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the estate was not all the separate estate of Crankshaw. Lord Chancellor CRANWORTH said, "When two partners are bankrupts, all the property must go in payment of all the creditors. In the administration of bankruptcy it has been the object from the earliest times to apportion the estate as fairly as possible between the joint and the separate creditors. There is often much difficulty in doing this satisfactorily, but some rules have been clearly laid down, for instance, that the joint property pays the joint creditors and the separate property pays the separate creditors." His Lordship then held that as Crankshaw suffered Rowland to trade in the name of the firm, any persons trading with him were entitled to say that Rowland and Crankshaw were the persons with whom they dealt, and that the goods were joint goods.

In the next place, assume that there is a partnership but no joint estate. The law is clear that the joint creditors rank as separate creditors against the separate estates of the respective partners; but the existence of any joint estate, however smalland though it appear that after payment of costs there will be nothing to distribute-prevents the joint creditors from proving against the separate estate. Yet, if the joint estate is so situated that it cannot be made available for the payment of the creditors, it will be regarded as though it did not exist.

There being a partnership clearly established, the next important consideration arises where one partner only becomes bankrupt. As regards the separate estate of the bankrupt partner, the rule is that until separate creditors are satisfied, joint creditors cannot prove against it. They may, however, prove under a separate adjudication, and may vote at any meeting of creditors. There are some exceptions to the general rule which are thus stated by Mr. Robson: If a joint creditor obtains a separate adjudication against one partner, he will be allowed to prove in competition with separate creditors, on the ground that as the adjudication is for their benefit, and he is precluded by petitioning from suing for his own debt, it would be inequitable not to let him come in with the separate creditors. And this privilege will be allowed to the petitioning creditor although the bankrupt may be separately indebted to him in an amount sufficient to sustain the adjudication. It will also be allowed, although as to part of the dividends received, the petitioning creditor may be a trustee for a joint creditor who, according to the general rule, could only prove as a joint creditor.

The operation of the rule prohibiting joint creditors from proving against the separate estate, was discussed by the Lords Justices in Lacey v. Hill; re Bailey's Claim (28 L. T. Rep. N. S. 86), in which Lord Justice James recognised the "number of nice and complicated questions arising from the rules in bankruptcy as respects joint and separate estates." His Lordship observed that the rules which have been laid down are rough rules of justice, because some rule must be laid down for the purpose of keeping joint and separate estates distinct, and for paying the joint and separate creditors out of the one and the other.' Before noticing the point in that case, it is necessary to look at Ex parte Topping (12 L. T. Rep. N. S. 3) which dealt with the right of a co-partner to prove against the estate of his insolvent partner. That is an important question, as affecting the rights of creditors, and Lord Westbury said that the established rule that a co-partner cannot be admitted to prove against the estate of his partner until the joint debts are satisfied, was intended for the benefit of joint creditors: and in cases where that intention fails, and the joint creditors are not benefited by the operation of the rule, the rule itself will cease. And he held that where the estate of a co-partner could not by possibility yield a surplus, the partner was entitled to prove-as he would not be thereby paying himself out of money which might be due to the joint creditors. Lacey v. Hill is the converse of the above, in which it was sought to take from the separate estate of an insolvent partner to pay the joint debts of the firm. A. was a partner in a banking firm, and on his becoming treasurer of a board of guardians, his partner B., and C. who was not a partner, became his sureties. The bank stopped payment, and A. died three days afterwards, and a suit was instituted in Chancery to administer his estate. The other partners in the firm were adjudicated bankrupts. A.'s joint and separate estates were both insolvent, but B.'s separate estate was solvent. When the bank stopped payment over £5000 was standing to the credit of the guardians. C. paid this amount in full, and was repaid a moiety of it out of B.'s separate estate, having previously been admitted to prove in the Chancery suit for the whole £5000. He also proved against the joint estate of the firm for the second moiety of the £5000. The trustee in B.'s separate bankruptcy sought to prove against A.'s separate estate for the moiety of the £5000 repaid to C. out of B.'s separate estate, but the Lord Justices refused the application on the ground that in reality the partnership received the money and owed it to the guardians. Lord Justice Mellish said that there was 66 a sort of joint and several liability." And here we get at the third class of partnership bankruptcies. First, we have a partnership bankrupt with and also without joint estate; secondly, one partner only bankrupt; and thirdly, the partnership bankrupt and a contest between separate estates of different partners over what is a "joint and several liability." As to this third head Lord Justice Mellish said: "It would be a violation of

every principle of equity that the joint estate, whose default was the origin of the whole difficulty, should get from the private estate of one of the partners that which would be to the prejudice of the separate creditors of that partner, and thus to enlarge the funds of the joint estate which has already received the whole of the guardians' balance.”


ALL attempts to render the transfer of land inexpensive and the title to it more secure, have hitherto signally failed. Several of our most learned lawyers have tried to unravel the difficulty, but with different degrees of non-success, and the existing system of land registry is a farce played at a cost of ten times the fees received.

Why have there been so many failures? Do the present body of landowners hope to keep their number select by allowing the cost of obtaining the article to be far heavier than there would seem any occasion, and by keeping up the wholesome dread that a person who has bought and paid, probably dearly, for land has to run the risk of some one turning up with a better title to it than he has obtained? We think no cost nor dread of the kind will prevent people buying land when they can get it, although it is in most cases one of the worst pecuniary investments to be obtained, the return upon the outlay being in most cases less than it would have been had the money been invested in Consols.

There are two matters to be solved-one, the title of the holder is to be made quite secure; and, two, the mode of transfer is to be simplified. Everyone who has had experience in conveyancing knows that in every large property a great number of persons, born and unborn, are interested, and that it sometimes happens that a person whose name has been inserted in the settlement as a remote beneficiary, comes into possession. In all large settlements, the husband, the lord of the soil, has a life estate, his wife a jointure secured by a term of years given to trustees; then the eldest son has an estate given to him which he is capable of converting into absolute ownership, but which, if he allows matters to remain, will devolve on his eldest son, and so on ad infinitum. Younger sons and daughters are provided for by means of the term of years, under which the trustees can raise portions by a sale or mortgage. The property, in case there happens to be no children, is then generally settled upon the brothers and the other remoter relations of the lord and their children, estates for life only being given to persons in existence, to whom are also given powers of jointuring wives and portioning children.

To make the title to landed property quite secure, one of two steps must be taken; either all limited estates, and the power to create new ones, must be swept away; or else, which appears more rational, there should be two kinds of estates as at present, viz., legal and equitable estates; the former should always be absolute, with full powers of selling, letting, and otherwise dealing with the land, without the slightest reference to the interest of any person beneficially entitled. The equitable estate should, subject to dealings therewith by the person in whom the legal estate is vested, entitle the beneficiaries to the enjoyment of the property and the rents and profits; but as regards the land itself, the beneficiaries should have no estate or claim, except whilst it is held by the trustee. In the event of any dealing with the property of which the beneficiaries disapproved, they should, except in the case of actual fraud, have a remedy only against the trustee personally.

To simplify the transfer of land, registration is absolutely neces sary. A registration of dealings, as at present in force in Middlesex and Yorkshire, is totally useless for the purpose, the sole object there being to prevent fraudulent dealings, and the effect being to increase the expense of each transfer. What is wanted is a system by which it can be shown at once who is the person legally entitled to sell and to confer an indefeasible title, and this can only be done by a compulsory system of registration, under which all land will appear, together with the name of the person authorised to seli.

Such a system, although expensive, would not be impossible. In cases where land is settled, the trustees should be entered as the owners; and where there are no trustees, the person or persons to be so entered should be the nominee or nominees of the tenant for life and remainderman.

To prevent expense there should be two registers, one provisional, the other absolute. To get placed upon the latter, an applicant should prove that he, or the person or persons for whom he is a trustee, had or have a saleable title, or that he has been upon the former register for five years, and no steps have been taken to remove his name. To get placed upon the former register, an applicant should prove that he or his beneficiary has a prima facie holding title.

Registration appears to us to be principally a question of expense. Should the public bear it or should the landowners? The object of registration is to make titles more secure and easier of transfer, and the practical effect will be to increase the value of land by at least the amounts now paid by the seller and purchaser, for the expenses of the transfer, less a certain per centage, which will be payable upon future transfers.

What matters it to the large majority of landowners that they may get short and absolute titles to their properties, under which they can easily deal with them, when their present titles are matters of public notoriety. Their ancestors have held the lands for ages, and their fondest wish is to keep them in the family. Instead of making lands more saleable, they would prefer a law of perpetual entail, and in the absence of such a law they do all in their power to prevent a sale, by prevailing upon their eldest sons, at the earliest convenient opportunity, to resettle the land. And, again, other persons have bought land with a desire to found families, and they do not wish to have it sold or made easily saleable.

To whom, then, would a system of registration be acceptable? Not to the public who hold no land, for the selling value of land would be proportionately increased; nor to the ordinary holder of land, because of the expense of registration. The only persons who would derive advantage are the owners of building estates and land jobbers. Why should the public be taxed for the benefit of these individuals, or why should all landowners be put to a heavy expense in registering because the system will be beneficial to a few of their number?

If the public are not to be benefited by registration, it seems only fair that they should not have to bear the expense of it, and it seems hard to throw the expense upon the landowners, who can have no delight in the results of the scheme. If, however, it be considered that the public will be benefited, they have clearly a right to demand that the system shall be compulsory, and, therefore, more likely to be self-supporting.

The question appears to be one for the landowners to settle amongst themselves. If they want to feel more secure in their titles, than they do at present, or to feel that they can transfer their property more quickly and inexpensively than they are at present able to do, they have only to speak out, and, doubtless, a satisfactory system will be soon brought forward; but in coming to any determination, they must bear in mind that the preliminary expenses of any system of registration will necessarily be heavy, and will fall upon themselves.




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In this state of uncertainty as to the effect of the Vice-Chancellor's judgment in Avery v. Griffin, it becomes necessary to refer to other cases. Nickoll v. Jones (15 L. T. Rep. W. S. 383), before Vice-Chancellor Wood, bears upon the question. There a compromise was entered into between the plaintiff and defendant in a probate suit, and an agreement signed by plaintiff and by one of the defendants, the husband, "for himself and wife," and by A. B. as attorney for the wife." Interest in land of the wife was affected by the agreement, and though it had been made a rule of court, the Vice-Chancellor said the agreement could not be enforced because it was not acknowledged by the wife. The reporter's note is as follows: "No contract entered into by a married woman with a person who knows her to be married otherwise than by deed acknowledged, or by some act in court in which she is put at arm's length from her husband, can bind her real estate, even though she has for a long time led the other party to believe that she will abide by such contract, and he has on the faith of such belief irrevocably abandoned valuable rights." In the course of his judgment the Vice-Chancellor said, The law had pointed out one way, and one way only, in which a married woman could bind her rights in real estate." This case disposes completely of the supposition that the element wanting in Avery v. Griffin was the consent of the husband. But there is the case of Wilkinson v. Castle (18 L. T. Rep. N. S. 100), decided by ViceChancellor Stuart, whose decision was affirmed by the Lords Justices on appeal, which seems to set at rest any ambiguity as to the effect of Avery v. Griffin. During coverture the wife became devisee in fee of certain property. The husband and wife entered into an agreement between themselves of the one part, and the purchaser of the other part, for the sale of the property. The agreement was signed by the husband and wife, and by the purchaser. There was some delay in preparing the conveyance deed, though the purchaser got into possession of the property, and the husband and wife sold through another solicitor to a third person and conveyed by deed acknowledged. The second purchaser filed a bill against the first purchaser in possession, praying for a declaration, that he was entitled to the property in question; the defendant set up his agreement claiming a prior equity; but it was held by the Vice-Chancellor, and also on appeal, that as he knew he was contracting to purchase the wife's estate, he took nothing under the agreement, and could not even compel the husband to convey his interest and receive an abated price. The defendant's counsel admitted that he could not ask for the performance of the contract so far as it affected the wife's fee simple, but only to the extent of the husband's estate by the curtesy. And in the judgment the Vice-Chancellor remarked "that the defendant claimed by an agreement of which it is impossible that he could obtain a decree for specific performance."

It would seem, therefore, that the ground of the decision in Avery v. Griffin, is based not upon the non-compliance with the 4th section of the Statute of Frauds, nor upon the fact of the husband not being an express party, but upon the doctrine that when a feme covert and her husband enter into a contract to convey her real estate, such an interest in land passes to the contractee, as to contravene the provisions of the Statute for the Abolition of Fines and Recoveries.

Ir is laid down in the last edition of Chitty on Contracts (1871, p. 179) that where an estate is devised to a woman in trust for sale, and she afterwards marries, she cannot, during the coverture, bind herself by contract to convey the estate so devised to her in trust. This doctrine is founded upon a case decided by ViceChancellor Giffard in 1868 (Avery v. Griffin, 18 L. T. Rep. N. S. 849; L. Rep. 6 Eq. 606), and it will be necessary to note the leading points therein in order to correctly interpret this doctrine of disability. There were three trustees with power to sell real estate, and one of them at the date of the will was a spinster. Before the exercise of the power the spinster married. other trustees and the married trustee, with her husband, gave to a solicitor ordinary verbal instructions to sell the trust estate by auction; and he accordingly entered into an agreement with the purchaser, as agent of the vendors, in the usual form, though the married trustee and her husband had not conferred upon him express authority to sign the agreement on their behalf. The vendors discovering that the estate had been sold at an under value, repudiated the agreement for sale on the ground that one of the trustees had become since her appointment a married woman, and therefore incompetent to act; and alleging that there was consequently no contract of sale with the purchaser. The purchaser filed a bill to enforce his contract, but the Vice-Chancellor held that he could not obtain specific performance of it upon the ground that "a feme covert could not bind himself by contract to convey an estate devised to her in trust for sale." This important judgment, couched in such general language, is somewhat ambiguous, and at first sight one is inclined to suppose that the Vice-Chancellor had regard to the facts of the particular case upon which he was adjudicating, and more particularly as neither the married woman nor her husband were express parties to the contract. The LAW TIMES reporter seems to have adopted this view, for in the Notes of New Decisions on Conveyancing (22nd Aug. 1868), referring to this case, he says: "It was objected that the contract was void because the husband of the married trustee had not assented to it, and so it was held." The Law Journal reporter, in his note of the case, says: "Bill for specific performance against trustees one of whom was a married woman, dismissed, as the feme covert could not bind herself by | NOTE-A continuation of the Specimens of Codification of the law of contract to convey."

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This appears to be a subject which has not received at the hands of the Profession the attention which it deserves. It is a matter of constant occurrence that the solicitor of a feme covert vendor goes to a sale and signs the contract as her agent in the ordinary form, and the purchaser's solicitor is content therewith. Where a husband and wife entitled in her right, or trustees, one of whom is a feme covert, seek to sell real estate, it is seemingly advisable to have executed when practicable, a conveyance upon trust to sell duly acknowledged by the married woman, but it is not quite clear what course should be taken in the case of those instruments where it has been held that there is no power to delegate a trust for sale.


The Statutes Revised. Vol. IV., from 41 Geo. 3, to 51 Geo. 3, 1801-1811. London: EYRE AND SPOTTISWOODE.

THIS Volume covers only ten years, but the chronological table preceding the text shows how vast an amount of cumbrous matter has been got rid of by the revision. The work is printed in the same admirable manner which has characterised the publica


Marine Insurance will be found under "MARITIME LAW."


THE Legal Practitioners' Society, whose adver. tisement appears in our issue of to-day, seems to have somewhat altered its tactics. The "defining the rules of etiquette of the Profession, and reducing them to a written code," viewed from a practical point of view, we certainly considered a reform (if the proposal can be so designated) not likely to be accomplished, and if accomplished hardly likely to produce very much good. Insofar as we can gather from the advertisement, this at all events for the present, abandoned as seems, one of the objects of the society. Then again, the "placing the government of the Profession on a sound representative basis;" this seems to have disappeared as an object of the society. As to this, no doubt in both branches there is much room for improvement, especially as regards the Bar; but the society would most assuredly find its work "love's labour lost," if it attempted such a reform without the hearty co-operation of both governing bodies, and both branches of the Profession. The society is one which in our opinion solicitors will do well to support, the main objects now being to bring about a fairer adjustment of the relations of the two branches of the Profession and to protect the Profession against the depredations of unqualified men. While such are the aims of the society it deserves, indeed commands, the support of the entire Profession. It may be that the society will resolve itself into two branches, one to represent the Bar and the other solicitors, each having separate committees, and acting to a certain extent independently the one of the other, but conferring together when mutual interests are concerned. This may be desirable, but we do not think there is at present in the two branches that feeling and disposition which will secure such a condition of things as one of the results of the present movement. No doubt solicitors have far the greater interests at stake; they have to work the amalgamation of the two principal societies-the In. corporated Law Society, and the Metropolitan and Provincial Law Association-and they have to secure the further representation of the interests of solicitors by the establishment of properly organised local law societies working in conjunc. tion with the chief society. The Legal Practitioners' Society should make the accomplishment of this one of its objects, for by this means it would probably relieve the society from further labour in putting a stop to the depredations of unqualified persons, which all the established societies ought to do their utmost to suppress.

THE Complaint of a London firm of solicitors, which we published in our last issue, upon the subject of the charge of 6d. per folio for copies of affidavits issued from the chambers of the common law judges, will not, we hope, pass unnoticed. We have searched in vain to find when, and under what circumstances, the charge was increased from 4d. to 6d., and at what time the taxing masters recognised such payments as correct in bills of costs. There is no reason why the charge per folio for these copies should be greater than that allowed to the Profession for the same work. Moreover, the charge for such work in the Court of Chancery is to this day only 4d. per folio. Where an affidavit is long-and there are many of them-this charge operates as a wholly unnecessary tax upon saitors.

MANY of our readers are probably unaware that ever since the system of examinations, by the members of the council of the Incorporated Law Society, for admission on the roll of attorneys, was instituted, it has been usual for the council to dine together after each examination. The usual dinner recently took place in the hall of the Society in Chancery-lane, Mr. G. H. Janson, the president, in the chair. Among the visitors present on the occasion were Vice-Chancellor Hall, the Attorney-General, Mr. J. G. Talbot, M.P.; the Town Clerk of the City of London, the City Remembrancer, and numerous members of the Society, including those who filled the office of scrutineers at the recent election to fill vacancies on the council.

THERE seems to have been some considerable doubt until very recently as to whether a summons for leave to plead several matters was necessary, in the case of one of several pleas being that of payment into court. We understand that the masters have lately met and deliberated upon the question, and it is said that they have decided that the summons is unnecessary in cases where the doubt only arose in consequence of the plea of payment into court.

WE have received numerous letters from solicitors upon the subject of the statements made by more than one speaker, at the recent meeting of members of the Profession, to establish "The Legal Practitioners Society" in reference to the amalgamation of the two branches, we are authorised and requested to say that this is not, and never has been, for a moment in contempla. tion by the promoters of the society in question, who are entirely opposed to it.

WE express no opinion on the alleged misconduct of Mr. Pollard, of the Treasury, as reported in last Monday's papers, re The Tichborne trial, but we may observe that that gentleman, though in many of the daily papers described as one of the assistant solicitors to the Treasury, or words to that effect, is in fact not a certiticated solicitor at solicitor to the Treasury is a Queen's Counsel, and all. As our readers well know, the so-called many of his subordinates are barristers, but we are not aware that Mr. Pollard is otherwise than simply one of the clerks of the department.

We think it high time that the form of subpoena should undergo some alteration. The necessity for inserting at least two names as witnesses is not justified by modern requirements. It seems almost absurd that, in order to comply with this, solicitors should be obliged and permitted to insert a fictitious name where the subpoena is, in fact, only required for one witness.

A SOLICITOR writes to us to say that he knows large way of business is in the habit of preparing of a case in which a City House Agent in a very leases in such numbers that it is a source of income to the extent of hundreds of pounds a year, and that on a lessee's informing him what his, the lessee's solicitors would charge for preparing a lease, the land agent invariably replies that he will get it done for so many guineas less. The sa de solicitor assures us that, having lately instituted proceedings to enforce specific performance of a contract, being an agreement for lease prepared by the land agent in question, he was, owing to the imperfect way in which the document was prepared, compelled, under the advice of counsel, to abandon the proceedings and pay costs. We hope that our correspondent will feel it his duty to bring the case under the notice of the council of the Incorporated Law Society, for it is so serious and flagrant an offence against sects. 59 to 64 of the last Stamp Act and other earlier enactments, that we feel convinced the council will see the necessity of taking steps to enforce payment of the penalty or penalties. We certainly think that the term "instrument" used in some or one of these sections ought to, though it does under hand only, and powers of attorney. In all not, include the preparing of wills, agreements probability a not inconsiderable portion of leases in connection with property in London are prepared directly or indirectly by the large firms of land agents. We commend this matter to the consideration of the "Legal Practitioners' Society."

A FIRM of solicitors send us the following letter and the subjoined notice: "A poor widow in this lar to the one mentioned in the LAW TIMES of town is being pestered with printed papers (simi1st Nov., p. 2), as to payment of a debt due to some person whose name is not disclosed, neither the amount of debt due, and intimating that if receipt of the paper, steps will be taken to obtain the debt be not paid within three days from the a warrant of execution against her goods, or a warrant of imprisonment for contempt of court. As no notice has been taken of the former papers, the inclosed form has now been sent to her. The woman is not aware that she has ever paid instalments towards the liquidation of any debt. If you, as the Editor of the Solicitors' Department, think fit in the interest of the Profession to give publicity to this paper, you can do so": THE UNITED KINGDOM MERCANTILE OFFICES, LONDON. Arrear Notice.

Sir,-The instalments towards payment of the debt being in arrear, it is necessary to intimate that pay due by you, as per payment paper in your possession, ment of all instalments due must be sent here by Tuesday next, otherwise steps for immediate recovery of the entire claim and expenses will proceed on the following day. We are, your obedient servants, A. B. and Co. (Accountants). Sevenpence added to the amount due, being the expense of this notice.

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ADMINISTRATRIX WIDOW RECEIVED HER MOIETY OF ESTATE-20 & 21 VICT. c. 77, s. 73.An intestate dying in India, the government, in whose service he was, paid a moiety of his estate to his widow, and transmitted the other moiety to this country, to be distributed among his next of kin here. The court granted administration under the 73rd section to the representatives of the next of kin, limited to this particular sum of money: (In the Goods of Hughes, 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 377.


PRACTICE INTEREST ON JUDGMENT FOR COSTS IN THE CAUSE-HOUSE OF LORDS-INTEREST UPON COSTS IN.-Where the judgment of a Superior Court is affirmed, with costs, in the Exchequer Chamber, and such decision of the Exchequer Chamber is subsequently affirmed, on appeal, by the House of Lords, who order the costs incurred by the successful party, in respect of the appeal, to be paid to him the amount thereof to be certified by the Clerk of Parliament," the Superior Court has power to allow interest only on the sum for which judgment was origi nally signed in such Superior Court, for such time as execution has been delayed by the proceed. ings in the appeals to the Exchequer Chamber ard the House of Lords, that is for the period between affirmance by the House of Lords; but it has no the date of the original judgment and its final jurisdiction or power to give interest on the costs incurred in such appeal. So held by the Court of Exchequer (Kelly, C.B., and Martin and Pigott, BB.): (Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway Company v. Gidlow, 29 L. L. Rep. N. S. 399. Ex.)


No LATENT AMBIGUITY-PAROL EVIDENCE NOT ADMISSIBLE. A testatrix gave "to her niece Laura, the second daughter of her brother John Webber," certain chattels. In a subsequent part of her will she gave to "each of her neices, Laura Webber" and others, £50: and almost immedi ately afterwards" to each of her nieces, the said Laura Webber" and others £100: and divided her residuary estate equally between "the said Laura Webber" and three others. Testatrix had two nieces, one named Laura, the second daughter of her brother John, and the other named Laura Frances Tonkin, the daughter of her brother William. Held, that the testatrix having once clearly and accurately described her niece Laura, as Laura "the second daughter of her brother Laura" afterwards, she must be presumed to John," whenever she mentioned "her niece have meant the same person: there was consequently no latent ambiguity, and parol evidence was therefore not admissible to show which of the two nieces was meant: (Webber v. Corbett, 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 365, V.C. M.).


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dant entered into a charter-party with plaintiffs' agent for the voyage of plaintiffs' ship don to the agent upon his personal liability; to Philadelphia, and advanced money in LonBeing unable to obtain payment he applied to and was refused by the plaintiffs, and he then directed an attorney at Philadelphia to proarrival. Accordingly a writ of attachment, pur ceed against the freight there upon the ship's porting to have issued from the District Court of Philadelphia in an action by the defendant against the plaintiffs, was served upon the captain, and the ship was seized. The captain paid the money under protest, but no steps had been taken in the action nor in resisting the attachment by the present plaintiffs. They now sued for trespass and conversion of the ship, for malicious process against the ship for a false claim, and for money received by defendant to plaintiff's' use. evidence was adduced concerning the validity of law. Held, that by the comity of nations the the writ of attachment according to American process of foreign courts should prima facie be assumed to be valid; and that therefore the plaintiffs, not having obtained a favourable termina tion of the proceedings at Philadelphia, could not recover from the defendant: (Taylor v. Ford, 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 392. Q. B.)


TWO MODEL ACTIONS AT LAW. THE two cases which we cut from the Times and print below, are perhaps unfortunate specimens of the business of the common law courts. In one of them a bad case seems to have been made infinitely worse by the conduct of the counsel engaged for the defence, on which we add no comments to those of the learned judge:


(Before BRETT, J. and a Common Jury.)
GOFF v. LOVEgrove.

Higgins was for the plaintiff; Huddleston, Q.C., Willis, and Fullarton were for the defendant.

This was an action brought to recover from the defendant certain chairs, which the plaintiff said were his. There was a count for slander, the words said to have been uttered accusing the plaintiff of theft and other acts of misconduct.

It appears that, the plaintiff having bought some chairs, the defendant came to his place of business with a van and an officer, said they were Government chairs, used the language complained of, and took them away. A man named Collins, from whom the plaintiff had bought these chairs, was arrested; an investigation was made at Slough, and he was committed for trial at Aylesbury. Eventually Collins, who was the defendant's servant, was convicted of stealing chairs, and sentenced to twelve months imprisonment. The chairs were marked "Lovegrove, Slough," and some of these marks had been obliterated.

The defence was that they were chairs made for Government, that Collins had stolen them, and that the plaintiff, well knowing that they were stolen, had bought them from him. The plaintiff, who admitted that he had been, in 1871, sentenced to eighteen months' imprisonment for receiving stolen goods, was cross-examined at great length by Mr. Huddleston, but in the midst of his cross-examination,

The learned JUDGE suggested that Mr. Huddleston should wait and see what Mr. Higgins would ask the plaintiff, and what further proof he would give.

That learned gentleman called the plaintiff's wife, and closed his case.

BRETT, J., addressing the jury, said-Gentlemen, can you trust these witnesses ?

After some consideration, the Foreman said-No, we cannot.

Higgins then elected to be nonsuited.

BRETT, J.-Such being the case, I must express my opinion, which is, that a more impudent action never was brought. The man is just out of prison, and he brings an action simply because Collins was not actually tried on the indictment for stealing chairs sold to him, the plaintiff having been found guilty previously on a charge of stealing property sold to some one else. It was not necessary to proceed on another charge. Not only is there no ground for this action, but it is a most impudent proceeding altogether.

The plaintiff was then called.

The defendant at once rose and said he was ready to take any further proceedings against the plaintiff which his Lordship might advise.

BLETT, J. replied that it was no part of his duty to give advice. In the course of the trial it was proved that the plaintiff had bought the chairs at a very low price from a cart or van having the defendant's name on it, and he and his wife both said it was a common custom in the trade to buy chairs from a van, and that they had often done so before. The plaintiff also said that he should give no more for picked out or selected chairs than for chairs rejected by the Government.

Tuesday, Dec. 2.

(Before HONYMAN, J., and a Common Jury.)

Shaw and Holl were for the plaintiff; and Frith for the defendant.

This was a case partly heard yesterday. It was an action to recover a sum alleged to be due from the defendant to a surgeon for fees, medicine, attendances, and consultations. It was said that the defendant had been injured in a railway accident, and that the plaintiff had agreed to charge him nothing, and to look to the Company for his remuneration. The now defendant, however, was nonsuited in his action against the Company, but he said that the now plaintiff had urged him to go on, and not to settle, as he should charge him nothing. His attorney also had, according to the defendant's statement, agreed to conduct the action gratui tously, but he had since "put in an execution and swept away all his property.” The plaintiff of course denied that he bad ever entered into any such agreement as the defendant set up.

On cross-examination, the defendant said that he did not believe that the jury in the action against the railway company said that he was not in the accident at all, or that he told the late Chief Justice Bovill that he was a returned convict. He admitted that he was asked some questions, but he did not know whether a warder from the hulks and two gaolers were shown to him. There were four gentlemen who stood up, and he was asked if he knew them, but he said that he did not. He thought it would be the counsel to the company who asked him if he was a returned convict. After several more questions from Mr. Shaw, the defendant said, "You have got a dirty client, and you are asking dirty questions, and I will not answer them.'

On this the jury said they were quite satisfied, and after some discussion found a verdict for the plaintiff for the amount claimed.

Shaw applied for immediate execution, on which Frith said, "They are welcome, if they think they can get anything."

In the course of the present trial the learned Judge repeatedly remonstrated with the defendant's counsel for his mode of conducting the case, and on reference being made by him to passages in his own speech for the defeuce, his Lordship said he should not forget that speech to his dying day.

Verdict for the plaintiff, with immediate execution.


MORLEY (Geo.), Gainsborough, York, landed proprietor.

Next of kin to send in by Dec. 20, at the chamber of V.C. M. Jan. 8, at the said chambers, at twelve o'clock, is the time appointed for hearing aid adjudicating upon such claims.

UNCLAIMED STOCK AND DIVIDENDS IN THE BANK OF ENGLAND. [Transferred to the Commissioners for the Reduction of the National Deot, and which will be paid to the persons respectively whose names are prefixed to each in three months, unless other claimants sooner appear.] CHARMAN (Hannah, widow, and CHARMAN (Thos.), gentleman. both of East Grinstead, Sussex. €122 18. 9d. Three per Cent. Annuities. Claimant, said Thomas Charman, the survivor

EDEN (Geo. Morton), 78, Onslow-square, Brompton, Middlesex, Lieut.-General, two dividends on the sum of £966 138. 4d.. Reduced Three Per Cent. Annuities. Claimant Louisa Anne Eden, widow, administatrix, with will annexed, to Geo. Morton Eden, deceased. HILL (Henry Finch), Green-hill, Harrow, Middlesex, farmer. £200 Three Per Cent. Annuities. Claimant, Henry Finch Hill, acting executor of Henry Finch Hill, deceased. LACY (Elizabeth Mary), Camden-street, Islington, Middlesex, spinster. £212 123. New Three per Cent. (formerly New £3 108. per Cent. Annuities. Cla mant, Richard Hall, administrator to Elizabeth Mary Lacy, deceased. LEWELLIN (Very Rev. Llewellin, D.C.L.. Dean of St. David's, Cardigan; LAWRANCE (Edward Billopp), Bakerstreet, Portinun-square, Esq; and SMITH (Col. John Thos.), Twellat House, Lee, Kent. One dividend on the sum of £1741 68. 1d. Three per Cent. Annuities. Claimant, said Very Rev. Lewellin and Col. John Thomas Smith. PULLEY (Emily Newell, Kidderminster, spinster. £260 Three per Cent. Annuities. Claimant, said Emily Newell Pulley, spinster.

SHAW (Charles), the Stock Exchange, gentleman. One dividend on the sum of £1039 17s. 11d. Three per Cent. Annuities; two dividends on £1912 178. 6d.; two on £1990 8s. 10d; three on £4137 3s. 10d.; and four on £3987 3s. 10d., New Three per Cent. Annuities. Claimant, Wm. Shaw, administrator to Ches. Shaw, deceased.

TELFER (Somerville), Philpot-street, Commercial-road, pawnbroker. £300 New Three per Cent. Annuities. Claimant, Maria Telfer, widow, and John Ashbridge Telier, executors of Somerville Telfer, deceased.


COOPER (Jeremiah), Green-street, Piccadilly, Middlesex, Lieut.-Col. in H.M.'s 18th Regiment of Infantry, and Companion of the Bath. Dec. 6; T. H. and C. B. Hodgson, solicitors, The Courts, Carlisle. Dec. 15; V. C. M., at twelve o'clock.

GOODE (Henry S,), 44, Howland-street, Fitzroy-square, Middlesex, solicitor. Jan. 6; H. W. H. Lea, solicitor, 7, Furnivals-inn, Holborn, Middlesex. Feb. 6; M. R., at twelve o'clock.

GORDON (Ann), 47, Richmond-road. Islington, Middlesex, spinster. Jan. 12; Clapham and Fitch, solicitors, 181, Bishopsgate Without, London. Jan. 26; V. C. H., at twelve o'clock. HALLWORTH (Chas.), Maulden, Bedford, miller. Jan. 1; John Wright, solicitor, Ampthill, Bedford. Jan. 13; V.C. B. at twelve o'clock.

IHLER (John), 31, Ashburnham-road, Greenwich, Kent, gentleman. Dec. 24; J. Dingwall, solicitor, 8, Tokenhouse yard, Lothbury, London. Jan. 13; V.C. M. at twelve o'clock.

KENNEDY (Henry), Marine-terrace, Brighton, Sussex, Esq. Jan. 1; R. Grimshaw, solicitor, Prince Albert-street, Brighton. Jan. 16; M.R., at twelve o'clock.

LANE (Thos.), formerly of Grove End House, Grove-road. St. John's-wood, late of 18, Boscobel-gardens, Alpha-road, London, merchant. June 12, 1874; Jas. J. Stokes, solicitor, 101, Borough High-street, Southwark, London. June 21; V.C. B., at twelve o'clock.

MAPPIN (Wm.), Sheffield, provision dealer. Jan. 6; Wm. Wilson, solicitor, Sheffield, Jan, 20, M. R., at twelve o'clock.

MARSDEN (Jos. D.), 59, Friday-street, London, and Edmonton, Middlesex, solicitor. Jan. 2; Thos. F. Robinson, solicitor, 9, Tokenhouse-yard, London, Feb. 2, M. R., at twelve o'clock.

MOTT (Chas. F.), Hastings. Sussex. Dec. 20; Walter Cheesman, solicitor, Hastings. Jan. 8; V.C.M., at twelve o'clock.

RIGTON (Ellen 8.), Southport, Lancashire. Jan. 5; Blagg and Sons, solicitors, Cheadle, Stafford, Jan. 15; V.C.M., at twelve o'clock.

SHEAT (Win. H., late of 35, Finborough-road, South Kensington, Middlesex, and formerly of Upton Manor, Essex, and some time since resided at Slashee's Hotel, Austin, Neveda, U.IS. A. Feb. 14; Chas. Grundy, solicitor, 26, Bridge-row, Cannon-street, London. March 2; M. R., at eleven o'clock.

SIMMONS (Edwd.), 1, Elizabeth-place, Liepsic-road, Camberwell-road, Surrey, Jan. 1; J. G. Shearman, solicitor, 10, Gresham-street, London. Jan. 15; V.C. M., at twelve o'clock.

TURNER (Mary), Derwent hill, Crosthwaite, Cumberland, widow. Dec. 24; Geo. Ansell, solicitor, Keswick. Jan. 12; V.C. H., at one o'clock. WALKER (John), 5, Carrington-street, Nottingham. Jan 5; Samuel Brittle, solicitor, St. Peter's-chambers, Nottingham. Jan. 15; V.C. M. at twelve o'clock. WEEKES (Thos.), Halling-wharf, Stratford, Essex, and Battersea, Surrey, limeburner. Dec. 31; R. Prall, solici tor, Rochester. Jan 11; V.C. H. at twelve o'clock.

CREDITORS UNDER 22 & 23 VICT. c. 35.

Last day of Claim, and to whom Particulars to be sent. BELLINGHAM (John), Upper Clapton, Middlesex, gentleman. Jan. 1; J. Brunskill, solicitor, 13, Great James-street, Bedford-row, Middlesex. BIGMORE (Win.), 21, Brook-street, Ratcliffe, Middlesex, labourer. Dec. 15; H. Ramsden, solicitor, 150, Leadenhall-street, London.

BORROW (Major Joha), 20, Pall-mall, London. Jan. 1; C. J. Borrow, Gillingham, Dorset.

BOULNOIS (John), 30, Sloane-street, Chelsea, Middlesex, holsterer. Jan. 1; 0. Richards, solicitor, 16, Warwickstreet. Regent-street, Middlesex. Box

(William), Woodland Mount, Cumberworth Half, Emley and Nortonthorpe Mills, near Huddersfield, fancy cloth manufacturer. Feb. 1: Hesp, Fenton, and Owen, solicitors, Station-street, Huddersfield. BRYSON (John), late of Dorchester House, Beverley-road, Kingston-upon-Hull, formerly a timber merchant, and afterwards a shipowner and gentleman. Jan. 10; J. J. Thornes, solicitor, 10, Parliament-street, Kingston-uponHull

CHEEK, Thos. F., St. Germain's Tavern, Forest-hill, Kent, and the White Lion, High-street, St. Giles's, Middlesex. Dec. 31; Hunter and Co., solicitors, 9, New-square, Lincoln's Inn, Middlesex.

CLEMOW, Wm. R., Anderton's Hotel, Fleet-street, London, Hotel-keepeer. Jan. 1; J. Price, solicitor, 12, Serjeants Inn, Fleet-street, London.

DANGAR (Francis R.), late of Sydney, New South Wales. but temporarily residing at the time of his death at the Albany, Piccadilly, England, Esq. Feb. 24; C. J. Mander, solicitor, 9, New-square, Lincoln's-inn, Middlesex. DENNYSON (Ann), Bellerby. Spennithorne, York, widow. Jan. 1; Teale and Sen, solicitors, Leyburn. DowSE (Samuel), Marsden, Almondbury, York, cotton spinner. Jan. 15; A. H. Owen, solicitor, Station-street, Huddersfield. Jan. 1;

DYER (John), Great Cornard, Suffolk, gentleman. Ransom and Son, solicitors, Sudbury, Suffolk. FAULKNER (Geo.), Shanghai, China, merchant. March 30, Edmands and Mayhew, solicitors, 33, Poultry, London. FRY (Chas.), Donnall's-row, High-road, Lewisham, Kent, corn and coal merchant. Dec. 16; Parker and Son, solicitors, Lewisham.

GARNE Thos.), Broadmoor Farm, Sherborne, Gloucester, farmer. Jan. 10; Kendall and Son, solicitors, Bourton-onthe-Water.

GROVES (John), Lark-hill, St. Martin, near Manchester, retired glove manufacturer. Jan. 6; T. R. Huxley, solicitor, Worcester.

GUNNELL (Richard P.), Woodford, Northampton, Esq.
Jan. 6; Archbould and Hawkins, solicitors, Thrapston.
HARINGTON (Martha), Surbiton, Surrey, widow. Feb. 2
Loughborough and Sons, solicitors, 23, Austin-friars,
HARRIS (Edward), Froome Farm, near Dorchester, yeoman.
Jan. 1; G. Symonds, solicitor, Dorchester.
HARRIS (Louisa), 60. Oxford-terrace, Hyde-park, Middle-
sex, widow. Jan. 1; H. Harris, 34A, Moorgate-street,
HEDGES, Thos. P., Bristol, accountant. Jan. 17; J. and H.
Livett, solicitors, Albion Chambers, Small-street, Bris
HENLY, Alexander, 330, Fulham-road, Middlesex, and 31,
Cannon-street, London, merchant." Dec. 31; Horace
W. C. Chatterton, solicitor, 4, Ludgate-hill, E.C.
HOGG (Charles), Lanesfield, Cheltenham, Esq. Dec. 17;
Ticehurst and Sons, solicitors, Essex-place Cheltenham.
HUTCHINSON (James), Bishop Auckland, Durham, grocer
and parish clerk. Jan. 10; Bowser and Ward, solicitors,
Bishop Auckland.

LINES (Wm.), 56, Clissold-road, formerly known as 27.
Park-road, St. Mary, Stoke Newington, Middlesex,
gentleman. Jan. 10; R. and W. B. Smith, solicitors, 7,
New-square, Lincoln's-inn, Middlesex.

LUKE (Wm.), Charlestown, St. Austell, Cornwall, merchant. Dec. 31; Shilson, Coode, and Co., solicitors, St. Austell.

LYON (Chas. J.) late of 51, Park-walk, Chelsea, Middlesex, and formerly of 12, Coleshill-street, Eaton-square, Middlesex, Esq. Jan. 1; Nicholson and Herbert, solicitors, 23, Spring-gardens, Charing Cross, Middlesex." MAKIN (Jos.) Monks Eleigh, Suffolk, farmer. Jan. 6; Robinson and Co., solicitors, Hadleigh, Suffolk. MALTBY (Thos. K.), New Hinksey, Berks, gentleman. Dec. 29; Wm. H. Walsh, solicitor, Oxford.

MARQUES (Elizabeth C.), Twyford, near Reading, Berks, widow. Jan. 23; J. C. Wootton, solicitor, 2, Fínsburycircus, London.

MARTYN (William), 17. Thayer-street, Manchester-square, Middlesex, Esq. Jan. 24; G. E. Thomas, solicitor, 8, Regent-street, Middlesex.

OLIVER (James), Lambourne Cottage, Bow-road, Middlesex, Esq. Dec. 15; W. H. Oliver, solicitor, 64, Lincoln'sinn-fields, Middlesex.

PINCHBECK (Lucy), 97, Queen's-road. Peckham, Surrey, spinster. Dec. 31; B. W. Jones, solicitor, s, Walbrookbuildings, Walbrook, London.

PORCHER Sarah), Park corner, Winchfield, Southampton, widow. Dec. 31; White and Co., solicitors, 12, Great Marlborough-street, London.

REYNOLDS (William J.), 32, St. James's-street, and 31, Claverton-street, Pimlico, Middlesex, print seller and publisher. Jan. 14; C. H. Hodgson, solicitor, 10, Salisbury-street, Strand, Middlesex.

RIDER (Mary A. E., Ramsgate, Isle of Thanet, Kent, widow. April 6; M. and O. Daniel, solicitors, Effinghamstreet, Ramsgate. ROBERTSON (Robert), Morpeth, Northumberland.


20; B. Woodman, solicitor, Newgate-street, Morpeth. SITI (Chas.), 14. Green-street, Wellington-street, Blackfriars-road, and 18, Grove Hill-terrace, Grove-lane, Camberwell, Surrey, sugar refiner and vinegar maker. Dec. 31; W. J. Myatt, solicitor, 2, Abchurch-yard, Cannonstreet, London. STACEY (Benjamin), Cliff Cottage, Corton, Suffolk, Esq. Jan. 1; Thos. Day, Saxmundham, Suffolk, and Charles Webb, 45, Cranbourne-street, London.

SWATTON (William), formerly of Gloucester Villa, Croydongrove, West Croydon, late of Sydney-road, Stockweli, Surrey, gentleman. Jan. 8; J. L. Dale, solicitor, 8, Furnival's-inn, Holborn, London.

THORPE (Mary A.), Bank-street, Sheffield, widow. Dec. 1; Rodgers and Thomas, solicitors, Bank-street, Sheffield. TOMLINSON (Wm.), 194, Essex-road. Islington, Middlesex, draper. Jan. 14; Phelps and Sidgwick, solicitors, 3, Gresham-street, London.

TORRIANO (Chas, J.), late a lieut, in the 2nd Native Veteran Battalion in the Hon. East India Company's service, who died at Vizagapatam, East Indies. April 4, 1874; Hensman and Nicholson, solicitors, 25, College-hill, London, E.C.

WALKER (Francis), Bellerley, Spennithorne, York, gentleman. Jan. 1; J, Teale and Son, solicitors, Leyburn. WALLIS, Jas., Kingston-upon-Hull, merchant. Jan. 15; Stamp and Co., solicitors, Quay-street Chambers, Hull. WHATELEY, Geo., 41. Waterloo street, Birmingham, and of the Cedars, Ampton-road, Edgbaston, near Birmingham, solicitor. Feb. 1; H. P. Bowling, East Lodge, The Mall, Hammersmith.

WHITE (John), late of the Oriental Club, Hanover-square, Middlesex, and 23, Hanover-square, Esq., formerly surgeon in the Service of the East India Company, on the Madras Establishment. Jan. 13; Lee, Pemberton, and Reeves, solicitors, 41, Lincoln's-inn-fields, Middlesex. WISEMAN (Jas.), Heathfield-terrace, Halifax, York, gentle. man. Jan. 15; Wavell and Co., solicitors, 20, Georgestreet, Halifax.


Wednesday, Nov. 26.

By Messrs. EDWIN Fox, and BOUSFIELD, at the Mart. Stockwell-park-road. - The Stockwell Grammar School, term 39 years-sold for £140. City.-No. 38, Bartholomew-close, freehold-sold for £110. Thursday, Nov. 27.

By Messrs. HARDS and VAUGHAN, at the Mart. Rotherhithe.-No. 18, Princes-street, freehold -sold for


By Messrs. NEWBON and HARDING, at the Mart. Canonbury.-No. 3, Douglas-road, term 73 years-sold for £400. Barnsbury.-No. 163, Hemingford-road, term 69 years-sold

for £510.

Upper Holloway.-Nos. 25 and 29, Alexandra-road, term 85 years-sold for £555.

Nos. 1 to 6, Stanley-terrace, term 85 years-sold for £1530. Kennington-lane.-Nos. 73 to 76, Devonshire-street, term 5 years-sold for £180.

By Messrs. GADSDEN, ELLIS, and Co., at the Mart. Tower-hill.-No. 2, Postern-row, freehoid-sold for £1000. Shoreditch.-No. 194, High-street, The Eagle house, freehold-sold for £is10.

No. 195, adjoining-sold 'or £1190.

No. 70, Holywell-lane-sold for £600.

Whitechapel-road.-No, 188, The Lord Rodney's Head, freehoid-sole for £2000.

Nos. 9 and 10. Hope-place-sold for £235.

Aldgate.-No. 34, Mitre-street, term 10 years-sold for £60. Bethnal-green.-Freehold ground-rent of £10 per annumsold for £290.

To Correspondents.

JAMES A. TUCKER.-You are entitled to present yourself for Intermediate Examination in Easter Term 1874, by giving the necessary month's notice. We do not think that the post of paid organist would be regarded as a con. travention of the provisions of 23 & 24 Vict. c. 127, 8. 10. so long as it does not interfere with service under articles; but it is wise in such a case as that which you put that the consent of the principal should be obtained. Read the case of Er parte Greville. reported in our last week's issue. page 70, and the case of Re Peppercorn, therein referred to. -ED. SOLS. DEPT.

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[See this title, sub-title "Partial Loss."] Under valued policies the underwriter pays only such proportion of the value stated as the freight lost bears to the full intended cargo.

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NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS. JUDGMENT CREDITOR-INTEREST IN LAND NOT CAPABLE OF ACTUAL DELIVERY IN EXECUTION-27 & 28 VICT. c. 112.-By the Law of Judgments Amendment Act (27 & 28 Vict. c. 112) a judgment creditor has no charge on the land of his debtor, although he has issued a writ of elegit and obtained a return from, the sheriff, where the interest of the debtor in the land is not capable of being actually delivered in execution: (Hatton v. Haywood, 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 335. V.C. M.)

WILL-MAINTENANCE AND EDUCATION-DISCRETION OF TRUSTEES-EFFECT OF ADMINISTRATION SUIT.-Where a testator by his will gives his trustees a discretionary power of advancement for the maintenance and education of children presumptively entitled under the will, the court will not control the trustees in the exercise of their discretion, because a decree has been made in a suit for the administration of testator's estate: (Brophy v. Bellamy, 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 380. Chan.)


Under open policies the loss is adjusted upon the gross proceeds of the freight at the port of desti- THE JUDICATURE COMMISSION AND THE nation, and the underwriters pay the actual amount of freight loss:

Arnould (4 edit.), 843.


Under valued policies the basis of adjustment is the value of the cargo stated in the policy. Under open policies it is the prime cost on board.

The underwriter pays the aliquot part of the the term particular average. Code de Com., art. original value estimated by the proportion of loss. This loss is ascertained by comparing the gross produce of the sound with the gross produce of the damaged sales :

463; 4 Boulay-Paty, Droit. Mar. 481.

SHIP. Loss.

The following losses are allowed as particular average: Sails split or blown away by the extraordinary force of the wind; cables parted or washed from the deck if properly kept there; masts sprung; spars carried away; planks started; damage by the vessel being so strained that its shape is distorted and its value materially diminished; loss of boats; tearing off the sheathing; breaking of the upper works, or timbers, or any part of the ship; damage by accidental straining; or by lightning; or by fire; or by collision; or in a justifiable engagement; and loss by plunder and force and while the ship is in possession of captors or pirates:

Phillips, sect. 1424.

Wages and provisions of crew engaged in repairing damage for which underwriters are liable, but not otherwise :

2 Phillips, sect. 1429, p. 175; Hall v. Ocean Ins. Co., 21 Pick. Mass. 472; Arn. (4th edit.) 784; BoulayPaty on Emerigon, vol. 1, p. 619. French Law. This expenditure is particular average during delay to repair, and also during quarantine: (Code de Com. a 103, pars 4 and 5.)

ADJUSTMENT. Ship. Under valued policies the basis of adjustment is the value in the policy, unless manifestly fraudulent :

Barker v. Janson, L. Rep. 3, C. P. 308; Share v. Felton, 2 East, 109; Haigh v De la Cour, 3 Camp. 319. Under open policies it is the value of the ship at the commencement of the risk:

Stevens on Average, 190; Beneke Pr. of Ind. 133. NOTE (a).-In open policies, therefore, the underwriter pays the same aliquot part of the sum he has agreed to insure as the damage or expense of repairing it, is of the ship's value at the commencement of the risk. In valued policies he pays the same proportion of the valuation in the

policy. NOTE (b).-A ship being valued at different sums in different policies the sum recoverable is liable to be diminished by the sum already recovered under other policies on the same risk for the same loss. Bruce v. Seais, 1 H. & C. 769; 32 L. J. Ex. 132;

Borsfield v. Barnes, 4 Camp. 227; North of England

Iron Steamship Company v. Armstrong, L. Rep. 5 Q. B. 244; Arn. 4th edit., 292, et seq. If a ship is repaired at a port of distress and totally lost before arriving at her destination, the cost of the repairs is recoverable in addition to the total loss:

Livie v. Jansen, 12 East, 655 (per Lord Ellen

borough); See Le Cheminant v. Pearson, 4 Taunt. 367; Stewart v. Steele, 5 Scott's N. R. 927. If not repaired when lost the repairs form no ground of claim. But if the ship is sold unrepaired the average loss is recoverable:

Knight v. Faith, 15 Q. B. 649, 668 per Lord Campbell.


When the damage has been repaired one-third new material for old is deducted(a):-unless the ship be on her first voyage(b), or she fail to come again to owners' hands without his default (c):

(a) Da Costa v. Newnham, 2 T. Rep. 407; Poingdestre

Royal Exchange Assurance Company, Ry. &

Moo. 378.

(b) Fenwick v. Robinson, 3 C. & P. 323; Pirie v. Steele, 2 Mood & Rob, 49; 8 C. & P. 200.

Johnson v. Sheddon, 2 East. 581; St. on Av. 92.

A portion of cargo shipped in separate packages
being lost, and another portion damaged, it is
usual to adjust the loss separately.

Where several articles are insured together, and
each suffers a particular average loss, the loss
must be adjusted separately on each :
Arn. 4th edit. 830.
NOTE.-There being a sale of damaged goods with a
view of comparing sound and damaged values,
the charges of such sales are added to the amount

of the loss after its quantum has been ascertained
and the whole is then apportioned on the under-
writers in the usual way.
Stevens on Average, 148-150; Benecke Pr. of
Indem. 436, 437.

The loss is generally adjusted at the port of
destination on the gross proceeds or market value

Arn. 4 edit. 831; Phillips, sect. 1454.
Goods being unloaded at a port of distress,
found damaged, and sold to prevent further de-
terioration, the claim is adjusted as a salvage

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There being only part of a full intended cargo on board, the loss under a valued policy is adjusted upon the proportion which the damage bears to the whole intended cargo.

On a continuing policy attaching to different parcels of goods successively and indiscriminately, the loss is adjusted on the proportion which the sum insured bears to the value of the goods at risk on board at the time of the loss:

Crowley v. Cohen, 3 B. & Ad. 478; Arn. 4th edit. 833;
Phillips, s. 1471.

Where no particular mode of proving damage to goods is stipulated for, the assured is not subject by usage to any condition, as to a survey of the damaged goods:

Rankin v. American Ins. Co., 1 Hall N. Y. 619.

Profits, &c.

If the profits are valued, and a part of the goods are lost or damaged, the assured must prove what proportion of the profits that would have accrued on the goods having arrived sound he has lost by reason of their being damaged or a part of them lost, according to the state of the market, and he will be entitled to recover a corresponding proportion of the amount at which the profits are valued.

Under an open policy upon profits the assured must prove what amount of profit would have accrued on the goods had they arrived sound: Phillips, sect. 1473.

Where the loss on goods is by expenditure and not by damage to them, it is not a loss on profits, unless specifically so agreed in the policy: Phillips, sect. 1475.


A LARGE and important meeting was held at the Croydon Town-hall, on the 25th ult., under the presidency of Dr. A. Carpenter, J.P., for the purpose of protesting against the evidence given before the Judicature Commission, to the effect that it would be for the public convenience that the Croydon County Court should be abolished. The chairman in introducing the business of the meeting, expressed an opinion that it would be not only unwise but unjust to remove the business of the County Court of Croydon to London.. Having commented upon the hardship that would be inflicted upon tradesmen and the community generally by compelling them to go to London. to recover a small debt, the chairman said a resolution on this subject would be submitted to the meeting, and respecting a proposal which had been made to abolish the system of imprisonment for debt. On this subject there might be a difference of opinion, but he must say that it would be unwise to take from County Court judges the power they possessed of sending persons to prison who could pay and would not. This was, he believed, the class of persons who would be the most affected by the abolition of imprisonment, and it was the very class against whom tradesmen and other creditors should be protected. It would, however, be suggested that no imprisonment should take place when the amount was less than 40s., and where the debtor was a working man in receipt of weekly wages, who was willing to pay his just debts. Dr. Carpenter having expatiated on the benefits of the County Court to the community at large, and the justice of the decisions of the learned judge, who presided therein, called upon Mr. Henry Moore, to move the first resolution.

1st.-"That this meeting is surprised to hear that it has been proposed before the Judicature Commission to abolish the Croydon County Court, and attach the same to a London court, and desires to enter its protest against such a proceeding, destroying as it would do the great convenience which the Croydon court affords to the district."

2nd.-"That the meeting regrets to find that a Committee of the House of Commons has reported in favour of the abolition of Imprisonment for Debt in the County Court in all cases; it being the opinion of this meeting that the fear of such imprisonment is the only security which a tradesman now has to recover from those who, having the means to pay, are not sufficiently honest to be just without being compelled by law to be so. But this meeting is quite of opinion that such imprisonment should not be enforced for debts of less than 40s., and where the debtor is ordinarily earning a weekly wage less than 20s. per week."

3rd."That the present mode of requiring a plaintiff to show that the defendant has the means to satisfy his debt, before the judge has power to commit him, is unreasonable and unjust, and throws upon the plaintiff an onus which properly belongs to the defendant, who could, when true, easily prove the contrary, and from which he ought not to be relieved."

Mr. W. Grantham moved the following resolution:

4th.-"That a petition to the House of Commons, embodying these resolutions, and praying that the County Court of Croydon may not be removed or interfered with; and that no alteration may be made in the law of imprisonment for debt in the County Courts as it now stands, except as regards small sums and working men in receipt of low wages, be signed by the chairman on behalf of the meeting, and be sent at once to the

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