OUR LITERARY COLUMN. CHOICE ANECDOTES OF THE IRISH BENCH AND BAR. (a) THE writer of "Here and There Memories," which is a series of disconnected anecdotes, any one of which, taken up haphazard, might make his fame as a raconteur, has evidently had a wide and varied personal acquaintance with all sorts and conditions of men in these countries and beneath the Southern Cross. British, Irish, and Australian statesmen pass rapidly in review before us in these pages, which abound in amusing and piquant stories, from which we select some few, which, relating to the men of the past or present generation on the Irish Bench and at the Irish Bar, will have a special interest in professional circles. MR. THOMAS HARRIS, Q.C. Mr. Thomas Harris had a foremost position amongst the Q.C.'s who, a few years ago, practised in the Courts of Equity in Ireland. He was deeply learned, a bon vivant, yet of an acridity of manner which covered up a rich and joyous heart. Some time before Harris's death, a "subinspector" of constabulary was tried for the murder of his "friend" Glass, a bank clerk in Ulster. The police officer was a Freemason, and, after his very proper conviction, it was commonly, though no doubt unfoundedly said, that the Irish Executive would not dare to have him hanged. With that fatuity which has too often marked the "Castle" doings, the Press were excluded from the scene of execution, and it was only through the finesse of an enterprising Dublin tailor who surreptitiously got into the prison and furnished a report, that the newspapers were enabled to record the facts of the criminal's final exit. Those circumstances begot a good deal of gossip. The morning after the execution the counsel about the fireplace of the Four Courts Library were discussing the matter, and the late Mr. George Perry said, "There are national peculiarities which repeat themselves at the last moment of the doomed man; a Communard facing the firing party invariably smokes a cigarette and says, "Vive la Commune! tirez directement, mes frères." John Bull's malefactor must eat a hearty breakfast provided by the governor. These are peculiarities, but the curiosity of the thing is the invariably calm sleep of the principal tragedian in the final act. At that moment Harris shuffled by. Hullo, Harris," said Perry, "explain this. We're talking of the Omagh execution. Perhaps you can tell us how it is that without exception we hear from every where that the condemned man slept well during his last night?" "Faith," said Harris, with a sententious shrug, "it's easy to understand. The fellow is always quite sure he'll be called in time." Mr. John M- (still living I think), a well-known Dublin solicitor, who whispered even professional confidences with the voice of a bo'sun in a gale, could nowhere be found on the eve of a certain case. The junior counsel who had been briefed for a motion "on short notice" in seeking him, ran against Harris. After apologising, he said, "Have you seen M-. The Master of the Rolls will want him presently. You know him, big John M-! "In truth," said Harris, "I have a sort of shouting acquaintanceship with M-," but he's not about I'm sure, for I distinctly heard two peals of ordinary thunder lately": (pp. 1-2). MR. FRANCIS MCDONAGH, Q.C. The late Francis McDonagh was at one time M.P. for the borough of Sligo, to represent which he had a severe tussle with a brother Q.C. (Serjeant Armstrong); McDonagh put up as a Conservative. He got the seat only on petition for at the poll Armstrong beat him. In early life McDonagh had been a Roman Catholic. He was the son of a small trader who kept a hardware shop in Sligo where McDonagh was born at the commencement of this century. There, however, the handsome successful lawyer was almost forgotten when he sought to represent it. Amongst other voters there was a Mr. Madden, a merchant who had amassed a large fortune and resided in a pretty villa outside the city. Madden had been a Repealer and continued to be a strong Liberal. He had not turned from the religion in which he was brought up. To him, however, "Frank" presented himself without asking the support of a single voter, Conservative or otherwise; Madden's dinner was just being served when McDonagh arrived. The servant, accustomed to his master's punctuality, declared it was impossible to see him before next day, but the candidate was importunate, and after a little parley he was led to the study, and his old schoolfellow came in watch in hand. McDonagh was effusive, Madden impatient and imperative. It wanted but three minutes of six, and whatever the visitor wanted he must despatch in these three minutes. Spake Mac, "My dear Martin, I cannot address you but by the name I used when we were innocent boys together; I am candidate for Sligo. I want you to second my nomination. Stop! do not say a word till I have done. I want you to second me, but I know your honest convictions. would not outrage them for a moment. I expect, nay, I am sure, that you will vote against me, speak against me, in all ways act against me, yet, for the sake of our dear boyhood, I hope you will fulfil the desire of my heart, and second me-of course, quite formally. Vote, speak, act, but do second me." Madden declined, protested, sulked. McDonagh expostulated and wheedled. The dinner bell rang. He gave in, and jubilant McDonagh went off, while Madden swore, "Mind, I'll vote and fight against you and beat you, though I don't know what you mean by tricking me into backing your nomination." The day came. A prominent Tory proposed Mr. McDonagh as a fit and proper person to receive the suffrages of their ancient borough. I (a) "Here and There Memories." By H-R-N-. London: T. Fisher-Unwin. 1896. Then Madden came forward. The surprised mob was silent. He spoke the formal words, and was assailed by jeers, curses, and a shower of bad eggs and dead cats. "Traitor! Coward! Renegade!" roared the boys. Madden stood unmoved with uplifted hands. Even human throats tire. In a lull the seconder roared: "Vote against the blackguard." A deeper silence fell. "Vote against and fight, aye, die fighting, against the trickster I have seconded." Hurrahs, yells, cheers from the dancing crowd. "I know the fellow; he came to my house and tried to humbug me, and would not go till I promised to second him because, when a barefooted gossoon, he went to school with me with a sod of turf under his I told him I would fight against him, and I shall, but I did go to school with him, I did, many a morning long ago, aye, and many a morning I served mass with him. Good day!" arm. The biter was bit. Mac's forgotten change of faith was out. "In honour bound" every Catholic voter plumped against him, and even Mac's suavity was unequal to the task of thanking his seconder": (pp. 10-12). "In bamboozling a jury McDonagh was supreme; as a cross-examiner, not so successful as others in upsetting witnesses; but he had the art to make adverse evidence seem on his side. Besides, he was a sounder lawyer than most of the craft who do much at Nisi Prius. The plaintiff for whom he led in a ticklish case was a wine merchant. McDonagh commenced to address the jury: Gentlemen, amongst the greatly-to-be-respected trading class of your city there is not one more distinguished for its severe and universal probity than the grocers. The plaintiff, whom I unworthily represent, is a grocer.' The solicitor, sitting below, whispered Wine merchant.' On McDonagh went, expatiating in all possible ways on the virtues of grocerdom, and ringing the changes on his client being a grocer. Now and then the solicitor interjected a correction-Wine merchant.' At length McDonagh grew impatient of the solicitor's interruptions, and, lowering his head, he pulled the solicitor to him and hissed in his ear, 'Silence, sir! Damn you, silence! Don't you see nine of them are grocers?" (pp. 13, 14). AN IRISH APPRECIATION OF THE ROYAL COURTS OF JUSTICE. "During the Parnell Commission the great hall was filled each morning with batches of Irish peasants. Detached from any group was a big woman, with a red homespun skirt, the cloak, the white 'kerchey,' and black ribboned' quilled' cap, which indicates a 'poor lone widdy woman of the west.' She had lost her party, and looked bewildered. As some excuse for intruding an acquaintance, with a mind to help her, I said, with as much of the natural rowl of the tongue' as remains to one in exile, Faith, ma'am, this same is a grand hall.' Bedad, your honour, it is, and,' with a pious glance upwards, a real illigant place to say one's beades in if it wasn't for the law:"" (p. 20). · MR. BUTT AND MR. JUSTICE KEOGH. In a great trial Mr. Butt was setting forth a most recondite view of the law, which few lawyers could follow or master without the most serious attention, certainly not the Court of Common Pleas, where Monahan, no great lawyer, presided. The most able of the judges under him was Mr. Justice Keogh, who several times interrupted the great Q.C and, with some appearance of design, interposed remarks which showed his inattention or want of appreciation of the intricate point which Butt was urging. At length Butt's patience gave way. He swung himself towards the Bench with that imperious gesture which was so well known (though often feigned), and in a tremendous voice and burst of indignation, growled, "Be Kent unmannerly when Lear is mad?" The auditors shuddered. The counsel resumed his line of argument, and without any further interruption the case went on and Butt triumphed. Keogh, in his decision, took pains to ground his dictum on the law of the great man who had rebuked him: (p. 27). LORD MORris. When, for the first time, Lord Morris went as a judge on the Connaught Circuit, at which he had practised before his election to the Bench, he gave many specimens of his native quality of wit. At one assize town the judges arrived late, and after being sworn the grand jury sent down a true bill in a very simple case, which might fill up the judge's spare time for "the heel" of the evening which remained. It was a case of the "abduction" of a small farmer's daughter by a shopkeeper who could not arrange the matter of the dowry of the sweetheart to the satisfaction of her relations. The accused had met the maid near his shop, and kept her half resisting, half consenting in his premises, and with an elderly female relative, so that the offence was only technically an abduction. But the girl's relatives were furious, the unwitting magistrates foolish, and the Crown officials anxious to make fees. "Charlie" O'Malley, without man whose speech for the defence a Mayo peasant would scarcely believe himself not guilty, made a wonderful speech, in which he flattered, toadied, and bullied in a farrago ranging from the Newtonian theory to the rights of and colleens. Finally, he complimented in the choicest terms a box of frieze-coated jurors, "The most intelligent, high-minded, naturally gifted men it had ever been the honour and privilege of counsel to address." Then came Judge Morris's turn. He ridiculed the magistrates, touched up the relatives, and rated the Crown officials with short, sharp words, and then wound up in Galway Doric : "You have seen my learned friend Mr. O'Malley's amazing performance. Dismiss it from your minds, and don't go home to your honest wives with peacocks' feathers in your hats to proclaim the special distinctions he piles upon ye. The law lays down certain definitions of abduction, and I am compelled to direct you to return a verdict of Guilty' in this case. But you will easily see that I think it is a trifling thing, which I regard as quite unfit to occupy my time. It's more valuable than yours-at least much better paid for. Find, therefore, the prisoner guilty of abduction, which rests, mind ye, on four points-the father was not But we have exceeded far the space allotted in these columns to the ordinary review, and feel constrained to pause without reference to a large fraction of the stories we had specially selected for reproduction. The anecdotes we have given, however, confined as they are exclusively to legal personages and writers, will enable the reader to form for himself an estimate of the merits of a volume of which these stories of the Bench and Bar dispersed amongst its pages form only one feature. We have been compelled to omit even a cursory notice of a very serious and affectionate study of the character, career, and genius of Mr. Isaac Butt, Q.C., M.P., of whom the writer speaks with a deep personal esteem and admiration, and to whose memory he dedicates this work, which is a mine of pleasant information delightfully conveyed. LAW LIBRARY. The Law of and Practice in Lunacy. By A. WOOD RENTON, M.A., LL.B., Barrister-at-Law. Edinburgh: Wm. Green and Son. London: Stevens and Haynes. THE first impression produced by this volume is one of depression. That any branch of learning should require so pondercus a tome for its exposition is-well, depressing. Two separate volumes would not have inspired the same feelings-a fact for which we know no reason. However, this, according to the author, is the first attempt which has been made to cover the whole field-the wide field of statute law and practice. The volume of statute law to be dealt with is very large and also complicated. The jurisdiction of the judges in lunacy requires careful statement. The entire practice under the Lunacy Acts cannot be worked without competent knowledge of the statutes, orders, and necessary forms. While going further afield, the responsibility of the insane offers much material for legal disquisition. Our examination of this monumental work has satisfied us that in Mr. Wood Renton the subject has found a conscientious, painstaking, and industrious compiler. He has scorned no help available to him-and that help has been bounteous. We have repeatedly said that it is quite impossible to test a work of practice except by practice, and to explore so large a volume for the purpose of hunting for defects is not a pastime in which we feel disposed to indulge. The Profession must therefore accept what Mr. Wood Renton gives them, relying a good deal upon his reputation. We do so, and add to this a favourable opinion gathered by what was necessarily a superficial examination of a most comprehensive treatise. The Law of War. By JOHN S. RISLEY. London: A. D. Innes and Co., Bedford-street. MR. RISLEY, in his preface, states that this book has no further pretensions than to be an introduction to more elaborate treatises, but we venture to think that it is entitled to more consideration than the author claims for it. It is distinguished throughout by considerable literary merit, and an evident familiarity on the part of the writer with his subject. He deals little with the speculative side of the question, and in the main confines himself, with occasional criticisms, to stating and illustrating the rules of war that are now recognised by civilised nations, It may not be a strictly scientific, but it is certainly a practical, method of ascertaining to what extent any rules or body of rules may be considered as law to measure the adherence which they command. With regard to the rules of war, it is the only method. For these rules cannot be said to emanate from any sovereign power, nor with some exceptions are they susceptible of enforcement in courts of justice. The utmost that can be claimed for them is that they are precise and authoritative precepts less binding than positive law, but at the same time more nearly resembling law than the sanctions of morality. The author has very ably stated their nature at the commencement of this book. In enumerating the sources of International Law, however, of which these rules form so important a parli; it may be noticed that he does not give sufficient prominence to the consent of nations as the fountain 66 not head of all International Law. He states as sources," history, treaties, diplomatic notes, the writings of jurists, and the decision are of prize courts; but these sources in themselves, they are only evidence of that general consent and usage which alone can originate and give validity to international law. This, however, does not impair the general accuracy of his treatment of the subject, nor does it at all diminish the interest attaching to this portion of the work. In Part II. he passes from discussing the nature of international law to the subject proper of the book, and under the heading of Law of Belligerency expounds the rules that prevail among belligerents during time of war, and gives numerous instances of their application. Part II. is followed by a review of the Law of Neutrality, and herein it is interesting to note the leading part that America and Great Britain have taken in the establishment of the principles directing the conduct of neutrals, and the early recogniton they gave to the duties of prevention-America through the United States Neutrality Act 1818; Great Britain through the British Foreign Enlistment Act 1819. A chapter on the Alabama claim, and the Washington treaty of 1871, narrating the history of that episode and its consequences, calls attention to the discredit that at the time attached to arbitration as a means of settling international disputes, at any rate in the eyes of Great Britain. The recent treaty concluded with the United States is perhaps the best commentary that can be made upon the stability of that discredit. The last chapter is devoted to an examination of England's maritime position as affected by the Declaration of Paris, the author's conclusion being that "England's independence and very existence is menaced by the Declaration of Paris, and it cannot be for the general good of all nations that one of them should be extinguished in order to confer a mere commercial advantage upon the rest." The "rest," we fear, wonld be hardly disposed t take this view, or accept it as an argument for repudiation. 66 NEW EDITIONS. A fourteenth edition of Chancellor Kent's Commenta “ies on American Law, in four volumes, lies before us, edited by Jo M. Gould, Ph.D. (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co.). There is here an accumulated wealth of talent, because the twelfth edition was prepared by Judge Holmes, and his labours upon it are all preserved. They are admitted to have placed Kent's work fully in harmony with the later researches and the current of more recent decisions. The present editor has done his utmost to present fully the growth of doctrine in recent years upon all the topics discussed in this work." This, we need hardly say, is a wide ambition, entailing very great labour. But American writers and editors think nothing of labour, and the perfection to which these classic volumes have now been brought must be a lasting tribute not only to their great originator, but also to all those who have been concerned in the numerous editions which have been given to the Profession. It is remarkable how surely a really good legal treatise finds favour with the Profession. The late Mr. Hanson's edition of the Acts relating to Estate, Probate, Legacy, and Succession Duties (Stevens and Haynes) is one of these. True it is that it first saw the light some thirty-two years ago. It has in that time run into four editions, the third being published twenty years ago. The fourth, just issued, has been prepared by Messrs. Lewis T. Dibdin and Francis H. L. Errington, both members of Lincoln's-inn. Needless to say, the lapse of twenty years involves extensive alterations in the text, and we are told that an effort has been made to render the introductory chapters more systematic and comprehensive as an elementary treatise on the death duties. The passing of the Finance Acts of 1894 and 1896 have caused the introduction of new matter. We recognise a decided improvement in the work, which we think will enhance its reputation with the Profession, and all interested in a somewhat troublesome subject. BOOKS RECEIVED. Ruling Cases. Vol. X. Stevens and Sons Limited. Price 25s. net. Butterworth's Maximum Railway Rates. Butterworth and Co., 7, Fleet-street, E.C. Price 12s. 6d. Markby's Indian Evidence Act. Henry Frowde, Oxford University Press Warehouse, Amen-corner, E.C. Price 3s. 6d. net. The New Century Review for February. Office: Imperial-buildings, Ludgate-circus, E.C. Price 6d. net. Moore's New Rules of the Road at Sea. J. D. Potter, 31, Poultry, E.C., and 11, King-street, Tower-hill, E.; also sold by Stevens and Haynes, 13, Bell-yard, Temple Bar. Price 3s. Year Books of the Reign of King Edward the Third. Year XVI. (First Part). Eyre and Spottiswoode, East Harding-street, E.C.; John Menzies and Co., Edinburgh and Glasgow; and Hodges, Figgis, and Co., Dublin. Chalmers and Hough's Bankruptcy Acts 1883 to 1890. Fourth Edition. Waterlow and Sons Limited, London-wall. Price 25s. Seaborne's Vendors and Purchasers of Real Property. Fourth Edition. Butterworth and Co., 7, Fleet-street, E.C. Price 10s. 6d. For delivering up or cancelling any agreement for sale or purchase For the dissolution or winding-up of a partnership Married Women's Property Act 1882 Number of petitions or notices filed For the appointment or removal of trustees For any other purpose under Trustee Acts For the maintenance or advancement of infants For partition For injunctions Number of instances of payment, &c., by trustees under sect. 70 of Act 1888 Amount of subject-matter in dispute or otherwise Amount of solicitors' costs allowed Amount of fees- Dec. 31, 1895 Number of suits or proceedings pending, Number of appeals Number committed for contempt Number of warrants of execution, possession, &c. Circuits. City of London Court. 1,068,908 Above £50... 12,999 950 SUMMARY of RETURN of ADMIRALTY ACTIONS in the year ending Actions or proceedings pending Dec. 31, 1894 Total number of Admiralty actions or proceedings taken in 1895 Circuits. 66 103 22 46 For plaintiff For plaintiff by consent or admission 8 For plaintiff by default, County Court Amount of claims £43,998 £31,590 Act 1888, or Bills of Exchange Act Nonsuit 2,550 279 £356 £315 Issued.... Judgment summonses Heard Warrants of commitment Issued..... Debtors imprisoned High bailiff £165 £21 93,041 8,375 618 £153 £44 SUMMARY of ADMINISTRATION ORDERS (Sect. 122 of the Bankruptcy SITTINGS OF THE COURTS. FOR THE WEEK ENDING SATURDAY, FEB. 13. Altrincham, Wednesday, at 10 Ashton-under-Lyne, Thursday (Contract, not exceeding £2) Aylesbury, Wednesday Barton-on-Humber, Saturday, at 10 Belper, Monday, at 10 Aberayron, Wednesday Aberdare, Wednesday 60 Abergavenny, Monday, at 10 498 Aldershot, Wednesday Bishop's Castle, Thursday, at 10 Blackburn, Monday, at 10 Blackpool, Wednesday, at 10 Blandford, Friday, at 10 160 Bolton, Wednesday, at 9.30 8 Bourne, Monday, at 1 Bow, Monday and Friday Bradford (Wilts), Friday, at 10 Bradford (Yorks),* Tuesday, Wednesday (R.), and Friday, at 10 Braintree, Thursday, at 11 Brampton, Tuesday, at 10.30 Brentford, Friday, at 10 Leigh, Friday Leighton-Buzzard, Thursday Liskeard, Monday, at 10 Liverpool, Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, and Thursday, at 10; Friday (Bky and Adm.), at 11 Longton, Tuesday, at 9.30 Newcastle-in-Emlyn, Thursday Newport (Mon.), Thursday, at 10.30; Newport Pagnell, Friday Oldham, Thursday and Friday, at 9 30 Oxford, Thursday, at 10 Peterborough, Tuesday, at 10 Plymouth, Wednesday and Thursday, at 10 Pontypool, Wednesday, at 10 Portsmouth, Thursday, at 12 Preston, Tuesday, at 10 Brompton, Monday, Tuesday, Thursday, Redhill, Wednesday, at 11 Burton, Wednesday, at 9; Thursday, at 11 Bury, Monday, and Wednesday (Reg.), at 9 Camelford, Thursday, at 12 Cardigan, Friday Carnarvon, Wednesday Chesham, Monday Chesterfield, Friday, at 9.30 Chipping Norton, Saturday, at 11 Chorley, Thursday, at 9.30 Cirencester, Thursday Coventry, Tuesday, at 9.30 Circuits. 1,784 1,946 53 £14,734 9s. 1d. 196 Conway, Thursday £4,342 13s. 8d. £365 3s. 6d. £220 13s. 6d. Croydon, Tuesday Derby, Tuesday, at 10 Dewsbury, Tuesday, Wednesday, 538 Devizes, Monday, at 10 Thursday (J.S.), at 10 Dorcaster, Thursday, at 10 Eastbourne, Thursday East Retford, Wednesday, at 11 Seaham Harbour, Monday, at 10.30 Sheffield, Thursday and Friday, at 10 Solihull, Friday, at 10 Southampton, Tuesday, at 11 Southport, Tuesday, at 10 South Shields, Thursday, at 10 Southwark, Monday, Tuesday, and Thursday, at 10.30 and Spalding, Monday, at 11.30 East Stonehouse,* Monday, Tuesday, and Edmonton, Monday and Tuesday, at 11 Spilsby, Friday, at 10 Stamford, Wednesday, at 1 Stone, Monday, at 9.30 Stourbridge, Wednesday and Thursday, at 10 Stratford-on-Avon,* Monday, at 11.30 Swindon, Tuesday, and Wednesday (J.S. and Reg., Bky), at 10 Tavistock, Saturday, at 10 Temple Cloud, Saturday, at 10.30 Thirsk, Wednesday, at 10 Thorne, Friday, at 11 Towcester, Wednesday, at 10.30 Tredegar, Tuesday, at 9.30 Tunstall, Friday, at 9.30 Uppingham, Thursday, at 11 Fakenham, Wednesday, at 11 Falmouth, Friday, at 10 Faversham. Friday, at 10 Fordingbridge, Saturday, at 11 Circuits. City of London Court. Garstang, Saturday, at 11 Gloucester, Tuesday Number of acknowledgments of married Godalming, Thursday women (sect. 184 of County Courts Act 1888) Grantham, Tuesday, at 10 (Reg., Bky), at 10 Number of proceedings under Friendly Societies Act. Greenwich, Friday, at 10.30 Halstead, Wednesday, at 12 Hanley, Wednesday, at 9.30 Number of proceedings under the Building Harleston, Monday Hastings, Monday Number of proceedings under the Ballot Helmsley, Thursday, at 10.30 AT the Birkenhead County Court, on the 15th inst., before his Honour Judge Ffoulkes, Mainwaring and others v. Barnes was heard. Moss for plaintiffs; Pugh for defendant. This was an action for recovery of arrears of rentcharge issuing out of the Whitelaw Estate, near Birkenhead. The plaintiffs are the representatives of the late Mr. Mainwaring, of Otely Park, in Shropshire. Some years ago the Whitelaw estate was sold in lots, and Mr. Mainwaring, the owner of the rentcharge, bought one of the lots. Hence the question arose Knaresbrough, Friday, at 10 Lampeter, Tuesday Launceston, Wednesday, at 10 Leeds, Monday. Wednesday, Thursday, and Friday, at 10 Winsford, Thursday, at 11 Wisbech, Monday, at 10 Wolverhampton, Monday, at 10 Woolwich, Wednesday, at 10.30 Worksop, Tuesday, at 10 Yarmouth, Thursday and Friday York, Tuesday, at 9.30. * Other sittings are specially fixed if necessary. BY PURCHASE. whether by the union of the estate in the rentcharge with the estate in the land charged the rentcharge was extinguished at law, and, if so, whether a court of equity would relieve against the merger. His HONOUR, in giving judgment, said :-The question which I reserved for further consideration was whether, assuming that the rentcharge became extinguished by the purchase by Mr. Mainwaring of a part of the estate out of which the rent issued, a court of equity would give relief against the merger of the estate in the rent in the estate in the land and the consequent extinguishment of the rentcharge. First, with regard to the merger, there is a long catena of authority to prove that merger does take place in such circumstances, and that extinguishment of the rent follows. In Co. Litt. s. 222, it is laid down: "If a man hath a rentcharge to him and his heirs issuing out of certain land, if he purchase any parcel of this to him and to his heirs all the rentcharge is extinct, and the reason given for this is, because the rent is entire and against common right and issuing out of every part of the land, and therefore by purchase of part it is extinct in the whole and cannot be apportioned. This view of the law is reiterated in Cruise's Dig. vol. 3, p. 301, quoting apparently from Co. Litt., and also in the notes to Clun's case in Tudor's Leading Cases on Real Property, &c., p. 270. Then, finally, it is stated in Lewin on Trusts, 8th edit., p. 726: "At law merger is the necessary consequence of the union of two estates in the same person in the same right," which is, I apprehend, what has taken place here. The estate in the rentcharge and the estate in the land out of which it issues have become united in the same person in the same right, and by this merger I apprehend the rentcharge has become extinct. The question whether a court of equity will, under the circumstances, relieve against this merger and extinguishment, is difficult of solution. The passage quoted from Lewin goes on to say: "In equity two estates without any intervening interest may meet in the same person in the same right without merger. the principle by which the court is guided is the intention, and in the absence of express intention either in the instrument or by parol the court looks to the benefit of the person in whom the two estates become vested; the chief importance of the doctrine of merger is with reference to charges. Is this equitable doctrine then applicable to the case of a rentcharge? A rentcharge is, I apprehend, a charge, but, unlike charges by way of mortgage and many other charges, it carries with it no estate in the land on which it is charged, nor creates any divided interest in that estate. Then comes the Act 36 & 37 Vict. c. 66, s. 25, sub-sect. 4, which enacts that there shall not, after the commencement of the Act (2nd Nov. 1874), be any merger by operation of law only of any estate, the beneficial interest in which would not be deemed to be merged or extinguished in equity. The terms of this sub-section seem to me to be wide enough to include an estate in a rentcharge. Mergers are, it is said, odious in equity. On the other hand, rentcharges are not favoured at law, for reasons stated in (Cruise's Dig., vol. 3, p. 301), quoting from Gilbert on Rents, where it is said as rentcharges were of no benefit to the public, and afforded no additional strength or protection to the kingdom,' the law carried them into execution only so far as they could take effect according to their original intention-in fact, a rentcharge was not the subject of tenure-therefore, where the grantee by his own act prevented the operation of the grant according to its original intention, the whole grant determined." In popular language therefore, rentcharges have no friends, unless equity will step in as a friend of the friendless. All the cases quoted in Lewin concern cases of mortgages or such like charges and divided interests in the land charged. And it seems to me that this one characteristic feature pervades them all, that the doctrine of intention is applied for the protection of purchasers or limited owners against charges subsequent in interest to theirs existing or likely to come into existence. If this is the guide or test applicable to all cases in which the aid of a court of equity is claimed the question arises, are the plaintiffs in a position to claim it? For this purpose they must put themselves in the position occupied by Mr. Mainwaring at the time of the purchase; if he could not then claim it, they cannot now. What, then, was the position of Mr. Mainwaring at the time of the purchase? As owner of the rentcharge he had no estate or interest whatever in the land upon which it was charged, he was not then in the position of an incumbrancer in the sense in which that term is used in courts of equity, although he was the owner of an incumbrance. Then he bought a parcel of the land on which the rent was charged, and for the purpose of this discussion he was, by so doing, in the same position as if he had bought the whole of the land charged, because the whole of the rent was equally recoverable by distress or action from the parcel or owner of the parcel which he bought as from the whole or owner of the whole of the land. He bought the whole estate both at law and in equity in that land; there was no interest left in it subsequent to the interest which he bought. He was, therefore, not a purchaser of any limited interest, nor a limited owner; he was the absolute owner. therefore, no interest left in the land which could possibly be available for the creation of any subsequent charge against which he would require the protection of the court. Is this, then, a case in which a court of equity would lend its aid when the perpetuation of the rentcharge cannot possibly be required for the protection of the owner of it against any subsequent interest which could be possibly utilised for the creation of any charge to the prejudice of the owner of the rentcharge? I apprehend not; but it may be said that, if there is evidence, even by parol, of an intention existing at the time of the purchase on the part of the owner to keep this rentcharge alive, equity will give effect to it; that the correspondence put in is evidence of such intention. But assuming the correspondence to be admissible, and available to prove the intention, will the court give effect to it when there is no object in giving effect to it? I think this must be answered in the negative. But, assuming the correspondence to be admissible to prove There was, the intention, is it sufficient? If a passage in Lewin on Trusts, 8th edit., p. 727, pars. 2 and 3, applies by analogy to this case, I apprehend it would not be sufficient. The statement there is to the effect that, if an incumbrancer buys the interest of the owner subject to the charge, he must make an assignment of his charge to a trustee for him in order that it may be kept on foot; otherwise it will be merged. Mr. Mainwaring had an incumbrance, though without an interest, and by analogy it would seem that, without making an assignment of it when he bought up the land charged, no other evidence of intention to keep it on foot will be sufficient for the purpose. That seems to be the inference from the passage cited, and it is not asserted that Mr. Mainwaring made any such assignment. But it may be urged again that, in the absence of any proof of intention in the instrument itself or by parol, the court will look to the benefit of the person in whom the two estates become vested. But this consideration, I apprehend, only arises where the subject of the charge is a capital sum and questions arise between personal representatives and the heir, and would have no application here, where the subject of the charge is a mere chose in action. Then, having regard to the statute 36 & 37 Vict. c. 66, s. 25, sub-sect. 4, does the merger still exist? By that statute the doctrine of equity is to prevail in cases of merger. In Snow v. Boycott (66 L. T. Rep. 762; (1892) 3 Ch. 116) Kekewich, J. lays it down that the effect of that sub-section is that, if there is a merger by operation of law and of the beneficial interest in equity also the merger exists, notwithstanding the statute. I apprehend that, where there is a merger and extinguishment by operation of law and equity does not grant relief against it, the merger prevails in equity as well as at law. According to my view as above expressed this is not a case in which equity will give relief. Then, whether the statute applies or not, I apprehend the merger exists both at law and in equity. This action, therefore, cannot be maintained, because the rentcharge was extinguished both at law and in equity, by reason of the union of the two estates in Mr. Mainwaring by purchase of the parcel of the land charged with it, and there must be judgment for the defendant. I give leave to appeal, but an amount equivalent to the defendant's costs must be paid into court in a week from this day. IN Bankruptcy, on the 2nd inst., before Mr. Registrar Linklater, an application was made on behalf of Mr. Charles C. Sharman, solicitor, for an order of discharge.-C. A. Pope appeared as assistant official receiver, and Arthur Powell for the debtor.-The evidence and the report of the Official Receiver showed that the debtor was admitted as a solicitor in June 1888, and practised at Stratford, in Essex. In 1890 he purchased the business of a Mr. Sedgwick from the executors, and continued to practise under the style of Sedgwick and Sharman. The debtor in 1895 acquired from a client who owed him between £300 and £400 the business of a grocer at East Ham. He had no experience of that trade, and he had no free capital at the time. He subsequently sold the concern, and he estimated his loss at £800. He attributed his failure to his liability as guarantor of a mort. gage, and to various other causes, and the unsecured liabilities were returned in the accounts at £4028, with assets £10, in addition to some further small sums which might be realised if legal proceedings were taken. The proofs made amounted, however, to £1286 only. The Official Receiver reported that the debtor had, for about eighteen months preceding the date of the receiving order, conducted his business in a loose, irregular, and unsatisfactory manner. Of this he cited instances, one of them being in reference to a Mr. Wooldridge. It appeared that, between the months of April and June 1895, he received from Mr. Wooldridge, who was the trustee of the estate of a lady recently deceased, sums amounting to £88 for payment of legacy duty. The money was paid by, or with the authority of, the debtor into his general banking account, and used by him for his own purposes. Subsequently, Mr. Wooldridge, finding that the money had not been properly applied, commenced criminal proceedings against the debtor for larceny, and he was committed for trial. It appeared, however, that between the commencement of the prosecution and the trial at the Central Criminal Court in Jan. 1896, the debtor made good his default, and the learned judge who presided directed the jury that no offence had been disclosed. Mr. Wooldridge subsequently brought the facts under the notice of the Incorporated Law Society, and, on the report of the committee, a divisional court in August last suspended the debtor from practice for two years. The Official Receiver opposed the application on the ground of fraud, and for various other statutory reasons, and the petitioning creditors also opposed it.-Powell, in addressing the court, said that with regard to the more important matter referred to in the official receiver's report, the debtor had already been punished. The judgment of the Lord Chief Justice absolved him from fraud, for his Lordship said: "There was no intention on the part of the |