it. How happy and proud, then, the Legal Profession must be, when they reflect upon the fact for it is a fact that their ingenuity affords an escape from this almost hopeless situation! The codes of ancient times were glossed over by annotators to make them conform to subsequent conditions, until their original doctrines were scarcely recognisable; and the word "gloss" has come to signify an uncandid and fictitious, though possibly a necessary, interpretation. Just so the constitution of the United States is being amended, not by political action on the part of the people, but by unfaithful interpretations on the part of the Supreme Court. Thus, when it became necessary to build the constitution up by what is known as "construction," in those matters wherein, by reason of its generality, it was defective, the Supreme Court supplied the necessary amendments under the disguise of construing the instrument. For example, the word "corporation" is not found in that instrument, but the judicial power of the United States was extended to controversies between "citizens" of different States. But, as the practice of organising private corporations for almost every purpose came into vogue, it was convenient to annex a judicial amendment to the constitution, making the word "citizen," as used therein, mean a corporation composed of many persons. not one of whose members might in fact be a citizen of the State granting the charter, but all of whom might be non-residents, or even aliens. This amendment, robbing as it did the State courts of a portion of their rightful jurisdiction over their own citizens, could not, it may be safely said, ever have been ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of the States. On the other hand, the amendment having been added to the constitution by us lawyers, speaking through our judges, cannot be got out of it; because, in order to that end, three-fourths of the States must concur, and the consent of three-fourths of the States cannot be procured. The corporation-ridden States would refuse their consent.

The constitution guarantees the right of trial by jury in all cases of crime except impeachment. This has always been held to mean trial by jury as it existed at common law at the time when the constitution was framed. But we lawyers, acting through our Federal tribunals, finding the remedy by ordinary criminal prosecutions before juries inadequate in cases of labour insurrections, have enlarged the equity powers of the courts of the United States by extending those powers to matters of crime, thus correspondingly curtailing the right of trial by jury, and successfully substituting a more summary and beneficial remedy called "government by injunction." It is true that a national convention recently held by one of the leading political parties has denounced that form of government in strong terms. But, nevertheless, we lawyers, acting through that part of our judiciary which is not responsible to the people, have, by a useful amendment to the constitution, established it. That amendment cannot be repealed without the consent of three-fourths of the States, which consent can never be obtained. What, then, are the cavilers going to do about it? I say, then, fellow lawyers, let us not despair too much of the evils of a straight-jacket constitution. The Supreme Court has wisely prohibited the Congress from dispensing with the constitution, and has widely taken to itself the power to amend it, and to dispense with acts of Congress impugning it. It is true that this involves a revival of the dispensing power, against which our English ancestors struggled so long and with ultimate success, but it revives it in the hands of us lawyers, albeit exerted through a non-elective judiciary, and not in the hands of military tyrants. Therefore, a revival of it does not menace the liberties of the people. It is also true that, in the exercise of this power of amendment, the supreme Federal tribunal takes upon itself the thankless office of superintending all the other departments of the government, of correcting their errors, and of keeping them in the straight and narrow path marked out by the constitution. In the exercise of this power the Supreme Court can correct mischiefs that the President cannot. For example, the President cannot, under the constitution, veto a single unconstitutional item in an appropriation Bill without vetoing the whole Bill, but, according to the reasoning of a recent decision, the Supreme Court can, though it has not yet seen fit to exercise the power. The President cannot veto a part of a law, but, as it is a settled maxim of constitutional law that a statute may be void in part and valid in part, the Supreme Court can veto the bad part of it, while leaving the good part stand.

The power to amend that venerable instrument really lies then in the hands of us lawyers, exerting our power and influence before and through a tribunal in which responsibility to the people is unknown, where the right of petition on the part of the people does not exist, where we lawyers alone are heard, and where the court exercises its power of amendment according to the accidents of lawsuits between private parties in real or collusive litigations. The constitution was of our building. Its corner stones were laid by lawyers. Every arch was rounded, every key-stone set in place by them; every stone in the magnificent structure was lifted into place by the hand of some legal architect. We lawyers built this monumental temple to a well ordered liberty.

"Not Babylon Nor great Alcairo such magnificence Equalled in their glories, to enshrine

Belus or Serapis, their gods, or seat

Their kings, when Egypt with Assyria strove

In wealth and luxury. The ascending pile

Stood, fixed its stately height, and straight the doors
Opening their brazen folds, discover wide
Within her ample spaces o'er the smooth
And level pavement. From the arched roof
Pendent by subtle magic, many a row

Of starry lamps and blazing cressets, fed
With naptha and asphaltus, yielded light
As from the sky. The hasty multitude
Admiring entered, and the work some praised,
And some the architect."

We lawyers were its architects; we are its guardians; we are its amenders and its perfecters. Time has made rents in its walls: we will close them up. Its stately battlements, which kiss the clouds, reveal their summits still ragged and incomplete: we will lift them to more stately architectural proportions and will then perfect and finish them. We will preserve the sacred temple from violence and spoliation; and we will graciously permit our fellow-citizens who are not lawyers those of the humbler and less useful callings, to come and sit with us in its shade. But it is barely possible that the people will, in time, get tired of being governed by us lawyers; at least, they may become tired of the kind of government by lawyers of which I have spoken. The intelligence of the people, as compared with the lawyers, is slowly rising, and, in the older States, non-lawyers are more and more participating in public affairs. In England the greatest political leaders are by no means lawyers: we must exclude the Palmerstons, the Beaconsfields, the Gladstones, and the Salisburys, from the ranks of the Legal Profession. If, as Mr. Jefferson believed, the encroachments of the Federal Supreme Court, some of which I have hastily sketched, threaten the gradual centralisation of all the powers of government in the hands of the one non-elective branch of the government, the remedy is easily in the hands of the people. The judiciary possesses only a moral power. It is even without power to execute its own process: the marshals of its courts are appointed by the president. Whenever its pretensions have been seriously resisted, they have gone down. Whenever the Supreme Court endeavours to impose its authority upon the Federal Executive the answer of the president will be that he too is sworn to support the constitution; that it is a part of the Constitution that he shall "take care that the laws be faithfully executed," and that he is not sworn to take care that the decisions of the Supreme Court be faithfully executed. The obligation of his official oath imposes upon him a duty, in the execution of his office, of determining for himself what are the laws to be faithfully executed by him, and what are to be rejected by him as not being laws. For the discharge of this duty he is, under the constitution, answerable on his oath of office and on his conscience; and the judgments of the Supreme Court are therefore not binding upon him; but are persuasive merely. The Federal tribunals, when attempting to interfere with and restrain executive action, were successfully resisted by Jefferson, by Jackson, and by Lincoln. If the people should ever conclude with Jefferson that the Federal judiciary, as at present constituted, is dangerous to public liberty, they can, by a mere act of Congress, abolish every inferior Federal court, all being the mere creatures of Congress. If, in addition to this, they should conclude that the Federal Supreme Court, in setting aside the laws of the States, is infringing upon their reserved rights, they can deprive the court of that power by repealing the 25th section of the Judiciary Act, which allows a writ of error from the Supreme Court of the United States to the highest courts of the States. Nay, more; the entire appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is established, by the language of the Constitution itself, "both as to law and fact, with such exceptions and under such regulations as the Congress shall make." Whenever the people get tired of the manner in which it exercises its appellate jurisdiction, they can, through their Congress, curtail that jurisdiction by such exceptions" as they may see fit to describe, and by such "regulations' as they may see fit to impose.

I do not expect that any of these measures will ever become necessary. I hope it will not be inferred, from anything I have said, that I advocate such extreme measures. I merely refer to them as powers held by the people among their other reserved powers, to be exercised by them when an emergency shall arise, for the protection of their liberties. Happily, notwithstanding the exceptions already referred to, the decisions of the Federal Supreme Court on public questions have generally commended themselves to public favour. Nor have judicious minds failed to observe the great benefit, in a popular government, which accrues from having a tribunal, which, uninfluenced by the passions of the hour, can calmly decide great public questions-not because it always decides them rightly, but because of the necessity of having them decided. Nor will any impartial student of our constitutional history, even though he admit all that I have said concerning certain manifest tendencies of the court, and even though he agree with all my objections to certain of its decisions, fail to concede the general beneficence of its work. Where would the Constitution have been, if the Supreme Court, uuder the leadership of Marshall, had not asserted the power to uphold and preserve it? What sort of government would we now have if its exposition had been finally committed to the uncertain action of bare popular majorities Balancing the labours of Marshall against those of Jefferson; the one in some sense the founder, the other the perfecter of our system of goverment-two men of the most opposite schools of political thinking, who stood towards each other even in personal antagonism and I do not know to which we ought to accord the greater honour. If, without moving laughter, I could imagine myself at so lofty a pinnacle as that of either, I confess that I would rather have been the author of the Declaration of Independence than of the Dartmouth College decision; the author of the Statute of Virginia for religious liberty than of the decision in Fletcher v. Peck. Nor do I know whether to accord the greater importance to the oft-repeated doctrine of Jefferson that the right of resisting tyranny and of overthrowing tyrannical government is always reserved to the people, and that revolutions are sometimes, nay frequently, necessary to liberty-a declaration which is embodied in the Bill of rights of nearly all our State constitutions : or to the declarations of Marshall that the Government of the United States, of necessity, exercises its powers directly upon the people, throughout the whole extent of our great country, and not mediately through the States, nor with the aid, nor even consent, of the State governments; that, within the scope of its granted powers, it is necessarily supreme; and that it is entitled by a just implication, to exercise all powers which are fairly necessary to carry into effect those powers expressly granted. I scarcely

know which of these opposing principles-opposing, yet reconcilable—has played the greater part in the phenomenal growth of our country. The doctrine of Jefferson has upheld individual liberty, developed individual strength, and enlarged individual manhood. The doctrine of Marshall has given us a country, and has given to each man the reasonable hope that he will be allowed in peace to enjoy the rewards of his honest industry. Nor ought we to forget that these enunciations were not the enunciations of mere doctrinaires, but the enunciations of two great lawyers. If put to my oath as to a choice between them, I confess that I might be obliged to say with Jefferson that I would rather have liberty without government than government without liberty. The loose atoms of the thirteen colonies were first crystallised around the sword of Washington. They were next baptised in fire and melted together in a single crucible in the War of 1812, our second War of Independence. The ingot thus produced was moulded into symmetry by the plastic skill of Marshall and his associates, And that court, notwithstanding the tendencies which I have pointed out, is still, in general, maintaining, in strength and symmetry, the colossal fabric created by the constitution "an indestructible union of indestructible States."

But notwithstanding this concession, which I freely and heartily make, the dangerous tendencies and extravagant pretensions of the court, which I have pointed out, ought not to be minimised, but ought to be resisted. That resistance ought not to take place, as advised by Jefferson, by "meeting the invaders foot to foot," but it ought to take place under the wise and moderate guidance of the legal profession. But the danger is that the people do not always so act. In popular governments evils are often borne with stolid patience until a culminating point is reached, when people burst into a sudden frenzy and redress their grievances by violent and extreme measures, and even tear down the fabric of government itself:

"When the crowd,

Maddened with centuries of drouth, are loud,
And trample on each other to obtain

The cup that brings oblivion of a chain

Heavy and sore, in which, long yoked, they plowed

The sand. Or if there sprung the yellow grain,

'Twas not for them: their necks were too much bowed,

And their dead palates chewed the cud of pain."

There is danger, real danger, that the people will see at one sweeping glance, that all the powers of their governments, Federal and State, lie at the feet cf us lawyers, that is to say, at the feet of a judicial oligarchy; that those powers are being steadily exercised in behalf of the wealthy and powerful classes, and to the prejudice of the scattered and segregated people; that the power thus seized includes the power of amending the constitution; the power of superintending the action, not merely of Congress, but also of the State legislatures; the power of degrading the powers of the two houses of Congress, in making those investigations which they may deem necessary to wise legislation, to the powers which an English court has ascribed to British colonial legislatures; the power of superintending the judiciary of the States, of annulling their judgments, and of commanding them what judgments to render; the power of denying to Congress the power to raise revenue by a method employed by all governments; making the fundamental sovereign powers of government, such as the power of taxation, the subject of mere barter between corrupt legislatures and private adventurers; holding that a venal legislature, temporarily invested with power, may corruptly bargain away those essential attributes of sovereignty and for all time; that corporate franchises bought from corrupt legislatures are sanctified and placed forever beyond recall by the people; that great trusts and combinations may place their yokes upon the necks of people of the United States, who must groan forever under the weight, without remedy and without hope; that trial by jury and the ordinary criminal justice of the States, which ought to be kept near the people, are to be set aside, and Federal court injunctions substituted therefor; that those injunctions extend to prevent labouring men from quitting their employment, although they are liable to be discharged by their employers at any hour, thus creating and perpetuating a state of slavery. There is danger that the people will see these things all at once; see their enrobed judges doing their thinking on the side of the rich and powerful; see them look with solenm cynicism upon the sufferings of the masses, nor heed the earthquake when it begins to rock beneath their feet; see them present a spectacle not unlike that of Nero fiddling while Rome burns. There is danger that the people will see all this at one sudden glance, and that the furies will then break loose, and that all hell will ride on their wings.

A few days ago, in a great audience chamber in Chicago, the representatives of a great political party were assembled from every state and territory of the Union, to discuss great questions and to consider great abuses, including some of those which I have mentioned. A young, smooth-shaven man, apparently just out of college, ascended the platform to close a memorable debate. When he faced the great audience it rocked with applause. But when he lifted his hand to speak.

"His look

Drew audience and attention still as night,
Or Summer's noon-tide air."

As he ascended each grand climax, a tempest broke forth from 20,000 throats, "like ocean warring 'gainst a rocky isle." And then a wave of his hand, stilling the uproar, almost recalled the miracle of Christ stilling the tempest. But this tempest was still only to burst forth at each succeeding climax of the speaker, and in like manner to be stilled again. That hour brought back into our practical and prosaic age the troubles

"Under the rock stand of Demosthenes,
Unstable Athens heave her noisy seas."

In that hour, he became the leader of a great party; perhaps the hope of a great people. The man whose voice raised that tempest and whose hand stilled it, was a member of the great, honourable and powerful profession of the law. Was that popular tempest a prelude to some greater popular tempest which is yet to break upon us? If so, will the Legal Profession, as they have so often done in the past, guide the ship of State safely through that tempest, or will they drift hopelessly along with it, and be ingulfed in it?

At that same hour, a few hundred miles away, seated in his unpretentious residence in a small city, surrounded by an aged mother, the wife of his youth, and the friends and neighbours who had witnessed his early successes at the Bar and his enviable political career, sat another lawyer. He heard, through that wonderful instrument the long distance telephone, the peals of applause which greeted the young orator in the distant convention, like the roar of a distant ocean after storm. He heard it without disdain, perhaps with a touch of admiration, certainly without fear. He, too, had been chosen the leader of a great party, perhaps the hope of a great people. Both of these great leaders, while differing vitally on public questions, are patriotic and lofty in character; sincere in their convictions of public duty; firm in their adhesion to principle; tender, chivalric, and faithful towards women; truthful and honourable in their public and private lives. Both are members of the Legal Profession. It is the office of that profession, and of the free institutions which that profession has fostered, to produce such men. Whichever shall be chosen the chief magistrate of the American people will illustrate, in that great office, the lofty ideal of a man that can rule and dare not lie."

What I have said will fail entirely of its intended effect if it does not bring you, my fellow-lawyers, to reflect how great the power, how important the trust, which your merits on the one hand, and popular consent, custom, and acquiescence on the other, have reposed in our profession. I magnify that profession. I exult that I am a member of it. But at the same time I trust that I feel an adequate sense of the responsibilities which attach to that membership. It is said that the Legal Profession is declining in power and influence; that the practice of the law is passing into the hands of corporations-of collection companies, security companies, trust companies, and the like. I know not how that may be. It seems to me that, in our complicated modern business-life, there is greater and greater need for good lawyers. Certain it is that our complicated system of federative government makes "government by lawyers" imperative, and concedes to our profession the principal offices of statesmanship, the noblest work that has yet been committed to man. Whether, as a profession, we maintain our present proud pre-eminence rests primarily with ourselves. If we sink to the mere pursuit of sordid gain, the leadership of the people and the offices of the government will pass into other hands. If we remain in the future what we have been in the past, the tribunes of the people and the champions of public right, we shall retain that natural ascendency in government, so long enjoyed, so honourable to us, and so beneficial to the state.

LAW LIBRARY.

Patent Law and Practice. By A. V. NEWTON. London: Horace Cox, Windsor House, Bream's-buildings, E.C.

THIS volume is divided into two parts. The first treats of patent law and practice, including the registration of designs and trade marks. In the chapter on precedents on which rules of procedure are based, abstracts of the law officers' decisions on the subject are given. The second portion of the book deals with the copyright of literary, musical, dramatic, and artistic works and lectures. It seems a clear and concise statement of the law.

Brief Aids to the Criminal Law. By HILTON KERSHAW, B.A., Barrister-at-Law. London: Stevens and Sons Limited, Chancery-lane.

THE salient points in the criminal law of England are given in this little book in a condensed form. It should certainly be a help to the student in his reading the larger text-books on the subject.

The Indian Evidence Act. By Sir WILLIAM MARKBY, K.C.I.E. London: Henry Frowde, Oxford University Warehouse, E.C. THE name of the author alone is sufficient recommendation for this work. He tells us that this edition of the Act of 1872 is to assist students who are preparing for their examinations, and has avoided the quotation of cases, which he has reserved for the lectures the book is intended to supplement and not to replace. The excellent plan is followed of giving illustrations after the various rules, and free criticisms are given of the

language and frame of the Act. It is a book we can recommend to Indian students.

:

Maximum Railway Rates. By A. KAYE BUTTERWORTH, LL.B., Solicitor to the North-Eastern Railway Company, assisted by A. R. BUTTERWORTH and F. H. CRIPPS-DAY, M.A., Barristersat-Law. London Butterworth and Co., Fleet-street. THIS is a treatise on the Railway Rates and Charges Order Confirmation Acts 1891 to 1896, and the Railway and Canal Traffic Act 1894. Reference is made to all the cases of importance decided under the Act of 1894, and two cases- -The Manchester and Northern Counties Federation v. The Midland Railway Company and The M. S. and L. Railway Company v. Pidcock and Co. not elsewhere reported, are set out in full. The analysis of the Confirmation Acts 1891 and 1892, issued by the Board of Trade, is given, and many other useful lists of rates concerning the subject. It will no doubt prove of great assistance to those who are concerned in the law respecting charges for the carriage of goods by railway.

The Law of Distress 1888, and the Law of Distress Amendment Act 1895. By H. G. WARD and F. W. GRANTHAM, Barristers-atLaw. London: The Solicitors' Law Stationery Society, Chancery-lane.

A HANDY little edition of these two Acts, with short notes added by way of a commentary.

MERCANTILE agents who sell goods intrusted to their care and buy goods on commission are the subjects of this book. The Factors Act 1889 and condensed reports of a few of the more important cases relating to factors are given. The rights of persons who let out goods under hire-purchase agreements as affected by the Factors Act, and the cases of Lee v. Butler and Helby v. Matthews, are also the subject of discussion. It is a handy work, and brings the law on this subject within a moderate compass.

Laws of the United States on Aliens, &c. By J. R. HUBBELL, Attorney-at-Law. New York: The Hubbell Publishing

Company.

THIS is a synopsis of the laws of the various States regarding aliens, estates of deceased persons, deeds of real property, descent and distribution of estates, and wills. It deals with these subjects in a brief and concise manner, and no doubt will prove useful to lawyers desirous of becoming acquainted with the law concerning those matters. Forms for acknowledgments are given in an appendix.

General Digest, American and English. Rochester, N.Y.: Lawyer's Co-operative Publishing Company.

THE quarterly advance sheets of this publication to October 1896 have just been issued. It consists of some five hundred pages of closely digested matter. We wonder to what extent the work will grow.

The New Rules of the Road at Sea. By H. STUART MOORE, Barrister-at-Law. London: J. D. Potter, Poultry, E.C. THE law relating to the new regulations for preventing collisions at sea 1897, with explanatory notes and observations, is set forth in this work. The old and new rules are printed in parallel columns, and the alterations shown by means of italics. The book is clear and practical, and will no doubt prove useful to those who have occasion to study the numerous alterations made by the rules.

Rating. By P. MICHAEL FARADAY (Rating Surveyor). The Legal Matter by STANLEY LATHAM, Barrister-at-Law. London: Sweet and Maxwell, 3, Chancery-lane.

MR. FARADAY writes from the point of view of a rating surveyor who has had practical experience of the difficulties that arise in the application of the principles of rating, and is therefore familiar with the points that stand most in need of elucidation. This is consequently a thoroughly practical book, and one that should prove useful to members of his own profession. It would perhaps have been more advantageous to the reader if

Mr. Faraday's respect for the decisions of the High Court had led him to state their effect instead of quoting them so constantly in extenso. As it is, the volume almost suggests the impression of having been composed by a syndicate of judges. But this is a reflection on the form of the work, and does not touch its merits, which, as far as we can judge from a cursory examination, will commend the book to persons seeking information as to the practice of rating.

The tenth volume of Ruling Cases carries the work down to Estate, and this is to be followed by a general index and addenda up to date (Stevens and Sons Limited). We do not blame the editors for going into the old law, and in our judgment there is no surplusage in the present volume, which is one full of important matter.

We have received The Local Government Directory, Almanac, and Guide for 1897 (Knight and Co.), which contains a mass of miscellaneous information, including a catalogue of works on Local Government.

NEW EDITIONS.

A fourth edition of the collection of the Bankruptcy Acts originally prepared by his Honour Judge Chalmers and Mr. Hough is now brought on by Mr. Muir Mackenzie, Barrister-atLaw, and Mr. Hough (Waterlow and Sons Limited). It is satisfactory to find it recorded that there has been no fresh bankruptcy legislation since 1890, and that the changes in the rules and forms have been few and relatively unimportant. Beyond noting up cases and making some improvements, there is nothing to mark this edition of a very useful work.

The Tagore Law Lectures of 1893, or Estoppel by Representation and Res Judicata in British India, by Arthur Caspersz, Barrister, Advocate of the High Court, Calcutta (Thacker, Spink, and Co., Calcutta), are now in a second edition. The work in its first edition had a rapid sale, and it is one of the best text-books on the subject.

Seaborne's Law of Vendors and Purchasers has entered a fourth edition under the supervision of Mr. W. Arnold Jolly, M.A. (Butterworth). There has been an interval of twenty-six years between the first and fourth editions, and Mr. Jolly says he has had to rewrite so much that the present edition is to all intents and purposes a new book. It is a concise and practical epitome, useful alike to students and practitioners. In its modern dress it has lost none of its merits, which are considerable.

Encyclopædia of the Laws of England. Vol I. Sweet and Maxwell Limited, 3, Chancery-lane; Wm. Green and Sons, Edinburgh. Price 208. Mews' Annual Digest 1896. Sweet and Maxwell Limited, 3, Chancerylane; Stevens and Sons Limited, 119 and 120, Chancery-lane.

Jordan and Gore-Browne's Handy Book on Joint Stock Companies. Twentieth Edition. Jordan and Sons Limited, 120, Chancery-lane, and 8, Bell-yard, Temple Bar. Price 5s. net.

Stone's Justices' Manual. Twenty-ninth Edition. Shaw and Sons, Fetter-lane and Crane-court, E.C.; Butterworth and Co., 7, Fleet-street. E.C. Price 25s.

PROMOTIONS AND APPOINTMENTS.

Information intended for publication under the above heading should reach us not later than Thursday morning in each week, as publication is otherwise delayed.

Mr. EDGAR J. ELGOOD, of the Chancery Bar, has been appointed by the Council of Legal Education to be a Member of the General Board of Examiners. Mr. Elgood was called to the Bar in Nov. 1875.

Mr. HERBERT J. E. PRICE, solicitor, of Haverfordwest, has been appointed Registrar of the Haverfordwest County Court and Coroner for Pembrokeshire, in succession to his father, the late Mr. James Price.

Mr. VERNON REILLY COCKERTON, solicitor, of Bakewell, has been appointed a Commissioner for Oaths. Mr. Cockerton was admitted in April 1893.

Mr. J. HOWARD WATERMAN, of 58, Lombard-street, E.C., and West Hampstead, solicitor, has been appointed a Commissioner for Oaths. Mr. Waterman was admitted in Dec. 1890.

Bath, Thursday, and Friday (if necessary).

at 10

Poole, Monday, at 10 Porth, Friday

Brighton, Thursday (Reg., Bky), at 11; Portsmouth, Thursday, at 12

Friday, at 10

Burnley, Thursday, at 10

Dolgelly, Saturday

Wellingborough, Monday, at 10
Wellington (Somerset), Monday, at 11
Wells, Tuesday, at 10

Ipswich, Wednesday and Thursday, at 10; Welshpool, Wednesday

Huntingdon, Wednesday, at 10

Hyde, Wednesday

Friday (Reg., Bky), at 11

Keswick, Saturday, at 10

at 10

* Other sittings are specially fixed if necessary.

COUNTY COURTS, EQUITY, AND BANKRUPTCY CASES.-Published quarterly, price 4s., post free.-HORACE COX, "County Courts Chronicle" Office, Bream's-buildings, E.C.-[Advt.]

LANDLORD AND TENANT-NOTICE TO QUIT— COUNTY COURT JURISDICTION.

AT the Brompton County Court, his Honour Judge Stonor gave judgment in the case of Holland and Andrews v. Dowle.

W. Hellyar, solicitor, for plaintiffs; Reed, barrister, for defendant. His HONOUR.-By an agreement, dated the 19th Sept. 1895, the plaintiffs (who are house agents in partnership), agreed to let to the defendant a house and premises, 51, Manor-street, Chelsea, for three years, at an annual rent of £35, payable by monthly payments of £2 18s. 4d., with a singular provision, that at the "expiration of the said term of three years, unless the tenancy thereby created should have been previously determined, the said tenant shall continue as tenant from year to year at the same rent, &c., unlesss either of the said parties should give to the other of them one month's previous notice in writing to determine the tenancy." The defendant took possession of the house and premises and paid rent under this agreement, and therefore, previously to the passing of the Judicature Act 1873, the defendant would have been at law tenant from year to year at the like rent and subject to the like provisions as are contained in the agreement, so far as the same were applicable to a yearly tenancy, and the agreement for a term of three years would have been enforceable in equity in a suit for specific performance. It has been decided by the cases of Coatsworth v. Johnson (53 L. J. 220, Q. B.) and Foster v. Reeves (Ct. of App.) (67 L. T. Rep. 537; (1892) 2 Q. B. 255; 61 L. J. 763, Q. B.) that a County Court has no jurisdiction as to an agreement for a lease where the value of the premises exceeds £500 (which I believe to be the present case) upon a counter-claim any more than upon a claim, and therefore the defendant must be regarded merely as a tenant from year to year, and cannot obtain specific performance of the agreement and its rectification on the ground of mistake and fraud, which is what he desires, although he has not filed a counter-claim to that effect. At present the case stands thus: The plaintiffs have sued him for six months' arrears of rent due the 29th July last, and he pleads that he has determined the tenancy by one month's notice given by him to the plaintiff Holland on the 29th Dec. 1895, and he contends that, according to the real intention of the parties, or at all events of himself, the tenancy was to be determinable at any time on one month's notice, and that the special provision in the agreement which I have read ought to be so construed, or, if necessary, that the agreement should be so rectified. Now, it is clear that the provision in question is restricted to the determination of the term at the end of three years by a month's notice, so as to prevent the tenant continuing as tenant from year to year thereafter without any express agreement to that effect, and therefore ought not to be so construed, and also (as I have already said) that this court has no equitable jurisdiction to deal with this agreement even on a counter-claim if the value of the premises exceeds £500, as I believe it does. If the premises did not exceed that amount, I cannot help thinking that this court would have such jurisdiction under sects. 24, 89, and 90 of the Judicature Act and the County Court Act 1888, re-enacting the provisions of the County Court Act 1865, although, as reported, one of the learned judges in the case last referred to appears to have held that a County Court" is not affected by the Judicature Act," and to have deprecated the exercise by a County Court of any such jurisdiction: (1892) 2 Q. B. 261). From the foregoing observations it follows clearly that the plaintiffs are prima facie entitled to a verdict, and the only remaining question is, whether the plaintiffs have accepted a surrender or done such acts as would amount to the same in law. The plaintiff Holland appears to have received the notice to quit of the 29th Dec. 1895 without protest or objection, and merely to have expressed his regret, and to have offered to get the defendant another house. This action of the plaintiff Holland could not, of course, have affected his joint tenant (or, so to speak, joint landlord), the plaintiff Andrews, nor possibly himself without other evidence of his intention to accept a surrender, and it becomes necessary to consider what was the subsequent action of both the plaintiffs. Four days after the delivery of the notice the plaintiffs wrote to the defendant a joint letter, dated the 2nd Jan. 1896, and signed in the name of their firm, saying, "We have received your month's notice, which we cannot accept." On the day when the notice expired, the defendant brought the month's rent then due and the key of the house to the plaintiffs' office, and delivered the key to the plaintiff Andrews. There is a conflict of evidence as to whether he said that he accepted it only for the firm as the defendant's agents, but, on the whole, I find that he did say so. The defendant, however, did not in any way assent to the firm acting as his agents in respect of the house at that or any other time, although he agreed to their acting as his agents to sell the business, fixtures, and stock there separately, and gave the plaintiff Andrews 10s. 6d. to advertise the The plaintiffs thereupon took possession of the house, fixtures, and stock, and they also put up a notice to let with the name of their firm, and caused the house to be cleaned for the purpose of letting without the authority of the defendant, and therefore not as his agents. The house remained unlet until the month of August, and during the interval the plaintiffs repeatedly wrote to the defendant demanding the monthly rent, and threatening legal proceedings (which, however, they did not take), and they also wrote to the defendant with regard to letting the premises, but the defendant never answered or took any notice of any of these letters. Ultimately on the 17th Aug. the plaintiffs wrote to the defendant saying that they had let the house and premises, which they had in fact done without the authority or knowledge of the defendant, evidently, therefore, acting not as his agents, but as landlords in possession. These acts of ownership by the plaintiffs subsequent to the expiration of the month's notice to quit without the authority or knowledge of the defendant in conjunction with the previous delivery of the key are evidence upon which a jury would, I think, rightly find

same.

that the plaintiffs had accepted a surrender of the lease, and I therefore find for the defendant in this action. With regard to the counter-claim as to the fixtures, I find that the plaintiffs took charge of the same as bailees for reward, inasmuch as they would, of course, have been entitled to commission on the sale, and that, by neglecting to secure the house, and especially by not closing the shutters, they allowed these fixtures to be destroyed or taken away, and that they are therefore liable to the defendant for the same, and I assess the damages at £5, the stock having been removed by the defendant previously. There will be judgment for the defendant on the claim and counter-claim accordingly with costs.

GENERAL INTELLIGENCE.

UNCLAIMED STOCK AND DIVIDENDS IN THE BANK OF ENGLAND.

[Transferred to the Commissioners for the Reduction of the National Debt, and which will be paid to the persons respectively whose names are prefixed to each in three months from the date given, unless other claimants sooner appear.] BEAUCLERK (Louisa Katherine), spinster, care of Messrs. Johnson and Master, 18, Theobald's-rd, Bedford-row. One dividend on the sum of £102 9s. 9d. Scinde, Punjaub, and Delhi Railway Annuity, Class A. Claimant, said L. K. Beauclerk. Jan. 30.

HEIRS-AT-LAW AND NEXT OF KIN. CHIQUET (Louis Basil), 68, Cecilia-villas, West Ham, Essex, gold and silver tester, who died in or about April 1893. His next of kin and the persons claiming to be his heir to come in, by March 31, and prove their claims at the chambers of Mr. Justice Stirling. April 8, at the said chambers, at two o'clock, is the time appointed for hearing and adjudicating upon the claims. Celine Augustine Chiquet, one of the sisters of the said L. B. Chiquet, has not been heard of for some years. FLACK (James Michael), 3, Broadway, Stratford, Essex, provision merchant. His next of kin to send in, by March 3, the particulars of their claims to Mr. G. E. Philbrick, Girdler's Hall, 39, Basinghall-st, agent for Messrs. Haynes and Co., solicitors, 113, Bow-rd.

KEITH (Douglas), a son of Daniel Keith, late of Foxley-rd, Kensington, who died Oct. 17, 1872, if living, or, if dead, his legal personal representatives, to come in, by March 6, at the chambers of Mr. Justice North, and prove his or their claim in the matter of the trusts of a sum of £1533 6s. 8d. Midland Railway Debenture Stock. March 9, at the said chambers, at one o'clock, is the time appointed for hearing and adjudicating upon the claim. TATE (Ann), formerly of Framlington, Northumberland, widow, who died on or about

Nov. 4, 1825, and was buried at Long Framlington. Persons claiming to be her next of kin, according to the statutes for the distribution of intestates' estates, living at the time of her death, or the legal personal representatives of such next of kin as are now dead, to come in, by March 16, and prove their claims at the chambers of Mr. Justice Kekewich. March 23, at the said chambers, at twelve o'clock, is the time appointed for hearing and adjudicating upon such claims. NOTE. It is believed that the said A. Tate was a daughter of John Wardle, of Long Framlington, and Grace, his wife, formerly Grace Marshall, of Bedlington, spinster; also that the said A. Tate was born in or about the year 1755, and was married about June 9, 1783.

TURNER (Martha), 151, Saltram-cres, St. Peter's Park, formerly of Everton, near Liverpool, Lancashire, spinster. Persons claiming to be the legatees named in the will and codicil of the said M. Turner, who died on Sept. 11, 1896, or the issue of any legatees who died before the said testatrix, or the legal personal representatives of any of the said legatees who have since died, or claiming to be entitled to the residue of her estate under her will, to come in, by March 16, and prove their claims at the chambers of Mr. Justice Byrne, Government-bldgs, Victoria-st, Liverpool. March 22, at the said chambers, at twelve o'clock, is the time appointed for hearing and adjudicating upon such claims. James Watts, one of the legatees named in the said will, resided at Waterford, Wisconsin, U.S.A., in 1883; his issue, if living, may be entitled under the said will.

APPOINTMENTS UNDER THE JOINT STOCK WINDING-UP ACTS. ANTI-FRICTION BALL COMPANY LIMITED.-Creditors to send in, by March 10, their names and addresses and the particulars of their claims, and the names and addresses of their solicitors (if any), to Messrs. C. D. Turrall and R. W. Palk, the liquidators of the company, care of Messrs. King, Patten, Palk, and Co., 105, Colmore-row, Birmingham. Smith, Pinsent, and Co., 6, Bennett's-hill, Birmingham, solicitors for the liquidators. NOTE.-The above company is in liquidation on the sale of the business to the Raglan Cycle and Anti-Friction Ball Company Limited. BRITISH UNION INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED.-Creditors to send in, by March 19, their names and addresses and the names and addresses of their solicitors (if any) to the Secretary of the liquidators of the British Union Insurance Company Limited, at 3, Eastcheap. A. J. Greenop and Co., 15, Victoria-st, Westminster, solicitors for the liquidators.

BROWN, MICHEL, AND PAGE LIMITED.-Petition for winding-up to be heard Feb. 15, before the Court sitting at the Royal Courts of Justice. Strand. E. Kemp Taylor, 62, Lincoln's-inn-ilds, solicitor for the petitioner. Notices of intention to appear on the hearing of the petition must be signed by the person or firm, or his or their solicitor (if any), and must reach the above-named not later than six o'clock on Feb. 13.

CARDIFF AND PENARTH STEAM FERRY COMPANY LIMITED (in liquidation).—Creditors to send in, by Feb. 17, the particulars of their accounts to Mr. H. J. Vellacott, 51, Mount Stuart-sq, Cardiff, the liquidator. CROWN ACCIDENT INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED.-Creditors to send in, by March 31, their names and addresses and the particulars of their claims, and the names and addresses of their solicitors (if any), to Messrs. Gwynn and Masters, 3, All Saints-ct, Bristol, the solicitors to the liquidators of the company. GREAT NORTHERN SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED.-Creditors to send in, by March 31, their names and addresses and the particulars of their claims, and the names and addresses of their solicitors (if any), to Messrs. J. Coull and J. Wishart, Balticchmbrs, Quayside, Newcastle-upon-Tyne, the liquidators of the company. Wilkinson and Marshall, 27, Mosley-st, Newcastle-upon-Tyne, solicitors to the liquidators.

HOLMFIELD BOOT MANUFACTURING COMPANY LIMITED.-Creditors to send in, by Feb. 24, their names and addresses and the particulars of their claims, and the names and addresses of their solicitors (if any), to Mr. T. H. Walker, Union-st, Bradford, one of the liquidators of the company. H. Farrar, 5, Townhall-sq, Bradford, solicitor for the liquidators. HORSHAM CORN EXCHANGE COMPANY LIMITED. Creditors to send in, by March 10, their names and addresses and the particulars of their claims, and the names and addresses of their solicitors (if any), to Messrs. A. Agate, E. Taylor, and H. P. Thorpe, 9, Carfax, Horsham, the liquidators of the company. A. C. Coole, 9, Carfax, Horsham, solicitor to the liquidators. HOWE CYCLE AND SEWING MACHINE COMPANY LIMITED.-Adjourned petition for winding-up to be heard Feb. 15, before the Court sitting at the Royal Courts of Justice, Strand, when the Court will be asked to make an order for the winding-up of the company by the High Court or, in the alternative, to continue

the voluntary winding-up of the company under the supervision of the Court. Linklater, Addison, Brown, and Jones, 2, Bond-ct, Walbrook, solicitors for the petitioner. Notices of intention to appear on the hearing of the petition must be signed by the person or firm, or his or their solicitor (if any), and must reach the above-named not later than two o'clock on Feb. 13. IMPERIAL WEST AFRICAN COMPANY LIMITED.-Creditors to send in, by March 20, their names and addresses and the particulars of their claims, and the names and addresses of their solicitors (if any), to Mr. A. Dobell, of B 21, Liverpool, and London-chmbrs, Liverpool, the_liquidator of the company.

JULIA-TALTAL NITRATE COMPANY LIMITED.-Creditors to send in, by March 15, their names and addresses and the particulars of their claims, and the names and addresses of their solicitors (if any), to Mr. G. S. Bankart, 80, Coleman-st, the liquidator of the company. Davidson and Morris, 40 and 42, Queen Victoria-st, solicitors for the liquidator.

LINCOLN CONSERVATIVE WORKING MEN'S CLUB COMPANY LIMITED.-Creditors to send in, by April 6, their names and addresses and the particulars of their claims, and the names and addresses of their solicitors (if any), to Mr. H. K. Hebb, Silver-st, Lincoln, solicitor, the liquidator of the company.

MAGNET DAIRY COMPANY LIMITED (in liquidation).-Creditors to send in, by March 16, their names and addresses and the particulars of their claims, and the names and addresses of their solicitors (if any), to Messrs. F. A. Benzinger and J. Crake, 3. Parliament-st, Hull, the liquidators of the company. Stead and Sibree, 13, Bishop's-la, Hull, solicitors to the liquidators. MAUDLIN STONE SYNDICATE LIMITED (in voluntary liquidation).-Creditors to send in, by March 25, their names and addresses and the particulars of their claims, and the names and addresses of their solicitors (if any), to Mr. J. M. Macmartin, Billiter-sq-bldgs, the liquidator of the company.

MINERVA NAILLESS HORSESHOE (PATENT) SYNDICATE LIMITED.-Petition for windingup to be heard Feb. 22, before the Court sitting at the Royal Courts of Justice, Strand. Collyer and Davis, 12, Pancras-la, Queen-st, solicitors for the petitioner. Notices of intention to appear on the hearing of the petition must be signed by the person or firm, or his or their solicitor (if any), and must reach the above-named not later than six o'clock on Feb. 20. NEWMARKET BREWERIES AND WHITE HART HOTEL COMPANY LIMITED.-Adjourned petition for winding-up to be heard Feb. 15. before the Court sitting at the Royal Courts of Justice, Strand. when, in consequence of the shareholders having resolved that the company be wound-up voluntarily and Mr. Edward Llewellyn Ernest, 63, Queen Victoria-st, chartered accountant, be appointed liquidator, the court will then be asked to make an order continuing the voluntary winding-up under the supervision of the court instead of winding-up of the company. A. Myers, 3, South-sq, Gray's-inn, solicitor for the petitioner. Notices of intention to appear on the hearing of the petition must be signed by the person or firm or his or their solicitor (if any), and must reach the above-named not later than six o'clock on Feb. 13. PHOSPHATE DEVELOPMENT AND FINANCE COMPANY LIMITED.-Creditors to send in. by March 13, their names and addresses and the particulars of their claims, and the names and addresses of their solicitors (if any), to Mr. F. W. Lord, 60, Watling-st, the liquidator of the company.

names

RAILWAY PRESS COMPANY LIMITED.-Creditors to send in, by March 13, their names and addresses and the particulars of their claims, and the and addresses of their solicitors (if any), to Mr. F. W. Lord, 60, Watling-st, the liquidator of the company. W. L. Cooper, 5, Queen Victoria-st, solicitor. STANDARD OIL COMPANY OF GALICIA LIMITED.-Creditors to send in, by March 5, their names and addresses and the particulars of their claims, and the names and addresses of their solicitors (if any), to Mr. H. T. McAuliffe, 27, Billiter-bldgs, Billiter-st, the liquidator of the company. H. J. Hood, Registrar, Companies Winding-up. Slaughter and May, 18, Austin Friars, solicitors for the liquidator. TAYLOR, COOPER, AND BEDNELL LIMITED.-Creditors to send in, by March 10, their names and addresses and the particulars of their claims, and the names and addresses of their solicitors (if any), to Messrs. C. D. Turrall and R. W. Palk, the liquidators of the company, care of Messrs. King, Patten, Palk, and Co., 105, Colmore-row, Birmingham. Smith, Pinsent, and Co., 6, Bennett's-hill, Birmingham, solicitors for the liquidators. NOTE.-The above company is in liquidation on the sale of the business to the Raglan Cycle and Anti-Friction Ball Company Limited.

THETFORD ELECTRIC LIGHT AND POWER COMPANY LIMITED.-Petition for winding-up to be heard Feb. 17, before the Cambridge and Norfolk County Court sitting at the Shirehall, Norwich. North and Sons, 4, East-parade, Leeds, solicitors to the petitioner. Notices of intention to appear on the hearing of the petition must be signed by the person or firm, or his or their solicitor (if any), and must reach the above-named not later than six o'clock on Feb. 16. VICTORIA TEMPERANCE HOTEL COMPANY LIMITED.-Creditors to send in, by March 10, their names and addresses and the particulars of their claims, and the names and addresses of their solicitors (if any), to Mr. A. Perrin, Ashleigh-rd, Barnstaple, Devon, the liquidator of the company.

VIEWFIELD SYNDICATE LIMITED.-Creditors to send in, by March 13, their names and addresses and the particulars of their claims, and the names and addresses of their solicitors (if any), to Mr. F. W. Lord, 60, Watling-st, the liquidator of the company. W. L. Cooper, 5, Queen Victoria-st, solicitor.

CREDITORS UNDER ESTATES IN CHANCERY.
LAST DAY OF PROOFS.

ANDREWS (Henry), 24, London-rd, Canterbury, Kent. March 11; J. Plummer, Esq.,
solicitor, 38, St. Margaret's-st, Canterbury. March 25; Mr. Justice North, at
twelve o'clock.
BURNETT (John Gould). Wye House, Rowsley, Derbyshire, farmer. March 9; J. H.
Cooke, solicitor, Ashborne, Derbyshire. March 24; Mr. Justice North, at twelve
o'clock.
CHIQUET (Louis Basil), 68, Cecilia-villas, West Ham, Essex, gold and silver tester.
March 1; Naunton and Son, solicitors, 58, Cheapside. March 9; Mr. Justice
Stirling, at twelve o'clock.
DODSON (Henry Percy), 41, Court field-grdns, Kensington, advertising agent. March 3:
H. Dale and Co., solicitors, 21, Copthall-av. March 16; Mr. Justice Romer, at
eleven o'clock.

ROBERTS (Frederick Bertie Worsley), Union Club, Trafalgar-sq, and lately residing at Balmoral Uitenage, Port Elizabeth, Cape of Good Hope. April 12; F. W. Biddle solicitor, 22, Aldermanbury. April 28; Mr. Justice Kekewich, at twelve o'clock.

CREDITORS UNDER 22 & 23 VICT. c. 35.

LAST DAY OF CLAIM AND TO WHOM PARTICULARS TO BE SENT. ARNISON (George Nathan), 5, Tavistock-pl, Sunderland, Durham, painter. March 87 C. R. Walker, solicitor, 61, Fawcett-st, Sunderland. ADEY (Ellen), 1, West Ascent, St. Leonard's-on-Sea, Sussex, widow. March 7; Young, Son, and Coles, solicitors, Bank-bldgs, Hastings.

BARLOW (Henry), Peel Farm, Astley, Lancashire, farm labourer, formerly of Eccles
and Cross-la, Salford, both in Lancashire, hay and straw dealer. March 17; DendyTM
and Paterson, solicitors, 5. Cross-st, Manchester.
BARNES (Robert Yallowley), Warwick-pl, Worthing, Sussex. April 10; Carter and
Bell, solicitors, 6, Idol-la, Eastcheap.

BYWATER (John), Keelinge-st. Dudley Port, Tipton, Staffordshire, manager of tube
works. March 15; A. G. Hooper, solicitor, 1, Priory-st, Dudley.
BAYLISS (Eliza Pudner), Westergate House, Kingston-on-Thames, Surrey. March 1:
J. Bell, solicitor, Kingston-on-Thames.

BLACKMAN (Egbert David), Edinburgh-rd, Ashford, Kent, tailor. March 1; Kingsford and Drake, solicitors, Bank-st, Ashford, Kent.

BELCHER (Alfred Bernard), Uppingham, Rutlandshire, assistant schoolmaster. March 9; W. H. Belcher, solicitor, Newbury, Berks.

BARNES (Frederick Carnac). 17, Park-st, St. James's, and of the Oriental Club, Hanover-sq. May 2: Sanderson, Holland, Adkin, and Co., solicitors, 46, Queen Victoria-st.