ENGLISHMEN are not oriental in their ideas of hospitality, but they have sympathy with the traveller who feels thirsty, even on a Sunday. A traveller, to come within the privilege of having liquor sold to him during prohibited hours, must have lodged during the preceding night at least three miles by the nearest public thoroughfare from the place where he asks for the liquor. He may be a traveller for pleasure, but not merely for the purpose of getting the drink: (Talbot's "Law and Practice of Licensing," p. 52). In Mountifield v. Ward (noted ante, p. 270) the respondent was licensed to sell intoxicating liquors to be consumed on his premises. Boné fide travellers arrived on a Sunday during the hours when the house was closed, bought some beer, and took it off to a neighbouring field, and there shared it with some friends. "Hard cases make bad law," and the justices refused to convict the respondent. On appeal to a Divisional Court, however, it was decided that the Act only permitted a sale of drink to be consumed on the premises, and accordingly the respondent should have been convicted. It should be observed that "keepers of houses licensed to sell liquor not to be consumed on the premises are not mentioned, so that they cannot claim any exemption": (Paterson's "Licensing Acts," 7th edit., p. 161).

THE London Building Act 1894, and other kindred Acts have no doubt conferred a real blessing on the community at large. It is well for us that our streets should be wide and our buildings safe. But, on the other hand, we naturally resent the interference of officials with the interiors of our buildings. In Venner v. McDonell (noted ante, p. 270), the replacing of certain seating in position in the Agricultural Hall was said to be a building, structure, or work within the Act, so that two days' notice of it should have been given to the district surveyor (sect. 145). The seating was so constructed that it could be put away when not wanted, and replaced in position when required. Hence, according to the surveyor's contention, notice would have to be given to him every time it was intended to use it. Mr. Justice Wills and Mr. Justice Wright have decided, after consideration, that the replacing of the seating was not the beginning of a structure or work within the section, so that no building notice was necessary. UNDER Sect. 257 of the Public Health Act 1875, where a local authority have incurred expenses for the repayment whereof the owner of premises in respect of which they are incurred is liable under that Act, they become a charge on those premises. "The charge is one not on the interest of any particular owner of the premises, but on the total ownership; that is to say, on the respective interest of every owner for the time being in proportion to the value of his interest": (Lumley's Public Health Acts, 4th edit., p. 319). An instance of this is to be found in Hornsey District Council v. Smith (noted ante, p. 269), where an apportioned part of certain paving and other expenses incurred in respect of the street on which a national school abutted had been held to be a charge on the school. The site of the school had been conveyed to trustees for the purposes of a school and no other purpose whatever. Mr. Justice Kekewich has held that the urban district council were entitled to have their charge on the school raised by sale or mortgage, free from the trusts of the conveyance, under the direction of the judge in chambers. In other words, the property can be sold as if were not a school.

WE referred on p. 290, ante, to the decision of the Lord Chief Justice, affirmed by the Court of Appeal, that a landlord was not liable for the injury done to the plaintiff, who was employed by a weekly tenant to remove some furniture, by the breaking of the staircase. We learn from a correspondent that the ground of the Chief Justice's decision was that the defective condition of a staircase inside a house is not a nuisance, and that a landlord is not liable to anyone for injury caused by the defective condition of a house (where he has not covenanted to repair), unless the defect is a nuisance, public or private. Our correspondent suggests that the only prior decision on the point is Robbins v. Jones (9 L. T. Rep. 523; 15 C. B. N. S. 221), decided in 1863. But Chief Justice Erle in that case said: "A landlord who lets a house in a dangerous state is not liable to the tenant's customers or guests for accidents happening during the term; for, fraud apart, there is no law against letting a tumble-down house, and the tenant's remedy is upon his contract, if any." The recent decision in Lane v. Cox may theoretically have carried this a step further, but, practically, the result is much the same, as anyone lawfully using the inside of a house must (in general) be the tenant, or his customer, or guest, unless he be the landlord or his agent inspecting the state of repairs under a provision contained in the lease.

66

Taking Silk" is the title of an illustrated article in Black and White for the 30th Jan.

Sir Richard Webster, Q.C., M.P., has consented to deliver the annual address to the Juridical Society of Glasgow on the 27th March.

"The Attorney-General " (Sir Richard Webster, Q.C., M.P.), is the fifteenth of a series of articles on "Our Judges and Famous Lawyers" now appearing in Lloyd's Weekly Newspaper.

The Lord Mayor will preside at the annual dinner of the Municipal Officers' Association, to be held on Saturday, the 27th inst., at the Holborn Restaurant, when he will be supported by Lord Balfour, the Secretary for Scotland, and others.

Messrs. Emanuel and Simmonds, solicitors, of Finsbury-circus, have taken into partnership Mr. Edwin Dill Simmonds, son of Mr. Edwin Simmonds, and Mr. Charles Herbert Lewis Emanuel, son of Mr. Lewis Emanuel. The style of the firm will remain unchanged.

The February general sessions for the trial of cases arising north of the Thames were opened on Wednesday, at the Sessions-house, Clerkenwell, before Mr. M'Connell, Q.C., chairman, Mr. Loveland Loveland, deputy. chairman, and other justices. The calendar contains the names of fiftyfour persons charged with offences.

The treasurer of the United Law Clerks' Society has just received the sum of £300 from the executors of the late John James, solicitor, of Pall Mall. This legacy comes at an opportune moment when the committee have under consideration a scheme for increasing the benefits under the benevolent branch of the society.

At Whitechapel County Court last week, in an action of no public importance, three witnesses in succession were called who could neither read nor write. In the next case called on there were three witnesses named respectively Speller, Reader, and Wright. Judge Bacon: A coincidence; the natural progress of education.

By the elevation of Mr. Justice Chitty to a Lord Justiceship of Appeal, it is now possible to form a Court of Appeal of old " Blues," says the Westminster Gazette. Both Lord Esher and Lord Justice A. L. Smith won their blue at rowing, whilst Lord Justice Chitty gained his in the cricket field. It will be remembered that Lord Justice Smith was one of the Cambridge Eight in 1859, when the Light Blues' boat sank.

The Rev. Dr. Wace having resigned the office of preacher to the Honourable Society of Lincoln's-inn, the Benchers have appointed a number of preachers to officiate at Lincoln's-inn Chapel up to Easter. The Bishop of London will preach at the morning service on Sunday, the 21st March, and the Rev. Dr. Wace will continue his course of Warburton lectures on the 7th Feb., 7th March, and 4th April respectively. No tickets are required, the seats being free.

A report has reached London that Mr. F. Conde Williams, recently appointed to a Supreme Court registrarship in the West Indies, has shot himself. Mr. Conde Williams graduated at Cambridge in 1868, and was called to the Bar at the Inner Temple in 1873. He had served in judicial capacities in Jamaica, Natal, and Mauritius, being a district judge in the former and a puisne judge at the latter places. He had been connected also with the Civil Service Commission of the Mauritius.

The gold medal for special distinction at the recent examination for the degree of Doctor of Laws of London University, was awarded to F. G. Neave, solicitor. Dr. Neave's record has been exceptionally brilliant. At the final examination for solicitors he obtained first-class honours; at the Intermediate LL.B., first-class honours, qualifying for the University Exhibition; and at the final LL.B., he was placed third in the honours list.

Three performances of Shakespeare's "Twelfth Night will be given by the Elizabethan Stage Society, in the Middle Temple Hall. The first on Wednesday evening, the 10th inst., which will be for the Benchers and their friends; the second on Thursday, the 11th, for the members of the Inn and their lady friends; and Friday, the 12th, when the friends and members of the Elizabethan Stage Society will be invited to be present. Mr. Arnold Dolmetsch provides the music, and Capt. Hutton advises as to the sword play.

The annual dinner of the solicitors' clerks of Coventry was held at the White Lion hotel, Smithford-street, on Monday evening. Mr. George Evans (Dewes, Seymour, and Wilks) presided, with Mr. Whiteman in the vicechair. The company numbered over forty. The toast-list was very short. After "The Queen" came "The Annual Gathering," submitted by Mr. Evans. Mr. Moore proposed "The Profession," to which Mr. Whiteman responded. A very pleasant evening was spent, Mr. R. A. Hughes rendering some capital songs.

In the House of Lords on the 2nd inst., the Lord Chancellor moved that a committee of seven lords be appointed to join with a committee of the House of Commons to consider all Statute Law Revision Bills and Consolidation Bills of the present session; that the following be members of such committee: the Lord Chancellor, the Earl of Morley, Lord Watson, Lord Herschell, Lord Thring, Lord Welby, and Lord James of Hereford; that such committee have power to agree with the committee of the House of Commons in the appointment of a chairman. The motion was agreed to.

Another edifying exhibition of judicial temper was given at Kilkenny Quarter Sessions the other day, says Truth. In an action for damages the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff, which did not meet with the approval of Judge Fitzgerald. "Oh! this is all nonsense," he declared, "it is not worth the paper it is written on. It shows the value of having fellows of this sort coming to try a case. Hand this (the paper) to these fellows, and let them find what damages they like." Whether the verdict was worth the paper it was written on or not, a judge who talks to a jury in this insolent tone is assuredly not worthy of the position he occupies.

Upon an application being made last Monday to Lord Russell to restore a case which stood in the learned judge's list on Saturday, but which was struck out because neither party was represented, Lord Russell observed that the habit of neglecting cases was becoming very prominent. He waited for a considerable time on Saturday, and inquired whether there was counsel, solicitor, or solicitor's clerk, or a party to the case present, and no one was there. This was very culpable neglect of business, and it was not confined to one or two persons. He would, however, restore the

case.

A singular judicial error has been brought to light by M. Henri Robert, the well-known French barrister, says a Dalziel telegram. He says that some time ago a considerable number of divorce decrees were issued by the Fourth Chamber of the Civil Tribunal, and, owing to the pressure of work, the President confused the names of the parties with those of two of the barristers who happened to be namesakes, with the result that the court gave judgment divorcing the two barristers. The registrar did not notice the error, and the judgment was duly drawn up, signed, and registered before the mistake was discovered.

The Llanelly Borough Council have now decided upon the qualifications which they will require in candidates for the position of clerk to the borough council and harbour commissioners. The salary fixed upon is £500 a year, out of which the clerk is to pay a competent assistant. The selected candidate must possess a thorough knowledge of municipal law, and devote the whole of his time to the duties. This appointment will not in any way interfere with the position of Mr. David Randell, M.P., solicitor to the two bodies. The hon. member for Gower will continue to act as such, a resolution to that effect being unanimously passed in recognition of the splendid services rendered by Mr. Randell in the past.

The New York correspondent of the Standard reports a novel law case. Peter Renshaw is a beneficiary to the extent of over 70,000 dollars, under his uncle's will, payable to him if he is of good character, but to be held in trust" while he is drunken, rakish, and vicious." Mr. Renshaw has led a strictly upright life throughout, until within a few weeks, when he began sedulously leading a dissipated life to convince the trustees, under legal advice, that they should withhold the fortune, which would otherwise be applicable to his creditors, who have demands upon him of nearly 100,000 dollars, which Mr. Renshaw does not feel morally bound to pay, since the debt arose from his partner's misconduct. Counsel argue that Mr. Renshaw must lose his last resource if he resumes leading a correct life.

Not often (says the Daily Telegraph) does a witness in the Law Courts venture to rebuke counsel without receiving a grave reminder from the Bench of his duty to submit patiently to whatever may befall him. But an incident which occurred in a trial before Mr. Justice Hawkins shows that there are exceptions to the general rule. A dock labourer, a sturdy fellow, who appeared to have great confidence in himself, was under crossexamination by a rather impetuous Queen's Counsel, and in the middle of it the learned judge interrupted to put a question to him. Before the witness had time to reply, counsel quickly started another question. The badgered dock labourer turned promptly round to the lawyer with the remark," You shut up; I'm talking to the governor now." This reply caused much laughter in court. Both the judge and the lawyer took the matter in good part, aud permitted the witness at some length to finish his explanation.

In the House of Commons on the 1st inst., Mr. Lloyd Morgan asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department whether he would consider the question of introducing a Bill during the course of the session to provide for the payment of the expenses of common jurors while attending assizes and quarter sessions, and to give them reasonable remuneration for loss of time necessarily incurred. Sir M. W. Ridley, in reply, said: I am afraid I cannot promise that the Government will be able to deal with this question during the present session. I think, however, that, at any rate so far as out-of-pocket expenses are concerned, some such proposal is worthy of consideration. As the expenditure involved would have to be met out of local funds, I suggested to a deputation which saw me last year, and of which the hon. member was one, that steps might be taken to ascertain the feeling of local authorities on the subject. Up to the present time, however, I have had very few representations on the subject.

The President (Mr. Joseph Addison), the Vice-President (Mr. W. Godden), and the Council of the Incorporated Law Society entertained a large company at dinner in their hall on Wednesday evening. Among the guests were the following: Lord Macnaghten, Mr. Justice Byrne, Mr. Luke Fildes, R.A., Mr. J. Dunlop (Canada), Mr. Christopher Heath, F.R.C.S., Mr. Richard Mills, Capt. S. Judge, D.S.O., Mr. G. B. Houghton, Mr. C. F. Brickdale, Mr. C. R. Williams, Mr. E. M. Johnson, Mr. A. J. Cleaver, Mr. P. W. Chandler, Mr. E. Sidgwick, Mr. H. B. Raven, Mr. L. J. Maton, Mr. J. J. Rogers, Mr. A. Keen, Mr. C. F. Kemp, Mr. P. R. T. Toynbee, Mr. G. D. Stibbard, Mr. C. Knight Watson, Dr. Arnould, Mr. Wilberforce, Mr. W. Addison, Mr. Williamson, and Mr. Bucknill. The following members of the Council were also present: Mr. Attlee, Mr. Barker, Mr. Blyth, Mr. Bristow, Mr. Budd, Mr. Ellett, Mr. Fladgate, Mr. Hollams, Mr. Howlett, Mr. Hunter, Mr. Lake, Mr. Munton, Mr. Pennington, Mr. Rawle, Mr. Roscoe, Mr. Walters, Mr. John Lawrence, and Mr. Mather.

During the hearing of a case at Swansea County Court last week (says Truth), Judge Gwilym Williams addressed a little homily on civility to a witness who had spoken rather abruptly. "I do wish people would recognise," said his Honour, "that a little civility costs nothing." This is true enough. It is a pity, though, that Judge Gwilym Williams does not practise what he preaches. In another case in the same court, a witness stated that the defendant was a coal trimmer working in a gang, afterwards adding, in reply to the judge, that a coal trimmer could not

work by himself. "Oh yes, he can," exclaimed the judge; "don't argue, you stupid fellow." The astonished witness begged his Honour's pardon. "I knew what a coal trimmer was before you were born," continued the judge; "I suppose you think County Court judges are elected because they are fools. I know something, you know. Get out of the box." Whatever else he may think, it is pretty certain that after this the witness will never suppose that County Court judges are appointed on account of their good manners.

If the Treasury be too economically-minded to rebuild the dilapidated structure known as the Lambeth County Court, it ought, at least, says the Daily Telegraph of the 29th ult., to insure the learned gentleman who dispenses justice therein for a considerable sum against death or injury in the discharge of his duty, should an officer be found daring enough to take the risk. Not long ago a gas pendant in the judge's room fell, on account of old age. Soon afterwards, part of the ceiling fell on the exact spot where his Honour had been sitting a few minutes previously; and yesterday, while Judge Emden was dispensing justice, the rod from which hangs the curtain at the back of the bench fell with a crash, startling all in the court. Fortunately, the learned gentleman was at the time leaning forward over his desk enforcing an argument, otherwise the rod would have fallen on his head. Judge Emden remarked that this was now the third time he had narrowly escaped injury, through the defective state of the court, and he asked the registrar to acquaint the proper authorities with what had happened.

The learned Quain Professor recently remarked to his audience that he did not attribute any great value to lectures. This was possibly the only observation that his audience could take any exception to. But, since he is the greatest authority on Boswell's Life of Johnson, it may not be impertinent to suggest that Mr. Birrell was influenced by Dr. Johnson's complaint to the effect that-"People have nowadays got a strange opinion that everything should be taught by lectures. Now I cannot see that lectures can do so much good as reading the books from which the lectures are taken. I know nothing that can be best taught by lectures, except where experiments are to be shown. You may teach chemistry by lectures; you may teach making of shoes by lectures!" (Life of Johnson, chap. xvii., p. 144). But Mr. Birrell's distrust of the value of lectures is, we are glad to learn, perfectly consistent with his being a lecturer himself. For we read in Boswell's pages-"Johnson: Lectures were once useful; but now, when all can read, and books are so numerous, lectures are unnecessary. If your attention fails, and you miss a part of the lecture, it is lost; you cannot go back as you do upon a book.' Dr. Scott agreed with him. But yet,' said I, 'Dr. Scott, you yourself gave lectures at Oxford.' He smiled. 'You laughed, then,' said I, at those who came to you'": (Life of Johnson, chap. liii., p. 451). As Martial wrote: Ride, si sapis.

Thanks to the energy and public spirit of Sir Harry Poland, Q.C. (says the Pall Mall Gazette), there has just been added to the library of the Inner Temple an intensely interesting little collection inscribed "Serjeants' Rings." It contains four gold rings which once belonged to Serjeants Channell (1840), Crompton (1852), Ballantine (1856), and Field (1875) respectively. The dates are those of their being made serjeants. All these gentlemen, except Ballantine, became judges; Lord Field alone survives. On each ring is engraved the motto the serjeant took. Channell's is Quid quandoque deceat: Crompton's Quaerere verum; Ballantine's, Jacta est alea and Field's, Fais ce que doit avienne que pourra. These rings were distributed by the new members of Serjeants'inn to the old ones before that Inn was broken up. Previous to that event all common law judges had to be Serjeants before they were raised to the Bench, and some judges still wear the coif, the privilege of that order. Serjeant Bellasis has left an account of his being sworn in in 1844. After the oath his "colt" (an attendant barrister) "presented the Chancellor with the royal ring, requesting him to present it to Her Majesty, and also with a ring for himself," and then "delivered rings for me to several judges. "The Queen's ring was very large the rest were of various sizes, according to the dignity of the person they were presented to." These rings have now become very scarce, and Sir Harry Poland has had the greatest difficulty in recovering these few comparatively modern ones. Anyone coming across gold rings with an inscription-it was nearly always in Latin-would do well to see if it could not be identified possibly with some historic name. In some of the older reports the creation of the serjeants are recorded, with their mottoes. There is a story that when a very long-winded serjeant took as his motto, Carpe diem, Baron Alderson exclaimed, "Ah! yes, take a whole day."

"We propose to show, gentlemen of the jury," said counsel for the defence, in Judge Chetlain's court the other day, "that it is impossible

for the defendant to have committed this crime. In the first place, we will prove that the defendant was nowhere near the scene of the crime at the time the crime was committed. Next we will offer the indisputable testimony of persons who saw the defendant on the spot, and who did not see the defendant commit the crime. We will show that no poison was found in the body of the deceased. Not only that, but we will prove that it was put there by the prosecution in this case. We will furthermore show that the deceased committed suicide. And last, but not least, we will prove beyond the shadow of a doubt that the deceased is not dead. In view of which corroborative facts, gentlemen of the jury, we respectfully ask for an acquittal.”—Chicago Law Journal.

WARNING TO INTENDING HOUSE PURCHASERS AND LESSEES.-Before purchasing or renting a house have the sanitary arrangements thoroughly examined, tested, and reported upon by an expert from Messrs. Carter Bros., 65, Victoria-street, Westminster. Fee quoted on receipt of full particulars. (Established 21 years.)—-[ADVT.]

NOTES OF RECENT DECISIONS NOT YET REPORTED.

BY OUR REPORTERS IN THE SEVERAL COURTS.

COURT OF APPEAL.

Bill of Sale-Mining Lease-Distress extending to Chattels on Premises other than those demised by Lease-Bills of Sale Act 1878 (41 & 42 Vict. c. 31), ss. 4, 6-Bills of Sale Act (1878) Amendment Act 1882 (45 & 46 Vict. c. 43), ss. 3, 8-Company-Debenture-holders-Validity of Distress against Debenture-holders.-A company was formed in 1889, and in 1890 became the assignees of a lease by F., dated the 7th Nov. 1890, of a colliery and seams of coal for thirty years at a rent of £1600 per annum and royalties. By a lease, dated the 20th Nov. 1891, E. demised to the company certain seams of coal adjoining those demised by the former lease for thirty years at certain rents and royalties. Under both these leases rent was in arrear in Sept. 1896. On the 24th Sept. 1896 a general meeting of the company was held at which a special resolution was passed that the company should be wound-up voluntarily. On the 14th Oct. 1896 a writ was issued in a debenture-holder's action. On the 12th Oct. two distresses were put in, one by F., the other by E. On the 13th Oct. a general meeting of the company was held, at which the resolution passed on the 24th Sept. was duly confirmed and a liquidator was appointed. On the 15th Oct. the usual judgment was given in the debenture-holder's action, and the liquidator was appointed receiver and manager on behalf of the debenture-holders. The liquidator and the plaintiff in the debentureholders' action then moved to restrain all further proceedings under the distresses put in by the two landlords. The power of distress given by the demise granted by E. was limited to the tenant's goods, but extended not only to the premises thereby demised, but to "any adjoining or neighbouring collieries," and as a matter of fact the chattels taken under the distress by E. were found on lands demised by F. The question was whether the distress put in by E. was invalid on the ground that it was made under a power in the lease which rendered it necessary that the lease should be registered as a bill of sale, there having in fact been no such registration of the lease. It was contended on behalf of E. that registration was unnecessary, and that sect. 6 of the Bills of Sale Act 1878 particularly excepted such a lease containing a power of distress from the requirements of the Act. It was decided by Stirling, J. (75 L. T. Rep. 508) that a power in a mining lease for the lessor to distrain for rent in arrear on chattels of the lessee on premises other than those demised was a "licence to take possession of personal chattels as security for a debt within the meaning of sect. 4 of the Bills of Sale Act 1878; and that the lease was, as regarded goods so distrained, a bill of sale; and the distress was invalid, unless the lease was registered under the Bills of Sale Acts 1878 and 1882. His Lordship relied on Pulbrook v. Ashby (56 L. J. 376, Q. B.). E. appealed on the point decided by Stirling, J. A further question was raised on the appeal, which was not dealt with by Stirling, J., viz., assuming the power of distress to be valid, it was exercised too late to prevail against the debenture-holders of the company. Held (on the first point), that the power of distress must be construed to apply to those neighbouring mines only which, though not actually adjoining the seams of coal demised, might be or become connected with it by underground workings; that, if the power of distress was to be regarded as a power of distress for rent, it was out of the Bills of Sale Act 1878 altogether; if not to be so regarded but to be regarded as a power of distress for debt so as to fall within sect. 6, then, being a common form in a mining lease, it fell within the exception contained in that section; and that either way the power was not invalidated by the Act. Pulbrook v. Ashby (ubi sup.) considered. Decision of Stirling, J. reversed. Held (on the further point), that the distress having been made before the commencement of the winding-up of the company and before a receiver was effectively appointed was valid against the debenture-holders. Biggerstaff v. Rowatts Wharf Company (74 L. T. Rep. 473; (1896) 2 Ch. 93) and Re The Opera Limited (65 L. T. Rep. 371; (1891) 3 Ch. 260) considered.

[Re The Roundwood Colliery Company; Lee v. The Roundwood Colliery Company. Ct. of App. No. 2: Lindley, Smith, and Rigby, L.JJ. Jan. 11, 12, and 30.-Counsel: for the appellant, Graham Hastings, Q.C. and Upjohn; for the respondents, Buckley, Q.C., Eustace Smith, and Younger. Solicitors: for the appellant, Bell, Brodrick, and Gray, agents for Parker Rhodes and Co., Rotherham; for the respondent, J. and R. Gole.]

Company Directors - Misfeasance or Breach of Trust-No Damage to Shareholders caused thereby-Companies (Winding-up) Act 1890 (53 & 54 Vict. c. 63), s. 10.-A summons was taken out under sect. 10 of the Companies (Winding-up) Act 1890, by a contributory in the winding-up of a company who was the holder of founders' shares issued as fully paid up, on the ground (inter alia) that H., T., and G., being directors of the company, and W., being the secretary and an officer of the company, were guilty of a misfeasance and breach of trust in relation to the company in combining together and with certain other persons to induce the holders of debentures of the company, or certain of them, to enforce their security, and to procure the appointment of the said W. as receiver and manager, and in procuring a sale to be made of all the assets and undertaking of the company to a new company in which the said directors and the said secretary were interested, and of which they were directors, for a wholly inadequate consideration, and in consenting to an order of the court for the confirmation of such sale, and in not opposing the making of such order,

and in not bringing to the notice of the judge, when he was asked to sanction such sale, the true facts of the case, and in allowing the company to be represented by the same solicitor as appeared for the new company, and in not obtaining independent advice, or acting as guardians of the interest of the company; and that the said directors and the said secretary were jointly and severally liable to pay to the official receiver, as liquidator, the sum of £10,000, with interest from a specified date. It was decided by Williams, J., before whom the summons came on to be heard, that W., as secretary, was under no liability. But his Lordship held that the three direetors were jointly and severally liable in damages to the amount of £5000, with costs, and he made an order accordingly as against them. But his Lordship entirely acquitted them of any fraudulent conduct, though he held that they had acted improvidently, and without due regard to the interests of the company. The three directors respectively appealed. The questions argued on the appeal were: First, whether the sale complained of would, if it occasioned damage to the company, be a misfeasance or breach of trust within the meaning of sect. 10 of the Act of 1890. Secondly, whether in fact the sale caused a loss to the holders of founders' shares, including the applicant, or of which she was entitled to complain. Held (affirming the decision of Williams, J.), that G. knowingly took steps culminating in the sale complained of, of which he must have known, or ought to have known, to be wrong, and so was guilty of a breach of duty for the consequences of which he was liable; and that H. and T., though they had not the same amount of knowledge as G., were still in such a position that they could not be heard to say that they were not doing wrong, and were therefore equally liable. But held, that no damage was shown to have been occasioned to the applicant and other holders of founders' shares by the action, however blameworthy, of the directors; and that consequently the judgment of Williams, J. ought to be reversed, and the summons dismissed.

[Re The New Travellers Chambers Limited. Ct. of App. No. 2: Lindley, Smith, and Rigby, L.JJ. Jan. 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 18, and 30.Counsel: Warmington, Q.C. and George Henderson; McCall, Q.C. and Dighton Pollock; Neville, Q.C. and Gore Browne. Solicitors: Hunters and Haynes; Richard Furber.]

Company--Voluntary Liquidation-Contributories-Transfers of Shares with Sanction of Liquidator-Change of Status-Liability of Trans ferees-Companies Act 1862 (25 & 26 Vict. c. 89), ss. 38, 131, 133, 153. -In 1893 a banking company went into voluntary liquidation with a view to a sale to, and amalgamation with, another bank. T.'s name was then on the register of shareholders as a holder of shares which were not fully paid-up, and he subsequently transferred his shares to P. with the sanction of the liquidator, who thereupon removed T.'s name from the register and substituted that of P. Subsequently P. similarly transferred his shares to R., whose name was similarly substituted on the register for P.'s At the time of these transfers it was contemplated by all parties that there would be sufficient assets to pay all the liabilities of the bank; but it subsequently became necessary to make calls on the shares, and the names of T., P., and R. were all placed on the list of contributories. They subsequently applied by summons to have their names removed from the list, and in the case of T. and P. the summons which was amended by leave of the court asked for an order that the status of each of them be altered. The question was, who, T., P., or R., ought to be put on the list of contributories? That question turned upon the construction of sects. 38 and 131 of the Companies Act 1862. Sect. 38 provides that, in the event of a company being wound-up, every present and past member of the company shall be liable to contribute towards the expenses of the winding-up subject to certain qualifications which, so far as material, are to the effect that no past member shall be liable to contribute if he has ceased to be a member for a year prior to the commencement of the winding-up; and that past members shall only be liable if the existing members are unable to satisfy the contributions required to be made by them under the Act. Sect. 131 deals with the effect of a voluntary winding-up, and provides that all transfers of shares except transfers made to or with the sanction of the liquidators or alteration in the status of members of the company, taking place after the commencement of such winding-up, shall be void. It was decided by Williams, J. (75 L. T. Rep. 296), (1) that under sect. 38 of the Companies Act 1862 T. was clearly liable to be on the list of contributories at the date of the commencement of the liquidation; (2) that the transfer made by T. with the consent of the liquidator under sect. 131 of the Act, while effective in other respects, did not affect the status of the transferor so as to free him from liability as a contributory; (3) that, while the court had a right under sect. 153 to make an order affecting the status of the transferor so as to free him from his liability as a contributory, it ought not to do so in the present case, where it could not fix anyone else with the liability; and (4) that P. and R., though respectively bound to indemnify their immediate transferors, were entitled to have their names taken off the list of contributories. From that decision T. appealed. Held, (1) that the register of members had been from time to time correctly altered by the liquidator, and that R. was the person to be on that document; (2) that R. was the person, and the only person, to be on the A. list of contributories in respect of the shares in question; (3) that T. and P. ought both to be on the B. list, so that in case of need they might be had recourse to for payment of the debts and liabilities of the company, and the costs of winding-up in accordance with sect. 38 of the Companies Act 1862. Held also, that this would be obviously right if the company were being wound-up by the court or subject to its supervision, and if the court had sanctioned the transfer under sect. 153; and that there was no sufficient reason for

deciding that the position of the parties to duly authorised transfers of shares in a company after the commencement of its winding-up depended upon whether the company was being wound-up in one way rather than another. Held, therefore, that the appeal must be allowed, and that the case being a test case, the costs might be paid by the liquidator out of the assets of the company. Barge's case (L. Rep. 5 Eq. 420); Fyfe's case (L. Rep. 4 Ch. App. 768); and Re The Onward Building Society (65 L. T. Rep. 516; (1891) 2 Q. B. 463) considered. Decision of Williams, J. reversed.

[Re The National Bank of Wales Limitod; Ex parte Taylor, Phillips, and Rickards. Ct. of App. No. 2.: Lindley, Smith, and Rigby, L.JJ. Jan. 22 and 30.-Counsel: for the appellant, Levett, Q.C. and Macnaghten; for the respondents, Buckley, Q.C. and Ingpen ; Bramwell Davis, Q.C, and Muir Mackenzie; Farwell, Q.C. and Ingle Joyce; Sheldon. Solicitors: for the appellant, Bower, Cotton, and Bower, agents for T. H. Stephens, Cardiff; for the respondents, Riddell, Vaizey, and Smith, agents for Vachell and Co., Cardiff; Few and Co., agents for Bythway and Son, Pontypool; Richard White, agent for Frank Lewis, Newport, Mon.; Burton, Yeates, and Hart, agents for Johnson, Barclay, Johnson, and Rogers, Birmingham.] Justices-Jurisdiction-Search Warrant-Sufficiency of Information.The plaintiff was for some years in the service of a Mr. Wood, and was about to leave his employment under a notice to quit. Mr. Wood found that the plaintiff had several boxes packed ready for removal, and he requested the plaintiff to permit him to search those boxes. The plaintiff refused permission. Mr. Wood then applied to the defendant, a justice of the peace, for a search-warrant, upon the following sworn information :-"Thomas Wood, on oath, maketh complaint that he hath just and reasonable cause to suspect, and doth suspect, that William Jones, of Brasted, has in his possession certain property belonging to the said Thomas Wood, and upon his oath doth depose and say that the said W. Jones has been in his employ for five years and is now under notice to quit, and that he has requested the said W. Jones to allow him to search several boxes which he the said W. Jones has had packed ready to be taken away, but which he refuses to be looked through." The defendant granted a warrant to search for the goods, and, if the goods were found, to arrest W. Jones. The boxes were searched and some property which Mr. Wood identified as his own was found. The plaintiff was arrested and committed for trial. At the trial the prosecution was withdrawn, and the plaintiff was acquitted. The plaintiff thereupon brought this action against the defendant to recover damages for illegal arrest, false imprisonment, and trespass to goods. At the trial the Lord Chief Justice held that, upon the sworn information, the defendant had jurisdiction to issue the warrant, and he gave judgment for the defendant (75 L. T. Rep. 161). The plaintiff appealed. Held (affirming the judgment of Lord Russell, C.J.), that, although the information did not allege that the goods had been stolen, or specify the goods, yet, since it might fairly be understood to allege reasonable grounds for suspecting that the goods had been stolen, the justice had jurisdiction to grant the warrant.

[Jones v. German. Ct. of App.: Lord Esher, M.R., Lopes and Rigby, L.JJ. Dec. 18, 19. Jan. 29. Counsel: for the appellant, Lawson Walton, Q.C. and A. Gill; for the respondent, Carson, Q.C., and Hohler. Solicitors: for the appellant, C. Everett; for the respondent, Routh, Stacey, and Castle, for Knocker, Knocker, and Holcroft, Sevenoaks.]

Mortgage-Sale-Proceeds in Hands of first Mortgagee-Interest on Surplus-Second Mortgagee.-By the sale of mortgaged property, and by payment of money by the mortgagor, the defendant, who was the first mortgagee of the property, received in 1890 a sum of £1790 beyond the amount which he was entitled to under his mortgage. In 1894 the plaintiff, who was second mortgagee, commenced an action in the Queen's Bench Division in which he claimed for "money had and received by the defendant to the plaintiff's use, and an account of the moneys received by the defendant as first mortgagee of certain debentures in Ormerod, Grierson, and Company Limited." The action was referred to an official referee. The plaintiff gave evidence that, under his mortgage, he was owed the full amount of £1790. The official referee directed that this sum should be paid over by the defendant to the plaintiff, but he refused an application by the plaintiff that the defendant should be ordered to pay interest on the amount in respect of the five years during which he had been in possession of the money. The ground of his refusal was, that the plaintiff had been aware during the whole of this period that the defendant had been in possession of the money, but had deliberately abstained from enforcing his claim. From this refusal to allow interest the plaintiff appealed to the court. The Queen's Bench Division (Day and Lawrance, JJ.) directed that the defendant should pay the plaintiff 4 per cent. compound interest upon the amount at annual rests. The defendant appealed, and contended that the matter was one of discretion, and that therefore the decision of the official referee who had decided with full knowledge of the facts of the case, ought not to be disturbed. He cited Merry v. Ryves (1 Eden, 1); Quarrell v. Beckford (1 Madd. 269); Wilson v. Metcalfe (1 Russ. 530). For the plaintiff it was contended that he was entitled to interest according to the constant practice in Chancery, and no reason had been shown why the rule of the court should be varied in this case. He cited Charles v. Jones (56 L. T. Rep. 848: 35 Ch. Div. 544); Ashworth v. Lord (58 L. T. Rep. 18; 36 Ch. Div. 545); and Smith v. Pilkington (1 De G. F. & J. 120). Held, that the defendant was trustee for the plaintiff of the surplus moneys he had received as first mortgagee, and that in such cases the rule is that interest is payable unless the circumstances of a particular case show that it would be unjust to charge the trustee with

payment of interest. The fact that the plaintiff had deliberately abstained for four years from taking legal proceedings against the defendant was not a circumstance which would relieve the defendant from payment of interest, but the interest payable would be simple, not compound. Order of Divisional Court varied.

[Eley v. Read. Ct. of App.: Lord Esher, M.R., Lopes and Chitty, L.JJ. Feb. 2.-Counsel: for the plaintiff, McIntyre and C. E. Bovill; for the defendant. Nepean. Solicitors; William Eley; Thomas Edwards.]

Practice-Consolidation of Actions-Jurisdiction-Application by Plaintiff -Rules of Supreme Court, Order XLIX., r. 8.-The Rules of the Supreme Court, by Order XLIX., r. 8, provide that "causes or matters pending in the same division may be consolidated by order of the court or a judge in the manner in use before the commencement of the principal Act in the Superior Courts of Common Law." The plaintiff brought an action against the defendants claiming damages for breach of contract: the defendants pleaded that a bill of exchange had been given and accepted in satisfaction of the claim, which had not matured when the action was commenced. The pleadings in that action were closed. The plaintiff then commenced a second action against the defendants, making all the same claims as were made in the first action, and also claiming upon the bill of exchange which had matured, and had been dishonoured. Upon the application of the plaintiff, Cave, J., at chambers, made an order that the two actions should be consolidated, though the defendants objected upon the ground that an order for consolidation could not be made upon the application of the plaintiff. The defendants appealed. Held (dismissing the appeal), that the judge had power to make an order that the actions should be consolidated upon the application of the plaintiff.

[Martin v. Martin and Co. Ct. of App.: Lord Esher, M.R., Lopes and Chitty, L.JJ. Jan. 25 and 29.-Counsel for the appellants, H. Kisch; for the respondents, Ashton Cross. Solicitors: for the appellants, Gibson, Waldron, and Bilborough; for the respondents, Goldberg, Langdon, and Co.]

HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE. CHANCERY DIVISION. Company-Winding-up-Misfeasance of Officers-Auditors-Chartered Accountants-Officers of Company-Companies (Winding-up) Act 1890 (53 54 Vict. c. 63), s. 10.-This was a summons on behalf of the applications, Messrs. P. and R., who carried on business in partnership as accountants, to stay all further proceedings under a misfeasance summons taken out by the respondent, the liquidator of the company, against certain officers of the company (including the applicants), on the ground that they, the applicants, were not "officers of the company" within the meaning of sect. 10 of the Companies (Winding-up, Act 1880. The company was formed in 1888, and the articles of association containing similar provisions as to the appointing of auditors as those provided by table A. in the Companies Act 1862. There was also an article giving indemnity to (inter alia) the auditors of the company for the time being. The applicants were never formally appointed auditors of the company, but were casually invited to prepare a balance-sheet by the chairman of the company, and they issued and signed a certificate to the effect that the accounts were in accord with the balance-sheet. The balance sheet with the certificate annexed was circulated amongst the shareholders, and a dividend was subsequently declared for the year 1888. In the year 1889 the applicants were invited not only to prepare a balance-sheet, but to audit the accounts of the company, and they again issued and signed a certificate in terms similar to the previous one, and the balance-sheet and the certificate were circulated as before, and a dividend subsequently declared for the year 1889. It was contended by the applicants that they were never appointed auditors of the company, and, inasmuch as they were only casually employed, they could not be "officers of the company" within the meaning of the section; that they simply signed the certificate as chartered accountants and not as officers of the company, and that the liquidator should have proceeded by action and not under sect. 10. The respondent relied upon Re London and General Bank (72 L. T. Rep. 227, 611; (1895) 2 Ch. 166). Held, that the applicants must be considered officers of the company, and that the application must be refused.

[Re The Western Counties Steam Bakeries and Milling Company Limited. Ch. Div.: Stirling, J. Jan. 12 and 27-Counsel: for the applicants, Graham Hastings, Q.C. and Frank Evans; for the respondent, the liquidator, Edwin Ward. Solicitors: Woodcock, Ryland, and Co., agents for Vaughan and Hornby, Newport, Monmouthshire; Talbot and Tasker, agents for Dixon and Dixon, Bristol.] Practice-Evidence-Order to examine Person making Statements deposed to in Affidavit filed on Motion-Ex parte Application-R. S. C. Order XXXVII., r. 5.-Where in an affidavit filed on behalf of the plaintiffs on a motion, which by consent stood over, statements were deposed to as having been made by a person to the deponent, and which were material for the purposes of the plaintiffs' case, leave was, on an ex parte application, granted to the plaintiffs to examine such person before an examiner, the deposition to be given in evidence as if it were an affidavit.

[The Turner Pneumatic Tyre Company Limited v. The Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Company Limited. Ch. Div.: Stirling, J. Jan. 30. Counsel H. Terrell. Solicitors: Lumley and Lumley. Practice-Infant made Plaintiff without Authority-Liability of Plaintiffs' Solicitors for Costs-Application by Defendants.--This was a summons taken out by the defendants in this action asking that all their costs of and occasioned by one of the plaintiffs in the action, Geiliger, being made a party to the action, and their costs of this

summons, should be taxed and paid by the plaintiffs' solicitors, Messrs. Williams and Neville. It appeared that at the time the action was commenced, the 10th Dec. 1895, the plaintiff Geiliger was an infant, he only attained the age of twenty-one on the 2nd July 1896. Messrs. Williams and Neville, who took their instructions from a co-plaintiff named Hallett, were unaware of this fact, but they had no authority from Geiliger, who first knew that he was a plaintiff in the action on the 13th Dec. 1895. He took no steps then to remove his name, but on the 13th July 1896 obtained an order, on a summons taken out by him on the 7th July, striking out his name as co-plaintiff, ordering Hallett to pay the defendants' costs of the summons in any event, and by consent ordering Hallett also to pay Geiliger's costs of the summons. Held, that the fact of Geiliger's taking no immediate steps to remove his name could not be held to be a ratification of what was done within Reynolds v. Howell (L. Rep. 8 Q. B. 398), as, being an infant, any ratification must be made by his next friend; and that although in this case it was the defendants who asked for costs and not a plaintiff as in Fricker v. Van Grutten (1896) 2 Ch. 649), yet it was within the principle laid down in that case. The plairtiffs' solicitors were therefore ordered to pay the defendants their costs of the action so far as they might be attributable to Geiliger's having been made a plaintiff, and also the costs of this application to be taxed.

[Geiliger v. Gibbs. Ch. Div.: Kekewich, J. Feb. 2.-Counsel: Warrington, Q.C. and Cave; Renshaw, Q.C. and Eldon Bankes. Solicitors: Hulberts, Hussey, and Metcatfe, for Carr and Wilson, Birmingham; Williams and Neville.]

Public Health-Local Act-Commissioners-Agent between Commissioners and Defendant-Powers of Commissioners vested in Council or Incorporation-Streets-Charges for paving, sewering, and metallingTrespass-Arbitration-Memorial to Secretary of State-West Hartlepool Extension and Improvement Act 1870 (33 & 34 Vict. c. cxiii.), ss. 3, 70, 71, 72, 73, 80, 81, 82, 348, 349, 350.-By a local Act commissioners were created having duties in regard to streets and buildings within a certain area. In 1878 the defendants proposed to lay out an estate within such area for building, and plans were submitted to and approved by the commissioners. By an agreement between them and the defendant, the defendant was on completion of the roads in question to throw 18 feet of his land into the said roads (which was done), but not to make the roads. In 1887 the powers of the commissioners passed to the council on incorporation. In 1892 the council by an order required the defendant to sewer, drain, level, flag, and metal the said roads, so far as his premises fronted, adjoined, or abutted thereon. The order not having been obeyed, the council did the work themselves, and on making request for payment the defendant's agent disputed that the property was liable at all. The council now sought to have the sums expended declared a charge on the property. Held, (1) that the said roads were streets as to which the corporation had power to make the said order; (2) (following The Midland Railway v. Watton, 54 L. T. Rep. 482) that they were public streets within the ordinary meaning of the term; (3) that the entry upon lands in obedience to the said order could not constitute a trespass; (4) (following The Mayor, &c., of Folkestone v. Brooks (69 L. T. Rep. 413) that the dispute not being as to the amount of apportionment, but whether the defendant was liable at all, the plaintiffs were not compelled to go to arbitration, and therefore were not disentitled to sue; (5) that the said agreement did constitute a defence to the action; and (6) that accordingly the plaintiffs must succeed, but (following Walthamstow Local Board v. Staines (65 L. T. Rep. 430), decided on sect. 268 of the Public Health Act 1879, which was substantially in the same words) that, having regard to sect. 349 of the local Act, it appeared to be a case where a memorial to the Secretary of State for relief would lie.

[The Mayor, &c., of West Hartlepool v. Robinson. Ch. Div.: Stirling, J. Dec. 10, 15, and Jan. 30.-Counsel: Buckley, Q.C. and S. B. L. Druce; Hastings, Q.C. and Strachan, Q.C. Solicitors: Baker, Lees, and Postlethwaite, for Higson Simpson, West Hartlepool; Bell, Broderick, and Gray, for Harrison and Barker, West Hartlepool.]

QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION.

Husband and Wife-Summary Jurisdiction-Summons for SeparationCosts-Jurisdiction of County Court-Summary Jurisdiction (Married Women) Act 1895, 88. 4, 5.-Appeal from the Birmingham County Court. The plaintiff, a solicitor, sued to recover a sum under £3 for costs incurred by him in proceedings as follows: The client of the plaintiff was a married woman, married to her husband in June 1895. In June 1896 the wife instructed the plaintiff to institute proceedings and take out a summons against her husband for an order of separation on the ground of crnelty. These proceedings were taken in a court of summary jurisdiction under sect. 4 of the Summary Jurisdiction (Married Women) Act 1895 (58 & 59 Vict. c. 39), which provides that "any married woman whose husband shall have been convicted summarily of an aggravated assault upon her or whose husband shall have deserted her, or whose husband shall have been guilty of persistent cruelty to her, or wilful neglect to provide reasonable maintenance for her and shall, by such cruelty or neglect, have caused her to leave and live separately and apart from him, may apply to any court of summary jurisdiction in which the cause of complaint shall have wholly or partially arisen for an order or orders under this Act, &c." Then by sect. 5: The court of summary jurisdiction to which any application under this Act is made, may make an order or orders containing all or any of the provisions following: (a) A provision that the applicant be no longer bound to cohabit with her husband (which provision while in force shall have the effect in all respects of a

·

decree of a judicial separation on the ground of cruelty); (d) A provision for payment by the applicant or the husband, or both of them, of the costs of the court and such reasonable costs of either of the parties as the court may think fit." The summons was dismissed and the wife went back to live with her husband and paid her solicitor's costs. Another summons was subsequently taken out by the wife, who had again left her husband, and this summons also was dismissed, and no order was made as to the wife's costs. The solicitor for the wife, the present plaintiff, then brought this action to recover the costs, and the Court held that there was jurisdiction to entertain the action, and gave judgment for the plaintiff. Held (allowing the appeal), that the clause (sect. 5 (d) which gave the court of summary jurisdiction power to make orders as to costs was intended to confer upon that court an exclusive jurisdiction as to costs. and that the County Court, therefore, had no jurisdiction to award the plaintiff his costs.

[Cale v. James. Q. B. Div.: Wright and Bruce, JJ. Jan. 26.Counsel: Loehnis; McCardie. Solicitors: T. A. Dennison and Co., for Seymour Price, and Adcock, Birmingham; Tippetts and Son, for E. Eaden, Birmingham.]

Master and Workman-Employers' Liability Act 1880 (43 & 44 Vict c. 42), s. 1, sub-sects. (1) (3), s. 2, sub-sect (1).—Appeal from his Honour Judge French. This was an action brought by the plaintiff, a lad of seventeen, under the Employers' Liability Act 1880, to recover damages from the defendants in respect of an injury which he had sustained in their employment. The defendants are the proprietors of saw mills, and the plaintiff worked as assistant to a man named Cook at one of the defendants' benches containing a circular saw two feet six inches in diameter. Part of the saw which was below the bench was ordinarily protected by a movable guard. On the 17th Aug., the day before the accident to the plaintiff, this guard was removed by Cook for his own convenience, and had not been replaced when the accident occurred. On the 18th Aug. the plaintiff was assisting Cook, and obeying his orders by drawing out the portions of a plank of teak which Cook was passing through the circular saw. In stooping down to assist a boy, who had come to remove the portion sawn off, the plaintiff slipped, and, in the absence of the guard, fell under the bench against the saw, which was still revolving, and SO was injured. At the trial the learned County Court judge held that the temporary absence of the guard was not a "defect in the condition of the ways, works, machinery, or plant connected with or used in the business of the employer" under sect. 1, sub-sect. (1) of that Act, or one which arose from.. or had not been discovered owing to the negligence of the employer" within sect. 2, sub-sect. (1). He held, however, that the injury to the plaintiff was caused "by reason of the negligence of a person in the service of the employer to whose orders or directions the workmen at the time of the injury was bound to conform, and did conform, where such injury resulted from his having so conformed" under sect. 1, sub-sect. (3), and gave judgment for the plaintiff for £118. The defendants appealed, and the Court allowed the appeal, holding that there was no evidence to support the finding of the judge under subsect. (3). On a cross-appeal by the plaintiff against the decision of the learned judge under sub-sect. 1 of sect. 1: Held, that the absence of the guard was a "defect in the condition of the machinery" for which the defendants were liable.

[Tate v. Latham. Q. B. Div.: Wright and Bruce, JJ. Jan 20, Feb. 1.-Counsel: for the plaintiff, Cyril Dodd, Q.C. and W. A. Willis; for the defendants, Jelf, Q.C. and Lynn. Solicitors: for the plaintiff, Lindus and Bicknell; for the defendants, Watson, Sons, and Room.] Landlord and Tenant-Covenant by Tenant to pay all Taxes, Rates, Duties, &c.-Cost of New Drainage-Public Health (London) Act 1891 (54 & 55 Vict. c. 76), ss. 4, 121.-Appeal from Bloomsbury County Court. By a lease of April 1896 the plaintiff demised to the defendant a house in York-terrace, Regent's Park, for a term of years. The lease contained a covenant by the lessee that he would pay "the land tax, sewer's rate, and all other taxes, rates, duties, assessments, and impositions, parliamentary, parochial, or otherwise, which now are or shall at any time during this demise be assessed or imposed on or in respect of the said demised premises." In June 1896 notice was served upon the occupier or owner of the premises by the County Council by virtue of the Public Health (London) Act 1891, requiring him to abate a nuisance on the premises by putting in a new and proper system of drainage. In compliance with this notice the necessary works were executed by the landlord at a cost of £43, and this sum he sought to recover from the lessee under the covenant abovementioned. The learned County Court judge was of opinion that the defendant was liable under the covenant, and gave judgment for the plaintiff. On appeal, it was contended by counsel for the defendant that the covenant in order to render the defendant liable must contain the words "bear, pay, and discharge" as in Budd v. Marshall (42 L. T. Rep. 793: 5 C. P. Div. 481) and Sweet v. Seager (2 C. B. N. S. 119): or else the words " 'payable either by the landlord or tenant" as in Budd v. Marshall (ubi sup.) and Aldridge v. Ferne (17 Q. B. Div. 212). He cited also Tidswell v. Whitworth (L. Rep. 2 C. P. 326). For the plaintiff the cases were cited of Payne v. Burridge (12 M. & W. 727), Thompson v. Lapworth (L. Rep. 3 C. P. 149), Hartley v. Hudson (4 C. P. Div. 367). Held (affirming the decision of the learned County Court judge), that the defendant was liable on the covenant.

[Brett v. Rogers. Q. B. Div.: Wright and Bruce, JJ. Jan. 21 and 29. -Counsel: for the plaintiff, Haldinstein; for the defendant, Brown, Solicitors for the plaintiff, Smith and Rydon; for the defendant.. Stevenson and Couldwell.]