the rent when due." At the time of entering into the agreement, A. was a lessee of the shop for a term of years, of which about ten years remained unexpired: Held, that under the agreement, B. was not merely a yearly tenant, but had a right to remain in possession for the unexpired residue of A.'s term, as long as he paid his rent when due: (Re King's Leasehold Estates, 29 L. T. Rep. N.S. 288. V.C.M.)

have passed between the clerk of Mr. King and Mr. Shearman and his clerks at the interview in his office on the 8th April 1873. Mr. Shearman's version of what occurred was in effect this: That Mr. King's clerk then handed the authority to a clerk of Mr. Shearman's for Mr. Shearman's approval; that it was taken in to him, and returned to Mr. King's clerk, with an intimation that it would be all right if signed, when the latter said the signatures to it would be obtained. Those statements were corroborated. Mr. King's clerk, however, said that, after some general conversation, the authority was taken in to Mr. Shearman, who, as Mr. King's clerk was informed, perused it, but declined to give an opinion on it, and said he would require everything to be done in strict form. Mr. King's clerk was told Mr. Shearman declined to approve the authority. The clerk then left Mr. Shearman's office, saying, Well, then, he shall have everything in strict form." Mr. King's clerk in other respects denied the allegations of the other side, and his statements were corroborated by Mr. King and other witnesses.

Dickinson, Q.C. Finlay (of the Common Law Bar), and C. H. Turner, in support of the motion, contended that the issue of the writs was clearly wrongful and an injury to the applicants, for which they had a right to sue at law. As the applicants had a clear right of action, the court would not allow them to lose it by upholding these writs.

De Gex, Q.C. and Ingle Joyce, for King, opposed the motion, and submitted that the applicants' case rested on the assumption of the validity of a contract which could not be entered into. No solicitor could bind even his own clients not to issue execution within a given time. But here the applicants were not Mr. King's clients. Want of good faith on his part towards someone else's clients was out of the question. He had really been misled by Mr. Shearman. If the applicants were in any respect right in their views, they ought to have asked the court to exercise its summary jurisdiction over solicitors as its own officers. But the case was not one in which the court would exercise such a jurisdiction, and, on the whole of it, the motion should be refused with costs.

Lindley, Q.C. and Brooksbank were for the com.

Dickinson, Q.C. was heard in reply.

addressed to the company, to A. Furness, and the other shareholders in it; and to Mr. Nutt and Mr. Robert King, their respective solicitors; and to Mr. Robert King and his solicitor. The facts of the case were shortly these: In Dec. 1872, the applicants, who were two of the shareholders of the company, presented a petition to wind it up. The petition was heard on the 22nd Feb. 1873, and was dismissed with costs. The order directed payment by the petitioners to the company and the opposing shareholders, who were sixty-six in number, of their costs of the petition. The costs were taxed at 144. 18s. 3d., the taxing-master's certificate being dated the 4th April. On that day, Mr. King, the solicitor of the company, and the shareholders who had opposed the petition, wrote to Mr. Shearman, the solicitor of the petitioners, a letter, in which he said that unless he received the amount of the taxed costs in the course of the ensuing Monday he should proceed to enforce payment. That demand of payment was one which Mr. King was not entitled to make, the practice not enabling him to enforce payment until either the 17th April, or some later period. Mr. Shear. man, upon receipt of that letter, wrote to Mr. Hollington informing him of the taxation of the costs, and requesting to have a cheque for the amount by the next morning. Mr. Hollington called upon Mr. Shearman the next morning and gave him a cheque for the amount. That was on a Saturday; and on the following Monday, the 7th April, Mr. Shearman wrote to Mr. King, whereupon the latter sent on the next day, the 8th April, a clerk to Mr. Shearman with a form of authority for his approval-that being an authority from Mr. King's clients to pay the taxed costs to him as their solicitor. It was alleged on behalf of the applicants that, on the clerk taking to Mr. Shearman on that occasion the form of authority, it was approved by him, and returned to the clerk approved, and that the clerk stated the authority would be signed in a few days. On the other hand, it was alleged that Mr. Shearman rePLEA THAT DEFENDANT IS NOT EXECUTOR- fused to approve the authority, and that it was ADMINISTRATION SUIT.-A testator by his will re-delivered to the clerk, he being informed that appointed A. and B. his executors. A creditor's Mr. Shearman declined to give an opinion upon suit was instituted against the two executors for it, but would require everything to be in the administration of the testator's estate, and strict form, or to that effect; and that the the bill alleged, as the fact was, that one of the clerk did not say that the authority would be executors, B., had not proved the will or re-signed in a few days. There was no communica-pany. nounced probate. It also alleged that B. was tion between Mr. Shearman and Mr. King in the indebted to the testator's estate, and that A. was interval between the 8th April and the 23rd April. insolvent, and did not intend to enforce the debt On the 21st April Mr. King, as solicitor for the against B. By his answer B. disclaimed all in- company, issued the two writs again the goods terest, and offered to renounce. The plaintiff then of the applicant-the one against Mr. Hollington, amended his bill, introducing allegations with a directed to the sheriff of Middlesex, and the other view to interrogating B. as to his debt to the to the sheriff of Surrey, each for the sum of estate. To the amended bill B. put in a plea that £144 18s. 3d. The writs were lodged by Mr. he had by deed renounced probate before the bill King with the sheriffs, and both writs were exewas amended. Held (reversing the decision of cuted on the 22nd April. The officers were placed Malins, V.C.) that the plea could not be susin possession of the business premises of Mr. tained: (Morley v. White, 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 289. Hollington at about half-past five of the afterChan.). noon of that day, he not having cash in hand to pay the amount, and being unable to obtain it from his bankers; the officers were also placed in possession of Mrs. Hollington's private residence. Mr. Hollington having communicated with Mr. Shearman, paid, on the following morning, under protest, £154 4s. 9d., the amount of the costs, and £9 6s. 6d., the costs of the levy, to the officers. At the time of that payment Mr. Shearman and Mr. Hollington only knew of the execution directed to the sheriff of Middlesex, and had not heard of a writ having been issued to the sheriff of Surrey; but in the afternoon of the same day Mr. Shearman was informed by Mrs. Hollington of the execution levied on her premises. Mr. Shearman thereupon informed the officers in poses. sion of Mrs. Hollington's premises that he had paid the £154 4s. 9d., but the officers required payment of £4 0s. 6d., the expenses of the levy. Mr. Shearman was, on behalf of his client, Mrs. Hollington, obliged to pay, and accordingly did pay that sum in order to procure the withdrawal of the officers. On the same day Mr. Shearman wrote to Mr. King complaining of his conduct in issuing the writs as he had, thereby wantonly putting Mr. Shearman's clients to great and unnecessary damage, annoyance, and inconvenience, informing him of the payments which, under protest, he had made, and concluding by a request that Mr. King would let him have the promised authority and receipt signed by the shareholders, as also the master's certificate. That letter was delivered by Mr. Shearman's clerk to Mr. King, who thereupon stated that the only reply he had to make was that Mr. Shearman had better send the balance (30s.) due to him for copy affidavits on the petition. Mr. King did not send any other reply. There was no further communication between the solicitors. Mr. Shearman gave the notice of motion, which, as amended, was to the effect above stated. The motion came on to be heard on the 13th inst., and the arguments occupied the court during that and the following day. A great deal of evidence was adduced on both sides, but a brief reference to a small portion of it is all that is here necessary. A principal discussion in the case arose upon what was alleged to

TAXATION OF COSTS-OUTPORT CHARGESAGENT NOT ATTORNEY OR PROCTOR-REVISION -SEPARATE BILLS OF COSTS.-The practice, which has hitherto obtained in the High Court of Admiralty, of presenting separate bills of costs for the London proctor's charges and for the outport or country agency charges, is now objectionable and must be discontinued for the future. Although a proctor may employ an agent, who is not an attorney or solicitor, to act as clerk pro hac vice, for the purpose of collecting evidence in a cause, &c., in the outports, and may lawfully charge for the expenses incurred in respect of such agent, as agency charges made by such an agent for doing work which is essentially the work of a proctor, attorney, or solicitor, such as taking instructions for brief and drawing the same,' &c., will not be allowed upon taxation: (The City of Brussels, 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 312. Adm.)

66

VICE-CHANCELLOR HALL'S COURT.
Wednesday, Nov. 19.

Re THE COMMONWEALTH LAND, BUILDING, ES-
TATE, AND AUCTION COMPANY (LIMITED).
Solicitor and client-Writs of fi-fa issued against
good faith-Process.

THIS matter came on to be heard on a motion on
behalf of Mrs. Ann Hollington, and Mr. Alfred
Jordan Hollington. The notice of motion asked
that two writs of fieri facias, dated the 21st of
April 1873, issued by the above-named company
and Alfred Furness and others, shareholders in it,
and directors respectively, to the Sheriffs of
Middlesex and Surrey, against the goods and
chattels of the applicants, might be set aside, as
issued contrary to good faith, and that the com-
pany, A. Furness, and the other shareholders, or
Mr. Robert King might pay the costs of the
application. The notice asked, in the alternative,
that, if the court should think the writs ought
not to be set aside, then Mr. Robert King might
be ordered to pay to the applicants the damages,
costs, charges, and expenses attending the issuing
of the writs, and also the costs of and occasioned
by this application. The notice of motion was

The VICE-CHANCELLOR having at the conclusion of the arguments reserved his judgment, now delivered it. He stated the facts of the case as above set forth, and, after minutely commenting on the evidence, said he thought that upon it the correct conclusion was that the authority sent by Mr. King for approval by Mr. Shearman was ap proved by him, that Mr. King's clerk was informed that Mr. Shearman had approved it, that such clerk did state that the signatures would be ob tained and the authority furnished in a few days, and that Mr. King's clerk did not correctly inform him of what had occurred at the interview of the 8th April. If that was the correct conclusion it followed that the writs should not have been issued as they were issued, and that the applicants had established that they were issued contrary to good faith. Mr. King must be responsible, although he might not have been correctly informed by his clerk of what had occurred. The Vice-Chancellor had said that the writs should not have been issued. It was said on the arguments that what happened did not amount to an agreement not to issue execution at the time when it could, according to the practice of the court, be issued, but at most amounted only to a statement that the signaturcs would be procured if they could be procured, so as to allow of payment being made under the authority to Mr. King instead of to the parties; that payment to Mr. King would have been a good payment without the authority, and that Mr. King could not, as solicitor of the company, bind the company not to issue execution when execution could be issued. As to the construction thus put upon what passed at the interview, the Vice-Chancellor thought it was not correct. It was to be observed that Mr. King's clients were interested in obtaining payment before the time when a writ could be executed, and that what occurred provided for and contemplated such earlier payment-the applicants thus making a concession in favour of Mr. King's clients. Whether or not payment could without the authority have been properly and effectually made to Mr. King it was not necessary to determine, seeing that Mr. King and Mr. Shearman acted upon the view that the anthority was necessary. Mr. King had not as solicitor for his clients, authority to contract with the debtor after judgment that his clients would not enforce payment of their demand until a specified time; but he had, as the Vice-Chancellor thought, authority to arrange on their behalf for acceleration of payment. In Lovegrove v. White (L. Rep. 6 C. P. 444), Mr. Justice Smith said: "The attorney has, no doubt, control over the process of execution so far as such purpose is concerned; but that he has not complete control over it is

shown by the decision that if the debtor has been
taken on a ca. sa. he cannot consent to his dis-
charge, though in the case of a fi. fa. he can consent
to the withdrawal of it, as in Levy v. Abbott,
(4 Exch. 588). If it is for the advantage of the
client, he may accept payment of the debt by in-
stalments; but he cannot, I think, enter into a
binding agreement that execution shall not issue
for a given period of time." Mr. King, for his
clients, by his clerk presented the authority, and,
as the Vice-Chancellor considered, stated by such
clerk that it should be signed and forwarded in a
few days. Nevertheless, misled by the statement
of his clerk, Mr. King took no step whatever to
get the authority signed. He made no communi-
cation to Mr. Shearman that he was not doing so;
but the time for execution having arrived, he
issued the writs. The Vice-Chancellor could not
but regard the issuing of execution under such
circumstances as contrary to good faith-in say.
ing which he did not impute to Mr. King any
wilful wrongful act, he having received from his
clerk the version given to him of what occurred.
Mr. Shearman was led by Mr. King, acting
through his clerk, to believe that payment was to
be made to Mr. King after he had obtained the
due execution of the authority. Mr. Shearman,
therefore, properly abstained from paying the
costs, even after the time when execution could
issue for nonpayment thereof. The applicants now
asked that the writs might be set aside, they de-
siring to proceed at law against Mr. King or his
clients to recover damages. It was not, however,
alleged that the levying of the executions occasioned
any pecuniary loss to the applicants or either of
them. Annoyance there must have been, but the
Vice-Chancellor did not think that justice required
that the writs should be set aside. He thought
that the proper order to be now made was, under
all the circumstances, that Mr. King should pay
to Mr. Hollington the sum of £9 6s. 6d., the
amount of the costs paid by him through Mr.
Shearman to the Sheriff of Middlesex, and to Mrs.
Hollington the sum of £4 0s. 6d., the amount of
the costs paid by her through Mr. Shearman to
the Sheriff of Surrey, and also to pay the appli-
cants their costs of this motion. As regarded the
other respondents, he should not make any order
As to Mr. King, he considered
that he had jurisdiction to make him pay the costs
occasioned by his having issued execution under
the circumstances, as in the cases of Re Hogan
(3 Atk. 812); Aubrey v. Aspinall (Jac. 441);
Browne v. Davies (4 Jur. N. S. 683); Bayley v.
Buckland (1 Ex. 1). The company had filed an
affidavit of the liquidators of it (the company
being now in the course of being wound-up under
a voluntary winding-up), and that affidavit had
been replied to by Mr. King. In those affidavits
Mr. King and the liquidators were at variance as
to whether the latter sanctioned the writs of
execution. The Vice-Chancellor did not consider
it necessary to say which of the two parties, Mr.
King or the liquidators, was right as to that,
because he thought that under the circumstances
the order he had mentioned should be made
against Mr. King, although he was, he thought,
led to act as he did through not having been
accurately informed by his clerk of what occurred
at the interview on the 8th April, and because
he did not consider the case one for giving costs
to the company.

upon the motion.

Wednesday, Nov. 19.
LYALL V. FLUKER.

years ago, and that he was, therefore, entitled to
the benefit of the Statute of Limitations. In
1868 a suit of Weldhen v. Fluker (to which the
plaintiff Lyall was a party), was instituted with
reference to some of the matters now in
dispute between the parties to this suit, and a
decree was pronounced. The decision of the ques-
tions in this suit depended on this-whether an
insolvent could, after making of a vesting order,
and before his discharge, by any act or acknow-
ledgment of his-as, for example, by the signature
of his schedule and the filing of his affidavit-
alter the position of his creditors under the insol-
vency. The 9 Geo. 4, c. 14, and the 2 & 3 Will. 4,
c. 27, and several authorities, were cited in the
arguments. It will be sufficient for the purpose
of this report to refer very briefly to the 40th sec-
tion of the latter statute. By that section it is
provided that no action or suit shall be brought
to recover any sum of money secured by any
mortgage, judgment, or lien, or otherwise, charged
upon or payable out of any land, at law or in
equity, but within twenty years next after a pre-
sent right to receive the same shall have accrued
to some person capable of giving a discharge for
or release of the same, unless in the meantime
some part of the principal money or some interest
thereon shall have been paid, or some acknow-
ledgment of the right thereto shall have been
given in writing, signed by the person by whom
the same shall be payable, or his agents, to the
person entitled thereto, or his agent; and in such
case only within twenty years after such payment
or acknowledgment, or the last of them, if more
than one, was given.

Dickinson, Q.C. and Fielding Nalder were for
the plaintiff in the case.

Greene, Q.C. and Methold, for the defendant,

were not called on.

The VICE-CHANCELLOR, after an elaborate
examination of the authorities referred to in the
arguments, said the principal defence which had
been set up to the plaintiff's claim was the
Statute of Limitations. In reply to that the
plaintiff had relied on the effect of certain litiga-
tions in a suit of Weldhen v. Fluker, in which a
decree had been made, and by which it was said
the plaintiff here had been entitled to redeem the
property. But the questions argued now were
not raised in that suit. It might well be that
there might have been acknowledgments available
then, which would not be so now; and that,
although the statute could not then have been set
up, it might be so here. The proceedings in that
suit had no bearing on the questions at issue in
this one, which, in truth, depended on the 40th
section of the statute of the 3 & 4 Will.
4, c. 27. To that statute Lord St. Leonards
had given a most liberal interpretation-an inter-
pretation to which also the Vice-Chancellor ac-
ceded. But Lord St. Leonards was not dealing
with a case or cases similar to this. The statute
was one which shortened the time for setting up
titles to real estates; and although, no doubt, it
was to be construed liberally, the true policy of
it must never be lost sight of. That was to quiet
persons in the possession of their lands; and,
though construed liberally, it must not be so read
as to let in claims which the policy of it clearly, if
not expressly, excluded. Then what was there in
the present case to take it out of the operation of
the statute? An insolvent had, on his own petition,
obtained an order denuding himself of all interest
in his own property, and vesting it in trustees,
for the benefit of his creditors. Could it be said
that he might directly after such an act on his
own part, by any acknowledgment of his, take
from his creditors that property which he had
deliberately made theirs, and which, but for such
acknowledgment on his part, was completely
theirs? So to hold would be most unreasonable.
The Vice-Chancellor then referred to the section
as above stated, and continued: Who was the
person by whom the money was-for the purposes
of the Act, and of this suit-payable? The object
of this suit was, it must be remembered, to try
the title to land. Then, by whom, and to whom,
was the money payable? By the assignee in the
insolvency to the owners of the land. It was not
He was not,
payable by the debtor himself.
therefore, the person contemplated by the statute.
Whatever might have been the effect of the
debtor's acknowledgments under other circum.
stances-if, for example, the insolvency had been
at an end when it was given-was another ques-
tion altogether. But as the case now stood, he
must hold that the plaintiff had failed to establish
his case, and that his bill in this suit must be dis-
missed, with costs.

Clarke.-My Lords, I have just been instructed to show cause, but I am in this position-that the office copies have not been taken of the affidavits that were used in support of the rule, nor has notice been given of the affidavits on which I now show cause. Under those circumstances I can only ask your Lordships to allow the matter to be enlarged until next Term.

KEATING, J.-What is the excuse for not instructing you before?

Clarke. I have heard of none.

Garth.-The rule was moved in January last, and at the request of the Law Institution, at my instance, it has been enlarged at some intervals to the present time.

DENMAN, J.-Not January, it was in May. pended from practice in this court for two years, Garth.-This gentleman has been already susby a rule in January, and now this is an entirely different offence which was brought before the court, for misappropriating a sum of £50 that was handed to him by a gentleman in July last year, for paying probate duty. I applied for the rule in April, and at Mr. Biddles' own request, it has been enlarged by the Law Society up to this time; and upon the last occasion there was the usual rule drawn up-that any affidavits he had to file in before the Term, and this is the first intimation answer to the application should be filed a week we have received.

Clarke. If I were allowed to go into the facts I think there are matters upon the affidavits before me on which I should ask your Lordships to go into the question.

KEATING, J.-What was the nature of the charge?

66

Garth.-A gentleman in July last year entrusted him with £50 to pay probate duty. Instead of paying it, he received the money and misappro priated it. He was applied to over and over again for the money, and at last representations were by other solicitors, who were instructed to apply made to the Law Society, and Mr. Williamson accusation against him, and asked what answer wrote to him a letter, in which he told him the he had to it, and this is the answer that he makes in February 1873, the money having been paid to received the cheque from this gentleman an him the previous July. Sir,-At the time I attachment was issued against me, compelling and ultimately, when going there, I was taken and me to absent myself from my office for some time, imprisoned for upwards of six weeks. In consequence my business became neglected, nor could I get money from many people who were indebted known, and I was pressed on all sides, and, to me. The fact of my imprisonment became although I made every effort, I could not raise the money to repay. Had I been left alone I should have done so." That is his explanation.

Clarke. There were fees owing to Mr. Biddles.
KEATING, J.-So he says.

Clarke. For business done by him.
KEATING, J.-At all events, this is a gentleman
who thoroughly knows the practice of the court.
The rule has been enlarged from the 30th May
last, he does not take out copies of the affidavits,
and five minutes before the case comes on he
hands a brief to the learned counsel, without
putting him in the situation of being heard. He
does not even come here to attempt to take out
copies, or to see how matters are going; in fact,
he appears to me to treat the court, or at least the
proceedings, with something very like contempt.
We see no reason why the rule should not be made
absolute to strike him off the rolls.

Re JOHN STAINER JONES.
Garth, C.-In this case, my Lords, I have to
move that the rule be made absolute. It was a
rule calling upon the attorney to shew cause why
he should not be struck off the rolls, and there is
no cause shown. The rule was obtained in June
last.

KEATING, J.-Is it to strike him off the rolls?
Garth.-Yes, my Lord.

KEATING, J.-What was the ground of the

rule?

Mortgage-Redemption Statute of Limitations. THE plaintiff in this case filed his bill for (inter alia) an account of what was due to him for principal, interest, and costs in respect of certain judgment debts and equitable charges, or mortgages, on some land at Shorne, in the county of Kent. It appeared from the bill that on the 21st May 1841, and the 24th Dec. in the same year, William Neely gave the plaintiff two warrants of attorney, with defeasances, to secure to him, by means of the land in Kent, the repay. ment of two sums of £500 and £1000, with interest. In that year the plaintiff obtained judg. ment against William Neely for £1000 and costs, and in 1813 a judgment for £2000 and costs. Those judgments were duly registered and reregistered, and were so for the last time on the 13th Feb. 1867. In 1849 William Neely took the benefit of the Act for the Relief of Insolvent Debtors, and the defendant was appointed his assignee. On the 17th March 1849, the Insolvent Court made the usual vesting order, on the petition of William Neely. In the schedule filed and signed by him in the insolvency, and after the making of the vesting order, he admitted the debts due from him to the plaintiff. Moreover, in an affidavit sworn by him on the 4th Aug. 1852, in the insolvency, he also stated the (Before KEATING, BRETT, GROVE, and DENMAN, to be paid over again. Another case was, he was

APPLICATIONS AGAINST ATTORNEYS.
COURT OF COMMON PLEAS, Nov. 11.

JJ.)

Re JOHN HENRY BIDDles.

debts due from him to the plaintiff. The defendant
denied the due registration of the judgments; he
also claimed to be entitled to the lands, in priority Garth, Q.C.-In this case, my Lords, a rule was
to the plaintiff, and he insisted that the debts and obtained to strike an attorney off the rolls, and
equitable charges were all dated more than twenty' I shall ask that the rule may be made absolute.

Garth.-There were no less than four charges against him. He has shown no cause and has filed no affidavits. There were four cases against him. One was, a writ was sent to him for service, and for service only, without any authority to receive the money. He told the person upon whom he served the writ that he had better pay the money, and the money was paid, £34, for which he never accounted. About four months afterwards another writ was served upon the debtor at the suit of the same person, and then it turned out that this man had received the money, and had not accounted for it and the money had

employed by a schoolmistress, near Bristol, to collect a sum of money for her, £10, which he collected, but he never let her know anything about receiving the money, and appropriated it to himself. There are two other cases, one a case

of probate duty, and the other was an application for one of the arbitrators for the arbitrator's fees, and the arbitrator never authorised him to apply. The arbitrator applied afterwards and the money had to be paid twice over, because this money had been misappropriated.

KEATING, J.-You had better call him. Mr. John Stainer Jones was called three times by the officer of the court, and there was no reply.

KEATING, J.-Then let the rule be made absolute to strike him off the rolls.

Re JAMES JONATHAN THORNLEY.

No. 19, South Wharf-road, term 48 years-sold for £235.
Wednesday, Nov. 18.

By Messrs. HARDS and VAUGHAN, at the Mart.

tation, containing 604 acres, with plant and live stock-
sold for £6500.

By Messrs. BONHAM and Sox.

De Beauvoir Town.-The lease of the Perseverance Tavern,
term 49 years-sold for £1850.
Dalston.-Nos. 9 and 10, Gayhurst-villas, term 71 years-
sold for £450.

By Messrs. RUSHWORTH, ABBOTT, and Co.
Mount-street. - No. 7, Bell-yard, term 13 years-sold for
Fitzroy-square.-No. 35, Fitzroy-street, term 12 years-sold

£450.

one.

justified a liberal payment to counsel, this was It was not a very large fee, but the master has reduced it. It is a question of principle, of great and grave importance, not only to the Bar, but to the public; it is conceded that the attorney for the petitioner was acting for the benefit of his client, and that being conceded I think it of the last importance to the public that when a solicitor thinks fit to give a proper remuneration to a counsel, his authority should not be treated with levity and set aside. I think no taxing-master, whether of this or any other court, can be as good a judge as a respectable solicitor acting bona fide for his client. He has means of knowing what is just to the Bar, taking into account the merit of the counsel he thinks fit to employ. We

Garth, Q.C.-My Lords,-In this case I am going St. Christopher.-A sugar estate, known as Godwin's plan- think this was a most proper fee, both in amount to make an application to your Lordships that the rule should be discharged, but I think I ought to tell your Lordships what the nature of the application is, in order that you may deal with it, notwithstanding we have not been able to serve the defendant. The Court of Exchequer have sus. pended him from practice for two years, and the Court of Queen's Bench have done the same thing. In this court the rule is that all the materials in the other courts should be brought here, that your Lordships may deal with it as they did, or as you please. Mr. Thornley is, so far as we can ascertain, in America at the present time, and I should ask your Lordships to deal with it as the other courts have dealt with it, and suspend him for two years, or else to discharge the rule, whatever your Lordships think right. We have not been able to serve him, and there is no doubt he is abroad.

BRETT, J.-Why should it not be postponed ? Garth, Q.C.-Of course we can enlarge the rule. I do not know that that is of any advantage, except to myself and my learned friend. If he comes back another application can be made; it is merely to prevent my coming to the court every Term, or twice every Term, and asking your Lordships to enlarge the rule. If you allow the rule to be struck out that will be the best course. KEATING, J.-Then at your request we strike it out.

Correspondence.

UNQUALIFIED PRACTITIONERS Deeming it the duty of every solicitor to make known to the Profession every attempt he observes, by persons not solicitors to usurp the province of those who are, I beg to call attention, through your valuable medium, to the enclosed advertisement which is repeated week after week in the Rugby Gazette and Midland Times. Possibly it is not so flagrant an invasion of the rights of the Profession as many others, but I think the whole system of such invasion, for, undoubtedly, it has now become a system, ought to be crushed; and I avail myself of this opportunity of giving to the legal world this notice, in the hope that the accumulated showing up of these advertisements may induce some solicitors of ample means to take the matter up in earnest. GEORGE ASHMALL.

The following is the advertisement so properly complained of, with certain omissions, and which we commend to the notice of the Legal Practitioners Society:

COMMERCIAL INQUIRY OFFICE.

Head Office:-Cheapside. Branches:-Manchester, Blackburn, Leicester, Edinburgh, Newcastle, Glasgow, Cork, Dublin. In the interests of trade, and at a heavy expenditure of time and capital, these Offices have been established. What members are entitled to for £3 38 :-Entitled to -Legal advice at any time, or any number of times, free of charge, on any commercial question. Debts applied for, subject to commission.

Our system of Debt Collecting is much approvedNo spending of good money after bad; special facilities in County Courts; judgment against debtor in twelve days; attendance to prove debt unnecessary; commission 5 per cent. under £20, 24 per cent. above. A carefully revised list of swindlers, with their latest aliases is kept at this office. NOTICE.-In this office, a debt, after application is made, is not left to die a natural death. Prompt, efficient, and voluntary advice is given to subscribers as to best means of recovering same. If in London, a clerk waits upon him (in the country, by post) and obtains from him such instructions as will enable us to recover debt without any further trouble to subscriber, and without any attendance of subscriber being necessary. Termas:-£3 38., £5 58., and £10 10s. and upwards, per annum. N.B.-Banks and their Branches contracted for.

To Correspondents.

STUDENT.-Wharton's Law Lexicon, price 2 guineas.
A COUNTRY ARTICLED CLERK.-You cannot quit the service
of your principal without his sanction. It is an omission
in your articles. No doubt the almost invariable practice
is to allow an articled clerk to serve the last twelve months
in the office of the London agent, but this gives you no
right to require it -ED.
INQUIRER.-See Order No. 3, issued by the authority of the
judges, on the 31st Jan. 1863, pursuant to 23 & 24 Vict. c.
127, 8. 5, 8 and 9. You must present yourself for examin
ation (intermediate) in one of the two Terms next before
or after one-half of your term of service. Communicate
with the Registrar of Attorneys, Law Institution, Chan-
cery-lane. The questions and answers for the last ex-
amination can be obtained of Messrs. Evison and Bridge,
law stationers, Chancery-lane.-ED. SOLA. DEPT.

for £450.

ELECTION LAW.

and in principle. As to the item of the subpoenas, which is an item of very considerable magnitudo, we see no reason to doubt the statement of Mr. Concannon that it would be dangerous to serve subpanas with more names than one. But it is stated by the master that there was an agreement that subpoenas should be allowed for each two witnesses; the matter was quite in his discretion and we decline to interfere. As to the item of fees on the briefs of counsel, I apply all I said before to this. 150 guineas were given to each of the leading counsel; but this was cut down. I will again refer to the judgment of Bovill, C.J., in the Southampton case. The first question argued there was as to the fees allowed to the leading and junior counsel. If these fees were allowed as being a uniform standard of allowance without reference to the particular case, we think this course would be wrong, and that the master ought to exercise his judgment in each case, but at the same time we see no objection to the master adopting such a scale as an average for ordinary cases.' This was an extraordinary case. The master allowed 100 guineas as the usual fee. He should have exercised his discretion. There should be no uniform rule in a case of such magnitude. As to the consultation fees and refreshers, we do not think they should have been reduced, but we decline to interfere with the discretion of the master as to the number of consultations. As to the shorthand writer's notes, nothing delays the case so much as taking down the evidence. The machinery for taking down the evidence, by means of shorthand writers, was provided by the Legislature. During the whole of this case there was constant reference made to the shorthand writers notes which were in the possession of counsel, and after all this are we to come to the conclusion that shorthand writers are not to be paid for by the parties? We think they should be paid for, but not as charges for brief, but specifically what was paid for them should be allowed, and the attorney's expenses incident to procuring them. It was said that three counsel were allowed, and that they should take down the notes. I think when a counsel is in a case he should act as counsel and not as a mere note-taker. As to the expenses of the witnesses, the regis trar's certificate is not indispensable, the master should allow all witnesses, bona fide summoned, no matter whether they were examined or no. We think the party is not bound to examine every witness he summons. As to the objection that the registrar did not give his certificate till after the judge's term of office expired, our previous decision renders it unnecessary to decide this point; but we have doubt that the registrar plication of the respondent to reduce the taxation As to the ap. could give his certificate even now. of the master, one of the items was to disallow the fees paid to counsel for daily consultations where it did not appear that difficult points or trial. If that was so, the master would have had unexpected complications had arisen during the to have retried not only the Galway Election Petition, but also have decided what matters required consultations. As to the witnesses who were examined to prove treating, the report of the re-judge was generally against the respondent, and we decline to go behind that. MORRIS and LAWSON, JJ. concurred.

ELECTION PETITION COSTS.
In view of the coming general election it may be
interesting to our readers to peruse the judgments
in a case heard some time since in Dublin on the
above subject. It is the well-known case of
Nolan v. Trench. Keogh, J., said: "The gene-
ral principles upon which we should proceed in
this case are clearly laid down by Bovill, C.J.:
'It is impossible to lay down with exactness any
rule upon the subject, but generally it would seem
that all such costs should be allowed as a solicitor
would ordinarily incur in the conduct of his
client's business, excluding those extraordinary
costs which may have been occasioned either by
the default of the client, as by his incurring a
contempt, or by his express instructions as to
employ an unusual number of counsel. It appears
to us that the parties entitled to their costs under
the orders, were entitled to an indemnity for all
costs that were reasonably incurred by them in
the ordinary course of matters of this nature, but
not to any extraordinary or unusual expenses in-
curred in consequence of over-caution or over-
anxiety as to any particular case, or from con-
sideration of any special importance arising
from the rank, position, wealth, or character,
of either of the parties, or any special desire
on his part to ensure success. We think
also that such extraordinary costs as an attorney
would not be justified in incurring without dis-
tinct and special instructions from his client,
ought not to be allowed, nor the costs of purely
collateral proceedings, upon which a party has
failed, nor those which may have been occasioned
by his default, negligence, or mistake:' (Southamp-
ton case, L. Rep. 5 C. P. 182.). I will first take the
petitioner's notice and his objections to the taxa-
tion. The first item of importance contained in
the affidavit of Mr. Concannon, the petitioner's
agent, was the retainers to counsel. The peti-
tioner retained two leading counsel, giving them
each ten guineas before the petition was filed, in
order to secure their services. There was much
cannot see the principle on which the master
discussion on the principle of these retainers. We
took five guineas off one, and allowed no
retainer to the other counsel. I think there
is some doubt as to whether this retainer did
We were referred to the rules of the Bar which were
not retain the services of the counsel for life.
adopted at a meeting of the Bar held on 3rd May,
1864, and by them it appeared that a fee of five
guineas was sufficient to retain any member of
the Bar for a particular court or circuit where he
ordinarily practised, but the retaining fee to
tain a counsel in every case was understood and
was there laid down to be ten guineas. That is
necessary to retain a counsel before a suit was
instituted. This jurisdiction did not exist at all at
the time these rules were passed. These inquiries
are almost invariably held in a remote part of
the country. We do not think that this retainer
comes at all within the descriptive particulars
'court or circuit where the member of the Bar
usually practised,' and, therefore, we think that
the attorney for the petitioner was perfectly
justified in securing the services of these counsel,
whom he, in the exercise of his discretion, thought
necessary for the proper conduct of his case,
and he was quite entitled to give them ten
guineas each. We are of opinion that this
item should be allowed, and we will send it
back for retaxation. The next item is the case
laid before the senior counsel to advise proofs.
Twenty guineas were paid for this, which was
cut down by the master to fourteen guineas; we
cannot see on what principle. If there ever was
a case, the magnitude and importance of which

THE BENCH AND THE BAR.

CALLS TO THE BAR.

LINCOLN'S-INN. - John Morley, Esq., B.A., Oxford; Frank Pownall, Esq., M.A., Oxford; Sebastian Evans, Esq., M.A. and LL.D., Cam bridge; Arthur Griffith Poyer Lewis, Esq., B.A., Oxford; John Reeve Brooke, Esq., B.A., Oxford; George Burvill Rashleigh, Esq., B.A., Oxford; George Broke Freeman, Esq., B.A., Cambridge; Robert Wood Smith, Esq., B.A. and S.C.L., Oxford; Frederick Ernest Muntz, Esq., B.A., Cam. bridge; Thomas Herbert Robertson, Esq., B.A., Oxford; Alexander Henry Patterson, Esq., B.A., Cambridge; Henry Nicholas Courtney. Esq., LL.B., Cambridge; Arthur Horatio Poyser, Esq., B.A., Oxford; Edward Bellasis, Esq.; George Montagu Worthington, Esq., B.A., Cambridge;