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proved, the grant of the dignity was invalid; for example, the claim to the Earldom of Wiltes, in which it was held that, though the pedigree was reported proved, the patent created a mode of descent of the dignity unknown to the law; or the claim to the barony of Buckhurst, in which a clause in the patent transferring the enjoyment of the peerage on the happening of a collateral event was held invalid.

Table C shows that a few divorce Acts are still passed, at the instance of petitioners in Ireland and India. Within the period covered by the table there were eighteen such Acts.

IV. THE COURT OF APPEAL.

By the Judicature Act 1873, s. 18, were transferred to the Court of Appeal all jurisdictions and powers of (a) the Lord Chancellor and of the Court of Appeal in Chancery, in the exercise of his and its appellate jurisdiction and as a court of appeal in bankruptcy; (b) the Court of Appeal in Chancery of the County Palatine of Lancaster and the Chancellor of the Duchy; (c) the Court of the Lord Warden of the Stannaries; (d) the Court of Exchequer Chamber; (e) the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council upon appeals from judgments of the Court of Admiralty or from orders in Lunacy.

An important addition to the business of the Court of Appeal was made by the Judicature Act 1890 (53 & 54 Vict. c. 44, s. 1), which transferred to the Court of Appeal jurisdiction as to motions for new trials. By the Liverpool Court of Passage Act 1893 (56 & 57 Vict. c. 37, s. 10), an appeal lies from that court to the Court of Appeal: (Anderson v. Dean (1894) 2. Q. B. 222).

Another change of great consequence was made by the Judicature Act 1894 (57 & 58 Vict. c. 16.). It took away the right of appealing from orders allowing extension of time for appealing or, without the leave of the judge or Court of Appeal, from interlocutory orders, except in certain cases; and it directed that appeals from judges as to matters of practice and procedure should be to the Court of Appeal.

With the exception of the first-mentioned Aet, none of the above-named Acts materially affect the figures for the period covered by the comparative table at page 100. The Judicature Act 1894 not having come into operation until two months after it was passed (July 1894), only the figures of the Michaelmas Sittings of that year would be changed.

The chief results to be noted from 1876 to 1894 are a decrease in the number of appeals, an increase in the proportion of affirmations of the judgments or orders of the courts below, and an increase in the percentage of appeals heard to appeals set down for hearing.

In appeals to the Court of Appeal from all courts there is a decrease in cases set down and heard and an increase in the proportion of cases heard to those set down.

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Bench, Exchequer, and Common Pleas to the Exchequer Chamber are not properly comparable with the appeals from the Queen's Bench Division subsequent to that period. The jurisdiction of the Court of Exchequer Chamber under the Common Law Procedure Acts was very different from that of the present Court of Appeal; many cases which could now go to the Court of Appeal were then disposed of in the Divisional Courts, and could not go further. "From the Courts of Common Law to the Exchequer Chamber," said the Judicature Commissioners, describing the right of appeal before the Judicature Acts, "error lies in certain cases, and appeal in others. Error is brought, as of right, on matter of law apparent on the record, on judgments on demurrers, on bills of exception or the improper reception or rejection of evidence, or for misdirection by the judge at the trial, on special cases, on judgments non obstante veredicto, and for arrest of judgment. Appeal lies, as of right, from decisions upon points of law reserved at a trial. It also lies, but not without leave of the court, unless the judges differ, on motions for new trial on the ground of improper reception or rejection of evidence, or of misdirection by the judge. No judgment, rule, or order is appealable which does not fall within one or other of these classes of cases :" (First Report of Judicature Commissioners, page 22).

The total number of appeals of all kinds, including interlocutory appeals, has diminished. One of the first effects of the Judicature Acts was to increase the number of such appeals, and they reached a maximum in 1881-85, after the introduction of the Rules of 1883. They have since steadily fallen in number. In regard to these appeals, there is a striking difference between the two divisions. The interlocutory appeals set down and heard from the Chancery Division are about half as many as they were in 1876-80. Such appeals from the Queen's Bench Division are about twice as many as they were. In the former, the proportion of such "appeals to the whose has fallen; in the latter, the proportion, though not so large as in 1886-90, is considerably greater than in 1876-80.

The proportion of interlocutory appeals to the total number of appeals set down was as follows:

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There has been a considerable increase, amounting to 32:1 per cent. since 1876-80, in the appeals from the Probate, Divorce, and Admiralty Division. Probate and Divorce appeals have increased 50 per cent. since 1881-85, but there is a decrease since the same date in Admiralty appeals of 42 per cent. Not less satisfactory, probably, is the reduction in the number of appeals entered, but for some reason not heard; it may mean a reduction of what Bentham termed malá fide appeals, that is, appeals brought for objects other than the ostensible objects.

10.4 per cent. 2.3 per cent.

The years in which there was the largest number of appeals set down for hearing were 1883 and 1884; those in which were the smallest number were 1893 and 1894. The increase of 7.2 per cent. in the proportion of appeals heard to appeals set dowu is probably indicative that appeals are more often brought to determine real questions than they once were. The first effect of the Judicature Acts was to increase the number of appeals, especially interlocutory appeals. They reached their maximum in 1884, and from that period there has been an almost uninterrupted decline.

The following statement shows the appeals coming from the Chancery and Queen's Bench Divisions :

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Queen's Bench Division.

heard to

Number

Number

Number

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Average Annual Annual Number Number set down. heard.

set down.

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Percentage of Appeals heard to Number set down.

*From 1876 to 1881 these Appeals include Admiralty Appeals.

The decrease in Bankruptcy appeals is worthy of note. In 1891-94 they were only a third of the number in 1876-80. The reduction is most marked since the Bankruptcy Act 1883 came into operation. To the appeals included in table D must be added the appeals to the Divisional Court from County Courts, in order to obtain the total number of Bankruptcy appeals. But even after making these additions, it will be found that one of the chief differences between the Act of 1869 and that of 1883 is the small number of appeals under the latter.

293

261

89.1

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Lord James of Hereford left London last Monday for Balmoral, as Minister in attendance on Her Majesty.

Lord Justice Kay, who recently underwent a painful operation, was able, for the first time, to leave his bed for a few hours last Tuesday.

The library of the late Lord Coleridge is on sale by Ashton Nield, bookseller, 30, Park-street, Bristol.

A telegram from Rome states that the Minister of Justice, Signor Costa, has just drafted a measure to provide for the indemnification of persons who are wrongly condemned by the courts.

The marriage arranged between Mr. F. H. Maugham, barrister-at-law, of 3, New-square, Lincoln's-inn, and Helen Mary, eldest daughter of the Hon. Mr. Justice Romer, will take place in December.

A man giving the name of Paul Gorman was charged at the West London Police-court last Monday with attempting to commit a burglary at the residence of Mr. Justice Romer. The accused was remanded.

The Lord Chancellor of Ireland has nominated Mr. Justice Madden to be assistant judge for the administration of the record of the Title Act 1865, and of the local registration of the Title Act 1891.

Last Tuesday night's London Gazette announces the knighthood conferred upon Mr. Henry Spencer Berkeley, Chief Justice of Fiji, and Chief Judicial Commissioner for the Western Pacific.

On Wednesday morning the Lord Chief Justice intimated in the course of a discussion as to expediting a case that, in consequence of the illness of Lord Justice Kay, he would on returning from circuit sit in the Second Court of Appeal.

The annual smoking concert in connection with the Royal Courts of Justices Staff Sick and Provident Fund will take place at St. Martin's Town Hall, Charing Cross, on Monday evening, the 23rd inst. The Attorney-General, Sir Richard Webster, Q.C., M.P., will preside.

The November general sessions of the peace for the county of London were commenced at Clerkenwell last Monday for the disposal of cases arising on the north side of the Thames. There are some sixty persons involved in alleged offences.

There are two registration appeals only arising out of the recent revision of the lists of voters in England and Wales, and these case will be heard before a court of three judges of the Queen's Bench Division on Saturday the 14th inst.

The Judges who are expected to attend the Lord Mayor's banquet at the Guildhall on Monday evening are the Master of the Rolls (Lord Esher), Lord Justice Lopes, Sir F. Jeune, Mr. Justice Barnes, Mr. Justice Grantham, and Mr. Justice Kekewich.

Mr. Peter Griffin, a grand juror and magistrate for county Limerick, and sub-commissioner under the Land Act, committed suicide, last week, by shooting himself with a revolver while staying at a Limerick hotel. The deceased was about fifty years of age.

The judges of the Probate, Divorce, and Admiralty Division will soon have nothing to do, and, in view of the heavy cause lists in the Queen's Bench Courts, a solicitor writes to the Daily Telegraph to suggest that one of the Probate judges should at once assist in the other division.

The movement for the incorporation of Westminster is attracting considerable interest from all sides. The unique historic importance of the ancient city appeals strongly to the imagination of many advocates of incorporation, and attempts are being made to justify the appeal for a charter chiefly on these grounds.

Mr. G. Bettesworth Piggott, barrister-at-law of the Middle Temple, recently appointed by the Marquis of Salisbury to the new office of Judicial Officer in British Central Africa, under the administratorship of Sir Harry Johnston, has arrived at Durban by the United States steamship Moor, on his way to Chinde.

The will of Mr. George Menzies Clements, of 17, Gresham House, Old Broad-street, and 7, The Terrace, Camden-square, solicitor, who died on the 12th Sept., at Wiesbaden, was proved on the 19th ult., by Mr. John Henry James, of Norfolk House, Norfolk-street, Strand, the surviving executor, the value of the personal estate being £25,852 16s. 2d.

Mr. Justice Hawkins completed last Monday twenty years of service on the Bench. On the 2nd Nov. 1876 he succeeded Mr. Justice Blackburn, who was then made a Lord of Appeal in Ordinary. Sir Henry Hawkins reached his seventy-ninth birthday on the 14th Sept. He was admitted a student of the Middle Temple as far back as April 1839.

For the first time in the history of New York State Courts, women have been appointed receivers in supplementary proceedings in insolvency. The appointments were made by Justice MacLean in the Supreme Court of the county, and are three in number, being Miss Rosalie Loew, Mrs. E. S. Warner, and Mrs. Anita Haggerty, all members of the New York Bar.

The Hon. William McKinley, the new President of the United States, is a lawyer. He was born at Niles, on the 29th Jan. 1843. He comes of a Scotch-Irish stock, which went to the New World early in the eighteenth century. Adopting law as a profession, he was admitted to the Bar in 1867, and, settling at Canton, Ohio, rapidly gained a place in local politics.

The sittings of the Law Lords for the transaction of judicial business during the Recess will commence on Thursday, the 12th Nov. The present list, which we print in another column, consists of sixteen cases, of which twelve are English and four are Scotch appeals, there being no Irish cases entered. There are also no less than seven appeals awaiting judgment, among them being the case of Earl Russell v. Countess Russell.

Mr. Alfred Billson, who has consented to contest East Bradford in the Radical interest, is the son of a Leicester banker, and is fifty-seven years of age. He was admitted as a solicitor in 1860, and has for many years been a partner in the firm of Oliver Jones, Billson, Jones, and Madge, of Liverpool. In 1892 Mr. Billson was elected for the Barnstaple Division of Devon by a majority of 147; but in 1895 Mr. Billson was defeated by Sir W. C. Gull by the narrow majority of 68.

The new town clerk of Windsor, Mr. Philip Lovegrove, is a native of the Royal borough. As a boy he entered the office of Mr. Long, who was clerk to the borough magistrates, and, in the course of time, having obtained his articles; became a member of his employer's firm. He is at present clerk to the magistrates of Windsor borough, and joint clerk to the county benches of New Windsor, Berks, and Stoke Hundred, Bucks. He is a member of the Incorporated Law Society, the Justices' Clerks Society, and the Berks, Bucks, and Oxfordshire Incorporated Law Society.

Mr. Henry Mason Bompas, Q.C., who has been appointed a County Court judge in the place of his Honour Judge Gates, is sixty years old, having been born in 1836. He is the youngest son of the late Mr. Serjeant Bompas. He was educated at St. John's College, Cambridge, and the London University. At the University of London he obtained the gold medal for mathematics at the M.A. Examination in 1857, and in 1858 he was fifth Wrangler at Cambridge. In 1862 he took the London LL.B. with honours in five branches, and was elected a Fellow of University College. He is a member of Convocation, and Recorder of Plymouth and Devonport. He was called to the Bar in 1863 and made a Queen's Counsel in 1877. He is also a Bencher of the Inner Temple. During the hearing of the case of Fairclough v. The Manchester Ship Canal last Tuesday, Mr. Justice Kekewich (addressing Mr. T. R. Hughes, the junior counsel for the plaintiffs, who practises in the Lancaster Palatine Court) said he had recently learnt through the usual channels of information that official shorthand-writers were in future to be employed to take the evidence in cases in the Palatine Court.-Mr. Hughes said that was so. The expense of taking the notes would be defrayed by the Duchy, but transcripts would be taken at the expense of parties desiring to have them.-Mr. Justice Kekewich: It is an interesting departure. There is a difference of opinion on the subject on the Bench; but I say nothing more. I only ask for information.

Addressing the grand jury at Cheshire Assizes last Wednesday, Mr. Justice Mathew said that two-thirds of the prisoners were charged with indecent offences. These cases were the despair of magistrates and judges, and it had been suggested that an attempt should be made by severer punishment to repress them. It had been said that the lash should be employed, but one ought to be very slow, for the credit of the country, in admitting that Englishmen could only be deterred from offences of that abominable kind by the lash. He hoped that the nineteenth century had a better message for the century that was to follow than that moral discipline could only be maintained in England by means employed in some gaols on hardened criminals. It might be that those who trained the young paid less attention to their moral than intellectual training, but he still hoped the real means of repression would come from that quarter.

NOTES OF RECENT DECISIONS NOT YET REPORTED.

BY OUR REPORTERS IN THE SEVERAL COURTS.

COURT OF APPEAL.

Bankruptcy Bankruptcy Notice-Service-Partnership Firm-Servicon Receiver and Manager appointed by Court-General Rules in Banke ruptcy 1883, r, 260.-Rule 260 of the General Rules in Bankruptcy 1883 provides that: " Any notice or petition for which personal service is necessary shall be deemed to be duly served on all the members of a firm, if it is served at the principal place of business of the firm in England, on any one of the partners, or upon any person having at the time of service the control or management of the partnership business there." Messrs. Ware and Co. obtained a final judgment against the firm of Messrs. Flowers and Co., in which there were five partners. An action for dissolution of the partnership was instituted in the Chancery Division by some of the partners in Messrs Flowers and Co. against the other partners. In that action an order was made, upon the application of the plaintiffs, appointing Mr. Ryder to be receiver and manager of the partnership business, and he took possession of the business of the firm under that order. Messrs. Ware and Co. issued a bankruptcy notice in respect of the judgment against Messrs. Flowers and Co., and it was served upon Mr. Ryder at the principal place of business in London of the firm of Messrs. Flowers and Co. Upon default in complying with the requirements of the bankruptcy notice, Messrs. Ware and Co. presented a petition in bankruptcy against Messrs. Flowers and Co. The registrar dismissed the petition upon the ground that the bankruptcy notice had not been duly served, inasmuch as the receiver and manager appointed by the court was not a person having the control or management of the partnership business" with the meaning of rule 260. The petitioning creditors appealed. Held (dismissing the appeal), that the receiver and manager appointed by the court was not "person having the control or management of the partnership business," within the meaning of rule 260 of the Bankruptcy Rules, upon whom a bankruptcy notice could be served.

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66

[Re Flowers and Co.; Ex parte Ware and Co. Ct. of App.: Lord

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E-her, M.R., Lopes and Rigby, L.JJ. Oct. 30.-Counsel: for the appellants, F. Cooper Willis; for the respondents, Muir Mackenzie. Solicitors: for the appellants, Kingsbury and Turner; for the respondents, George Coote.] Company-General Meeting-Voting-Proxies-Blank Date-Authority to fill up-Validity-Duly stamped-Stamp Act 1891 (54 & 55 Vict. c. 39), s. 80.-A notice convening an extraordinary general meeting to confirm a special resolution was accompanied by a circular from the secretary and directors with a form of proxy attached asking for the return of the proxy in support of the resolution. By a printer's error the day and hour of the meeting were left blank in the proxy. The secretary filled up this blank in several of the proxies after they had been executed and returned by the members. It was decided by Chitty, J. (75 L. T. Rep. 221) that, as the members by returning the proxies in compliance with the circular must have intended that they should be used at this particular meeting, the secretary had authority to fill in the date; and that these proxies were valid and duly stamped within the provisions of the Stamp Act 1891, s. 80. The plaintiff appealed on this point, and also on another point decided by Chitty, J., but on that other point the Court of Appeal reserved judgment. Held, that sect. 80 of the Stamp Act 1891 did not enact that, if the date was omitted from a proxy at the time it was executed and was subsequently inserted, before the proxy was used, by a person duly authorised to insert it the proxy was to be invalidated; but that it was enough to insert the date before the proxy was used. Held, therefore, that the appeal on this point must be dismissed. Decision of Chitty, J. affirmed.

Ernest v. The Loma Gold Mines Limited. Ct. of App. No. 2. Lindley and Smith, L.JJ. Nov. 4.-Counsel: for the appellant, Ashton Cross; for the respondent, Byrne, Q.C. and E. W. Stock. Solicitors: for the appellant, W.T. Hart; for the respondent, Powell and Burt.]

The agree

HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE.-CHANCERY DIVISION. Author and Publisher-Publishing Agreement-Assignability-Company -Receiver-Unsold Copies of Books-Injunction.-The plaintiff, an author of three novels which had been published by the defendant company, sought to restrain the company and the receiver of the company, who had been appointed in a debenture-holder's action, from selling without the plaintiff's consent certain assets comprising (inter alia) unsold copies of books and illustration plates in the possession of the receiver, and also from purporting to sell or assign the benefits, rights, or interest alleged by the defendants to be vested in them under an agreement between the plaintiff and the company. ment provided for payment to the author on the half-profit basis, the company taking all risk in the publication except actual out-of-pocket expenses. On motion for an interim injunction the plaintiff contended that the agreement was merely personal to the parties thereto, and could not therefore be assigned, and that the receiver ought not to deal with the said assets until the trial of the action. In support of the motion the authority of Hole v. Bradbury (41 L. T. Rep. 153, 250; 12 Ch. Div. 886) was relied upon. The defendant company were not represented. The receiver submitted that a limited company was not debarred from assigning such an agreement, as the personal relationship between author and publisher or a partnership firm of publishers did not exist in the case of a company; but he offered to give an undertaking as to the assets in terms of the notice of motion. Held, that the principle as to the non-assignability of such agreements extended to a limited company, and an injunction must be granted, but that the undertaking offered by the receiver was sufficient as to the

assets.

Griffith v. Tower Publishing Company Limited. Ch. Div.: Stirling, J. Oct. 30.-Counsel: for the plaintiff, Millar, Q.C. and T. B. Napier; for the receiver, Graham Hastings, Q.C. and Edward Ford. Solicitors for the plaintiff, Harrison and Davies; for the receiver, McKenna and Co.; the defendant company were not represented.] Bankruptcy Beneficed Clergyman-Sequestration of Income of BeneficeDischarge of Bankrupt-Continuance of Sequestration. On the application of the trustee in bankruptcy of a clergyman of the Church of England and rector of a parish, the bishop of the diocese issued a sequestration of the income of the living, by virtue of which a portion of the income was paid to the bankrupt while performing the duties of the benefice under the order of the bishop, and the residue, after paying thereout the costs and expenses of the sequestration, was handed over to his trustee in bankruptcy. Subsequently the bankrupt obtained his order of discharge, the whole of his property available for dividend other than the moneys available by means of the sequestration having been realised and distributed; but the sequestration was not relaxed by the bishop, the trustee in bankruptcy having refused to take any steps to obtain the relaxation on the ground that the bankruptcy had not been closed; that a dividend of only 8s. 9d. in the pound had been paid, and that the sequestration ought not to be relaxed until the whole of the debts were satisfied. In an action by the clergyman against the trustee in bankruptcy for an injunction to restrain him from receiving the residue of the income of the living, a declaration that the clergyman was entitled after his discharge to receive the profits of his benefice, and an order on the defendant to take steps to obtain the relaxation of the sequestration, it was held that the order of discharge did not entitle the clergyman to the profits of his benefice, and the action was dismissed.

Lawrence v. Adams. Ch. Div.: North, J. Nov. 3.-Counsel: H. P. St. Gerrans; J. G. Wood. Solicitors: Withalls and Belton; Coode, Kingdon, and Cotton, for Coode, Shilson, and Co., St. Austell, Cornwall.]

Post Office Savings Bank-Nomination of Deposits-Nomination by a Testatrix of an Executor named in her Will Evidence rebutting Presumption of Gift-Savings Bank Act 1887 (50 & 51 Vict. c. 40), 8. 3. -Where a testatrix, subsequent to the execution of her will, filled up a nomination in the prescribed form of the amount (being under £100) due to her by the Post Office Savings Bank at her decease, in favour of one of her executors, and the evidence was sufficient to rebut the presumption that the executor should receive such amount as a gift, it was held that he received the same in his capacity of executor, and he . was ordered to account for the same accordingly.

[Re Read; Turner v. Read. Ch. Div. Stirling, J. Oct. 29.Counsel G. E. Tyrrell; Mulligan. Solicitors: H. Tyrrell and Son, agents for Frank S. Pearson, Birmingham; Smith and Eldridge, agents for T. W. Walthall, Birmingham.]

Practice Originating Summons- Mortgage-Construction-Jurisdiction -Rules of Court 1883, Order LIV.A., r. 1.-This was a summons taken out by a mortgagor under R S.C., Order LIV.A., r. 1, for the determination of the following questions: (1) Whether, according to the true construction of the indenture of mortgage dated the 25th April 1892, and made between the plaintiff of the one part and the defendant society of the other part, the plaintiff is now entitled to give to the defendant society a valid and effectual notice of her intention at the expiration of six months from the date of such notice to pay off the principal money now owing upon the security of the said indenture of mortgage, together with all interest at the expiration of such notice due thereon according to the provisions of the same indenture with respect to such interest, and thereupon to have a reconveyance of the premises comprised in the said mortgage security; or whether the defendant society are entitled to insist upon the said principal moneys remaining upon the security aforesaid until the death of the tenant for life in the said indenture named; (2) costs. By the said indenture the plaintiff N. assigned to the defendant society a sum of consols to which she was entitled expectant on the decease of her father C. to secure the sum of £1100 and interest at the rate of 5 per cent. per annum thereon, subject to a proviso for redemption therein contained. And it was provided that, notwithstanding the covenants thereinbefore contained, neither the principal nor interest should be called in during the life of the tenant for life. A preliminary objection was raised on behalf of the defendants that the court had no jurisdiction to decide the question upon originating summons because the instrument was a mortgage deed, and the person claiming to have the deed construed was a mortgagor, and there was no offer by her to redeem. Held, that the court was competent to decide the question upon originating summons, and that upon the true construction of the mortgage deed the plaintiff was entitled to redeem the security notwithstanding that the tenant for life was still alive. The mortgagees to add their costs to their security.

[Re Nobbs; Nobbs v. Law Reversionary Interest Society Limited. Ch. Div. Kekewich, J. Oct. 28 and 29-Counsel: Renshaw, Q.C. and Godefroi; MacSwinney. Solicitors: H. Cubitt Ireland; Caprons, Dalton, Hitchins, and Brabant.]

Settled Land Act 1890, s. 16-Mansion House-Object of Restrictions.W. by will bequeathed certain objects in and about his mansion-house K. House, to be enjoyed by his eldest son as heirlooms during his life, and after his death to be divided amongst the testator's daughters, and the testator devised his said mansion-house and all other his real estate to trustees in trust for his son for life, and on his death to be sold and the proceeds divided into numerous shares. The son wished to sell the estate, together with the mansion-house, in exercise of his powers under the Settled Land Acts. The trustees refused their consent, and the tenant for life applied to the court for leave to sell the mansion-house. Held, that the house, not having been a family seat, and the direction that it should be sold at the death of the tenant for life showing that the testator did not intend to make it one, the case was not one of those to which the exception made by the Settled Land Acts of the mansion-house from the general power of sale given to the tenant for life was intended to apply, and there was no reason why the court should not allow the tenant for life to exercise his discretion as to the sale of the mansion-house as well as the land. Leave was, therefore, given

[Re Wortham's Estate. Ch. Div.: North, J. Oct. 27.-Counsel: Swinfen Eady, Q.C. and Philpotts; Vernon Smith, Q.C. and Upjohn. Solicitors Mear and Fowler; Woodcock, Ryland, and Parker, agents for I. Cooke and Sons, Bristol.]

Solicitors-Costs-Taxation-Scale Fee-Lease in Consideration of Rent and Premium-General Order under Solicitors' Remuneration Act 1881 Sched I., Part II., r. 5.-A lease was granted at an annual rent of £250, in consideration of a premium of £5000. The lessor's solicitors, in their bill of costs, charged a sum of £40 for negotiating, in addition to the scale fee of £29 in respect of the rent, and the scale fee for deducing title calculated on the premium. The taxing master disallowed the

sum of £40 charged for negotiating. The solicitors took out a summons to review the taxation, claiming that, under rule 5 to Part II. of Sched. 1 to the General Order under the Solicitors' Remuneration Act 1881, they were entitled, in addition to the remuneration prescribed by the schedule in respect of the rent, to a further sum equal to the remuneration on a purchase at a price equal to the premium, and that therefore the charge of £40 for negotiating should be allowed. Held, that the solicitors were paid for negotiating by the scale fee calculated on the rent; and that, if the charge were allowed, they would be paid twice over for negotiating, and summons dismissed.

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QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION. Burial Acts-New Burial Ground-Addition to old Burial GroundConsecration of Part-16 & 17 Vict. c. 134, s. 7.-Rule nisi to the burial board of the county of Southampton to show cause why a mandamus should not issue directing them to apply to the Bishop of Winchester to consecrate a part of an addition made to the burial ground at Basingstoke in accordance with the provisions of sect. 7 of the Burial Act 1853 (16 & 17 Vict. c. 134). That section provides that in all cases in which a burial board shall provide a new burial ground under the Act, "that new burial ground shall be divided into consecrated and unconsecrated parts." Counsel on behalf of the burial board now contended that this enactment did not apply to additions made to an already existing burial ground, but only to one which was entirely new. Held (without calling upon counsel in support of the rule), that the section applied to additions to old burial grounds. Rule absolute.

[Reg. v. Basingstoke Burial Board. Q. B. Div.: Grantham and Wright, JJ. Nov. 2.-Counsel: for the board, Lord Coleridge, Q.C. and W. H. Roberts; for the Crown, Sir R. Webster, A.-G., and Sutton. Solicitors: Bayley, Basingstoke; Solicitor to the Treasury.] Poor Rate-Distress Warrant-Rate upon Land not in Occupation of the Person assessed-Jurisdiction and Discretion of Magistrates.Rule nisi calling upon justices of Derbyshire to show cause why a mandamus should not go, directing them to issue a distress-warrant for £2 38. 4d., the amount of a poor rate made upon one Bramall, in respect of various holdings under different landlords, all of which were set down in the rate-book as being in the occupation of Bramall. At the hearing of the overseers' application for a distress-warrant, the magistrates held that they had jurisdiction to inquire into the question of Bramall's occupation of the holdings, and, after hearing evidence, decided that one of the holdings rated was in the occupation, not of Bramall, but of his wife, that another was in the occupation of his son, but that a third, which was alleged to be in the occupation of his daughter, was in the occupation of Bramall himself. The evidence showed that Bramall and his wife, son, and daughter all lived together. and that the son worked on his father's farm. It was now contended on behalf of the overseers that, as Bramall was in visible occupation of all the holdings, the inquiry of the justices was an inquiry as to the beneficial ownership, which, on the authority of Reg. v. Bradshaw (29 L. J. 176, M. C.), they had no authority to make. Held, that the justices had jurisdiction to inquire not only whether the person rated was in actual or visible occupation of the lands assessed, but also whether he was the person having the real mastership or control in respect of these lands.

[Reg. v. Bagshawe and others (Justices); Ex parte Bramall. Q.B. Div.: Grantham and Kennedy, JJ. Oct. 29.-Counsel for the Justices, C. A. Russell; for the Overseers, R. G. Glenn. Solicitors: for the Justices, P. G. Robinson, for Ainsworth and Shipton, Buxton; for the Overseers, Campion and Simmons, for Clegg and Sons, Sheffield.]

Public Health-Provision of Water Closets--Discretion of Sanitary Authority Jurisdiction of Justices-Public Health (London) Act 1891 (54 & 55 Vict. c. 76), s. 37 (3 & 5).-Appeal by case stated from decision of metropolitan magistrate dismissing a summons under sect. 37 (3) of the Public Health (London) Act 1891 (54 & 55 Vict. c. 76). The appellants, the Vestry of St. John. Hackney, were a sanitary authority in the district where a house of the respondent's was situate. Owing to complaints from the respondent's tenant the appellant's inspector visited the premises and reported that they were without sufficient water-closets. The appellants thereupon caused notice to be served upon the respondent requiring him forthwith, or within a time specified in the notice, to provide an additional water-closet. The respondent failed to comply with this notice. The appellants thereupon laid an information before the magistrate, and a summons issued under sect. 37 (3) of the Public Health (London) Act 1891. the hearing of the summons the magistrate expressed a strong opinion that the whole matter arose out of a squabble between the respondent and his tenant, and adjourned the case to see if the tenant cared to enforce by civil action a covenant in his lease binding the respondent to provide proper sanitary conveniences for the premises. On the summons coming on again and the tenant refusing to take steps to enforce the covenant, the magistrate dismissed the summons, holding that the second water-closet required by the notice was not necessary. The sanitary authority appealed, and the question raised for the opinion of the court was, whether or not the magistrate had under the Act any jurisdiction to control the discretion of the sanitary authority as to the need of additional water-closets.

that he had no such jurisdiction.

At

For the appellants it was contended The Act gave the sanitary authority an absolute discretion in the matter subject to an appeal to the county council under sect. 37 (5). The jurisdiction of the magistrate was limited to deciding whether proper notice had been served and what the amount of the fine should be. For the respondents it was argued that, though the magistrate's jurisdiction was limited when the sanitary authority themselves executed the works to the ministerial act of enforcing payment of the expenses, the case was different where the sanitary authority proceeded by way of fine. Then the matter became a criminal one, and it could not be contended that the Act gave to a non-judicial body like the sanitary authority a power to declare when a given person was guilty of a crime, subject only to an appeal to the county council which itself was not a judicial body. Surely in criminal matters the magistrate was the only person entitled to say that a crime had been committed and his functions could not be limited to deciding what punishment the crime, as found by the local authority, demanded.

Held, that the magistrate had no jurisdiction to decide whether or not the sanitary authority had rightly exercised the discretion given it by the Act: but he had jurisdiction over the amount of the fine. The case therefore must be remitted with a direction to convict. Per Wright, J. There was no necessity upon conviction to inflict any fine in case the magistrate thought the offence committed was not such as to call for such punishment. During the argument the following cases were referred to: Vestry of St. Luke v. Lewis (5 L. T. Rep. 608); Sherborne Local Board v. Bogle (46 J. P. 675); Hargreaves v. Taylor (8 L. T. Rep. 149).

[Vestry of St. John, Hackney, v. Hutton. Q. B. Div.: Grantham and Wright, JJ. Nov. 3. Counsel: for the appellant, Beven; for the respondent, Carrington. Solicitors, Tiddeman; Stones, Morris, and Stones.]

Sale of Food and Drugs Act 1875 (38 & 39 Vict. c. 63), s. 6-Adulteration -Drug, meaning of-Beeswax.-Case stated by justices of Cranbrook, who refused to convict the respondent under sect. 6 of the Sale of Food and Drugs Act 1875. The respondent was a grocer carrying on business at Marden, in Kent, and the appellant, an inspector for the purposes of the Act, purchased from the respondent at his shop some beeswax which was found upon analysis to be adulterated with 50 per cent. of paraffin. The justices held that there had not Counsel, been a sale of a "drug" within the meaning of the Act.

on behalf of the appellant, now contended that the test of whether an article was a drug or not was its appearance in the Pharmacopoeia. Beeswax did so appear and was used in the preparation of different medicines. Held (affirming the decision of the justices), that beeswax sold by a grocer is not a "drug" within the meaning of the

section.

[Foule v. Fowie. Q. B. Div.: Grantham and Wright, JJ. Nov. 2. Counsel for the appellant, T. Mathew. Solicitors: for the appellant, Warner and Turner, Tonbridge.]

Bankruptcy

IN BANKRUPTCY.

Fraudulent Preference-Accommodation Acceptance Payment by Drawer to relieve Acceptor-Acceptor a "Creditor". Bankruptcy Act 1883 (46 & 47 Vict. c. 52), ss. 37-48. Prior to the 17th April 1895 the bankrupt had received from one Barnard an accommodation acceptance for £20, which he discounted with his bankers. The act of bankruptcy was committed on the 25th April, and a receiving order was made on the 8th May, followed by an adjudication on the 13th May. On the 17th April the bankrupt paid the sum of £20 to his bankers for the purpose of meeting the accommodation acceptance. Held, that the acceptor, although only a surety, was a "creditor" within the meaning of sect. 48 of the Bankruptcy Act 1883, and on discharging his liability under his acceptance would have a right of proof under sect. 37, and the payment which relieved him of his liability was a fraudulent preference.

[Re Paine; Ex parte Read v. Barnard. Q. B. Div. in Bank. : Williams, J. Nov. 2-Counsel: F. Cooper Willis; Muir Mackenzie. Solicitors: W. H. Smith and Son; Pritchard, Englefield, and Son.]

TAXING MASTERS' DISCRETION.

IN the Queen's Bench Division of the High Court on Tuesday, during the hearing of an action Verheyen v. Freeman, before Cave, J. and a common jury, his Lordship complained that he was handed up copies of letters torn off, instead of being supplied with a complete copy of the correspondence, and he should therefore disallow the cost of all copies in the action. Mr. Lynch, for the plaintiff, explained that he was always desirous that the presiding judge should be supplied with proper copies : but that the taxing masters habitually disallowed them, and had even done so in face of the judge allowing them. His Lordship rejoined, with some warmth, that that surely could not be so; but, if it were the case, the master should be brought before the Divisional Court, and he would soon be set right; in fact, he was not sure that he would not be sent to prison for contempt of court.

OUR LITERARY COLUMN.

STORIES FROM THE LAW REPORTS.

[In these days of "Leaves from the Diary of a Doctor," "Adventures of a Man of Science," and so forth, when all kinds of life are searched into for the interesting stories which they may afford, it is not fitting that the great storehouse of such things which our law reports afford should be left unexplored. We propose, therefore, to publish a series of stories actually drawn from the case-books, and which tell of life under a great diversity of different circumstances. All sorts and conditions of men will figure in them-literally from princes to beggars, such is the beautiful variety of the law. The true reference to the report will in each case be given; but, if any facts or details appear which are not in the report, the reader will of course assume that the editor-as in the case of “ Esmond and "John Inglesant" and similar veracious histories-is in possession of authentic family papers and historical archives, from which deficiencies have been supplied.

Esop of old concluded each of his fables with the appropriate moral to be derived from his narrative. We shall conclude each of our stories with the legal proposition established by the case in question.

I. THE STORY OF THE BEAUTIFUL GIRL WHO WAS HATED BY HER

FATHER.

(From Dew v. Clarke, 3 Addams, 79.)

Charlotte Mary Stott was a beautiful baby from her birth, and she grew up to be one of the most engaging and interesting children ever seen. Phoebe Wall, her nurse, who had many another child under her care in after years, always alluded to this one as her favourite; and the common opinion agreed with her. There is no doubt about this; little Charlotte was equally lovely in person and amiable in disposition, and in the Berkshire country mansion where she resided she was beloved by the whole household-with one exception. This exception was her father, Ely Stott; he hated her.

He was a doctor of medicine, an eminent electrician, and of the Calvinist persuasion. Shortly after Charlotte's birth he became a widower. He was of some standing in his profession, and great men came to him to be his patients. His opinion upon scientific subjects at least was certainly considered valuable. His opinion of Charlotte was unequivocal; he thought her repulsive and abominable in every way. He was a most unnatural parent.

When she was four years of age her friends prevailed upon him to send her away to school. Mistress Gwillim, who kept the school, was prepared for an atrocious little wretch; but she found her in all respects one of the most lovely and endearing little children imaginable-pretty to look at, with the sweetest of tempers and the best of manners. The father came to see the school one day, and the schoolmistress took Charlotte to him and put her hand in his, saying, "My dear, this is your papa." But he thrust the hand away from him in a furious temper, and, screaming out "Ma'am I must be going by the coach," departed hastily. Soon after this -when the child was between eight and nine years of age-she was taken away from this school, and came to her father's town house in Bishopsgate-street. Mistress Gwillim was very sorry to lose her, but her parent loathed her more than ever with an unspeakable loathing.

Nobody knew why, though everybody knew the fact. The child did everything to turn him to another frame of mind; she conducted herself with great respect and submission, and did all in her power to soothe and soften him. But it was all of no avail; all his acquaintances could testify to the invariable horror which her presence always aroused in him. He could not even bear to have her sitting in the same room with him for a little while, and if she so much as passed the window when he was talking to a friend the whole form of his countenance was changed and his demeanour and language became most violent.

After a time she was sent to school again the school of Mistress Rivers, at Hackney, where she speedily became a favourite. Soon, however, after her arrival her father sent a birch-rod to the mistress, begging that she would use it upon her often. The mistress replied that the custom of the school did not admit of this, and she locked it up in a drawer. Then the father said that he would come and use it himself, and though, of course, this was not possible, yet when he did come the girl often had blows from him of one sort or another.

She was subsequently removed to the school of Mistress English, at Hampstead, when again her delightful manners won her many friends. She got on excellently with the mistresses, though the latter were greatly harassed by perpetually receiving letters from her father at home abusing her. She did, however, get into trouble one day for saying some little thing which she ought not to have said, and her father, hearing of it, wrote to say that it was a case for expulsion, such a wicked character being hopelessly irreclaimable. When soon afterwards Mistress English was obliged to get rid of the child, owing to the harm which the discipline of the school was suffering from the father's impertinent interference and frequent disturbing visits, he spread it abroad among his friends and family that Charlotte had been expelled for language and practices of the grossest impropriety.

What she suffered when she returned home again is a story beyond all words. She was treated worse than the servants: she had to do the hardest of the household work, and whereas the scullery-maid was allowed warm water, she had to do with cold. But this was the least of all her troubles. He used to make her sit in his study and write out "an account of her secret thoughts." Whatever she wrote he said it was a lie, and laid his horsewhip across her shoulders. The threats that he had made against her when she was at the school of Mistress Rivers he carried out now that she was at home.

At last his good neighbours, Sir Thomas and Lady Barnard, resolved to put an end to this state of things, which had become a scandal in those quarters, and which they feared might lead to murder. So they procured her a place as parlour-boarder at Miss Brent's school in Westminster Old Palace-yard.

There she remained as long as suited the convenience of Miss Brent, who subsequently passed her on to another school, kept by Miss Atkinson. This last lady took a great fancy to her, and in her house she was very happy-though her father meanwhile was always writing and saying whatever he could to harm her. He would talk about her to his patients, one of whom was the Bishop of Durham, and describe her as abnormally immoral.

Somehow Charlotte's character survived all these calumnies-possibly because her good friends Sir Thomas and Lady Barnard explained the true circumstances. Be that as it may, on the termination of her residence with Miss Atkinson, she obtained a post as governess in the family of a certain Mr. and Mrs. Abbott, where she remained for five years and a half. At the end of that time the eldest son of the family, scarcely more than a schoolboy, fell desperately in love with his sisters' beautiful governess; he followed her about with tender glances, and sat at her feet at schoolroom tea. Miss Stott endeavoured to discourage him, but without avail; so, to put an end to an uncomfortable situation, she resigned her place.

Mrs. Abbott never ceased to regret the treasure that she had lost, an remained her friend through life.

Miss Stott now took another similar post in the family of a Mr. and Mrs. Dew, and endeavoured once more to take an unassuming part in the background, for she never forgot her place as governess. But, although she was quiet in manner and simple in dress, and was very seldom seen, when it could be helped, without the precincts of the schoolroom, beauty like hers could not be hidden away. A son of the house of Dew soon fell a victim to the ravishing charms which had proved so disastrous in the case of young Abbott, and this time Charlotte found herself unable to resist an answering emotion. Governess though she was, the Dew parents were so completely fascinated by her perfections that they facilitated the match, and their son and Charlotte were soon betrothed.

Charlotte, alas! could bring no dowry with her; her father, she explained, would probably, from a sense of duty, leave her a trifle by his will, but the bulk of his money he would assuredly leave elsewhere. The Dew family, however, were contented to accept her penniless, and the wedding-day was fixed.

One day, while she was still with the Dews, a Nonconformist minister of the name of Wilson called, and asked to see Miss Stott. He explained to Mrs. Dew that he had heard what a very wicked character her governess was. "What do you mean?" said Mrs. Dew. "You had better not let my son hear you say that, or he would kick you down the doorsteps. From whom have you heard anything against her." "From Mr. Ely Stott, her father," replied the other. "He is one of my congregation. He came to ask me to reprove his boot boy for not blacking his boots properly, and then he suddenly burst out into invective against his daughter, hoping that I would come and remonstrate with her. I gathered from him that she was one of the worst of the women of the town." This was the sort of character her father was always giving her. This was what he had repeated to the Bishop of Durhamn. This was what he had told his friend in the City-Mr. Daniel Goff.

The Dews, however, laughed all insinuations against their favourite to scorn. The wedding duly took place, and a very pretty wedding it was. Soon afterwards-it was on the 21st Nov. in the year 1821-Ely Stott died, and when his will was read it proved to be as Charlotte had foretold. The bulk of his fortune was bequeathed to her two young cousins, whose name was Clarke; she herself had nothing but a trifle. "It is no disappointment to me," she said, "I never expected more." "Nor I," said her husband; "it is a shameful thing, but it can't be helped, a man can do what he likes with his own."

A few days later he met a friend, a young solicitor, to whom he shortly told the story of his father-in-law's will. The solicitor said nothing for a while, but thought in silence. Then he said suddenly, " Put the case in my hands. I can upset that will."

The Dews instructed him accordingly, and, after all the facts which we have set forth above had been proved, the Court pronounced that the will was void, so that Charlotte and her husband succeeded to the property and lived happily ever afterwards.

Legal Proposition.-A will is void where the testator was not at the time of making it "of sound disposing mind." When a man has a mental delusion that his daughter is profligate and very wicked, whereas she is in fact quite the contrary, that is sufficient to upset--not necessarily any will which he makes-but a will which is inofficious to her. Such a delusion is considered, FOR THE PURPOSE OF UPSETTING SUCH A WILL, as constituting partial insanity. Note, therefore, that, to support a will, what you have to prove is not that the testator was sane within the ordinary meaning attached by the law to "sanity," but that he was "of sound disposing mind" within the above-stated principle. For the distinction between "sound disposing mind" and ordinary "sanity," cf. Banks v. Goodfellow (22 L. T. Rep. 813) and Smee v. Smee (15 P. Div. 84); and ride Jarman on Wills, p. 38.

LAW LIBRARY.

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Conflict of Laws. By A. V. DICEY, Q.C., B.C.L., of the Inner Temple, Barrister-at-Law, &c., with Notes of American cases by JOHN BASSETT MOORE, Professor of International Law, Columbia University, New York. London: Stevens and Sons Limited, Sweet and Maxwell Limited; and the Boston Book Company Limited.

THIS work is an application to the whole field of private International law of the method of treatment pursued by the author in his well-known treatise on the Law of Domicile. Mr. Dicey keeps fast hold of the principle that private International Law, if a discussion of it is to be of any value to English practitioners, must be treated as a branch of the Law of England. In the first place, he disposes of certain preliminary matters in a masterly introduction followed by chapters on the interpretation of terms, domicile, and British nationality. He then elaborately discusses, under the head of Jurisdiction, the jurisdiction both of the High Court and of Foreign Courts, embracing all questions of administration, succession, and the enforcement of foreign judgments. In a third part of his treatise he deals with the choice of law, while a number of subjects for which it was perhaps difficult to find a place in the

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