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tiffs having two open policies then running with the defendants, declared the cotton against them, and at the same time wrote the London branch of the bank offering "to hold the amount insured at their disposal until payment of the acceptance for £3000." The vessel in which the cotton was shipped having been lost at sea, the plaintiffs paid the bill of exchange for £3000, obtained possession of the bill of lading, and demanded the policy moneys from the defendants. Payment being refused, the plaintiffs brought an action on the policies, averring that the plaintiffs, or some or one of them, were or was interested in the goods to the full amount claimed, and that the insurances were made for the use and benefit and on account of the person or persons so interested. Held (per Bovill, C.J., and Denman, J.), that the plaintiffs had an equitable interest in every part of the cotton, they being liable upon their acceptance, and that the plaintiffs had such an interest in selling and managing the consignment as in law entitled them to insure; and also that as the plaintiffs intended to cover the interests of all parties interested in the cotton, they might recover the full amount under a declaration averring interest in themselves, applying the proceeds to the extent of their claims, and holding the remainder as trustees for the other persons beneficially interested. Held (per Keating and Brett, JJ.), that the plaintiffs having made advances on goods in transitu, had only a contract right in the cotton to have the bill of lading endorsed to them on payment of their acceptance, and that they, as consignees, though they were interested in every part, were not the legal owners, nor the trustees for the persons beneficially interested, and could not therefore, recover more than their own beneficial interest: (Ebsworth and others v. The Alliance Marine Insurance Company, 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 479. C. P.).

BROKER-MATERIAL ALTERATION-WHETHER BKOKER MAY TREAT HIMSELF AS PRINCIPAL MOLLETT v. ROBINSON.-In the absence of evidence of custom otherwise, a broker may not treat himself as principal, and sue his employer as for goods bargained and sold. The plaintiffs as brokers, bought for the defendant upon the 6th Jan. five tons of india-rubber, at 2s. 11 d. per lb., and sent them a bought-note in which the india-rubber was set out as deliverable “during the month of January." A corresponding sold note was sent to the sellers, at whose instance the plaintiffs struck out " during the month of January," and wrote "forthwith," but did not communicate the alteration to the defendant. On the 7th Jan., the defendant decided to throw up the contract, and sent an order to the plaintiffs to sell at 3s. The plaintiffs could only sell at 28. 10d., and having paid the sellers at the rate of 23. 11 d., sued the defendant for the difference. The plaintiffs having been nonsuited, Held that the alteration was material: that the plaintiffs could not treat themselves as principals, and recover for goods bargained and sold; and that the alteration being material the plaintiffs had

of trustees; That Lord Hardwicke's decree was binding on the court; that upon failure of Lord E. to present, the college could say that they had lost the right to present one of their fellows, and that the gift over took effect so as to vest the living in the college: (St. John's College, Cambridge, v. Earl of Eppingham, 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 447. M. R.)

FOREIGN STATE-PROPER PLAINTIFF-DEMURRER.The minister of a foreign state does suing in this country in his own name in respect not represent his sovereign for the purpose of of his sovereign's property: (Baron Penedo v. Johnson, 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 452. V.C. M.)

WILL-CONSTRUCTION-"SUMS OF MONEY DUE TO ME"-UNLIQUIDATED DAMAGES.-Bequest by a testator of "all sums of money due to him at the time of his decease." At the death of the testator, A. was under an unascertained liability to him for breach of a covenant in a lease. Held, that the damages recovered in an action brought by the executor against A. for the breach passed under the above bequest, as the action merely ascertained the amount of what was due to the testator at his death: (Bide v. Harrison, 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 451. V.C. M.)

WILL-INTENTION

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RESIDUARY DEVISE.-The wife of A., being entitled in fee, devised to him the B. property. A., under a wrong impression that his wife had no power of testamentary disposition, made his will containing this clause: "And I am wishful here to observe that my son R., as heir-at-law of his mother, will inherit the B. property, and is therefore further provided for." A. then devised his residuary estate to other persons. Held, follow. ing Circuitt v. Perry (23 Beav. 277; 28 L. T. Rep. O. S. 115), that A. had died intestate as to the B. property, notwithstanding the residuary devise: (Hawks v. Longridge, 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 449. V.C. M.)

WILL ILLITERATE PERSON - INDEFINITE ESTATE-CHARGE OF GROSS SUM.-A testator who died in 1806, by his will gave two freehold houses to one of his sons without any words of limitation, subject to legacies and annuities, with a gift over, in case of alienation or death without issue, to his brothers and sisters, nomination also subject to the legacies and annuities, and with a direction to pay sums of 41. to each of certain grandchildren as they attained twenty-three. Held, that on James's death without issue, and without barring any estate tail he might have had, the brothers and sisters took as joint tenants, and as the gift was coupled with a direction to pay several gross sums, their estates would in a case coming under the old law, be enlarged to a fee simple: (Wilkinson v. Wilkinson, 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 416. M.R.).

INVALID WILL-RIGHT AGAINST OTHER DEVISEES STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS-POSSESSION UNDER ESTOPPEL.-The Statute of Limitations cannot give a person who has entered into a life estate paid to the sellers what the defendant was not under an invalid will, a right against other divisees of the will. A testator devised lands, of bound to pay, and consequently could not recover for money paid to the defendant's use. A prior which he was seised only as tenant by courtesy, contract (at the same price) having been made by subject to legacies to the testator's heir and to his daughter for life, rema nder to her son, the plaintiffs with other sellers, and cancelled at others. The daughter entered under the will, the instance of such sellers, Held, per Brett, J., that in making such prior contract, the plaintiffs paid the legacies, and continued in possession for more than twenty years. She afterwards conhad exhausted their authority, and had no power veyed the premises in fee to the defendant. to make another: (White and another v. Beneken-Plaintiff, who had acquired the interest of the dorf, 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 475. C. P.).

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NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS. Charity-Trust TO PRESENT TO LIVINGSPRINGING USE-FAILURE TO PRESENT-OLD DECREE-COMMON RECOVERY. In 1723 five advowsons were settled by deed, giving them to certain persons successively in tail male, upon the express condition or limitation" that upon a vacancy the person entitled to present should nominate and present a Fellow of St. John's, and on failure so to nominate and present, that the advowsons and right of presentation should be to the use, benefit, and behoof of the Master and Senior Fellows of the college. In 1754 Lord Hardwicke made a decree by which, treating the settlement as a 66 trust or benefaction," he held that the presentation of a certain class of Fellows called Platt Fellows, instead of Incorporated Fellows, or Fellows on the ancient foundation, was void. In 1802 the then patron suffered a recovery. Fellows of St. John's continued to be presented till 1871 to one of the livings, but then Lord E., the then patron, failed to present, and the bishop presented by reason of lapse. Held, that the settlement created a charitable trust; that the recovery could not operate so as to destroy the conditions upon which presentations were to be made, but simply as a change

remainderman under the will, brought ejectment. Held, that the defendant was estopped from disputing the plaintiff's claim under the will: (Board v. Board, 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 459. Q. B.)

DEED OF GIFT-POWER OF SALE-ALTERATION OF USUFRUCT BEFORE SALE.-By a deed of gift in May 1827, a widow gave to her son C., to take effect as an immediate gift, the enjoyment and usufruct of lands in Montreal, for his life, and after his death to his legitimate children; in case of his death without children, to his brothers and sisters, or any of them, during their lives; and if at C.'s death his brothers and sisters should be dead, the property should belong to their legitimate children per stirpes (par souches). Power was given to the donee to sell the property for a rentcharge, if it should be judged by experts to be advantageous to the succession. C. died childless in 1861, having survived all his brothers and sisters. Two brothers, J. and B., left children. B. died before the deed of gift of 1827. In 1814, C. desiring to exercise his power of sale, filed a petition in the court of Queen's Bench, Canada, stating his desire, and praying the court to nominate a council of the family to appoint a tutor to represent the substitutes, and to act with C. in nominating experts to certify as to the advantage of sale. The tutor appointed having refused to nominate an expert, C. brought a suit against him to compel him to do so. The court compelled the nomination of experts, who reported to the court in favour of a sale; and the court ultitimately declared C.'s right to exercise the power of sale “en observant les formalités requises."

This judgment was affirmed on appeal, after a long delay, in 1857. It was then thought that a sale in lots would be an advantage, and C., on the tutor's opposition to such sale, petitioned the court to appoint an expert for the tutor to value the property for such sale. The experts duly reported their valuation to the court, but no further proceeding, prior to the sale, was taken in the suit. Pending these proceedings, in April 1857, C. sold his life interest in the usufruct to L., Sept. 1857, C. sold the corpus of the property. who was subrogated in all C.'s rights, under the deed of gift and the judgment of the courts. In Held (reversing judgments of the Court of Queen's Bench, Lower Canada); First, that the execution of the power of sale by C. was not, in the absence of fraud, invalidated by C.'s previous alienation of the usufruct and the subrogation of his rights in another. Secondly, that judicial sanction was not necessary to the exercise of the power of sale; and that the clause" en observant les formalités requises," was directory only of the formalities imposed by the deed, and did not make necessary the formalities required on judicial sales. Thirdly, that the tutor's participation in the sale was not essential to its validity. Fourthly, that on the terms of the deed of gift, all the grandchildren of the donor, including the children of B., were entitled to share per stirpes: (Sutere v. Beaudry, 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 410. Priv. Co.).

WILL-CONSTRUCTION-GIFT OVER-PERIOD OF VESTING-PRIOR LIFE INTEREST.-A testator beqeathed his residuary personal estate to trustees, upon trust to pay the income to his wife for life; and after her decease upon trust (in the events which happened) to pay the income to his daughter (naming her) for life; with a gift over in the event of her death without issue to his two sons (naming them); with a gift over in the event of both his sons dying without issue to Mary H.; with an ultimate gift over in case Mary H. should die without leaving any issue living at the time of her decease. The testator's widow died in 1823. His two sons survived her, and died without issue

in the lifetime of his daughter, who died without issue in 1866. Mary H. survived the daughter, and died without issue in 1872: Held (reversing the decision of Malins, V.C.), that the representatives of Mary H. were entitled to the fund, as

she did not die without issue in the lifetime of the

tenant for life: Edwards v. Edwards (15 Beav. 357), approved and followed. (Re Heathcote's Trusts, 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 445. Chan.)

COMPANY LAW

NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS. VOLUNTARY WINDING-UP-PRACTICE.-Three petitions having been presented, summonses to order to give time to the company to hold a meetappoint provisional liquidators were adjourned in ing, at which it was resolved to wind-up voluntarily, and two liquidators were appointed. At a subsequent meeting these resolutions were confirmed. Held that the appointment was valid. One order was made on the three petitions, the and the others for an order, directing the windingfirst of which was for a compulsory winding-up, up to be continued under supervision, and the carriage of the order was given to a petitioner, advertised after one of the other two. Semble, whose petition had been presented before, though that the secretary of a company is a proper person to act as liquidator: (Re London and Australian Agency Corporation, 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 417. M. R.)

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RAILWAY-LIABILITY REDUCED RATE OF WILFUL MISCONDUCT. - Plaintiff CARRIAGE consigned goods by the defendants' railway at a reduced rate, below the ordinary rate, upon an undertaking to relieve the defendants from all liability in case of damage or delay, except upon proof that such loss, detention, or injury, arose from wilful misconduct on the part of the defendants' servants. It was proved that the goods were placed in a truck to be attached to a train passing the station late at night. That train brought some cattle to the station, and the defendants' servants, in order to prevent the cattle from being kept in their trucks till the next day, drove them into a yard, from which they strayed upon the railway, and upset the train, thereby injuring the plaintiff's goods. Held, in an action for this injury, that the contract was reasonable; and that the facts proved did not constitute evidence for a jury of defendants' liability: (Glenister v. The Great Western Railway Company, 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 423. Q. B.)

RAILWAY-LIABILITY FOR ACCIDENT TO A PASSENGER ON LINE OVER WHICH IT HAS RUNNING POWERS.-Under the statutory powers of an Act of Parliament the L. and N. W. Railway Company ran passenger trains over a certain portion of the defendants' line of railway, paying to the defendants therefor a certain fixed mileage rate. The times of the passing of these trains over the defendants' line were regulated by the defendants,

and the signals, at the point of junction between the two lines of railway, were under their control and management. In consequence of the driver of a L. and N. W. train negligently disobeying the signal duly given to him by the defendants' servants, such train, whilst running under the above-mentioned powers, and without any negligence on the part of any of the defendants' servants, came into collision, on the above-mentioned portion of the defendants' line, with a train of the defendants, in which the plaintiff was travelling as a passenger under a contract with the defendants, and caused the injury to him for which this action was brought; and it was held by the court (Bramwell, Cleasby, and Pollock, BB.) that the action was not maintainable against the defendants, inasmuch as the L. and N. W. R. Company's servants, through whose negligence alone the collision occurred, were not concerned in the carrying of the plaintiff, and were not either in the employment or under the control of the defendants, who consequently were not liable for the injuries resulting from such collision. The Great Western Railway Company v. Blake (in error) (7 L. T. Rep. N. S. 94; 7 H. & N. 987; 31 L. J. 346, Ex.); and Thomas v. The Rhumney Railway Company (L. Rep. 5 Q. B. 226; 39 L. J. 741, Q. B.; 22 L. T. Rep. N. S. 297); s.c. in error (L. Rep. 6 Q. B. 296: 40 L. J. 89, Q. B.; 24 L. T. Rep. N. S. 145) discussed and distinguished: (Wright v. The Midland Railway Company, 20 L. T. Rep. N. S. 436. Ex.)

COUNTY COURTS,

SWANSEA COUNTY COURT. REES V. THOMAS. Charter-party-Demurrage-Civil commotion in foreign State.

His Honour (Judge FALCONER) said-In this case a charter-party was made between David Rees, the owner of The Village Belle, of 320 tons, and W. H. Thomas, an agent for merchants. The vessel was to proceed to Bilboa, and to load in customary manner from the agent of the freighter a complete cargo of iron ore, in bulk, to be brought alongside, at merchants' expense; and, being loaded to proceed to Llanelly, with an option of one out of three voyages to Swansea. There were to be eight working days allowed to load at Bilbao, and to be discharged in regular turn and in the customary manner, with all such despatch as the usage of the port will permit. "All accidents or causes occurring beyond the control of the shippers or affreighters which might prevent or delay her loading or discharging, including civil commotions, strikes of any pitmen or workmen, riots, frosts, floods, stoppage of trains, accidents to machinery, &c., always excepted. Demurrage, 4d. per register ton per day." The charter being concluded on the behalf of others, it was agreed that all liability of agents signing in every respect, and as to all matters and things as well before as after, the shipping of the said cargo, shall cease so soon as the cargo is shipped. The charter was to remain in force for three consecutive voyages. Mr. David Rees, the plaintiff, and shipowner of The Village Belle, produced the charter-party. He claims the stipulated demurrage of 4d. per ton on 199 tons, for thirty-nine days, which amounts to £129 7s. After reciting the evidence, his Honour continued: Mr. Strick stated that his client (the defendant) could not have chartered the vessel unless he had protected himself from the probable effect of civil commotions in Spain. Of the necessity of such a course there can be no doubt. In countries where educated men have influenced the multitude, and society is protected by legal equality-the only equality which in this world can be perpetuated or even exist there is necessarily continued security. Contracts can be made and entered into in such contries without any reference to any expectation of the disturbance of the ordinary business of life. In Spain, however, revolution succeeds revolution, general after general, ecclesiastic after ecclesiastic, stimulate to frequent civil strife, the desperate passions of an ignorant population. Against the effects of such events even private contracts require the protection of exceptional conditions. But in the expression of the terms of such exceptional conditions, such as "civil commotions," charter-parties are defective in not expressing what shall be received as sufficient evidence of the facts connected with such conditions. What, for example, shall be sufficient evidence of a "civil commotion ?" A claim for demurrage may relate to £50 or £100, and the claim, if contested, though perfectly just, may involve the expenditure of a very large sum of money to sustain it, and an equally large expenditure to oppose it if it be unjust. A"civil commotion" means much more than a civil riot. It means attacks by force on the authority of the Government through measures which disturb the ordinary trade or business of a locality. The occurrence of such an event, from its publicity and importance, it may have been assumed, would not be disputed. But sup

pose it is disputed, see what expense may be incurred! Witnesses must be brought from a great distance, and as the knowledge of each witness can extend only over a limited space of ground, many witnesses must be summoned. At one end of a disturbed district all may appear to be peace: at another place there may appear the activity of business, and yet they may be only hasty efforts to preserve what may be threatened with destruction; and in another locality the beasts of burden which may usually be employed to supply a port or city with its common articles of trade may be driven off. The bolt of war may fall on one place, and the noise of its explosion may shake the whole district. One witness might relate little, and even several might appear to contradict each other when no just ground of disagreement existed. In the case of The San Ransom (28 L. J. 381 (1873), P. C.), where a ship had been delayed by its captain at Valparaiso, under the apprehension of being captured, the evidence seems to have included reports respecting the movements of a vessel of war, and newspaper reports, which might have been correct or incorrect, and the advice of a consul not to sail. The evidence of the most justly apprehended danger must be imperfect. But surely there would be no difficulty to provide in charter-parties that those who are the parties to them shall be bound by local official statements of fact relating to causes of delay, matters of regular turn in loading, or such other facts as are connected with what are usually called "exceptional clauses." This could be especially done when the evidence relates to events of a public character. Commissions to examine witnesses abroad are the source of a great money outlay, and the testimony of witnesses brought from abroad is frequently enormously expensive. It is thus that the great difficulty in this case arises. What is sufficient evidence of "civil commotions" disturbing the trade of a port? The plaintiff, through his agents, may know what occurred. He should, as a just man, disclose it. He may be ignorant, and it is the duty of the defendant to excuse the non-performance of his contract. The seamen on board the Village Belle can tell us little. Their knowledge is limited to the business of their own vessel, and to what they can imperfectly observe from its deck. Neither the master, mate, nor seamen could relate what is passing on the not distant mountains which may interfere with the trade they are engaged in. John Jones, the mate of the Village Belle, says: "There were 400 to 500 vessels there; there were lots arrived after us." "Did they get away before you?"-" Yes, one; she loaded before us." Surely such an accumulation of ships at the end of February and in March, and d down to near the end of Aprilis strong evidence of great disturbance of the trade, caused by these political events mentioned by the witnesses. The ship Daniel was at Bilbao in February, but the master was not able to get away till April, though it was early in April. The payment to him of demurrage is of no importance, as his delay might not have been excused by any exception contained in the charter-party. The ship Campanile was a steamer, and it is admitted that a preference is given to the loading of steamers; perhaps, even "regular turn" might permit such a preference. The evidence of Mr. Warburton and of Vice-Consul Tutor proves a state of commotion and disturbance, extending from February to Aprilthat is, to the time of the departure of the Village Belle. How, in such a state of affairs, could there be order or regularity in the transaction of business ? Some merchants of San Nicholas, or persons having private wharves, or who were placed in favourable positions on the river, from the first loading-place on the river Nervon to Bilbao, may have loaded vessels. "All accidents and causes occurring beyond the control of the affreighters, preventing or delaying loading," are specified in the exceptional clause as well as "civil commotions." Is there not sufficient evidence of general commotion and disturbance of the trade delaying the loading of vessels? The case of Tendvilsden v. Hardcastle,heard by me at Cardiff so far back as the year 1857 has been cited. That case, in principle, has been sustained by several decisions of the superior courts: (Adams v. R. Mail, S. P. Com., 32 L. J. 92.) The charter-party in that case provided that the freighters should not be held to be liable for any delay in loading caused by frosts, floods, strikes of workmen, or accidents. I held that a strike at a particular colliery was no defence to the action, the general market for the purchase of coal not being affected by the strike. The strike at a particular pit did not prevent the obtaining of coal in the ordinary course of the coal trade, and it is now usual to meet such a case by a special provision in charter-parties referring to the particular pit or pits from which it is intended to procure coal. If, however, vessels are laden in a port during the general disturbance of trade from some general cause, or during civil commotions of lading, such cases are exceptional. The excusing cause is to be a general disturbance in the business of the port. The inference I draw

is that there was a prevalent general cause of delay, arising from circumstances named in the exceptional clause existing up to the time the ship was laden, as well as at the time of her arrival. There were clearly disturbances in those districts from which the customary supply of ore at the port of Bilbao came, and the disturbance was not a mere local riot, which could be suppressed by the ordinary civil power of the town, and this also was shown by the preparations made for the defence of Bilbao-the breaking up of the railway, &c. Verdict for defendant.

BANKRUPTCY LAW.

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NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS. THE BANKRUPTCY RULES 1870, R. 292-LIQUIDATION BANKRUPTCY No RESOLUTION COSTS OF LIQUIDATION-PRACTICE.-A debtor filed a petition for liquidation of his affairs by arrangement, but no resolution was come to by the creditors. The debtor was subsequently ad. judicated bankrupt. Held, upon appeal, that the costs of the liquidation proceedings must, in the absence of proof that the debtor had acted from corrupt or improper motives, be paid out of the estate, pursuant to the 292nd Bankruptcy Rules 1870: (Ex parte Jeffery; re Hawes, 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 433. Bank.)

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VENDOR AND PURCHASER-LIQUIDATION STOPPAGE IN TRANSITU-RIGHt of Vendor TO. -A., a merchant in Liverpool, bought certain winches of yarn of B., in London, of C., who acted as broker for both parties," to be taken immediately from the wharf in London and paid for by the buyers' acceptance at four months." B. sent an invoice of the goods to A., inclosing a bill of exchange for his acceptance, and on the same day C., acting as agent for A., directed the goods to be forwarded by rail to Liverpool. Upon their arrival there the railway company sent A. the usual advice note that the goods there to his order and were then held by the com. pany, not as carriers, but as warehousemen." A. did not accept the bill of exchange, but filed a petition for liquidation. B. having claimed the right of stoppage in transitu as against the trustee under A.'s liquidation: (Ex parte Catling; re Chadwick, 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 431. Bank.)

66 remained

BILL OF SALE-BANKRUPTCY OF ADMINISTR/TRIX-ASSUMPTION OF ABSOLUTE OWNERSHIP. -A., a trader, died in Oct. 1870, intestate, being indebted to the plaintiffs, to whom he had given a bill of sale, which was not registered. Administration was granted to his widow on the 14th Nov. 1870, who continued the business, remaining in possession of the chattels assigned by the bil of sale, and became bankrupt on the 13th Jan. 1872. On the 30th Jan. 1872, the plaintiffs filed a plaint in the County Court for the administra tion of A.'s personal estate. Held, that the title of the plaintiffs to the chattels could not prevail against that of the trustee in bankruptcy (1), because they had not taken possession under their unregistered bill of sale; (2), because (independently of that) they had allowed the administratrix to continue in possession for more than twelve months, during which time she had dismissed the character of administratrix, and assumed that of absolute owner of the chattels : (Kitchen v. Ibbetson, 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 450. V.C. M.)

PARTNERSHIP-BUSINESS CARRIED ON BY SURVIVING PARTNER SUBSEQUENT BANKRUPTCY.-A deed of partnership between a father and his son provided that in the event of the death of the father (to whom all the capital belonged, the son having only a share in the profits), the partnership should be dissolved, and the son's share in the profits should thenceforth belong to the father's personal representatives, or to such person as he should by his will appoint. By his will the father authorised the trustees to delay for two years the sale and conversion of such part of his estate as might at his death be employed in the partnership business, and in the meantime to make arrangements with the son for carrying on the business, and he appointed the son one of his executors. The son alone proved the will, and took possession of the estate, and continued to carry on the business for over a year after his father's death, and he then filed a petition for liquidation. The trustee in the liquidation sold the stock in trade, which consisted partly of goods which existed at the death of the father, and partly of goods since purchased by the son: Held, that the moneys arising from the sale of those parts of the stock in trade which existed at the death of the father were divisible amongst the joint creditors of the father and son, and that the moneys arising from the sale of those parts of the stock in trade which were purchased by the son since the death of the father were divisible amongst the separate creditors of the son; (Er parte Morley; re White, 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 442. Chan.)

BRADFORD COUNTY COURT.

Oct. 10, 29, and Nov. 25. (Before W. T. S. DANIEL, Q.C., Judge.) Ex parte DICKIN; Re JOWETT. Sale by trader debtor for value-No transferSecret reservation-Subsequent creditors. The purchase of the goods of a trader not debted though for value, is void against subsequent creditors, if it be kept secret, and the trader be allowed to remain in possession without visible change in the actual ownership, and there be a secret trust for the benefit of the trader, to take effect in the event of his insolvency. Notoriety is essential to perfect a purchase for value when the possession is not changed. (See Latimer v. Batson, 4 B.& C. 652; Kidd v. Rawlinson, 1 B. & P. 59.)

Watson (Watson and Dickson), Bradford, for the

motion.

Killick (Wood and Killick, Bradford), for the respondent.

the money of Mr. Joseph Craven, who was the brother of the bankrupt's wife. Mr. Craven has recently died, but has not been examined under this proceeding nor made any affidavit in the matter. Broadbent, in his examination before the registrar on the 13th Dec. 1872, states that he has no interest in the £180, or the furniture and in-effects, and that his name has been used simply to give effect to Mr. Craven's arrangements. By payment of the £480 on the 1st Nov., it would appear that Craven had through Broadbent as his trustee, became the purchaser for value from the trustees of the property mentioned in the memorandum of the 29th Aug. 1867, and as between him and the bankrupt, the legal right to the property was in Broadbent, and the equitable ownership was in Craven. The effect of the arrangement necessarily was, and I presume was intended to be, that as regarded the bankrunt's position at Idle, and the property and effects at Thorpe House, and the farm, there was, and should be, no visible change whatever. He had been the real owner up to the execution of the deed of the 27th Sept. 1867, and by means of the arrangements made by Broadbent and Craven with the trustees, remaining a secret as they did, he was enabled to continue, and did continue to appear to all his friends and neighbours, and those who had dealings with him, and even those who might know of his insolvency, as the real owner still. And if any person with whom the bankrupt might continue to have dealings in the way of business had been informed that his furniture and effects and property at Idle had been bought by Mr. Craven from the trustees, such person being informed also or knowing that Mr. Craven was his wife's brother, might reasonably have concluded from the fact that there was no outward change in the bankrupt's position, that the purchase had been made under some family arrangement for the bankrupt's benefit, and that he continued the real, as he was permitted to be the apparent, owner. It appears, however, that this was not Mr. Craven's real intention. He intended, as I infer from what took place, that in the event of a subsequent insolvency of the bank. rupt, whenever that might happen, he (Craven) should, through the instrumentality of Broadbent as his trustee, be enabled at any moment to assert and give effect to his real ownership, and have it in his power to place the property beyond the reach of the bankrupt's creditors, and apply it according to his discretion for the benefit of the bankrupt in providing, or helping to provide, a home for his wife and children. What was done to secure Craven's interest was this: At first it appears to have been suggested, at least I so infer from the evidence, that the £480 should be treated as a loan by Craven to the bankrupt, and the purchase as really made for him, and that he should give a bill of sale of the property as a security for the loan, and pay interest at five per cent. ; but this suggestion was not adopted, under the advice of Mr. Killick, who advised Mr. Broadbent that, as the ownership of the property was already vested in Mr. Craven, all that was required would be a document defining the interest which the bankrupt was intended to have in it. Such a document was accordingly prepared by Mr. Killick, his firm acting in the matter on behalf of all parties, Craven, Broadbent, and the bankrupt, and such document is indorsed on the valuation and inventory, and is as follows: Memorandum, that Mr. John Johnson Broadbent, being the absolute owner of the articles and things mentioned in this inventory and valuation, it is hereby agreed between him and Mr. Joseph Jowett, as follows-Mr. Jowett shall be at liberty to keep, use, and enjoy, but not to sell or dispose of, the said articles and things, subject to the stipulations of this memorandum, for so long as Mr. Broadbent thinks fit, except as regards the live stock and consumable stores, which Mr. Jowett may sell and dispose of. Mr. Jowett shall keep and maintain the articles and things in good and sufficient repair, order, and condition, and insured from loss by fire, in Mr. Broadbent's name, for £480 at least. Mr. Jowett shall pay Mr. Broadbent a rent of £21 yearly, by halfyearly payments, beginning the first day of May next, for the use of these articles and things. Mr. Broadbent shall be at liberty at any time, upon giving to Mr. Jowett, or leaving at his residence, a weekly notice of his intention so to do, to enter upon any place where the said articles and things, or any of them, may be, and to take possession thereof, and may also take possession, in manner aforesaid, without any such notice, if Mr. Jowett fail to punctually pay the said rent when due, become bankrupt or insolvent, or make an assignment or composition with his creditors, and for the purpose of taking possession Mr. Broadbent may employ any person or persons as assistants, and break open any doors, external or internal, or take any other steps that he may think necessary. Witness their hands, the twenty-seventh day of December, 1867, Signed, Joseph Jowett." It is not signed by Broadbent. From the affidavit of Mr. Killick,

His HONOUr. This is a motion by Henry Dickin, the trustee under the bankruptcy of Joseph Jowett, that John Johnson Broadbent, of Bradford, worsted spinner, may be ordered to deliver to the trustee certain household furniture and effects, referred to in the notice of motion, or pay to the trustee the sum of £480, the value of the said household furniture and effects of the bankrupt, and in his order and disposition. And that Broadbent may pay the costs of the application, or that such order may be made as to the court shall seem reasonable in the premises. The facts as established by the evidence are these: For some time previously, and up to the 27th Aug. 1867, the bankrupt carried on business in Bradford as a worsted top maker, at a mill called Osborne Mill, and he resided with his wife and children at Thorpe House, Idle, in the parish of Calverley, which he occupied, with some land attached, as tenant to Mr. Edmondson. In the month of Aug. 1867, the bankrupt found himself unable to pay his debts in full, and resolved to execute a creditors' deed under the Bankruptcy Act 1851. In contemplation of his insolvency, he, on the 12th Aug. 1867, procured an inventory and valuation to be made of his household furniture and effects (including the live and dead stock in the land and premises at Thorpe House) by Messrs. Hardwick, Best and Young, of Bradford, who valued the same at £516 13s. Messrs. Wood and Killick acted as the bankrupt's solicitors in the arrangements with his creditors, and on the 27th Aug. 1867, an assignment (in the usual form) of the bankrupt's estate and effects was executed by the bankrupt to two of his creditors, James Rhodes and Benjamin Read, as trustees for themselves and the rest of the bankrupt's creditors. And at the same time the bankrupt signed a memorandum in the following terms, indorsed on the inventory and valuation: "I acknowledge that I have this day handed over possession of the within mentioned articles to Messrs. James Rhodes and Benjamin Read, and I hold possession thereof on their behalf, and at their disposal, 27th Aug. 1867, Joseph Jowett." This memorandum was signed by the bankrupt in order to satisfy the requirements of sub-sect. 7, of sect. 192 of the Bankruptcy Act 1861. No other pos session was given to or taken by the trustees. On the 29th Aug. 1867, the following memorandum of agreement was indorsed on the same inventory and valuation, namely, "Memorandum.-That Messrs. James Rhodes and Benjamin Read, the assignees of Mr. Joseph Jowett, agree to sell to Mr. John Johnson Broadbent, who agrees to purchase of them all the articles included in this valuation, and all other property and effects at Idle belonging to Mr. Jowett, including the interest and benefit of the farm at Idle, held under Mr. Edmondson for £480, to be paid as soon as the assignees require it after the registration of the deed, dated 29th Aug. 1867. Signed James Rhodes, Benjamin Read, Jno. J. Broadbent." Best and Co.'s valuation was £516 13s., and did not include the interest in this farm; why the sale was for less does not appear. Subsequently, but previously to the 13th Sept. 1867, the deed was executed by the requisite majorities in number and value of the bankrupt's creditors, such execution being attested by Mr. Killick or his clerk, and therefore, I presume, procured by them on behalf of the bankrupt and his trustees, for whom they also acted. On the 18th Sept. the deed was duly registered in the London Court of Bankruptcy, and it must be presumed that the bankrupt's estate and effects have been duly administered and the proceeds distributed among those who were his creditors at the date of the deed, and their claims duly satisfied. The £480 was handed by Mr. Broadbent to Mr. Killick on 29th Oct., and on 1st Nov. 1867 was paid by him to Mr. James Rhodes, one of the assignees, and a receipt given in the following form: "Jowett's assignment.-Received from Messrs. Wood and Killick 2480, paid them by Mr. J. J. Broadbent. Signed, James Rhodes, assignee." It appears that the £180 was not the money of Broadbent, but was

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before referred to, it appears that this document had been prepared on the 16th Nov., and was signed by the bankrupt on the 27th Dec., in consequence of a letter written to him on the 26th, by Mr. Killick's firm, to this effect: "Mr. Broadbent seems annoyed at your not calling to sign the memorandum. Please do so at once." I have already observed that I inferred that the real transaction, as intended by the parties themselves, was a loan by Craven to the bankrupt of £480, to enable the purchase to be made for his benefit, and for which he was to pay Craven interest at 5 per cent., and give a bill of sale as security; and I look upon the agreement as prepared by Mr. Killick as an effort of skill and ingenuity to protect the property more effectually against the bankrupt's creditors than could be done by a bill of sale, which would require registration and re-registration, and would be no protection against creditors if mere formal possession were taken, whereas the agreement would leave the bankrupt in the undisturbed possession of the property, and enable him to keep up the appearance of real ownership until the critical moment of insolvency should arrive, and then possession could be taken by virtue of the legal ownership in Broadbent, and this might be done quietly and secretly, and still be effectual if taken in fact. Now, what is the agreement? It begins by representing Broadbent as the absolute owner, which is true only in the most technical sense. According to Broadbent's evidence, there was a secret trust that for paying 5 per cent. on the £480 the bankrupt was to have the use of the property for the benefit of himself and family. Proceeding upon the false assumption of absolute ownership in Broadbent, he grants the bankrupt, as though he were an independent hirer or bailee of the furniture, the liberty to use and enjoy it independently of his wife and children, at a rent of £24, payable half yearly, the first payment to be made on the 1st May, and he is to insure against fire in the name of Broadbent. It was admitted on the hearing before me that he never did insure. And why is what is called rent fixed at £21? It is plainly the interest at 5 per cent. on the £480. And why is the first half yearly payment of this rent to be paid on the 1st May 1868? Plainly because the £480 had been paid on the 1st Nov., though Broadbent's title had accrued on the 29th Aug., and the bankrupt had had the use and enjoyment of the furniture all along. Was this rent ever paid? Broadbent says it was not. He calls it interest. The proviso enabled Broadbent to enter and take possession of the property if the rent was not paid punctually as it became due. It was not paid. The proviso was not acted upon. Why not, if the agreement was intended to carry into effect a real arrangement. Honour fully examined the evidence of the proceedings and continued.] And thus by providing a means for helping to make a home for his wife and children, the bankrupt has had the benefit of the purchase made by Mr. Craven, and which I infer from all the circumstances of the case, was the original intention to be carried into effect in the event of the bankrupt's insolvency. The question raised by the notice of motion is whether this mode of dealing with the property is effectual as against the creditors of the bankrupt. It appears that the bankrupt's debts amount to £2322 18s. 10d. and his assets (exclusive of the property in question) to £178 6s., so far as the trustee in the absence of the bankrupt has been able to ascertain. Mr. Watson, for the trustee, contended, first, that the furniture and effects must be treated as the property of the bankrupt, and that the assignment to Broadbent was void for want of registration under the Bills of Sale Act (17 & 18 Vict. c. 36); but that contention must fail. Broadbent's title is derived from the trustee under the creditor's deed of the 27th Sept. 1861, and that was duly registered and completed as a valid assignment against the bankrupt under the Bankruptcy Act 1861. The next contention was that the assent given by the bankrupt to Broadbent taking possession immediately, and waiving the week's notice to which the bankrupt was entitled under the agreement of the 27th Dec. 1867 was a fraudulent preference, but the answer given by Mr. Killick appears to me conclusive as to that ground; Broadbent was not a creditor-he was the legal owner of the goods, and the assent merely anticipated his right to resume possession of his own property. A third ground taken by Mr. Watson was that the whole arrangement was a scheme and device to deceive creditors, void both at common law and under the Statute of Elizabeth, as tending to defeat and delay them. Upon this ground I think the question must be decided. Mr. Killick met it thus: That the purchase by Broadbent from the trus tees, though with the money and really on behalf of Craven, was a purchase for full value and bond fide. As between Broadbent, Craven, and the bankrupt, I have no doubt it was so, and that the bankrupt was not intended, as between them, to have any other interest in or power over the goods than was given him by the agreement of the 27th

His

Dec. 1872; and that being so, Mr. Killick contended that the mode in which possession was taken and held by Harrison, though it might be formal or apparent only, was immaterial if as against the bankrupt it was real, and intended to be real, and he relied strongly upon Vicarino v. Holdsworth (20 L. T. Rep. N. S. 362); and he further insisted that as the possession was in fact taken before any act of bankruptcy had been committed, which was available for adjudication, the question of order and disposition with the consent of the true owner (which was one of the questions also raised by Mr. Watson), was sufficiently answered. I am of opinion, however, that this contention, though good as far as it goes, does not go far enough; it does not answer the objection as to creditors being deceived. I

collect from what was done that the intention was

that no persons, not parties or privies to the transaction of purchase by Craven, should be aware that such a transaction had ever taken place, but that all persons not parties or privies should be induced to believe that the bankrupt still continued the real owner of the property at Idle, and were permitted to trust him upon the faith of that belief. There is evidence on the file of proceedings that one creditor, at least, was so deceived. Charles Turner, a creditor for £198, and described as of Idle, worsted spinner, by his affidavit, filed the 12th Aug. 1873, states that "for three years prior to the filing of the petition in this matter I was in the habit of visiting the debtor at his house at Idle very frequently. During all that time the household furniture, the subject of this motion, was in the debtor's house at idle, which was well and comfortably furnished; and the said debtor and his family used the same in the usual way, and the same appeared to be treated as the property of the debtor. I understood and believed the same to be his property until the same were claimed by Mr. Broadbent upon the debtor's failure. Being under that impression and belief I lent money to the said debtor, and I am a creditor in this estate in respect thereof for the sum of £198." Although, in considering whether a transaction is void, as being intended to deceive creditors, it is not necessary to show that any creditor has been actually deceived, yet when it appears that a creditor has been deceived by the false appearance necessarily created by the transaction, that fact is strong to show its inherent viciousness-as being a transaction intended, because from its nature calculated, to deceive. Secresy and want of possession combined, producing, as they have produced in this case, a deception upon one creditor at least, have the effect, in my opinion, of vitiating the title of Craven and Broadbent, as his trustee, as against the creditors under the bankruptcy, and estop each of them from saying that the ownership which the bankrupt once really and notoriously had of this property, and which they permitted him, after the secret change of ownership, ostensibly to continue, was not the real ownership; and that these goods ought therefore to be treated as the goods of the bankrupt at the commencement of the bankruptcy. I am not aware of any case in which the combination of secrecy and want of possession, followed by an actual deception of a creditor, has been made the subject of decision; but I think the principle applicable to such a case may be collected from the authorities to which I will refer. Latimer v. Batson (4 B. & C. 652), was an action against the sheriff for seizing goods of the plaintiff under an execution against the Duke of Marlborough at the suit of a creditor. At the trial it appeared that in 1823, one Richardson, who had obtained a judgment against the Duke, issued a fi. fa., under which property of various descriptions was seized at Blenheim. An officer remained in possession until the end of 1823; then Richardson took a bill of sale from the sheriff, but the Duke prevailed upon Richardson to postpone the sale still further. In May 1824, the plaintiff (Latimer) took from Richardson a bill of sale of the goods, and paid him for them the sum of £700, and put a man in possession. On the 14th March 1825, a warrant was given by the sheriff to his bailiff to levy on the goods of the Duke for another judgment creditor. The plaintiff's man was still in possession, but the officer seized and carried the goods away. Up to that time the Duke had continued to reside at Blenheim, and to use the goods as if no execution had been put in, but the execution by Richardson was well known at Woodstock, and generally in the neighbourhood of Blenheim. The only question left to the jury was whether the sale by Richardson was bona fide or merely colour. able. The jury found it was bona fide, and a verdict for the plaintiff was entered. A new trial was moved for on the ground that the judge should have directed the jury to find for the defendant if they thought that the sale was colourable, or that the Duke remained in possession. The rule was refused. Lord Tenterden said it must be taken to have been proved that the transaction between Richardson and Latimer was bona fide; that Richardson was paid for the goods with the money

of Latimer; and that it was generally known in the neighbourhood of Blenheim that an execution had been put into the house. Bayley, J., said, the goods in question were seized under a fi. fa.; the creditor took a bill of sale of them from the sheriff, and afterwards, for a valuable consideration, sold his interest to the plaintiff, and the circumstances attending the execution were well known in the neighbourhood. And, referring to Leonard v. Baker (1 M. & S. 251), Watkins v. Birch (4 Taunt. 823), and Jozeph v. Ingram (8 Taunt. 838), his Lordship says, "If goods seized under an execution are bona fide sold, and the buyer suffers the debtor to continue in possession of the goods, still they are protected against subsequent executions if the circumstances under which he has the possession are known in the neighbourhood." And the law is laid down to the same effect in Kidd v. Rawlinson (1 B. & P. 59). These authorities establish that where the transaction is bona fide and for value, the continuance in possession is no objection, provided the transaction is notorious. In every one of these cases, the validity of the transaction, being in itself bona fide, has been upheld upon the ground of its notoriety. But where there is no notoriety, no change of possession, or secret arrangement for the benefit of the party indebted, and a creditor actually deceived (which is the present case), I am of opinion that the transaction is void as against creditors under a bankruptcy. The question, however, is not covered by any distinct authority, and it is a satisfaction to know that my judgment may be set right on appeal if it be wrong. There was another point made by Mr. Watson, which I have not yet noticed, but have considered with some anxiety which was this, that the paper signed by the bankrupt on the 16th Sept. 1872, waiving the seven days' notice to which he was entitled under the agreement of the 27th Dec. 1867 (and which had been prepared for him by Mr. Killick to be signed on his return from seeing Broadbent) might be treated as in itself an act of bankruptcy under sect. 6, sub-s. 2 of the Bankruptcy Act 1869 as being a fraudulent gift of part of his property, namely, his right to retain possession of the goods in question for seven days after service of the notice, and as having been given to Broadbent for the fraudulent purpose of enabling him to take possession at once, so that he (the bankrupt) might be able immediately after possession was taken, and within the seven days, to file his petition for liquidation, and then abscond, as he did on the 19th Sept., believing that the goods would be applied for the benefit of his wife and children, as they in fact were. If there were any direct evidence to show that the waiver was made with that fraudulent intent in the mind of the bank. rupt, the question would deserve serious consideration. But there is no such direct evidence, and I should hesitate to infer such an intention without the assistance of a jury. In answer to this objection of Mr. Watson's, it was pointed out by Mr. Killick that as the rent had not been punctually paid, Mr. Broadbent had, under the agreement, the right to enter at any time, and the waiver of the seven days' notice was therefore not required to authorise Broadbent taking possesssion. This, however, would not be an answer if the bankrupt believed he was entitled to the seven days' notice, and for the fraudulent motive and purpose suggested, waived it. I consider, however, that I cannot decide the case on this ground, though I recognise its importance. The order will be that the furniture mentioned in the inventory and valuation of Hardwick and Co., and effects which were taken possession of by Harrison on the 18th Sept. 1872, under the authority of Wood and Killick's letter of that date, be delivered by the said J. J. Broadbent to Mr. H. Dickin, in as good a state and condition as the same were when so taken possession thereof. Or in case the same cannot now be delivered in specie, then that the particulars and value thereof be ascertained and certified by the registrar, and the amount of such value so certified be paid by the said J. J. Broadbent to the said H. Dickin within seven days after the date of such certificate. And that the said J. J. Broadbent do pay to the said H. Dickin the costs of and incidental to this motion, but the costs of the proceedings before the registrar and of his certificate are reserved, with liberty to either party to apply with reference thereto, and by whom and to whom such costs should be paid.

LEGAL NEWS.

A JUST LAW.-The Times states that, for the first time, at the Woolwich Police court, an order was issued on the 3rd inst., against a soldier for support of his illegitimate child. By the new clause in the Mutiny Act, non-commissioned officers and privates are liable to deductions in their pay for the support of illegitimate children, and of their wives and families, to the extent of 6d. for a non-commissioned officer, and 3d. for a private soldier.-Pall Mall Gazette, Dec. 5.

ALBERT ASSURANCE ARBITRATION. - Lord Cairns has directed that a third and final dividend of 5d. in the pound be paid to the creditors of the Albert Assurance Company. The previous dividends were 2s. and 1s. 6d. The total amount, therefore, which the creditors will have received will be 3s. 114d. in the pound.

COMMITMENTS IN IRELAND.-The total number of commitments in Ireland during last year, as stated in the recently printed judicial statistics, was 30,427, against 31,348 in the preceding year: the males were nearly the same, being 19,264 in 1871, and 19,243 in 1872.

CRIMINAL STATISTICS.-The whole criminal Irish population on one day was calculated recently to be 30 in every 10,000, against 89 in 10,000 persons in England and Wales; and out of 1872, 2267 were "known thieves."-Times, Dec. 4. 217,333 persons proceeded against in Ireland in

MUNICIPAL BOROUGHS.-The annual returns relative to municipal boroughs presented to Parliament and printed show that the receipts were £3,267,294 last year, and the expenditure £3,432,666. The amount of loans effected on the rates and outstanding on the 14th Aug. last was £6,830,874.

LEGAL EXPENDITURE.-The Royal Commis sion appointed to inquire into the expenditure of the legal departments have agreed upon the first report. The attention of the commission up till now has mainly been directed to the preparation and consideration of a scheme for the re-employment or retirement of the holders of offices which may be abolished. The annual charges for compensation paid on account already amount to a very large sum. It is not anticipated, however, that the commission will make a final report for several months to come.

THE CRIMINAL COURTS. According to an article in the Globe, "a very offensive mode of cross-examination has recently come into fashion in the criminal courts. A witness already on his oath, gives certain evidence; he is immediately asked whether he swears that, and answers that he does. But this by no means satisfies the crossexamining barrister. 'You really mean to swear that?' &c. Remember you are on your oath;' and similar suggestions that the witness is perjuring himself, are reiterated to induce the jury to believe his evidence untrustworthy This is hardly fair to one who may be endeavouring to speak the truth, while a hard swearer will be by no means checked by such unauthoritative additions to the oath previously administered to him. This custom is singularly offensive to those who have proper regard for an oath's sanctity, but ridiculously inoperative in the case of those who are not so influenced."

THE Legal Offices Commission has for some time been sitting three days a week, and examining witnesses on the subject of the Chancery offices, but without much avail. With their minds an utter blank on the matters committed to them, they have had to receive instruction from those who have come before them, and to learn step by step what they require to know. This process has proved to be too slow and too inefficient for the purpose, and it appears the commissioners become more confused, and, to their own thinking, further than ever from their object the more they advance in their inquiry. No witnesses can be found to state that a radical fault exists in the organisation of the offices under review. Sugges tions of all sorts, relating to idleness, incompetency, and even to corruption in the officials of the court, have failed to produce the desired evidence. In this dilemma the commissioners have resorted to one of the most reasonable methods of action; they have asked the Lord Chancellor to appoint a committee of officers of his court who shall report as to the best mode of reorganising and amalgamating offices with a view to the provisions of the Judicature Act and the contemplated "fusion" of law and equity. This is an acknowledgment of weakness, but we congratulate the commissioners on having arrived at a full knowledge of their ignorance-the first step towards the success of their labours.-Globe.

WHAT IS LEGAL INSANITY?-The Master of the Rolls had before him on Monday, in the cross petitions of Joy v. Joy, some curious evidence as to the mental condition of one of the petitioners. This gentleman, who is more than forty years of age, appeared to have excited the commiseration of his mother on account of his habits of life and a certain tendency to follow bad example, which made him a likely dupe of vicious and unscrupulous companions. She accordingly petitioned that an arrangement might be made by order of the court by which the income of the money to which he is entitled under a decree in Chancery might be so paid as to find its way direct into the hands of her son, without passing through the hands of persons who, in his mother's opinion, were not suitable companions for her son. A mass of affidavits had been filed with a view of showing that the gentleman was of weak mind, and it was said that he had got into the keeping of a family at

Antwerp of doubtful reputation; that he possesssed and read with avidity a mass of immoral literature; and that he was incapable of understanding anything that was not of the simplest character. His Honour said that the mother had, in her maternal anxiety concluded that, because her son was not very virtuous, therefore he was not sane. But the law knew no degrees of insanity. Either he was or he was not compos mentis. Vicious habits alone were no indication of weak mind in the legal sense; as for the devotion to immoral literature, a very distinguished literary man not only possessed but gloried in the possession of a large library of erotic literature, and yet no one doubted his sanity; and, lastly, the incapacity to understand what was not simple was one in which this gentleman by no means stood alone. Ultimately an arrangement was made with the sanction of the court.

DAMAGES FOR RAILWAY UNPUNCTUALITY.— The question of whether railway companies are bound to keep the time set down in their timetables was raised before Mr. Whigham, in the County Court at Aylesbury on Wednesday. The plaintiff was Mr. Wm. Adams, cattle dealer, and the defendants were the London and North

Western Railway Company, as the proprietors of the branch line between Aylesbury and Cheddington. It was shown that on the 20th Oct. the plaintiff took a ticket at Aylesbury for Luton, where he ought to have arrived at 9.28 a.m., in time for Luton market, at which he was to dispose of some beasts. The train by which he was travelling from Aylesbury to the main line was delayed nearly an hour, owing to the engine being short of steam. The consequence was he missed the train at Cheddington, and did not arrive at Luton till 11.30 a.m., by which time the market was over. He now claimed 108. damages per head of his beasts-30 in number-which he did not get sold for nine days. The want of steam, it appeared, arose from the fire-box of the engine having been choked, the fireman having Welsh coal that daya variety to which he was not accustomed. It was pleaded for the defence that the company were exonerated from liability by the statement on their time-tables that they would not be responsible for delay. His Honour held, however, that the choking of the fire-box was not a circumstance over which the company's servants had no control, and he therefore gave a decree for the plaintiff for 40s, in respect of the loss of his time, through having found no market for his cattle at Luton. The Tribunal de Première Instance of Brussels has recently pronounced a decision which will be interesting to railway travellers in England. The railways in Belgium are the property of the State, and it was against the State that a traveller sought damages for delay in the performance of a journey. On the 1st of February the complainant took a ticket at Brussels for Marchiennes. The train started at the time fixed, but was detained for three-quarters of an hour near Charleroi in consequence of the line being blocked by goods trains. The traveller sought 300f. damages for the delay to which he had been exposed. The counsel for the State resisted the demand, contending that the delay to which the plaintiff had been subjected was the result of inevitable accident, and further, that, according to the terms of the contract upon which a railway ticket was granted, no compensation greater than the amount of the fare paid could be demanded. The court overruled that objection, and decided that the blocking up of the line by an accumulation of trains "constitutes a fault on the part of the administration, since it is not to be contested that it is bound to assure a free passage and the punctual arrival of the trains which are under its control." The court made an order against the State to pay to the plaintiff the sum of 150f. as damages.

CORRESPONDENCE OF THE

PROFESSION.

NOTE.-This Department of the LAW TIMES being open to free discussion on all professional topics, the Editor is not responsible for any opinions or statements contained in it

ARTICLED CLERKS' NOTICES.-I read with much satisfaction your remarks in last Saturday's LAW TIMES on the inconsistent decisions given by the masters sitting for the judges at chambers. On the 4th inst. I myself applied for an order to be at liberty to give an admission notice for Hilary Term next, on the ground that I had never heard of such a notice being requisite, and that I believed my admission would follow my examination as a matter of course; but my application met with a negative response. As I had entered into negotiations with the gentleman to whom I was articled for a partnership with him when admitted, the result became a grievance to me, and I was advised to apply to a judge, which I did, on the 6th inst., and obtained an order. AN ARTICLED.

NOTES AND QUERIES ON

POINTS OF PRACTICE.

NOTICE.-We must remind our correspondents that this column is not open to questions involving points of law such as a solicitor should be consulted upon. Queries will be excluded which go beyond our limits. N.B.-None are inserted unless the name and address of the writers are sent, not necessarily for publication, but as a guarantee for bona fides.

Queries.

42. CONVEYANCE-STAMP.-Perhaps one of your readers will be good enough to solve the following case for me: "A. executes a lease to B. of a certain freehold property for a term of twenty-one years, reserving a yearly rent of £21; at the end of ten years B. wishes to purchase the entire freehold of the property in question, and so A. executes a conveyance to him of the reversion for £300. As by the conveyance of the reversion to himself, B. is released from the covenants contained in the indenture of lease." Will any extra stamp

be needed beyond the ordinary £1 10s.

Answers.

X. Y.

(Q. 34.) STAMPS-AGREEMENT FOR WEEKLY TENANCY. The stamp duty depends on the rent reserved. If exceeds the rate of £10 per annum, the same duty the rent reserved on letting an unfurnished house must be paid as on a lease for a year as the rent reserved for a definite term. Thus an agreement for a week's holding, at the rate of £11 per annum, would require a 6d. stamp; if not exceeding £10 per annum, a id. stamp. Adhesive stamps may be used to be obliterated by the person who first executes. (See the Stamp Act, 1870, head "Lease;"' also sect. 99.) Z. Y.

(Q. 35.) BILL OF COSTS-PARTNER.-The firm cannot sue for any part of the costs, unless there be some evidence, by acquiescence or otherwise, that the client Z. Y.

adopted the firm as his solicitors.

(Q. 36.) CHEQUE-INDORSEMENT.-Under the circumauthority to obtain payment of the cheque; unless it stances, J. P. might consider that he had an implied be clear that he could not reasonably have thought himself entitled to do everything necessary to obtain payment, and that in fact he had a fraudulent intent in signing as executor, there was no forgery. The bank 19. As between the drawer and the executor of Mrs. is relieved from liability by the 16 & 17 Vict. c. 59, s. G., if there be no forgery, the executor of Mrs. G. must, of course, bear the loss; if there be forgery, the drawer must bear the loss, unless, as seems probable, the executor of Mrs. G. has so dealt with the cheque be, was rendered possible through the voluntary act of as to absolve the drawer. The fraud, if fraud there the executor.

2. Y.

ing of the money appears to be rather a misdemeanour Unless J. P. is one of the executors, his obtainunder 24 & 25 Vict. c. 98, s. 88, than a "forgery;" and if so, J. P. is liable to five years' penal servitude for the fraud by 27 & 28 Vict. c. 47, or two years' imprisonment. It is not a case of larceny. B.'s conduct seems rash in parting with the cheque so as to make him responsible for the loss in the first instance. As he treated J. P. as his agent, the latter might be liable in an action for damages, if solvent: (See Dunn's Case, 2 East, P. C. c. 19, s. 49, p. 962, as to forgery.)

(Q. 37.) TRUSTEES-INVESTMENT.-The East Indian Company, being incorporated or constituted by Act of Parliament (12 & 13 Vict. c. 93), I think its capital stock is within the power in question. Z. Y.

The cases of Hancorn v. Allen (7 Dick. 498 :) Clough v. Bond (3 M. & Cr. 496), showed that an unauthorised investment in India Stock would be made upon the responsibility of trustees prior to 22 & 23 Vict. c. 35, s. this investment was legalized. The Act only applies to 32 (13th Aug. 1859), and 23 & 24 Vict. c. 38, s. 12, when old India Stock, not that created by 22 & 23 Vict. c. 39. See Lewin on Trusts, ch. xiv. s. 4 p. 252. It is silent as to mortgages or bonds. In these cases the trustees should be furnished with an indemnity deed, in case of detriment.-C. C.

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Unity of interest, title, time, and possession, are necessary: (See Cruise's Digest, vol. 2, p. 366.) If A., B., C., are joint tenants, and A. sells to D., the unity of title is destroyed: (See Cruise, vol. 2, p. 379; Lit. S. 292.) Unity of possession is also at an end (Cruise, vol. 2, p. 380), and it is a tenancy in common, which merely requires unity of possession (p. 399, Lit. S. 292-99, and there is no survivorship. Hence, B.'s share descends to his heir; or, if a term of years, it is his personalty.

C. C.

(Q. 12.) Poor LAW-LIABILITY TO MAINTAIN GRAND PARENT.-The following note occurs (1 Bolt. Poor Laws, 374): "In this case (Waltham v. Sparkes, Skinner 566) it is said by Holt, C.J. that the word children in the statute of 43 Eliz. c. 2, s. 7, extends to grandchildren, because there is same natural affection; but no has occurred in which the same has been judicially determined. And perhaps, says Dr. Burn, there may be some doubt as to this point; natural affection descends more strongly than it ascends; and it is observable that whereas the 39 Eliz. c. 3 did only enact that parents and children should mutually maintain each other, this statute 43 Eliz., enlarging this branch, extends it to grandfathers and grandmothers, but doth not specify grandchildren," &c. Z. Y.

LAW SOCIETIES.

HUDDERSFIELD LAW STUDENTS'

DEBATING SOCIETY.

THE usual fortnightly meeting of this society was held on Monday, the 8th inst., Mr. Guy Morrison in the chair. The subject for discussion was"Should defendants in criminal cases be competent and compellable to give evidence, as in civil cases ?" Messrs. R. Welsh and E. H. Armitage conducted the affirmative, and Mr. G. F. Johnson the negative. The question was decided in the affirmative.

ARTICLED CLERKS' SOCIETY. A MEETING of this society was held at Clement's Inn Hall, Strand, on Wednesday the 10th_Dec., Mr. E. F. Stanway in the chair. Mr. Baker opened the subject for the evening's debate, viz., "That the acceptance by the Prime Minister, without additional remuneration, of the office of Chancellor of the Excheqner, vacates his seat in Parliament." The motion was lost by a majority of one.

SOCIETY.

BRISTOL ARTICLED CLERKS' DEBATING A MEETING of this society was held in the Law Library, Small-street, on Tuesday evening, the 2nd inst. F. N. Budd, Esq., Barrister, occupied the chair. Mr. Crewdson opened the following subject in the affirmative, Was the case of Hammersmith Railway Company v. Brand (L. Rep. 4 H. L. Cas. 171, 18 W. R. 12) rightly decided ?" Mr. Doggett opposed; and, after a considerable discussion, the affirmative carried by a large majority.

was

LEGAL EDUCATION ASSOCIATION. AT a meeting of the executive committee of the Amplett, Esq., Q.C., M.P., in the chair. After a association, held on Friday, Dec. 5, R. Paul reference by the chairman to the great loss the association had sustained by the death of ViceChancellor Sir John Wickens, who was an active solved that a deputation should wait upon the member of the executive committee, it was reLord Chancellor to ascertain what steps the Government was prepared to take in order to give effect to the objects of the association.

Since the meeting of the executive committee, it was ascertained that the Lord Chancellor would receive the deputation in Lincoln's-inn at four arranged. o'clock on Friday, Dec. 12, which he received as

Several leading members of both branches of the Profession having consented to act on the deputation, were present on the occasion.

DUBLIN LAW STUDENTS' DEBATING SOCIETY.

AT a meeting of this society held on Monday last, at King's Inns, Dublin, the following subject was debated: "That the present agitation of labour against capital is to be deprecated."

LEGAL OBITUARY.

NOTE. This department of the LAW TIMES, is contributed by EDWARD WALFORD, M.A., and late scholar of Balliol College, Oxford, and Fellow of the Genealogical and Historical Society of Great Britain; and, as it is desired to make it as perfect a record as possible, the families and friends of deceased members of the Profession will oblige by forwarding to the LAW TIMES Office any dates and materials required for a biographical notice.

THE HON. SIR G. ROSE, F.R.S. THE late Hon. Sir George Rose, formerly a Master in Chancery and a judge of the Court of Review, who died at Brighton on the 3rd inst., in the ninety-second year of his age, was born in London in or about the year 1782. He was educated at Westminster School, where he became one of the most able and accomplished classical scholars of the day; and it is stated that he frequently aided in the preparation of the Prologue and Epilogue of the "Westminster Play," at which from year to year he was a constant attendant. Sir George Rose was called to the Bar by the Honourable Society of the Inner Temple in 1809, and he was for many years the Senior Bencher of that body He was made a King's Counsel in 1827, and in 1831 he took his seat upon the Bench as judge of the Bankruptcy Court, or, as it was then called, the " Court of Review," at the same time having granted to him the rank and precedence as one of the judges in the Courts of Westminster Hall, and receiving the customary honour of knighthood. In 1810, during the Chancellorship of Lord Cottenham, he was made a Master in Chancery, the duties of which office he performed for many years. Sir George Rose, who was a Fellow of the Royal Society and of the Royal Geographical Society, married in 1821 Mary, daughter of the late Capt. Robert Pouncey, of the Hon. East India Company's Service. Lady Rose died in 1855.

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