GENERAL INTELLIGENCE. THE PRESENT STATE OF THE LAW. (Concluding portion of an address delivered by Hon. U. M. Rose, of Arkansas, at the last meeting of the Virginia Bar Association at Old Point Comfort.) AFTER the death of Bacon there ensued a period of 200 years, during which the spirit of Coke lay heavy on tower and tree, and during which no one even so much as mentioned the name of law reform. Scientific men stole the ideas of Bacon without remorse, without acknowledgment; and lawyers discredited him because he had shone in fields which they were disqualified to enter. But when Blackstone had presented his stately and classical outline of English law Bentham fired his signal gun of revolt. When the discussion on the Reform Bill of 1832 admitted some rays of light into the medieval dungeons of English law, crustaceans began to lose their vitality and to disappear, and insurgents like Mill, Langdale, Mackintosh, Romilly, and Brougham took up the task where Bacon had left off. They fought often unprevailing, but with occasional victories the value of which no one at present disputes. Time would fail me to speak of the manner in which the warfare has been carried on by Field and by others in our own country. But the contest begun by Bacon still remains undecided. The most common objection to allowing the law to reveal itself in a statutory form, as Bacon proposed, is that case law is much more flexible than statutory law. If flexibility is what is desired, manifestly the best thing to do is to leave all questions to the discretion of the judge. But the quality of inflexibility, supposed to inhere in statutes, is a delusion. Most of us have heard how it was that the Statute of Uses, passed with great deliberation by King, Lords, and Commons, had no other effect than that of adding three more words to conveyances of land; and most of us have observed how numerous statutes which seemed to a casual observer to be solid and rigid, under the skilful manipulation of the courts have first become flexible, then plastic, then fluid, until at last becoming gaseous, we have seen them exhale and disappear into interstellar space. What in our ignorance we had taken to be a promontory of firm land proved to be only an evanescent fog bank. : Flexibility is only another name for uncertainty and proverbially the highest excellence of the law consists in its freedom from uncertainty. The law is supposed to be made up of rules; and flexibility or uncertainty is that which renders any rule ineffectual. Whatever is intelligible must have some definite form, or some power of resistance, or some consistency. The lawyer who wants flexible rules, is like the carpenter or the geometer who should attempt to draw straight lines along the edge of an unconfined shoe string. Consciously or unconsciously he favours that laxity which makes of the law a snare for the ignorant and the unwary, an accomplice of fraud and crime. The laws which "palter with us in a double sense are worthy of the malediction which Macbeth at last bestowed on false prophets that keep the word of promise to our ear, But break it to our hope. When laws are few, like those of Solon or Lycurgus, it is not difficult to reduce them to a written form. When they increase in number the difficulty increases. Thus the difficulty of making a code increases just as the need of a code becomes more urgent. With us the undertaking is so immense that we hardly dare give it a serious thought. The endeavour seems like that of putting the ocean into a pint cup. Increase of knowledge brings confusion, and confusion requires a reduction to method. But our collection of card houses, made up of case law, is so extensive, so ramified, so void of contour, such a wilderness of perplexity, that we are afraid for anyone to touch it. There is no map or bird's-eye view of it, no living guide that knows a tithe of its convolutions, labyrinths and entanglements, so that no lawyer is willing to trust any other lawyer or set of lawyers to undertake what seems to be a hopeless task. We know that the intelligent advocate of a code does not propose to change the law itself, but only to change the form in which it is expressed, cancelling whatever is obsolete, contradictory, or redundant, reducing the remainder to an orderly arrangement. But the Italians have a well-known saying that the translator always betrays; and as the proposed change of form is a kind of translation, we tremble for the result. We are afraid that while the wine is being decanted from one vessel into another some drop of the precious fluid may be lost; or that some fermentation may supervene that may impair the flavour of the whole. We recall the pleasant story told by Voltaire of the way in which the Sultan Haroun-alRaschid caused all the wisdom of his vast library to be condensed first into five hundred volumes, then into one volume, and then into a single sentence, with an unexpected and disappointing result. But every great change is attended with fears, many of which are usually groundless. By whomsoever done the work will no doubt bear that stamp of imperfection which seems to be the trade-mark of the visible universe; but it can hardly be worse than our present state in which the law is fast drifting from the region of the unknown to the region of the unknowable. After all, though the talents of Coke and the genius of Bacon would not be amiss in the accomplishment of such a task, yet the qualities required, though of a high order, are not really of the highest; patience, fidelity, and accuracy being most in demand. Cardinal Wolsey, who was certainly a sincere friend of the cause of education, desired to raise a fund out of the proceeds of confiscated estates to establish a university in London for instruction in the civil and common law; a measure which was defeated by the rapacity of the courtiers of Henry VIII. Noticing this incident Lord Campbell says: "Such an institution is still a desideratum in England, for, with splendid exceptions, it must be admitted that English barristers, though very clever practitioners, are not such able jurists as are to be found in other countries where law is systematically studied as a science." Just here he struck a very sore spot. We have thousands of individual instances, mere snap-shots of the law on the rack, showing the law in countless contortions, a wilderness of notes without any text, but we have no scientific system. In no way has the insular condition of England been more fully shown than in the development of her laws. Without dwelling on the European continental system, I may say in few words that by that system the laws are reduced to written codes; that the courts do not as such make any laws, their decision in one case not being authority in another. A council of revision looks after the written law, recommending needed changes as experience may suggest. In some countries this council is permanent; in others it is appointed from time to time as may seem needful. It is, of course, in communication with distinguished judges and jurists throughout the country, and its influence on the legislative department is paramount, though not decisive. Comparative jurisprudence is a subject so extensive that it is necessarily but little understood, but it must not be inferred that English law has not been studied by continental jurists. It has been studied closely by specialists, and one of its institutions, that of trial by jury, has been in modern times adopted into various continental systems. Nevertheless, I believe that it would be quite impossible to find that any continental jurist has ever expressed a preference for judge-made law, that peculiar institution of the English-speaking races. The entire adoption of the continental system is not practicable, and is really not desirable. Our lawyers would never consent to a change so radical as that which would result from the adoption of the practice of continental courts, which, in deciding cases, briefly recite a few facts, and then pronounce judgment without citing authorities beyond perhaps an occasional reference to the Code. The question is whether Bacon was right in thinking that case law should be regarded as only provisional, and that it ought to be revised, arranged, condensed, and re-uttered in statutory form, so that the whole law might be briefer, more systematic, more comprehensive, more intelligible, and more authoritative. It is said by historians that just before the compilation of the Codes of Justinian, the Roman law had become so voluminous that no one could understand it, and that the books which contained it would have made a load for many camels; but it would be easy to show that our law books are far more numerous than could ever have been those of Rome, or indeed of any other country. Our law is fragmentary. It is like the broken mirror of Richard II., and day by day it is broken into still smaller pieces. It is for the most part a vast and heterogeneous collection of individual instances. Since the time that Coke made his accurate survey of English law the great books of the common law have never been adequately posted up. Since that time, now more than 250 years, entries have only been made in journals, blotters, day books, in loose memoranda on detached sheets, and by almost anyone that desired to write on the subject. When we want to know how any particular account stands we refer to all manner of writers and judges as experts, who disagree after the manner of experts. The courts are perpetually in conflict. If Charles V. could not succeed in making a few clocks keep time together, it would be sheer madness to expect that a hundred or so of courts whose reports are printed could be kept in accord. On almost every question they are found to vary, and they are generally as divergent as Sampson's foxes. We have had various labour-saving devices, leading cases, selected cases, American decisions, American reports, and so on. Then we have annual volumes on certain topics of the law, legitimate successors of the annual keepsakes, tokens, and books of beauty, issued by Lady Blessington and others in the first half of this century. Then we have digests and text-books on all subjects without number. But these we can hardly use in court, for while one section or one page may be favourable to our views, the next will be hostile, so that, whatever we may use in the seclusion of our chambers, what we require in the court-room is the uncontradicted, the immaculate, the austere, the uncriticised original report. Where there is such a conflict among the authorities uniform results are not to be expected. A judge may decide almost any question any way, and still be supported by an array of cases; and his decision will a last probably be the result of temperament or of prepossession. It is one of the maxims of our law that that law is the best that leaves the least discretion to the judge. But in the existing conflict of authorities a judge can hardly decide anything without exercising his discretion. A choice between antagonising cases involves a large discretion. I apprehend that if by some photographic process we could get a visible outline of our nebular system of law, it would appear very much in the shape of the chancellor's foot. The mere fact that every judge attempts to express his conception of the law in his own language must of itself be productive of endless controversy. Our text-books are for the most part collections of multitudinous headnotes, which are no more than compressed tablets of the law, warranted to keep in all climates, convenient for administration to all the courts but as no two of them are alike, and as they are liable to interact upon and to neutralise each other, their effect on the judicial economy is only a matter of conjecture. The glorious uncertainty of the law which was some time a proverb has become a truism. A man's library is often a fair index to his character. Coke's library consisted of folios, not many in number; for in those days there were only twelve volumes of reports, of which nine were year-books. Besides these he had the statutes of the realm, and various abridgments. His library, though exhaustive, was not large. We may suppose that a single shelf might hold all the books of a law library of that time. Nothing is more in contrast with the age of Elizabeth than the modern deluge of books. There are now added to the National Library in Paria about 60,000 volumes a year, making about 6,000,000 volumes in the course of a century, even if there should be no increase from year to year. In various other public libraries the number of annual additions is, perhaps, no less. Of this 60,000, it is quite impossible that more than 500 volumes can have any reasonable or even tolerable excuse for being. When we look at the books and pamphlets that litter our bookstalls, for the most part mere sweepings of vacant chambers, it seems a pity that most of them shall be handed down to a remote posterity, like the mummied cats of Egypt. If things go on in this way for a thousand years, it is hard to see how such vast collections as must accumulate can be housed and cared for. As books continue to breed like rabbits in Australia, the time may come when it may be a thing to mention in one's epitaph as commending him to all ages that he never wrote a book, and when the man that utterly extirpates a book will receive more honour than one who has written a hundred; but before that time comes it would 'be a public boon if the Malthusian doctrine for the restriction of population could be applied to the production of books. It seems a pity that the tribunal composed of the barber and the curate that disposed of the library of Don Quixote could not have been perpetuated with an immense increase of jurisdiction. But no books increase faster than our law reports. It is deplorable that there cannot be some kind of central clearing house, where reported cases may cancel each other, leaving us some net and intelligible result. If things go on at the present rate, the time must soon come when any new Omar will be hailed as a deliverer and as a public benefactor. Years ago they had a law in Sweden that possessed some excellent features. Whoever wrote a foolish or an evil book was condemned to eat it under penalty of death. He thus appeared in the character of Saturn devouring his own children. By a humane provision the author was allowed to serve up his book with such ingredients as might render it most palatable. Theodore Reinking, having written a stupid book in Latin on political subjects, was condemned under this law in 1644. It is said that he cooked his book up into some kind of a sauce, in which form it no doubt acquired a piquancy that it had not before possessed. The punishment was presumably effectual, as there is no evidence that he appeared again as an author, probably having lost his taste for books. Such a law would not only lessen the number of books, but it would promote brevity and simplicity of style, for if a man were in danger of having literally to eat his own words, it may be supposed that he would not use any more than were necessary, and that he would avoid sesquipedalian words, any one of which would suffice for a hearty meal, while the rigid enforcement of such a law would tend greatly to promote the improvement of the culinary art, to say nothing of the accurate knowledge that would be acquired as to the effect of different kinds of literary diet on the digestive organs. A year or so ago I read what seemed to be a very sensible report by one of your committees on the subject of the avalanche of law books that daily issues from the teeming press. Soon afterwards I saw a notice of this report in a publisher's circular, in which the publisher said that if lawyers did not want new books the remedy was easy, they need not buy them. It was very kind of him to say so, and what he said was true, but it was not the whole truth. Collectively we could refuse to buy such books, individually we cannot. We are like the armed powers of Europe; each and all would be benefited by a general disarmament, but neither can disarm unless all the rest will do so. As nearly all of our law stands on the shifting sands of individual cases, and as every new case, like every new child that is born, is fraught with unknown possibilities, selfpreservation requires that we shall keep up with the disorderly and rapidly moving procession as well as we can; and as we cannot remember one case out of a hundred, even if we had time to read them all, we have to buy digests and text-books without number, good, bad, and indifferent, to serve as convenient indexes. If we fail to act thus, dire will be our fate. If, for instance, we have occasion to refer in argument to the Dartmouth College case, we may apprehend that our adversary, holding aloft a late issue of some reporter, will triumphantly announce that that decision has been overruled by the Supreme Court of Alaska, a fact that he supposed was known to every practising lawyer; or, if emulating the eloquence of Patrick Henry, we refer to the Magna Charta, our opponent will announce with fiendish exultation that he holds in his hand a book fresh from the press, a book destined to form an epoch in the history of jurisprudence, a mature work on the Statute of Limitations as applied to Estrays, written by a retired minister of the Gospel of several years standing, which demonstrates conclusively that the Magna Charta was never enacted in the manner required by the English Constitution. Happy shall we be if we shall be able to produce some printed paragraph saying that the learned judges of the Supreme Court of Alaska have fallen into an error as to the Dartmouth College case, or that the extremely erudite author of the text-book mentioned has drawn his conclusion from insufficient data. Thus it is that we have to buy all the latest books, if for nothing else in order to defend ourselves against the bad law that is constantly being exploded on the Profession. To a traveller from Cathay it might well seem that the Legal Profession is organised and maintained solely in the interest of booksellers. To the really thoughtful mind the expedient of a strike must sometimes have suggested itself. If we were only organised, and had a master lawyer, who could tell us how and when to strike, and if we could manage to evade federal injunctions, we might march on the principal publishing centres, and, firing their immense magazines of unsold law books, we might feel one moment of delirious joy to see the landscape illuminated by what Coke called "the gladsome light of jurisprudence." Or, if we preferred milder measures, we might issue an ultimatum, saying: "We do not want any more of your books. If the law is a science at all, anything capable of human comprehension, we have more books now on that subject than there are on all other scientific subjects put together, leaving out of course all those that are wholly obsolete on one side. Mind cannot master them, the memory cannot retain them. Extremes meet, and too much law is the same as no law. By dint of endless repetitions counsel is darkened, by reason of multitudinous illustrations the rule is lost sight of." In arguing the case of Jones v. Randall, before Lord Mansfield, Mr. Dunning said: "The laws of this country are clear, evident, and certain ; all the judges know the laws, and, knowing them, administer them with uprightness and integrity." Mr. Dunning certainly displayed a keen sense of humour: but Mansfield, true to his Scotch origin, answered seriously, saying: "As to the certainty of the law mentioned by Mr. Dunning, it would be hard upon the Profession if the law was so certain that everybody knew it; the misfortune is that it is so uncertain that it costs much money to know what it is, even in the last resort." The rule, correctly stated, is that all men are presumed to know the law except the judges of the courts. They are not presumed to know it; and hence they cannot be held responsible for any official conduct based on ignorance or misconception of the law. The courts, which are only the judges idealised, are however presumed to know the law; a presumption that can be safely indulged, since it involves no personal liability; a mere complimentary fiction, as most lawyers know, like the presumption that all men are innocent. None of us pretend to know the law; or if we know it at all it is in a very general way, something like the manner in which we know our native country, by maps, by boundaries, by great mountain ranges, and by a few landscapes, being ignorant of the most of the multitudinous details. When asked a question about the law, whether written or unwritten, we answer with a modesty and distrust not innate, but which is the fruit of many surprises and disappointments. We never could have known much of such a boundless subject; and much that we may have known has been forgotten. Mr. Livingston, in his report on the penal code of Louisiana, said: “Is it not a mockery to refer me to the common law of England? Where am I to find it? Who is to interpret it for me? If I should apply to a lawyer for a book that contained it, he would smile at my ignorance, and, pointing to about five hundred volumes on his shelves, would tell me that these contained a small part of it; that the rest was either unwritten, or might be found in London or New York, or was shut up in the breasts of the judges at Westminster Hall.” At present an American lawyer, pointing to shelves containing at least five thousand volumes, would say that no one knows, or pretends, or hopes ever to know the law. Were Coke alive now he would not pretend to know all the unwritten law. Such stupendous knowledge was never vouchsafed to mortals. We are soon to have a digest that is to contain references to nearly five hundred thousand American cases, overflowing, like the floods of Egypt, through all the letters of the alphabet. Our statutes are for the most part as fragmentary as the unwritten law. Drawn up often by some rural member who is trying his prentice hand on legislation, and who would not hesitate to change the orbits of the planets if he had a chance, mutilated in the legislative mill, thundering in the preface with preposterous titles and irrelevant preambles, contused, riddled, and broken by discordant and conflicting amendments, dislocated and distorted by impossible provisoes, they inspire us with a sense of dismay; so that after perusing them repeatedly we are fain to confess that they are like the idle tears," and that we "know not what they mean." Or if the statute is more carefully drawn, and by a more competent hand, it will generally be found to be a mere stone or log thrown in for the purpose of checking or diverting some current of judgemade law, with the unexpected result of overflowing remote gardens and plantations of which the author of the statute had never a thought. The time was when it was supposed to be a reproach to call one a case lawyer, but now we are all either case lawyers, or are not lawyers at all. Cases are our counters, and there are no coins. Our legal arguments are for the most part a mere casino-like matching and unmatching of cases, involving little or no intellectual effort. The law is ceasing to be a question of principles, and is becoming a mere question of patterns. Often we have to snatch the cases from the vast mouldering heap in haste. Some of them may have been overruled, others may be moribund; some of them may be like Thoroughgood v. Bryan, overruled by the court that made them, or, like Dumpor's case, repealed by Act of Parliament, but still having a posthumous existence in some of our States. We do know how the matter may stand, but we walk out on the unsteady footing of these cases to the extreme limit, and marshal the court the way it should go. The judge may be learned, but he may know no more of these particular cases than we do. The familiar sound of Brown v. Jones may awaken some far off memory like the reminiscences of childhood, and on the faith of that case he may decide the question one way or the other, only to find out afterwards that he was in error, as the case that he recalled was another case between the same inveterate litigants. Brown and Jones, whose quarrels live after them, have been overtaken by a strange destiny. They disputed, perhaps, about an ox found damage feasant, levant and couchant; and, going to law tooth and nail, they hurled sulphurous imprecations at each other, and cherished a mutual hatred that might be compared in intensity to that which animated Coke and Bacon. Their warfare is over, and they have long since been buried in remote and forgotten graves; but now by the irony of fate they appear in all law books bracketed together in an eternal embrace, like Francesca da Rimini and her lover in the shades below; and their united names serve as a tag to indicate some particular principle or axiom of the law over which new controversies arise from time to time. Seeing them so often engaged in this pas de deux this modern Damon and Pythias might seem to be as inseparable as the Siamese twins, but at rare intervals we catch a glimpse of one or the other of them walking alone ex parte, as if in a trance," wrapped in the solitude of his own originality." Obscure as they were, a certain amount of mystery attended their coming hither and their going hence; but if, either jointly or severally, they served to make clearer the difference between trespass and case, or to explain the irne inwardness of the Absque Hoc, surely they did not live in vain. The trial of each case in our courts brings with it a re-trial of many former cases; and each lawyer engaged in court sets up his own mental alembic in order to distil the law of the cases cited by him from the concrete facts in which it is embodied; a task requiring time, patience, and discrimination, but which must often be accomplished with a degree of haste which renders anything like accuracy impossible. In many instances we simply call over our rosary of cases, pitting against one decision by Chief Justice Marshall ten later ones rendered by Mr. Justice Shallow, without any attempt at discrimination as to facts, partly because lack of time forbids that necessary process. With proper relays of books there is no reason why, under our system, a legal argument should not go on for ever, provided the principal actors could be rendered immortal, and could be made proof against exhaustion. As the matter stands, after the incumbent of the bench has been pelted with cases of every degree of relevancy and irrelevancy for some hours, during the latter part of which time, being now thoroughly hypnotised, he has been engaged in a vain effort to find out what the universe was made for, he finally recovers sufficient animation to pass on the question, so ably and exhaustively discussed at the bar," as he is pleased to remark, deciding, perhaps, as charitable people are wont to do, in favour of the most importunate beggar, who is generally the worst of the lot. For no truer thing has been uttered than was spoken by Judge Dillon, who says: 66 "When the judges resort, as they frequently do, to analogies supposed to be furnished by previous cases for the rule of decision to apply to the case in hand, it must often be extremely uncertain in advance what the result will be, and it is frequently doubtful whether, fettered in this way, they reach as sound results as if governed by general considerations of what is right and just." I have made no special estimate, but I think I cannot be far wrong in supposing that there are in this country to-day in common use at least ten times as many law books as there were forty years ago, and during the last twenty years the progressive increase in the number of such books has been greatly in excess of all previous calculations. A short chapter, in Blackstone's Commentaries, on corporations, is now expanded into the magnum opus of Judge Thompson on that subject, consisting of six volumes of more than a thousand pages each, of which a proper index, as the publishers inform us, would require a volume of from 400 to 800 pages. The most of the new cases that are reported are in principle mere repetitions of former cases, and as such they are not only useless, but detrimental. More than two hundred years ago the Statute of Frauds of Charles II. was enacted. It seemed to be simple enough, comprising only a few sections; but the last work on the subject of this statute is a bulky volume, containing reference to thousands of cases. It must be plain that if, with all of the adjudications, we do not understand the statute, then we never can do so. Indeed, the statute is so stuck all over with cases, just as the hull of a ship is sometimes stuck all over with barnacles, that we hardly ever see it, and whenever we consult that branch of the law we lose ourselves among the glosses that have been put upon it. In short, our legal science tends rapidly to a mere strife of words not unlike that in which scholastic learning finally broke up and disappeared. Of course, one may be an advocate of codification without approving of many wild optimistic theories that have emanated from its most enthusiastic partisans. If Bentham seems to belong to that class, it must be remembered that when he took up arms against the existing state of the law English jurisprudence was burdened and disgraced by many absurdities, which have since disappeared under an influence which Bentham was the first to inspire into the public mind. It must also be conceded that the excessive zeal of reformers is sometimes beneficial in redressing the balance that is ruled by an equally unreasonable conservatism. A medium course would no doubt be safest. A few judicious additions to our Statute of Frauds, for instance, might condense and give definite expression to whole volumes of case law. Recently the commercial law of England has been enacted as a statute consisting of 100 sections, reducing the volume of the law on that subject, as was estimated by the author of the statute, to about one five-thousandth part of its former bulk. In this country the reduction by the same process would hardly be less than one fifty-thousandth part. The statute referred to seems to have given very great satisfaction in England; but some such work is much more needed here than there, both on account of the greater number of our law books, and on account of an anomaly that exists nowhere else. Ever since the decision in Swift v. Tyson, it has been held by the Federal Courts that they are not bound to follow the decisions of the State Courts of last resort in respect of questions of general commercial law. Thus it often happens that a State court and a Federal court sitting side by side will purposely decide cases on a like state of facts differently. This gives to the complaining party in many instances not only a choice of forums, but also a choice of results; an evil which ought not to exist, an evil which would not exist if the law on this subject were reduced to the form of a statute, either State or Federal. Perhaps if Congress could be induced to pass an interstate and international commercial code, all the States would soon adopt it; and this would certainly be a great improvement on our present chaotic methods. There are other branches of the law that, like commercial law, naturally lend themselves to codification; and prudence would suggest that they should first receive attention, the process being gradually extended to other topics. In England the constitution is unwritten. It is nothing but a collection of customs more or less vague. There is a notion that in order to be respected it must be concealed, or wrapped in mystery like the veiled prophet. No one knows what it is, and anyone can claim for it whatever he likes. We in America assume that we occupy in this regard a much more enlightened position. Our organic law is all written, so that anyone can read it that pleases. It is more important than all other laws put together. It sums up all the guaranties of rights of property, of life, and of liberty, precious heirlooms acquired after ages of deadly strife and warfare, sealed with the blood of a long line of patriots and brave men. While we do not question the necessity of expressing the fundamental law relating to these vital principles in terse and deliberate language through the organ of conventions composed chiefly of laymen, we scruple to undertake the perilous task of reducing to peremptory and plain written words the law relating to bills of exchange and promissory notes. "The frightful accumulation of case law," said Sir Henry Maine, "conveys to English jurisprudence a menace of revolution far more serious that any popular murmurs, and which, if it does nothing else, is giving to mere tenacity of memory a disgraceful advantage over all the finer qualities of the legal intellect." In this country of course the case is far worse. Compared with that of the American lawyer, with his prodigious collection of cases, the condition of the Chinese printer with his hundred thousand separate blocks with which to set up the printed page, is enviable. Reviled or contemned, whoever favours a rational law reform may possess his soul in peace. The stars in their courses fight for him. Sooner or later the present system must break down under its own weight. Every new case that is decided, every new digest or text-book that is issued, but hastens the day when the great Pontine marsh of case law shall be drained. When Napoleon at St. Helena looked back over the past, he said: "My Code is the sheet anchor that will save France, and will entitle me to the benediction of posterity." His genius and energy had sufficed to compress the evolution of centuries into less than a lifetime; and now, when his sceptre had turned to ashes, when all his conquests had been wrenched away, and he was a lonely prisoner far from the scenes of his triumphs, something told him that beyond his victories on the field of battle, more enduring than towering arch, or stately column, or marble sepulchre, would be a work of peace to which he had given only a part of four months of his time, a work unstained with blood, unpolluted with crime. Perhaps I cannot better close what I had to say this evening on a topic that requires much more ample and profound consideration than I have been able to give it, than by quoting the language of a modern writer : A petty state, having little to boast of, may well keep its laws, or what are called its laws, hidden in obscurity; but a great country loses half its dignity and strength when it cannot in an orderly and methodical way give some account to all whom it may concern of the main reasons why its social progress and the contentment of its citizens have been so well assured." TRIAL BY JURY OF ROMAN ORIGIN. BY BOYD WINCHESTER. THE Saxon common lawyer delights to attribute the usage of trial by jury to his German ancestry; and his American associate seldom lets a jury trial pass without some adulatory sentiments to the great Alfred, to whose age, it is conceived, are to be traced the earliest memorials of its establishment. But we conceive the trial by jury can be shown to be derived from the institutions of Rome by more direct and conclusive testimony than is adduced in favour of its Saxon origin. The proofs of such an establishment among these people, previous and, indeed, down to the time of William the Conqueror, amount to no more than evidence that barbarous men may submit questions of contestation to the decision of their friends; but surely amounts to no proof that the trial by jury existed among them as an institution entirely aboriginal; and, because such a custom gave hints to successive law makers of a system by which regular adjudications might be regulated, it does not prove that such a system might not have been matured by more polished ancient nations, and have originated with them. The disposition to arbitrate questions of controversy is not indigenous to civilised communities. We think testimony may be gathered from the customs and habits of all barbarous nations, in proof that such a mode of deciding differences is natural to all men. The North American Indians could furnish us as many incidents upon this point, in favour of their being the originators of the trial by jury, as any other people. So far as the records of such trials exist in English history, the most enthusiastic advocate of this theory has been able to imagine memorials of its existence only so far as the age of the Conqueror. The triumphant instances given only prove that, to settle questions, they resorted to the simple mode of summoning persons having a knowledge of the facts-these were only witnesses. But even if such cases were entitled to any consideration in tracing the origin of jury-trial, it is within the legitimate province of conjecture to conceive that the first idea of such a custom may have been taken from the Romans, For Cæsar invaded Britain upwards of eleven hundred years previously, and even Germany some years earlier. His superior abilities, great ambition and extensive knowledge, combined with the pride of a Roman in the institutions of his country, render it more than probable that he laboured to extend her civilisation, as well as empire, to the barbarous people whom he had conquered. Now it is much more reasonable to infer that the various invasions of the Roman armies of the territory of barbarous nations may have impressed their habits upon political and judicial institutions than that particular systems originated with the latter. Mr. Turner, in his history of the Anglo-Saxons, states that, by one of the judicial customs of the Saxons, an accused person was acquitted if a certain number of men swore he was innocent; and he hence infers the existence of the trial by jury in the earliest Anglo-Saxon times. There is nothing conclusive in this circumstance. The resort to witnesses to prove or repel an accusation is what people, however rude their institutions, may resort to. The same author dwells much on the fact that those jurators were of the number of twelve. The circumstance must be purely accidental. Or, if not, its establishment may be traced to a more remote time. We read in the early Greek poets that twelve was the number of persons who met often to deliberate on important affairs. But admitting that these circumstances are entitled to the weight given them, it is very evident that the customs indicated may still be of Roman origin. The fame and prosperity of the Roman people must have been known to the people of all Europe. Men from every barbarian tribe must have occasionally visited this great city, and carried back to their countrymen accounts of her manners, customs, and habits. In this way her institutions may have been insensibly impressed upon the customs of these rude nations. It is not difficult to imagine that Addison had in view the famous lines of Virgil in summing up the mission of Rome in contrast to the artistic glories of Greece, "Tu regere imperio populos Romane, memento," when he placed in the mouth of Juba the sentiment of Rome's dominion founded on law: "A Roman soul is bent on higher views; Again, there is a remarkable similarity in these customs and the judicial regulations of Rome. By the laws of Alemanni persons who swore to the innocence of the accused were called nominati or persons named. So the judex or arbiter was either named by the parties or selected by the prætor. The shire-gemot, among the Saxons, determined on the dispute in the first instance, but if the judge doubted, twelve men were chosen who swore to the truth of their decision. Thus among the Romans the prætor acted in the first instance and summoned a jury, who swore to decide according to law and the best of their judgment. By a law of Ethelred the verdict of a majority of eight of the twelve, selected to expurgate an accused, was conclusive. Among the Romans the opinion of a majority controlled the judgment; and if the judges were divided epually the prætor decided. When we reflect upon the manner of selecting the Roman judices, the time during which their authority lasted, and compare them, in these respects, with the regularly appointed judges, we think a striking resemblance exists between them and the jury of the present day. Like most nations of ancient times, judicial power was exercised by the kings of Rome to the time of their expulsion, A. U. 244. When this event occurred, two supreme magistrates, called prætors, judices and consuls, were created, and performed the duties of judges. The wars in which the nation was engaged devolved the administration of justice, in the year A. U. 389, upon the prætor. The influx of foreigners and increase of causes at Rome, in 510, induced the agpointment of a second prætor. Because this last officer administered justice to foreigners, and between these and citizens, he was called Praetor Peregrinus. The prætor who performed the functions of judge between citizens of Rome was known as Praetor Urbanus. The prætor possessed a permanent judicial authority. He was not only the dictator of trials, but sometimes the judge himself. When a plaintiff summoned a defendant before the prætor he demanded from this officer a writ suitable to the injury, and also judges of the affair in issue. These judges were: (1) a juder or single person who determined the controversy according to the declaration of the law, or the forms prescribed by the prætor; (2) an arbiter who was not restricted by law or form, but who determined bona fide or according to equity; (3) recuperators, men who first judged between the Romans and foreign states concerning the recovery and restoration of private property, but who were afterwards determined other matters-these three classes chosen from the body of the Roman citizens; then (4) were the centumviri, composed of three persons selected from each of the tribes, and these judged matters relating to testaments and inheritances, and exercised their functions for a year; while the appointment of the judges, selected by the prætor, expired with the decision of the particular cause. We do not pretend that the trial by jury, as modified and improved upon by successive generations, existed at Rome But it is reasonably certain that we see in the institutions of the civil law the germ of this system, and in the authority of some of the judges functions similar to those of juries. From the functions of these Roman judges, the nature of the courts over which they presided, and the proceedings in the actions before them, it is possible to trace the origin of jury trial to the civil law. Laws grow great and ennoble themselves like our rivers by running; but follow them upwards to their source, 'tis but a little spring, scarcely discernible, that swells thus, and thus fortifies itself by growing old. From the nature of the institution of Roman judges, it is inferable that they were composed of various orders; and that it was in the power of the litigating parties to choose one or the other of them; that they came from the vicinage of the litigants to aid the prætor; and were selected from the different classes of the people. That these judges were inferior to the prætor is proved by the fact that while the prætor sat on a tribunal, the judices sat on lower seats called subsellia. The first steps of municipal justice in private disputes consist, on the one hand, in subjecting rude strife to some conventional regulation, and investing the appeal to force in this regulated form to the solemn aid and ideal of trial by combat, thus introducing the conception of legal process; on the other hand, by the occasional intervention of neutral parties or bystanders as arbiters. With respect to the latter, the history of the Roman law furnishes an instructive and interesting parallel. "Very far," says Maine, "the most ancient judicial proceeding known to us is the Legis Actio Sacramentis of the Romans, out of which all the later Roman law of actions may be proved to have grown. In early and even in mature Roman life, the judges no more than the priests were a class distinct from the rest of the community. These were offices open to the whole body of citizens, and were filled by its most distinguished members, forming their title of honour and highest road to distinction. In the absence of our formal courts of justice, every contending claim, as it arose, was referred by the presiding magistrate for the year to the arbitration of one or more citizens who, on the facts presented to them, formed their decision, to which the authority of the magistrate gave the force of law." "In Rome," says Forsyth," we find a presiding judge who was either the praetor or judex question is specially appointed by him, and a body of judices taken from a particular class whose duty it was to determine the facts of the guilt or innocence of the accused." At the close of the evidence they were said to be missi in consilium by the judge, that is, told "to consider their verdict," and to each were given three tablets marked respectively with the letters A. for Absolvo, C. for Condemno, and N. L. for Non Liquet, one of which he threw into an urn, and the result of the trial was determined by the majority of the letters that appeared. The prætor referred many cases to a single judex; in many instances again they were sent to a number of judices who constituted a sort of board or jury to look into the merits of the controversy, and under a formula-a brief technical expression of the disputed issues, constructed by the prætor-they proceeded to receive the evidence of the witnesses, to hear the arguments of the advocates, and finally to return their verdict or decisive judgment to the prætor who had appointed them. Always, however, prætor and judices stood towards each other in much the same relation that the judge and jury of our own system hold towards one another; except that they did not sit together and hear cases at the same time, but acted separately. There is a strong disposition, especially with those who are not familiar with the excellence of the civil law, not only to undervalue the system, but to set up every just rule of right as indigenous to modern times. It seems, indeed, to be the favourite effort of juridical writers to establish for their own age a system of independent institutions, reaching far back into antiquity. The mind which revolts from the recognition of hereditary honours in a family, loves to linger on the feeblest evidences of a country's ancient establishments. Such antiquarian partiality has been eminently exhibited in researches upon the common law of England. Men have explored every region of fancy to furnish it an independent existence; and in the United States we freely admit that our only hope of a name and praise in the world, politically speaking, is derived from an attachment to those old British monuments of liberty, trial by jury, the habeas corpus, freedom of speech, and liberty of the press. But a sober investigation of the civil law evinces the identity of many of its principles with those of the common law. The connection of the histories of Rome, Germany, and England prove that the common law is, generally speaking, but a set of laws and customs engrafted upon the stock of Roman jurisprudence. No investigations prove this more fully than the history of the Roman courts and their mode of proceeding, and especially the trial by jury. Sir James Mackintosh has observed that Governments are not framed after a model, but that all their parts and powers grow out of occasional acts prompted by some urgent expediency or some private interest, which in the course of time coalesce, and harden into usages, and that this bundle of usages is the object of respect, and the guide of conduct long before it is embodied, defined and enforced in written laws." It has been said to be the great and final object of government to get twelve impartial and intelligent men into the jury-box; by which, of course, is meant that the administration of equal rights between man and man is the primary object of civilised and social life. Paley declares, "the wisdom of man hath not devised a happier institution than that of juries, or one founded in a juster knowledge of human capacity." In despite of the mist that may surround the origin and development of this "buttress of liberty" as Chatham called it, this "mudsill" of constitutional liberty and broad foundations of personal rights; and despite the contention that its institution is valued rather as a protection against governmental encroachment on private rights than as an instrument for performing in the most efficient manner the intellectual process involved in the judicial administrations of law, we all must concur in the hope expressed by Mr. Hallam "From this principle may we never swerve, may we never be compelled in wish to swerve, by a contempt of their oaths in jurors, a disregard of the just limits of their trusts."-The Green Bag. HEIRS-AT-LAW AND NEXT OF KIN. DALE (John), formerly of Upper Charlton-st, Fitzroy-sq, late of Colney Hatch Lunatic Asylum, who died there on Sept. 24, 1896. His next of kin to apply to the Solicitor for the Treasury, Treasury-chmbrs, Whitehall. DAWSON (William Thomas), 89, Tyrwhitt-rd, St. John's, Kent, retired licensed victualler, who died there on Dec. 22, 1896. His next of kin to apply to the Solicitor for the Treasury, Treasury-chmbrs, Whitehall. JEYES (Samuel Fredericus), if living, or if dead, his issue (if any), if he died before Feb. 25, 1883, or his legal personal representatives, if he died since that date, to come in, by Oct. 26, at the chambers of Mr. Justice Kekewich, and prove their claims in the matter of the estate of Hannah Frances Jeyes, deceased. Nov. 2, at the said chambers, at twelve o'clock, is the time appointed for hearing and adjudicating upon such claims. The said S. F. Jeyes was the son of Ferdinando and Frances Jeyes, and was baptized on March 23, 1827, at the parish church of St. Andrew, Holborn; he is believed to have emigrated to Australia in 1848, and to have married there and to have had issue; he is believed to have died in or about the year 1870, at Melbourne, Australia. KIDDLE (James), who is supposed to have died in the U.S. of America in or about 1852 or 1853, and Benjamin Kiddle, who is supposed to have died in the U.S. of America in or about 1862 or 1863, or any person or persons claiming to be interested in the property devised by the will of Isaac Kiddle. late of Odcombe, Somersetshire, yeoman, to the said J. Kiddle and B. Kiddle, to come in, by May 22, and establish their respective claims, at the chambers of Mr. Justice North. May 26, at one o'clock, at the said chambers, is the time appointed for adjudicating upon such claims. MICHELL (George), late of Langport, Somerset, surgeon, who died May 25, 1839. Thomas Michell, Alfred Michell, and Jane Mackey (formerly Michell), brothers and a sister of the above testator; or, if dead, their children or the legal personal representatives of such children as may have since died, to come in, by June 1, at the chambers of Mr. Justice Stirling, and prove their claims to share in the personal estate of the said G. Michell. July 8, at the said chambers, at twelve o'clock, is the time appointed for hearing and adjudicating upon such claims SMITH (Frederick York). deceased. Any person claiming to be entitled to any mortgage charge or other incumbrance affecting the shares of Reginald Seymour Smith and Frances Georgina Hickey, formerly F. G. Smith, in the leasehold dwelling-house and premises called Penang Villa. near Kingswear, Devonshire. bequeathed to them by the will of their father, said F. G. Smith, to come in, by May 12, and prove their claims, at the chambers of Mr. Justice Kekewich. May 19, at twelve o'clock, is the time appointed for hearing and adjudicating upon the claims. APPOINTMENTS UNDER THE JOINT STOCK WINDING-UP ACTS. AUSTRALIAN JOINT STOCK BANK LIMITED.-Petition for winding-up to be heard April 28, before the Court sitting at the Royal Courts of Justice, Strand. Slaughter and May. 18, Austin Friars, solicitors for the petitioner. Notices of intention to appear on the hearing of the petition must be signed by the person or firm, or his or their solicitor (if any), and must reach the above-named not later than six o'clock on April 27. AVON VALE COLLIERY COMPANY LIMITED.-Creditors to send in, by May 31, their names and addresses and the particulars of their claims, and the names and addresses of their solicitors (if any), to Mr. D. H. Francis, 129, Bute-st, Cardiff, the liquidator of the company. Ingledew and Sons, 57, Mount Stuart-sq, Cardiff, solicitors to the liquidator. BOURNEMOUTH COFFEE TAVERN COMPANY LIMITED.-Creditors of the above-named company, whose registered office is situated at Richmond-chmbrs, Bournemouth, Hampshire, to send in, by May 14, their names and addresses and the particulars of their claims, and the names and addresses of their solicitors (if any), to Mr. E. Bicker, at the registered office aforesaid, the liquidator of the company. BANK OF SYRIA LIMITED.-Petition for winding-up to be heard April 28, before the Court sitting at the Royal Courts of Justice, Strand. Carlisle, Unna, Rider, and Heaton, 8, New-sq. Lincoln's-inn, solicitors for the petitioners. Notices of intention to appear on the hearing of the petition must be signed by the person or firm, or his or their solicitor (if any), and must reach the above-named not later than six o'clock on April 27. BLYTH ST. ANDREW STEAMSHIP COMPANY LIMITED (in liquidation).-Creditors to send in, by May 15, their names and addresses and the particulars of their claims, and the names and addresses of their solicitors (if any), to Mr. A. Tate, 17, Sand-hill, Newcastle-on-Tyne, the liquidator of the company. Daggett and Grey, 1, Deanst, Newcastle-on-Tyne, solicitors. CHARTERLAND CONSOLIDATED LIMITED.-Adjourned petition for winding-up, to be heard April 28, before the Court sitting at the Royal Courts of Justice, Strand, when, in consequence of the shareholders having resolved that the company be wound-up voluntarily, and Mr. Frederick Seymour Salaman, 3, Bucklersbury, chartered accountant, be appointed liquidator, the court will then be asked to continue the voluntary winding-up under the supervision of the court instead of making an order for the winding-up of the company. Mackrell and Ward, 1, Walbrook, solicitors for the petitioner. Notices of intention to appear on the hearing of the petition must be signed by the person or firm, or his or their solicitor (if any), and must reach the above-named not later than six o'clock on April 27. COMMERCE LIMITED (Incorporated in 1895)-Creditors to send in, by June 1, their names and addresses and the particulars of their claims, and the names and addresses of their solicitors (if any), to Mr. A. E. Cowley, Lawrence bldgs, Mount-st, Manchester, the liquidator of the company. CALEDONIAN MINERAL OIL COMPANY LIMITED (in iiquidation).-Creditors to send in, by May 10, their names and addresses and the particulars of their claims, and the names and addresses of their solicitors (if any), to Messrs. T. B. Clark and A. J. Macdonald, 64, Queen-st, Edinburgh, the liquidators of the company. Francis and Johnson, 26, Austin Friars, solicitors for the liquidators. GARNER PATENT SAFETY HOIST COMPANY LIMITED.-Creditors to send in, by May 25, their names and addresses and the particulars of their claims, and the names and addresses of their solicitors (if any), to Mr. H. Mather, 10, A resfield, Bolton, Lancashire, the liquidator of the company. Fielding and Fernihough, 7, Fold-st, Bolton, solicitors to the liquidator. KINSELLA GOLD MINES LIMITED.-Creditors to send in, by June 1, their names and addresses and the particulars of their claims, and the names and addresses of their solicitors (if any), to Mr. C. W. Cornish, 1, Gresham-bldgs, the liquidator of the company. Hepburn, Son, and Cutcliffe, Bird-in-Hand-ct, Cheapside, solicitors for the liquidator. MINERVA NAILLESS HORSE SHOE (ENGLISH AND COLONIAL) COMPANY LIMITED.Creditors to send in, by May 20, their names and addresses and the particulars of their claims, and the names and addresses of their solicitors (if any), to Mr. A. Binnie, 58. Coleman-st, the liquidator of the company. Sweetland and Greenhill, 23, Fenchurch-st, solicitors. MARINE SECURITIES CORPORATION LIMITED.-Creditors to send in, by May 31, their names and addresses and the particulars of their claims, and the names and addresses of their solicitors (if any), to Sir W. B. Forwood and Sir H. S. King, K.C.I.E., M.P., 3, Crosby-sq, the liquidators of the company. Paines, Blyth, and Huxtable, 14, St. Helen's-pl, solicitors to the liquidators. OLDHAM ENGINEERING COMPANY LIMITED.-Adjourned petition for winding-up to be heard April 27, before the Manchester District of the Court of Chancery of the County Palatine of Lancaster sitting at the Assize Courts, Strangeways, Manchester, when, in consequence of the shareholders having resolved that the company be wound-up voluntarily, and Messrs. John Thomas Yardley, 94, Brompton-st, Oldham, secretary, Noel Newall Haigh, the petitioner, and Asa Mills, of 78, Stoneleigh-st, Oldham, be appointed liquidators, the court will then be asked to make an order continuing the voluntary winding-up under the supervision of the court, instead of winding-up of the company. G. P. Fripp, 18, Clegg-st, Oldham, solicitors for the petitioner. Notices of intention to appear on the hearing of the petition must be signed by the person or firm, or his or their solicitor (if any), and must reach the above-named not later than six o'clock on April 26. RIVER CRAY LAUNDRY COMPANY LIMITED (in liquidation).-Creditors to send in, by May 13, their names and addresses and the particulars of their claims, and the names and addresses of their solicitors (if any), to Messrs. H. W. Francis and D. T. Corke, 35, Queen Victoria-st, the liquidators of the company. Jenkins, Baker, and Co., 134, Fenchurch-st, solicitors for the liquidators. SOUTH BEACH LAND AND BUILDING CORPORATION LIMITED.-Creditors to send in, by May 31, their names and addresses and the particulars of their claims, and the names and addresses of their solicitors (if any), to Mr. F. J. Warmsley, Chester, the liquidator of the corporation. J. Mitchell, 140, Leadenhall-st, agent for R. A. Willcock and Taylor, of Wolverhampton, Staffordshire, solicitors to liquidators. SALVATION ARMY BUILDING ASSOCIATION LIMITED.-Creditors to send in, by May 31, their names and addresses and the particulars of their claims, and the names and addresses of their solicitors (if any), to Messrs. J. Kitchin and W. A. Harding, London Bridge House, the liquidators of the company. Snell, Sons, and Greenip, 1 and 2, George-st, Mansion House, solicitors for the liquidators. the THAMES NAVIGATION STEAM CARRYING COMPANY LIMITED.-Creditors to send in, by May 28, their names and addresses and the particulars of their claims, and the names and addresses of their solicitors (if any), to Mr. W. West, 3 Cross-la, Eastcheap, the liquidator of the company. West, King, Adams, and Co., 66, Cannon-st, solicitors to the liquidator. WATERHEAD LAND COMPANY LIMITED.-Adjourned petition for winding-up to be heard May 14, before the Lancashire County Court sitting at the Public Hall, Baillie-st, Rochdale, when, in consequence of the shareholders having_resolved that the company be wound-up voluntarily, and Mr. Eli Harrop, 125, Union-st, Oldham, accountant, be appointed liquidator, the court will then be asked to make an order continuing the voluntary winding-up under the supervision of the court instead of winding-up of the company. G. P. Fripp, 18, Clegg-st, Oldham, solicitor for the petitioner. Notices of intention to appear on the hearing of the petition must be signed by the person or firm, or his or their solicitor (if any), and must reach the above-named not later than six o'clock on May 13. WILLIAM ANDREWS LIMITED.-Creditors to send in, by June 1, their names and addresses and the particulars of their claims, and the names and addresses of their solicitors (if any), to Messrs. W. Andrews and S. H. Hossell, Hatherton-chmbrs, Old-sq, Birmingham, the liquidators of the company. Snow and Atkins. Princeschmbrs, Corporation-st, Birmingham, solicitors for the liquidators. N.B.-The above notice is issued in connection with the sale of the undertaking of the above company to the Sanspareil Cycle Company Limited. WIGSTON ELECTRICAL AND ENGINEERING COMPANY LIMITED.-Creditors to send in, by May 26, their names and addresses and the particulars of their claims, and the names and addresses of their solicitors (if any), to Mr. A. B. Wykes, 24, Friar-la, Leicester, the liquidator of the company. CREDITORS UNDER ESTATES IN CHANCERY. HILL (John), Durham, miller. May 20; W. Pitman, solicitor, 14, Clement's-la, E.C. SOPER (John Burgess), Basingstoke, gentleman. June 1; W. Sherwood, solicitor, WILLIS (Henry), Combmartin, near Ilfracombe, Devonshire, publican. May 14; F. Day, solicitor, South Molton, Devonsaire. May 21; Mr. Justice Stirling, at twelve o'clock. CREDITORS UNDER 22 & 23 VICT. c. 35. LAST DAY OF CLAIM AND TO WHOM PARTICULARS TO BE SENT. ALLPRESS (Ana Joaquina), formerly of Cliefden, Eltham, Kent, afterwards of 23, Gledhow-grdns, South Kensington, late of the Imperial hotel, 122, Queen'sgate, South Kensington, widow. May 27; Rhodes and Son, solicitors, Skinners' Hall. Dowgate-hill. BLAKE (Horace Lynn), formerly of the Castle hotel, Norwich, late of Heigham Hall Asylum, Heigham, Norwich, hotel proprietor. May 31; Sadd and Bacon, solici tors, Theatre-st, Norwich. BALLARD (Mary), 133, Queen's Park-rd, Brighton, Sussex, widow. Goodman, solicitor, 9, North-st, Brighton. May 23; T. A. BALL (James), 34, Hill Park-cres, Plymouth, Devonshire, gentleman. May 8; Whiteford and Bennett, solicitors, 17, Courtenay-st, Plymouth. BOULTON (Mary Ann). Fairview, Radnor Park, Folkestone, Kent, formerly of Tunbridge Wells, widow. May 17; Morgan and Upjohn, solicitors, 7, Furnival'sinn, Holborn. BENSON (William), Main-st, Flookburgh, Cartmel, Lancashire, farmer. May 8; J. BLAKE (Joseph William), Ranworth-mansions, Compayne-grins, gentleman. May 31; BOWLER (Mary Ann), 7, Albion-ter, Whitecross-st, Hereford, spinster. May 17; CHAPMAN (George), 20, Great College-st, Westminster, surveyor. man, solicitor, 28, City-rd, Finsbury-sq. CORDON (Elizabeth), Effingham-st, Rotherham, Yorkshire, widow. April 26; S. ChapMay 8; J. Wilcox, one of the executors, 8, Nelson-st, Rotherham. J. B. Kesteven, solicitor, 404, Bank-st, Sheffield. CAVE (Charles Donovan), a major in the Suffolk Regiment of Her Majesty's army. CRESWICK (George), Holmesfleld, Derbyshire, farmer. June 30; Porrett and Fawcett, solicitors, Queen-st chmbrs, Sheffield. CROSS (Rev. John Edward), Halecote, Grange over-Sands, Westmorland, clerk in holy DRAYSON (Rosina Jane), Laura Cottage, 16, London-rd, Southampton. May 22; Hick- May 16; Tatham, Oblein, and Nash, solicitors, 11, Queen Victoria-st. DAWSON (Sarah Ann), formerly of Ten Bell-la, Norwich, late of St. Giles-rd, Norwich, widow. June 1; H. R. Culley, solicitor, 12, Bank-st, Norwich. |