CLEAVER, ROBERT, Marden, farmer. Ct. Maidstone. Order, Dec. 14. CHAMBERLAIN, CHARLES WILLIAM, Norwich, groundman. Ct. Norwich. Dec. 15. COLES, WILLIAM HENRY. Portsea, bookseller. Ct. Portsmouth. Order, Dec. 16. DOVE, WILLIAM, Chesterfield, tailor. Ct. Chesterfield. Order. Dec. 14. DUNFORD, TIMOTHY, Mirfield, innkeeper. Ct. Dewsbury. Order, Dec. 16. EBREY, RICHARD, Cardiff, draper Ct. Cardiff. Order. Dec. 14. Order, FYFE, JOHN CUMMINE, Ipswich, bookseller. Ct. Ipswich. Order, Dec. 12. GEORGE, THOMAS, Aberdare, furniture dealer. Ct. Aberdare. Order, Dec. 16. Ct. HODGE, EDWARD GEORGE, Kentish Town, draper. Ct. High Court. Order. Dec. 16. HUEBNER, FREDERICK LOUIS, 35, Jewin-cres, manufacturing furrier. Ct. High Court. Order, Dec. 15. HAGENBUCH, CHARLES HENRY, Manningham, drysalter. Ct. Bradford. Order. Dec. 15. HASLETT, WILLIAM GEORGE (trading as Smart and Haslett), Singleton, grocer. Ct. Brighton. Order, Dec. 14. HEARN, ROBERT HENRY, Ipswich, seed merchant. Ct. Ipswich. Order, Dec. 15. HARRISON, GEORGE, sen., Tetford, farmer. Ct. Lincoln. Order, Dec. 15. MARTIN, HENRY RAY, New North-road, Hoxton, cheesemonger. Ct. High Court. MATTHEWS, FREDERICK, Bristol, saddler. Ct. Bristol. Order, Dec. 16. PRICE, JOHN, Merthyr Tydfill, licensed victualler. Ct. Merthyr Tydil. Order, Dec. 15. PICKERSGILL, WILLIAM (trading as Pickersgill Brothers), Wakefield, mineral-water manufacturer. Ct. Wakefield. Order, Dec. 16. PERCIVAL, THOMAS, Appleton, farmer. Ct. Warrington. Order, Dec. 16. WILES, ROBERT, Rothwell, hay dealer. Ct. Leeds. Order, Dec. 15. WALKER, MAURICE (trading as Walker and Co.), Doncaster, wholesale confectioner. Ct. Sheffield. Order. Dec. 15. WEBSTER, GEORGE, and BINNIE, JOHN (trading as George Webster and Co.), 29, Cannon-st, warehousemen. Ct. High Court. Order, Dec. 14. The following amended notice is substituted for that published in the Gazette of Dec. 11. NORTHCOTT, ROGER SECCOMBE, Poughill and Bude, butcher. Ct. Barnstaple. Order, Dec. 7. GAZETTE, DEC. 22. ASKIN, GEORGE EDMUND, West Bromwich, late carver. Ct. West Bromwich. Order, Dec. 17. BIGGS, THOMAS, and NINNES, RICHARD, Reigate, ironmongers. Ct. Croydon. Order, Dec. 16. BODGER, WALTER RALPH, Tottenham, clerk. Ct. Edmonton. Order, Dec. 18. BARBER, ARTHUR SAMUEL, Caston, baker. Ct. Norwich. Order, Dec. 19. BATTERSHELL, FRANCIS SPRAGG, New Wandsworth, wood engraver. Ct. Wandsworth. Order, Dec. 19. CRANHAM, JAMES LAIRD, Barking-rd, Plaistow, pawnbroker. Ct. High Court. Order, COPPOCK, JOHN GEORGE, and CASCAJO, JUAN (trading with Felipe Jugo as Coppock, DOBINSON, JOSEPH, Harlesden. solicitor's clerk. Ct. High Court. Order, Dec. 17. Order, Dec. 17. Order, GIBBON, JAMES (trading as James McGibbon and Co.), Leeds, late fish merchant. Ct. Leeds. Order, Dec. 17. HAWES, JAMES THOMAS (otherwise known as J. B. Hawes), Brewery-rd, Caledonianrd, provision dealer. Ct. High Court. Order, Dec. 17, HARFORD, JOSEPH WILLIAM, King's Norton, builder. Ct. Birmingham. Order, HALL, CHARLES WILLIAM, Northwich, hairdresser. Ct. Nantwich and Crewe. Order, MCLOUGHLIN, JAMES ANDREW, late Camplin-st, New Cross, builder. Ct. High Court. MARKLEY, HORACE WILLIAM (trading as Markley and Piper), Bristol, tailor. Ct. Bristol. Order, Dec. 17. MILNER, JANE, Sedgefield, nurse, spinster. Ct. Stockton-on-Tees and Middlesbrough. Order, Dec. 17. MIRFIN, JAMES WILLIAM, Darlington, boilersmith. Ct. Stockton-on-Tees and Middlesbrough. Order, Dec. 18. MORGAN. GRIFFITH JOHN LEWIS, Swansea, solicitor. Ct. Swansea. Order, Dec. 16. PEARCE, LABAN, Cardiff, boot dealer. Ct. Cardiff. Order, Dec. 15. PHILLIPS, ELLEN (otherwise Farnan), Carysfoot-rd, Clissold Park, widow. Ct. Edmonton. Order, Dec. 18. PULMAN, EDWIN JOHN, Merthyr Tydfil, confectioner. Ct. Merthyr Tydfill. Order, Dec. 18. SAYNOR, WILLIAM (late trading as the Southport Wheel Company), Southport, cycle dealer. Ct. Liverpool. Order, Dec. 17. TREE, GEORGE, Chiselhurst, basketmaker. C. Croydon. Order, Dec. 17. The following amended notice is substituted for that published in the Gazette of Nov. 24. Winding-up of Companies. THE COMPANIES ACTS 1862 TO 1890. GAZETTE, DEC. 22. INMAN'S YACHT AND SHIPYARD LIMITED, Lymington. Ct. Southampton. Meeting, creditors, Jan. 1, at noon; contributories, Jan. 1, at 12.30, at office of Off. Rec. Southampton. HOTEL METROPOLE (SCARBOROUGH) LIMITED, Martin's-la, Cannon-st. Ct. High Court. Meeting, creditors, Dec. 31, at 11; contributories, at 11.30, at 33, Carey-st. PERFECT PAVEMENT COMPANY LIMITED, Penmaenmawr. Ct. Bangor. Meeting, creditors, Dec. 30, at 11.45; contributories, at 12.15, at Crypt-chmbrs, Eastgaterow, Chester. NOTICES OF DIVIDENDS. GAZETTE, DEC. 18. ISLE OF WIGHT DISCOUNT COMPANY LIMITED, Ryde. Ct. Newport and Ryde. Amount per pound, 3s. 6d. Second. Payable, Dec. 21, at office of Off. Rec. Newport. GAZETTE, DEC. 22. BENNETT.-On the 18th inst., at 14, Barrington-st, Limerick, the wife of E. E. Bennett, A.V.D., Barrister-at-law, of a daughter. FOSTER. On the 12th inst., at Gildabrook-av, Eccles, the wife of Arthur La Trobe Foster, Barrister-at-law, of a son. HICK. On the 13th inst., at 30, Cathcart-rd, South Kensington, the wife of William T. SOULSBY. On the 9th inst.. at 14, Belsize-rd, South Hampstead, N.W., the wife of WAY. On the 18th inst., at Glenlea, Waverley-rd, Southsea, the wife of Ernest W. BRAMWELL DAVIS-VAUGHAN.-On the 19th inst., at St. Saviour's, Walton-pl, S W.. COATES REDFERN.-On the 12th inst.. at St. Mary's, The Boltons. Victor Henry, law. MAUGHAM-ROMER.-On the 19th inst., at St. Jude's, Courtfield-grdns, S. W., Frederic Herbert Maugham, of Lincoln's-inn, second son of the late Robert Ormond Maugham, to Helen Mary, eldest daughter of the Hon. Mr. Justice Romer, of 27, Harrington-grdns, S. W. DEATHS. ABRAHAMS.-On the 16th inst., at his residence, 21, Chester-ter, N. W., Michael Abrahams, of 8, Old Jewry, E. C., Solicitor, in his 73rd year. COLLISSON. On the 20th inst., at 131, King Henry's-rd, South Hampstead, Emma Mary, wife of William Collisson, South-Eastern Circuit. GRIMWADE.-On the 13th inst., at Toppesfield Hall, Hadleigh, Suffolk, Charles Archer Grimwade, Solicitor, eldest and dearly-loved son of Charles James and Elizabeth Martha Grimwade, aged 27 years. HUGHES. On the 18th inst., at Buckland Hill, Maidstone, Henry Alexander Hughes, Solicitor, aged 37. SWAINSTON.-On the 20th inst., at West End, Prescot, Robert Russell, Swainston, M.A., Brasenose College, Oxford, Barrister-at-law, aged 61. TORR.-On the 19th inst., at 10, Poplar-gr, West Kensington-pk, W., Joseph Hooley Torr, Solicitor, youngest and last surviving son of the late Rev. John Torr, Vicar of Westleigh, North Devon, aged 72. WILLIAMS-On the 13th inst., at No. 1, Hulme-villas. Reading, Susan Julian Williams, daughter of the late Mr. James Williams, Solicitor, of Merthyr, and niece of the late Mrs. William Hood, of Reading. BRINDLEY-THOMAS.-In loving memory of William Brindley-Thomas, of Eversley Lodge, Ealing Common, and the Middle Temple, Barrister-at-law, who died Dec. 22, 1891, in the 30th year of his age. Gentle in life, peaceful in death. To Readers and Correspondents. All communications must be authenticated by the name and address of the writer not necessarily for publication, but as a guarantee of good faith. Anonymous communications are invariably rejected. All communications intended for the Editorial Department should, in order to prevent delay, be addressed to the EDITOR OF THE LAW TIMES." Advertisements, orders for papers, &c., should be kept distinct, and addressed to the Publisher, Mr. HORACE Cox, "Law Times" Office, Windsor House, Bream's-buildings, E.C. The volumes of the LAW TIMES and of the LAW TIMES REPORTS are strongly and uniformly bound at the office, as completed, for 5s. 6d. for the Journal, and 5s. for the Reports. Portfolios for preserving the current numbers of the LAW TIMES, price 5s. 6d. ; LAW TIMES REPORTS, price 38. 6d. The Publisher undertakes the binding of the LAW TIMES and LAW TIMES REPORTS at the following rates: LAW TIMES, in half calf, office pattern....................................................................................... Per Volume 58. 6d. 58. Od. Parcels of volumes for binding should be sent to the Publisher, LAW TIMES Office, Windsor House, Bream's-buildings, E.C., by whom they will be returned in about a fortnight bound. TO ADVERTISERS. SCALE OF CHARGES FOR ADVERTISEMENTS. Four lines of thirty words, or less than thirty words, in body type 3s. 6d. Each additional line, or ten words, or less than ten words. 08. 6d. For three insertions a reduction of 10 per cent.; for six insertions a reduction of 20 per cent. Advertisers whose reference is under initials to this office should remit 6d. additional to defray postage in transmitting replies to their Advertisements. Advertisements must reach the office not later than five o'clock on Thursday afternoon, and must be accompanied by a remittance. Post-office Orders payable to HORACE COX. Er parte KIPPINS.-Hackney carriage -Railway station-Refusal by cabdriver to drive into-"Place" within limits of Act...... 421 QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION, IN BANKRUPTCY. Re STOCK; Er parte AMOS.-Bankruptcy-Composition with creditors -Bankruptcy Act 1869 (32 & 33 Vict. c. 71), ss. 125, 126-Default-Determination of deed.... 422 PROBATE, DIVORCE, AND ADMIRALTY DIVISION. ADMIRALTY BUSINESS. in THE MANNHEIM.-Practice-Collision -Guarantee abroad-Arrest England-Lis alibi pendens LEADING ARTICLES; &C. 424 TO READERS AND CORRESPONDENTS.. 195 LEADING ARTICLES." 1896"-Discretionary Powers - Wills of Foreigners-Civil Judicial Statistics, 1894 .... COMMENTS ON CASES OCCASIONAL NOTES... 195 202 202 OUR LITERARY COLUMN. Stories from the Law Reports-Lawyers and their Critics 204 PROMOTIONS AND APPOINTMENTS ...... 205 CRIMINAL LAW AND THE JURISDICTION OF MAGISTRATES.-Quarter Sessions 206 COUNTY COURTS.- - Sittings of the Courts. 206 GENERAL INTELLIGENCE. Administration of the Estate of the LivingThe Newfoundland Judges and the Executive-Temple Church-Heirsat-Law and Next of Kin-Appointments under the Joint Stock Winding-up Acts-Creditors under Estates in Chancery Creditors under 22 & 23 Vict. c. 35... LAW SOCIETIES. Sunderland Law Now ready, Part 4 of Vol. XVIII., price 5s. 6d., of COX'S CRIMINAL LAW CASES: In the Court of Criminal Appeal, the Superior Courts, the Central Criminal Court, at the Assizes, and in Ireland (published quarterly). Edited by R. CUNNINGHAM GLEN, M.A., LL.B., Barrister-at-Law. The Parts and Volumes may still be had to complete sets. It is the only complete series of Criminal Cases published in England. An Appendix contains a valuable collection of Precedents of Indictments. Complete Vols. from the commencement (1844) of this work can be had. Price can be obtained on application. HORACE COX, "Law Times" Office, Windsor House, Bream's-buildings, E.C. The Law and the Lawyers. 1896. THE legal year which came to an end on the 21st of last December has not been remarkable in any respect. Neither legislation, nor judicial decision, have left any deep or permanent mark upon it. The constitution of the Bench remains exactly as it was a year ago. Notwithstanding increased trade, and improved business throughout the country, legal business is little, if at all, better than in 1895. There are, however, signs of revival which make the outlook certainly more promising. As regards legislation, no measure of firstclass importance has become law during the Session of Parliament (59 & 60 Vict.) which concluded last autumn. Among the more important Acts of Parliament passed during the recent session, the following may be included. By cap. 14 short titles were conferred upon a number of Acts. By cap. 27 the practice vulgarly known as "bilking" cab drivers was rendered a police offence. Cap. 36 will possibly prove the most important Act passed during the session. For, by it, the use of light locomotives on highways was rendered lawful, and it may be that these light locomotives will, in the future, both revolutionise the whole road traffic of our country districts, and bring to them the advantages which our railway system-which by the way has been supplemented by the Light Railways Act (cap. 48) of this year-has already conferred upon larger and more accessible centres of industry. The Coal Mines Acts 1887 and 1894 have been further supplemented by the Coal Mines Regulation Act 1896 (cap. 43), while our old friends the Truck Acts have been further tinkered by the addition to their number of the Truck Act 1896 (cap. 44). The Friendly Societies Act 1875 has been replaced by the Friendly Societies Act 1896 (cap. 25), and the Industrial and Provident Societies Act 1876 by the Collecting Societies and Industrial Assurance Companies Act 1896 (cap. 26), which latter embodies provisions formerly contained in each of the two first-named Acts. A very old West country court is swept away by the Stannaries Abolition Act 1896 (cap. 45). The Evidence in Criminal Cases Bill, which has for some years past been annually introduced by Lords Chancellors Halsbury and Herschell respectively, and has been again and again passed by the House of Lords, during the past session of Parliament once more failed to obtain consideration in the House of Commons, and was consequently again withdrawn. In this we have a measure, the passing of which is earnestly pressed by two Lord Chancellors of opposite political parties, and one which nine-tenths of the Legal Profession, and also the bulk of educated laymen who have considered the subject, have long agreed ought to be passed. Yet year after year the House of Commons fails to consider it. The fact is, that it every year becomes more and more apparent that the House of Commons is so entirely occupied with debates or matters of Imperial concern, or what may be termed "high politics," that it is utterly unable to devote adequate time to mere domestic matters, or to the consideration of necessary legislation. Never was the whole machinery of the law in greater need of being thoroughly examined and put in order, and never has the House of Commons shown itself so unequal to the task as it appears now to have become! For sixty years past, and ever since the termination, by the Battle of Waterloo in 1815, of the wars in which England had till then been engaged, the country down to 1870, at short intervals, examined and endeavoured to amend the state of her legal procedure and sought to make it more and more fitted for the increased business which peace has brought in its case The Our train. But it is now twenty-six years since any endeavour was made to substantially improve our legal machinery. Judicature Act of 1870, which was then passed, was well enough at the moment, but it, like the Procedure Acts which preceded it, has now grown quite out of date. In the long interval which has elapsed since it was passed, indeed, the whole procedure of our law, both civil and criminal, has grown quite out of harmony with the times in which we are. cumbrous criminal procedure is, to a large extent, the mere survival of a system long ago found to be ill-suited for modern jurisprudence, which relies more upon the power of education and of reformatories, than upon punishments which are of a very severe character, or are needlessly prolonged. Our civil procedure is also unsuited to days in which business is transacted with swiftness and rapidity, and it has come to be regarded by modern business men as being dilatory as well as cumbrous. A resort to the legal tribunals of the country-in other words, to the courts of law-to settle their disputes is, consequently, avoided by commercial men whenever it is possible to escape it, and is every year becoming less and less frequent. Wellconsidered measures for the reform of both our criminal and our civil systems are urgently needed. They might be so framed as to secure that each of them should assist the other. Our criminal procedure might be amended by giving a greatly increased jurisdiction to quarter sessions, if it were only required that the chairmen should be always possessed of certain legal qualifications (for example, should always be Recorders or County Court judges), and the Sessions themselves were made to work subject to the supervision of a strong Court of Criminal Appeal, such latter court being invested not only with the power to grant new trials, and otherwise supervise proceedings in criminal cases, but also with a power to revise sentences. It is, moreover, only by means of such a court that we shall ever attain any approach to uniformity in sentences. The establishment of such a court would be received with satisfaction, alike by the public, the Profession, and the Bench itself. The constitution of the present Court for Crown Cases Reserved is eminently unsatisfactory, since the court is always a "scratch court," comprised of temporary members, taken haphazard from such judges as the chances of the moment, and the requirements of other business, allow to be got together, and selected quite regardlessly of all considerations of whether or not the judges asked to sit happen to have made criminal law a study or to have had much experience of it. A permanent court, composed of the Lord Chief Justice of England, two puisne judges, selected for their knowledge and experience of criminal law, and a junior judge known to have devoted special attention to criminal matters, would form a far superior tribunal, and would possess that continuity of principle the want of which is, owing to its construction, a great defect in the Court for Crown Cases Reserved. Our civil procedure might be amended by advantage being taken of the judges having been relieved of much of their criminal work, and, with this effected, it might be easily arranged in each year that one half of their number should sit continuously in London during the ensuing twelve months, while the other half occupied themselves in trying such criminal cases throughout the country as might not fall within the enlarged jurisdiction of Quarter Sessions. At least one other judge would be left at liberty and available for sitting either at the Old Bailey or in the place of any brother judge who might be temporarily ill. In addition to this re-arrangement, the procedure in the High Court ought to be rendered far more rapid than it now is. It should be closely assimilated to the County Court system. Every case ought, as in Chancery, to be from the first attached to some particular judge, and every action ought, as in the County Court, to be tried at a stated time (say a month) after the issue of the writ in it. During the interval between writ and trial the judge to whom the case was attached should have it in his power to make any interlocutory orders, including, if necessary, orders for the postponement of the trial, which the circumstances of the case might render necessary. But though some such reforms, both of our criminal and of our civil procedure, are urgently necessary, all prospect of any of them being even suggested to Parliament appears to be at present sadly remote; while the legislation achieved by Parliament during its last session holds out little hope that our Legislature will, for many a long day, bring itself to consider domestic reforms such as these, which the public and the Profession alike require. Passing from the legislation of the year to consider the judicial decisions arrived at during the same period, we find that the judge-made law, which has come into existence during the twelve months, is, as a whole, scarcely of more importance than the law which owes its origin to legislation. Nevertheless, one or two judicial decisions are worthy of note as likely to be of permanent interest. In Criminal Law, the time-honoured rule of English law, that "hearsay " evidence is not admissible, already appeared to some to be somewhat broken in upon by the practice as to the admission of complaints by the prosecutrix on the trial of charges for rape, which had already been long in existence. The established practice in such cases had grown to be that counsel might ascertain from the woman if she made any complaint directly after the alleged outrage had been committed upon her. She was also allowed to state the name of the person to whom she had made such complaint, and to call such person to corroborate her statement that she did make "a" complaint at the time stated. Some judges, indeed, even allowed the prosecution to get out the fact that the accused was named as the person complained of by a direct question, while others permitted this evidence to be indirectly given by allowing, say, a policeman to state that the prosecutrix made a complaint to him, and then to be asked, "In consequence of such complaint, did you do anything? and to reply, “I at once went and arrested the prisoner." On a review of all the authorities in the case of Reg. v. Lillyman, which was reserved by Mr. Justice Hawkins and is reported 74 L. T. Rep. 730; (1896) 2 Q. B. 167, the Court for Crown Cases Reserved, in June 1896, held that, on the trial of a charge of rape, the whole of the statement made by the prosecutrix on making her first complaint of the outrage upon her is admissible in evidence. The ground upon which it is thus admissible is that, in cases of rape, the absence or presence of consent is the test question, and what the prosecutrix said immediately after the outrage affects her credibility. and may be either confirmatory or contradictory of that which she has said in evidence about the matter. In Commercial Law, two important decisions call for notice. In the well-known case of Schofield v. Earl of Londesborough, the House of Lords, affirming the decisions originally given by Mr. Justice Charles at the trial, and of the Court of Appeal, which (dissentiente Lord Justice Lopes) had affirmed him, held, that a man who had accepted a bill of exchange for £500 on a stamp covering £3500, was only liable for the £500, although his negligence in leaving a blank space after it had enabled the drawer to insert the words "three thousand and" before the first mentioned Under this head of law there is also another decision which is worth noting, which is that of the House of Lords with regard to what have come to be known as one-man companies." One Mr. Salomon, for reasons of his own, found it convenient, in future, to carry on his business under the name of a limited company. So he took to himself divers other members of his family, and, with their aid, the seven necessary signatories to the memorandum of association of a joint-stock company were procured, and the company duly registered. This company carried on its business until its debts accumulated to an extent which obliged it to go into liquidation. The other shareholders in the company were obviously the mere nominees of Salomon, who had been the directing spirit of the concern. Under these circumstances, the liquidator endeavoured to render Salomon liable for the debts of the company. Mr. Justice Williams accepted the liquidator's view, and held that Salomon himself was really the company, and that the device of trading under the name of a company, which Salomon had adopted, was a fraud upon, and attempted evasion of, the Joint Stock Companies Acts, and that, in any case, the company was merely Salomon's agent to contract debts, which were in reality the debts of Salomon. The Court of Appeal confirmed the decision of Mr. Justice Williams. But, so recently as the 16th Nov. last, the House of Lords reversed the decisions of both the Court of Appeal and of Mr. Justice Williams. The House held that, whatever his motive, Salomon had successfully brought himself under the Joint Stock Companies Acts, and had created a legal "entity," which the law said should come into existence whenever the formalities prescribed by those Acts had been in fact complied with; while it rejected the agency theory as too far-fetched, and on the ground that there never had been any sum. 66 intention on either side that any contract of agency should be created. And Lord Macnaghten pointed out the real scandal was that in a company constituted as this was the debentureholders practically absorbed all the assets, which, by the way, those who were creditors could have avoided by a little inquiry, had they made it, before giving credit to the company. The law as to the separate property of married women has also been affected by one or two decisions of importance. It has been decided that the usual restraint on anticipation has no application to arrears of income which have become due, but have not yet been paid over, and remain in the hands of the trustees. The Profession are indebted to Mr. Hood-Barrs for obtaining this decision from the House of Lords, in the case of Hood-Barrs v. Heriot. At the same time, the Court of Appeal has decided (in the case of Whitely v. Edwards) that it is not the practice to appoint a receiver of such income, of a married woman having separate estate, as has accrued due since judgment was recovered against her. On the other hand, a writ of sequestration (it was decided in Hulbert v. Cathcart) will always issue, without previous proof that there is any property on which it can take effect. Bankruptcy law, unfortunately, suggests itself in connection with commercial law. Under this head, it is to be noted that much of the beneficial effect anticipated from the Winding-up Act 1890 appears to have been taken away by the decision (in Ex parte Barnes) that, to authorise an order under that Act for a man's public examination, there must be some charge of fraud against him, either in the Official Receiver's report or otherwise. The Lord Chief Justice has during the year, by his charge in the case of Reg. v. Jameson, proved that he is a master of constitutional law; his address in America, and the comments of the American Press thereon, prove him to be a jurist; while his inaugural address for the Council of Legal Education show him to be interested in the establishment in England of a scientific school of law. In connection with this subject, although points of constitutional law are not of great interest to the working practitioner, we may remind those of our readers who do not confine their attention merely to the details of every-day practice, that in England the Privy Council finally decides the relation of the mother country to its colonies, just as in America the Supreme Court determines the legal position of the various States towards the Constitution. It has been held that the colonial constitutions, contained in the various statutes establishing them, in Nova Scotia gives power to its Legislative Assembly to commit for contempt (Fielding v. Thomas), and also is such as to contain a waiver of the usual right of the Crown to appoint and dismiss its servants at its pleasure (Gould v. Stewart); in New South Wales allows its Legislative Assembly to grant allowances of "wages " alike to present and future members (A. G. of N.S.W. v. Renny); and in Canada authorises even a provincial legislature (and à fortiori would authorise the Dominion Legislature) to adopt local veto (A. G. of Ontario v. A. G. for Dominion of Canada). 66 Finally, descending from the exalted regions of jurisprudence and constitutional law, to the humble one of English magisterial law, we find that, owing to the activity and zeal of the Anti-Gambling League, the Queen's Bench Division has during the past year been much occupied with cases as to the proper construction of the Betting and Gambling Acts. Encouraged by the success which had on the whole attended their previous efforts, the Anti-Gambling League recently had the hardihood to attack the inclosure sometimes called "Tattersall's Ring" at Hurst Park, and summoned a wellknown professional bookmaker for using it for betting. The magistrates dismissed the charge, holding that the inclosure (or Tattersall's Ring) at Hurst Park was not a place" within the meaning of the Betting House Act. The prosecutors appealed to the Court of Queen's Bench, where the case was argued at length on the last two days of the Michaelmas Sittings before a specially constituted Divisional Court, consisting of five judges. In the result, judgment was reserved, but we believe that it is the general opinion of those who heard the argument throughout that the court will eventually give judgment in favour of the appellants, and send the case back to the magistrates, with an intimation that, in the opinion of the court, the inclosure (or Tattersall's Ring) at Hurst Park is a "place" within the meaning of the Betting Acts. For the cases have gone far to show that a very liberal construction must be put upon the word "place" in the statute, and that certainly any structure, and also anything that can by possibility be called a structure, will fall within the Act, as, for instance, even an umbrella fixed in the ground, or a box carried by a man who remains standing at about the same spot throughout the day. And, in the case before the court (Reg. v. Dunn) it came out that the inclosure at Hurst Park is divided off from the rest of the course and has within it a grand stand, which persons who are already within the inclosure can go in at their pleasure, and without any intervening physical obstacle. The only escape from the decision which we have ventured to foretell as probable, would be to hold that the question whether the locus in quo is so structurally severed from its surroundings as to constitute it a "place within the meaning of the Act, is a question of degree for the magistrates, and that their finding as to this is one of fact, with which the court cannot interfere. While the judicial decisions given during the year have, as a rule, been unimportant, no change has occurred in the constitution of the Bench by reason of the death or retirement of any of its members. We have on a previous page (ante, p. 1) pointed out that no less than ten occupants of the Bench have served for more than fifteen years, and are consequently eligible for pensions, and we have there given a list of who they are. The absence of promotion, coupled with considerable stagnation of business, has produced a congestion at the Bar, but how largely the former cause has contributed to this may be judged from the fact that, during the past ten years, only eight new judges have been appointed, namely, one Chancery judge and seven judges of the Queen's Bench Division, while during the same period more than one hundred new Queen's Counsel have been appointed-exclusive of those made at the end of last sittings. 66 One of the most eminent lawyers of modern days-the late Lord Blackburn-has died during the year. The deaths of two ex-judges - namely, the late Mr. Justice Denman, the once popular oar" of the Cambridge boat, and the late Mr. Justice Grove, whose eminence as a scientific discoverer somewhat threw into obscurity the position which he deserved as a lawyer-have, of course, caused no promotions. Neither have such appointments as have been made during the year done much to relieve the congested ranks of the Inner Bar. Sir Francis Maclean, who has been appointed to an Indian chief justiceship, was already a Master in Lunacy. County Court judgeships have been filled by the appointments of Mr. Waddy, Q.C., and Mr. Whitehorn, Q.C., who can be said to have recently enjoyed very extensive practices at the Bar. The Bar Council has, during the past year, held its first election, when the largely increased number of candidates showed the interest taken by the Profession in it. The council, for the first time since it came into existence, has worked during the whole year with the assistance of adequate funds which the four Inns of Court were, after some little difficulty, persuaded to give as their contribution to the Bar's only homogeneous and representative organisation. It has achieved much in an unostentatious manner, but we will not anticipate its next annual report by any enumeration here of the good work which it has done. It ought not, however, to pass unnoticed that the Council had a large share in bringing about the appointment last spring of two commissioners to go circuit who, by their services, rendered it possible for sufficient judges to remain in town to, at all events nominally, continue the sittings of the courts in London, which it at one time appeared would have to be altogether shut up. It is in this direction that the council must expand its energies in the future. Of primary importance to such an organisation is, of course, that it should protect the Profession and advance its interests. But both branches of the Profession and the public will look to it to aid the movement in favour of the reform of the law of legal procedure. Retainers, fees, and comfort in and out of court, are matters of interest; but the subjects dealt with in this article, the glaring defects in our legal system, which cry out for a remedy, cannot be passed on one side by such a strong body as the General Council of the Bar. The law itself; its codification; our circuit system; our courts in town; criminal appeal; and our County Courts too all offer a field of activity to the Bar Council. In these matters it must act with its sister society, the Incorporated Law Society, and our final remarks may fitly deal with that society-what it has done during the year and what is its prospect of usefulness in the future. Solicitors have long possessed in the Incorporated Law Society an example of professional organisation which, until recent years, was entirely wanting amongst the Bar. Since its original formation, the Incorporated Law Society has raised the professional tone and status of the important profession which it represents in a manner which probably few solicitors now in practice are able to at all realise. It has on more than one occasion, and in a spirit free from the faintest taint of jealousy or rivalry, shown that it is ready at all times to meet and heartily co-operate with the Bar Council in an endeavour to obtain legal reforms for the common good, both of the Bar, and of the important body of professional men which the society directly represents. Its interests, both in suggested law reforms and in current topics engaging the attention of lawyers, was shown at the society's last annual meeting, which was held in the autumn of this year at Birmingham, when an interesting address was delivered by the president, Mr. Joseph Addison, of London, and some excellent papers on matters of general professional interest were read. The united endeavours of the Bar Council and of the Incorporated Law Society will, we hope, be able to lay the lines in the coming year of reforms in the law, which will be worthy of the longest and most prosperous reign known in the annals of British History. WHEN a discretion has been reposed in trustees it requires strong circumstances to induce the courts to exercise a judgment which has been primarily committed to other persons. Nevertheless, there are many cases in which this discretionary power has been interfered with at the instance of parties feeling themselves aggrieved at the conclusion arrived at by trustees. Some thirty years ago this interference of the court could have been more easily obtained than is possible now. The case of Gisborne v. Gisborne (36 L. T. Rep. 564; L. Rep. 2 App. Cas. 300) in the House of Lords has, however, rendered the exercise of a trustee's discretion far more stable. In that case, by the testator's will, his residuary property had been given to trustees" upon trust that they in their discretion, and of their uncontrollable authority, should pay and apply the whole or such portion only of the annual income thereof as they should think expedient to, or for the clothing, board, lodging, maintenance, ease, and support, or otherwise for the peculiar and personal benefit and comfort of his wife during her life." The wife was of unsound mind when the will was made. She was possessed of means other than those coming under any of the provisions of the will. In the courts below some differences of judicial opinion were found, and the trustees' contention that they were in their discretion empowered to pay over only a part of the income so as to supplement the wife's separate estate was held to be good. Hence the appeal to the House of Lords. It was argued that this was a trust for "maintenance " subject to the trustees' discretion, and not merely one to supplement her other means. The Lord Chancellor (Lord Cairns), however, decided that the trustees were left by the testator the complete masters of the question, and that, as their discretion was to be "uncontrollable," the court could not assume to control it, so long as there was no mala fides with regard to its exercise. The same line was taken in the subsequent case of Tabor v. Brooks (39 L. T. Rep. 528; 10 Ch. Div. 273), where a power was given under the provisions of a settlement enabling the trustees to raise funds to purchase the husband's life interest "in their uncontrolled and irresponsible discretion," and to pay the income to the husband or wife in such way as they should think proper. The husband was of grossly drunken habits, and the wife was compelled to live apart. The trustees, who were also relations of the husband, concluded that it was for the best to force the wife to rejoin her husband, and with this view they refused to allow any part of the income of the fund, derived from the sale of the life estate, to come to the wife's hands. The court was asked to override the exercise of the discretion, but Vice-Chancellor Malins felt that the "uncontrolled and irresponsible discretion" committed to the trustees was not capable of being removed from them unless mala fides could be shown. He concluded his decision with an appeal to the feelings of the trusteesan indication that his sympathies were in favour of a conclusion different to that to which he had been driven. In Re Lofthouse (53 L. T. Rep. 174; 29 Ch. Div. 921) trustees were simply empowered, without employing such strong discretionary expressions as those referred to previously, to apply all or any part of a certain income for the maintenance of infants. They exercised their powers by applying a very small sum out of a very considerable income. Lord Justice Cotton in the event was not called up on to decide the point as to the valid exercise of the power, but, in reply to counsel's question, he indicated for the guidance of the parties his view of the law affecting interference with the discretion reposed in trustees. He considered that the trustees might exercise their judgment as they had done, but they must look to the benefit of the child in a comprehensive way. Vide also Re Bryant; Bryant v. Hickley (70 L. T. Rep. 301; (1894) 1 Ch. 324). Quite recently, in the case of Re Boys; Boys v. Hardy (as yet unreported), decided by Mr. Justice Chitty, the point rose up again in an application to compel trustees to exercise their power in a manner other than that decided upon by them. The will authorised the trustees "either to pay to, or allow to be received by [the plaintiff], the whole or such part of the income as my trustees shall in their discretion think fit." Mr. Justice Chitty, feeling himself tied by the Gisborne case (sup.), refused to upset the trustees' view in the absence of bad faith. He held that the court could only examine the trustees' grounds of decision so far as was necessary to determine the purity of their motives: to go further than this would be to substitute a judge's discretion for that committed to trustees. The above cases showing instances in which the discretion has been left to the trustees for exercise, we turn to a brief notice of some of the leading cases in which the courts have intervened on various grounds. In Re Sanderson's Trust (30 L. T. Rep. O. S. 140; 3 K. & J. 497) there were a devise and bequest to trustees upon trust during the life of an imbecile to pay and apply the whole or any part of the income therein mentioned for and towards his maintenance, attendance, and comfort. It was decided by Vice-Chancellor Wood, semble, that this trust was one which would be enforced, and that the trustees could not insist that they had a discretionary power such as would oust the court's jurisdiction; nevertheless the imbecile could not contend for the whole unless he could show that it was wanted for his maintenance, attendance, and comfort. Again, where a testator as in Re Hodges; Davey v. Ward (7 Ch. Div. 754), has given a legacy to children with a direction that the trustees of the will "should pay or apply the whole or such part as they shall think fit" of the income towards maintenance and education of the beneficiaries, the contention that an entire discretion had been conferred on the trustees was unsuccessful. ViceChancellor Malins held that such a contention would paralyse the judicial discretion and act prejudicially to the best interests of society. The learned judge while paying respect to the view of the trustees, exercised his own judgment on the ground that the exercise of the discretion on the part of the trustees had not been proper. It is not, it is apprehended, on the ground of mala fides that this decision was arrived at, but merely on grounds of comparative expediency. So also in Re Weaver (48 L. T. Rep. 93; 21 Ch. Div. 615), the Court asse tedits right to oust the discretion of trustees. There property was held on trust to pay the income in such way, at such time, and in such manner as the trustees should think fit for the maintenance of a lunatic; but the case of Gisborne v. Gisborne (sup.), where the trustees' discretion was so strongly supported, was distinguished on the ground that the discretion in the case now considered related only to the time and manner of the payment and not to the determination whether the whole or a portion of the income was to be enjoyed. So also in Tempest v. Lord Camoys (48 L. T. Rep. 13; 21 Ch. Div. 578) the Court asserted its right to see that, where trustees have had conferred upon them a power to sell a trust property, the discretion be wisely exercised. A very large number of other cases might easily be cited; but, on reference to the cases already mentioned, it will be found that, as indicated by Mr. Underhill in his work on the Law of Trusts and Trustees (4th edit., p. 420), it is very necessary to scrutinise with care the words conferring the authority and discretion to determine whether it be one which the courts will leave to the unhampered judgment of the persons to whom it has been primarily given, or whether such discretion is more limited and confined in its operation. The principle is, that where trustees are given a power to pay the whole or any part of a sum in their discretion, such power being drawn so as to make it apparent that they are intended to be the arbiters, in such cases as these the court will not attempt to go behind the expressed intention of the will or settlement, unless where some evidence of bad faith is forthcoming. On the other hand, if the discretion be confined to the narrower limits of determining, not on the amount of the benefit, but on the time or method of its application, the court will not hesitate to require that the trustees' actions should be such as meet with the views of the court. The present tendency is to favour the view taken by trustees, and in this connection it may be mentioned that in Godefroi's "Law of Trusts" (2nd edit. p. 518) the learned writer considers that Vice-Chancellor Malins, in Re Hodges; Davey v. Ward (sup.), went somewhat further than the present state of the authorities warrant in his view of the jurisdiction possessed by the court over trustees. The criterion seems to be a fair, honest, and reasonable exercise of the discretion, for, as Mr. Justice Chitty recently said, in the absence of mala fides, to question the trustees' view, where this is not found, is to substitute the discretion of the judge for that of the trustee. WILLS OF FOREIGNERS. PRIOR to the Wills Act a will of personalty need not have been in writing, and, although the 5th section of the Statute of Frauds required writing and attestation to give validity to a will, this manner of execution did not apply to a will of personalty, but only of realty; therefore, a nuncupative will was effectual so far as regards personalty, but a will made in such a manner was subject to certain restrictions, and the difficulty experienced in complying with the formalities requisite to render such a will valid had the effect of making it almost essential for testators to make their wills in writing. By the Wills Act 1837 a person has the power to dispose of all his property by will, but no such will shall be valid unless in writing and executed in manner prescribed by the Act, viz., signed at the foot or end thereof by the testator or by some other person in his presence and by his direction, and such signature shall be made or acknowledged by the testator in the presence of two or more witnesses present at the same time, who shall attest and subscribe the will in the presence of the testator, but no form of attestation is necessary: (1 Vict. c. 26, ss. 3, 9; see also 15 Vict. c. 24). The will may be written in any language, and, if written in a foreign |