WE have before us the draft "Judicial Trustee Rules" under the Judicial Trustees Act 1896 (59 & 60 Vict. c. 35), which comes into operation, by virtue of sect. 6, on the 1st May 1897, on which day, also, the rules are expressed as intended to come into operation. The rules are thirty-six in number, and there is a schedule of fees. They are made under sect. 4 of the Act, which directs that, "Rules may be made by the Lord Chancellor, subject to the consent of the Treasury as to fees, and to the consent of the authority for making orders under the Solicitors' Remuneration Act 1881 as to the remuneration of solicitors," for carrying the Act into effect," and especially" in relation to eleven matters designated by eleven sub-sections, as to assigning jurisdiction under the Act to County Courts, "for facilitating the discharge by the court of administrative duties under this Act without judicial proceedings, and otherwise regulating procedure under this Act and making it simple and inexpensive," "for preventing the employment by judicial trustees of other persons at the expense of the trust, except in cases of strict necessity," and otherwise, as by reference to the eleven sub-sections will more particularly appear. We propose to deal with the whole set of rules in a subsequent issue. Meanwhile, we may state that the rules provide that any premium payable to a guarantee company on account of its security may, if the court so directs, be paid out of the income of the trust property; that every judicial trustee is to pay all money coming into his hands on account of his trust without delay to the trust account at some bank approved by the court; and that the County Court jurisdiction is limited in amount to £500, and locally to courts having bankruptcy jurisdiction. We hasten, also, expressly to transcribe the most important rule of the set (No. 5), which is as follows: (1.) The court shall not be precluded, by any existing practice as to the appointment of trustees, from appointing any person to be a judicial trustee, by reason of that person being a beneficiary, or relation, or husband or wife of a beneficiary, or a solicitor to the trust or to the trustee or any beneficiary, or a married woman, or standing in any special position with regard to the trust. (2.) A person may be appointed to be a judicial trustee of a trust although he is already trustee of the trust. It is impossible to exaggerate the importance of the second clause of this rule. THE grave objection taken by Sir EDWARD CLARKE, in the debate in the House of Commons on the Irish Financial Question, to members of the Judiciary being invited to accept seats on any future commission for the adjustment of the financial relations between Great Britain and Ireland, seems only a reflection of the views of Lord ESHER, the Master of the Rolls, with reference to the inadvisability of judges stepping outside the sphere of their strictly judicial duties and taking part in Royal Commissions. Speaking on the 9th Nov. 1892, at the Guildhall Banquet, Lord ESHER thus referred to the acceptance by Mr. Justice MATHEW of a seat on the Irish Evicted Tenants' Com mission: "The education and training of judges made them impartial and determined to do what was right in every question that came before them. This was indeed so well known and recognised that, when the judges of England acted within the scope of their ordinary duties, nobody ever attempted even to suggest that they were not impartial. At the present time, however, they knew that one of the judges had been asked to go beyond the scope of his ordinary duty, and he, for one, was surprised and sorry that the judge in question had consented to do so. The result was inevitable. The judge had been fiercely accused already of partiality, or of a want or desire to do justice. But he could safely say that, throughout his close experience of twenty-four years, there had not been a judge of the English Bench who had shown, at any time or in any position, any other feeling or desire than that to be absolutely impartial and to do right. He was quite ready, . therefore, to vouch for the integrity of the particular judge to whom he referred." THE draughtsman of the Court of Criminal Appeal Bill seems to have done his work in a rather perfunctory way. In the fifth section he confers certain rights on a defendant sentenced to be flogged. In the second section he confers certain other rights on a defendant convicted on an indictment. No one would ever suppose that the word "defendant" without any qualification meant the same thing as the phrase "defendant convicted on an indictment." Yet, according to the interpretation clause, both expressions mean the same thing. Then the sixteenth section provides that "the Acts mentioned in the schedule to this Act shall be repealed to the extent in the third column of that schedule specified." Naturally one turns to the "schedule to this Act" in the expectation of finding an array of statutes some entirely and some partially repealed. But, when the schedule is examined, it will be found not to mention Acts at all, but only one Act; and, when the third column is scrutinised, it will be found that, instead of the limited repeal implied by the words "to the extent in the third column of that schedule specified," the repeal extends to the whole Act. Now, it certainly seems to us that the phraseology of this projected enactment would be much improved if, instead of using two conflicting expressions for the same idea, viz. that of a defendant convicted on an indictment, the proper qualification were used in every case, and the cumbrous interpretation omitted; and that, instead of the pompous announcement about the repeal of Acts that are not even mentioned, the schedule should be abrogated and the enactment specified as repealed in the body of the Bill. PERSONS become Jesuits and members of other Roman Catholic orders in this country at very great peril. For it is enacted by sects. 28 and 34 of the Roman Catholic Relief Act 1829 (10 Geo. 4, c. 7), that, " in case any person within any part of this United Kingdom become a Jesuit, or brother or member of any other religious order, community, or society of the Church of Rome, bound by monastic or religious vows, such person shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanour, and, being thereof lawfully convicted, shall be sentenced and ordered to be banished from the United Kingdom for the term of his natural life." Mr. HEALY is pressing for the repeal of this and other sections of the Act of 1829 by a Statute Law Revision Bill, and Mr. BALFOUR has referred him to the Statute Law Revision Committee; but it is a matter of some doubt whether their repeal would fall within the scheme of Statute Law Revision as at present framed. Other curious provisions of the Act, it may be observed, such as that by which every Roman Catholic bishop is liable to a penalty of £100, and every Roman Catholic ecclesiastic who shall wear the habits of his order save within the usual places of worship of the Roman Catholic religion, or 66 in private houses, is liable to a penalty of £50," are, by sect. 38 of the Act, enforceable only by proceedings taken by the Attorney-General; but it appears to be open to any one of HER MAJESTY's subjects to indict all the Jesuits and Roman Catholic monks in any of the three kingdoms, and obligatory on any of HER MAJESTY'S judges before whom such indictment may be tried, to pronounce sentence of banishment for life upon a convicted offender. THE Post Office Consolidation Bill, which has passed through Committee in the House of Lords, and is identical with that which passed the Joint Committee of the two Houses on Statute Law Revision Bills and Consolidation Bills, except that two clauses have been altered to give effect to the repeals in connection with the law of quarantine effected by the Public Health Act of last session, repeals wholly or in part twenty-nine enactments, from 9 Anne, c. 11, to the Post Office Amendment Act 1895. The Joint Committee reported last year that the Bill then before them conformed with the lines for Consolidation Bills laid down by them, “inasmuch as it reproduced the existing enactments with such alterations only as are required for uniformity of expression and adaptation to existing law and practice, and did not embody any substantial amendment of the law." It may be suggested as desirable that at least one substantial amendment of the law may be incorporated in the Bill, and that is a clause allowing persons who may be charged with any offence against the Bill to give evidence on their own behalf. An amendment to this effect, moved by the Attorney-General and accepted by the House of Commons without dissent (as it probably would be), might expedite the passing of the general Bill to the same effect which has for the last fifteen years been introduced by successive law officers. Ir a town councillor disobeys the direction of sect. 22 (3) of the Municipal Corporations Act 1882, to the effect that a councillor shall not vote or take part in any proceedings in which he has directly or indirectly any pecuniary interest, what proceedings can be taken against him? This question has been recently raised in Truth, and considering that sect. 22 of the Municipal Corporations Act applies to county councils by virtue of sect. 75 of the Local Government 1888, it is one of far-reaching importance. If the interest arises from a contract, not being a contract for a lease or advertisements, or on the part of a company in which the councillor is a shareholder (as specially excepted in sect. 12 (2) of the Act of 1882), the councillor is beyond doubt ipso facto disqualified by the contract, and liable to the penalty for acting notwithstanding disqualification, which is imposed by sect. 41 of the Act. But in other cases considerable difficulty may arise. A correspondent of Truth boldly puts it that the peccant councillor is liable to amotion, and we incline on the whole to think that this view is correct. But Reg. v. Mayor of Ryde (28 L. T. Rep. 628), is at first sight, at any rate, indirectly opposed to it. In that case an alderman had been actually amoved (see the resolution of amotion in the report of the case) for disobeying repealed direction of the Municipal Corporations Act 1837 which is precisely similar to the existing direction of sect. 22 (3) of the Act of 1882, and the resolution was afterwards rescinded upon it being discovered that the illegal voting complained of had taken place before the re-election of the alderman. An application to the court for a writ of restitution was refused as unnecessary, and Mr. Justice BLACKBURN took occasion to remark that the alderman had been "improperly sentenced to removal." We cannot take these words to mean that amoval for voting in spite of interest and in contravention of a statute was unjustifiable in principle. The proper construction of them surely is that amoval under the circumstances as stated to the court was unjustifiable. In the Local Second Sheet. Government Act 1894, we may observe, a penalty is expressly imposed by sect. 46 on a parish or district councillor or guardian voting on a matter in which he is interested, but there is no such express penalty in the Act of 1882, so that without amotion the case cannot be properly met, unless, indeed, the chairman of the council can face the question by disallowing the vote of the interested councillor, and even this would not prevent his taking part in the proceedings. Only amotion could effect that. ALLEN v. FLOOD. When Hawke had Dunn with Hawkins, J., "What is a place?" is not a theme But, as the Chief was ill down West, A red-robed, solemn band, The Bar, with nought on earth to do, To be, p'rhaps, fined by Hawkins, J., What retribution this would be For spinning out a cause! McNeill declared that the blockade Swore he would rescue Crete. The most enchanting airs, Then Lumley really felt for Gye, North, J. told Hawkins he should try As ends will do, it came at last; The judges slowly rose. SOLICITORS' COSTS-A WARNING. SOLICITORS should notice the very important point recently decided by the Court of Appeal, in Coburn v. Colledge (noted post, p. 531), in which the question arose as to whether the effect of sect. 37 of the Solicitors Act 1843 was to cause the Statutes of Limitations to run from a period of a month after the delivery of the bill of costs, or whether, on the other hand, time began to run from the date of the completion of the work. The above-named section provides in effect that no solicitors shall commence an action for the recovery of their charges until the expiration of a month after delivery of a bill of such charges. The question arose under circumstances of so common a character that it seems curious that this point has never been decided. The client instructed the solicitor to do certain work, which was completed on the 29th May 1889. On the 7th June following the client left this country. On the 12th June, acting on request, the bill of costs was delivered at the client's house, but in point of fact did not reach him till 1891. The client returned to England last year, and the writ was issued against him in June last. The facts admitted of several views being taken. Thus the client contended that the effect of the section mentioned was only operative upon the remedy, and that it had no effect upon the cause of action. The solicitors, on the other hand, argued that their cause of action was only ripe one month after the delivery of the bill. The client being at this time out of the jurisdiction could be dealt with on the lines formulated by sect. 19 of 4 Anne, c. 16; that is, by bringing the action upon his return within the period limited for bringing such actions by the old Act of 21 Jac. 1, c. 16, s. 3, viz., six years. The result would therefore be to make time run from 1896. Yet another view was, that the effect of sect. 37 was to place the cause of action upon bills of costs in a state of suspended animation until the period of a month had expired. The Court of Appeal eventually held that solicitors were in the position of ordinary members of the community, and were entitled to be paid for the work they were instructed to perform upon its completion. Sect. 37 was intended merely to impose a time barrier between the performance of the work and the payment thereby earned. Some additional confirmation for this view can be adduced by glancing at sect. 2 of the Legal Practitioners Act 1875, whereby judges of the Superior Courts are empowered to authorise solicitors in bringing an action for their charges, although the period of a month has not elapsed, on proof of probable cause for believing that the party chargeable is about to quit England, or to become bankrupt, or a liquidating or compounding debtor, or about to take steps tending to defeat or delay the solicitor's payment. This enactment assumes that the cause of action sprang into existence at a date prior to the month specified, but could not be, apart from special leave, consummated by litigation until after its completion. The result was, therefore, that the solicitors were deprived of their costs, inasmuch as the work was completed as already mentioned on the 29th May 1889, and the period allowed consequently expired in 1895. The expression "cause of action has been repeatedly under the notice of the Courts. Thus Lord Justice Lindley, in Reeves v. Butcher (65 L. T. Rep. 329; (1891) 2 Q. B. 509), holds that they arise "at the time when the debt could first have been recovered by action. The right to bring an action may arise on various events; but it has always been held that the statute runs from the earliest time at which an action could be brought." Again, in Read v. Brown (60 L. T. Rep. 250; 22 Q. B. Div. 228), Lord Esher defines 66 cause of action as denoting "Every fact which is necessary to be proved to entitle the plaintiff to succeed-every fact which the defendant would have a right to traverse. It does not comprise every piece of evidence which is necessary to prove each fact, but every fact which is necessary to be proved in order to succeed." The case shows, therefore, that solicitors having any reason to believe that their client is about to go abroad, would be well advised in using, without hesitation, the machinery supplied by the Legal Practitioners Act 1875 in obtaining payment of their charges before the month has expired from delivery of their bill. PERMANENT ALIMONY. PERMANENT alimony is that provision made for a wife after the final decree in a matrimonial suit has been pronounced; it is sometimes, however, spoken of as "permanent maintenance." By sect. 32, of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1857 (20 & 21 Vict. c. 85) power is given to order a gross or annual sum of money to be secured for the wife for a term not exceeding her own life; but the court has no power to order that a sum of money standing in the names of husband and wife in a savings bank should be paid to the wife, but it can order the husband to secure the same to the wife: (Rowbotham v. Rowbotham, 1 S. & T. 190). Again, by the Matrimonial Causes Amendment Act 1866 (29 & 30 Vict. c. 32) it is enacted that "the court may, on pronouncing any decree for a dissolution of marriage, order that the husband shall to the satisfaction of the court secure to the wife such gross or annual sum of money as the court may deem reasonable." Where the husband has no property on which the payment of any such gross or annual sum can be secured, but nevertheless he would be able to make a monthly or weekly payment to the wife during their joint lives; in every such case the court is empowered to make an order on the husband for payment to the wife during their joint lives, of such monthly or weekly sums for her maintenance and support as the court may think reasonable; but the court may, when it is satisfied that the husband is unable to make the payments, discharge or modify the order, or temporarily suspend the same as to all or any part of the money so ordered to be paid, and again revive the same order, wholly or in part. By rules 84-88, 91-103, 189-192, and 214-218, regulating the divorce and matrimonial causes made under the provisions of 20 & 21 Vict. c. 85, 66 23 & 24 Vict. c. 144, 32 & 33 Vict. c. 62, and 38 & 39 Vict. c. 77, where a wife has obtained a final decree of judicial separation, and on such decree being affirmed on appeal, or after the expiration of the time for appealing against the decree, if no appeal be then pending, she may apply to the court by petition for allotment of permanent alimony, though no alimony shall have been allotted to her pending the suit; and the rules from 84 and 88, both inclusive, of the rules and regulations for this court, bearing date the 26th Dec. 1865, relating to petitions for alimony pending suit as varied by these and other additional rules and regulations, shall, so far as the same are applicable, be observed in respect to the proceedings upon such petitions for permanent alimony": (rule 192). The answer to a petition for alimony must be filed within eight days, and a husband must enter an appearance before his answer can be filed (see rules 84 and 85), and where the husband in his answer alleges that the wife has property of her own, she may file a reply on oath within eight days, but the husband cannot make a rejoinder without leave: (see rule 87). These eight days, it may be noted, must be reckoned exclusively of the day on which the notice is given, and of that on which the application is made: (Robinson v. Robinson, 30 L. J. 189, P. & M.). Permanent alimony commences and is computed from the date of the final decree of the Divorce Court, or of the Court of Appeal (rule 93); it must be paid to the wife, or to some other person or persons nominated by her, and approved by the court, as trustee or trustees on her behalf (rule 94). It must be borne in mind that applications to the court for permanent maintenance must be made in a separate petition, and filed as soon as the decree nisi has been pronounced, but not before (rules 95 and 96). A certified copy of the petition must be served personally on the opposite party, unless substituted service has been granted by leave of the court (rule 97). After a decree of judicial separation, the court is not at liberty to allot more than one-half of the joint income of the wife, although she may have brought more than one moiety into settlement: (Haigh v. Haigh, 20 L. T. Rep. 281). Again, sums of money ordered, under sect. 1 of the Divorce and Matrimonial Causes Amendment Act 1866 (29 & 30 Vict. c. 32), to be paid by a husband for the maintenance of his divorced wife are a purely personal allowance, and can neither be alienated nor released so long as the order subsists: (Watkins v. Watkins (1896) C. A. 222). Furthermore, the court will not make an order for securing "permanent alimony" which will have the effect of charging the husband's property with its payment, whatever alterations might take place in his circumstances at any future time: (Haigh v. Haigh, sup.). In the case of Robertson v. Robertson (48 L. T. Rep. 590), Sir George Jessel, M.R., expressed the opinion that sect. 32 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1857 (20 & 21 Vict. c. 85) was intended to give the court a discretion which was to be exercised according to the circumstances of each case, and that it was not intended that a guilty wife should be turned into the streets to starve. In conclusion, we may add that a liability to pay alimony in weekly sums by an order made in a divorce suit, under sect. 1 of the Matrimonial Causes Amendment Act 1866 (29 & 30 Vict. c. 32), " is not a future debt or liability provable in bankruptcy, under sub-sect. 3 of sect. 37 of the Bankruptcy Act 1883, and, notwithstanding the bankruptcy of the person liable, payment of such an order may be enforced as of a debt due in pursuance of an order of a competent court under sect. 5 of the Debtors Act 1869 (Re Linton; Ex parte Linton, 52 L. T. Rep. 782). LIABILITY FOR BREACHES OF TRUST. ALMOST hid away in the Judicial Trustees Act of last year—a statute that a busy lawyer might, judging of its practical importance from its title, be reasonably excused for passing over-is an enactment which should be of cardinal importance to honest trustees. This enactment also throws a novel and a considerable burden on the Chancery judges, and is expressed as follows in the Statute-book: 59 & 60 Vict. c. 35, s. 2.- "The jurisdiction of the court under this Act may be exercised by the High Court, and, as respects trusts within its jurisdiction by a palatine court, and (subject to the prescribed definition of the jurisdiction) by any County Court judge to whom such jurisdiction may be assigned under this Act." Sect. 3.-(1.) "If it appears to the court that a trustee, whether appointed under this Act or not, is or may be personally liable for any breach of trust, whether the transaction alleged to be a breach of trust occurred before or after the passing of the Act (14th Aug. 1896), but has acted honestly and reasonably, and ought fairly to be excused for the breach of trust and for omitting to obtain the directions of the court in the matter in which he committed such breach, then the court may relieve the trustee either wholly or partly from personal liability for the same. (2.) This section shall come into operation at the passing of this Act." A careful reader of sect. 3 will at once perceive that its operation extends to past, as well as present and future, breaches of trust, and to all trustees; and that the exercise of the jurisdiction by the court is optional, and not obligatory. Further, in order that relief may be granted, the guilty trustee must have acted honestly and reasonably, and should fairly be excused in the opinion of the court for the breach of trust, and for omitting to obtain the direction of the court in the matter. Hence a trustee asking for relief from personal liability in respect of a breach of trust must be prepared with satisfactory evidence to show these four things. And with those who have studied the authorities on the liability of trustees, the feeling may that the cases will be few and far between in which the court will feel justified and be prepared to exercise the power conferred on it by the section. However much a trustee may have acted throughout with an honest purpose and with an anxiety to do what was best for his cestuis que trust, a judicial mind, more particularly when exercising a discretionary power, cannot but be much impressed with a conviction that, if it be impossible to feel anything but regret at the loss which in strictness falls upon the trustee, it would be a matter of greater regret if that loss were made to fall upon those depending upon the trustee's vigilance and care for their protection. The family lawyer knows that breaches of trust of a more or less responsible nature are committed nearly every day. No apology is therefore required for calling prominent attention to the recent enactment, and also to the first case in which it has been judicially considered. In Barker v. Ivimey (noted ante, p. 414; Times, 27th Feb. 1897), the two trustees of a will, Messrs. Ivimey and Turner, in 1880, reinvested a trust fund upon a mortgage which was, in the judge's opinion, obviously improper, not only in respect of the value, but from its nature. Mr. Turner having died, the action was brought against Mr. Ivimey and the personal representatives of Mr. Turner, to make good the trust fund on the ground of the breach of trust. Turner's executors said that, having regard to the circumstances of the case, the court ought to act on the sect. 3 set out above. But Mr. Justice Byrne held that he had not sufficient evidence that Mr. Turner acted in respect of the mortgage reasonably or as he would probably have acted had it been a transaction of his own. And, further, there was not sufficient evidence to apply the section in this case. "I think," his Lordship is reported to have said in the course of his judgment, "that the section relied on is meant to be acted upon freely and fairly in the exercise of judicial discretiou, but I think that the court ought to be satisfied, before exercising the very large powers conferred upon it, by sufficient evidence, that the trustee acted reasonably. It was alleged that Mr. Turner was entitled to rely on the statements of his cotrustee as contained in the letters I have referred to. and that I ought to infer that he did so rely without further inquiry. It was pointed out that Mr. Ivimey was a solicitor and a trustee appointed by the testatrix, and therefore a person upon whom she relied, and upon whom Turner might consider himself entitled to rely, and that upon these facts alone his estate ought to be exonerated from the consequences of the breach of trust. It would be impossible to lay down any general rules or principles to be acted on in carrying out the provisions of the section, and I think that each case must depend upon its own circumstances." In conclusion, we commend this case to the consideration of all those in the Profession who are interested for trustees, or cestuis que trust. We are of the number who will wait with interest to see to what practical extent the Judicial Trustees Act 1896 has succeeded in amending the law respecting the liability of trustees. COUNTY COURT SYSTEM. NEW RULES.-There have been a great many objections recently made to the new rules issued in March, and it has been pointed out by many law societies and others how they would hamper plaintiffs in recovering their debts. But the objectors do not seem to consider that while sect. 74 of the County Courts Act, and the recent decision, re Judge Turner, are in force, that the County Courts Rule Committee are in a different position, and that (although in many points the rules could be improved) some rules, like those in question, must be issued. Something more than an improvement in the rules seems necessary. In the objections drawn up by the Bristol Law Society appear the words "mercantile debts," and I think that in this expression lies a solution of the difficulty, viz., that mercantile debtors should be liable to be sued without any trouble, but that instalment debtors should be protected. There are many obvious reasons why instalment debtors should be sued in their local courts; one may be mentioned, that the postage of the monthly instalments adds a large percentage to the debts. But the mercantile debtors are in a different position altogether, and require no such protection. I would, therefore, extend the principle now in force as to default summonses to all summonses to be issued for service out of the district; and amend sect. 76 of the Act by allowing all plaints to be entered in the district where either the plaintiff or defendant lives, with a proviso that, in all cases for amounts under £5, leave must be obtained to enter a plaint otherwise than in the court where the defendant lives. This leave not to be given unless it appears from an affidavit that the defendant is not a domestic or menial servant, a labourer, a servant in husbandry, a journeyman or artificer, a handicraftsman, a miner, or a person engaged in manual labour; and also, unless the registrar is satisfied that the debt was intended by both the parties to be discharged at one payment, and not by instalments. EXTENDED JURISDICTION. Your correspondent, "A Lincolnshire Solicitor," hits on one great difficulty to be got over before the jurisdiction of the courts can be much extended-viz., reducing the volume of the work on the court day. This applies very strongly to many smaller courts, where only one court room is available, and where a judge is often kept waiting till a registrar has finished the undefended list. I do not agree with him that every registrar should act independently, as in many small courts the registrar, being a practising solicitor, is too much connected with the plaintiffs and defendants to make it pleasant for him to decide disputed cases. I would suggest that certain selected registrars should be debarred from private practice, and should sit in certain courts independently of the judge, disposing of all the undefended cases with a compulsory jurisdiction in cases of contract up to £10, and with power to exercise a sort of Order XIV. jurisdiction in cases up to £20, and ordering certain pleadings, discovery, &c., in cases sent for trial. Thus when the judge came he would proceed at once with judgment summonses and his list of disputed cases. This arrangement would also do away with a great deal of the objection to the long time gained by defendants giving notice to defend default summones and having no real defence. A REGISTRAR. WITH reference to the letter in our last issue in which mention was made of the relations between a late County Court judge and one of the advocates in his court, we are told that it apparently relates to the late County Court judge of Lincolnshire, and might be taken to refer to a well-known advocate in his court. This our correspondent says was not so; the reference was to a different court altogether; and the advocate referred to no longer ranks amongst practising solicitors. COMMENTS ON CASES. IN an Irish case of Fitzmaurice v. Gordon (32 L. Rep. Ir. 112) the Court held that the solicitors were personally liable to repay taxed costs paid to them, although there was no personal undertaking on their part to repay them, when the decision under which those costs were paid was reversed above. The English Court of Appeal refused to follow this case in Hood-Barrs v. Crossman (74 L. T. Rep. 372), and their decision has been upheld in the House of Lords (noted ante, p. 461). That the decision should have been otherwise would have been to have imposed intolerable hardship on solicitors. The rule was stated by Lord Justice Cotton, in The Lydney and Wigpool Iron Ore Company v. Bird (55 L. T. Rep. 561). There the Lord Justice said: "I do not encourage any application against the solicitors to make them repay the costs, for I think that such an application would fail. The order does not direct the money to be paid to the solicitors in their own right, but only on behalf of James Bird, just as if he had given them a power of attorney, and that the money had been paid out to them as his attorneys." This statement was approved of by all the members of the Court of Appeal in the present case (Hood-Barrs v. Crossman), and has now been accepted by the House of Lords. The Irish decision was dealt with, for, as Lord Esher said, "we are bound to consider it with respect, as being a decision on the subject by eminent judges." But, as the Court pointed out, they declined to follow it, for no satisfactory reason was given for making the order which they made." Solicitors act merely as the agents for their clients in the conduct of the litigation, and should a personal obligation be added for any order that may be made against their client, there would be no knowing where their liability would cease. 66 THE power of distress for a rentcharge is not often exercised; but there is no doubt that the grantee of a rentcharge has just the same power as a landlord has of seizing other people's goods for the payment of the grantor's debt. Mr. Greene's Sale of Distress Amendment Bill (which we referred to last week) will have the effect of mitigating the hardship of the law in this respect, inasmuch as the word "rent" by the interpretation clause is to include "any tithe or other rentcharge as well as rent in the ordinary sense of the term. A curious instance of the extreme hardship of the existing law is afforded by the case of Owen v. Wynne (4 E. & B. 579). In that case, as in many others at the present day, land subject to a rentcharge was let to many tenants. The grantee of the rentcharge, probably not wishing to proceed to extremities, having first distrained for a small portion of the rentcharge upon one tenant only, proceeded to distrain upon another for another small portion. But the tenant secondly distrained upon recovered the distress from the grantee by replevin, on the ground that a second distress is illegal. The result is that, if land subject to a rentcharge be let, and the grantee do not choose or be not able to resort to the landlord for payment, he must either distrain upon a single tenant for the whole rentcharge or not distrain at all. Why the law should allow him to distrain upon any tenant for his landlord's debt is a question more easily asked than answered. A GROUP of revenue cases has recently been under the consideration of the High Court, and, as might have been expected, more than one of them arose out of the complicated provisions of the Finance Act 1894. AttorneyGeneral v. Dodington, which was one of the earliest taken, turned upon sect. 21. That section provides that "Estate duty shall not be payable on the death of a deceased person in respect of personal property settled by a will, or disposition made by a person dying before the commencement" of that part of the Act which relates to death duties "in respect of which property," any probate duty or account duty "has been paid or is payable, unless the deceased was at the time of his death, or at any time since the will or disposition took effect had been competent to dispose of the property." In Dodington's case (which is one which must be of frequent occurrence), a lady had both married and died before 1894. By her marriage settlement she had settled certain property on herself for life, with remainder to her husband for life, with remainder as she should appoint by will. Her husband dying after the commencement of the Act, the Crown claimed duty on the whole fund, although on her death probate duty had been paid on the then value of her reversionary interest. Her executors relying on theexemption under sect. 21, the Crown contended that there had been no settlement" by will or disposition" within the meaning of that section, the settlement having been in reality affected by her marriage settlement, which the appointment merely carried mechanically into effect. But the Court took a liberal view, and held that the settlement and the appointment ought to be read together. At the same time, however, judgment was given for the Crown in respect of that part of the fund which had been deducted at the time of the death for the purpose of calculating the then value of the reversionary estate. We confess we cannot quite understand this part of the judgment, inasmuch as the Crown at the time of the death obtained duty in anticipation, and therefore on ordinary principles of calculation forfeited its right to duty as upon an estate in possession. This latter point is of great importance to all exec tors in whom a reversionary estate may have become vested before the Finance Act. OCCASIONAL NOTES. No more Final Appeals will be taken those sittings in Appeal Court II. The Divisional Court in Bankruptcy will not sit again to hear Appeals from County Courts until the Easter Sittings. Actions set down for trial under Order XIV., r. 8, will be taken to-day (Saturday) and continued on Monday. Affidavits must be in court on the hearing of these actions. Notice should be given to the proper officer. The Lord Chancellor has accepted an invitation to be present on speech day at the Leys School, Cambridge, on Wednesday, the 9th June. An honorary degree of the University of Edinburgh will be conferred upon the Lord Chief Justice of England to-day. Sir Henry Hawkins has arranged to leave London on Sunday next for the Continent for a short rest from his judicial duties. Mr. H. H. Asquith, Q.C., M.P., has taken a house at Great Malvern for a few weeks. Sir William Nevill M. Geary, Her Majesty's Attorney-General at Accra, has arrived in London, and has left town for Oxon Heath, Tunbridge. Mr. Sheil at Westminster Police-court is the subject of a sketch in the Morning Leader of the 2nd inst. Lord James of Hereford has taken a new lease of Ferne, near Salisbury, the seat of Sir Walter Grove, and will enter into possession before Easter. Mr. William Grabam presided on Wednesday evening at the last smoking concert of the season of the Legal Musical Society held at the Freemasons' Tavern. The hon. secretary of the Inns of Court Mission, to which we referred last week, is Mr. C. E. Malden, 2, Harcourt-buildings, Temple, to whom subscriptions may be paid. The Attorney-General (Sir R. Webster, Q C., M.P) will preside at the annual general meeting of the Bar, which will take place on Tuesday, the 4th May, in the Old Dining Hall, Lincoln's-inn. Mr. F. O. Crump, Q.C., has accepted an invitation to open a discussion at a meeting of the Solicitors' Managing Clerks Association on Wednesday evening, the 28th inst. The subject will be "A Modern Action at Law." Mr. C. J. Darling, Q.C., M.P., is the chairman of a select committee appointed by the House of Commons to inquire into the management and administration of the Royal National Lifeboat Institution. The Master of the Temple has returned to town from Clifton, and he is to preach at the Temple Church next Sunday morning. Dr. Ainger has been the Canon-in-Residence at Bristol Cathedral during the last three months. The Bishop of Winchester has issued a notice to the Surrogates in his diocese that marriage licences are not to be granted in any case to divorced persons whilst the former husband or wife is living, whether the person applying is in fault or not. Probably for the first time in the annals of English local government a lady has discharged the duties of returning officer at an election. At Pinchbeck, West, near Spalding, a lady, Mrs. Sanders, presided over the poll on Monday last. Sir Harry Bodkin Poland, Q.C., commenced his career at the Bar exactly forty-nine years ago. He has been engaged, says the Saturday Review, in nearly all the important criminal cases during the last quarter of a century, and his friends are desirous that his legal and quaint anecdotes should be presented to the public in the popular form of an autobiography. The April Quarter Sessions for the trial of cases arising on the north side of the Thames were opened on Monday at the Sessions House, Clerkenwell, before Mr. M'Connell, Q.C. (chairman), Mr. Loveland. Loveland (deputy-chairman), and other justices. The calendar contains the names of sixty-nine persons charged with offences. The committee recently appointed by the Home Secretary to inquire into the education of persons sent to gaol has recommended, among other things, that all under forty years old who cannot pass Standard 4 shall receive school instruction in their cells, at least twice a week, and arrangements are to be made to permit this reform being carried out without avoidable delay. The Lord Chancellor entertained at dinner, on Monday, Lord Watson, Lord Hobhouse, Mr. H. H. Asquith, Q.C., M.P., Mr. Justice Hawkins, Mr. Justice Mathew, Mr. Justice Cave, Mr. Justice Wills, Mr. Justice Byrne, his Honour Judge Bacon, Mr. Cohen, Q.C., Mr. Jelf, Q.C., Mr. Bosanquet, Q C., Mr. Kenneth Muir Mackenzie, C.B., Q.C., Mr. Rawlins, Q.C., Mr. Freeman, Q.C., Mr. Macmorran, Q.C., Mr. Boyd, Q.C., Mr. Lawrence, Q.C., Mr. A. J. Ram, Mr. Eldon Bankes, the Hon. Alfred Lyttelton, and Mr. Adolphus Liddell; and on Tuesday, Lord Macnaghten, the Home Secretary, Mr. Justice Wright, Mr. Justice Lawrance, the SolicitorGeneral, Sir Patrick Talbot, K.C.B., his Honour Judge Snagge, Sir Walter Phillimore, Q.C., Mr. Crackanthorpe, Q.C., Mr. Gates, Q.C., Mr. Dugdale, Q.C., Mr. Joseph Walton, Q.C., Mr. Mattinson, Q.C., Mr. M'Connell, Q.C., Mr. Amphlett, Q.C., Mr. C. A. Russell, Q.C., Mr. Thomas Raleigh, Mr. Alfred Lawrence, Mr. Cautley, Mr. Montague Muir Mackenzie, Mr. Scott Fox, and Mr. E. H. Alderson. It is not generally known that Mr. Thomas Hope McLachlan, whose very sudden death occurred on the 1st April, was a barrister, who at one time appeared likely to do a considerable Chancery business. He was called to the Bar at Lincoln's-inn in 1868, but gave up law for painting, and became well known at Burlington House, the Grosvenor and New Galleries, and at the Institute, for his poetic landscapes. He also did much unobtrusive work as hon. sec. to the Discharged Prisoners' Aid Society. The length of judicial service of some English County Court judges, which has been noticed by the LAW TIMES, is, writes an Irish correspondent, far surpassed by the Irish record. Of the twenty-one Irish County Court judges no fewer than eight are entitled to full retiring pensions. The appointments of two of these gentlemen date thirty-nine years back -from 1859, of one from 1861, of one from 1865, of one from 1866, of two from 1872, and of one from 1876. Five Irish County Court judges have had a judicial career of over thirty years, two of over five-andtwenty years, and one of one-and-twenty years. The April Sessions for the jurisdiction of the Central Criminal Court were opened at the Sessions-house in the Old Bailey on Monday, before the Lord Mayor, Sir Forrest Fulton, Q.C., Common Serjeant, Alderman Sir Reginald Hanson, M.P., Alderman and Col. Davies, M.P., Mr. Alderman Pound, Mr. Alderman Halse, Mr. Commissioner Kerr, Mr. Alderman and Sheriff Ritchie, Mr. Under-Sheriff Glynes, and Mr. Under-Sheriff Halse. The calendar contains the names of sixty-nine persons for trial, and the alleged offences are thus enumerated: Manslaughter, 1; assault on girl, 1; bigamy, 4; burglary, 1; uttering counterfeit coin, 3; conspiracy, 1; corrosive fluid throwing, 1; fraudulent directorate, 1; embezzlement, 1; explosive substances, 1; forgery, 6; housebreaking, 3; larceny, 12; letter-stealing, 4; libel, 1; misdemeanour, 10; perjury, 3; riot, 6; robbery with violence, 2; and woumding, 4. 1 The controversy recently raised in both Houses of Parliament, with reference to the right of Irish judges when going as Commissioners of Assize to have a military guard as sentinels outside their lodgings, calls to mind a curious adventure in the early career of Sir Peter O'Brien, the present Lord Chief Justice of Ireland. Before his call to the Irish Bar, the future Chief Justice accompanied his uncle, the late Mr. Justice James O'Brien, as his registrar on circuit. During the Fenian outbreak of 1865 the Chief Justice, on coming home from dinner to the judge's lodgings, was challenged for the watchword by the sentinel on duty. He gave the man some chaffing reply, whereupon the soldier instantly presented a bayonet to his breast, and kept him thus unpleasantly secured till he was identified by the servants of the judge as a "friend." Attorneys quoted Scripture before Judge Woods in the United States Court of Appeals at Chicago the other day. The suit was an appeal from the Federal Court of Western Wisconsin, where a jury gave a verdict of 2000 dollars against the Minneapolis, St. Paul and Sault Ste. Marie Railroad for the burning of property in Lincoln County, the fire, it was alleged, being caused by sparks from a locomotive. Alfred H. Bright, in arguing for the railroad company to have the verdict set aside, asserted that sparks from a locomotive fly upward, and the probability of the fire having been caused by sparks was remote. "The universal effect of air currents on sparks of fire was discerned by the author of Job long prior to the birth of our jurisprudence when he said, 'Man is prone to trouble, as the sparks fly upward.' William H. Flett, attorney for Emerson Bros., the firm securing the verdict, rejoined: "Counsel has seen fit to cite the Book of Job in support of his theory as to sparks. It is also recorded in holy writ, 'Behold how great a matter a little fire kindleth."" The right of counsel to shed tears before the jury was recently decided by the Supreme Court of Tennessee in the case of Ferguson v. Moon, which was a case for breach of promise and seduction. The court, speaking through Judge Wilkes, said: "It is next assigned as error that counsel for plaintiff in his closing argument, in the midst of a very eloquent and impassioned appeal to the jury, shed tears, and thus unduly excited the passions and sympathies of the jury in favour of the plaintiff, and greatly prejudiced them against defendant. Bearing upon this assignment of error we have been cited to no direct authority and after diligent search we have been able to find none. The conduct of counsel in presenting their cases to juries is a matter which must be left largely to the ethics of the Profession and the discretion of the trial judge. Perhaps no two counsel observe the same rules. Some deal wholly in logic and legal argument, without any embellishment whatever. Others use rhetoric and occasional flights of fancy and imagination. Others rely upon noise and gesticulation, earnestness of manner, and vehemence of speech. Others appeal to the prejudices, passion, and sympathies of the jury. Others combine all these modes with various accompaniments of different kinds. No cast-iron rule should be laid down. To do so would result that in many cases clients would be deprived of the privilege of being heard at all by counsel. Tears have always been considered legitimate arguments before the jury, and we know of no power or jurisdiction in the trial judge to check them. It would appear to be one of the natural rights of counsel which no statute or constitution could take away. It is certainly a matter of the highest personal privilege. Indeed, if counsel have tears at command, it may be seriously questioned whether it is not his professional duty to shed them whenever proper occasion arises, and the trial judge would not feel constrained to interfere unless they are indulged in to such excess as tʊ impede, embarrass, or delay the business before the court. In this case the trial judge was not asked to check the tears, and it was, we think, a very proper occasion for their use, and we cannot reverse for this reason; but for other errors indicated the judgment is reversed and cause remanded for a new trial.” |
