case. the purpose of trying the right, broke the staple of the door of the washhouse on the 25th Sept. 1896, and did a small amount of washing. The plaintiff then brought this action for damages for trespass, and for an injunction to restrain the defendant from the continuance or repetition of the trespass. At the request of the parties I went with the solicitors on each side to view the premises. It appeared that the pump at the back of No. 5 had been used in common by all the occupiers of the houses until quite recently, when two or three houses have had water from the town laid on. The others use it still. It also appeared that the closets and ashpit at the end of the gardens of Nos. 3 and 4 are still used by the occupiers of the houses Nos. 2, 3, 4, and 5. Mr. Graham said that the pump was on the little footpath at the rear of the houses, and on a second view I found that this was so. He contended that this made a difference, and also that a pump does not stand on the same footing as a washhouse on the ground that a pump might perhaps be considered an easement of necessity, but that a washhouse could not. I think the contention of Mr. Graham, that there can be no easement by prescription because no such easement can arise while the dominant and servient tenements are the property of the same owner, is correct. Neither am I prepared to hold, having regard to the authorities, that this was a licence coupled with an interest and therefore irrevocable, although there seems to me more to be said in favour of this. I prefer to rest this case on a statement of the law in Gale on Easements, 6th edit., pp. 87, 88, and 89, and, although there is not much authority cited in support of this statement, I have no reason to doubt its correctness, and it appears to be applicable to the present Mr. Gale says: "Where the land benefitted and the land burthened belong to the same owner, he may change the qualities of its several parts at his will, and his express volition, evidenced by his acts, must at least be as effectual to impress a new quality upon his inheritance as the implied consent arising from long-continued acquiescence. It is true that, strictly speaking, a man cannot subject one part of his property to another by an easement, for no man can have an easement in his own property, but he obtains the same object by the exercise of another right, the general right of property. But he has not the less thereby permanently altered the quality of the two parts of his heritage; and if after the annexation of peculiar qualities he alien one part of his heritage, it seems but reasonable, if the alterations thus made are palpable and manifest, and in their nature permanent changes in the disposition of the property, so that one part thereby becomes dependent upon another, that a purchaser should take the land with the qualities which the previous owner had undoubtedly the right to attach to it. This reasoning applies to those easements only which are attended by some alteration which is in its nature obvious and permanent, or, in technical language, to those easements only which are apparent and continuous; understanding by apparent signs, not only those which must necessarily be seen, but those which may be seen or known on a careful inspection by a person ordinarily conversant with the subject." Mr. Gale also refers to the same point, pp. 84 and 85, as that which is designated by the French law Destination du père de famille, and I would refer to that also, but it is too long to quote. It seems to me in this case that the former owner of the whole property, by his " 'express volition, evidenced by his acts, permanently altered the quality" of the different parts of his heritage. He built seven cottages, and not being able to give to each a pump, a washhouse, closets, and an ashpit, he built these things on different parts of the property and allowed the tenants to use the pump and the washhouse in common, and the tenants of Nos. 2, 3, 4, and 5 to use the closets and ashpit at the back end of the gardens of Nos. 3 and 4. He arranged that this should be so, it was his volition that it should be so. It may be that a washhouse is not quite so much an easement of necessity as a pump or the closets, but with tenants of small houses such as these it is not much less so. Am I to hold that the owner of Nos. 2 and 3 has a right to shut up the washhouse, but that the owner of No. 5 must allow the pump, and the owner of No. 4 the closets, to be used as above mentioned; or am I to hold that the owners of Nos. 5 and Nos. 3 and 4 can deprive the owners of the other houses of the common necessaries of life? It seems to me that I must consider the actual facts of this case, and what I find is, that the owner of these seven houses provided these things for the common use of the tenants of all the houses, that he allowed them to be so used for many years during his life, and that they were so used, as occasion required, for several years after, and I do not see my way now, either to confine these things to the use of the tenants or owners on whose respective lands they stand, or to distinguish one from the other. It may be said that this easement was not, in technical language, "apparent and continuous," but Mr. Gale understands by apparent "signs" not only those which must necessarily be seen, but those which may be seen or known on a careful inspection. It must be remembered that this washhouse, though not used much by the defendant, was used by the tenant of No. 4 once every three weeks for many years, and until she was stopped a year ago. I think "a person conversant with the subject" would have seen that this building was intended for a washhouse, might have seen that most of these houses had no washhouse attached to them, and might have ascertained that these things, the pump, the washhouse, the closets, and the ashpit, had for many years past been used as above stated by the owners or tenants of the other houses. I do not go so far as to say that a washhouse is an easement of necessity in every case; but I say, looking at the facts and circumstances of this case, that the owner of this property put these things on the same footing, and that he thereby, as to all of them, " made one portion of his estate subject to the convenience of another by an express act done during the union." One word more as to Mr. Graham's contention that such an easement would not pass by the word "appurtenances," in the will. Most of the cases I have seen on this point are under deeds and not under wills, and there may be some difference of construction between the two; but apart from this it seems to me, as stated above, that this easement " within is in the circumstances of this case 66 continuous and apparent the meaning put on these words by Mr. Gale; and if so, then I think it would pass under the word appurtenances without any other express or particular words. The plaintiff having, as it seems to me, failed, the action will be dismissed. and the costs on the scale the rules allow, that is the B. scale, will follow, but, having regard to the very small interest the defendant had in disputing this claim, I shall not allow any extra costs under the scales. DEVONSHIRE.-Robert Harvey, of Dundridge, Totnes, Esq. DORSETSHIRE.-Sir Henry Peto, of Cheddington Court, Crewkerne, Somerset, Bart. DURHAM.-Colonel Lancelot Allgood Gregson, of Burdon, Sunderland. ESSEX.-Edward Murray Ind, of Coombe Lodge, Great Warley, Esq. GLOUCESTERSHIRE.-James Dugdale, of Sezincota House, Moreton-inMarsh, Esq. HEREFORDSHIRE.-Captain John Geers Cotterell, of Garnons, Hereford. HERTFORDSHIRE. John Henry Buxton, of Hunsdon Bury, Ware, Esq. KENT.-Richard Coombe Miller, of Oakfield, Dartford, Esq. LEICESTERSHIRE.-Edward Handley Warner, of Quorn Hall, Loughborough, Esq. LINCOLNSHIRE.-Thomas Cheney Garfit, of Kenwick Hall, Legbourne, near Louth, Esq. COUNTY OF LONDON.-Henry James Lubbock, of 15, Lombard-street, Esq. MIDDLESEX.-Lieutenant-Colonel Bernard Tindal Bosanquet, of Fairholme, Teddington. MONMOUTHSHIRE.-Charles Montague Crompton Roberts, of Drybridge, Monmouth, Esq. NORFOLK.-Major George Nathaniel Micklethwait, of Taverham Hall. NORTHAMPTONSHIRE.-Pickering Phipps, of Rushton Hall, Kette ing, Esq. NORTHUMBERLAND.-Sir John Walter Buchanan Riddell, of Hepple, NOTTINGHAMSHIRE.-Philo Laos Mills, of Ruddington, Esq. RUTLAND.-Henry Clarke Jervoise, of Langham, Esq. SHROPSHIRE.-John Baddeley Wood, of Henley Hall, Ludlow, Esq. SOMERSETSHIRE.-Henry Martin Gibbs, of Barrow Court, Barrow Gurney, Bristol, Esq. COUNTY OF SOUTHAMPTON.-Godfrey Baring, of Nubia House, West Cowes, Isle of Wight, Esq. STAFFORDSHIRE.-William Bealey Harrison, of Aldershaw, Lichfield, Esq. SUFFOLK.-Edward Walter Greene, of Nether Hall, Pakenham, Esq. SURREY.-William Keswich, of Eastwick Park, Great Bookham, near Leatherhead, Esq. SUSSEX.-William Dodge James, of West Dean Park, Chichester, Esq. WARWICKSHIRE.-Howard Proctor Ryland, of Moxhull Hall, Erdington, CARDIGASHIRE.-Colonel William Price Lewes, of Llysnewydd, Llandyssil. DENBIGHSHIRE.-Thomas Williams, of Llewesog, Denbigh, Esq. GLAMORGANSHIRE.-Godfrey Lewis Clark, of Talygarn, Pontyclun, Esq. MONTGOMERYSHIRE.-John Lomax, of Bodfach, Esq. PEMBROKESHIRE.-Clement John Williams, of Penally, Esq. RADNORSHIRE.-Walter de Winton, of Maesllwch Castle, Glasbury, Esq. DUCHY OF LANCASTER (February 26, 1897). The Queen has been this day pleased to appoint Samuel Radcliffe Platt, Esq., of Werneth Park, Oldham, to bo Sheriff of the County Palatine of Lancaster for the year ensuing. : TEMPLE CHURCH. THE following is the order of the morning service for to-morrow: -First Lesson Genesis xix., vv. 12 to 30. Second Lesson: Mark vii., v. 24, and chap. viii. to v. 10. Versicles, &c.: Ferial, pp. 1-3. Te Deum Laudamus: Barrow in F. Jubilate Deo: Barrow in F. Apostles' Creed Harmonised Monotone, E. J. H., pp. 4 and 5. Preces and Responses, Ferial, pp. 6-8. Anthem "O Lord, my God" (Wesley, No. 282, p. 126). Kyrie Eleison: Young in B flat, No. 20. Doxology (before and after the Gospel): Tallis, p. 89. Nicene Creed: J. H., p. 100. Hymn before Sermon: "Just as I am, without one plea" (No. 179). : : For Sunday morning, the 14th inst.:-First Lesson, Genesis xxvii. to v. 41. Second Lesson, Mark xi., v. 27, and chap. xii. to v. 13. Versicles, &c. Ferial, pp. 1-3. Te Deum Laudamus: Gibbons in G. Benedictus : Gibbons in G. Apostles' Creed: Harmonised Monotone, E. J. H., pp. 4 and 5. Preces and Responses: Ferial, pp. 6-8. Anthem: "I will love Thee, O Lord" (Clark: Psalm xviii.: 1. Duet, T., B. I will love Thee, O Lord, my strength; the Lord is my stony rock, and my defence: my Saviour, my God, and my might, in whom I will trust; my buckler, the horn also of my salvation, and my refuge-3. Solo, T. I will call upon the Lord, which is worthy to be praised; so shall I be safe from mine enemies -4. Solo, B. The sorrows of death compassed me: and the overflowings of ungodliness made me afraid-5. The pains of hell came about me: the snares of death overtook me-6. In my trouble I will call upon the Lord : and complain unto my God-Duet, T., B. So shall He hear my voice out of His holy temple: and my complaint shall come before him; it shall enter even into his ears-7. Chorus. The earth trembled and quaked: the very foundations of the hills shook, and were removed, because He was wroth-13. Duet, T., B. The Lord also thundered out of heaven, and the Highest gave His thunder: hailstones and coals of fire-16. Duet and Chorus. He shall send down from on high to fetch me: and shall take me out of many waters-21. Because I have kept the ways of the Lord: and have not forsaken my God). Litany and Suffrages: Pages, 9-15. Hymn before Sermon: " Jesu, Lord, we kneel before Thee " (No. 219). For Sunday morning, the 21st inst.:- First Lesson: Genesis xxxvii. Second Lesson: Mark xv. to v. 42. Versicles, &c.: Ferial, pp. 1-3. Te Deum Laudamus: Smart in F. Jubilate Deo: Smart in F. Apostles' Creed: Harmonised Monotone, E. J. H., pp. 4 and 5. Preces and Responses: Ferial, pp. 6-8. Anthem: "All ye who weep" (Gounod, No. 360, p. 166). Kyrie Eleison: Hopkins in C, No. 11. Doxology (before and after the Gospel): Tallis, p. 89. Nicene Creed: J. H., p. 100. Hymn before Sermon: "My God, and is Thy table spread ?" (No. 90, vv. 1, 2, and 4). For Sunday morning, the 28th inst.:- First Lesson: Genesis xlii. Second Lesson: Luke iii. to v. 23. Versicles, &c.: Ferial, pp. 1-3. Te Deum Laudamus: Hopkins in C. Benedictus: Hopkins in C. Apostles' Creed: Harmonised Monotone, E. J. H., pp. 4 and 5. Preces and Responses: Ferial, pp. 6-8. Anthem "Praise the Lord, O my soul" (Purcell, No. 36, p. 16). Litany and Suffrages: Pages 9-15. Hymn before Sermon: "Jesus came, the heavens adoring " (No. 220). MANDAMUS. WHAT IS THE MODERN REMEDY BEARING ITS NAME? IN those days before the iconoclastic influence of Bentham and what may be called the school of change broke in upon the traditions of the English law, the writ of mandamus possessed an entirely different character from that which it to-day exhibits. The passing of those centuries that saw the rise and expansion of English jurisprudence did not fail to leave an impress upon the form of the writ, though in the main this famous royal process of mandamus in company with her powerful and no less famous sisters, the prerogative writs of certiorari, prohibition, procedendo, quo warranto and habeas corpus had successfully resisted the effect, which though indirect, was nevertheless powerful. Those repeated and ultimately victorious attacks made upon the "Divine right of kings," the prerogatives of the Crown, the courts of extraordinary jurisdiction and their process. These writs, issuing as they did by virtue of the extraordinary power of the king's prerogative, bent and swayed in the blast that strove with the regal power, and their very bending was their preservation and the means whereby they escaped the disaster in which prerogative was wrecked. The writ of mandamus is of very ancient origin; the mist of ages gathers around its birth, and hides from us the history of its creation. We know not whose fertile brain first gave it forth, neither can we tell if it came hot-forged from the workshop of the intellect, in that first form of it which history discovers to us; or if it grew from the small beginning of the despatch of the monarch's signet to give force and weight to a verbal command. We can, however, do much toward understanding its growth since the time of the early Edwards; and can also with much satisfaction and no little certainty draw interesting inferences of its nature and origin prior to the accession of these monarchs by the aid of our knowledge of the history of the time. In the investigation of the subject of this paper, we will regard mandamus as having passed through three periods. The first of these we will designate as early English, and assign to it the period prior to the reign of Edward II. The second period or middle English epoch will embrace the years from 1 Edward II. to 17 Victoria in England and the year 1790 in America; while modern English will comprehend the time since the close of the second epoch. During the early English period the writ of mandamus was the command of the king; nothing more or less than an arbitrary exercise of the prerogative of the Crown. As we constantly associate these writs with the term prerogative, let us glance at this attribute of the sovereign. Prerogative may be defined as the king's rights, or the king's rights of the Crown, for by ancient writers the terms jura regia, juria regia coronaœ, and juræ corona are used synonymously. Bracton calls these rights "privilegia rigis," and Britton "Droit le roy," but since the Act of jus regni they have been commonly called "prerogativa regis," which is all one with "Droit le roy." The king's prerogative is regarded as part of the law of England, and as comprehended within the same. The term came into general use in the conflicts between the Crown and Parliament of Great Britain, especially in the time of the Stuarts. We would to-day define prerogative as a personal privilege, power, or right of a superior character; or perhaps as an exclusive or peculiar privilege, or prior and indefeasible right, which may be exercised without question, and for the exercise of which there is no responsibility or accountability as to the fact or manner of its exercise. In England, however, it is used in the sense of the distinct authority vested in the Crown; the special power, pre-eminence, or privilege which the king has over and upon other persons in right of his crown. And this opinion accords with that of Vattel, who defines the prerogatives of majesty "As all those prerogatives without which the sovereign command or authority could not be exercised in the manner most conducive to the public welfare." I have dwelt upon this question of prerogative at length in order that the source and force of the writ of mandamus, not only as it exists to-day, but as it has existed from the earliest stages of its history in the land of its creation, may be thoroughly comprehended. An understanding of the prerogative feature of the English writ will facilitate the tracing of the difference between it and the writ as it runs in these United States. As we have said, the early English writs were commands, writs of direction created and enforced by authority of the royal will, They were not only instruments by which the executive would enforce obedience to existing laws, but they were far more. They were laws in themselves, and laws from which lay no appeal. In those early days the writ of mandamus was not merely declaratory of duty under existant law, but of the law itself. It was the creator of the law and the duty. With the coming of the Edwards these arbitrary writs were to become obsolete, and in their place was to appear a more just, less harsh but quite as efficacious mandamus, and with the change in their nature came a change in nomenclature, for while formerly any mandate was called a mandamus; from the words "vobis mandamus"- -we command youwith which, when the writ was in Latin, the mandatory part began: a differentiation came about, and the mandate proper ceased to be called a mandamus, and this name was applied to that variety of the writ issued by the King's Bench, in the name of the king, which prior to this time had been called special mandamus or the judicial writ. While this writ was not an arbitrary one, in the sense that the more ancient process was, it was still a prerogative writ. In our research, we are able to trace this judicial writ of mandamus to the time of Edward II., at which period we find it occupying an established and powerful position among the flowers of the king's prerogative. The term mandamus was not applied to one specific species of writs, but was the generic name for a class of writs varying in their form and object, but all totally different from the modern prerogative writ which commenced its existence under the term of special mandamus: (Rex v. Gower 2 Salk. 230.) Among the several forms of the ancient writ which have been preserved it may be instructive to note: That mandamus, which lay after the year and day (where in the meantime the writ called Diem clausit extremium, had not been sent out) to the escheator, on the death of the king's tenant in capite, commanding him to inquire of what land holden by knight's service the tenant died seised. Another species was a writ of charge, to the sheriff, to take into the hands of the king, all the lands and tenements of the king's widow, that, against her oath formerly given, married without the king's consent. And the mention of these writs reminds me of the mistake made by a gentleman of my acquaintance whose knowledge of law is large, but whose command of the Latin language is small. He was rapidly searching for the names of the ancient varieties of mandamus, and fell upon the term mandato, panes de. Columbus could hardly have manifested more joy at sight of land than our friend, when he announced that he had chanced upon a hitherto unmentioned form of the writ. You can imagine his disgust when he was told that the words that had so charmed him were simply the designation of the loaves of bread customarily given to the poor on Maundy Thursday: (Chaslular-Glaston, M.S. folio 29). Passing now to the middle English period of our subject, we find that in e tes I the reign of Edward II., as since, mandamus was used in England as the suppletory police power of the kingdom: (Cowper, 378; 2 B. & C. 198 ; Barrows, 1265-1268). It was certainly granted in civil cases (a motion) in this reign and in that of Edward III., and for early instances in which the writ was used to restore municipal officers to their corporate rights, we have many instances in the books: (Rex v. City of Cambridge, 1 Lev., p. 1-119; Rex v. Mayor of Oxford, 2 Salk., p. 428). The antiquity of this writ in civil cases is referred to in a leading case by Lord Mansfield: (Rex v. Askew, 2 Burr. 186). He speaks of a manuscript book of reports which he has seen, and which contained a report of Dr. Bonhams' case in which a mandamus was directed in the time of Edward III. to the University of Oxford, commanding the university to restore a man that "banitus." This case of Dr. Bonhams," says Lord Mansfield, "shows well both the nature and extent of mandamus at that early period." was In the 14th and 15th centuries the writ was in the form of a letter missive of the sovereign. During the latter half of the 15th century the writ was directed to issue on a petition to Parliament for redress. It thus became in form a parliamentary writ, and being then chiefly used to enforce restitution to public officers, was commonly known as the "writ of restitution." The reports, however, offered few instances of its application before the latter part of the 17th century, at which time it was used systematically, not only, as we have seen, to correct official inaction, but for the purpose of setting in motion inferior tribunals and officers. After the years when mandamus was essentially a parliamentary writ, it became an original process, issuable by the Court of King's Bench, in the name of the sovereign, in all cases where there was a legal right and no other specific remedy. The best definition, both from its comprehensiveness and clearness, that we can find of the mandamus of this middle period, is given by Blackstone. He says: "A writ of mandamus is a command issuing in the king's name from the Court of King's Bench, and directed to any person, corporation or inferior court of judicature within the king's domains, requiring them to do some particular thing therein specified, which appertained to their office and duty, and which the Court of King's Bench had previously determined, or, at least, supposed to be consonant to right and justice." It is a high prerogative writ of a most extensively remedial nature (1 Bl. Rep. 352), and might be issued in some cases (but see Tapping, Mand. p. 18) where the injured party had also another, but more tedious method of redress, as in case of admission or restitution to an office; but it issues in all cases where the party had a right to have any. thing done, and had no other specific means of compelling the performance. The writ was grounded on a suggestion of right in the petitioner and a denial of justice, whereupon, to more fully satisfy the court that there is probable ground for its interposition, a rule is made (14 Wall. 166, and cases cited) (except where probable ground is manifest) directing the party complained of to show cause why a mandamus should not issue; and if he shows no sufficient cause the writ itself is issued, at first in the alternative, to do thus or show some reason to the contrary, to which an answer is made at a certain day, and if the respondent shows an insufficient reason, there issues a peremptory mandamus to do the thing absolutely, to which perfect obedience is required. So firmly grounded had the association of prerogative and mandamus become during that period designated by us as Middle English, and so firmly did the English judiciary adhere to the doctrine that mandamus was not a writ of right, that Lord Mansfield expressed the opinion at both the English bench and bar, when he said in a leading case (Rex v. Askew, Burr. p. 2186): "There is no doubt that where a party who has a right, has no other specific legal remedy, the court will assist him by issuing this prerogative writ; but the court ought to be satisfied that they have ground to grant a mandamus, it is not a writ that is to issue as of course, or to be granted merely for the asking" (Rex v. Chester [Bishop] 1 T. R. 396; Rex v. Nottingham Waterworks Co., 6 A. & E. 355). At first these writs were issued by the King's Bench, only in cases in which the king or the public were interested, and for these reasons it was called prerogative and was regarded as not issued as of strict right, but only at the will of the sovereign, and as decided in many leading cases mandamus was strictly and essentially a prerogative writ: (Rex v. Bristol Dock Co., 12 East, 429; Rex v. Baker, 3 Burr. 1267; 1 Blk. Rep. 352, 552; Cowper, 378). Let us now consider the writ during the modern period of its existence. For a score of years, prior to 17th Victoria, signs of change were noticeable in the opinions which were held concerning mandamus and kindred writs. This change was to manifest itself, to the consternation and astonishment of those wedded to the old ideas. In 1854 (17 & 18 Vict.) the Common Law Procedure Act was passed, and the practice and procedure in administering the relief afforded by mandamus were entirely revolutionised. The Act extended the jurisdiction to all the superior courts of the kingdom, which were authorised to grant the relief in connection with any civil action, save ejectment and replevin, the pleadings, practice, and procedure therein being assimilated, as closely as possible, to those prescribed in ordinary civil actions for the recovery of damages. The effect of this sweeping enactment has been to place mandamus proceedings upon much the same footing as ordinary personal actions, and, although the statute expressly preserved the jurisdiction of the King's Bench as formerly exercised, the necessary result of the statute has been the almost total annihilation of the prerogative features of the remedy, reducing it to a personal action for the protection of individual rights. We have now seen royal prerogative diminish to a minor position, when viewed in connection with the remedy we are discussing; but the process of mandamus, the legitimate offspring of prerogative, has endured and grown in force and strength. It has seemed to possess the faculty of adapting itself to every shifting of the current of sentiment and with every flood of liberal ideas it has received the alluvium of enlightenment, as with every ebb it has by erosion lost obsolete or inapt features. Wherein did the early English writ differ from that of the middle period, and in what does the modern writ differ from its predecessors ? The first part of the question requires but little explanation, as the difference is patent, even to a casual observer. The arbitrary features of the writ disappeared, the writ was no longer a law, and a command to obey the self-contained law, but it was based upon law existing de hors the writ. It had become a commandment based upon well-defined anterior enactments. In other features a change had come, the writ had lost the feature which it had thus far shared with its French cousin, the lettre de cachet. Its issuance had passed from the hand of the monarch, through the hands of Parliament into the Court of King's Bench, and it was no more to go forth, save with the consent of those learned in the law of the land. The arbitrary features of the writ disappeared with the Edwards, but for many centuries the prerogative aspects were to remain in full force and effect; even to-day, in these United States, wherein the question of prerogative would not seem to have place, and to a greater extent in England, where it still retains much force, if not legally, then sentimentally, we have not been able to free ourselves of this prerogative fetter, despite the many decisions of our highest court asserting its absolute non-existence. The consideration of the distinction between the two later forms of the remedy, that of Blackstone's, for example, and that of to-day, affords us a most interesting study. The difference is not so much that of form, for after the first centuries of its growth it assumed, in the 17th, a definite shape, and occupied a recognised sphere, which it held till nearly a century after that peerless epitome of English law, which to-day forms the basis of American jurisprudence, was produced by the greatest of legal commentators, Sir William Blackstone, Knight. Indeed, had it not been for 17 & 18 Vict., the writ in England to-day would differ in but little from that used in the time of Edward II. As the difference is not one of form, neither is it one of process, for the modern practice closely follows the ancient rule. Nor is the demarcation that caused by the effect of time upon the reasons for the issuance or withholding of the writ, for then, as now, the chief requisites to warrant the issuance of a writ of mandamus were: 1st. Petitioner must show a legal right to have the action done which is sought by the writ. 2nd. It must appear that the act which is to be enforced by the mandate is that which it is the plain duty of the respondent to perform, without discretion on his part, either to do or refuse. 3rd. That the writ will be availing as a remedy, and that the petitioner has no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy. The difference that engages our attention is more radical, it is one not of practice, form, issuance, withholding or effect, for the last is the same, practically, now as in earliest times. It is a difference in the very essence of the process, a difference that has permeated and affected every fibre of its organisation, and completely changed the nature of the remedy. I can explain the change by a homely illustration. An eccentric man dying, devised to his next of kin, who were rather remote relations, and cared but little for the old man, or that to which he was attached, his old home. This was a large, substantial mansion, situated on a bustling business street of a large city. The dead man had borne a sincere affection for the old house, and could not endure to think of the time when its demolition would come, and the thought that those who were to receive his property might, and probably would, tear down the house, greatly annoyed him. He sent for his lawyer, told him his trouble, and a condition was added to the will, setting forth that should the old house be removed or demolished within a period, that the property should go over to a charity named. Sure enough, the old man was hardly cold when the thoughts of his heirs turned to the erection of a large and modern business block on the site of the old house, but speculation was met by fact. There was the condition. "What legal ingenuity can devise, legal ingenuity can circumvent," is the saying; and in this case it was to prove a true one. I believe that had Adam been a lawyer the garden of Eden would still be the manor of his descendants. The heirs went to work; first the old house was raised and two new storeys built beneath it. This did not violate the condition, at least in the letter, and yet substantially improved the premises, and the new and the old were practically one house. Next year the walls of the old house were strengthened and the front rebuilt, and this did not violate the condition-the building with its old and new parts was one structure. The snow fell again, and in the spring the builders reappeared. This time the roof of the old house was the point of repair, and when the carpenters were done a new roof crowned the structure; and while practically a new and modern building stood in the place of the old man's home, the condition of his will had not been so violated as to cause the heirs to lose their property. (This case occurred in Boston, 1887-1890.) As with the old house so it has been with mandamus; a new writ stands in place of the old, and yet the new is the old adapted to modern needs. To more quickly arrive at the solution of the question, to more understandingly grasp the difference with which we are concerned, let us review the status of mandamus to-day in this country. It has been recognised and incorporated into our constitutions generally, along with other established common law remedies, with no material change from its earliest object and employment; though it has ceased to be looked upon as flowing from a sovereign source, except in the sense that the process usually runs in the name of the State, and the people of the State are theoretically supposed to be present and watching and directing all judicial proceedings. It is used at the present day, as at first, to give relief where ordinary legal procedure, by reason of its defects, gives none, and the same methods characterise its employment, and the same means are resorted to, to make it effective; but the important differences that have arisen exist in the primary source whence it issues, and the extent to which it reaches. When we read Lord Mansfield's definition of mandamus, we can see at once the more important differentiation. He says in a leading case (Rex v. Baker, 1267 Burr.): "This is a prerogative writ, to the aid of which the subject is entitled, upon a proper case, previously shown to the satisfaction of the court. The original nature of the writ and the end for which it is framed direct upon what occasions it should be used. It was introduced to prevent disorder from a failure of justice and defect of police. Thus it might be used upon all occasions where the law has established no specific remedy, and where in justice and good government there ought to be one. Within the last century it has been liberally interposed for the benefit of the subject and the advancement of justice. The value of the matter or the degree of its importance to the public police is not scrupulously weighed. If there is a right and no other specific remedy the writ should not be denied." We can agree with the learned lord as to mandamus being an original proceeding, but the writ is no longer a criminal proceeding, nor can it be superseded by the remedy of prosecution (criminal), nor as formerly by civil action on the case for neglect of duty. Although it is true that in this country, as in England, in some States it retains some of the characteristic features of the original writ, it is in most States regarded as an ordinary action between parties, and though the well-established rules of common law governing the jarisdiction are generally adhered to where such rules are applicable: (Kimbull v. Union Water Company, 44 Cal. 173). The jurisdiction of the courts in administering this remedy, as well as the manner of its employment, have been in many cases greatly modified by statutory enactments. Mandamus is still regarded as an extraordinary remedy (Commonwealth v. Canal Commissioner, 2 P. & W. 2nd ed., 517; Commission v. Alleghany, 16 S. & R. 17; Commonwealth v. Commissioner of Philadelphia, 1 Whart. 1); but in the sense only that it is resorted to only upon extraordinary occasions and when the usual and ordinary modes and forms of procedure are powerless to afford redress to the aggrieved party, and its use is necessary to prevent a failure of justice. Much confusion has resulted from the efforts of some of the courts to attach prerogative features to the remedy as used in the United States. 'This confusion has arisen in the main from a failure to properly discriminate between the English and American systems of government. Under the English Constitution the king was theoretically the fountain and source of justice, and where the law did not afford a remedy by the regular forms of proceedings, the prerogative powers of the sovereign were invoked in aid of the ordinary judicial powers of the courts, and the mandamus was issued in the king's name, and by the Court of King's Bench only, as having the general supervisory power over all inferior jurisdictions and officers. Originally, too, the king sat in his own court in person and aided in the administration of justice, and although he has long since ceased to sit there in person, yet by a fiction of law, he is still so far presumed to be present, so as to enable the court to exercise its prerogative powers in the name and by the authority of the sovereign, and the fact that mandamus was formerly allowed only in cases affecting the sovereign, or the interests of the public at large, lent additional weight to the prerogative theory of the writ. These suggestions are believed to sufficiently explain the statements so frequently made in the reports that the writ of mandamus is a prerogative writ, issuing not of strict right, but at the will of the sovereign, and as an attribute of sovereignty. As confined to the English system, and to the jurisdiction of the Court of King's Bench, those statements in the reports, ascribing to the writ prerogative features, are more nearly correct; but even then there seems to have been, since 1853, a marked tendency to divest the writ of even its sentimental prerogative features, and to treat it as a writ of right. In this country the form of government is essentially different from that of England, and the sovereign will is not exercised upon occasion to meet emergencies. The people crystalise their will into laws for the equal government of all, in advance of cases which arise for their application, and the writ of mandamus does not arise directly from a sovereign, either in fact or theory, except in the sense that by pre-existing law all process runs in the name of the State: (80 Iowa, 229). Indeed, it is extremely difficult to perceive how, in any case, mandamus can be deemed, in any sense, a writ prerogative; even though the power of granting it were confined to a particular court in each State, or to a particular Federal court, whose general functions should correspond to those of the King's Bench, and represent the sovereignty in the same way in which that court does in England, for even though you have this done, where and what is your sovereignty? Certainly not in England do we find it existing. The false premise is fatal to the conclusion sought, and though this theory is sanctioned by a recent writer upon the subject, I believe it untenable. We have reviewed the history of the writ, and noted its growth and the change in its nature. We have watched the divestment of its prerogative and extraordinary qualities, and observed its passage to the various common law courts of England, and we will sum up our work with a definition of mandamus, which shall, as nearly as may be, answer the question with which we began this paper: What is the modern remedy bearing this name? Mandamus is an ordinary, original, personal, civil action, issuing as of right from a court of competent jurisdiction, with the office to compel the performance of a plain personal duty, which the petitioner has shown a clear legal right to have done by the person to whom the writ is sent, and which that person has no discretion, on his part, to do or to refuse to do, though he has neglected or refused to perform it having the power to do it. GUY CARLETON LEE. UNCLAIMED STOCK AND DIVIDENDS IN THE BANK OF ENGLAND. [Transferred to the Commissioners for the Reduction of the National Debt, and which will be paid to the persons respectively whose names are prefixed to each in three months from the date given, unless other claimants sooner appear.] INGLIS (Mary Ann), 110, Jermyn-st, St. James, widow. £460 17s. 4d. £2 15s. per Cent, Consolidated Stock. late Consolidated Three per Cent. Annuities. Claimant, Charles Dickson Inglis, sole executor of the said M. A. Inglis, deceased. Feb. 24. APPOINTMENTS UNDER THE JOINT STOCK WINDING-UP ACTS. AFRICAN GOLD CONCESSIONS AND DEVELOPMENT COMPANY LIMITED.-Creditors to send in, by April 15, their names and addresses and the particulars of their claims, and the names and addresses of their solicitors (if any), to Mr. B. Newstead, 3, Church-passage, Guildhall. the liquidator of the company. Clayton, Sons, and Fargus, 10, Lancaster-pl, Strand, solicitors to the liquidator. AUSTRALASIAN TERRITORIES LIMITED (in voluntary liquidation).-Creditors to send in, by April 10, their names and addresses and the particulars of their claims. and the names and addresses of their solicitors (if any), to Mr. G. C. Harrower, College Hill-chmbrs, 23. College-hill, the liquidator of the company. BEDS AND HERTS LAND BUILDING AND ADVANCE COMPANY LIMITED (in liquidation). -Persons having any debts due from or claims against the above named company to send in, by March 22, the full particulars thereof to Mr. W. Austin, 7, George-st West, Luton, the solicitor for the liquidators. BREMNAES GOLD COMPANY LIMITED (in liquidation).-Creditors to send in. by April 12, their names and addresses and the particulars of their claims, and the names and addresses of their solicitors (if any), to Mr. C. H. Smith, 6A, Austin Friars, the liquidator of the company. BULTFONTEIN SUN DIAMOND MINE LIMITED.-Petition for winding-up to be heard March 10, before the Court sitting at the Royal Courts of Justice, Strand. E. G. Barrett, 11, Poultry, solicitor for the petitioner. Notices of intention to appear on the hearing of the petition must be signed by the person or firm, or his or their solicitor (if any), and must reach the above-named not iater than six o'clock on March 9. BRITISH EXPLORATION COMPANY LIMITED.-Petition for winding-up to be heard March 10, before Mr. Justice Vaughan Williams. Dixon, Watts, and Elkin, Savoy Mansions, the Savoy, solicitors for the petitioners. Notices of intention to appear on the hearing of the petition must be signed by the person or firm, or his or their solicitor (if any), and must reach the above-named not later than six o'clock on March 9. CEFN-Y-VAN ESTATE COMPANY LIMITED.-Creditors to send in, by March 41, their names and addresses and the particulars of their claims, and the names and addresses of their solicitors (if any), to Mr. C. E. Dovey, 31, Queen-st, Cardiff, the liquidator of the company. DEVONIA SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED (in liquidation).-Creditors to send in, by April 10, their names and addresses and the particulars of their claims, and the names and addresses of their solicitors (if any), to Mr. J. H. Goodyear, 31, James-st, Liverpool, the liquidator of the company. GREAT BOULDER EAST EXTENDED GOLD MINES LIMITED -Creditors to send in, by March 31, their names and addresses and the particulars of their claims, and the names and addresses of their solicitors (if any), to Mr. R. Warner, 300, Winchester-house, the liquidator of the company. HARPENDEN FREEHOLD ESTATES COMPANY LIMITED.-Creditors to send in, by March 14, their names and addresses and the particulars of their claims. and the names and addresses of their solicitors (if any), to Mr. W. Briggs, 9, Newsq, Lincoln's-inn, the liquidator. MAZOE DEVELOPMENT COMPANY LIMITED (in liquidation).--Creditors to send in, by May 31, their names and addresses and the particulars of their claims, and the names snd addresses of their solicitors (if any), to Mr. G. G. Walker, the liquidator of the company. MITCHELL AUSTRALASIAN SYNDICATE LIMITED.-Creditors to send in, by April 9, their names and addresses and the particulars of their claims, and the names and addresses of their solicitors (if any), to Mr. J. G. Langton, 6A, Austin Friars, the liquidator of the company. Ingle Holmes and Sons, 20, Threadneedle-st, solicitors for the liquidator. MANCHESTER TUBE SYNDICATE LIMITED.-Petition for winding-up to be heard March 9, before the Lancashire County Court holden at the Court-house, Quay-st, Manchester, at ten o'clock. Sale, Seddon and Co., 29, Booth-st, Manchester, solicitors, agents for Messis. Ashurst, Morris, Crisp, and Co.. 17, Throgmortonav., solicitors for the petitioner. Notices of intention to appear on the hearing of the petition must be signed by the person or firm, or his or their solicitor (if any), and must reach the above-named not later than six o'clock on March 8. NORTH WALES MINING PROPRIETARY LIMITED.-Petition for winding-up to be heard March 10, before the court sitting at the Royal Courts of Justice, Strand. Nicholson, Graham, and Graham. 24, Coleman-st, solicitors for tTe petitioner. Notices of intention to appear on the hearing of the said petition, must be signed by the person or firm, or his or their solicitor (if any), and must reach the above-named not later than six o'clock on March 9. NORTH BORNEO PROSPECTING AND CULTIVATION SYNDICATE LIMITED.-Petition for winding-up to be heard March 10, before the court sitting at the Royal Courts of Justice, Strand. F. J. Abbott, 3, Long-acre, solicitor for the petitioner. Notices of intention to appear on the hearing of the said petition must be signed by the person or firm, or his or their solicitor (if any), and must reach the above-named not later than six o'clock on March 8. NEWMARKET BREWERIES AND WHITE HART HOTEL COMPANY LIMITED. - Order for continuation of voluntary winding-up, subject to the supervision of the court made by Mr. Justice Byrne on Feb. 15. A. Myers, 3, South-sq, Gray's-inn, solicitor for the liquidator. NORTHERN WEALTH OP NATIONS LIMITED.-Creditors to send in, by April 10, their names and addresses and the particulars of their claims, and the names and addresses of their solicitors (if any), to Mr. A. H. Hardy, 5, Angel-ct, the liquidator of the company. Romer and Haslam, 4, Copthall-chmbres, solicitors to the liquidator. S. H. SIDIRE AND CO. LIMITED.-Creditors to send in, by April 8, their names and addresses and the particulars of their claims, and the names and addresses of their solicitors (if any), to Mr. C. H. Cooper, Ogden's-chmbrs, 134, Deansgate, Manchester, the liquidator of the company. Grundy, Kershaw, and Co., 79, Mosley-st, Manchester, solicitors to the liquidator. TIVOLI PALACE LIMITED.-Creditors to send in, by April 15, their names and addresses and the particulars of their claims, and the names and addresses of their solicitors (if any), to Mr. T. Van Putten, Hanway-pl, the liquidator of the company. Campion and Simmons, 90 and 91, Queen-st, solicitors to the liquidator. WATERHEAD LAND COMPANY LIMITED.-Petition for winding-up to be heard March 12, before the Lancashire County Court sitting at the Public Hall. Baillie-st, Rochdale. G. P. Fripp, 18. Clegg-st, Oldham, solicitor for the petitioner. Notices of intention to appear on the hearing of the petition must be signed by the person or firm, or his or their solicitor (if any), and must reach the above-named not later than six o'clock on March 11. CREDITORS UNDER ESTATES IN CHANCERY. BALD (Edward William), Guadalajara, Jalisco, Mexico, formerly of Old Bond-st, Piccadilly, also formerly of Denver, Colorado, and of Los Angeles, California, U.S. and Niagara Falls, Ontario, Canada. May 22; C. W. Dommett and Son, solicitors, 46, Gresham-st. May 31; Mr. Justice Kekewich, at two o'clock. SIDDALL (George), 150, Plymouth-grove, 256, Oldham-rd, and of Smithfield Market, all in Manchester, Lancashire, provision merchant and dealer. April 1; H. Rogers, solicitor, 23, Cross-st, Manchester. April 14; the Registrar of the Liverpool District of the Court of Chancery of the County Palatine of Lancaster 9, Cook-st, Liverpool, at eleven o'clock. CREDITORS UNDER 22 & 23 VICT. c. 35. LAST DAY OF CLAIM AND TO WHOM PARTICULARS TO BE SENT. AKESTER (Mary Elizabeth), Newbegin, Hornsea, East Riding of Yorkshire, spinster. March 31: A. M. Jackson and Co., solicitors, Victoria-chmhrs. Bowlalley-la, Hull. ADAMS (Sydney Herbert) Sampson's Lodge, Oldham, Suffolk, medical student. March 27: Frennell and Newman, solicitors, Hadleigh, Suffolk. ATKINSON (John). 34. Victoria-rd. Tranmere, Cheshire. retired shipwright: and his wife. ATKINSON (Bridget). March 31; W. H. Reinhardt, solicitor, 33, Hamiltonst, Birkenhead. BAILEY (Anna Maria), St. Arnaud, Victoria, widow, who died on July 11, 1885; LAUGHTON (Mary). Salford, Manchester, who died on Nov. 22. 1867; BAILEY (Eva), Indented Head, Bellarine or Drysdale, Victoria, who died on March 23, 1856; BAILEY (William), Rangoon. India, who died on July 2, 1861; BAILEY Alexander William). Northcote. Victoria, gentleman, who died June 19, 1878; BAILEY (Alexander William), Indented Head, Bellarine or Drysdale, Victoria, who died March 9. 1859; BAILEY (Arthur, or Arthur Cole), formerly of Townsvil'e, Queensland, afterwards of 2, Princes-pl. late of 39, Duke-st, St. James's, London, who died Dec. 27, 1876; and BAILEY (Louisa Maria). Avoca, Victoria, who died Feb. 4, 1884. The above-named deceased persons were all members of the same family. March 31: Messrs. Blyth, Dutton, Hartley, and Blyth, solicitors, 112, Gresham-house, Old Broad-st. BROCKHURST (Thomas), Pulborough, and of Harting, Sussex. March 25; T. Brockhurst, one of the executors Harting, Petersfield. JUXTON (Benjamin), Birches Farm, near Hanley, Staffordshire, farmer. March 26; 9, Angel-ct. Throgmorton-st. April 8; Dawes aud Sons, solicitors, BAILEY (Jesse). Bilston, Staffordshire, general dealer. solicitor, Bilston. March 11: J. D. Wassell, BARKER (William). Hutton Rudby, North Riding of Yorkshire, builder. March 27; W. Lowther Carrick, solicitor. Stokesley, York, R.S.O. CHEW (Thomas), the elder, 252, Queen's-rd, Cheetham, and of 4a, Cheetham Hill-rd, both in Manchester, horse-hair and fibre manufacturer and brush material merchant. March 25, Phythian and Bland, solicitors, 27, Brazenose-st, Manchester. GRAKE (Margaret), 36, Studley-rd. Harrogate, Yorkshire, widow. March 31; Riddell, CHARLTON (William). 15, Norwood-st. Kingston-upon-Hull, consulting engineer. CALVERT (Hannah), 6. Stipendiary-st, Leeds, widow. April 15; W. Willey, solicitor, 5, South-parade, Leeds. CROCKER (Charles), 51, Friday-st. gentleman. April 12; Phelps, Sidgwick, and Biddle, solicitors, 22. Aldermanbury. CLARK (Sarah_Anne), formerly of Kegworth, Leicestershire, late of Chescombe, Durdham Down, Bristol, widow. March 31; F. J. Clark, solicitor, 5, Unity-st, Bristol. CORRY (Rev. William Frederick Corry De Bentley), Bengeworth. Evesham, Worcestersbire, clerk in holy orders. April 6; Eades and Son, solicitors, The Abbey, Evesham. CARR (Jane), 5, Gloucester-st, Belgrave-rd, S. W., widow. March 25; Roopers and Whateley, solicitors, 17, Lincoln's-inn-flds. CLARKE (Kezia). Green Farm, North Piddle, Worcestershire, widow. April 3; Curtler. Davis, and Curtler, solicitors, Worcester. CHAPLIN (William Augustus), 3, Gloucester-sq, Hyde Park, and of Wyndham Lodge, Melton Mowbray, gentleman. March 25; H. Robartes, Esq., the agent of the executors, 65, Gresham-st. Park, Nelson, Morgan, Ferguson, and Davie, solicitors. 11, Essex-st, Strand. CONINGHAM (Charles Stuart), 17, Pall Mall. March 27; Angrove and Bromwich, solicitors, 14. Great Winchester-st. Cox (William Alfred). 2, Mulgrave-rd, Sutton, Surrey, surgeon and medical practitioner. March 26; Spencer, Gibson, and Son, solicitors, 61, High-st, Sutton, Surrey. CAMPBELL (Colin), 26, North Park-rd, Bradford, Yorks, who carried on bussness as manufacturer and merchant under the style of Campbell and Co at 46, Vicar-la, Bradford. March 26; Humphreys and Hirst. solicitors, 5, Harrison-rd, Halifax. CHAMBERLAIN (Ann), 1. Bridge-rd, West Batterses, Surrey, widow. March 30; Whitakers and Woolbert, solicitors, 12, Lincoln's-inn-fids. COCKRANE (Robert), West Hartlepool, Durham, clothier. March 9: J. Hunter, 74, Church-st, West Hartlepool. J. R. Fryer, solicitor, West Hartlepool. DAY (Eliza Slade). 53, Adelaide-rd, Hampstead, widow; April 5; Coode, Kingdon, and Cotton, solicitors, 34, Eedford-row. DAVIES (Margaret). The Elms, Wigan. Lancashire, spinster. March 31; Woodcock, Stobart, ahd Pears, solicitors, 36, King-st. Wigan. DELL (Levi), Denmark House, East Cowes, Isle of Wight, Southampton, formerly a gas manufacturer. April 6; W. J. Bailey, jun, solicitor, Newport, Isle of Wight. DEAKIN (Henry), formerly of the Telegraph Hotel, Shepherd's Bush, late of the Oaklands, Horsham-rd, Dorking. Surrey. March 29; H. J. and T. Child, solicitors. 2. Paul's Bakehouse-ct, Doctors' Commons. DAVIES (William Trevelyan Somerset Kevill), Moor Hall, Shropshire, gentleman. late captain in Her Majesty's Army. March 22; Weyman and Weyman, solicitors, Ludlow. Salop. DAVIS (Jane), Charleton Mackrell, near Somerton, Somerset, formerly of 2, Althorpeter. Upper Tooting, Surrey, spinster. April 7; E. Flux and Leadbitter, solicitors, 144, Leadenhall-st. EVANS (John). 91. Park-cres, North Shields, Northumberland, fish merchant. April 2; Dickinson, Miller, and Dickinson, solicitors, 97, Howard-st, North Shields. EATOCK (William). 3, Mill-la, Daisy Hill. Westhoughton. Lancashire, retired farmer. EVANS (Rev. Albert Eubule), Kirk Hallam, Derbyshire, clerk in holy orders. June 1: FORSTER (Anthony). 6, Anglesea ter. St. Leonard's-on-Sea, Sussex. gentleman. HARRIS (Llewellyn Boult), Ashtead, Surrey, gentlemen. April 8; Dawes and Sons, solicitors, 9. Angel-et, Throgmorton-st. HOWLETT (Henry), Aslacton, formerly of Beeston, St. Andrew, both in Norfolk, farmer. HOTHAM (Augustus Thomas), 17, Calverley-pk, Tunbridge Wells, Kent, gentleman. HOBLYN (Cyril Onslow Peter), Colquite. Bodmin, Cornwall, gentleman. March 6; HUXLEY (Joseph), 44, Dale End, Birmingham, Warwickshire, grocer. March 25; JONES (David William), 178, High-st, Dowlais, Glamorganshire, outfitter. April 1; JOHNSON (Henry), Bingham, Nottinghamshire, wine and spirit merchant. March 29; KING (William), 24, Lincoln's-inn-flds, and of Acacia-av, Addlestone. Surrey, actuary. KNIGHT (Mary), Church Villa, Harrow, widow. April 1; Tozer, Whidborne, and Tozer, solicitors, Teignmouth. LYSONS (Joshua). Pendlebury, Lancashire. April 2; Bowden and Widdowson, solicitors, 19, Brazennose-st, Manchester. LANGRISH (William), Bitterne, Southampton, yeoman. April 3; F. I. and J. C. Warner, solicitors, Jewry-st. Winchester. MORGAN (Richard), Bridgend House, Llanguryfon, Cardiganshire, grocer. April 1; J. Davies, solicitor, Townhall. Aberystwith. MOORE (William Henry), 74. North-st, Brighton, Sussex, tobacconist. April 1; T. A. Goodman, solicitor, 9. North-st. Brighton. MOODY (Henry), the Tower, Pitsmoor-rd, Sheffield. mining engineer and a member of the firm of Moody Brothers and Co.. of Clydach, Glamorganshire, colliery proprietors. April1; Smith, Smith, and Elliott, solicitors, Meeting House-la, Sheffield MARTIN (Fanny Wilson), Manor Cottage, High Beech, near Loughton, Essex, widow. April 6: F. R Nott, solicitor, 6, New-inn. MUNDAY (Richard White), Horn hotel, Braintree, Essex, licensed victualler. April 7; F. Smoothy, solicitor, Braintree, Essex. MARRIOTT (Elizabeth). 9, Henrietta-villas, Bath, Somersetshire, spinster. April 20; G. S. Pearce, solicitor, 14, New Bond-st, Bath. NEILL (Lucy Mary), formerly of 165, Newington-causeway, late of Beer Alston, near Tavistock, Devonshire, spinster. May 1; G. and F. East, solicitors, 10, Basinghall-st. NEAL (Robert), 16, Cleveland-parade Darlington, Durham. April 3; Steavenson and PURNEY (Blanche), 17. Lady Somerset-rd, Kentish Town, spinster. April 1; Saxton PUGH (Edward), Guilsfield, Montgomeryshire, gentleman. March 25; C. H. Howell, RAWSTHORNE (Margaret), Whasset, near Milnthorpe, Westmorland, spinster. SWATMAN (Francis John), King's Lynn, Norfolk, gentleman. April 24; Archer and SALTMARSHE (Mark Alfred) 1, Comeragh-rd, West Kensington, physician and surgeon. April 10; N. M. Saltmarshe, the widow, 1, Comeragh-rd. R. A. Harding, solicitor, 16, Ab hurch-la, Cannon-st. STAPLETON (Joseph Whitaker). Rossye Lodge, Central-hill, Upper Norwood, Surrey, TAYLOR (Ésiza), 55, Thistlewaite-rd, Lower Clapton, spinster. March 22; Steavenson and Couldwell, solicitors, 93, Gracechurch-st. THORPE (Charles Henry), Bowling Green hotel, Bradford, Yorkshire. licensed victualler. March 29; J. Freeman, solicitor, Queen Anne-chmbrs, Sunbridge-rd, Bradford. TIMBRELL (Aubrey Augustus), 24, Martin's-la, Cannon-st, and of 202, High-rd, Leyton, Essex, sol.citor. April 10; Vincent and Vincent, solicitors, 20, Budge-row, Cannon-st. THORNE (Susan), Cruwys Morchard, Devonshire, widow. April 2; R. S. Crosse, solicitor, 25, Broad-st, South Molton, Devon. UNITE (George Richard), Blackwell Court, near Bromsgrove, Worcestershire, and of the firm of George Ünite and Sons, of 69, Caroline-st, Birmingham, silversmiths. April 2; J. B. Clarke and Co., solicitors, 40, Waterloo-st, Birmingham. UZIELLI (Thérèse Rosalie), Hanover Lodge, Regent's Park, widow. March 31; Thomsons, Brooks, and Danby, solicitors, 63, Cornhill. VERNON (Lieut.-Col. George Augustus), Harefield Park, Uxbridge. March 31; Lowe and Co., solicitors, 2, Temple-grdus, Temple. WARKINER (Eralé), 64, Holland-pk, gentleman. April 10; Meek, Jackson, and Jackson, solicitors, Devizes. WILSON (Dr. Thomas Watkins), 71, Philbeach-grdns, retired surgeon of Her Majesty's Indian medical service. March 18; Waddilove and Johnson, solicitors, 23, Knightrider-st. Doctor's-commons. WATERHOUSE (Thomas), Armstrong's hotel, Bradford, Yorkshire, licensed victualler. WEEKS (James), formerly of 13, Endwell-rd, Brockley, Kent, late of 16, South-st, WILDY (Augustus Samuel), formerly of 3, Threadneedle-st, late of 116, Regent's Park-id, gentleman. April 5; A. C. Beattie, solicitor, 119 and 120, London-wall. WELCH (Janies), 55, King William-st, and of 20, London-rd, both in Blackburn, Lancashire, watchmaker and jeweller. March 27; Malam Brothers, solicitors, Exchange Flags, Blackburn. WOODCOCK (Henry Cleever), Rearsby, Leicestershire, gentleman. March 24; R. B. Berridge and Sons, solicitors, 8, Friar-la, Leicester. |