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to the puissance de père, which she was formerly not entitled to exercise.

It may be mentioned that hotel-keepers in Portugal, unlike those in England and France, are not entitled to detain the baggage of their guests (C. proc. civ., art. 815, No. 11), for payment of hotel charges.

The land question is as burning a subject in Portugal, especially in the southern province of Alemtejo, as it is elsewhere. The emphyteusis is gradually giving way to allodial tenure, though the first was sought to be extended in the province of Alemtejo, with a view to ameliorating the condition of agriculture. The Jus Sanguinis, which an eminent writer on Private International Law recently declared was everywhere gaining ground as the principle of determining nationality, does not, however, obtain in Portugal. A child born in Portugal to a foreign father is born a Portuguese, but he may, however, claim the nationality of the father on attaining majority. And a child born abroad to a Portuguese, even if the father is banished, becomes a Portuguese, if, on attaining majority, he claims Portuguese nationality and establishes himself in Portugal.

Our own great jurist Austin insisted that the leading and guiding conceptions of a code must be the work of one luminous intellect. It is a singular confirmation of this that we find MM. Lanyrie and Dubois mention the circumstance-as, indeed, they were bound to do—that the task of compiling this Civil Code of Portugal was intrusted to M. Antonio Luis de Seabra, professor in the University of Coimbra, alone, and that, with the exception of two amendments on nationality and marriage, his projected code became the Code Civil of Portugal-a fabric of law that contrasts favourably with the Code Civil of France.

suggested by summons under Order XXXII., r. 6, of the Rules of the Supreme Court. Mr. Justice North said he clearly had jurisdiction to order such payment, and he should do so if he thought the proceedings in court had been adopted for the purpose of making costs. In this case, however, it did not appear that costs had been incurred oppressively. The plaintiffs had some show of authority for the course they took, having regard to a reported

His Lordship therefore declined to accede to the defendant's request. Still we consider a plaintiff who knowingly indulges in a more expensive method of proceeding should contemplate as one result that, even if successful, he will have to pay some of the defendant's costs.

An unfortunate practitioner who has made an unintentional mistake in the choice of the appropriate procedure, and has discovered his error when too late, may have a gleam of hope in referring to the case of Re Edmund Hartley ; Nuttall v. Whittaker (66 L. T. Rep. 589) as suggesting a “way out.” From that case it would appear that, when it has been the practice for a certain application to be made in a particular way, the parties are not to be blamed for having adopted the usual course ; and, on the first occasion that the objection is taken that that course puts an unsuccessful defendant to greater expense than is necessary, the court will perhaps allow the applicants their full costs. The practitioner should, however, also consult and compare the case of the London Steam Dyeing Company v. Digby (ubi sup.), and he should not, as we submit, put too much trust on the safety of such a method of exit out of his difficulty. As has been already said, the judge in the last-mentioned case said that the plaintiffs had some show of authority for the more expensive course of a motion that they took, and yet he allowed them only the cost of a summons.

EXPENSIVE PROCEDURE. LAWYERS' costs are most elastic in amount. Not only may a bill be drawn on different scales of charges, but, in many cases, the quantity of work done may, by care and foresight, be reduced, or unnecessarily increased. It is well, then, that a litigant who chooses to adopt a more expensive procedure, or who indulges in extravagance, should have to pay the extra costs caused thereby in any event. Otherwise, an unsuccessful defendant would be at the mercy of his opponent even more than he is at present. We would say at once we do not mean by this that a successful litigant should be denied the costs of any item that is occasioned by the conduct of his adversary, or was, under the circumstances, properly incurred, and is fair and reasonable. The two positions are miles apart.

The readers who possess the new series of the Law TIMES REPORTS will have at hand the authorities for the proposition that a successful plaintiff is only entitled to such costs as would be incurred in obtaining the judgment or order in the cheapest way. At p. 29 of vol. 60, he will find the report of the case of Johnson v. Evans. In that case the plaintiffs title to redeem mortgage was disputed. They, to settle the question, commenced an action for redemption by writ, and in due course proved their title and a tender before action of the amount due under the mortgage and recovered judgment. But the judge held they were only entitled to such costs as would have been incurred on an originating summons-under Order LV., r. 5A of the Rules of the Sapreme Court—which was attended by counsel in chambers, including the costs of the witnesses examined in court. Then in a subsequent volume (vol. 69, p. 178; 8. C. (1893) 3 Ch. 151) there is the case of St. John's Hospital, Bath. Three railway companies, under their statutory powers, had taken land belonging to the hospital, and the purchase moneys had been invested. The trustees of the charity presented a petition for the transfer to the official trustees of charitable funds of the three sums of stock which then represented the investment. The three sums of stock were, in round figures, £1244, 244, and £36, Mr. Justice North decided that the respective costs payable by the two companies whose purchase moneys were represented by the two smaller sums should not exceed the amounts they severally would have had to pay if the application had been made by summons, under Order LV., r. 2 of the Rules of the Supreme Court, and that that was not to increase the costs payable by the third company.

The other cases which support the proposition are Re Kellock (56 L. T. Rep. 887); The London Steam Dyeing Company v. Digby (58 L. T. Rep. 724 ; 57 L. J. 505, Ch.); Allen v. Oakey (62 L. T. Rep. 724); and Re The Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway Company: Slater v. Slater (72 L. T. Rep. 627). It would be tedious to enter into the details of these cases in the present article. We only cite them, as we believe they are not collected in any one report, and the citation may therefore be of use to our readers.

To proceed: not only is a litigant who is unsuccessful not subject to be oppressed by having to pay excessive or unnecessary costs, but a successful plaintiff may have to pay the extra costs incurred by an unsuccessful defendant in consequence of the plaintiff's extavagant proceedings. In The London Steam Dyeing Company's case (ubi sup.) the unsuccessful defendant asked that the plaintiffs should be ordered to pay the extra costs occasioned to him by the plaintiffs having moved for judg. ment apon admissions in the pleadings instead of proceeding as the defendant


DEBTS. MR. JUSTICE MATHEW decided on the 25th Feb. 1897, that the defendant, William Reginald Wentworth Fitzwilliam was not liable to pay Mesdames Hayward £218 18s. 6d., the balance of a bill due to them for dresses and millinery supplied by them to the defendant's wife from the 1st May 1895 till the 30th Jan. 1896. It was alleged and proved on the part of the plaintiffs that during that period the defendant and his wife were living together as man and wife, and that the dresses and millinery so supplied were during that period used by the defendant's wife. On one occasion in December 1895 the plaintiffs' insistance upon immediate payment for one particular item of £19 8s. 6d. had been met in this way: The defendant's wife paid to the plaintiffs a cheque drawn by the defendant to the order of his wife and indorsed by her. The amount of the cheque was £20, and apparently the plaintiffs had given the defendant's wife the difference between the amount of the cheque and the amount of the item so paid. The defendant proved that he gave his wife an allowance of £160 per annum, generally increased by presents to £200 for her dress, and that he had expressly forbidden her to pledge his credit. Upon these facts the learned judge gave judgment for the defendant.

The question of a husband's liability for articles supplied to his wife is one that requires frequent consideration, and although the legal principles which should govern the question are sufficiently clear it is in some cases difficult to apply the facts to those principles. The husband's liability on contracts for necessaries supplied to his wife is best considered under two main divisions : first, where husband and wife are cohabiting; second, where they are separated.

Two principles of law underlie all these cases, and in considering a particular case it is necessary to keep these principles distinct. The first principle is, that a husband is bound by law to maintain his wife. This is a fundamental common law obligation underlying the status a man assumes by marriage. It places on the husband, quâ husband, a legal duty, but quâ father at common law it creates no obligation. In contrast to his marital duty to maintain the wife the father at common law has no legal duty to maintain his children. The second principle is, that a principal is liable for the acts of his agent if the agent act within the scope of his authority. The overlapping and confusion of the legal duty quà husband and the legal duty quâ principal has caused most of the difficulties in ascertaining the husband's liability.

Wbere husband and wife cohabit it might be natural to suppose that the husband was performing the marital obligation of maintaining his wife, and e converso a not unreasonable legal inference might arise that, where another legal incident attaching to contract of marriage, viz. consortium, is admittedly neglected, from whatever reason, the husband is or may not be performing the remaining incident, viz. to maintain his wife.

It is clear that, where the parties are separated, the maxim Omnia præsumuntur rite esse acta could hardly apply. However this may be, the courts from the earliest times have taken a different view. Where the contract sued on is made during cohabitation the judges have rather inferred that the husband had been performing his legal duty to his wife by authorising or assenting to the particular contract which he subsequently disputes, and where the contract was made while the husband was separated the court has required the creditor to show affirmatively that the husband had not performed the duty he undertook to maintain, and had thereby compelled as it were the wife to maintain herself on his credit.

The principal anthorities are of ancient date, collected with admirable clearness in the notes to Manby v. Scott (2 S.L.C. 516). Taking the subject as it is there treated in two divisions, the first consideration is of the husband's liability during cohabitation.

Where husband and wife live together the person supplying “necessaries” to the wife, upon proof of the cohabitation, makus against the husband a primâ facie liability.

Such primù facie liability arises from the inference of fact that a woman


DRAUGHTSMEN of bills of sale have to regard, not only the form of the bill itself, but also of collateral documents relating to the same loan. The tenth section of the Act of 1878 (sub-sect. 3) provides that, “If the bill of sale is made or given subject to any defeasance, or condition, or declaration of trust not contained in the body thereof, such defeasance, condition, or declaration shall be deemed to be part of the bill, and shall be written on the same paper or parchment therewith before the registration, and shall be truly set forth in the copy filed under this Act therewith, and as part thereof, otherwise the registration shall be void.” Mr. Weir (The Law of Bills of Sale, p. 213) quotes the dictum of the late Master of the Rolls in Ex parte Popplewell ; Re Story (47 L. T. Rep. 274 ; 21 Ch. Div. 73): A defeasance is something which defeats the operation of a deed, but is contained in some other deed or document. If it is contained in the same deed it is called a condition. A condition is something which defeats or qualifies an estate.” In more recent cases, the same author tells us, different views have been expressed as to the contradistinction of these words. The important point for our consideration, however, is the effect of some provision of a collateral deed upon the validity of a bill of sale. In Counsell v. London and Westminster Loan and Discount Company (19 Q. B. Div. 512), a bill of sale provided that the debt should be repaid by certain instalments. A promissory note for the same debt had the same provision, but a stipulation was added that, in case of default in payment of any instalment, the whole should become due. The Court of Appeal decided that this was a defeasance of the bill of sale, and therefore the bill was void. In Edwards v. Marcus (70 L. T. Rep. 182 ; (1894) 1 Q. B. 587), the bill of sale secured repayment of the debt with simple interest, but on the same day, and as part of the same transaction, one of the grantors mortgaged certain reversionary interests to secure the same debt with compound interest. “ According to the bill of sale,” said Lord Justice Lindley," they would get rid of their indebtedness by paying the £300 and interest, whereas, by the true bargain between them, they can do nothing of the kind.” The Court of Appeal held that the bill was bad. The same court have had a somewhat similar case before them in Ellis v. Wright (noted ante, p. 529), and held the bill of sale invalid, as the debt was made payable, according to the bill, at the expiration of one month, whereas in a collateral mortgage there was a covenant to pay it on demand.


occupying the position of wife, whether married or not, has an implied authority to pledge the man's credit for necessaries. A doubt was suggested whether such implied authority extends to necessaries other than those which are ordinarily necessary to the maintenance of a household (see per Lord Blackburn, Debenham v. Mellon, 43 L. T. Rep. 674; 6 App. Cas. 36); but such doubt was not part of the decision, and is not substantially supported by the judgment or by the prior decision of Jolly v. Rees (10 L. T. Rep. 298) there approved. A clear and, we venture to think, trustworthy classification of necessaries appears in the judgment of Mr. Justice Byles in Jolly v. Rees, although he dissented. Such inference may be rebutted by proof on the husband's part that he prohibited the wife or woman from pledging his credit. On the question of the man's prohibition has arisen the confusion between the two principles of law before mentioned. The question is, has the woman authority ? The proof of the man, if accepted, that he prohibited the wife before she made the bargain, is conclusive.

The making of an allowance, notice to tradesmen and other circumstances are relevant merely in corroboration of the main issue. Undoubtedly such facts would strongly corroborate an alleged prohibition, and perhaps even in the absence of direct evidence of prohibition such facts would entitle a jury to hold that there had been a prohibition. Such a point might easily arise where the husband subsequently was not available as a witness to conversations when the prohibition was given.

Inasmuch as evidence of a sufficient allowance does not per se rebut the primâ facie inference of authority arising from cohabitation, evidence that an allowance was promised, and not paid does not invalidate an actual prohibition which has been proved : (Jolly v. Rees, sup.).

The question upon which Mr. Justice Byles in that case dissented, and on which confusion even now arises, is whether notice of the prohibition to the person supplying is necessary. Such doubt we think is due to the confusion between the two principles of law adverted to. It is clearly a maxim in the law of principal and agent that, if an agent is held out to A. B. as having a particular authority, and A. B. deals with the agent on that representation, no secret revocation of the agent's particular authority is valid against A. B. Cohabitation, however, is not in any sense a holding out of the wife or woman by the inan : it is merely a general expression for a certain condition of facts.” It is a representation by the man to the world that the woman has the rights of the wife. The right of the woman is correlative to the duty of the man. The man is bound to maintain her, and she is entitled to be maintained by him. It is obvious, therefore, that while cohabitation exists she is not entitled to maintain herself at his expense by pledging his credit. Such a proposition would involve the absurdity that the man legally liable to pay was legally impotent to regulate the expenditure.

The fact of cohabitation implying confidence at least between the parties then raises the inference that the husband has assented to her maintaining herself by pledging his credit; but it is clear that when the husband denies this assent such inference falls to the ground.

It may often be the case that, in addition to the fact of cohabitation, the creditor can adduce evidence of an actual holding out. If the husband has habitually paid with his own cheqne prior debts, has been present when the order was given or done acts of similar import, it would then be a question of fact whether by so acting the husband has given the wife an apparent authority to pledge his credit; and if this be so found, then no secret revocation of such authority would defeat the creditor's right who had acted on such apparent authority.

When husband and wife are living apart, the inference arising from cohabitation does not exist, and although the factum of marriage is necessary to lay the foundation of the creditor's right against the husband, he must prove the circumstances of the separation.

Where the separation is by mutual consent the creditor must prove (1) that the goods were necessaries, or that he advanced money in fact expended on necessaries (Deare v. Southen, 21 L. T. Rep. 523 ; L. Rep. 9 Eq. 151); (2) that the wife had not been paid a sufficient allowance. If on separating the husband and wife agreed a certain sum to be paid for the wife's maintenance, the amount so agreed is conclusive of “ sufficiency": (Eastland v. Burchell, 38 L. T. Rep. 563; 3 Q. B. Div. 432). The creditor must then show that the amount has not been paid or only paid in part. It has been alleged that the husband, if sued upon a contract made by his wife when separated, is entitled to prove that she has in fact had sufficient moneys to maintain herself from other sources. Such evidence might be admissible, but whether it would relieve the defaulting husband is not definitely laid down. Where no amount has been agreed the question of what is a sufficient allowance is one of fact.

The same rules apply where the wife has been deserted or unjustifiably expelled. She is entitled to pledge her husband's credit for necessaries, and it would be open to the husband to prove the payment of an allowance; whether such allowance were sufficient or not being, as in the previous case, a question of fact.

Where, bowever, the wife has deserted the husband, or bas, whether to the knowledge of the creditor or not, subsequently committed adultery, the husband is not liable. Desertion and adultery both terminate the marital duty of maintenance, and by necessary sequence the wife's rights to maintain herself at her husband's expense. A husband, however, may by condonation cause the wife's right to pledge his credit to revive : (Cooper v. Lloyd, 33 L. T. Rep.O. S. 149; 6C.B.N.S. 519). The theory of the creditor's right to sue the husband upon contracts made while the husband and wife are separated is, that pro hac vice he takes the same position as the wife. If therefore the wife had a separate maintenance secured by deed, without the dum casta clause, and that allowance was not paid, the creditor could sue the husband, and the fact of adnltery would we think afford no defence. The common law right of the wife to be maintained is merged in the express unqualified covenant.

The Law Courts re-open on Tuesday next, the 27th inst.

Mr. Justice Grantham will take summonses at chambers (not before twelve o'clock), on Tuesday, the 27th April, after taking the ex parte motions in the Divisional Court.

The next sitting of the Mayor's Court, London, is fixed for Monday, the 10th May.

The annual meeting of the Bar will be held in Lincoln's-inn Hall on Tuesday next, the 4th inst.

Mr. Justice Wright has been unanimously re-elected chairman of the Parish Council of Headley, Hants.

The Master of the Temple is confined to the house by an attack of influenza.

The Paris tribunals have decided that the habit of gambling in the wife is valid ground for divorce.

Sir John Bridge, the chief magistrate at Bow-street, has now recovered from his indisposition, and returns to his duties on the expiration of his leave of absence in three weeks' time.

His Honour Judge Smyly entertained the Lord Chancellor at lunch on the occasion of his visit to Derby, and not his Worship the Mayor, as stated in our issue of the 17th inst.

Lord Coleridge, Q.C., who was to address a meeting on the Eastern question at Exeter on Friday, is lying ill at Heath's Court, Ottery St. Mary, and the meeting has been postponed.

Members of the Solicitors Managing Clerks' Association are reminded of the meeting on Wednesday evening, at 6.45, when it is hoped there will be a large gathering of the members.

Mr. Justice Byrne will preside over the annual dinner of the Old Boys of King's College School, to be held on Friday, the 30th April, at the Criterion. The dinner is intended to celebrate the commemoration of the Diamond Jubilee by the removal of the school to Wimbledon.

Sir Charles Hall, Q.C., M.P., the Recorder of London, is progressing favourably towards recovery, and should the present favourable symptoms continue, Sir Charles will, it is said, attend the next sitting of the Central Criminal Court.

The partnership existing between the members of the firm of Downing, Holman, and Co., of 50 and 51, Lime-street, E.C., having been dissolved by mutual agreement, Messrs. Holman, Birdwood, and Co. will continue to carry on business at the same address.

The post of Deputy Judge Advocate-General of the army is about to become vacant by the retirement of Mr. James Cornelius O'Dowd, C.B., whose extended period of employment in that capacity will expire this month. Mr. O'Dowd, who was called to the Bar at the Middle Temple in 1859, holds also the post of Army Purchase Commissioner, and is honorary Professor of Military Law at the Staff College. The salary of the Deputy Judge Advocate-General is £1000 a year.

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The fourteenth report on Patents, Designs, and Trade Marks, just issued as a Parliamentary paper, states that the number of applications for patents, which in 1895 showed a decrease of 324 upon that of the previous year, was increased in 1896 by 5132.

The April adjourned Quarter Sessions for the trial of cases arising on the north side of the Thames were opened on Wednesday at the Sessionshouse, Clerkenwell, before Mr. M'Connell, Q.C., chairman, Mr. Loveland Loveland, deputy-chairman, and other justices. The calendar contains the names of seventy persous charged with offences.

Sir Robert Reid, Q.C., M.P., has been presented by the fishermen of Annan with a handsome silver model of a Solway trawl, in recognition of his many and valuable services rengered to the fishing community, and particularly in connection with their own case before the Royal Commission in 1895.

At Winchester, where the North London Brigade conducted operations, under the command of Lord Falmouth, Col. Bargrave Deane, Q.C., commanding the 21st Middlesex, who sustained a serious accident on Saturday, experienced another mishap. He was thrown out of his carriage and his face badly cut.

A costly memorial tablet has been placed in the chancel of St. George's Church, Barnsley, by the relatives of the late Messrs. Edward and Charles Newman, solicitors, of Barnsley. The first named died at Barnsley in 1879, and his son Charles, who served as Mayor of the borongh, died in 1886. The tablet is made of exquisitely veined English alabaster.

Mr. Edward James Pollock, the newly-appointed official referee, is the youngest son of the late Sir Frederick Pollock, Bart., Lord Chief Baron of the Exchequer. He was born on the 1st Feb. 1841, and is, therefore, fifty-six years of age. He married in 1871, and was called to the Bar by the Inner Temple in 1872. He is a younger brother of the present Baron Pollock.

The Secretary for Scotland, Lord Balfour of Burleigh, has intimated to Mr. Alexander Asher, Q.C., ex-Solicitor-General for Scotland, that Her Majesty has given her assent to and approval of the petition of the Faculty of Advocates, the prayer of which was that members of the Scottish Bar should from time to time be appointed to the dignity of Queen's Counsel, upon the recommendation of the Lord Justice-General through the Secretary for Scotland.

The Master of the Rolls is always amusing, says the Pall Mall Gazette, but he rarely indulges in such homely wit as he did on a recent occasion when a junior before him cited the Law Reports as “ 2 Q.B.D.” “ That is not the way you should address us,” said Lord Esber. The learned gentleman protested that he merely meant to use the brief and ordinary formula for the second volume of the Queen's Bench Division Reports. “I might as well," retorted his Lordship, “say to you, “U.B.D.'”

A striking divergency in the professional life of members of the English and the Irish Bars is that, whereas in London barristers await business in their chambers and receive briefs and fees through the medium of clerks, in Dublin barristers await business in the Law Library of the Four Courts, where they are expected to be or to be heard of between the hours of 11 a.m. and 3.30 p.m. during the sittings, and where they receive personally fees and briefs when not sent to their private residences. In Dublin a barrister's clerk is unknown, and there are no barristers' chambers, unless the studies of their private residences may be so termed.

Probate has been granted of the will and codicil of Mr. Samuel Boteler Bristowe, Q.C., of 84, Onslow-gardens, S.W., and of Beesthorpe Hall, Nottingham, County Court judge, who died on the 5th March at St. Leonards-on-Sea, and the value of whose personal estate has been sworn at £22,327, by bis widow, Mrs. Albertine Bristowe, and his son, Mr. Frederick Edward Bristowe. The testator settles Beesthorpe Hall and all his real estate on his son, Charles John Bristowe, and his issue. He gives to his wife £500, all money at current or deposit account at his bankers, and his household furniture, and the residue of his personal estate he leaves between all his children, except sach child as shall succeed to his real estate.

The Easter Law Sittings were opened in Dublin on the 15th inst. with. ont the usual ceremonies, owing to the almost unprecedented circumstance of the 15th April, the day fixed by statute for the opening of the Easter Sittings, coming immediately before Good Friday and the Easter holidays. Among the subjects discussed by the members of the Bar was the report of intended legislation to reduce the judicial bench, and it was stated that the next three vacancies will not be filled. A very handsome apartment, for the construction of which a sum of £15,000 was voted by Parliament, was opened. It is 135ft. long and 23ft. wide, and presents a striking contrast to the dingy little room which has hitherto served as a library.

Mr. Edward Ridley, Q.C., who has been appointed a judge of the Queen's Bench Division, is a brother of the present Home Secretary, Sir Matthew White Ridley, M.P., he was born in August 1843, and was educated at Harrow and Corpus Christi College, Oxford. He was called to the Bar at the Inner Temple in 1868, and afterwards joined the NorthEastern Circuit, whereon and in London he enjoyed a fair practice. He sat as Conservative Member for South Northumberland from 1878 to 1880, and was appointed an official referee in 1886 and created a Qneen's Counsel in 1892. He was married in 1882 to Alice, second daughter of the late Mr. Bromley Davenport, M.P. Mr. Ridley has always enjoyed the reputation of being a sound, painstaking, and courteous lawyer, and he has given general satisfaction to the parties coming before him in his capacity of official referee. The new judge will take his seat at the ensuing Easter Sittings.

The following are the arrangements made by the judges for hearing probate and matrimonial causes during the ensuing Easter Sittings : Undefended matrimonial causes will be taken on Tuesday, Wednesday, and Thursday, the 27th, 28th, and 29th April. Special jury causes will be proceeded with from Friday, the 30th April, to Thursday, the 13th May, inclusive. Probate and matrimonial special jury causes will form one list, and be taken in the order in which they are set down. Probate and defended matrimonial causes for hearing before the court itself will be taken after Thursday, the 29th April, in Probate Court II. when Admiralty cases are not fixed, and in Court I. after the special juries are finished. These cases will form one list. Common jury cases will be taken on and after Friday, the 21st May, and will form one list. Divisional Courts will be formed to sit on Tuesdays, the 4th May and the 1st June. Supple. mental lists will be published from time to time during the sittings, and three days' notice will be given when such lists will be proceeded with. Summonses before the judge will be heard at eleven o'clock, and motions will be heard in court at twelve o'clock on Monday, the 3rd May, and on every succeeding Monday during the sittings.

The anti-trust law just enacted in Georgia is (says the Green Bag) a very comprehensive and thorough one. It prohibits and declares void all contracts, agreements, or arrangements made with a view to preventing or obstracting free competition in the importation or sale of foreign articles, or the sale of articles of domestic growth or domestic raw material. It declares unlawful and void all trusts or combinations between persons or corporations which are designed to have a tendency to advance, reduce, or control the prices of such products to producers or consumers. It provides for the forfeiture of the charter and franchise of any domestic corporation violating any of its provisions, and prohibits offending foreign corporations from doing business in the State. The Attorney-General is required to institute legal proceedings against any corporation that violates the law in any way, and to enforce the prescribed penalties. Any person or corporation damaged by a trast is authorised to sue for the recovery of such damage, and for other purposes. There are several additional provisions intended to facilitate prosecution and to prevent the defeat of the law by the technical means to which corporation lawyers habitually resort in the interests of their clients. The law is based upon the theory that free competition in all forms of business is a personal right and a public advantage, and that a wrong is done whenever it is suppressed or obstructed. There seems to be no room left for the escape of any combination designed to control prices or to interfere with the general laws of trade. It remains to be proved, if a law so stringent and farreaching can be enforced, and its power and usefulness will depend very largely upon the ability and integrity of the officers and the friendly disposition of the courts. However, the Legislature has done its part in a determined manner, and there does not seem to be any reason to doubt that the law can be made effective.

The recent remarkable feat of Isaac Dement, a Chicago stenographer, in taking testimony at the almost incredible rate of 402 words per minute, during a test recently made in that city, serves to direct public attention to the development of shorthand writing since its inventor, Isaac Pitman, who died in England a few weeks ago at an advanced age, first gave his system of brief writing to the world in 1837. It is a curious fact that the principal object for which the system was originally invented--the reporting of debates in Parliament--has been greatly dwarfed by the uses to which stenography has been put in the courts of law of the world, and its incalculable influence upon and facilitation of trials. In order to obtain some realisation of this, one has but to recall the procedure in vogue a half century ago, and compare it with these fin de siecle methods. Trials that would formerly occupy a week or more are now often concluded in a day, or less.

The judge who presided at the trial, and counsel on each side, wrote out in longhand full notes of the evidence, and even the crossexamining counsel took notes as he went along. In addition to this, any. one could require a witness to pause until he caught up with him in writing down his evidence. As Mr. Henry L. Clinton shows in his interesting reminiscences of New York courts and lawyers fifty years ago, the very object of cross-examination was not infrequently defeated by this method, as a witness was given the opportunity to change his evidence before it was written down. There would be frequent discassions as to what a witness said, and from such discussions the witness would be able to perceive which version of his evidence would best subserve the side on which he testified. When the discassions ended, it would be left to the witness to state what he actually said. All this the taking of evidence in shorthand has prevented, besides enormously lightening the labours of Bench and Bar, and rendering the entire machinery of justice more certain. Thus shorthand, together with that other remarkably modern invention, the typewriting machine, has to a large extent emancipated the judges and lawyers, and there has grown up a remarkably clever class of hard-working male and female experts, who are able to take with more than phonographic accuracy, because brains and wise discrimination are bebind them, every word that is spoken by even the most rapid and garrulous witness. The marvellous dexterity of the shorthand-writer who is able to take 400 words per minute may be partially comprehended by reflecting that this feat involves the writing of between six and seven words in each second, a most remarkable feat, even if kept up for only one minute. Shorthand and the typewriter have thus inconceivably reduced the burdens of modern life, making it possible for the business man to dispose of correspondence, the care of which, under old methods, would have been a practical impossibility, even with every minute of the business day devoted to it.-Albany Law Journal.

The office of Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States was established by the Constitution concurrently with the office of President; but while the presidency has been open to all native-born citizens above the age of thirty-five, the office of Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, bestowed usually upon men of mature, if not advanced years, has been held, in fact, by seven persons only since the foundation of the Government. There have been more than three times as many Presidents. John Jay, of New York, was the first Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. He was appointed by Washington in 1789. Judge Jay was at that time only forty-four years of age. When he attained the age of fifty he resigned and retired to private life. He died thirty-four years later-in 1829. The second of the Supreme Court Chief Justices was John Ellsworth, of Connecticut. He was fifty-four years of age when appointed, and served until 1801, when he resigned, resignations from public office being somewhat more frequent at that time than now. His successor was John Marshall, of Virginia, who was forty-six years of age when he assumed this post by appointment of President John Adams ; he held it uninterruptedly for thirty-four years, until his death, in 1835. Andrew Jackson appointed his successor, Roger B. Taney, of Maryland, who held the office until bis death, in 1864. Judge Taney was fiftynine years of age when appointed, and eighty-seven at the time of his death. No Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, perbaps, had more intricate questions to determine or to vote upon in that tribunal than Judge Taney, and his tenure and that of Chief Justice Marshall stretch over nearly onehalf of the bistory of the United States as a nation. Chief Justice Taney's successor was Salmon P. Chase, of Ohio, who had previously been Secretary of the Treasury, and was fifty-six years of age when appointed. He served for nine years, dying in 1873. Mr. Chase was appointed by Abraham Lincoln, and it is a part of the political history of their day that Mr. Chase was himself a candidate for the Presidency, and had hoped to defeat Mr. Lincoln for the re-nomination and to succeed him ; and later, in 1868, it is known that Mr. Chase was a candidate for the Democratic nomination for the Presidency, though he had been one of the founders of the Republican party. Chief Justice Chase was succeeded in 1873 by President Grant's appointment of another Ohio man, Morrison R. Waite, who was fifty-seven years of age when appointed, and served until 1888, when he was succeeded by the present Chief Justice, Melville W. Fuller, appointed by President Cleveland. Mr. Fuller is a native of Maine. He was, when appointed, fifty-five years of age, and will be sixty-four on the 11th Feb. next. He is the seventh of the Chief Justices of the Supreme Court, and has served, thus far, a briefer term than any of his predecessors since Chief Justice Ellsworth. In addition to the Chief Justices who have served, several men have been nominated for the office, but rejected by the Sonate, which has confirmatory power. The office of Chief Justice is by many citizens more highly coveted than that of the Presidency. The labour is less, the responsibility much smaller, the tenure longer, and the honorr an exalted one.-Worcester (Mass.) Spy.

remain married, or whether the marriage should hereafter be dissolved. The petitioner to have the custody of the child.” On the 17th July 1895 the petitioner filed another petition for dissolution of marriage by reason of the respondent's adultery and desertion; and a decree absolute was made by the court, on the 8th June 1896, dissolving the marriage, and an order was made giving the petitioner the custody of the only child of the marriage. The respondent continued to pay the allowance agreed upon, which was, in fact, the amount allotted by way of alimony pendente lite in the first suit. Upon petition for maintenance, and for an allowance for the maintenance and education of the child beyond that which was stipulated for by the agreement in the first suit, the respondent set up the agreement as a bar. The registrar was of opinion that, by the terms of the agreement, the petitioner was not entitled to any further maintenance, and reported accordingly. The petitioner moved the court to vary the report of the registrar, and to direct the inquiry as to means to proceed on the merits. It was decided by Sir F. H. Jeune (76 L. T. Rep. 28) that the petitioner was entitled to an order for further maintenance, and that, therefore, the inquiry as to moans must be directed to proceed. The respondent, by leave, appealed. Held that, the present case being one of dissolution of marriage and not of divorce, Gandy v. Gandy (46 L. T. Rep. 607; 7 P. Div. 100) was not in point, except in so far as it negatived any implied condition of continued chastity; that the present case must turn on the power of the Divorce Court on a dissolution of marriage to compel a husband to provide for his divorced wife, and to make orders for the maintenance and education of the children ; that as regarded permanent maintenance sect. 32 of the Act of 1857 was very wide, and it would not be right for the court to put a narrow construction upon it or to fetter in any way the court or judge intrusted with its application in cases of divorce ; that the statutory powers were ample to justify the order appealed from; and that, therefore, the appeal must be dismissed with costs. On the application of the respondent leave to appeal to the House of Lords was given under sect. 9 of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1881.

[Bishop v. Bishop. Ct. of App. No. 2: Lindley, Smith, and Rigby, L.JJ. March 10 and April 14.-Counsel: for the appellant, William Willis, Q.C. and W. F. Barnard; for the respondent, Bargrave Deane, Q.C. and Durley Grazebrook. Solicitors : for the appellant, Edward

J. H. Carter; for the respondent, Edwin Siniih and Ellis.] Judicial Separation-Permanent Alimony and Allowance for ChildrenPrior Separation Deed set up in Bar-Inquiry to proceed as to leans

- Matrimonial Causes Act 1857 (20 $ 21 Vict. c. 85), 88. 17 and 32Matrimonial Causes Act 1866 (29 8. 30 Vict. c, 32), 8. 1.-A wife, who had been living apart from her husband for about four years under a deed of separation, instituted a suit, and obtained a decree of judicial separation, with custody of the children, on the ground of the husband's adultery since the date of the deed. She afterwards applied for permanent alimony, and for an allowance for the children. She had been receiving an allowance under the deed, wbich contained a covenant not to sue for a divorce or judicial separation in respect of previous misconduct, but did not contain any express covenant not to sue for increase of alimony. The registrar was of opinion that the petitioner was not entitled to any order for permanent alimony, on the ground that the case was governed by the decision of the Court of Appeal in Gandy v. Gandy (46 L. T. Rep. 607; 7 P. Div. 168). The petitioner appealed to the judge. It was decided by Barnes, J. (76 L. T. Rep. 169), reversing the decision of the registrar, that, as the parties were no longer living apart under the terms of the deed of separation, but under the decree of the court, and the petitioner, by order of the court, having the legal custody of the children of the marriage, all the provisions of the deed were practically at an end ; that, therefore, the court was not debarred by the decision of the Court of Appeal in Gandy v. Gandy (ubi sup.) from exercising the powers conferred by sect. 17 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1857, but that this case was governed by the second decision of the Court of Appeal in Gandy v. Gandy (53 L. T. Rep. 306; 30 Ch. Div. 57); and that, where there was no specific covenant in the deed restraining the petitioner from seeking an order for increased nony, the court might justly award such increase as the means of the respondent allowed. His Lordship also decided that the mere fact that the adulterous husband might not be able to support an application to set aside his contract to pay alimony, and, if his means declined, reduce the amount which he had covenanted to pay under the deed, was not enough to deprive the court of its statutory powers. His Lordship decided, therefore, that the petitioner should have leave to file ber petition for permanent alimony and allowance for the children, and to proceed with the inquiry thereon as to means. The respondent, by leave, appealed. Held, that the view taken by Barnes, J. in treating the second decision in Gandy v. Gandy (ubi sup.), rather than the first, as applicable to the present case, was right; and that the petitioner ought to have leave to proceed. Held, therefore, that the appeal must be dismissed with costs.

[Judkins v. Judkins. Ct. of App. No. 2: Lindley, Smith, and Rigby, L.JJ. April 7 and 14.--Counsel : for the appellant, Cozens-Hardy, Q.C. and Priestley; for the respondent, Rawlins, Q.C. and W. F. Barnard. Solicitors : for the appellant, Arnold Williams and Co.; for the

respondent, H. B. Wade.] Poor Law--Settlement-Residence-Irremovability-- Patient in Hospital

-The Poor Removal Act 1846 (9 & 10 Vict. c. 66), s. 1--Divided Parishes Act 1876 (39 $ 40 Vict. c. 61), 8. 34.-The Divided Parishes Act 1876, by sect. 34, provides that, " Where any person shall have resided for the term of three years in any parish in such manner and under such circumstances in each of such years as would, in accordance with the several statntes in that behalf, render him irremovable, he shall be deemed to be settled therein." The Poor Removal Act 1846, by sect. 1, provides that, “No person shall be removed, nor shall any



COURT OF APPEAL. Assignment of Debt-- Absolute Assignment in Writing-Right of Assignee

to sue-Assignment to Agent to collect - Judicature Act 1873 (36 f. 37 Vict. c. 66), 8. 25, sub-sect. 6.--This action was brought by the plaintiff as assignee of a debt due from the defendant to a third person, a foreigner resident abroad. The assignment was by a deed, by which it was witnessed that, in consideration of £50 then paid to the assignor, the assignor did “absolutely assign " the debt to the plaintiff. The debt, which amounted to £59, was in fact assigned to the plaintiff in order to enable him to sue the defendant in England as agent for the assignor ; the plaintiff was to deduct a certain amount as commission, and was to pay over the balance to the assignor. The action was tried by Bruce, J. without a jury, and the learned judge gava judgment for the defendant, upon the ground that the assignment was a sham, and was, therefore, not an absolute assignment in writing of the debt, which would enable the assignee to sue in his own name, within sect. 25 (6) of the Judicature Act 1873. The plaintiff appealed. Held (reversing the judgment of Bruce, J.), that the assignment of a debt to an agent for the purpose of enabling him to sue in his own name and recover the debt on behalf of his principal is an absolute assignment within sect. 25 (6) of the Judicature Act 1873, and that the assignee can sue in his own name.

[Wiesener v. Rackow. Ct. of App. : Lord Esher, M.R., Lopes and Chitty, L.JJ. April 9.-Counsel: for the appellant, Rufus Isaacs ; for the respondent, Ruegg, Q.C. and Sington. Solicitors : for the appellant,

Mann and Taylor; for the respondent, J. P. Budden.] Divorce-Permanent Maintenance and Allowance for Child-Agreement

in former Suit set up in Bar-- Inquiry to proceed as to Means-Matrimonial Causes Act 1857 (20 & 21 Vict. c. 85), s. 32-Matrimonial Causes Act 1866 (29 & 30 Vict. c. 32), 8. 1.-On the 22nd Dec. 1892 a wife brought a suit for dissolution of marriage against her husband on the grounds of his alleged cruelty and adultery. The only child of the marriage, a girl, was born at the beginning of the year 1893. On the 20th March 1894 the petition was in the list of causes for hearing, but shortly before the case was called the petition was withdrawn, and the petitioner and respondent signed the following agreement: "The petitioner agrees to accept £130 per annum by way of permanent maintenance, this sum to include the maintenance of the child. The said allowance to be paid by the respondent by monthly payments during their joint lives. This payment to be made in any event, whether they

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warrant be granted for the removal of any person, from any parish in which such person shall have resided for five years (reduced to one year by 28 & 29 Vict. c. 79] next before the application for the warrant : Provided always that the time during which such person shall be a prisoner in a prison, or shall be serving Her Majesty as a soldier, marine, or sailor, or reside as an in-pensioner in Greenwich or Chelsea Hospitals, or shall be confined in a lunatic asylum, or house duly licensed, or hospital registered for the reception of lunatics, or as an in-patient in a hospital

shall for all purposes be excluded in the computation of time hereinbefore mentioned.” A. Farr went to reside in the St. Olave's Union on the 23rd July 1892, and continued to have his residence and his house in that union until his death on the 15th April 1896. On the 1st May 1895, however, he was admitted into a hospital, outside the St. Olave's Union, as an in-patient, and continued there until the 29th July, when he returned to his house in the St. Olave's Union, and remained there until his death. His son, aged nine, became chargeable to the Canterbury Union, and an order for his removal to the St. Olave's Union was duly made. That order of removal was confirmed on appeal to quarter sessions, and a case was stated for the opinion of the High Court. The Divisional Court (Wright and Bruce, JJ.) held that A. Farr had not acquired a settlement in the St. Olave's Union, and allowed the appeal : (76 L. T. Rep. 88). The guardians of the Canterbury Union appealed. Held (affirming the judgment of the Queen's Bench Division), that A. Farr had not acquired a settlement by residence in the St. Olave's Union, because the time during which he was an inpatient in a hospital must be excluded from the computation of the term of three years. Dorchester Union v. Weymouth Union (54 L. T. Rep. 52; 16 Q. B. Div. 31) approved.

[St. Olave's Union v. Canterbury Union. Ct. of App. : Lord Esher, M.R., Lopes and Chitty, L.JJ. April 9.-Counsel : for the appellants, Dickens, Q.C. and Hohler ; for the respondents, Macmorran, Q.C. and R. W. Harper. Solicitors : for the appellants, Speechly, Mumford, and Co., for John Plummer, Canterbury; for the respondents, Arkcoll, Cockell, and Chadwick.]



account which represented moneys received as above mentioned from & purchaser in respect of transactions subsequent to the death of the testator. The claimants had no notice of the testator's death until some weeks after the completion of such transactions. It was contended that an obligation within the meaning of sect. 9 of the Partnership Act 1890 was incurred which was binding on the testator's estate, and that the claim ought to be allowed. The claim was resisted on the ground that there was nothing more than a contract of agency between the claimants and the partnership firm of F. and Co., and that consequently upon the death of the testator the partnership was determined and no liability attached to the testator's estate on account of transactions subsequent to his death. Held, that, although the Partnership Act 1890 may have conferred a legal right to claimants against the estate of a deceased partner in respect of obligations, no such obligation as that contended for was incurred, and that the term

obligation” in sect. 9 of the Act ought not to be read so as to throw upon the estate of a deceased partner liability which before the Act, according to the principle laid down in Devaynes v. Noble ; Houlton's case (1 Mer. 616), did not attach. That claim must therefore be disallowed.

[Re Friend; Friend v. Young. Ch. Div.: Stirling, J. March 12, 13, and April 6.--Counsel: for the claimants, Grosvenor Woods, Q.C. and J. Mathew ; for the executrix, Graham Hastings, Q.C. and Le Riche.

Solicitors : Hugh P Davies ; Sims and Syms.] Urban District Council-Drainage-Surface Water from Road-Right

to discharge into natural Watercourse-Public Health Act 1875, 88. 15, 17, 308.-The plaintiffs were the owners of an estate in the neighbour. hood of Bournemouth, part of which was laid out for building, and which included a part of the course of the small stream called the Bourne. Three roads upon this estate originally laid out by the plaintiffs had been taken over by the defendants, the Branksome Urban District Council, after they had constructed a system of drains and sewers for them under the powers of the Private Streets Works Acts 1892. In the scheme originally proposed by the council the surface water from these roads was allowed to flow into the sewers, but the local board having refused to sanction any scheme which did not provide a separate system for carrying off the surface water, the defendants had provided such a system by drains which discharged the surface water into the Bourne. The plaintiffs objected that the water so discharged carried with it a great quantity of sand, silt, and other solid matter washed off the roads, and was much more in quantity than would have naturally flowed into the εtream, and that its discharge into the stream would injure the plaintiffs by causing floods and silting up the stream. They brought this action to restrain the defendants from permitting any water, sand, silt, or other solid matter to flow through their drains into the Bourne. The streets in question were situated within the natural watershed of the Bourne. The defendants' drains were furnished with catch-pits, the best known method of intercepting sand and silt. Held, that the council had a right to drain the surface water from their roads into the stream which formed its natural outlet, provided that they observed the restrictions of sect. 17, which forbids the conveying sewage or filthy waters into a natural watercourse ;

that water charged with sand or silt was not filthy water within the meaning of that section, and that if the plaintiffs had suffered any damage their only remedy was compensation under sect. 308.

[Durrant v. The Branksome Urban District Council. Ch. Div.: North, J. July 22, 33, 24, and 25, 1896, and April 10, 1897.- Counsel : Swinfen Eady, Q.C. and Hadley ; Vernon Smith, Q.C. and Rouden. Solicitors : Withall, Trotter, and Patteson, agents for Orerbury and Steward, Norwich ; Peacock and Goddard, agents for Trevanion, Curtis,

and Ridley, Poole.] Will-Construction-Illegitimate Child-Nephew.-By his will made the

25th June 1889 a testator gave “to my said wife's nephew James William Robinson all my silver spoons and my gold spectacles.” And the testator directed that his trustees should hold the surplus of the trust funds as to one moiety upon trust for “all and every tbe nephew and niece and nephews and nieces of my said wife.” J. W. Robinson was illegitimate. The testator died on the 21st Sept. 1893, and his widow in 1896. This was a summons taken out by the trustees to determine the question whether J. W. Robinson, 0. T. Robinson, deceased, and Charles Henry Robinson, deceased, the illegitimate children of William Robinson, deceased, were included in the gift by the testator of bis residue to the nephews and nieces of his wife. Held, that, having regard to the more modern cases which showed a tendency to include an illegitimate person in a class, where he had been clearly designated in other parts of the will as a member of that class, James William Robinson, notwithstanding his illegitimacy, was included in the gift of residue to the nephews and nieces of testator's wife.

[Re Parker; Parker v. Osborne. Ch. Div.: Kekewich, J. April 9 and 13. - Counsel : Gatey; Renshar, Q.C. and Freeman; Lorence Ryland. Solicitors : F. Douglas Alloway, for F. W. Richardson, Burton-on-Trent ; James Cornford; Woodcock, Ryland, and Parker.]

HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE.-CHANCERY DIVISION. Charity-Impure Personalty-Mortmain and Charitable Uses Act 1891

(54 & 55 Vict. c. 73), 8. 9-Birmingham Corporation Stock-- Metropolitan Board of Works Consolidated Stock.Testator by his will, made the 6th Sept. 1890 (that is to say, before the passing of the Mortmain and Charitable Uses Act 1891), directed that all legacies given by his will for any charitable purpose, and the legacy or succession duties payable in respect of the same, should be paid exclusively out of that part of his general estate which might lawfully be bequeathed by will for charitable purposes. And the testator directed that, after payment of certain legacies and annuities, all such part of his residuary estate as should consist of, or should have arisen from, or been produced by, the investment or reinvestment of property which, at the time of his decease, was pure personal estate capable of being lawfully bequeathed by will for charitable purposes, should be held by his trustees upon trust for a charity. And, subject to the trusts and provisions of his will, the testator gave all such parts of his residuary estate as could not lawfully be devised, bequeathed, or given by will for charitable purposes, and all other his general estate not otherwise disposed of, to George David Greenhough absolutely. The testator died on the 3rd Jan. 1892. Among the property of the testator was a sum of £6000 Birmingham Corporation Three-and-a-Half per Cent. Stock, and a sum of £4000 Metropolitan Board of Works Three-and-a-Half per Cent. Consolidated Stock. Held, that the charitable legacies and duty thereon were payable out of pure personalty ; the Birmingham Corporation Stock was pure ; and the Metropolitan Consolidated Stock was impure personalty.

{Re Crossley; Birrell v. Greenhough. Ch. Div. : Kekewich, J. April 7 and 8.--Counsel : Crawley; Renshaw, Q.C. and Yardley; Warrington, Q.C. and Mark Romer; Ingle Joyce. Solicitors : H. and

G. Keith ; S. R. Lewin and Co.; Solicitor to the Treasury.] Practice--Costa-Solicitor and Client-Bankrupt Trustee-Charging

Order.-Costs due to a trustee who has become bankrupt, whether incurred before or after bankruptcy, are payable to the trustee in bankruptcy, unless the solicitor of the trustee obtains a charging order in his favonr. If costs are payable out of a fund in court, the ta xing master by his certificate would not make them payable to the trustee's solicitors, but to the trustee in bankruptcy, unless the solicitor obtains a charging order. They are not the solicitor's costs at all ; they are the trastee's costs, and, being an asset coming to him after bankruptcy, must be paid to his trustee in bankruptcy.

[Baker v. Abbott. Ch. Div.: Romer, J. April 8.-Counsel : Ingpen ; C. E. E. Jenkins; L. Ryland ; Beddali. Solicitors : Fooks, Chadwick, Arnold, and Fooks; Godfrey and Webb; Woodcock, Ryland, and

Parker; Taylor and Taylor.] Principal and Agent-Contract for Agency with Agency Firm-Deceased

Partner--Money had and received by surviving Partner-Liability of Estate of deceased Partner-Obligations - Partnership Act 1890 (53 & 54 Vict. c. 39), 8. 9.—The testator and his son carried on the business of commission agents in partnership under the style of F. and Co. The claimants employed F. and Co. to sell certain goods and receive the proceeds of sale, and now songht to prove in an action commenced by the executrix of the testator for the administration of his estate for certain moneys received by the surviving partner in the name of F. and Co. on account of transactions arising out of an agency contract subsisting between the claimants and F. and Co. The testator's son had been adjudicated bankrupt shortly after the death of the testator, and it was admitted that no money could be recovered from the trustee in his bankruptcy. There were four substantial items in the

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QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION. Inland Revenue--Income Tax-Yearly Interest ---Profits and Gains

Interest received by Building Society on Mortgages---Schedule D, Income Tax Act 1842. 8. 100; and Act of 1853, s. 2.-Case stated by Income Tax Commissioners. The Leeds Permanent Benefit Building Society appealed against an assessment of £60,200, made by the commissioners under schedule D. of the Income Tax Acts. The appellant society was established in Leeds in 1848, under the provisions of the Building Societies Act 1836 (6 & 7 Will. 4, c. 42), and was incorporated under the Building Societies Act 1874. The objects of the

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