An attractive programme was arranged on Tuesday last, to mark the initial performance this season of the Inns of Court Orchestral Society, on the occasion of their Smoking Concert, held by kind permission of the Treasurer and Masters of the Bench in Gray's-inn Hall. When it is mentioned that the instrumental item included overtures "Zauberflote and "Lustspiel" a new Russian sinte by Borowski, portions from a Haydn symphony, and Schubert's "Rosamunde " music, it will be readily understood that the society attempts works of no mean order; and under the able conductorship of Mr. A. W. Payne accomplished their task in a praiseworthy manner. Among the contributors to the evening's entertainment were the Guildhall Glee Singers; Mr. Phil Langdale (bassoon solo), and Mr. G. W. Payne, violinist, who one and all fulfilled their self imposed tasks with more than average excellence, and to the complete satisfaction of the large audience assembled. The following compose the committee of this society, viz.: Edmund Macrory, Q.C. (Chairman), Mr. Justice Romer, Sir Frank Lockwood, Q.C., M.P., Thomas T. Bucknill, Q.C. M.P., M. W. Mattinson, Q.C., H. Tindal Atkinson, and Messrs. F. A. Broxholm, S. W. Casserley, J. C. Lewis Coward, C. J. Etherington, W. H. Griffith, Henry Johnston, C. Montague' Lush, and H. W. McGee.

The General Purposes Committee of the London County Council have just issued a report on a reference from the council to consider and report whether a letter should be addressed to the Home Secretary, asking him to make arrangements under which the hearing of non-criminal cases, such as summonses under the Education, Metropolis Management, Public Health, and Building Acts shonld be conducted on days other than those upon which criminal cases are appointed to be heard. The committee state that previously to this reference they had had before them a circular letter from the School Board for London. The object of the School Board was that certain other bodies should join with the Board in a memorial to the Home Office, with a view to getting a bill introduced by the Government which would repeal sect. 42 of 2 & 3 Vict. c. 71, to the extent of enabling justices' clerks to receive fees in cases arising under certain specified Acts, as it was considered that the Government would not consent to a total repeal of that section. The comptroller reported that on the best estimate that could at the present time be made, the increased annual cost that would fall upon the county as a result of the change of law desired by the School Board would be £1800, or, after the deduction of receipts by fees and fines, £850. The committee came to the conclusion that an amendment in the law was desirable. In their report they ask the council to pass the following resolution: "That the council is of opinion that, with reference to cases arising under the Education Acts, it is desirable that, subject to sect. 42 of 2 & 3 Vict. c. 71, being repealed to such an extent as to allow the justices' clerks to receive fees in respect of such cases (which fees would, together with any fines imposed, and the application of which is not otherwise provided for, be then payable to the county fund), such cases should be heard in petty sessions; and that this principle should be extended to other cases of a similar character."

A smoking concert was given by the 14th Middlesex (Inns of Court) Volunteer Rifle Corps last Monday night in the Middle Temple Hall, by permission of the Benchers of the Inn. The Prince of Wales was among the guests, who included Mr. Bayard, Mr. Justice Barnes, Col. Sir E. Bradford, Sir John Bridge, Mr. Justice Gainsford Bruce, Col. Barrington Campbell, the Lord Chancellor, Lord Chelmsford, Mr. Justice Chitty, Sir E. Clarke, Q.C., M.P., Mr. C. A. Cripps, Q.C., M.P., Lieut.-Col. Deane, Capt. Drummond, Lieut.-Col. Edis, Capt. the Hon. F. F. Fremantle, Col. French, Mr. Justice Grantham, Col. Gray, Major-Gen. Sir Francis Grenfell, Col. Lonsdale Hale, Sir Charles Hall, Sir Reginald Hanson, Brigadier-Gen. Sir W. Humphery, Lord James of Hereford, Sir Harry Keppel, the Hon. Derek Keppel, Sir Francis Knollys, Sir Edward Lawson, Sir Frank Lockwood, Q.C., M.P., Mr. Gerald Loder, M.P., Col. W. H. Mackinnon, Col. W. Mackinnon, the Lord Mayor, Major-Gen. Lord Methuen, Mr. Justice North, Sir Hugh Owen, Col. Parke, Col. Paton, Mr. Melton Prior, Col. Howland Roberts, Lord Russell of Killowen, Col. Satterthwaite, Mr. W. J. Soulsby, C.B., Major-Gen. Sterling, Major-Gen. Stracey, Mr. J. W. Waldron, Sir Richard Webster, Q.C., M.P., Col. Verrall, the Treasurers of Middle Temple and Lincoln's-inn, and the Captains of Oxford University Rifle Volunteers, the Cambridge University Rifle Volunteers, the Charterhouse and Rugby School Corps, and the Marlborough and Winchester College Corps. The Prince of Wales was received by Lieut.-Col. S. H. S. Lofthouse, commanding the Inns of Court Volunteers, who presented to His Royal Highness the senior officers of the corps, including Col. Bulwer, Col. Russell, and Col. Coltman (former colonels commanding the corps), Major Glen, and Major Sankey (ActingAdjutant). The entertainment was furnished by the members of the corps, assisted by Mr. George Grossmith, Mr. Phil May (who drew lightning sketches), Mr. John Proctor, Mr. Geoffrey Thorn, and others. The hon. secretaries, who had charge of the arrangements, were Lieut. Grantham and Mr. Sidney Clarke, who were assisted in their work by Sergt. Hole, Colour-Sergt. Bethune, and Colour-Sergt. Eastwood.

Dr. Benjamin Howard, who since 1859 has made a special study of penology, has arrived in England from a fourth visit to Russia and Siberia, undertaken for the purpose of confirming and bringing up to date the observations made by him in Saghalien and elsewhere since 1888. In the course of an interview he said: Comparing the lot of Siberian exiles with that of convicts in other countries, "The result of my experience has been to show that the treatment of a convict largely depends upon himself. After a Siberian exile's term of two years' imprisonment is over, there is nothing to prevent him in three to five years from becoming, within certain geographical limits, a free man. Escape from Saghalien is practically impossible. A political prisoner or a murderer in Saghalien lives with his family in a well-built, and often pretty, fourroomed cottage, with its vestibule and garden. The island is populated

mostly by murderers or by persons guilty of similarly serious crimes. They work peaceably and quietly on their farms, and walk about the streets to all appearance free men. You go into the bureau of the prisons and you see men writing at rows of desks. Their general demeanour and the appearance of the place is not unlike that you would see in offices in any part of the world. Yet each man is probably a convicted murderer. Russian convicts, instead of being a heavy charge on the resources of the country, are a source of revenue. Convict labour has added to the Russian Empire an island the length of England, not an acre of which was previously under cultivation, and it is only the population of Siberia by these people that has made possible the line of the Trans-Siberian Railway-the envy of the whole world." In conclusion, Dr. Howard said: "The main lesson to be drawn from this system is the absolute futility of punishment for its sake alone. The first principle taught is that of self-maintenance. Convict labour should be productive of a net profit to the State, so that instead (as in England, for instance) of costing many millions, it should prove a source of annual revenue by putting in force organised forms of industry suited to the capacity of the respective criminals. By the means employed in Siberia the convicts do not lose all self-respect, and are often better fitted than before to become useful members of society. In the English and some other prison systems the outcome is generally the opposite. The result of the convict's incarceration, and of the useless forms of labour on which he has been employed, has often been merely to generate a vengeful feeling, which tends to render him an habitual criminal."

Evidence was being taken as to the value of certain water privileges, and photographs were put in of the locus in quo. The fall in question was only some few inches, but the photographer's art had improved on it, Counsel, wishing to magnify the descent of water, and the consequent value of the right to use it, holds up the picture and remarks: "Why, my Lord, it is a perfect cataract." C. M., Q.C., in his dry way, replies: "On investigation, my Lord, the cataract will be seen to be in my learned friend's eye."

NOTES OF RECENT DECISIONS NOT YET REPORTED.

BY OUR REPORTERS IN THE SEVERAL COURTS.

COURT OF APPEAL.

Friendly Society-Administration-Preferential Payment-Officer of Friendly Society having in his Possession" by virtue of his Office" the Society's Moneys-Secretary-Unauthorised receipt of Money byFriendly Societies Act 1875 (38 & 39 Vict. c. 60), s. 15, sub-sect. 7.-An application was made by the trustees of a Lodge of Oddfellows, under sect. 15, sub-sect. 7, of the Friendly Societies Act 1875, asking for a declaration that they were entitled in priority to the other creditors of their deceased secretary, his estate being insolvent. The deceased was duly appointed secretary of the lodge, and acted in that capacity for many years. For a long period he received (1) money from ordinary debtors to the lodge; (2) members' subscriptions to the lodge; and (3) money of the lodge paid to him by the treasurer of the lodge. As the result of an investigation after the death of the deceased, a very large sum was found to be due from him to the lodge. Rules 6 and 7 of the Lodge Rules provided for the appointment, and defined the duties of the treasurer. Rule 8 defining the secretary's duty, provided that the secretary should attend all the meetings of the lodge, take minutes of the proceedings, and keep the accounts; prepare and deliver all summonses, attend the auditors to explain the accounts, balance such accounts when required, prepare all documents for the district and board of directors, and the statutory returns, and should receive a salary. It was contended for the general creditors that sect. 15, subsect. 7, of the Friendly Societies Act did not apply, inasmuch as the deceased did not receive any money or property of the lodge into his possession by virtue of his office. It was decided by Chitty, J. that the moneys in question were not received by the secretary "by virtue of his office" within the meaning of the statute; and that the trustees, therefore, were not entitled to priority. The plaintiffs gave notice of appeal, but upon the appeal coming on to be heard the respondents' counsel stated that a notice had been received from the appellants of their intention not to proceed with the appeal; and they asked therefore that the appeal might be dismissed with costs. The court made an order accordingly.

:

Ct. of

[Re Aberdein, Bagshaw v. Aberdein; Hagon v. Aberdein. App. No. 2: Lord Russell, C.J., Lindley and Smith, L.JJ. Dec. 17.Counsel Levett, Q.C. and Charles Macnaghten; Byrne, Q.C. and N. Micklem. Solicitors: Collyer-Bristow, Russell, Hill, and Co., agents for Mills and Reeve, Norwich; Storey, Cowland, and Hill, agents for Sadd and Bacon, Norwich.]

Fund in Court-Fraudulent Petition-Order for Payment out-Payment to wrong Person-Improper Use of Solicitor's Name-Officer of the Court-Partnership Liability to replace Fund - Chancery (Funds) Act 1872 (35 36 Vict. c. 44), s. 5.-In July 1895 John Arthur Hales, a solicitor, by means of a fraudulent petition, obtained an order for the transfer out of court of certain India 3 per Cent. Stock. He then, having obtained a cheque from the Paymaster-General for the proceeds of sale of the stock after providing for costs, forged thereon an indorsement, and paid the money amounting to over £6000 into Messrs. Child and Co.'s Bank. Hales made use of the names of Messrs. Clear and Green, solicitors, as the solicitors who purported to act for the

petitioner, without their knowledge, and his own name appeared as solicitor for the respondents. On the 12th Aug. he called at their office and informed Mr. Clear that he had used the firm's name. Mr. Clear remonstrated with him, but, being told that it was merely a formal affair, and that counsel had appeared, consented to receive a cheque for £15, out of which he retained £4 5s. 6d. as his firm's share of the costs. This sum he handed to his partner, Mr. Green, who paid it into the banking account of the firm as part of the partnership assets. At this date, the 12th Aug., there still remained about £2000 in the bank, the remainder having been drawn out by Hales. Mr. Green, Mr. Clear's partner, knew nothing about the matter at all until the fraud was discovered in October. A petition was presented on behalf of the persons legitimately entitled to the fund to discharge the order of July 1895, and to have the fund replaced by the Commissioners of the Treasury. The commissioners admitted their liability, but contended that Messrs. Clear and Green ought to be held liable to make good the loss. Hales had been convicted and sent to penal servitude for the forgery of the indorsement on the cheque which he got from the Paymaster-General. It was decided by Kekewich, J. (74 L. T. Rep. 412) that Messrs. Clear and Green were jointly and severally liable to replace the cheque for £15, and so much of the moneys as had been lost since the 13th Aug., when Mr. Clear first knew of the improper use of the firm's name, the learned judge being of opinion that Mr. Clear was acting within the scope of the partnership authority in what he did, and that therefore Mr. Green was subject to the same liability as his copartner. From that decision there were cross-appeals by Mr. Green, the Crown, and Mr. Clear respectively. For the Crown it was contended that the firm were liable for all the loss sustained whenever it occurred. For Mr. Clear it was contended that his liability was limited to the repayment of the £15. For Mr. Green it was contended that his liability was limited to the repayment of the £4 5s. 6d. received by him for the partnership. Held, that what had been done by Mr. Clear was at most a ratification by him of the use of his firm's name in a formal matter for a formal party, he not knowing that the name had been used for the petitioner, nor that the object of the petition was to obtain payment out of a fund in court; that that was not enough to fix him with liability for what had been fraudulently done by Hales for his own purposes, there being nothing to suggest in the remotest way that Hales had for his own fraudulent purposes used the name and been a party to a forgery and perjury in effecting those purposes; and that therefore the contention of the Crown failed as against both Mr. Clear and Mr. Green. Held also, that the judgment must stand against Mr. Clear for the £15, he having received the cheque for that amount, part of the fund in court fraudulently obtained, and not having validly discharged himself of it; but that to hold him liable for the other moneys lost since the 13th Aug. would be to hold him responsible for a breach of duty which was not imposed by any known legal principle, and which the court was not warranted in imposing on its officers. Slater v. Slater (58 L. T. Rep. 149), Re Dangar's Trusts (60 L T. Rep. 491; 41 Ch. Div. 178), Re Ward (31 Beav. 1), and other authorities distinguished. Held further, that, as regarded Mr. Green, he was not liable jointly and severally with Mr. Clear for the £15, but only for the £4 5s. 6d. which he received from Mr. Clear, and paid into the banking account of the firm as part of the partnership assets, inasmuch as it was not within the scope of the agency authority created by the partnership for one partner to allow the use of the name of the firm by another solicitor, and thereby to bind his copartner. Order of Kekewich, J. varied accordingly.

[Marsh v. Joseph. Ct. of App. No. 2: Lord Russell, C.J., Lindley and Smith, L.JJ. Nov. 19, 23, 24, and Dec. 18.-Counsel: Sir R. B. Finlay (S.-G.) and Ingle Joyce; Witt, Q.C. and Ernest de Witte; Ashton Cross; Stewart Smith. Solicitors: Hare and Co., agents for The Solicitor to the Treasury; J. E. Green; John Clear; Mear and Fowler.]

Highuay-Extraordinary Traffic-" Person by whose Order" Traffic is conducted-Highways and Locomotives (Amendment) Act 1878 (41 & 42 Vict. c. 77), s. 23. It is provided by sect. 23 of the Highways and Locomotives (Amendment) Act 1878 that, "where by a certificate of their surveyor it appears to the authority which is liable or has undertaken to repair any highway, whether a main road or not, that, having regard to the average expense of repairing highways in the neighbourhood, extraordinary expenses have been incurred by such authority in repairing such highway by reason of the damage caused by extraordinary traffic thereon, such authority may recover in a summary manner from any person by whose order such traffic has been conducted the amount of such expenses. Lord Gerard, who was the owner of a mansion and park, undertook works in connection with his property upon a large scale. Part of the work was done by contractors and part by Lord Gerard himself. With respect to the materials for the work done by Lord Gerard himself, samples were given by contractors and the prices fixed, and orders were sent for delivery of materials as required. The price included the cost of delivery, which was done by the contractors. Lord Gerard did not contract or direct that materials should be brought by any particular road, or from any particular place, or in any particular manner. He knew that they would be delivered by traction engines. Extraordinary expenses were incurred by the Kent County Council for the repair of a road by reason of the damage done by the carriage of these materials, which was" extraordinary traffic." The justices in petty sessions ordered Lord Gerard to pay £750 to the County Council. On appeal, the Quarter Sessions reversed the order of the justices, and stated a case. The Divisional Court (Cave and Wills, JJ.) held that the decision of the quarter sessions was wrong, and allowed the appeal (75 L. T. Rep.

247.) Lord Gerard appealed. Held (reversing the decision of the Queen's Bench Division, dissentiente Lopes, L.J.), that the traffic had not been conducted by the "order" of Lord Gerard, within the meaning of sect. 23 of the Highways Act 1878.

:

[Lord Gerard v. The Kent County Council. Ct. of App.; Lord Esher, M.R., Lopes and Rigby, L.JJ. Nov. 18 and 19, and Dec. 17.-Counsel for the appellant, Channell, Q.C. and Edwardes Jones; for the respondents, R. M. Bray and Hohler. Solicitors: for the appellant, Meynell and Pemberton; for the respondents, Prior, Church, and Adams, for Warner and Turner, Maidstone.]

Inland Revenue-Stamp Duty-Marketable Security issued by Foreign Company " Issued' in United Kingdom-Stamp Act 1891 (54 § 55 Vict. c. 39), s. 82, sub-sect. 1 (b).-The Stamp Act 1891 provides, by sect. 82, sub-sect. 1, that " Marketable securities for the purpose of the charge of duty thereon include: (b) A marketable security by or on behalf of any foreign corporation or company -(i.) which is made or issued in the United Kingdom; or (ii.) which, though originally issued out of the United Kingdom, has been or is offered for subscription and given or delivered to a subscriber in the United Kingdom." A scheme for reconstructing an English company, and transferring its business to a company formed in America, provided that the old company should sell, and that the new company should' buy, the property and assets, and take over the liabilities of the new company, and that the debenture-holders of the old company should receive in lieu of their debentures gold mortgage bonds of the new company, payable in America at a certain date. This scheme was binding on the debenture-holders. Under a deed executed in order to carry out the scheme, the property of the new company was assigned to a trustee for the debenture-holders, and provision was made for the issue of gold bonds of the new company in exchange for the old debentures. These bonds were to be given by the trustee in exchange for the debentures. The holder in London of a debenture lodged it with an agent of the American company in London, who sent it to the officials of the American company in America, who received from the trustee a gold bond in exchange for the debenture and forwarded it to London, where it was delivered to the debenture-holder. The bond in question was a marketable security, and the Commissioners of Inland Revenue decide that it was liable to duty under sect. 82, sub-sect. 1 (b). Upon a case stated by the commissioners, the Divisional Court (Pollock, B. and Bruce, J.) held that the bond was not liable to duty: (75 L. T. Rep. 157). The commissioners appealed. Held (affirming the decision. of the Queen's Bench Division), that the bond was not " issued," and was not "offered for subscription and given or delivered to a subscriber," in the United Kingdom, and was not liable to duty.

[The Chicago Railway Terminal Elevator Company v. The Commissioners of Inland Revenue. Ct. of App. : Lord Esher, M.R., Lopes and Rigby, L.JJ. Dec. 11 and 15.-Counsel: for the appellants, Sir Robert Finlay (S.-G.) and Danckwerts; for the respondents, Cohen, Q.C. and T. T. Paine. Solicitors: for the appellants, The Solicitor of Inland Revenue; for the respondents, Paines, Blyth, and Huxtable.] Practice-Action to restrain Defendant from passing off his Goods as thoso of Plaintiff Interim Injunction--When same should be granted.-In an action for an injunction to restrain the defendant from selling his goods in such a way as to mislead the public into the belief that they are the goods of the plaintiff, the court should not be too ready to grant an interim injunction before the final hearing of the action; and the granting of an injunction in such a case ought, speaking broadly, to be confined to two instances: first, where the injury to the plaintiff to be apprehended from what the defendant is doing is such as to be practically irreparable; or, secondly, where the injury to the plaintiff is of such a serious character and the position of the defendant is of such a nature that it is not likely that he will be able to answer damages if damages should be awarded against him. But, except in these two instances, and limited to applications of this nature, if the defendant. offers to keep an account, and does keep an account, the matter may well be left over until the trial of the action: per Lord Russell, C.J.

[Clark and Son v. Petrocokino. Ct. of App. No. 2: Lord Russell, C.J., Lindley and Smith, L.JJ. Dec. 17 and 18.-Counsel: for the appellants, Levett, QC. and Robert Frost; for the respondents, Byrne, Q.C. and Willis Bund. Solicitors: for the appellants, Peacock and Goddard, agents for H. C. Collins, Reading; for the respondents, Fullilov and Co.]

Practice - Suing in formâ pauperis-Affidavit verifying Case and Opinion of Counsel-Case and Opinion made Exhibits-Right of Dejendant to Inspection-Rules of the Supreme Court, Order XVI., r. 24. -Order XVI., r. 24, of the Rules of the Supreme Court, provides that "no person shall be permitted to sue as a pauper, unless the case laid before counsel for his opinion, and his opinion thereon, with an affidavit of the party, or his solicitor, that the case contains a full and true statement of all the material facts, to the best of his knowledge and belief, shall be produced before the court or judge, or proper officer to whom the application is made, and no fee shall be payable by a pauper to his counsel or solicitor." The plaintiff, who alleged that he had been injured through negligence, for which the defendants were responsible, laid a case before counsel for his opinion whether or not he had a reasonable ground for suing, and obtained an opinion thereon. He then applied at chambers for leave to sue in forma pauperis, and made the necessary affidavit, to which the case and opinion were made exhibits. Leave to sue in formâ pauperis was given, and this action was commenced. The defendants inspected the affidavit which had been filed, and then applied at chambers for an order that they should be allowed to inspect the case and the opinion, which had been made exhibits to the affidavit. Lawrance, J., at chambers, made the order,

relying upon the authority of Re Hinchcliffe (71 L. T. Rep. 532; (1895) 1 Ch. 117). The plaintiff appealed. Held (allowing the appeal), that the defendants had no right to inspect the case and opinion of counsel, although made exhibits to the affidavit.

[Sloane v. Britain Steamship Company Limited. Ct. of App.: Lord Esher, M.R., Lopes and Rigby, L.JJ. Dec. 14.-Counsel: for the appellant, C. Gregson Ellis; for the respondents, J. E. Bankes. Solicitors for the appellant, Ewer and Neave, for Woodburn and Holme, Liverpool; for the respondents, Botterell and Roche.] Sale of Goods-Goods delivered "on Sale or Return"-Goods pawned by Buyer-Title of Pawnee-Sale of Goods Act 1893 (56 & 57 Vict. c. 71), s. 18, r. 4.-The Sale of Goods Act 1891 provides, by sect. 18, that: "Unless a different intention appears, the following are rules for ascertaining the intention of the parties as to the time at which the property in the goods is to pass to the buyer: Rule 4. When goods are delivered to the buyer on approval, or on sale or return,' or other similar terms, the property therein passes to the buyer: (a) when he signifies his approval or acceptance to the seller, or does any other act adopting the transaction." The plaintiff, who was a manufacturing jeweller, delivered to one Winter certain jewellery upon "sale or return." Shortly afterwards Winter pawned the goods with the respective defendants. In Jan. 1896 Winter died. The plaintiffs, who had not been paid for their goods, demanded the return of them, and the respective defendants refused to give them up unless they were paid the amount due to them respectively. The plaintiff thereupon brought these actions for trover and conversion of the goods. The actions were tried by Grantham, J. without a jury, and the learned judge gave judgment for the plaintiff in each action. The defendant in each action appealed. Held (reversing the judgment of Grantham, J.), that the buyer, by pawning the goods, had done an "act adopting the transaction," so that the property in the goods passed, and a good title was conferred upon the pawnee.

[Kirkham v. Attenborough; Kirkham v. Gill. Ct. of App.: Lord Esher, M.R, Lopes and Rigby, L.JJ. Dec. 17.-Counsel: for the appellant Attenborough, Bonsey and Attenborough; for the appellant Gill, Bucknill, Q.C. and Attenborough; for the respondent, McCall, Q.C. and Hume Williams. Solicitors: for the appellant Attenborough, Stanley Attenborough, and Tyer; for the appellant Gill, Attenborough and Son; for the respondent, Colyer and Colyer.]

Trade Fixture-Machinery supplied under Hiring and Purchase Agreement-Mortgage of Land-Default of Hirer in Payment of Instalments under Agreement-Removal of Fixture-Rights of Mortgagee as against Owner of Fixture.-In Jan. 1895, H., by a contract in writing not under seal, let to K., a builder, a gas engine upon the hire-and-purchase system, for the purpose of being fixed upon land of which K. was owner in fee. It was thereby agreed that K. was to pay H. for the engine £18 in cash before delivery, and £3 10s, per month after delivery for ten months, at the expiration of which time the gas engine was to become the absolute property of K. upon the further payment of £3. It was also agreed that, if during the continuance of the hiring K. should fail to pay the hire or any part thereof, H. should be at liberty to repossess himself of and to remove the gas engine, and that K. should have no claim whatever against H., either for money he had paid for the use of the gas engine or for any damage sustained by reason of the retaking thereof. It was further agreed that the contract should not be construed to operate in any way as a contract for the sale of the gas engine, but only as an arrangement for the hire thereof, unless and until K. should have paid the instalments before mentioned. The gas engine, as was known to H., was required by K. in order to drive a sawmill which he had upon his land, and it was erected thus: A bed of concrete was prepared, in which were embedded two iron plates, out of each of the four outside corners of which an iron bolt projected upwards in a vertical position, having a screw at its uppermost end. The base plate of the engine was fitted with four holes, and at each outside corner, so that when the engine was placed in position upon the concrete bed the four bolts projected through the four holes in the base of the engine, and nuts were then screwed down tightly upon the tops of the bolts, and thus the engine was kept in position and prevented from rocking and shifting as it would have done if merely placed upon the concrete foundation without the aid of the projecting bolts. K. made some of the payments of £3 10s. per month to H. and then fell into arrear, and never made the contracted payments so as to become the owner of the gas engine as a chattel. In July 1895 K., for valuable consideration, conveyed by way of mortgage to G. his land (together with the sawmill, engine-house, warehouses, and other buildings erected thereon, and the fixed machinery and fixtures) in fee simple, subject to the usual proviso for redemption. In Jan. 1896 K. was adjudicated a bankrupt, and in March of that year G. lawfully entered and took possession of the mortgaged premises, together with the gas engine, which he found in its place as before mentioned. The question was whether G. was entitled, under the above circumstances, to the gas engine. His claim to it was disputed by H., upon the ground that it had never become K.'s; but that, having regard to the terms of the hiring and parchase agreement, it had always remained a chattel belonging to H., and was never a fixture, notwithstanding its annexation to the freehold; and the observations of Blackburn, J. in Holland v. Hodgson (26 L. T. Rep. 709; L. Rep. 7 C. P. 328, at p. 335) were cited in support. Wood v. Hewitt (8 Q. B. 913) and Lancaster v. Eve (5 C. B. N. S. 717) were also relied upon. Kekewich, J. decided in favour of G. H. appealed. Held, that, if there had been nothing but the existing visible degree of annexation of the gas engine to K.'s freehold, and the known object for which such annexation had taken place, the authorities conclusively established that the gas engine had ceased to be a

chattel, and had become part of the freehold; that the true view of the hiring and purchase agreement, coupled with the annexation of the gas engine to the soil, was that it became a fixture when it was annexed to the soil, subject as between H. and K. to H.'s right to unfix it if K. failed to pay, which right, however, imposed no legal obligation on any grantee from K. of the land, nor could it be enforced in equity against any purchaser of the land without notice of the right, G. being such a purchaser; and that, therefore, H.'s remedy for the price or for damages for the loss of the gas engine was by proof against K.'s estate. The authorities relied upon were distinguished, as also was Gough v. Wood (70 L. T. Rep. 297; (1894) 1 Q. B. 713). Decision of Kekewich, J. affirmed.

[Hobson v. Gorringe. Ct. of App. No. 2: Lord Russell, C.J.; Lindley and Smith, L.JJ. Dec. 10, 11, and 19.-Counsel: for the appellants, Joseph Walton, Q.C. and Curtis Price; for the respondent, Warrington, Q.C. and Willoughby Williams. Solicitors for the appellants, C. W. and H. B. Taylor; for the respondent, Edward H. Quicke, agent for H. Montague Williams, Brighton.]

HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE.-CHANCERY DIVISION. Evidence-Deed more than Thirty Years old-Appointment-Execution by Attorney-Presumption. By a settlement dated the 19th Dec. 1851, and made on the marriage of J. M. C. Airey and Amelia Walsh, Amelia Sarsfield Walsh purported, under a special power of appointment, to exercise the power in favour of the intended wife. The deed was executed by the attorney of Amelia Sarsfield Walsh. There was no reference in the deed itself to the appointment of an attorney. No power of attorney was produced, and there was no evidence that the attorney had been authorised to act. Held, that the power had not been validly exercised; although, by reason of the lapse of time, it would be presumed that the deed was duly executed at the date on which it purported to be executed, yet there was no rule of law which would justify the court in assuming that the attorney was duly authorised to exercise the power.

[Re Airey; Airey v. Stapleton. Ch. Div.: Kekewich, J. Dec. 10 -Counsel: Renshaw, Q.C. and Stokes; Warrington, Q.C. and Howard Wright; P. O. Lawrence, Q.C. and George Henderson; Spence, E. Beaumont, Musgrave. Solicitors: Crawley, Arnold, and Co.; Freshfields and Williams; Field, Roscoe, and Co.; George Coote; Wilde, Berger, and Moore.]

Landlord and Tenant-Covenant by Lessor to pay Water Rate-Water for Trade Purposes.-By a lease dated the 11th Jan. 1895, Alice C. Floyd let to J. Lyons and Co. Limited certain premises in Walbrookstreet, City, for a term of thirty years. The lease contained a covenant by the lessor to pay rates, taxes, and assessments, water rate, and other outgoings, except gas and electric light, then or thereafter to be imposed or assessed upon the premises, or on the lessor or lessee in respect thereof. There was also a clause forbidding the lessees to carry on any noisome or obnoxious trade or business, but the use of the premises for the sale of refreshments was not to be considered as a breach of this provision. The New River Company, under their Act of 1852, sect. 35, charged £8 5s. per annum as a water rate for domestic purposes, assessed on the annual value of the premises; and by contract with the New River Company, under sect. 40 of their Act, the lessees also paid them £15 per annum for water supplied for their trade of providers of refreshments. The lessor refused to pay the £15 charged for trade purposes, and took out this summons to determine whether the covenant by her to pay rates, &c., obliged her to pay the £15. It was contended for the lessor, that the covenant only covered the water rate for domestic purposes assessed on the annual value of the premises, and could not include money payable under a contract made between the lessees and the water company for a supply of water for trade purposes, over which the lessor could have no control. Held, that a rate in respect of water, whether levied under sect. 35 or sect. 40 of the New River Company's Act 1852, was a water rate as defined by the Waterworks Clauses Act 1847, sect. 3 (" any rent, reward, or payment to be made for a supply of water"), and that the £15 was therefore payable by the lessor under her covenant.

Floyd v. J. Lyons and Co. Limited. Ch. Div.: Kekewich, J. Dec. 18.-Counsel: McSwinney; Ribton. Solicitors: J. G. Bullen Edward Lee and Davis.]

;

Married Woman-Bequest to separate Use absolutely Fund directed "to be paid"-Restraint on Anticipation.-By her will a testatrix bequeathed a share of her residuary estate (subject to a life interest which had expired) to one of her nieces, a married woman, and declared that the share should be paid to her separate use, free from the control of any present or future husband, without power of anticipation. No settlement was made on the marriage of the niece. On summons to decide the question whether the niece was entitled to the immediate payment of her share, or whether it ought to be retained by the trustees of the will and the income only paid to her: Held (following Re Bown, 27 Ch. Div. 411), that the niece was entitled to the immediate payment of her share, and that the restraint on anticipation was of no effect. [Re Fearon; Hotchkin v. Mayor. Ch. Div. Kekewich, J. Dec. 10. -Counsel: J. E. Harman, Hatfield Green. Solicitors: C. E. Beal, for

T. Ponting, Warminster; W. H. Mathews.] Practice-County Court-High Court-Power of County Court and High Court to order Service out of the Jurisdiction-Transfer of ActionAdministration-Judicature Act 1875 (38 & 34 Vict. c. 77) 8. 17Rules of Supreme Court, Order XI., rr. 1 (d), 2-County Court Act 1888 (51 & 52 Vict. c. 43,) ss. 67, 68, 164-County Court Rules 1889, Order LI., r. 23. An action was commenced in the County Court against a

defendant resident out of the jurisdiction, who was the executor of an executor of a trustee, claiming a declaration that the investment of a legacy bequeathed to the plaintiff at twenty-one was a breach of trust, and that the defendant was liable to make good the loss, and for administration of the testator's personal estate. The Registrar gave leave to serve out of the jurisdiction, and subsequently interrogatories were ordered to be administered, and these were answered. But before this the defendant gave notice that she objected to the jurisdiction on the grounds (1) that the estate was beyond the County Court limit, and (2) that the process had been served out of the jurisdiction. Notice of motion was given that at the trial a further and better answer to interrogatories would be asked for. At the trial (the earliest time by the County Court practice) the above objections were taken on behalf of the defendant, and on the ground of the first of them the action was ordered to be transferred to the High Court. On a summons for further and better answer in the High Court it was held (1) that there was jurisdiction, under Order LI., r. 23, of the County Court Rules 1889, to order service out of the jurisdiction, although no similar rule in such a case existed in the case of the High Court, and (2) that there having been no waiver while the action was pending either in the County Court or in the High Court, the defendant ought to have opportunity now to show that the action was one which ought not to be prosecuted in the High Court, being one which that court could not entertain.

[Wood v. Middleton. Ch. Div.: Stirling, J. Nov. 25, and Dec. 16.--Counsel H. Terrell; J. Sharpe. Solicitors: Andrew Wood, agent for H. J. Whiteside, Whitehaven; Helder, Roberts, Son, and Co., agents for Brockbank, Helder, and Co., Whitehaven.] Specific Performance-Contract on Letters-Reference to Time for Completion in Acceptance.-The defendant Hughes was the owner of a freehold estate. On the 7th Nov. 1895 his agent wrote to the plaintiff offering it for sale at £2000. The plaintiff wrote back accepting the offer, and his letter went on to say, "I should like to know from what time Mr. Hughes wishes the purchase to date." In an action for specific performance against Mr. Hughes and a gentleman with whom he had entered into a subsequent contract for sale, it was contended by the latter that there was no completed contract, inasmuch as the letter of acceptance contained a reference to a new term upon which the parties never agreed: (May v. Thomson 47 L. T. Rep. 295; 20 Ch. Div. 705). Held, that there was a completed contract for sale on the letters.

[Simpson v. Hughes and Armstrong: Armstrong v. Hughes. Ch. Div. Romer, J. Dec. 18.-Counsel: Eve, Q.C. and Fellows; Oswald, Q.C. and G. Lawrence; Neville, Q.C. and Clare. Solicitors: Hyde, Tandy, Mahon, and Sayer; Meredith, Roberts, and Mills, for Birch, Cullimore, and Douglas, Chester; Talbot and Quayle.]

QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION.

Betting Payment of Bets in Public-house-Bets made elsewhere—“ Using House for purpose of Betting with Persons resorting thereto "-Betting Act 1853 (16 & 17 Vict. c. 119), s. 3.-Case stated by Mr. Fenwick, metropolitan police magistrate sitting at Southwark Police-court. The respondent, Dawson, was summoned for " that he, on the 8th, 9th, 12th, 13th, 14th, 15th, and 16th May 1896, being a person using the Duke's Head beerhouse, Blackfriars, did use the same for the purpose of betting with persons resorting thereto, contrary to sect. 3 of the 16 & 17 Vict. c. 119, the Betting Act 1853;" and the respondent Parker was summoned for "that he," on the same days, "being the occupier of the Duke's Head beerhouse, did knowingly and wilfully permit the same to be used by Dawson for the purpose of betting with persons resorting thereto, contrary to sect. 3 of the 18 & 19 Vict. c. 119." The facts proved were these: The defendant Parker was the licensee and rated occupier of the beerhouse in question, and had been since Nov. 1893. Parker resided on the premises, and carried on the business of the beerhouse. Prior to 1893 Dawson was the licensee. Dawson now carries on the business of a professional bookmaker. On the days mentioned in the summonses Dawson was at the Duke's Head beerhouse, between the hours of 8 and 9 p.m., for the purpose of paying out to a number of persons, who resorted to and came into that house for the purpose, sums of money which they had won from Dawson on bets made on horse races. Dawson, with the cognizance and connivance of Parker (the licensee), always located himself in the private part of the bar at the corner of the counter close to a back room or parlour, which he was permitted by Parker to make use of at will. The habitual practice was for the persons who had won bets, and who resorted to the house in considerable numbers for the purpose of obtaining payment of their bets, to present slips of paper to Dawson, who would look at the slip, step into the back room, come out again with another slip, and, after comparing the two, pay over to the person who had handed him the slip the sum which appeared to be due to such person. It was proved that Parker had full knowledge of the nature of the transactions carried out by Dawson. There was no evidence to show where the betting contracts were made, but the magistrate was satisfied that Dawson carried on the material part of the business as a professional bookmaker in the Duke's Head, and used the house to that extent for the purpose of his business. It was contended for the prosecution that the habitual user of the house by a professional bookmaker for the purpose of meeting customers for settling up with them any bets which they had won amounted to a user of the house contrary to the Betting Act 1853, and that the paying out of bets was a most substantial aud essential part of the transaction of betting: (Reg. v. Worton, 72 L. T. Rep. 29; (1895) 1 Q. B. 227). For the defendants it was contended that the transactions did not in any way come within the Act: (Davis v. Stephenson, 62 L. T. Rep. 436; 24 Q. B. Div. 529).

The magistrate was of opinion that the facts proved did not in point of law constitute the commission by Dawson of an offence against the Act of 1853, and he dismissed the summons against him, and as it was admitted that if the case against Dawson failed the case against the licensee Parker must fail also, he dismissed the summons against him. Held, that the mere payment of the bets in the public-house-the bets being made elsewhere-did not come within the section, and that Dawson was not a person using the house for the purpose of betting with persons resorting thereto, and that consequently neither of the defendants came within the section. Appeal dismissed.

[Bradford v. Dawson and Parker. Q. B. Div.: Hawkins, Cave, Wills, Wright, and Kennedy, JJ. Dec. 19.-Counsel: Danckwerts; Bigham, Q.C., Grain, and Kershaw. Solicitors: Wontner and Sons; C. Butcher.]

Commons--Highway Authority-Right to take Gravel from CommonJurisdiction of Justices to refuse Order-Commons Act 1876 (39 & 40 Vict. c. 56), s. 20.-Case stated by justices of the peace for the division of Bromley, in the county of Kent. A complaint was preferred by the Bromley District Rural Council (the respondents), under the Commons Act 1876, against the Conservators of the Hayes Common (the appellants), that the appellants "being the persons having the regulation or management of Hayes Common have refused their consent to the respondents to search for, dig, get and carry away gravel, sand, stones, or other material in or from any part of such common." The justices heard this complaint, and ordered that the respondents should be at liberty in every year to search for, dig, get and carry away 250 cubic yards of gravel, sand, or stones from the gravel pit at Hayes Common, subject to such conditions as are provided in the bye-laws for the regulation of Hayes Common. The respondents are the highway authority for the district in which Hayes Common is situate, and the powers formerly exercised by the surveyors of highways under the Highway Act 1835 have devolved upon them, and the respondents or the highway authority have for certainly thirty years taken gravel from the gravel pit on the common without making any payment for the same. In 1868 a scheme for the establishment of local management of Hayes Common was in pursuance of the Metropolitan Commons Act 1866 certified by the Enclosure Commissioners, and the appellants are the persons having the regulation or management of the common within sect. 20 of the Commons Act 1876. About 250 cubic yards of gravel per annum is the average quantity of gravel required to be used for the repair of highways within the parish of Hayes, and this gravel is used for the repair of roads in Hayes parish only, and there is no other gravel pit in the parish from which the respondents can procure gravel without having to pay for it, and the respondents consider it necessary in the interests of the district that they should continue to get gravel from this gravel pit for the repair of the roads in the parish. The appellants declined to authorise the removal of any more gravel from Hayes Common, because they considered that such removal would reduce the area of the common available for recreation, and would destroy its natural aspect and beauty. The justices were of opinion that the right of taking gravel from Hayes Common derived by the respondents as the highway authority under sect. 51 of the Highway Act 1835 was preserved, or was not injuriously affected, by the Hayes Common scheme, and was not taken away by sect. 20 of the Commons Act 1876, which section they considered was intended simply to enable the justices to impose proper conditions in case of the unreasonable exercise of the right to dig gravel by a highway authority. Sect. 20 of the Commons Act 1876 enacts that, "where any common is regulated by a provisional order of the Enclosure Commissioners, or is the subject of a scheme no surveyor of highways or highway board shall search for any gravel. from any part of such common without the consent of the persons having the management of the same, or without an order of two or more justices, who may in their order prescribe such conditions as to them shall seem expedient." The question now was whether under this section the justices have a discretion to refuse the order absolutely, or whether their only power is to impose conditions. Held, that the justices have a discretion under sect. 20 to refuse the order if they think fit so to do. Case remitted to justices.

[The Conservators of Hayes Common (apps.) v. The Bromley Rural District Council (resps.). Q. B. Div.: Wills and Wright, JJ. Dec. 16. -Counsel: Rawlinson; Macmorran, Q.C. and Clarke Williams. Solicitors: Horne and Birkett; May, Sykes, and Co.]

Factories-Dangerous Machinery-Fencing-Factories Act 1878 (41 Vict. c. 16), s. 5, and Factories Act 1891 (54 & 55 Vict. c. 75), s. 6-The respondents were summoned before the justices of Blackburn by the appellant, an inspector of factories, for that, being occupiers of a certain factory, they had neglected to fence a dangerous part of the machinery as required by sect. 5 of the Factories Act 1878 (41 Vict. c. 16) and sect. 6 of the Factories Act 1891 (54 & 55 Vict. c. 75). The dangerous part of the machinery as alleged were shuttles, and at the hearing it was given in evidence that the said shuttles when working were liable to "fly out," and when they did so they sometimes inflicted injuries on the person attending to them. Evidence was also given that in the respondents' factory, where some 450 workpeople were employed, three serious accidents were reported during the last four or five years as resulting from a shuttle flying out, while in all the factories in Blackburn, thirteen, seventeen, and thirteen serious accidents from the same cause had been reported in 1895, 1894, and 1893. There was no evidence as to the number of minor accidents, as these are reported to the authorities. On this evidence the justices held that the shuttles were dangerous machinery within the Factories Acts 1878 and 1891 and should be fenced, and they convicted the respondents and

fined them 20s. The respondents appealed to quarter sessions, and the Recorder quashed the conviction, on the ground that the evidence showed that the flying out of the shuttle was caused by negligence in working the machine, or in supplying it with defective cotton, and that there was nothing to show that if it was worked with proper care it was in any degree dangerous. The inspector appealed. Held, that the true test as to whether the machinery in question was dangerous or not was not whether it was dangerous in itself while working, but whether, as a matter of fact, with ordinary care accidents were likely to occur while it was working. If, as a matter of fact, accidents did occur frequently, it was dangerous and should be fenced. Case remitted to the Recorder.

[Hindles (resp.) v. Birtwistle (app.). Q. B. Div.: Wills and Wright, JJ. Dec. 16.-Counsel: for the appellant, the Attorney-General, H. Sutton, and Sanderson; for the respondent, Sir Edward Clarke and E. Sutton. Solicitors: Read, Blackburn; Carter, Blackburn.] Justices-First Offence-Mitigation of Penalty-Summary Jurisdiction Act 1879 (42 & 43 Vict. c. 49), s. 4-Cotton Cloth Factories Act 1889 (52 & 53 Vict. c. 62), s. 13.-The respondents were summoned by the appellant, an inspector of factories, for an offence under sect. 13 of the Cotton Cloth Factories Act 1889 (52 & 53 Vict. c. 62). Sect. 13 requires the inspector, where there is any breach of the provisions of the Act, to give notice in writing to the occupier of the factory of such breach, and in case the breach is not remedied, or is repeated within twelve months after such notice, the occupier of such factory shall be liable, on summary conviction, for the first offence to a penalty of not less than five pounds nor more than ten pounds, and for every subsequent offence to a penalty of not less than ten pounds nor more than twenty pounds." The justices, being of opinion that, under sect. 4 of the Summary Jurisdiction Act 1879 (42 & 43 Vict. c. 49), they had jurisdiction to reduce the amount of the fine, this being a first offence, fined the respondents £1. The inspector appealed. For the appellants, it was contended that, though by the use of the words " in sect. 13 of the Cotton on summary conviction " Cloth Factory Act 1889, the Summary Jurisdiction Acts were to be read with it, yet the offence there set out was not such a first offence as contemplated in sect. 4 of the Summary Jurisdiction Act 1879, being an offence committed after express warning. Moreover, the words of sect. 13 were strong enough to show that the Legislature intended to create an exception to the rule in sect. 4. For the respondents, it was contended that the words in sect. 13 created no such exception. Sect. 4 was passed for the very purpose of meeting cases where a minimum fine was fixed in a statute. Where no minimum fine was fixed the justices could reduce the ordinary fine without its help. Held, that sect. 4 of the Summary Jurdisdiction Act 1879 did not apply to first offences within sect. 13 of the Cotton Cloth Factory Act 1889, and that the justices had no power to reduce the fine of £5 fixed by it for the first offence.

[Osborn v. Wood Brothers. Q. B. Div.: Wills and Wright, JJ. Dec. 10.-Counsel: for the appellant, H. Sutton; for the respondents, Danckwerts. Solicitors: Solicitor for the Treasury; Rowcliffes, Rawle, and Co., for J. Hall, Bury.]

Parliament-Borough Vote-Disqualification-Receipt of Alms-Reform Act 1832 (2 & 3 Will. 4, c. 45), s. 36.-Case stated by the revising barrister of the borough of Kingston-upon-Hull. At a court for the revision of the lists of voters objection was taken to the names of the appellants, John Cowen and William Steels, being retained on Division I. of the occupiers list for the parliamentary borough of Kingston-uponHull, on the ground that during the qualifying period they had been in receipt of alms. The appellant Cowen is now and has been for some years past a brother of the Charterhouse in Hull, and in that capacity has occupied during the qualifying period a room in the almshouse known as the Charterhouse, and has received a weekly allowance of seven shillings with medical attendance and coals. The charity was founded in 1384 by a grant of lands under the licence of Richard II. "to the Masters, Brothers, and Sisters of the House." The lands are still vested in the masters, brothers and sisters, of whom the appellant is one, and form the source from which the revenues of the charity are derived. By this grant the founders established a hospital for thirteen poor men and thirteen poor women, feeble or old, so long as they are necessitous. This is still the necessary qualification for election to the charity. The brothers and sisters at present number about eighty, and are elected by the town council, and are removable at the pleasure of the town council. This last power was introduced by a scheme made in 1872 under the sanction of the Charity Commissioners. The power has not been exercised. There is also power to vary the allowances and number of rooms occupied by each. The gates are closed at 10 p.m., at which hour all the brothers must be within; they cannot sleep out, or allow relations to sleep in their rooms without leave. The gates are also closed for an hour on Sunday afternoons, and the inmates are unable to pass in or out during that time. The brothers are bound to clean their rooms to the satisfaction of the master, and each brother is separately rated, but the rates are paid out of the funds of the charity. The brothers have always voted without objection in the past. The revising barrister decided on the authority of Harrison v. Carter (35 L. T. Rep. 511; 2 C. P. Div. 26); and Baker v. The Town Clerk of Monmouth (53 L. T. Rep. 668), that the appellant Cowen was disqualified by the receipt of alms. The appellant Steels is an inmate of the Mariners Almshouse, a charity founded by charter in 1369, and it was admitted that his case was to be governed by the decision in Cowen's case. If the court should be of opinion that the decision of the revising barrister was wrong, then the register is to be amended by retaining the names on the list. Sect. 36

of the Reform Act 1832 (2 & 3 Will. 4, c. 45) disqualifies any person from being registered as a voter in the election of a member of Parliament for any city or borough who shell within twelve months next previous to the 31st July in such year "have received parochial relief or other alms which by the law of Parliament now disqualify from voting, &c." The respondent did not appear. Cur. adv. vult. Held, that by reason of the facts (inter alia) that the lands forming the charity are vested in the brethren themselves, and the brethren, so long as they are such, live in houses of which they are for the time legal owners, the case was distinguishable from the two cases cited by the revising barrister; that the appellants were not in receipt of disqualifying alms within sect. 36, and were entitled to be on the register.

[Cowen v. Town Clerk of Kingston-upon-Hull. Q. B. Div.: Hawkins, Cave, and Wright, JJ. Nov. 14 and Dec. 21.-Counsel: Jelf, Q.C. and Grotrian. Solicitors: Rollit and Sons, for Rollit and Sons, Hull.]

Parliament Registration Hearing of Objections-Lists closed-The Parliamentary Registration Act 1842 (6 Vict. c. 18), s. 40, and Parliamentary and Municipal Registration Act 1878 (41 & 42 Vict. c. 26), 8. 28 (10) & (11).—Rule nisi to the revising barrister at Leeds, to show cause why he should not state a case under sect. 42 of the Parliamentary Registration Act 1842 (6 Vict. c. 18), and sect. 37 of the Parliamentary and Municipal Registration Act 1878 (41 & 42 Vict. c. 26). In revising the lists for the city of Leeds, it was the habit of the revising barrister to fix certain days upon which all claims and objections as to the lists, from a certain portion of the city were to be heard and disposed of. Public notice of these days was given, and all desirous of supporting or opposing the claims or objections were directed to attend. If all those present for this purpose had been heard on the last of the days so fixed, the lists for the district in question were then declared closed. On subsequent days, the lists were called over, claims supported inserted on, and claims struck out expunged from them, and other clerical work done. At the revisions for 1896 the revising barrister fixed four days for The the hearing of claims and objections for a certain district. applicant, whose name was on both the Parliamentary and burgess lists for the said district, but was objected to, was present, by his agent L. on all four days. At the end of the fourth day the revising barrister asked if there were any other claims or objections to be heard. It was not clear whether L. said anything as to the applicant's claim or not, but, if he did, the revising barrister did not hear him. At this time no evidence as to the service of the notice of objection on applicant had been given. On a subsequent day, when the list was being called over, L., when the applicant's name was reached, drew the revising barrister's attention to the fact that the objection was bad, as no evidence had been given as to service or otherwise in support of it. The revising barrister then heard evidence of service. L. then asked leave to call evidence to show that the objection was unfounded. The revising barrister refused to hear this, declaring that it should have been tendered during the days fixed for hearing contested claims and objections. He thereupon expunged the applicant's name from the Parliamentary list, retaining it on the burgess list, to which the objection did not apply. On these facts the rule nisi was granted. It was now contended for the revising barrister that the rules laid down by him as to the conduct of the business of the court were absolutely necessary to enable him to revise the lists within the time allowed by law, that the applicant knew the practice of the court, and if he had liked could have had his case heard on one of the days appointed for that purpose. Counsel cited Reg. v. Soden (74 L. T. Rep. 520; (1896) 1 Q. B. 499.) For the applicant it was contended that the objection, not being made by the overseers, the qualification of the applicant was good until evidence of service of the objection and primâ facie proof of the grounds of the objection were given (Parliamentary Regis tration Act 1843, s. 40; Parliamentary and Municipal Registration Act 1878, s. 28 (10) and (11). Accordingly, if the lists were closed on the last day fixed for hearing claims and objections, the qualification was good; if they were not then closed the revising barrister had no right to exclude evidence in support of applicant's qualification. Held, that the practice of the revising barrister was convenient and reasonable, and that the rule should be discharged.

[Reg. v. Soden and Overend. Q. B. Div.: Wills and Wright, JJ. Dec. 16.-Counsel: for the applicant, E. Lewis Thomas; for the revising barrister, H. Sutton; for the objector, W. Graham. Solicitors: A. ScottLawson for W. and E. H. Foster, Leeds; Solicitors for the Treasury: Hickin, Smith, and Capel Cure, for Ford and Warren, Leeds.]

TEMPLE RESTAURANT. This establishment, situate in Tudor-street, adjoining King's Bench Walk (four minutes from the High Courts of Justice), has been entirely rebuilt and enlarged. The Temple Restaurant is now replete with every convenience and comfort which experience and capital can command. Table d'Hôte daily, consisting of soups, entrées, joints, vegetables, &c., at 2s. each. No charge for attendance. Dinners à la Carte quickly served. Choice wines, spirits, and malt liquors. Chops, steaks, tea, and coffee. The Legal Profession is respectfully informed that Breakfasts, Dinners, and Teas are supplied in chambers if desired. Menus and tariffs forwarded daily for selection upon application.—[ADVт.] WARNING TO INTENDING HOUSE PURCHASERS AND LESSEES.-Before purchasing or renting a house have the sanitary arrangements thoroughly examined by an expert from the Sanitary Engineering Co. (Carter Bros.), 65, Victoria-street, Westminster. Fee, for a London House, 2 guineas Country by arrangement. (Established 1875.)-[Advт.]