debt would have ranked after them but before the simple contract creditors, and that the Crown were not affected by the Act; and it was submitted that the cases on executors' retainer were analogous to the position of the Crown debt as against the simple contract creditors, and that the rights of specialty creditors were not taken away except for the purpose of ascertaining, in the first instance, what dividend should be paid to the specialty and all the simple contract creditors pari passu. On behalf of the simple contract creditors, it was contended that the Act was intended to reduce specialty creditors for all purposes to the level of simple contract creditors, and that the case of Re Williams (28 L. T. Rep. 17; L. Rep. 15 Eq. 270) favoured their contention. Held, that, if there was any difference in the views entertained by different judges as to the object of the statute in question, the view expressed by Kay, J. in Re Jones; Calver v. Laxton (53 L. T. Rep. 855; 31 Ch. Div. 440) was preferable, and that the position of the Crown resembled that of an executor seeking to retain his simple contract debt, and that the fund available for the simple contract creditors must bear the Crown debt.

[Re Bentinck; Bentinck v. Bentinck. Ch. Div.: Stirling, J. March 13, 16, and 17.-Counsel: Graham Hastings, Q.C. and J. D. Davenport for the specialty creditors; Buckley, Q.C. and Methold for the simple contract creditors: Cunliffe for the executors. Solicitors: Cunliffes and Davenport; R. S. Taylor, Son, and Humbert.] Copyright-Picture-Licence to reproduce on Wood-Assignment of Copyright. This was an action by an artist for an injunction to restrain the proprietors and publishers of a magazine called the Idler from infringing his registered copyright in a certain picture by the publication in the magazine of a photograph of the picture and for damages. It appeared that the plaintiff had allowed the Graphic to publish a wood engraving of his picture, for which he received £21, giving a receipt in the following form: "Received of the proprietors of the Graphic the sum of twenty-one pounds for the wood engraving copyright of the picture, &c." This receipt was not registered, and was the only evidence of any assignment of copyright. It was, however, contended for the defendants that by giving this receipt the plaintiff had parted with the whole of his copyright in the picture, and could not, therefore, maintain the action. Held, that the copyright remained in the plaintiff, and that he could maintain the action, his Lordship saying that he was not aware that any Copyright Act contemplated more than one unseverable copyright vesting and passing on assignment as one whole and indivisible copyright, but that the receipt was, in effect, merely a licence to reproduce on wood. The plaintiff was awarded £25 damages and costs.

[Smith V. New Publishing Company Limited. Ch. Div.: Kekewich, J. March 18.-Counsel: Willis Bund and Baines; Renshaw, Q.C. and Kerly. Solicitors: Withalls and Belton; Kerly, Son, and Verden.]

Local Government-Street-Urban Authority-Public Health Act 1875 (38 & 39 Vict. c. 55), s. 149.-This was an action by the Salt Union and the Droitwich Salt Company against J. P. Harvey and Co., to restrain the defendants from laying down or permitting to remain pipes for the conveyance of brine under certain streets in Droitwich. The plaintiffs were the owners of property abutting on the said streets, and as such owners claimed to be entitled to the soil of the roads subject only to rights of way, &c. The defendants, under a licence from the Corporation of Droitwich, had laid the pipes in the macadam of the streets about 18 inches below the surface. The defendants contended (inter alia) (1) that the absolute ownership in the streets was vested in the -corporation under a charter of King John, and subsequently confirmed by a charter of King James I.; and (2) that under the Public Health Act 1875, s. 149, which provides that all streets being, or which at any time may become, repairable by the inhabitants at large within any urban district, and the pavements and stones and other materials thereof, and all building implements and other things provided for the purposes thereof, shall vest in and be under the control of the urban authority, the soil of the streets was vested in the corporation as urban sanitary authority, and that the corporation were consequently entitled to lay the pipes or grant licences for so doing. The plaintiffs alleged (1) that Doomsday Book showed that the ville of Droitwich did not belong to the king in his demesne, and that therefore the streets could not have vested in the corporation under a grant from the king; and (2) that the corporation were not entitled to lay pipes for trade purposes under the streets under the Public Health Act 1875. Held, (1) that the grant in the charter of King John of whatever we may have in that town," i.e. of Droitwich, did not vest the streets in the corporation, as it appeared from Doomsday Book that the town did not belong to the king in his demesne; and (2) that, under the Public Health Act 1875, s. 149, there was no vesting of property in the corporation in the ordinary sense in which the word is used in reference to lands conveyed by one man to another, but only a vesting quâ street. The title of the corporation was therefore of no avail to protect the defendants, and as there was a presumption of ownership in favour of the plaintiffs ad medium viæ, there must be an injunction to restrain the defendants from laying the brine pipes or permitting them to remain if laid.

[The Salt Union Limited v. Harvey. Ch. Div.: Kekewich, J. March 18.-Counsel: Renshaw, Q.C., Warmington, Q.C., and E. R. Moore; Haldane, Q.C., Warrington, Q.C., and A. Adams. Solicitors : Ashurst, Morris, Crisp, and Co.; Chester and Co., for Ivens and Morgan, Kidderminster.]

Practice-Solicitor and Client-Taxation of Costs-Solicitor Mortgagee of Client-Joint Application by Solicitor and Client-Submission to pay.

On the 30th Oct. 1896 A. de Svatchkoff took out a summons against

At

Messrs. Battams and Hutchinson, who had been his solicitors, for delivery of certain bills of costs, a cash account, and for taxation. this time, a receiving order having been made against Mr. Svatchkoff, the court required Mr. Parkinson Harker (Mr. Svatchkoff's present solicitor), who claimed to be mortgagee of all moneys coming from Messrs. Battams and Hutchinson, to join in the application, which he accordingly did. On the 21st Jan. 1897 the court ordered delivery of the bills of costs and cash account, directing the rest of the summons to stand over. Bills and cash account were accordingly delivered; but, being considered insufficient, the applicants on the 19th Feb. 1897 moved for delivery of the bills and cash account, &c., when all the bills were ordered to be taxed. During these proceedings Mr. Svatchkoff became bankrupt. In drawing up the order of the 19th Feb., the registrar required both applicants to make the usual submission to pay whatever should be found due to Messrs. Battams and Hutchinson. Mr. Harker being unwilling to make the submission, now moved to vary the minutes of the order and to be relieved from making the submission to pay. Held, that the order could not be allowed to go unless Mr. Harker joined in the submission to pay.

[Re Battams and Hutchinson. Ch. Div.: Kekewich, J. March 19. -Counsel: Eustace Smith; Stephen Lynch. Solicitors: Edward Swain; John Battams.]

Settled Land Act 1882 (45 & 46 Vict. c. 38), ss. 22, 24, 37-Sale of Heirlooms Investment of Proceeds in Purchase of Land-Land purchased not subject to Charges on other Land comprised in Settlement.-By a settlement made in 1866 certain freehold estates were settled, after the death of John, then Duke of Marlborough, and subject to a jointure payable to his wife, to the use of George, the late Duke of Marlborough for life, with remainder to the use of his first and other sons successively in tail male, and by the same settlement certain pictures were settled as heirlooms, the trusts being that the trustees thereof should allow the same to be used and enjoyed so, far as the rules of law and equity would permit, by the person or persons who should, for the time being, be in the actual possession or in the receipt of the rents and profits of the freehold settled estates, but so as not to vest absolutely in any person thereby made tenant in tail by purchase unless such person should attain twenty-one. The settlement contained certain powers of chargiug jointures and portions, some of which had been exercised. In 1884 some of the pictures were sold by the late Duke of Marlborough under the powers of sect. 37 of the Settled Land Act 1882, and a portion of the purchase money was invested in the purchase of two freehold houses in Leadenhall-street, London, which were conveyed unto and to the use of the trustees of the settlement in fee simple upon the trusts, and subject to the provisoes, provisions, agreements, and declarations contained in the settlement upon, with, and subject to which the same ought to be held as proceeds of trust moneys under the Act. The present Duke of Marlborough, who was the only son of the late duke, shortly after attaining twenty-one, barred the entail in the settled estates and also any entail which might be subsisting in the houses in Leadenhall-street, and subsequently the trustees of the settlement conveyed the said houses to him in fee simple. The present duke, having contracted to sell the said houses, the purchasers raised the objection that, under sect. 24 of the Settled Land Act, the said houses became subject to the charges to which the freehold settled estates originally comprised in the settlement were subject. Held, that, as the houses were purchased with the proceeds of the sale of heirlooms which were not subject to the charges, the houses were not so subject.

[Re Contract between the Duke of Marlborough and the Governors of Queen Anne's Bounty. Ch. Div.: Romer, J. March 19.-Counsel: Levett, Q.C. and W. C. Druce; W. E. Capron. Solicitors: Milward and Co.; The Solicitor of Queen Anne's Bounty.] Specific Performance-Sale of Public-house-Transfer of LicenceObligation on Vendors-9 Geo. 4, c. 61, 88. 11, 14-5 & 6 Vict. c. 44, s. 1. -By an agreement in writing the defendants, W. and others, agreed to sell, and the plaintiffs, the T. B. Company, agreed to purchase, a freehold house and shop with the off beer-licence held by one of the defendants thereto, for the price of £725, and it was further agreed that, if the licence or magistrates' certificate in respect of the said house and shop should be indorsed or otherwise affected prior to the completion of the purchase, the agreement should, at the option of the plaintiffs, be at an end. The plaintiffs postponed the completion, and then, without previously consulting the vendors, or obtaining any indorsement of the licence, or asking the vendors to attend or assist the plaintiffs, applied to the magistrates for temporary authority until the next transfer day to carry on the licensed business in the name of their nominee. The magistrates declined to give this temporary authority. The plaintiffs claimed to have the agreement set aside and the deposit money returned. The defendants counter-claimed for specific performance of the contract. Held, (1) that the licence could not be said to have been "affected" by what passed, within the meaning of the contract, the application having been made in an irregular manner; (2) that under the contract there was no obligation on the vendors to procure from the magistrates the temporary authority for carrying on the business, and that they were not bound to do more than, if asked, to join with the purchasers, or authorise them to use thier name, in the application to the magistrates for the interim protection and transfer of licence; and (3) that the plaintiffs having failed in their contention, the defendants were entitled to specific performance of the contract, which they had in no wise broken, but had always been able, ready, and willing to perform.

[Tadcaster Tower Brewery Company v. Wilson. Ch. Div.: Romer, J. March 17.-Counsel: Farwell, Q.C. and Butcher; Neville, Q.C. and R. J. Parker. Solicitors: Emmet and Co., agents for Leeman, Wilkinson, and Badger, York; Clarke and Blundell, agents for J. Richardson, Bradford.]

QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION. Banker-Crossed Cheque-Forged Indorsement-Collection for Customer -Customer's Account overdrawn-Protection to Banker-Bills of Exchange Act 1882 (45 & 46 Vict. c. 61), s. 82.-Appeal from a decision of the learned judge of Dartford County Court. It appeared that one Fisher, who was a customer of the defendant bank, received on behalf of the plaintiff, who was also a customer of the same bank, a cheque for £43 68., drawn by one Scott on the Bank of England, and made payable to the plaintiff or order. Fisher, having forged the plaintiff's name to the cheque, paid it into the defendant bank for collection, and the bank, having collected the cheque, placed the amount to the credit of Fisher less the sum of £19, by which sum Fisher's account at the bank was at the time overdrawn. At the hearing it was contended, on behalf of the plaintiff, that the fact that part of the proceeds of the cheque were applied by the defendants to the payment of the debt due to themselves from Fisher, deprived them of the protection given to collecting bankers by sect. 82 of the Bills of Exchange Act 1882, which provides that, "where a banker in good faith and without negligence receives payment for a customer of a cheque crossed generally or specially to himself, and the customer has no title or a defective title thereto, the banker shall not incur any liability to the true owner of the cheque by reason only of having received such payment." The learned County Court judge held that the defendants were entitled to the protection of the section. The plaintiff appealed. Held (affirming the decision of the County Court judge), that the fact that the account of the customer was overdrawn did not prevent the bankers from receiving payment of the cheque in good faith for the customer. They were therefore protected by the section.

[Clarke v. London and County Bank. Q. B. Div.: Cave and Lawrance, JJ. March 15.-Counsel: for the plaintiff, Morton Smith; for the defendants, Cock, Q.C. and Guy Lushington. Solicitors: for the plaintiff, Pike and Parrott, for J. and J. C. Hayward; for the defendants, Harries, Wilkinson, and Raikes.] Insurance-Ship-Master legal Owner-Alleged casting away by Master -Rights of Master's Mortgagee-Barratry.-Action on two policies of insurance on the barque J. S. The plaintiffs were the executor and executrix of one S. S. W., the son-in-law of S. S., was the master of the J. S., and he bought, with money advanced by S. S., twenty-six sixty-fourths of the barque. As a security for the loan he gave S. S. a mortgage of the twenty-six sixty-fourths, and as a further security he agreed that the barque should be insured by him in such an amount as would, in case of her loss at sea, cover the loan. The barque

was insured by the ship's husband in ordinary course in such an amount, but W., in directing the insurance, gave no intimation as to the persons for whose benefit it was to be effected. Afterwards the ship was lost. The defendants, who were the insurers thereupon, paid the other co-owners of the barque their proportion of the insurance money, but they refused to pay S. S. or his representatives anything, alleging that, in the first place, the insurance had not been effected for the joint benefit of S. S. and W., but merely for the benefit of W. and the other legal owners; and, in the second place, granted that it had been effected for their joint benefit, yet W. had wilfully cast away the ship, and that thereby any claim S. S. had was vitiated. By direction of the Court, the questions (1) whether or not the insurance was effected for the joint benefit of S. S. and W., and (2) whether or not, assuming a joint insurance, the alleged casting away of the barque by W. would, if proved, constitute a good defence to an action on the policy by S. S. or his representatives, were tried before the question whether W. actually did cast away the barque. As to (1), the Court held on the facts that the insurance was for the joint benefit of W. and S. S. As to (2), it was contended for the defendants that the master here was legal owner of the share of the barque in which S. S. was interested. He was not the servant of S. S. The master himself could not recover on the insurance, neither could S. S., since the master was trustee for him, and the loss had been caused by the master's act. Barratry was a fraud upon the owners by the master. Here the master was owner as far as S. S.'s claim was concerned. For the plaintiffs it was contended that the principle on which the case should be decided was that no one should benefit by his own wrong. The master here could not recover for his own benefit, but he could sue and recover for the benefit of an innocent mortgagee or other person interested in the insurance. Here, however, W., in insuring the barque, had acted merely as agent for the real owners, and the action lay in their name. Further, it was admitted that, assuming the master cast away the barque, that was barratry as against the co-owners, assuming the master to be part owner. The act of casting away being barratrous, the whole loss arose through barratry, and every body innocent of the barratry was entitled to recover according to his interest under the policy. Held, that the assumed casting away of the barque by the master would, even if proved, not be a good defence to the plaintiffs' claim.

[Small and others v. United Kingdom Marine Mutual Insurance Company. Q. B. Div., Commercial Court: Mathew, J. March 11 and 15.-Counsel: for the plaintiffs, T. G. Carver; for the defendants, Joseph Walton, QC. and J. A. Hamilton. Solicitors: Warriner and Co., for Davis and Lloyd, Newport; Waltons, Johnson, Bubb, and Whatton.]

Insurance-Ship disabled at Port on Voyage-Necessary Repairs Damage resulting to Cargo-General Average.-Plaintiffs' claim was for a general average contribution in respect of certain goods, part of the cargo of the H. G., which were damaged under the following circumstances: The H. G. left B. A. for N. with a cargo of goods, which were to a large extent of a perishable nature. In crossing the bar at B. A. the ship grounded, but it was not thought she was injured.

When, in the course of the voyage, she arrived outside the port of L. P. it was found that her screw had slipped and become stuck, and it was necessary to have her towed into the harbour. At L. P. there were no vessels into which her cargo could be transshipped, and no storehouseswhere it could be preserved. The master resolved to have the ship "tipped," in order to have the screw put right. Tipping is accomplished by means of alterations in the water ballast, by which the bow of the shipis depressed and the stern raised. The tanks in the bow part of the ship were filled with sea water through the sea pipes for this purpose. Unknown to the master one of the sea pipes had been injured, probably when the ship grounded, and was not watertight. The sea water, when the tanks were being filled, escaped through this pipe into the cargo, and did the damage in question in this action. This damage was not discovered until the ship reached its destination (N.). The plaintiffs now claimed general average contribution from the defendants, on the ground that the tipping of the ship at L. P. was necessary for the general benefit of the ship and cargo; that it was an operation calculated to cause damage to the cargo; and that any damage caused by it was a general average sacrifice necessary for the prosecution of the undertaking, and therefore for the benefit of everyone interested in it. For the defendants it was contended that the ship was in no danger when it was laid up at L. P.; that tipping is an ordinary proceeding in the management of a ship; and that if there was a sacrifice for the general benefit it was not voluntary. Held, that, under the circumstances, tipping was a general average act; and that the damage, though not actually foreseen, yet, as it was such as might reasonably arise from the tipping, was voluntary, and amounted to a general average sacrifice.

[McCall and Co. Limited v. Houlder and Co. Q. B. Div., Commercial Court: Mathew, J. March 11 and 12.-Counsel: for the plaintiffs, J. Walton, Q.C. and Hollams; for the defendants, Boyd, Q.C. and Dawson Miller. Solicitors: Hollams, Son, Hawksley, and Coward; W. A. Crump and Son.]

PROBATE, DIVORCE, AND ADMIRALTY DIVISION. PROBATE BUSINESS. Administrator and Receiver pendente lite-Probate Act 1857 (20 & 20 Vict. c. 77), ss. 70, 71-Suit in Chancery against AdministratorCreditor of Testator's Estate-Motion by Administrator to restrain Chancery Proceedings-Judicature Act 1873 (36 & 37 Vict. c. 66), 8. 24sub-sect. 5.-In a probate suit, wherein Stephen Luther Martin and Alfred Somerville Augustus Dodson, as executors, propounded the will of James Toleman, deceased, and probate was opposed by the defendants, Richard Toleman and Richard James Toleman, two nephews of the testator, an order for an administrator and receiver pendente lite was made on the 14th Dec. 1896, and on the 21st Dec. 1891 Mr. Eustace Booker, chartered accountant, was duly appointed. On the 23rd Feb. 1897 an originating summons in the Chancery Division was taken out by one, Westwood, who claimed to be a mortgagee and creditor of tho testator's estate, and he asked, as against Mr. Booker, who was made defendant in those proceedings, that an account might be ordered in respect of a certain tramway in or near London; that a certain mortgage might be declared valid and subsisting; that accounts might be taken of what was due thereunder; and, for a sale of the property comprised in the said mortgage. The plaintiff Westwood admittedly had received notice of the appointment of Mr. Booker before he made him defendant in the Chancery proceedings. Mr. Booker entered an appearance under protest, and a summons had been taken out to strike out that appearance. On the 8th March the administrator brought the matter to the notice of the President (in chambers), asking for directions. Counsel, on behalf of the administrator and receiver pendentelite, now moved the court (1) "that the respondent Westwood, the plaintiff in the action in Re Toleman; Westwood v. Booker, may be restrained from suing the administrator pendente lite and receiver herein without the leave of this court, and from in any way interfering with the discharge of his duties as such officer, and from doing anything inconsistent there with; (2) that, if necessary, directions be given for an application to be made for the final stay of such action; (3) that all costs occasioned to the administrator pendente lite and receiver and to the other parties to this action may be taxed as between solicitor and client, and paid by the respondent Westwood; and (4) that such further or other order be made in the premises as to this court shall seem fit." The grounds put forward in support of the motion were: (a) That Mr. Booker, being an officer of this court, no proceedings could be taken against him without leave of the court, and that anyone who doestake proceedings against him without such leave is guilty of contempt of court; (b) that no action lies in Chancery against a limited receiver or administrator; and (c) that if Mr. Westwood had any complaint against the administrator and receiver pendente lite, he ought, under the Judicature Acts, to bring it before the Probate Court to avoid multiplicity of actions. The plaintiffs in the probate suit supported the motion. On the other hand, it was contended, on behalf of the respondent (who had been served with short notice of motion, by leave of the President), that the motion was misconceived; that the respondent had a perfect right to bring his action in the Chancery Division, and, without leave, to make the administrator and receiver pendente lite defendant in that action; and that, although under the Judicature Acts, there was nothing to prevent questions relating to the validity of a mortgage or questions of account from being tried in the Probate Division; still, such a course might be found inconvenient from want of the necessary machinery. Moreover, the Judicature Act 1873, s. 24 (5), was conclusive against granting an injunction in such a case as the present. Held, that the Chancery proceedings could not be restrained by a judge of this court by injunction; that leave be given to

the administrator and receiver pendente lite to defend those proceedings; that it be left to him to take the objection, if so advised, that those proceedings ought not to have been taken against him without leave, and the judge of the Chancery Division would be left to deal with that objection, if it should be raised. The administrator would have to apply for his costa in this court, and also in the Chancery proceedings; the executors, also, would have their costs out of the estate. Leave was granted to the administrator to appeal against this decision, on the one point of want of jurisdiction to restrain.

[In the Goods of James Toleman, deceased. P. & D. Div.: The President (Sir F. H. Jeune). March 22.-Counsel: for the applicant, Bargrave Deane, Q.C. and Ashton Cross; for the executors, Priestley and R. Bayford; for the respondent, Sir W. Phillimore and J. M. Stone. Solicitors for the applicant and the executors, Henry Pumfrey; for the respondent, Baillie and Cato.]

Probate Practice-Presumption of Death-Merchant Shipping Act 1894 (57 & 58 Vict. c. 60), ss. 255, 256, 257, 695-Evidence.-Upon a motion for leave to swear the death of an intestate, it appeared that the presumed deceased sailed on the 1st April 1896 as second mate on board a small steamship called the St. Mawe's Castle from Holyhead bound for Perth in Western Australia. She was to make the voyage under sail,

and arrived at Capetown on the 3rd July 1896. She left Capetown on the 11th July 1896 in continuation of her voyage to Perth, W.A., but nothing had since been heard of her, and her underwriters had paid the £1600 insurance money upon her as for a total loss. The affidavit of the secretary to the Western Australian Steam Packet and Transport Company Limited, her owners, besides stating these facts, set forth that "the said company duly deposited the list of the crew of the said ship, as required by the Merchant Shipping Act 1894, s. 255, in which the deceased was stated to have been serving on board the said ship as second mate at the time and to have been supposed drowned. The paper writing now produced and shown to me is the certificate of the Registrar-General of Shipping and Seamen to the above effect." This exhibit was as follows:-" General Register and Record Office of Shipping and Seamen, Custom House, London, E.C.-Certified statement relating to the supposed death of a seaman by reason of loss or supposed loss of a vessel. This is to certify that the list of crew' required by sect. 255 of the Merchant Shipping Act of 1894 to be furnished by the master or owner of a lost or abandoned ship, has been deposited in this office in respect of the St. Mawe's Castle, of Manchester, Official No. 92,233, in which the vessel is described as not heard of since this date-11.7.96, Capetown, supposed to be lost, and in which Adam Dodd, of English nationality, aged twenty-five, is stated to have been serving on board the said vessel in the capacity of second mate at the time and to have been supposed drowned.'-Dated this 11th day of Feb. 1897. J. Clark Hall, Registrar-General of Shipping and Seamen. Examined by P. C. H. J. Office fee, fourpence." Two affidavits by relatives deposed to their belief that Adam Dodd was dead. Held, under the provisions of the Merchant Shipping Act 1894 (57 & 58 Vict. c. 60), ss. 255, 256, 257, and 695, that the copy certificate above set forth was evidence which was admissible and upon which the court must act in presuming that Adam Dodd was on board the said vessel at the time when she left the port of call and when she was believed to have been subsequently lost with all hands. The Court consequently granted the application, and gave leave to the next of kin to swear that Adam Dodd died on or since the 11th July 1896.

6

[In the Goods of Adam Dodd, presumed deceased. P. D. and A. Div. The President (Sir F. H. Jeune). March 22-Counsel: DurleyGrazebrook. Solicitors: Ridsdale and Son, agents for Humphrey Davies, Liverpool.]

OUR LITERARY COLUMN.

STORIES FROM THE LAW REPORTS. XV. THE STORY OF ONE OF THE WORLD'S GREATEST TEACHERS, WHOM A LEARNED LORD CHANCELLOR CONSIDERED UNFIT TO TEACH HIS OWN CHILDREN.

(From Shelley v. Westbrooke, Jac. 266, n.)

JOHN SCOTT, the son of William Scott, the coal-fitter, had the arrogance to lift his eyes toward Bessy Surtees, the daughter of Aubone Surtees, the banker. The Surtees family did not stoop to visit the Scott family, for bankers and coal-fitters were, in 1772, considered at Newcastle to be the opposite extremes of the tra ling world.

But Bessy, who was the beauty of Newcastle, loved John Scott, who was a tall, handsome young man, with black eyes, regular features, and most pleasing manners; he was a Christian and a gentleman at heart; and barring the questions of birth and wealth, entirely unexceptionable; but these were sad impediments to the match.

Bessy had come out at a Newcastle ball, where John was; but he had not dared to ask her hand in the dance on that occasion. He had been biding his time. But he used to meet her surreptitiously when she rode in her native county; he used to "happen " to see her passing in Hyde Park when she went up to London, for when she went to town he somehow went too; and their interviews, though short and secret, had been enough to give him true intelligence of the condition of her heart. They never could, in her relations' eyes, be anything to one another; but to each other they were already declared lovers.

John Scott, we have said, had been biding his time; but now his time had come. It was night and John stood at the foot of a ladder which led

to his lady's window. The ladder had been provided by John's friend, Wilkinson, an apprentice in the shop of Clayton, the clothier, which was under the residence of Mr. Surtees. In a few minutes Bessy descended into her lover's arms.

She confided herself utterly to him; and he for his part resolved that she should never regret that she had trusted in him. "The man who would ever give the woman, who thus confidingly ran away with him, any cause for subsequent unhappiness would indeed," thought he, "be a pitiful and despicable scoundrel."

After some peril of being discovered and stopped, they reached a post chaise which was in waiting for them. They took the road by Morpeth to Coldstream; and next morning they reached the village of Blackshiels, close to Fala, only two stages from Edinburgh. Here they were married, on the 19th of November 1772, by the clergyman of an Episcopal congregation at Haddington.

The third day of the marriage found them with funds exhausted, with no home to receive them, and doubtful whether their friends would ever speak to them again.

But the marriage, which neither family had desired, could not be undone; and loving parents forgave them. A small sum of money was settled upon them by both of the families. In January 1773, in case there should be any doubt about the validity of the Scotch marriage, the ceremony was again performed in London, in the parish of St. Nicholas; and, less than a fortnight later, John was called to the Bar by the Honourable Society of the Middle Temple.

In September 1811-nearly forty years after the events which we have been describing-another eloping couple crossed the border which separated the land where speedy and secret marriage was difficult, to the land where it was easy, as an immense number of similar couples had crossed it in the interval.

The present pair presented a vastly different appearance from that which John Scott and Bessy Surtees presented, although they were like them in their runaway match, and like them in their poverty.

Scott was a man of the world, of business capacity, robust, and vigorous to look upon. The present bridegroom was very young, and of an almost girlish aspect. His head was quite uncommonly small, covered with abundant wavy hair, dark brown, and of a very wild growth. His face was of a fair colour, with small features, an infinite play of expression, and a certain seraphic look. His eyes were the most remarkable thing in him, eyes with a "fine frenzy "--but not "rolling," on the contrary unusually fixed, and hardly ever so much as winking-" stag eyes," in which there shone the light of genius. This

His companion was not less of a contrast with Bessy Surtees. bride was no county beauty, the belle of many a ball, and the rejector of many suitors, as Bessy was, She was a mere school-girl to look uponbut beautiful in her own fashion too, " with a complexion brilliant in pink and white, and hair like a poet's dream." Her eyes followed the eyes of her intended husband with confiding trust.

These two had been travelling, of course, incog., but when they came to Edinburgh they declared their true names, that so they might be validly married according to the law of Scotland.

Their names were of no public interest then, but half a century later they were in all men's mouths. For the bride was Harriet Westbrook, and the bridegroom was Percy Bysshe Shelley.

They were married, then, according to Scottish law; but, like John Scott and Bessy Surtees, they were not contented in after years with this marriage only. When Shelley came of age, in 1813, he married his wife again in an Episcopal chapel in Edinburgh; and yet once again-misdoubting the validity of Scottish law-they were married, in 1814, in that church which has seen so many remarkable marriages-St. George's, Hanover-square, in London.

In the year 1817, the two eloping husbands stood face to face in the High Court of Chancery.

John Scott had now become Lord Eldon and his Majesty's Lord High Chancellor. Percy Bysshe Shelley had become something greater still, for he had written "Alastor," and stood already with the Immortals.

The question for the Court was, whether the poet or Harriet's father should have the care of the poet's motherless children. For Harriet was dead-had committed suicide-had thrown herself into the Serpentine.

By the law of England a father has the right to the custody of his own children, unless cause to the contrary be shown. But it was said that the father in this case was unfit to be the custodian of his own children.

It seems strange now to read of it. Shelley stands now high above all praise as one of the world's greatest teachers. The music of his wonderful verse is ringing, and will ever ring, through the ages with a message which teaches men something of the glory which lives in the possibilities of the soul of man, and something of the meaning which that glory gives to the visible glory of Nature's universe; and we hear this message alike in the fullest magnificence of his burning tragedies, and in the most exquisitely gentle utterings of his lyric muse-a muse which seems, like his skylark, to pour her full heart "in profuse strains of unpremeditated art."

Yet Lord Eldon, who held one of the highest offices known to the established order of things, which Shelley abhorred, and who was a faithful servant of the Church of England, and was a reverent believer in the faith which Shelley blasphemed, was not without his reasons for pronouncing, as he did pronounce, that Shelley was "unfit" to take care of his own children.

thought of Bessy, and how he had thought then that the man who would ever give the woman who thus confidingly ran away with him any cause for subsequent unhappiness would be indeed a pitiful and despicable scoundrel. Bessy had never had cause for regret that she married John Scott; and, though it was now three-and-forty years since their elopement, Bessy was yet dearer to the Lord Chancellor than she had been to the penniless youth. The elopement of Shelley and Harriet was not yet six years old; and Shelley had deserted his wife, who post hoc, if not propter hoc, had drowned herself. If you had said, "Yes, but Shelley married her because of her love for him, and not because he had a passion for her," Lord Eldon would have said, "So much the more reason why any man of chivalry should not have been a traitor to the woman whose love he had won and had accepted." And his desertion of her was not all. It had been immediately followed by a state of things for which the Chancellor could have but one name: the name of adultery.

Were then the poet's principles better than his conduct? Lord Eldon knew his principles only by "Queen Mab" and the author's notes thereto, which violated every principle which Lord Eldon held most sacred.

Even the modern world which appreciates Shelley and recognises that not only is the poet one of England's greatest glories, but that the man had in him much that was loveable and something that was actually heroic— even the modern world will allow to Lord Eldon that from the slender knowledge of the man which he had when he was judging his case, it was not altogether unpardonable to hold him "unfit" to have the teaching of the very young.

The deserter of Harriet-the author of " Queen Mab" (not the whole of Queen Mab to which the reader inclines favourably for the many beauties which even the nineteen-year-old poet could impress upon his work, but such parts as counsel chose to read)-the man who recognised no authority human or divine-stood upon one side of Lord Eldon, and on the other side stood the image of a little child.

This is what the Chancellor said :--

"I have read all the papers left with me and all the cases cited.

"I have carefully looked through the answer of the defendant, to see whether it affects the representation made in the affidavits filed in support of the petitions and in the exhibits referred to of the principles and conduct in life of the father in this case. I do not perceive that the answer does affect that representation, and no affidavits are filed against the petition.

"Upon the case as represented in the affidavits, the exhibits, and the answer, I have formed my opinion, conceiving myself, according to the practice of the court, at liberty so to form it in the case of an infant, whether the petition in its allegations and suggestions has or has not accurately presented that case to the court, and having intimated in the course of the hearing before me that I should so form my judgment.

"There is nothing in evidence before me sufficient to authorise me in thinking that this gentleman has changed, before he arrived at twentyfive, the principles he avowed at nineteen. I think there is ample evidence in the papers, and in his conduct, that no such change has taken place.

"I shall studiously forbear in this case, because it is unnecessary, to state in judgment, what this court might or might not be authorised to do in the due exercise of its jurisdiction, upon the ground of the probable effect of a father's principles, of any nature whatever, upon the education of his children, where such principles havs not yet been called into activity or manifested in such conduct in life as this court, upon such an occasion as the present, would be bound to attend to.

"I may add that this case differs also, unless I misunderstand it, from any case in which such principles, having been called into activity, nevertheless in the probable range and extent of their operation, did not put to hazard the happiness and welfare of those whose interests are intrusted to the protection of this court.

"This is a case in which, as the matter appears to me, the father's principles cannot be misunderstood, in which his conduct, which I cannot but consider as highly immoral, has been established in proof and established as the effect of those principles: conduct, nevertheless, which he represents to himself and others, not as conduct to be considered as immoral, but to be recommended and observed in practice, and as worthy of approbation.

"I consider this, therefore, as a case in which the father has demonstrated that he must and does deem it to be a matter of duty which his principles impose upon him, to recommend to those whose opinions and habits he may take upon himself to form, that conduct in some of the most important relations of life as moral and virtuous, which the Law calls upon me to consider as immoral and vicious conduct which the law animadverts upon as inconsistent with the duties of persons in such relations of life, and which it considers as injuriously affecting both the interests of such persons and those of the community.

"I cannot, therefore, think that I should be justified in delivering over these children for their education exclusively to what is called the 'care' to which Mr. Shelley wishes it to be intrusted.

If I am wrong in the judgment which I have formed in this painful case, I have the consolation to recollect that my judgment is not final.

"I add, that the attention which I have been called upon to give to the consideration how far the pecuniary interests of these children may be affected, has not been called for in vain. I should deeply regret if any act of mine materially affects those interests. But to such interests I cannot sacrifice what I deem to be interests of greater value and higher importance."

This was the "justice sold, truth trampled, Nature's landmarks overthrown," of which Shelley's indignant protest, now in every English library, complained. It is possible to sympathise with the poet and yet not to allow that "his country's curse necessarily rests upon the Chan

The Yearly Abridgment of Reports, by Mr. Arthur Turnour Murray (Butterworths) is an addition to the many works now published to facilitate the reference to reported cases. All the reports are included in this abridgment with the useless addition, in our opinion, of "a selection from the Scotch and Irish Reports." Scotch and Irish cases are very rarely cited in English courts of justice. Half the publication is composed of the names of cases and an index, whereas the abridgment contains a digest of cases and their names. The period covered is 1896. The digesting is carefully done, but we doubt the utility of giving lists of the cases cited in argument. Completeness, and not brevity, appears to be aimed at, and in this Mr. Murray is undoubtedly successful.

NEW EDITIONS.

William Clowes and Sons Limited have re-issued Serjeant Pulling's The Order of the Coif. To those who care about the antiquities and history of the law the learned serjeant's work is a familiar volume. The chronicle of the serjeants has much to do with the growth and development of our law. There is nothing new in this re-issue, and we have consequently nothing to add to our appreciation of the work long since formed and expressed.

Mr. Garrett's very useful compendium on The Law of Nuisances (Wm. Clowes and Sons Limited), first published in 1890, has now reached its second edition. Scarcely any branch of our statute law grows so rapidly as that affecting local government and sanitary matters. This growth, since 1890, has required Mr. Garrett to make very extensive alterations, particularly in chap. xi., which deals with minor statutory nuisances, and he has had to quote 250 fresh cases. To all intents and purposes this is a new book-the old one must be obsolete. Mr. Garrett may be accepted as a perfectly safe guide.

We

Our familiar friend Grant's Law of Banking is now in its fifth edition, under the editorship of Messrs. Claude Plumptre and J. K. Mackay (Butterworth and Co.). Every effort appears to have been made to bring it up to date as an authority. quite agree that it would not have been expedient to incorporate the Bills of Exchange Act. That is really a subject for a separate treatise, and should no more be adopted bodily than the Companies Acts. It is highly desirable to keep volumes on special subjects within moderate compass. This our editors have succeeded in doing without, so far as can judge, omitting anything necessary to the completeness of the treatise.

BOOKS RECEIVED.

we

COUNTY COURTS.

SITTINGS OF THE COURTS.

FOR THE WEEK ENDING SATURDAY, APRIL 10.

Alston, Friday, at 12

Altrincham, Wednesday

Appleby, Saturday, at 1

Ashford, Monday, at 10

Ashton-under-Lyne.* Thursday

Aylesbury, Wednesday

Aylsham, Friday, at 11.30

Barton-on-Humber, Saturday, at 10
Bath, Thursday, at 10
Beccles, Tuesday
Belper, Monday, at 10
Birkenhead, Tuesday

Birmingham, Monday (Adj.), Tuesday
(Adj.), Wednesday (Adj.), Thursday
(Adj.), and Friday (Adj.), at 10
Bishop Auckland. Tuesday, at 10
Blackburn, Monday, at 10

Blackpool, Wednesday, at 10

Blandford, Friday, at 10

Bourne, Monday, at 1

Bow, Monday and Friday

Bradford (Wilts), Friday, at 10

Liverpool, Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, and Thursday, at 10; Friday (Bky and Adm.), at 11

Louth, Thursday, at 10
Lowestoft, Wednesday

Ludlow, Wednesday, at 10
Lutterworth, Saturday, at 10
Lynn, Thursday, at 10

Macclesfield,* Wednesday (Contract, not exceeding £2)

Malvern, Friday, at 10

Manchester, Monday, Tuesday, Thursday,
and Friday, at 10
Mansfield, Monday, at 10
Melton Mowbray,* Friday, at 11
Middlesbrough, Monday, at 10
Mold, Friday

Narberth, Tuesday
Newcastle-on-Tyne, Friday (Bky and J.S.),

at 10

Newcastle-under-Lyme, Tuesday, at 9.30
Newport (I. of W.). Wednesday, at 11

Bradford (Yorks), Wednesday (Reg.), Newport Pagnell, Friday

at 10

Dewsbury, Tuesday, Wednesday, and Southampton, Tuesday, at 11

Croydon, Tuesday

Derby, Tuesday, at 10

Devizes, Monday, at 10

Southend, Thursday, at 11

Southport, Tuesday, at 10
South Shields, Thursday, at 10

Southwark, Monday, Tuesday, and Thursday, at 10.30

Spalding, Monday, at 11.30
Spilsby, Friday, at 10

Stamford, Wednesday, at 1
Stockport, Friday

Stoke, Monday, at 9.30
Stourbridge, Wednesday and Thursday,

at 10

Stratford-on-Avon, Monday, at 11.30
Sunderland, Thursday (Reg., Bky)
Swaffham, Tuesday, at 11.30
Swindon, Tuesday, at 10

Great Grimsby, Tuesday, and Wednesday Taunton, Thursday, at 10

Favershamn, Friday, at 10

Garstang, Saturday, at 11

Glossop, Tuesday

Grantham, Tuesday, at 10

(Reg., Bky), at 10

Temple Cloud, Saturday, at 10.30
Thirsk, Wednesday, at 10
Thorne, Friday, at 11

Hull, Monday, Wednesday, Thursday, Wellington (Somerset), Monday, at 11

and Friday (Bky)

Hyde, Wednesday

Kettering, Monday, at 10

Kingston-on-Thames, Friday, at 10

Kirkham, Friday, at 10.30

Westbromwich,* Friday, at 10 Westminster, Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, and Friday

Whitchurch,* Saturday

Whitechapel, Tuesday, Wednesday, Thurs-
day, and Friday

Wigton, Monday, at 11
Wincanton, Tuesday, at 11.30
Winsford, Thursday
Wirksworth, Thursday, at 11.30
Wisbech, Monday, at 10
Wolverhampton, Monday, at 10
Woolwich, Wednesday, at 10.30
Worksop, Tuesday, at 10
Yarmouth, Thursday and Friday
York, Tuesday, at 9.30.

* Other sittings are specially fixed if necessary.

COVENANT-LEASE-" CHARGES"-RATES AND

TAXES.

AT the Marylebone County Court last month, before his Honour Judge Stonor, Tubb v. Leon was heard.

Brinton for plaintiff; Neilson for defendant.

His HONOUR delivered the following judgment: The only question in this case is whether the word "charges interposed after the words "rates and taxes" and before the word " assessments," contained in a

covenant by a lessee with a lessor, and followed by no other words restricting or enlarging their ordinary signification and operation is sufficient to include a sum of money expended by the lessor in executing certain works for the abatement of a drain nuisance in obedience to an order of the. Paddington Vestry under the Public Health (London) Act 1891 (54 & 55 Vict. c. 76), which expenses are not charged or chargeable on the premises demised, but only on the lessor personally. The precise words of the covenant are as follows: "That the lessee, his executors, administrators, and assigns, will pay the rent without any deduction whatsover except the landlord's property tax, and also will pay the sewers rate, metropolitan main drainage, and all other rates and taxes, charges, and assessments whatsoever except as aforesaid." It is a somewhat remarkable circumstance in the present case that the covenant does not contain either of the ordinary qualifications which are found in most, if not all, the leases set out in the reported cases, viz., the insertion after the words, "rates, taxes, charges," &c., of the words upon the premises demised," or of the words "in respect of the premises demised." The first qualification which is restrictive in its operation is one which, if not expressed, must, I think, be implied ex necessitate in every case, and its omission is therefore immaterial. The second qualification is nowise necessary. If used alone it is restrictive, but if preceded by the first it manifestly enlarges the operation of the covenant. It might also possibly be implied on the ground that a covenant must always be construed most strongly against the cevenantor. However, this may be, in the case of Tidswell v. Whitsworth (36 L. J. 103, C. P.) the words were substantially the same as in the present case, except that the word "charges" was not used, but the word "impositions," (a word, in my opinion, of wider meaning) was used in its place, and the words "in respect of the premises were also used; and in the charges case of Rawlings v. Brigg (3 C. P. Div. 368) both the words " and "impositions" were used, and also the words "on the premises or in respect thereof." and the Court held that the covenantors in both cases were not liable to pay to the lessors expenses incurred by them substantially in the same manner as the expenses for which the plaintiff now sues, and gave no wider interpretation to the covenants on account of the additional words. The two cases I have cited, therefore, appear to me to be clearly in point, and to be even stronger than the present. With regard to the actual intention of the parties as to the operation of this covenant, it is difficult to speak with certainty; but as a nuisance like that now in question might arise wholly or partly through a structural defect or other cause for which the lessee was not answerable, it probably was not the intention of the parties to render the lessee liable for expenses which might be so occasioned, but only to render him liable for the ordinary well-known pecuniary charges upon the premises, and to secure to the lessor the receipt of the rent feee from any deduction in respect of such charges only; and on the whole I have come to the conclusion that this was the actual intention of the parties. The cases I have cited seem, however, to render it almost unnecessary to consider the question of intention in the present case. With regard to the numerous cases in which the courts have held the lessees to be liable under covenants of this kind, the covenants seem always to have contained words of special and wider significance, such as "duties," "outgoings," &c., or else expressions showing that the intention of the parties was to extend the operation of the covenants to charges or expenses which were not charged on the demised premises, but were charged personally on the lessor, or even in some cases on "any person in respect of the premises" (which latter words, if strictly construed, would include even a ground or mesne landlord not a party to the lease) and these cases are, I think, clearly distinguishable from the present. See the cases of Hartley v. Hudson (4 C. P. Div. 367), Budd v. Marshall (5 C. P. Div. 481), Aldridge v. Ferne ( 17 Q. B. Div. 212), Smith v. Robinson (1893) 2 Q. B. 53), and Brett v. Rogers (13 Times L. Rep 175). I, therefore, find for the defendant with costs.

AT the Birkenhead County Court, on the 19th March, his Honour Judge Wynne Ffoulkes dealt with an application to review the registrar's taxation of certain charges claimed by the high bailiff for keeping possession in respect of a levy made by him under an execution, and a distress for rent pursuant to sect. 160 of the County Courts Act 1888, where in con sequence of bankruptcy proceedings supervening the sale had been stopped. It appeared that separate poundage for keeping possession-which includes expenses of removal, storage of goods, and all other expenses--was claimed on the warrant, and also on the distress for rent, both processes being for amounts exceeding £20, and sufficient goods to satisfy both having been seized. The charges on the former were allowed by the registrar, but on the latter he taxed off £2 on the ground that four of the days on which possession was held under the distress were concurrent with the possession on the warrant.

Matheson (Thomson, Hughes, and Matheson) now appeared for the high bailiff, and pointed out that sect. 160 required the bailiff or officer making the levy to distrain, in addition to the levy, for the rent and the costs of such distress. It is provided that such costs "shall be the same as would have been payable if the distress had been an execution of the court," and he, therefore, submitted that the high bailiff was entitled, as the section expressly enacted that "no other fees shall be demanded or taken in respect thereof," to charge the poundage on each process; subject to the limitation, with respect to each proceeding, prescribed by Schedule A., Part I. of the Treasury Order regulating Court Fees and Form 163 in the Appendix to the County Court Rules. He also desired to point out that the poundage prescribed for