BISCHOFSWERDER, HELENA, Plymouth, general dealer. Ct. Plymouth and East Stone- CHIGNELL, BENJAMIN JAMES, Romsey, auctioneer's managing clerk. Ct. Southampton. COLE, WILLIAM HARRY, Southampton, builder. Ct. Southampton. Order, Nov. 10. COOPER, GEORGE, Rickmansworth, beerhouse-keeper. Ct. St. Albans. Order, DAWSON, THOMAS HENDERSON (late trading as S. E. Dawson), Swinton, grocer. Ct. DODD, ARTHUR, Basingstoke, publican. Ct. Winchester. Order, Nov. 11. GRANT, CAROLINE, Leamington-rd-villas, Westbourne Park, spinster. Ct. High Court. GORTON, GEORGE THOMAS, Woking, baker. Ct. Guildford and Godalming. Nov. 10. Order, HADLEY, TROPHIMUS HOPTON, Lower Cam, carpenter. Ct. Gloucester. Order, Nov. 10. JENKINS, ISAAC JOHN, Llanelly, commission agent. Ct. Carmarthen. Order, Nov. 6. KNIGHT, REGINALD BRODNEX (described in receiving order as J. B. Knight), late Conduit-st. Ct. High Court. Order, Nov. 10. LOMAS, THOMAS HENRY, Burnley, confectioner. Ct. Burnley. Order, Nov. 10. LAURENCE, HERCY WILLIAM, Leominster, market gardener. Ct. Leominster. Order, Nov. 9. LINCOLN, EMMA, Norwich, grocer, widow. Ct. Norwich. Order, Nov. 10. Nov. 9. Order, MALAMMA, BASIL (trading as N. Malamma and Son), Gaythorne, chromo lithographer. MORRELL, RICHARD LEWIS, Harrogate, farmer. Ct. York. Order, Nov. 11. Order, RHODES, WILLIAM TABOR (described in receiving order as William Tutn Rhodes), late Trafalgar-bldgs, Charing Cross, managing director. Ct. High Court. Order, Nov. 10. REDHOUSE, AMBROSE GEORGE, Liverpool, grocer. Ct. Liverpool. Order. Nov. 11. RAWLINS, SILAS, Southampton, farmer. Ct. Southampton. Order. Nov. 10. SPRING, ALFRED ARCHER, Grantham, tailor. Ct. Nottingham. Order, Nov. 9. Order, VICKRIDGE, FREDERICK MICHAEL (late trading as Vickridge Brothers), Liverpool, tobacconist. Ct. Liverpool. Order, Nov. 10. VICK, DAVID, Tewkesbury, coal dealer. Ct. Cheltenham. Order, Nov. 10. WAKEFIELD, HENRY (described in receiving order as H. Wakefield), Lawrence-la, blouse manufacturer. Ct. High Court. Order, Nov. 9. WINTLE, VAUGHAN BENJAMIN, Frome, schoolmaster. Ct. Frome. Order, Nov. 9. WILBY, RICHARD (trading as Richard Wilby and Sons), Huddersfield, machine maker. Ct, Huddersfield. Order, Nov. 11. WALMSLEY, ALBAN, Manchester, solicitor. Ct. Manchester. Order, Nov. 9. GAZETTE, Nov. 17. BUNTING, WILLIAM, Hyde, manager of baths. Ct. Ashton-under-Lyne and Stalybridge. Order, Nov. 13. BALL, THOMAS, Ibstock, boot dealer. Ct. Leicester. Order, Nov. 14, BARNES, WILLIAM, Nottingham, late confectioner. Ct. Nottingham. Order, Nov. 13. CRACKNELL, RICHARD, Ipswich, journeyman butcher. Ct. Ipswich. Order, Nov. 12. EATON, GEORGE, Kettering, farmer. Ct. Northampton. Order, Nov. 11. GREENWOOD, JOHN WILLIAM, Royton, late insurance agent. Ct. Oldham. Order, HALL, GEORGE HARRY, King's Heath, carpenter. Ct. Birmingham. Order, Nov. 14. HOLLANDS, CHARLES, Hollingbourne, late farmer. Ct. Maidstone. Order, Nov. 12. HIBBERT, CHARLES ROBERT, Newton-le-Willows, late butcher. Ct. Warrington. Order, Nov. 13. LUKE, THOMAS, late Prince Regent's-la, Custom House, grocer. Ct. High Court. Order, Nov. 13. LEWIS, THOMAS, Llantrisant, draper. Ct. Pontypridd. Order, Nov. 14. MAY, JOHN CHARLES (otherwise known as Frederick Fordham), late Southampton, music hall proprietor. Ct. High Court. Order, Nov. 12. MUCKLOW, JOHN ARTHUR, Dudley, grocer. Ct. Dudley. Order, Nov. 12. OWEN, LEWIS, Llanfinan, farmer. Ct. Bangor. Order, Nov. 14. ORMROD, WILLIAM (trading as William Ormrod and Sons), Pemberton, brick manufacturer. Ct. Wigan. Order, Nov. 13. PRITCHARD, JAMES, Cardiff, grocer. Ct. Cardiff. Order, Nov. 12. ROBERTS. EMMA, Little Bytham, grocer. Ct. Peterborough. Order, Nov. 12. ROWLANDS, JOHN PENRY DAVIS, Swansea, architect. Ct. Swansea. Nov. 12. Order, STEVENS, JOHN, Leicester, joiner. Ct. Leicester. Order, Nov. 13. TAYLEUR, A. C., Richmond, gentleman. Ct. Wandsworth. Order, Nov. 12. WATSON, OLIVER GWYNNE, Birmingham, grocer. Ct. Birmingham. Order. Nov. 11. WRIGHT, JOHN HENRY, Dronfield, journeyman joiner. Ct. Chesterfield. Order, Nov. 13. WITHERS, ALFRED STANLEY, Liverpool, gentleman. Ct. Liverpool. Order, Nov. 13. YARWOOD, HENRY, Reddish, blacksmith. Ct. Stockport. Order, Nov. 12. The following amended notice is substituted for that published in the Gazette of Nov. 3. WENDT, HENRY FERDINAND AUGUSTUS, late Thecbald's-rd, corset maker. Ct. High Court. Order, Oct. 30. ALFRED SHAW AND CO. LIMITED, Eastcheap. Ct. High Court. Meeting, creditors, Dec. 15, at noon, at 33, Carey-st. WIGTON INDUSTRIAL CO-OPERATIVE SOCIETY LIMITED, Wigton. Ct. Carlisle. Meeting, creditors, Nov. 21, at 4; contributories, at 4.30, at King's Arms hotel, Wigton. GAZETTE, Nov. 17. LA BUFA MEXICAN GOLD MINES LIMITED, New Broad-st. Ct. High Court. Meeting, creditors, Nov. 26, at 11; contributories, at 11.30, at 33, Carey-st. NOTICES OF INTENDED DIVIDENDS. BUCKFASTLEIGH GAS COMPANY LIMITED, Leadenhall-st. Ct. High Court. Last day NOTICE OF RETURN TO CONTRIBUTORIES. BIRMINGHAM COMPRESSED AIR POWER COMPANY LIMITED, Birmingham. Ct. High NOTICE OF APPOINTMENT OF LIQUIDATOR. J. WELLS AND CO. LIMITED, Earlsfield. Ct. Wandsworth. Liquidator, J. M. Henderson, 2, Moorgate-st-bldgs. Appointment, Nov. 2. NOTICES OF RELEASE OF LIQUIDATORS. ANGLO-SARDINIAN ANTIMONY COMPANY LIMITED, Bartholomew House, Bartholomewla. Ct. High Court. Liquidator, George Stapylton Barnes, 33, Carey-st. Release, Nov. 7. ST. IVES (CORNWALL) GAS COMPANY LIMITED. Fenchurch-st. Ct. High Court. Liquidator, George Stapylton Barnes, 33, Carey-st. Release, Nov. 9. BIRTHS, MARRIAGES, AND DEATHS. BIRTHS. LATHAM.-On the 14th inst., at 36A, Rosary-grdns, the wife of W. Latham, Q.C., MARRIAGES. BEALE FARRAR.-On the 10th inst., at St. Mary Abbotts, Kensington, Bertram Robert, second son of the late W. Lansdowne Beale, J.P. and D.L., of Waltham St. Lawrence, Berks, to Frances Amelia, widow of the late T. W. Lewis Farrar, of Bucklands, Teddington. HAES-MAY.-On the 14th inst., at St. James's Kidbrook, Andrew Mount Haes, eldest son of the late E. E. Haes, Esq., and Mrs. Haes, Surbiton, to Ethel, eldest daughter of the late H. W. May, Barrister-at-law, and Mrs. May, Blackheath. MILNE NUTT.-On the 12th inst., at Christ Church, Lancaster-gate, the Rev. Ernest Arthur Milne, M.A., rector of Wyverstone, Suffolk, youngest son of the late Frank Milne, formerly one of the Registrars of the Court of Chancery, to Ida Cecilia, daughter of Major J. A. Nutt, late 27th Inniskillings. DEATHS. BARTON.-On the 28th Sept., at Auckland, N.Z., in the 68th year of her age, Jane London. LINDSELL. On the 12th inst., at 16, Fitzroy-sq, London, William Harry Barber Lindsell, of Lincoln's-inn, Barrister-at-law, aged 48. NEILL. On the 9th inst., at 28, Davies-st, Berkeley-sq, W., William Alexander Neill, M.A., Trinity College, Cambridge, and of the Inner Temple, Barrister-at-law, in the 63rd year of his age. STONE. Suddenly, while on a visit to E. A. Helps, at the Bungalow, Coleshill, Amersham, William Henry Stone, J.P., D.L.. late Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge, of Lower House, Thursley, Godalming, Cox's CRIMINAL LAW CASES: In the Court of Criminal Appeal, the Superior Courts, the Central Criminal Court, at the Assizes, and in Ireland (published quarterly). Edited by R. Cunningham Glen, M.A., LL.B., Barrister-at-Law. The Parts and Volumes may still be had to complete sets. It is the only complete set of Criminal Cases published in England. An Appendix contains a valuable collection of Precedents of Indictments. Complete Vols. from the commencement (1844) of this work can be had. Price can be obtained on application.-HORACE COX, "Law Times" Office, Bream's-buildings, E.C.-[ADVT.] To Readers and Correspondents. Mr. ARCHER MARTIN writes from Canada:-" Allow me, as a far-off subscriber, tɔ corroborate what Practising Solicitor' writes in your issue of the 24th ult., regarding that capital series of papers which you have published entitled. Where to find your Law.' It seems to me that, if the various chapters were to be republished in book form, it would be much appreciated by the Profession. To show that I am in earnest, please enter my name as first subscriber." In reply, we may say that the work is in course of preparation for publication. W. W. HALLAM.-Scurrilous books by members of the Profession are not within the jurisdiction of the Attorney-General. We refused to notice the work in question when sent for review, which is all we can do. All communications must be authenticated by the name and address of the writer not necessarily for publication, but as a guarantee of good faith. Anonymous communications are invariably rejected. All communications intended for the Editorial Department should. in order to prevent delay, be addressed to the "EDITOR OF THE LAW TIMES." Advertisements, orders for papers, &c., should be kent distinet, and addressed to the Publisher, Mr. HORACE Cox, Law Times" Office, Windsor House, Bream's-buildings, E.C. OUR LITERARY COLUMN. from the Law Reports LAW LIBRARY Stories 86 87 notice-Service-Partnership firm- HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE. R HENLEY: ALCOCK V. HENLEY- R NOBBS; NOBBS v. LAW REVERSIONARY INTEREST SOCIETY LIMITED-Practice- Originating summons- Mortgage ConstructionJurisdiction FOXWELL . VAN GRUTTEN-Practice -Receiver-Disputed title-Ejectment action-Heir-at-law in possession Jurisdiction - Discretion R BUCK: BRUTY T. MACKAY Friendly society-Failure of objects -Charity Poverty-Lapse - Cypres..... 307 Courts GENERAL INTELLIGENCE-The Death- LAW SOCIETIES-Barristers' BenevoJent 309 Law Association - United Society-Union Society of London PROMOTIONS AND APPOINTMENTS 88 88 90 90 90 LAW STUDENTS' JOURNAL -Success- LEGAL OBITUARY.-Mr. Charles Carne THE COURTS AND COURT PAPERS The County Court Rules, December 1896-High Court of Justice: Probate. Divorce, and Admiralty Division Supplemental Lists-Order of Court-Rota of Registrars THE GAZETTES.. ............ 91 91 95 95 96 NOW READY PATERSON'S PRACTICAL STATUTES of the SESSION 1896 (9 & 60 Viet.), with Introductions, Notes, Tables of Statutes repealed and Subjects altered, Lists of Local and Pers nal and Private Acts, and a Copious Index. By J. S. COTTON, Barrister-at-Law. Forty eighth issue of the Series. Cloth, 108.; half-calf, 128.; calf, 13s. 1896. N.B-The Vols. from 1858 to 1895 may also be had. Price 5s. a volume if complete set is taken HORACE COX, "Law Times" Office, Windsor House, Bream's-buildings, E.C. The Law and the Lawyers. THE main ground upon which objection to County Court judges holding Recorderships is based is, that it is anomalous in our legal system. A Recorder-County Court judge holds one judicial office which may be held by practising barristers, and another which may not. No judge should hold an office which is open to practising barristers. Again, it creates an inequality between County Court judges appointed from the Chancery Bar and those appointed from the Common Law Bar. The former do not as a rule hold Recorderships; so that a Common Law County Court judge may be in receipt of an income of £1800 or £2000 a year, whilst his Equity brother earns no more than £1500. The practice should be put an end to in some way or other. AN evening contemporary speak, by way of illustration, of a lay client being out of place in a barrister's consultation room. This is not the lawyer's view. An intelligent client frequently gives counsel great assistance, whilst he himself, perhaps, learns for the first time thoroughly what he will encounter when he goes into court. At any rate, it is a common thing for the lay client to attend consultations. WHAT does Mr. PHILIP STANHOPE mean when he speaks of lawyers-on-the-job in the House of Commons, whose advice about a leader for the Liberal Party he scornfully rejects? We doubt whether there are any of this class on Mr. STANHOPE'S side now in the House? He cannot refer to Sir R. REID or Sir F. Lockwood, Mr HALDANE or Mr. ASQUITE. All smaller partisans long since learned that they stand the best chance of promotion when the Conservatives are in office. THE Bar Council having received information that the Bar Reading and Writing Room in the Royal Courts is ready for use although not completely furnished, it was opened on Wednesday last. SIR WILLIAM GROVE, ex-judge of the Queen's Bench Division, died leaving over £200,000. This can hardly be said to be living up to the ideal career which commended itself to DANIEL WEBSTER and many other great American lawyers, namely, to work hard, to live well, and to die poor. As the result of communications between the Secretary of the Bar Council and the several Clerks of Assize throughous the country, notices as regards Circuit business are now remitted, often by telegram, and posted up outside the Inner Temple Hall. At the same place appear other notices, with reference to the holding of Metropolitan County Courts and the daily list of causes in the House of Lords. THE secretary of a Motor Car Club has been anxious to explain in a letter to the Times that there was no race of motor cars between London and Brighton, and claims that the pace of the cars in their first celebrated journey did not exceed on the average twelve miles an hour, which is a less speed than that allowed by Parliament, though he admits that when the road was clear the twelve-mile It is of rate was occasionally exceeded. the utmost importance to all concerned that they should bear in mind that, though the Locomotives on Highways Act fixes the maximum pace at fourteen miles an hour, the regulations of the Local Government Board (to which we called attention a fortnight ago) reduce this maximum to twelve; that the penalty for breach of any of these regulations is £10 (or less), and that such penalty is recoverable on the information of any person whatever. In event of any injury being caused to a foot passenger or a bicyclist by a car proceeding at an unauthorised speed, the damages recoverable would no doubt be heavy, as may be seen from a perusal of North-Eastern Railway Company v. Wanless (30 L. T. Rep. 275), in which case the House of Lords held the company liable for an injury caused by an omission to perform a statutory duty. All regulations of the Local Government Board under the Locomotives on Highways Act have, by sect. 6 of the Act, "full effect, nothwithstanding anything in any other Act," so that any breach of them is equivalent to a breach of a statutory duty. And it is material to point out that, in addition to the restrictions on speed, article 4 of the recently made regulations provides that the driver of a locomotive within the meaning of the Act shall not drive it on a highway at "any speed greater than is reasonable and proper, having regard to the traffic on the highway, or so as to endanger the life or limb of any person, or to the common danger of passengers.” WE understand that a Copyright Acts Amendment Bill has been for some time in preparation for the Society of Authors, in consultation with the Publishers' Association, the Copyright Association, and the leading dramatic authors and managers, and that the terms of the Bill are now practically settled. The principal matters dealt with will be magazine copyright, now so unintelligibly dealt with in sect. 18 of the Copyright Act of 1842; the dramatisation of novels and the novelisation of dramas, which it will be proposed to constitute breaches of copyright; the copyright in abridgments, and the copyright in lectures, now unsatisfactorily dealt with in the Lectures Copyright Act 1835, which it will be proposed to repeal. So long ago as 1878 a Royal Commission, of which the present DUKE of RUTLAND, Lord HERSCHELL, and Sir HENRY DRUMMOND WOOLFF are the only surviving members, reported in favour of a complete re-arrangement of the law of the subject, and in 1891 Lord MONKSWELL introduced a consolidating and amending Bill carrying out the recommendations of the Commission, which the then and present LORD CHANCELLOR allowed to be read a second time, on the singular condition that it should not be further proceeded with. The forthcoming Bill will be an amending one only, and, as every effort has been made to secure the concurrence of all persons interested and qualified to judge of its necessity, may perhaps be expected to pass through Parliament without much difficulty. MR. JACOBY pleads hard for his Street Noises Bill, by which he proposes to repeal the Metropolitan Police Act 1864, which goes by the popular name of Bass's Act, and is styled in the Bill the Street Noises Act, and not only to re-enact it in a more stringent form, but to apply it in a new shape to the whole of the country. It should be pointed out in connection with this subject that the Municipal Corporations Act of 1882, by sect. 23, already arms the borough councils with considerable powers of restricting street noises. By that section the councils may make bye-laws for the good rule and government of their boroughs and for prevention and suppression of nuisances not already punishable in a summary manner by virtue of any Act of Parliament. In Reg. v. Powell (51 L. T. Rep. 92) a bye-law under this section prohibiting street music after requisition by a resident householder to desist was held good, but afterwards a bye-law prohibiting street music without the licence of the mayor was held bad in Munro v. Watson (57 L. T. Rep. 366). In the latter case, however, Mr. Justice CAVE expressed the opinion that a proper bye-law against music would be easy enough to frame, and it may perhaps be doubted whether Mr. JACOBY's requirements would not in a great measure be satisfied by the full exercise of their statutory powers on the part of the town councils. For the validity of a bye-law it is required by the Municipal Corporations Act that it should be passed at a meeting at which at least two-thirds of the council are present, and, even after it is passed it may within forty days be disallowed by the authority of the QUEEN in Council. WHAT A BLOCK ON THE BENCH MEANS. WE have received the following important communication by one signing himself "Fairplay": That eminent statesman, Lord Dufferin, at the farewell banquet given in his honour in Paris on the occasion of his retirement from the Diplomatic Service, gave expression to the following generous sentiments: "I cannot complain of the rule which fixes the age for the compulsory retirement of ambassadors. The earlier stages of the diplomatic career are unremunerative. . Its later phases, however, are full of responsibility and importance. But the thing which casts a shadow over the prospects of those who follow it is the slowness, the uncertainty, and sometimes the stagnation, of promotion. The younger members are crushed by the solid crust of the ranks above them, while those in their turn grow stale and disheartened. Now, change and advancement are the life of every career." Yes, sir, of " every career," and the above remarks apply with even greater force to the judicial career in present circumstances than to the diplomatic. Why, then, may we not ask, is not the same rule, or at any rate some rule, for retirement made to apply to the former career as well as to the latter ? The present" time-expired" judges are no doubt thoroughly up to their work; but, in the absence of any rule for retirement, the tendency of the average official, good or bad, is to remain in the service as long as he possibly can, without much regard for the interests of the service itself, or of those of his successor. The introduction of the Royal Courts of Justice (Officers') Bill was a recognition on the part of the late Government of the justice of the principle, so far as the clerical staff of the courts is concerned. Its subsequent withdrawal on two separate occasions shows how strong is the opposition provoked by any attempt to deal effectually with the subject where lawyers are concerned; though why a law which is good for laymen should not also be good for lawyers, I am at a loss to understand. We regret to observe one comment upon our last week's article, suggesting that there are not the men in practice who could adequately replace the superannuated judges. This is a most audacious reflection upon the English Bar. But, if it were true, it would be due to the stagnation in promotion condemned by Lord Dufferin. If a whole generation is allowed to pass away without any sensible change in the Bench it is bad for the Bench, bad for the Profession, and very bad indeed for the public, because the source of future supply of judges becomes prejudicially affected. REFERENCE TO CHARACTER OF GOODS. WITH all due deference, it may well be asked whether the decision recently arrived at by Mr. Justice Kekewich, in the case of Re Eastman's Photographic Materials Company's Trade Mark, with respect to the word "Solio," as applied by them in connection with certain printing paper of their manufacture, does not strain unduly the chain of authorities relating to the registration of words having reference to the character or quality of the goods. These words occur in sect. 10 (e) of the Patents, Designs, and Trade Marks Act 1888, whereby it is laid down that one of the essential properties of a trade mark for goods must be the absence of words referring to their character or quality. In the case before Mr. Justice Kekewich, the learned judge held that the expression "Solio" clearly connoted "Sunlight," and that, as this was a necessary incident to photography, the term could not be registered, for it referred to the character or quality of the goods. Without stopping to question the dictum that sunlight is requisite for photography, let us examine a few recent cases on the sub-section. In the well-known case of Re Farbenfabriken Application (70 L. T. Rep. 186; (1894) 1 Ch. 645), the word "Somatose was refused registration on the ground that the word denoted its use for the human body. The word in question was used in connection with a preparation of meat so manufactured as to be readily absorbed and digested. It will be seen that the expression is either the genitive of the Greek word "soma," with the addition of an "e," or else an adjective framed upon it. Lords Justices Kay and Smith concurred in regarding this as referential to the character or quality, whilst Lord Justice Lindley could see no such connection with the substance as would sustain the objection to registration. In the "Solio" case, Mr. Justice Kekewich held that the word was based npon the Latin "Sol," and denoted that the goods were such as required sunlight. But, assuming that this is the case, would it constitute a reference to character or quality. Were the paper prepared by the action of sunlight, or possessed some property of resembling sunlight, as, for instance, under some method of combustion, or in some other respect shared in the character or quality of sunlight in the same way that "Somatose" related in its character and quality to the body or carcase, it would generally be regarded as coming within the purview of the subsection. The connection between "Solio " paper and the sunlight is not, it is submitted, equally close, and it appears to be a very large step forward to exclude a word of this nature in relation to goods which can be used without sunlight. Were it sought to register the word as the trade mark of a sun-gauge, it would be as impossible to separate the notion of sunshine from "Solio," as "Somatose" from the bodies of men or animals. There is also the well-known "Mazawattee" case, Re Densham's Trade Mark (72 L. T. Rep. 614: (1895) 2 Ch. 176), where Mr. Justice Romer and the Court of Appeal affirming him, held that the word had no reference to the quality of the goods. It was argued that it was descriptive, inasmuch as "wattee" signified "estate," and indicated a particular system of growth. It is submitted that the question put by Lord Justice Lindley in his judgment may be applied to the "Solio case. He said, "What character, or what quality is referred to? If you talk about it being a descriptive word, I ask what it describes ?" Even assuming that "Solio' is only referable to "Sol," and not to other Latin terms, what meaning does the expression leave upon the mind of the ordinary reader? There seems to be little closer connection between Solio and photography, than between Mazawattee" and Ceylon tea. 66 Yet another case is Re Trade Mark Bovril (74 L. T. Rep. 805; (1896) 2 Ch. 600). It was there sought to expunge the word " Bovril" from the register, on the ground (inter alia) that it was descriptive of the character and quality of the goods. The word is doubtless a compound of "bos," .an ox. It was held by the Court of Appeal, affirming Mr. Justice Kekewich, that, though the word might have some reference to the subject matter of the substance, it was not descriptive. and the word as a whole conveyed no meaning. It is submitted that this criticism is applicable to "Folio." There may or not be any reference to "Sol"; but the word is not such as to connote the substance so named. These are decisions always closely marked in mercantile circles, to whom they are of considerable importance. On the one hand, restrictions are placed upon the choice of words too closely approaching a mere summary of the nature of merchants' goods; and, on the other hand, success is not so likely to await those whose goods are not named at once strikingly, succinctly, and as discriptively as is possible. It seems very desirable that these decisions should not cross the line between common sense and hair-splitting distinctions; it is submitted that the foregoing cases made it rather difficult to see upon what grounds this recent case can be based. VESTING OF A LEGACY. TESTATORS are not always as careful as they might be in defining the time at which a legacy is to vest, as witness the large number of cases on the subject. Mr. Theobald, in his useful work on Wills (4th edit., p. 459), says: It has been said that the word 'vest' being derived from 'vestire,' naturally refers to vest in possession, and not to vesting in interest: (Young v. Robertson, 4 Macq. 314). This is, however, contrary to the whole current of English authority, according to which the word 'vest' has always been held to refer primâ facie to vesting in interest or transmissibility, and not vesting in possession or indefeasibility. Thus, where there is a direction that the gifts are to be vested at a certain period, the legatee will take no interest till then." The advantage of early vesting is, that the legatee can make a marriage settlement of the legacy; the disadvantage is, that he may improvidently dispose of it, and that if he -dies young there will be the duty to pay on his death as well as on that of the original testator. No doubt, the wishes of testators have sometimes been frustrated instead of forwarded by interpretations of their words which make the legacies vested, when they only intended them to be - contingent. In Booth v. Booth (4 Ves. 399) a testator gave his residue to trustees apon trust to pay the dividends thereof equally between two named legatees until their respective marriages, and immediately after their respective marriages to assign and transfer their respective shares thereof unto them respectively. The case came before the Master of the Rolls (Sir Richard Arden), who drew a distinction between a legacy and a share of residue and held it to be an absolute gift of the residue qualified only thus, that until their marriages, until when, I suppose, he thought they would not want it, they were not to have the actual possession." As the legatees had the whole of the interest up to marriage and then the capital, they were regarded as having the whole of their respective shares vested in them. In Re Wrey; Stuart v. Wrey (53 L. T. Rep. 334; 30 Ch. Div. 507), the testatrix gave the residue of her stocks and shares to trustees upon trust to pay the dividends and interest thereof to her nephew until marriage, and at the time of his marriage to hand over the stocks and shares to the said nephew. Lord (then Mr.) Justice Kay pointed out that there was a complete separation of the subject of this specific bequest from the rest of the testatrix's property for the purpose of effecting the gift, and that there was no gift over in case the nephew did not survive the testatrix, or in case he died without having been married. His Lordship refused to draw fine distinctions between gifts of residue and general legacies, and held that the legacy was vested, and being vested the legatee was entitled to have it transferred to him at twenty-one although he was not married. Second Sheet. It would seem to follow, then, that a gift of a legacy to anyone at a named time with the gift of the whole income meanwhile will confer a vested legacy on the legatee which he can demand to be paid to him on his attaining twenty-one. The reasoning by which this rule is arrived at can hardly be said to be applicable when only part of the income is given in the meantime, or only such part as the trustees may choose to give for maintenance. Accordingly, in the recent case of Re Wintle; Tucker v. Wintle (75 L. T. Rep. 207; (1896) 2 Ch. 711) Mr. Justice North, after remarking that the authorities on this point were in conflict, expressed his own view thus; "Where a legacy is given vesting at a future time and the whole of the intermediate interest is given to the legatee in any event, there the entire gift, principal and interest, is absolutely devoted to the legatee's use and vests in præsenti. If, on the other hand, the whole of the intermediate interest is not so given, but only some discretionary portion thereof, it cannot be said that the entire gift, principal and interest, is absolutely devoted to the legatee's use. In such a case the gift does not vest in præsenti." That decision places the law on a reasonable and intelligible footing. Where a testator wishes the vesting to be postponed until the legatee attains twenty-five, and it is not certain that he will attain that age (if he attains it at all) within twenty-one years from the testator's death, and the testator directs the application of the income according to the trustees' discretion in the maintenance of the legatee and the accumulation of the unapplied part so long as the Thellusson Act permits, and then the payment of the whole income to the legatee until he is twenty-five, this would seem to bring about an earlier vesting, as the whole principal and interest will be devoted absolutely to the legatee's use: (2 Key & Elphinstone's Precedents, 4th edit. p. 834). Draftsmen should be on their guard against this result, which is probably not the intention of the testator. In giving an opinion as to whether a gift of intermediate income vests a legacy, it must be borne in mind that there is a great distinction in this respect between "a gift to a contingent class and a gift to a class upon a contingency; thus a gift to children who attain twenty-one, or to such children as attain twenty one, is a gift to a contingent class, and will only vest in those who attain twenty-one, though there may be a gift of interest, or other circumstances, which in a gift to a class upon a contingency, as, for instance, at twenty-one, might have the effect of vesting the bequest" (Theobald, p. 461; 2 Key & Elphinstone, sup.).. THE BANKRUPTCY OF MARRIED WOMEN. As a general principle, a married woman cannot be made a bankrupt; no, not even when she has separate property, and has entered into contracts after her marriage: (Ex parte Jones; Re Grissel, 40 L. T. Rep. 790; 12 Ch. Div. 484; Re Gardiner; Ex parte Coulson, 58 L. T. Rep. 119; 20 Q. B. Div. 249). The reason is, that she is not personally liable for the debt: (Ex parte Jones, ubi sup.). The exceptions to the rule are, first, if her husband be civilly dead, or have been convicted and sentenced as a felon (Ex parte Franks, 7 Bing. 762); and, secondly, if she trade separately from her husband within the custom of the City of London (Lavie v. Phillipps, 2 Burr. 1776), or within the terms of sect. 1, subsect. 5 of the Married Women's Property Act 1882. We intend to consider briefly the statutory exception. It is so very important to note and consider the exact language of this sub-section, in order to arrive at the true state of the law, that we may be excused transcribing it before making any comments on "the anomalous kind of bankruptcy" created by the enactment. 45 & 46 Vict. c. 75, sect. 1 (5): Every married woman carrying on a trade separately from her husband shall, in respect of her separate property, be subject to the bankruptcy laws in the same way as if she were a feme sole." : On this wording the following conclusions seem to follow :(a.) The date of the marriage of the trader-whether before or after the 1st Jan. 1882-is immaterial, except when the question is being considered what property is, and what property is not, separate, and so assets in the bankruptcy. (b) The married woman must carry on her business separately from her husband; in other words, if the husband have a common interest in partnership or otherwise in the business, that is enough to prevent his wife being made a bankrupt, even although, as between husband and wife, her interest is her separate estate. In the case of Re Helsby; Ex parte Helsby (69 L. T. Rep. 864), which may well be referred to in support of this statement, Mr. Justice Kennedy said he considered, without attempting any precise definition or description of separate trading, that trading "separately from her husband" must mean a trading in such a way that in fact, as between the married woman and her husband, the latter can make out no claim to the property and benefits of the trading-in such a way, that the profits of the business, and the assets of the business, as between husband and wife, belong solely to her. (c) Moreover, that a married woman shall be amenable to the bankruptcy laws she must have separate property (Re Helsby; Ex parte Helsby, ubi sup.). It may seem that this is a condition which of necessity is involved in the previous one-that she carry on a separate trade, because if she have such a trade it would be separate property. It may be well to bear this prominently in mind, however, that where a married woman has no separate trade, only separate property, this state of things will not satisfy the terms of the sub-section under consideration. Expresso unius exclusio alterius. After some disputation in the Profession on the crux, some nine years ago Mr. Justice Cave decided that, if a married woman have separate estate but do not carry on a separate trade, her creditors cannot make her bankrupt: (Re Gardiner; Ex parte Coulson, ubi sup.). The whole trend of bankruptcy legislation in recent years has been to abolish the distinction between traders and non-traders. The purpose and intention of the revolutionary Act of 1882 was, it is believed, to confer upon married women having separate estate a complete independent status; and it is not difficult to imagine that its framers would be anything but satisfied with the interpretation thus placed upon, and the limited effect thus given to the sub-section, and complain of the narrow deduction drawn therefrom against the general liability of married women to the bankruptcy laws. (d) To proceed: a married woman, to be subject to the operation of the bankruptcy laws, must also be carrying on her separate business at the time of the act of bankruptcy. Whether she was, or was not, doing so is a question of fact. This topic is illustrated by the last reported case, heard on appeal last August, Re Dagnall; Ex parte Soan and Morley (75 L. T. Rep. 142; (1896) 2 Q. B. 407). A married woman, having carried on in Sussex a trade separately from her husband, sold it. Within a month she gave notice to her creditors that she was about to suspend payment of her debts. Thereupon a bankruptcy petition was presented against her by two creditors in respect of debts incurred by her in her trade, alleging as the act of bankruptcy the notice to her creditors. At the date of the petition she was possessed of separate estate and of separate trade property. The registrar of the County Court refused, in these circumstances, to make a receiving order against her; but the Divisional Court allowed the petitioning creditor's appeal: Mr. Justice Williams, on the ground that trading is not completed until the trader has performed all the obligations that the fact of trading imposes on him, and that the fact of the debtor having trade debts undischarged at the date of the petition was evidence from which it ought to be inferred that she was still carrying on the trade at that date; Mr. Justice Wright on the ground that, having once carried on a trade, she continued, even after she had ceased to carry it on, to be subject to the bankruptcy laws in respect of all debts incurred by her during the period of her trading. (e) To pass on a step further, to the effect of the bankruptcy under the sub-section. It is conceived that all the bankrupt's creditors, and not merely those who are her trade creditors, will be entitled to come in and prove their debts thereunder. Also, it follows from the wording of the sub-section that only her separate property-i.e., the property that is separate by virtue of the instrument conferring it, or by virtue of the legislation respecting married women's property-will be affected by the bankruptcy. But all her separate property, and not only that portion of it which is embarked in her separate business, will, it is apprehended, be liable to satisfy the creditors. Sect. 19 of the Married Women's Property Act 1882 should not, too, by forgotten. It provides, amongst other things, that no restriction against anticipation in a settlement of a woman's own property by herself shall have validity against antenuptial debts, and no settlement shall have any greater validity against her creditors than a like settlement by a man would have against his creditors. There is another point in this thorny subject which cannot be passed by. It will be in the memory of all that, according to the celebrated judgment in the case of Scott v. Morley (57 L. T. Rep. 919; 20 Q. B. Div. 120), a judgment against a married woman creates no personal liability at all-it is a judgment against property, not against the person. Now, a bankruptcy notice under sect. 4, sub-sect. (g) of the Bankruptcy Act 1883 (46 & 47 Vict. c. 52) can be only in the form given in Form 6 of the Appendix to the Bankruptcy Rules 1886, the wording of which, it will be observed on reference, as well as the sub-sect. (g), presupposes a personal liability to pay the judgment debt. Such a notice is, therefore, inapplicable to the case of a judgment against a married woman, and consequently it cannot be issued against her either during or after her Coverture: (Re Gardiner; Er parte Coulson (ubi sup.); Re Lynes; Ex parte Lester and Co., 68 L. T. Rep. 739; (1893) 2 Q. B. 113; Re Hewitt; Ex parte Levene, 72 L. T. Rep. 60; (1895) 1 Q. B. 328). ACKNOWLEDGMENTS OF TITLE TO LAND. EVERY legal practitioner knows that the Statutes of Limitation with regard to actions to recover land can be prevented from running by obtaining an acknowledgment of title from the person in possesions; but, except in cases where acknowledgments are intentionally given as such, it is not always easy to say what is and what is not a sufficient acknowledgment for the purpose. It may therefore be useful to collect the law on the subject, and to see what is the general tendency of the decisions of the courts. And first as to the statutes themselves. The Real Property Limitation Act 1874 (37 & 38 Vict. c. 57), s. 1, provides that no person shall make an entry or distress, or bring an action or suit to recover any land or rent, but within twelve years from the time the right to do so shall have first accrued to him, or some person through whom he claims. This section was substituted for the parallel section of the Act of 1833, which fixed twenty years as the period of limitation, and the cases on the earlier enactment are equally applicable to the later. Sect. 14 of the Real Property Limitation Act 1833 (3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 27), which is left unrepealed, provides that, "when any acknowledgment of the title of the person entitled to any land or rent shall have been given to him or his agent in writing, signed by the person in possession, or in receipt of the profits of such land, or in receipt of such rent," the latter's possession or receipt shall be deemed to have been the possession or receipt of the former, and the right of the person to whom the acknowledgment is given, or of any person claiming through him to make an entry or distress, or bring an action to recover such land or rent, shall be deemed to have first accrued at the time at which such acknowledgment, or the last of such acknowledgments, if more than one, was given. The case of a mortgagor whose mortgagee is in possession is specially provided for by sect. 7 of the Act of 1874. The mortgagor, or anyore claiming through him, shall not bring any action or suit to redeem the mortgage after twelve years from the time when the mortgagee obtained possession or receipt of the rent, unless an acknowledgment in writing of the title of the mortgagor or of his right to redemption has been given to the mortgagor, or some person claiming his estate, or the agent of such mortgagor or person, signed by the mortgagee or the person claiming through him; and in such case the time is twelve years from the acknowledgment, or the last acknowledgment. The question whether a particular document is an acknowledgment is a question of law for the judge, and must not be left to the jury: (Doe d. Curzon v. Edmonds, 6 M. & W. 295). For the construction of written documents, except where parol evidence is necessary to explain them, is a question of law for the court: (Morrell v. Frith, 3 M. & W. 402). In Doe d. Curzon v. Edmonds (ubi sup.), in 1841, A. being in possession, B. claimed a title to the land, and demanded rent, offering to grant A. a lease. A. wrote: "Although, if matters were contested, I am of opinion that I should establish a legal right to the premises, yet, under all the circumstances, I have made up my mind to accede to the proposal you made, of paying a moderate rent on an agreement for a term of twenty-one years." The lease was not executed, nor was any rent paid. The letter was held to be no acknowledgment, as it was only made with a view to an arrangement which was not carried into effect. A series of letters from a tenant pur autre vie to his remaindermen, after the death of the cestui que vie, not admitting that their title was free from doubt, but saying that he was ready to account, and had no further claim against the estate than what would appear in the account, was held by Lord Chancellor Sugden, in 1841, a sufficient acknowledgment of their title: (Incorporated Society v. Richards, 1 Dru. & War. 258; 1 Conn. & Law. 58). In Fursdon v. Clogg (10 M. & W. 572), in 1842, a letter from a tenant to his landlord, in answer to a demand for payment of arrears of rent, saying it was reasonable that the lords of the fee should compensate him for expenses incurred in litigation with respect to the land, that the previous landlord had been. applied to to defend his title but refused, and asking the devisee to vindicate his right to the land rather than let the expense of so doing fall on the tenants, was held to be an acknowledgment of the landlord's title. The next case in point of time is Jayne v. Hughes (10 Ex. 430; 24 L. J. 115, Ex.). Here a mortgage deed, dated the 27th Oct. 1827, and executed on the 23rd Aug. 1834, contained a covenant by the mortgagor admitting the title to be in the mortgagee. On default by the mortgagor, the mortgagee, in Feb. 1854, brought ejectment. The defendant pleaded the statute 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 27, s. 14; but the deed. was held a sufficient acknowledgment of the plaintiff's title at the time of the execution of the deed, and consequently he could recover within twenty years of the date of execution. A person through whom the defendant in an action of ejectment claimed, had, in an answer sworn by him to a bill filed by the plaintiff in reference to the same property, acknowledged the plaintiff's title within twenty years of the time of action brought. This acknowledgment was held to be evidence against the defendant, and operated as a bar to the statute: (Goode v. Job, 1858, 28 L. J. 1, Q. B.; 1 E. & E. 6). An unaccepted proposal for a lease, made by one whose personal representative the defendant was, to the plaintiff's lessor, signed by a third party for and in the presence of the party making it. was held, in a case in the Irish Exchequer in 1847, to be evidence of an acknowledgment of title: (Lessee of the Corporation of Dublin v. Judge, 11 Ir. L. Rep. 8). Compare this with Doe d. Curzon v. Edmonds (ubi sup.). There are also a few cases under sect. 7 of the Act of 1874, relating to mortgagor and mortgagee, and the statutes which it replaced. In Hodle v. Healey (Mad. & Gel. 181), a case before Vice-Chancellor Leach in 1819, a letter from a mortgagee to his mortgagor, claiming to have the equity of redemption released, was held an acknowledgment of the mortgagor's title under 8 Geo. 1, c. 4. 1n Trulock v. Robey (12 Sim. 402), before ViceChancellor Shadwell in 1841, a mortgagee in possession wrote to the agent and grandfather of the mortgagor as follows: "Concerning the business at H., which you know nearly as well as myself, as there has been nothing kept from you; which I am very willing to settle if your granddaughter is of age. I never told you any otherways; as I have been informed she is heiress of what there is. The difference is not worth much. I shall hear from your granddaughter about the business." In an action for redemption by the infant when she came of age, this was held a sufficient acknowledgment of her right to redeem. In Gregson v. Hindley (10 Jur. 383), before the same judge in 1846, H. mortgaged leaseholds to D., and gave a bond, in 1806. After having made a further charge in favour of D., H. died and bequeathed the property to his wife A. H. for life, remainder to the defendant. D.'s representatives assigned in 1839 by deed to the plaintiff, and in the deed recited that all interest had been paid. The plaintiff took as trustee for A. H. After the death of A. H., the bill was filed to compel the defendant to renew the lease, and praying that such renewed lease might be charged with the principal money and interest. The admission in the deed by the trustee of the tenant for life, that all interest had been paid, was held not to be a sufficient acknowledgment of the debt as against the remainderman. Stansfield v. Hobson (3 De G. M. & G. 620), in 1853, is a case showing that the statute does not create a new title, but only bars the remedy, and, therefore, if an acknowledgment is given after the period of limitation has passed, it keeps alive the right of action for another period of twelve (or twenty) years from that date. More than twenty years after a mortgagee had entered into possession, the mortgagor's solicitor wrote to him requesting to know when he could see him upon the subject of the mortgage. The mortgagee replied, "I do not see the use of a meeting unless someone is ready with the money |