buildings thereon when completed. This sub-section, according to Key & Elphinstone (5th edit. vol. 1, p. 846), "would no doubt apply to a statement that the rent is the best."

WARRANTS OF EXECUTION ISSUED BY COUNTY COURTS.

WHAT is the exact nature and effect of the warrant of execution issued by a County Court for the enforcement of its judgments or orders? It is somewhat strange that this point has never been judicially determined, though it has been raised by several eminent legal writers. It is obviously of great importance to know the time from which such a warrant "binds the property," and to what extent the learning relative to executions in general applies to the process of a County Court.

The writ of fi. fa. dates back from the time when all writs were supposed to emanate from the Sovereign. It had a witnessing clause called the teste," the date of which was very important, since by the common law the goods of the debtor were bound as from the date of the teste : (Edwards, Execution, pp. 113, 114). In other words, the goods were attendant to answer the execution: (Gilbert, Execution, p. 13). The warrant of execution issued by a County Court is not a writ, is not supposed to emanate from the Sovereign, and has no teste or witnessing clause. There seems, therefore, considerable difficulty in imagining any connection between a warrant of execution and the doctrines of the common law. It is indeed true that County Courts existed at common law, under the title of Sciremotes, as far back as the time of Alfred the Great, but these have long since died a natural death. The County Courts as we know them (and their procedure also) are creatures of modern legislation.

Some doubt has also been felt as to whether the various statutes which have fixed the time from which a writ of fi. fa. is to bind the property in the goods apply to warrants of execution issued by a County Court. The question seems to have been raised, though not decided, in Ex parte Williams (26 L. T. Rep. 303: L. Rep. 7 Ch. 314). Sect. 15 of the Statute of Frauds, sect. 1 of the Mercantile Law Amendment Act 1856, and sect. 26 of the Sale of Goods Act 1893 have each in turn dealt with the subject, and it is very remarkable that in these sections sheriffs and writs of execution are alone referred to; no mention whatever is made of warrants of execution or of high bailiffs.

Turning to the provisions of the County Courts Act 1888 dealing with the subject, two sections only (146 and 152) need be considered. Sect. 146 provides that, "Whenever the court shall have given or made a judgment or order for the payment of money, the amount may be recoverable, ... by execution against the goods and chattels of the party against whom such judgment or order shall be given or made; and the registrar, at the request of the party prosecuting such judgment or order, shall issue under the seal of the court a warrant of execution in the nature of a writ of fieri facias to the high bailiff of the court, who, by such warrant, shall be empowered to levy, &c. The precise time when an application shall be made to a registrar to issue a warrant against the goods of a party shall be entered by him in the execution book and on the warrant." With the exception of the italicised words (in the nature), this section is practically (for the present purpose) identical with sect. 60 of 7 & 8 Vict. c. 96, and sect. 94 of 9 & 10 Vict. c. 95, so that the Legislature has expressly called attention to the fact that a warrant of execution is not a writ of fi. fa., but only in the nature of one. These words intensify the doubt which has been felt as to whether the before-mentioned enactments apply to warrants of execution.

It will be convenient to refer at this point to the exact terms of sect. 26 of the Sale of Goods Act 1893, which now contains the whole law relating to the time at which writs of execution become operative. That section is as follows: "A writ of fieri facias, or other writ of execution against goods, shall bind the property in the goods of the execution debtor as from the time when the writ is delivered to the sheriff to be executed; and, for the better manifestation of such time, it shall be the duty of the sheriff without fee, upon the receipt of any such writ, to indorse upon the back thereof the hour, day, month, and year when he received the same. Provided that no such writ shall prejudice the title to such goods acquired by any person in good faith and for valuable consideration, unless such person had at the time when he acquired his title notice that such writ or any other writ, by virtue of which the goods of the execution debtor might be seized or attached, had been delivered to and remained unexecuted in the hands of the sheriff. (2) In this section the term sheriff' includes any officer charged with the enforcement of a writ of execution." This sub-section has been treated by some authors as expressly or impliedly including the high bailiff of a County Court who is enforcing a warrant of execution, but it is difficult to see how it throws any light on the subject. Comparing this explanation of the term "sheriff" with that contained in sect. 168 of the Bankruptcy Act 1883, i.e., "Sheriff includes any officer charged with the execution of a writ or other process," the proper conclusion would almost seem to be the opposite to that which has been drawn.

Shortly put, the points in the case are these: If sect. 26 of the Sale of Goods Act 1893 does not apply to warrants of execution issued by a County Court, such warrants are either (1) Wholly regulated by the County Courts Act 1888, or (2) governed by that Act in conjunction with the common law doctrines applicable to writs of fi. fa. Apart from the reasons already advanced why these latter can have no application, if, by analogy to a writ of fi. fa. a warrant of execution is to bind the property from the moment of the application to the registrar to issue it (which is the only time of which the registrar has to take note, and which must be indorsed on the warrant), a subsequent bond fide purchaser from the

debtor for value and without notice would not be protected. In other words, a satisfactory title to goods which had been once subjected to an execution could in general be given only where an actual sale under the warrant itself had taken place. It is not credible that such can be the law. If, on the other hand, the Act of 1888 is alone to be looked at, further difficulties at once arise. There are practically only two stages in the process of a County Court from the point of view of the subject in hand, of which the application to the registrar to issue the warrant is the first, and actual seizure under it the final stage. If the first of these stages is selected as the moment at which the warrant is to bind the property, then the same result follows as if the common law doctrine is applied; since there is nothing in the Act of 1888 to protect a subsequent bona fide purchaser for value without notice. If the time of actual seizure be selected as the operative moment, then sect. 152 of the Act of 1888 gives rise to a somewhat extraordinary position. By that section, if a creditor under a judgment in a County Court applies to the registrar for the issue of the warrant to be executed before a creditor under a judgment of the High Court has delivered his writ to the sheriff to be executed, the former is entitled to priority over the latter. But suppose the debtor, after both these events had taken place, but before any seizure had been made under the warrant, assigns his goods to a purchaser who knows of the delivery of the writ to the sheriff and of the issue of the warrant to the high bailiff. In this case the County Court creditor would ex hypothesi have no right to the goods, seizure under his warrant not having taken place. The High Court creditor, on the other hand, would be entitled under sect. 26 of the Sale of Goods Act 1893 to seize the goods. But by sect. 152 of the Act of 1888 (set out above) the County Court creditor would be entitled to priority over the High Court creditor; i.e., a creditor with no rights against the assignee with notice would be entitled to priority over a creditor with them. This may be the law, but it seems, to say the least of it, improbable. The proper conclusion, then, seems to be, though the point is open to considerable doubt, that sect. 26 of the Sale of Goods Act 1893 does apply to warrants of execution issued out of a County Court; that such a warrant binds the property from the moment of the application to the registrar to issue it, subject, however, to the proviso in favour of a bona fide purchaser for value without notice.

SALE OF GOODS ACT 1893, SECT. 18, R. 4 THE number of decisions on this Act is so rapidly increasing that it will soon be necessary, in accordance with the present custom, to pass a short amending Act to explain what its provisions really mean. As is well known, the opponents of the codification of English law have always contended that the genius of the common law is entirely opposed to it, and that the binding weight attached to precedents in the English courts would soon render any codification an extra source of confusion without any corresponding advantages. The present Master of the Rolls, no mean authority on any question affecting commercial law, has always been opposed to such attempts as were intended to be carried out by the Sale of Goods Act 1893, and whenever the opportunity has arisen has not been slow to point out the evils arising from that Act. In the two cases of Kirkham v. Attenborough and Kirkham v. Gill (noted ante, p. 181) a most important point arose with regard to the construction of sect. 18, rule 4, of the above Act and its applicability to goods bought on "the sale or return" principle and afterwards pledged before the intending purchaser had definitely signified whether he would buy the goods or not.

The words of the section, so far as they are material, are as follows:"When goods are delivered to the buyer on approval or on sale or return,' or other similar terms, the property therein passes to the buyer-(a) when he signifies his approval or acceptance to the seller or does any other act adopting the transaction; (b) if he does not signify hie approval or acceptance to the seller, but retains the goods without giving notice of rejection, then on the expiration of a reasonable time. What is a reasonable time is a question of fact." The facts so far as material were these: The plaintiff, who is a manufacturing jeweller, delivered goods to one Winter in the ordinary course of business with a note specifying that they were delivered on sale or return. Winter afterwards pledged some of them to the defendant, who advanced money on them in good faith. Afterwards Winter died without having paid for any of the articles, and the plaintiff discovered where they were and brought an action against the defendant for delivery up to him of those pledged with the defendant. Mr. Justice Grantham decided that the property in the goods had never passed from the plaintiff, that sect. 18, rule 4, was not applicable, and gave judgment for the plaintiff. This judgment was appealed against and the arguments shortly were these: On behalf of the plaintiff it was said that, inasmuch as Winter had never expressly signified his approval or acceptance to the seller, the only ground on which Winter could be said to have adopted the purchase was, that he had pledged the goods, but that this was not sufficient evidence of such an intention, because Winter by merely pledging could not be regarded as having intended to part with any ownership in the goods, as he could at any time have redeemed them and returned them to the plaintiff, and might have done so if he had not died. It was also argued that the words in the section "adopting the transaction" must be construed as referring to some act as between buyer and seller and could not include acts done without the knowledge of the seller and to his detriment, and that this was the sole object of the section in question.

On behalf of the defendant it was contended that the true object of the section was simply to have evidence that the intending buyer had exercised his option of buying, and that any act which showed such an election was sufficient to bring the case within the words of the section;

that Winter's pledging of the goods was an act inconsistent with the idea of his returning them, and that any dealing with goods was adopting the transaction: (see Brown v. Marr, 17 Scottish Law Reporter 277); and that, inasmuch as the plaintiff had intrusted Winter with the goods in such a way as to enable him to hold himself out as the rightful owner, he was further estopped from saying as against the defendant that Winter was not the rightful owner.

The Court allowed the appeal. The Master of the Rolls in giving judgment said that the language of the section was most unhappily chosen, but, inasmuch as the principles adopted by the court in dealing with this form of contract for the delivery of goods on sale or return had now unfortunately been put into a code, they were bound by the wording of that section. He thought the words " any other act adopting the transaction' were as bad words as could possibly have been used, but the court must give them some meaning. What transaction was the buyer to adopt? It could not mean the mere delivery of the goods, as that had already been done. It must refer to some act which signified that he adopted the transaction in the sense that he was to be considered the purchaser of the goods, and in his opinion, if he did any act which was consistent only with his being the purchaser, that was sufficient. The act of pledging was such an act, as it was inconsistent with the free power to return the goods. Lord Justice Lopes, in concurring, also remarked that the words of the section were difficult to construe; and Lord Justice Rigby agreed with the other two Lords Justices.

COMMENTS ON CASES.

THE doctrine of estoppel in pais in connection with the common practice of underwriting the capital of a company, as laid down in Re Henry Bentley and Co., and The Yorkshire Breweries Company (69 L. T. Rep. 204), has been followed by North J. in a recent case where somewhat similar circumstances appeared: Re Consort Deep Level Gold Mines Limited (1897) W. N. 1. 1). A. offered to the M. company, in consideration of a commission, to subscribe by a given date for 10,000 shares in the C. company, being promoted by the M. company. There was the common clause as to the guarantee being annulled or reduced, according as the public applied for the whole or a portion of a certain number of shares therein mentioned. As usual the M. company was empowered to apply on A.'s behalf, in default of A. himself so doing, for the whole or part of the shares guaranteed. The M. company accepted the offer, but never gave him notice of such acceptance; they subsequently applied for certain shares to be allotted to him, as agreed, but A. being informed of this action sought to absolve himself on the ground that his offer had never been accepted. His name being placed on the register of the C. company, he now sought by motion to obtain rectification of the register, but North, J., on the authority of the foregoing case, concluded that A. was estopped as against the C. company from denying that his offer had been accepted, and that his application must accordingly fail.

IN Redman and Lyon's excellent work on Landlord and Tenant it is stated (p. 194) that "the rule of law is that the occupier and not the owner of premises is prima facie liable for damages resulting from a nuisance arising upon the demised premises or for injury to third persons or adjoining property from the same being in a ruinous or dangerous condition." The same authorities add an exception: "But if the tenant was under no obligation to repair, and the defect, to the knowledge of the landlord, existed at the time of the letting, he would be liable (p. 195). In the case Lane v. Cox (noted ante, p. 220) the plaintiff, who was employed by the weekly tenant to remove some furniture, was injured owing to the staircase breaking beneath him. Evidence was given to show that the staircase was defective and unsafe in its construction at the time of letting, but still the Lord Chief Justice held that in an action brought by the injured man against the landlord there was no case to go to the jury, and the Court of Appeal have dismissed an application for a new trial. The reason of this decision would seem to be that, though the landlord may be liable for damage to third persons in general, he is not liable to the tenant or his guests or customers (Redman and Lyon, p. 195), and the furniture remover was in the position of a paid guest of the tenant.

IN Hobson v. Gorringe (noted ante, p. 181) the point in dispute was whether the vendor under an ordinary hire-and-purchase agreement who has allowed the purchaser before payment to affix to some extent to the land the chattel so sold can afterwards on failure of the purchaser to pay the stipulated instalments, bring an action for the recovery of the chattel so fixed from a mortgagee of the land and fixtures who is in possession under his mortgage. The case is not only of great practical importance, having regard to the prevalence of this form of agreement, but it is legally important from the dicta contained in it as to the ratio decidendi of certain earlier cases dealing with the same subject, which would on first reading have led one to expect a different conclusion. The facts in the above case were that, on the 7th Jan. 1895, the plaintiff Hobson, by a contract in writing not under seal, let to a builder named King a gas engine upon the hire-and-purchase system for the purpose of being fixed on some land of which King was the owner in fee. There was the usual clause in the contract that the property in the engine was to remain in Hobson until all the instalments had been paid, and that until then the agreement should be construed simply as & contract of hiring. The engine was duly delivered and fastened by bolts and screws to four iron plates fixed in a bed of concrete which had been specially prepared for the purpose. King paid some

of the instalments and then made default. On the 24th July 1895, King, for valuable consideration, mortgaged his land to the defendant Gorringe, such mortgage expressly including the fixed machinery and fixtures thereon. On the 17th Jan. 1896 King was adjudicated bankrupt, and in the March of that year Gorringe, as mortgagee, lawfully entered and took possession of the mortgaged premises, and the gas engine which he found there. Hobson then brought the present action against Gorringe on the ground that the property in the engine was still vested in him, and that it could not become a fixture until the property was King's, and was not, therefore, within the provisions of the mortgage deed. As to the first point, as to how far the engine could become a fixture under the above circumstances, the Court said, "In our opinion the engine became a fixture subject to this right of Hobson which was given him by contract (to remove the engine if default was made in payment of the instalments). This right to remove the fixture imposed no legal obligation on any grantee from King of the land. Neither could the right be enforced in equity against any purchaser of the land without notice of the right, and the defendant Gorringe is such a purchaser. The plaintiff's right to remove the chattel if not paid for cannot be enforced against the defendant, who is not bound either at law or in equity by King's contract. The plaintiff's right for the price or for damages for the loss of the chattel is by action against King, or he being bankrupt by proof against his estate." The reasons why the court held the engine to be a fixture are based on a review of the well-known cases set out in the notes to Elwes v. Maw (2 Smith's Leading Cases 183), and referred to in our issue of the 9th inst. in an article entitled "Right to Fixtures." The other point as to whether the mortgagee was entitled to the engine at all gave rise to much more difficulty, because of the case of Cumberland Company v. Maryport Company (66 L. T. Rep. 103; (1892) 1 Ch. 415) which was approved and followed in Gough v. Wood (70 L. T. Rep. 297; (1894) 1 Q. B. 713) and Huddersfield Banking Company v. Lester (72 L. T. Rep. 703; (1895) 2 Ch. 273). In the former case Mr. Justice North, in giving judgment, is reported to have said that no title could pass to a mortgagee of chattels held by the mortgagor under a hire-and-purchase contract, since the mortgagor could not pass a title to things which were not his merely by fixing them to the freehold and making them fixtures. Mr. Justice Wright, in giving judgment in Gough v. Wood, begins (70 L. T. Rep. 298): "I hold that one man's property cannot be taken away from him by being fixed into the land of another. I cannot imagine such a contention as has been raised prevailing." Lord Justice Lindley, on appeal, whilst upholding the decision on other grounds, distinctly says (page 298) that the above statement of Mr. Justice Wright goes too far, but that the decision of Mr. Justice North was rightly decided, having regard to the fact that the mortgagor was in possession. Lord Justice Kay, referring to the first case, says (p. 300): "I understand that decision to mean that the fixtures could be removed with the consent of the mortgagee, and the decision can be supported on the ground of an implied assent by the mortgagee in that case. If it means that the fixtures could be removed without such implied assent, I should respectfully differ from that view." In Gough v. Wood the Court of Appeal went entirely on the ground that the fixtures were trade fixtures erected by the mortgagor whilst in possession, and removed by him before the mortgagee entered into possession; Lord Justice Lindley expressly saying that the point as to what the rights of a mortgagee in possession were under such circumstances was not then necessary for their decision. In Huddersfield Banking Company v. Lister the two prior decisions were again referred to and explained. In giving judgment in the case now under review Lord Justice Smith in effect laid down the following propositions of law, which may now be considered to govern this difficult subject:-(1) That the ordinary authorities as to what are and what are not fixtures apply as much to goods obtained under hire-andpurchase contracts as to those bought right out. (2) That a mortgagee of land and fixtures is entitled to all fixtures placed on the land whether before or after the mortgage, and if Mr. Justice North intended to decide otherwise he must now be held to have been wrong. (3) That if the fixtures are trade fixtures, and the mortgagee allows the mortgagor to remain in possession and continue trading, the court may imply from the facts of the case that he impliedly assented to the mortgagor's removing the fixtures, and that the cases of Gough v. Wood and Cumberland Company v. Maryport Company must be supported on that ground only. (4) That if no such implied or express assent on the mortgagee's part can be proved the fixtures belong to the mortgagee, and cannot be claimed or removed either by the mortgagor or the vendor under a hire-and-purchase agreement under which the fixtures were originally obtained, although default has been made in payment of the instalments.

OCCASIONAL NOTES.

Mr. Justice Day has been absent from court the last few days in consequence of a severe cold.

Sir Isaac Pitman, the inventor of phonography, died on the 22nd inst., at his residence in Royal Crescent, Bath, aged eighty-four.

There will be no judicial retirements till the Queen's Reign festivities are over, says the Pall Mall Gazette ("Silk and Stuff"). Doubtless among the celebrations there will be a distribution of honours.

Baron Dimsdale has been presented with a pair of silver candelabra and a silver salver by the magistrates of Hertfordshire on his retirement from the office of chairman of quarter sessions, and in recognition of the numerous services rendered by him to the county. The Earl of Clarendon made the presentation. Baron Dimsdale represented Hertford from 1866 to 1874, and the Hitchin Division from 1885 to 1892.

A letter headed "Chancery Businesss" in our correspondence column is one that needs attention by the chief clerks, and those higher in authority. Our correspondent is a well-known solicitor of standing.

The sittings of the Railway and Canal Commission will commence on Tuesday next. There is a substantial list of cases, and it is anticipated that the presiding judge, Mr. Justice Collins, will be occupied hearing them until he starts on the Northern Circuit on the 10th Feb.

Lord Russell of Killowen presided on Wednesday evening at the inaugural banquet of the Ulster Association held at the Hotel Cecil, Strand. Among those present were Lord Macnaghten, W. R. McConnell, Q.C., and J. A. Rentoul, Q.C.

"The Recorder of London-The Common Serjeant-Mr. Commissioner Kerr-Sir Peter Edlin," is the fourteenth article of a series on "Our Judges and Famous Lawyers," now appearing in Lloyd's Weekly Newspaper.

Mr. Oswald, Q.C. M.P., one of the leaders proposing to practice in Mr. Justice Byrne's court, has been ordered by his medical advisers to take complete rest, and will therefore not be able to resume his professional duties for some weeks.

Sir R. T. Reid, Q.C., M.P., Sir Frank Lockwood, Q.C., M.P., and Sir George Lewis, have intimated their intention of attending the complimentary dinner to Mr. Labouchere at the National Liberal club, on Wednesday, the 3rd Feb.

The frontispiece of the Pall Mall Magazine for February contains a portrait of Lord James of Hereford. Arrayed in somewhat fancy costume, he is represented as shielding a poor boy whilst shaking his fist against "The Cruel Sea," which is the title of the picture.

The plate glass of the roof light of the Northwich County Court fell in at noon last Monday. Mr. Rhodes and Mr. Overend Evans, barristers, of Manchester, had marvellous escapes, and Mr. Lawrence, a solicitor's clerk, sustained a wound to his head requiring his removal to a surgery. The incident created a great sensation.

The season at Dublin Castle opened on Tuesday with the first levée of the Lord Lieutenant. Among those who attended were the Lord Chancellor of Ireland, Lord Morris, Lord Maurice FitzGerald, the Lord Chief Justice, the Lord Chief Baron, Lords Justices Fitzgibbon, Barry, and Walker, and a number of other judges and privy councillors.

At Blackburn County Court last Monday, a large number of auctioneers applied for renewal of certificates enabling them to levy distress for rent. Judge Coventry, as a result of inquiries into the circumstances of some of the applicants, said he should refuse them certificates, as he did not think them fit to bear the responsibility of collecting the moneys of other people when they could not pay their own debts. They must have clean hands.

The present list of House of Lords appeals, which we print in another column, consists of nineteen cases, of which seventeen are English and two are Scotch appeals, there being no cases from Ireland in the list. The judicial members of the House of Lords are expected to commence the hearing of these appeals in the early part of next month. There are four cases awaiting judgment, among them being the case of Earl Russell v. Countess Russell, in which the question was raised as to what constituted legal" cruelty.

66

An account, issued as a Parliamentary paper, respecting the Supreme Court of Judicature shows that the net apparent liability of the Consolidated Fund in respect of suitors' cash at the end of the year ended the 29th Feb. 1896 was £1,800,080, as against £1,860,755 in the previous year's account. The amount of suitors' cash remaining on deposit on the 23rd Feb. 1896 was £1,606,821, as compared with £1,024,389, the amount so remaining on the same date in the previous year. The number of suitors' accounts open in the paymasters' books was 44,924, the number at the close of the preceding year being 45,199.

At Northampton County Court, on Wednesday, Judge Snagge, when a certain witness was about to be sworn, described the kissing of the Testament as a dirty practice. He was surprised that the medical profession throughout the country did not revolt against it. He wished it to be understood that no witness in his court need kiss a book which all manner of persons had kissed. He regarded the Scotch form of " swearing" as objectionable, on the ground that the oath taken contained words which he should not like people, especially in Northampton, to repeat. Eventually, the witness was sworn on a book wrapped in clean paper.

Mr. Charles Royle, who has been appointed a judge in the Native Court of Appeal in Alexandria, is, with the notable exception of Sir Charles Cookson, K.C.M.G., probably the best known lawyer in the Consular Courts of Egypt. Outside the Consular Courts, Mr. Royle is best known for his book on the Egyptian Campaign of 1882-5, a work mainly remarkable for its untiring statistical research among the blue-books of AngloEgyptian interests. Mr Royle should prove a useful addition to the lawgivers of the land of Paradox. He was called to the Bar by Lincoln'sinn in 1865, having previously gained an exhibition.

In the House of Commons, on Tuesday, Mr. O'Keefe asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether, on the introduction of the Budget, having regard to the decline of legal business in Irelaud and the nonnecessity for the tax, he would consider the question of remitting the licence duty made annually payable by solicitors in Ireland. The Chanceller of the Exchequer, replying, said, "I am sorry to learn that the legal business has declined in Ireland. I thought that that profession at any rate was flourishing. I had the matter of the duty on solicitors under my consideration last year, and I made a proposal to the House with regard to it which was not very favourably received. I am afraid I cannot promise that I shall be able to do anything in the matter."

The Local Government Board have issued a circular with reference to the new order regulating the election of parish councillors. The circular points out that rule 1 of the order directs that the parish meeting for the annual election of parish councillors in the present year shall be held on Thursday, the 18th March, or on such one of the three preceding days as may, for special reasons, be fixed by the county council. The order admits of the transaction at the meeting of business besides that relating to the election, and also of the meeting being the annual assembly of the parish meeting if it is held on the 18th March.

The Lord Chancellor has issued an order of court respecting the bearing of Liverpool and Manchester District Registry business, which has hitherto been taken by Mr. Justice Kekewich, by which it is provided that, until further order, every cause or matter in the Chancery Division of the High Court of Justice commenced in the District Registries of Liverpool or Manchester, shall be marked with the name of Mr. Justice Byrne, and it is also ordered that all causes and matters in the Chancery Division now proceeding in the said District Registries and assigned to Mr. Justice Kekewich be transferred to Mr. Justice Byrne, with the exception of two actions, which are specified, which will be retained by Mr. Justice Kekewich.

Wednesday being the Grand Day of Hilary Term at Gray's-inn, the Treasurer (Master James Mulligan) and Benchers of this society entertained at dinner the following guests, viz.: Lord James of Hereford, the Hon. Willoughby Burrell, Sir Henry Fowler, Lord Justice A. L. Smith, Lord Justice Rigby, Mr. Justice Byrne, Sir George Errington, Bart., the treasurer of Lincoln's-inn (Mr. G. W. Hemming, Q.C.), Mr. Levett, Q.C., the president of the Incorporated Law Society (Mr. Joseph Addison), the president of the Surveyors' Institution (Mr. Daniel Watney), Mr. Henry Sutton, and Mr. Charles Stewart. The Benchers present, in addition to the treasurer, were Master Lord Shand, Master Griffith, Master Hugh Shield, Q.C., Master James Sheil, Master Beetham, Master Rose, Master Judge Paterson, Master Mattinson, Q.C., Master Lewis Coward, Master Macaskie, Master Dicey, C.B., Master Terrell, Q.C., and Master Barnard, and the preacher (the Rev. Dr. Lupton).

An important point relating to deposits at railway cloak-rooms was decided at the Southwark County Court on the 21st inst., when Deputy Judge Sills gave his decision in the case of Pratt v. The South-Eastern Railway Company. The plaintiff, Mr. Henry Pratt, a dentist, practising at 2, Poland-street, Oxford-street, sought to recover £5 for damage to a gun deposited by him at the cloak-room of the defendant company at Charing Cross. It appeared that on Saturday, the 3rd Oct., the plaintiff had a day's shooting in Kent, and, returning to town, arrived at Charing Cross Station, and took his gun to the cloak-room, paying 2d. for its care and receiving in return the usual receipt. The gun was then in a sound condition, but when it was returned to him on the following Monday the stock was broken and the weapon otherwise injured. Mr. Archibald Wills, barrister, on behalf of the company, denied that there was any proof that the damage was done on the company's premises, but mainly resisted the claim on the ground that the company was not liable, it having been proved that the gun was worth more than £10, and one of the conditions on the receipt being that the company would not be resposible for any parcel over the value of £10, and he quoted the cases of Parker and the Company and Van Tool and the Company, in both of which instances the judges in the High Court held that the condition was reasonable, and absolved the company from liability for parcels over the above-stated value. His Honour, in giving judgment, said he had carefully considered the effect of the judgments given in the cases quoted by Mr. Willis. each instance the company obtained judgment for a lost parcel. In this instance there was a difference to his mind a most material one. article deposited had not been lost, but had been depreciated in value in consequence of the usage of the article while in the care of the company's He was quite of opinion that the words meant that the company would not be responsible for the package itself, and could not refer to damage to a package, or words to that effect would have been inserted. That being so, he must give a verdict for the plaintiff for £5 5s. with costs. He knew the company looked upon the case as one of importance to themselves, and he would give them the necessary leave to appeal, on the understanding that they must pay their own costs in any event.

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The

An anonymous article on the French Bench, or rather magistracy, contains some good reading, says the Albany Law Journal. Before the Revolution, legal appointments were hereditary. Now, it seems, it is by no means difficult to obtain the position of judge. A certain number, like our own "great unpaid," are willing to do the work of a magistrate for nothing. Even when a magistrate is paid, the salary would be considered insignificant by many an English clerk, for a French judge of the fourth class is only too well pleased when, after some years of unpaid work, he is appointed to a post worth £120 a year. And yet it is greatly to the honour of the French magistracy that the charge of venality is never brought against them. Still, the fact that their position carries with it so extremely small an income makes them naturally painfully anxious for advancement, and though absolutely incorruptible when in the exercise of their functions, there is nothing they will not do as men and private citizens in order to obtain a better judgeship, or, rather, a better paid post. On the other hand, the judges of whom so much is heard in England, in other words, the juges d'instruction play an all-powerful part in French life, for it is they who have it in their power to torture, from the British point of view, a supposed criminal into acknowledging the crime of which he is accused. It is an old joke that in France a young man who was passing his Bar Examination was asked: "Who holds the greatest position in France ?" Instead of naming the President of the Republic, he stammered out "The juge d'instruction," and the youth was not so far wrong, for everything short of physical torture is within his power. On a simple written order of the jugc d'instruction,

the French citizen's house can be broken into, his leiters read, his servants questioned, nay even his family grave opened. It is curious to note that the anonymous writer of this article considers that the French magistracy have two powerful enemies-namely, the press and the political world; and certainly a section of the Paris press does not love the French bench and seldom mentions it without some unpleasing epithet. These attacks, which really mean very little, are answered on the part of those whom they seek to injure by the most absolute silence. As for the political world. those composing it or touching on it have too often had to appear before the juge d'instruction to wish him much good, and it will be interesting to see if these two all-powerful and venal sections of the French world of to-day will carry out their openly-expressed intention of abolishing one of the oldest and most worthy of French institutions, for on the whole la magistrature is in every sense above reproach.

NOTES OF RECENT DECISIONS NOT YET REPORTED.

BY OUR REPORTERS IN THE SEVERAL COURTS.

COURT OF APPEAL. Bankruptcy Bankrupt in receipt of Half-pay or Pension-Order of Court for Payment to Trustee-Bankruptcy Act 1883 (46 & 47 Vict. c. 52), 8. 53. -By sect. 53, sub-sect. 1, of the Bankruptcy Act 1883, it is enacted that when a bankrupt is an officer of the Army or Navy, or an officer or clerk or otherwise employed or engaged in the Civil Service of the Crown, the trustee shall receive for distribution amongst the creditors so much of the bankrupt's pay or salary as the court, on the application of the trustee, with the consent of the chief officer of the department under which the pay or salary is enjoyed, may direct. And by sub-sect. 2, where a bankrupt is in receipt of a salary or income other than as aforesaid, or is entitled to any half-pay or pension, or to any compensation granted by the Treasury, the court, on the application of the trustee, shall from time to time make such order as it thinks just for the payment of the salary, income, half-pay, pension, or compensation, or of any part thereof, to the trustee, to be applied by him in such manner as the court may direct. In 1888 Lieutenant-Colonel Ward, of the Cameronians, voluntarily retired from active service and received a "gratuity or retired pay" of £120 a year under article 1057 of the Royal Warrant (Pay and Promotion) of the 15th Nov. 1887. He was subsequently adjudicated bankrupt, and upon the application of the trustee Mr. Registrar Linklater made an order under sect. 53, sub-sect. 2, for the payment to the trustee of £40 a year out of the "gratuity or retired pay." The bankrupt appealed from this order on the grounds (1) that the learned registrar had no jurisdiction to make the order, and (2) that, if he had, the court in the exercise of its discretion ought not to make it. Reference was made to articles 103, 241, 519, 520, and 526 of the Royal Warrant, and it was contended that, as the bankrupt was liable to be called on to serve in case of emergency, the "gratuity or retired pay was given partly in consideration of future services and could not be attached under sect. 53, sub-sect. 2. No consent of a chief officer of a department, such as is referred to in sub-sect. 1 had been obtained for the order. Held, that the learned registrar had jurisdiction under sect. 53, sub-sect. 2, to make the order appealed against, but in the exercise of its discretion the court would reduce the amount ordered to be paid to the trustee from £40 to £20.

[Re Ward; Ex parte Ward. Ct. of App.: Lord Esher, M.R., Lopes, and Chitty, L.J. Jan. 22.-Counsel: for the bankrupt, Herbert Reed, Q.C. and E. P. Willes; for the Official Receiver, The Attorney-General (Sir Richard Webster, Q.C.) and Muir Mackenzie; Solicitor, F. W. Tonkin; Solicitor to the Board of Trade.]

Partnership-Articles-Partnership in Brewery-Death of one Partner— Purchase of Business by surviving Partner-Valuation-Tied Publichouses-Goodwill.-The defendant and William Jeffery (since deceased) entered into partnership as brewers for twenty-one years upon the terms of articles dated the 2nd July 1866, which were extended by deed of covenant, with certain immaterial modifications, to the 1st July 1894, and from that time to the death of Jeffery, without any further arrangement, written or verbal. The articles provided (among other things) that in case of death either partner might nominate a son to succeed him in the business, and that if there were no son the business was to be valued, and the surviving partner to have the option of purchase; that, at the termination of the partnership by any of the contingencies mentioned in the articles, the "property, stock, goods, and effects then employed or used in carrying on the said business were to be valued, and the defendant was to have the option of purchase at the valuation, and that, if he declined, then Jeffery might exercise such option. If neither purchased at such valuation, then the business was to be wound-up. Jeffery died on the 24th June 1895, leaving no son, and it thereupon became necessary to ascertain his share of the partnership, and to make the valuations, required by the articles, with that object. In these circumstances a summons was taken out to obtain the opinion of the court as to whether, in making these valuations, the goodwill of the business was to be valued separately, or whether the business should be valued as a going concern without any separate item for goodwill. It was argued in support of the summons that the case was practically covered by the decision of Lord Westbury in Hall v. Barrows (9 L. T. Rep. 561 4 De G. J. & Sm. 150), where goodwill was included as a distinct subject of value. On the other hand, it was contended that the principle laid down by Lord Romilly, Master of the Rolls, in Hall v. Hall

(20 Beav. 139) was the true one, and that general words were not to be extended to meet the case of goodwill. It was decided by Stirling, J. (74 L. T. Rep. 343) that the valuation ought to be made on the same principle as that laid down by Lord Westbury in Hall v. Barrows (ubi sup.) viz., that the goodwill of the business ought to be valued separately (except so far as it related to tied public-houses forming part of the partnership property at the death of the partner), but that the same was to be valued on the footing of the surviving partner being at liberty to set up and carry on the same business. On appeal: Held, that the words "employed or used in carrying on the said business could not be construed in so narrow a way as to exclude the goodwill in valuing the business; and that therefore the appeal must be dismissed with costs. Hall v. Barrows (ubi sup.) applied. Decision of Stirling, J. affirmed.

"

[Page v. Ratliffe. Ct. of App. No. 2: Lindley, Smith, and Rigby, L.JJ. Jan. 21.-Counsel for appellant, Graham Hastings, Q.C.; Cozens-Hardy, Q.C., and E. P. Hewitt; for the respondents, Buckley, Q.C., and Micklem. Solicitors: for the appellant, Preston, Stow, and Preston, agents for Browne and Haviland, Northampton; for the respondents, Sharpe, Parker, Pritchards, and Barham, agents for Shoosmith and Sons, Northampton.]

Poor Rate-Tithe Rentcharge-Net annual Value-Deductions- Tenant's Profit-Repair of Chancel-Parochial Assessment Act 1836 (6 & 7 Will. 4, c. 96), s. 1.-The Dean and Chapter of St. Asaph were assessed by the assessment committee of the Llanfyllin Union in respect of rectorial tithe-rentcharge, the gross estimated rental being £280, and the rateable value £245. Upon appeal the assessment committee reduced the rateable value to £233, allowing deductions of £31 for rates, 4 per cent. for expenses of collection, &c., and £5 for repairs of cathedral. The dean and chapter appealed to quarter sessions. The appeal was allowed, subject to a special case, in which the following facts were stated: The Court of Quarter Sessions held that the deduction for rates was correct: the court also found that a deduction should be made for: (1) remuneration of collector; (2) legal costs and out-ofpocket expenses; (3) bad debts and irregularity in payments; (4) tenant's taxes; and with respect to these the court ordered that the amount of the deduction should be 4 per cent. off the gross estimated rental. The court also held that a further deduction should be made for tenant's profits, and that the amount of this deduction should be 1 per cent. off the gross estimated rental. The court further held that a deduction should be made in respect of the liability of the dean and chapter as owners of the rectorial tithe-rentcharge of the parish to repair the chancel of the parish church, and that the amount of that deduction should be 1 per cent. Upon the argument of the special case, the Divisional Court (Wills and Wright, JJ.) held that the Court of Quarter Sessions was wrong in allowing the deductions for tenant's profits and for the liability to repair the chancel of the parish church. The Dean and Chapter of St. Asaph appealed. Held (affirming the decision of the Queen's Bench Division), that the Court of Quarter Sessions was wrong in allowing deductions for tenant's profit and for liability to repair the chancel of the parish church.

[The Dean and Chapter of St. Asaph v. The Overseers of Llanrhaidr yn-Mochnant and The Assessment Committee of Llanfyllin Union. Ct. of App.: Lord Esher, M.R., Lopes and Chitty, L.JJ. Jan. 25.Counsel for the appellants, Macmorran, Q.C. and Stevenson Moore: for the respondents, Marshall, Q.C. and Ellis J. Griffith. Solicitors: for the appellants, E. W. T. Peterson; for the respondents, Robbins, Billing, and Co., for Pughe and Jones, Llanfyllin.]

Practice-Contempt of Court-Commitment or Sequestration-Accidental and unintentional Disobedience of Order-Absence of Contumacy.— The plaintiffs were owners of mills situate on the river Mersey. On the 4th Nov. 1896 Kekewich, J., on the application of the plaintiffs, ordered that a sequestration should issue against the property of the defendants, on the ground that they had disobeyed an order made by him in the action on the 1st Nov. 1894, perpetually restraining them from abstracting or diverting from the river Mersey, or allowing to flow therefrom into their canal, such a quantity of water as would diminish the downward flow past a certain quay in any twenty-four hours by greater quantities than were authorised by the Manchester Ship Canal Act 1885. Against the order of the 4th Nov. 1896 the defendants appealed. Their Lordships, on the evidence, came to the conclusion that the order for sequestration ought to be set aside, and the appeal allowed; and that the plaintiffs should pay the defendants' costs in the court below and in this court. Their Lordships added: The plaintiffs are here seeking to sequestrate the property and effects of the defendants. The ground of that application is that the defendants have committed a contempt of court by wilful disobedience of an order of the court. The case is as if it were sought to commit a private individual to prison for contempt. We desire to make it clear that in such case no casual or accidental and unintentional disobedience of an order would justify either commitment or sequestration. Where the court is satisfied that the conduct was not intentional or reckless, but merely casual and accidental, and committed under circumstances which negative any suggestion of contumacy, while it might visit the offending party with costs, and might order an inquiry as to damages. it would not take the extreme course of issuing an order either of commitment or of sequestration. To justify so serious a proceeding the court must be satisfied that a contempt of court has been committed-in other words, that its order has been contumaciously disregarded.

[Fairclough and Sons v. The Manchester Ship Canal Company. Ct. of App. No. 2: Lord Russell, C.J., Lindley and Smith, L.JJ. Dec. 15, 16, 17, 1896, and Jan. 21.-Counsel: for the appellants, Moulton, Q.C.

and O. Leigh Clare; for the respondents, Warmington, Q.C. and T. R. Hughes. Solicitors for the appellants, Grundy, Kershaw, Saxon, Samson, and Co., London and Manchester; for the respondents, Burton, Yeates, and Hart, agents for Wilson and Cowie, Liverpool.] Practice Costs—Administration Action-Defendant Trustees-Severance of Defence-Deprivation of Costs-Discretion of Court-Unreasonable carrying on of Proceedings-Rules of Court 1883, Order LXV., r. 1.—The will and codicil of a testator dated the 3rd July 1886, and the 10th Nov. 1886 respectively, were proved by two of the executors named therein, Isaac and Solomon (who were also appointed trustees), power being reserved to the others to come in and prove. On the 15th Nov. 1886 the testator executed a voluntary settlement in favour of practically the same persons as were beneficiaries under the will. He died on the 22nd Nov. 1886. The testator was a contractor to a railway company, and it was stated that shortly after his death his brother Isaac endeavoured to get the contracts transferred to him for his own benefit. An action was commenced by writ issued on the 14th Dec. 1886, for the administration of the trusts of the testator's will. Judg. ment in the action was delivered on the 30th April 1887. The chief clerk's certificate was filed on the 12th Aug. 1895, and the further consideration of the action came on for hearing on the 20th March 1896, when Kekewich, J. made an order that one set of costs only should be paid to the executors and trustees out of the estate, and that those should be paid to Solomon. It appeared that on the 14th Nov. 1887, Isaac changed his solicitors, and from that date until the 22nd Nov. 1892 the executors were represented by Grover, Humphreys, and Son. Isaac being dissatisfied with the long delay withdrew his retainer on the latter date, and put his own name on the record. On the 24th Jan. 1894 he appointed Ernest Bevir as his solicitor, who had continued to act for him ever since. No further evidence was before the court to explain why the trustees had severed in the course of the proceedings. Isaac appealed from the decision of Kekewich, J. as to the costs. For the appellant it was argued that, unless severance per se was misconduct, the trustees were under rule 1 of Order LXV. entitled to their costs in their proper shares; and that, if the appellant were deprived of his costs, the curious anomaly would arise that as the estate was not yet fully wound-up, and as the appellant was ordered to get in some of the outstanding assets, he would have to give his services in that respect gratuitously. Course v. Humphrey (26 Beav. 402) and Attorney-General v. Wyville (28 Beav. 464) were relied upon. Held, that the evidence before Kekewich, J. did not justify the view that Isaac had unreasonably carried on the proceedings; that an opportunity ought to be afforded him of explaining his conduct in having severed the defence; and that therefore the appeal was competent. Held also, that on the evidence now adduced there was no ground for judicially depriving Isaac of his costs; and that, therefore, the order of Kekewich, J. must be varied by directing that one set of costs only should be allowed, but that the same should be apportioned by the taxing master between Isaac and Solomon, so nevertheless as only to give Isaac costs for work actually done by him.

[Re Isaac; Cronbach v. Isaac, Ct. of App. No. 2: Lindley, Smith, and Rigby, L.JJ. Jan. 20 and 22.-Counsel: for the appellant, Farwell, Q.C. and A. W. Rowden; for the respondents, Warrington, QC. and Borthwick; A. H. Jessel. Solicitors: for the appellant, Ernest Bevir; for the respondents, Grover, Humphreys, and Son; McDiarmid and Teather.]

Practice-Costs-Taxation-Appeal-Copies of Documents for Use of each Member of Court of Appeal.-On an appeal relating to the construction of a will one copy only of the will was furnished for the use of the Lords Justices, the reason alleged for this course being that the taxing masters were chary of allowing the cost of three copies in a small case. The Lords Justices protested against the notion that it was possible for the court to perform its duty properly in construing a will or other instrument unless a copy of such instrument was provided for the use of each member of the court, and intimated that the cost of copies so provided ought be allowed on taxation.

[Re Maule; Chester v. Maule. Ct. of App. No. 2: Lindley, Smith, and Rigby, L.JJ. Jan. 23.-Counsel: for the appellant, Dauney; for the respondents, Renshaw, Q.C. and Brabant. Solicitors for the appellant, Edward Chester; for the respondents, Greenfield and Cracknall.]

Trade Name-Imitation-Name of Article-" Swift" Cycles-Appropriation of Word by Plaintiffs-Passing off by Defendant of GoodsCalculated to deceive. The plaintiffs were manufacturers of cycles which had become known as "Swift" cycles, and they claimed to have a monopoly of that word as applied to bicycles. For several years the defendant had been selling cycles under the term "Swift," or "Walsall Swift"; but it was not until Sept. 1896 that the plaintiffs discovered what the defendant was doing. Thereupon the plaintiffs commenced an action and moved for an interlocutory injunction. No evidence of anyone having been deceived was given. The defendant denied that the term "Swift" was exclusively applied to the plaintiffs' cycles, and there was evidence to the effect that other manufacturers had applied the same fancy term to their machines, but no names or details were given. The question was, whether the descriptive word "Swift," which conid not be registered as a trade mark, could be appropriated by the plaintiffs for their bicycles. The evidence was contradictory as to whether the word was in common use in the trade, as stated by the defendant. It was decided by Kekewich, J., upon the evidence as it stood, that the plaintiffs had appropriated the word "Swift that therefore the use by the defendant of the words complained of was calculated to deceive. His Lordship accordingly granted an interlocutory injunction to restrain the defendant until the trial of the action or further order from selling cycles under the name of "Swift" or

and

"Walsall Swift," on the ground that his so doing would lead the public to believe that his cycles were those of the plaintiffs. The defendant appealed. Held, that, having regard to the evidence, an interlocutory injunction ought not to be granted, the defendant giving an undertaking to keep an account. The costs in the court below were made costs in the action; and the costs of the appeal the defendant's in any event. [The Coventry Machinists' Company v. Helsby. Ct. of App. No. 2: Lindley, Smith, and Rigby, L.JJ. Jan. 20.-Counsel: for the appellant, W. E. Hume Williams and James M'Connell; for the respondents, Warrington, Q.C. and John Cutler. Solicitors for the appellant, Henry Pumfrey, agent for M. Powell, Manchester; for the respondents, C. Urquhart Fisher.]

HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE.-CHANCERY DIVISION. Company Winding-up- Advertisement of Petition - Omission in · Practice-Companies Winding-up Rules (April) 1892, r. 19, Form 3. -Where by an oversight the advertisement of a petition for windingup a company omitted the note at the foot prescribed by rule 19 of the Companies Winding-up Rules (April) 1892, in Form 3, leave was given to re-advertise the petition on the next day, and to bring on the petition in a week, thus giving less than seven clear days' notice, it being shown that all the creditors had in fact had notice by a circular which invited the expression of their views.

:

[Re Hille India Rubber Company Limited. Ch. Div. Byrne, J. for Williams, J. Jan. 25.-Counsel: H. S. Sankey. Solicitors: Powell and Burt.] Executor-Intermeddling with Estate before Probate-RenunciationWilful Default-Delay-Loss of Interest. The testator in this action died in 1882, having by his will appointed the defendants S. and E. and another executors. The will was not proved until 1889, when it was proved by S. alone. The testator's estate was got in and administered by S. and E. before and after probate, but E., who was a solicitor, alleged that he had only acted as solicitor and agent for S. In April 1894 this action was commenced by one of the residuary legatees under the testator's will for administration of the testator's estate and an account, on the footing of wilful default against S. and E. The statement of claim was delivered on the 28th May 1894, and on the following day E. renounced probate. The action was pressed against him on the ground that he had intermeddled with the assets and could not afterwards renounce. Part of the testator's estate consisted of a policy of insurance on his life in the Scottish Widows Fund, which was deposited with Gurneys' Bank as security for an overdraft. In July 1883 a letter was written to the insurance company, signed by the three executors named in the will, directing them to pay the amount of the policy to Messrs. Gurney. It appeared from E.'s bill of costs that this letter was written by arrangement with the bank. The insurance company refused to pay until probate. The money was finally paid on the 18th Nov. 1889, with interest at 1 per cent. for the interval. Meanwhile the testator's estate had been charged with interest by the bank at the rate of 5 per cent. The delay in getting in the policy money was relied on by the plaintiffs as an act of wilful default. Held, that the signature of the letter to the insurance company by E. was an intermeddling with the assets as executor which prevented renunciation, and could not be treated as an act done as agent or solicitor for S., E. and S. being both in the same position as executors who had not proved. Held also, that the delay in getting in the policy moneys not having resulted in any loss of the principal was not such an act of wilful default as would entitle the plaintiff to an account on the footing of wilful default. The usual accounts were directed against E. and S. as executors.

[Re Stevens; Cooke v. Stevens. Ch. Div.: North, J. Jan. 21, 22, 23, 26.-Counsel; Everitt, Q.C. and Butcher; Swinfen Eady, Q.C. and Chris. James. Solicitors: S. S. Seal, agent for Steavenson, Darlington; Whites and Co., agents for M. S. Emerson, Norwich.]

Letters Patent-Infringing Goods manufactured abroad, and sent through forwarding Agent to Customer in England-Injunction against foreign Manufacturer-Jurisdiction.-Goods covered by an English patent were manufactured by a foreign manufacturer at Basle, Switzerland, and sent by him, with instructions to hold them at the disposal of an English customer, to a forwarding agent in Basle, in order that the forwarding agent might pay the forwarding charges and send them by post to the customer, who, in his order to the manufacturer, had directed the manufacturer to send them by post. The goods arrive in England, and the English customer pays through the post-office the forwarding charges of the forwarding agent, which include the agent's commission; but there was no evidence to show that the customer, when he paid the charges, knew that he was paying anything to the agent. The goods admittedly infringed the English patent, and it was admitted that it was on this account that the manufacturer sent them to a forwarding agent on the Continent instead of sending them himself. Held (in an action by the owner of the patent), that the court had jurisdiction to grant an injunction against the foreign manufacturer restraining him from importing or bringing into or delivering, in England, the goods which infringed the plaintiffs' patent.

[Badische Anilin und Soda Fabrik v. Henry Johnson and Co. and the Basle Chemical Works, Bondschedler. Ch. Div.: North, J. Jan. 26 and 27.-Counsel: Moulton, Q.C. and W. N. Lawson; Bigham, Q.C. and Upjohn. Solicitors: J. H. and J. Y. Johnson; Ward, Perks, and McKay.] Power of Appointment-General Power-Donee of Power-Tenant for Life, without Power of Anticipation-Power exercisable by Deed or Will. Where a married woman was tenant for life of property with