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Thursday, the 19th inst., being Grand Day of Michaelmas Term, the Treasurer (Master James Mulligan) and Benchers of Gray's-inn entertained at dinner the following guests, viz.: The Earl of Coventry, Lord Davey, Sir Francis Jeune, Lord Justice Lindley, Mr. Justice Chitty, Sir Benjamin Baker, K.C.M.G., Sir Forrest Fulton, Q.C., Sir Arthur Arnold, Sir W. H. Russell, LL.D., Colonel Egerton (Equerry to H.R.H. the Duke of Connaught), Mr. Edward Carson, Q.C., M.P., Mr. W. P. Beale, Q.C., and Mr. M. Ingle Joyce. The Benchers present, in addition to the Treasurer, were: Master His Royal Highness tha Duke of Connaught, K.G.K.T., Master Lord Shand, Master Griffith, Master Hugh Shield, Q.C., Master Sheil, Master Beetham, Master Rose, Master Judge Paterson, Master Mattinson, Q.C., Master Lewis Coward, Master Oswald, Q.C., M.P., Master Fleming, Q.C., Master Macaskie, Master C. A. Russell, Master Lush, and the Preacher (the Rev. Dr. Lupton).

Estate duty has been paid on £215,899 14s. 4d. as the value of the personal estate of the Right Hon. Sir William Robert Grove, of 115, Harley-street, D.C.L., F.R.S., formerly a justice of the Common Pleas and a Judge of the High Court from 1840-47, Professor of Experimental Philosophy at the London Institution, author of "The Correlation of Physical Forces" and other works, who died on the 1st Aug. last, aged eighty-five, a son of Mr. John Grove, of Swansea. Probate of Sir William Grove's will, which bears date the 28th May 1895, with a codicil of the 6th Aug. 1895, has been granted to his sons, Mr. Florence Crawford Grove, of Belgrave Mansions, and Major-General Coleridge Grove, of 115, Harley-street. The testator left his landed property to his said two sons; as to the property in Gower and in and about Swansea to his son Florence, and as to the land in Carmarthenshire and Sussex and the Pentrehyd Farm to his son Coleridge, to the latter of whom he also bequeathed £6000; to his grandson, Edmund Herbert Hills, £5000 and his 6ft. telescope; to his granddaughter, Flora Duff Baker, £2000; to his butler, William Hooker, £100; and to his late housekeeper, Mrs. Gibbs, £20 a year during her life. Sir William Grove left his residuary estate as to one-fourth thereof to each of his two sons; as to one-fourth to his daughter, Anna Hills; and as to one-fourth to his granddaughters, Flora Duff Baker and Leila Crackenthorpe; but the share of the said granddaughter, Flora Baker, is to be in addition to her marriage settlements, and the share of Leila Crackenthorpe is to be taken in satisfaction of the testator's covenant to settle £10,000 on her marriage

"The Gray's Inn Moot Society," writes a correspondent of the Times, under date Sept. 23rd, "attained its majority to-night, the president on this occasion being Sir Frederick Pollock. From very early times in the history of Gray's-inn the exercise of mooting formed an essential part of the career of each student. Before he became eligible for call to the Bar it was necessary that he should take part in a certain number of moots, and the Masters of the Bench enforced a systematic practice by strict regulations. Gradually this custom became a mere matter of form, and towards the end of the seventeenth century it ceased altogether. From time to time many projects to revive the old system have been suggested. The possibility of the revival formed one of the subjects for consideration by the Select Committee on Legal Education and the Royal Commission on the Inns of Court, and twenty-one years ago the Gray's Inn Moot Society was formed by the Masters of the Bench. The object of holding these moots is to advance the forensic education of young barristers and students. It is modelled on the procedure of the Court of Appeal, and, like that court, is only bound by decisions in the House of Lords. After dinner upon the appointed day the tables in Gray's Innhall are arranged for the audience, desks and seats for the counsel' are set at some distance from the high table, and at eight o'clock the moot begins. The court is formed by the presiding judge and the Masters of the Bench, who sit on either side of him at the high table. Two'counsel' on either side argue the case. The leader for the appellant opens, and he is followed by the junior; then the respondents are called upon; and, after the opener has replied, the presiding judge delivers judgment, the result of which he enters in the minute-book. Eight moots, as a rule, are held in each year-two in each dining term-and they usually take place upon Monday evenings."

NOTES OF RECENT DECISIONS NOT YET REPORTED.

BY OUR REPORTERS IN THE SEVERAL COURTS.

HOUSE OF LORDS.

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Practice--Pleading - Statute of Frauds Order XIX., r. 15. The respondents, by a writ specially indorsed, claimed "£152, being the a nount payable under a guarantee signed by the appellant' in respect of goods sold and delivered to, and work and labour done for the L. Company." The appellant, in his statement of defence, did not plead the Statute of Frauds, but he set out the guarantee, which was not sufficient to satisfy the statute. Held, that, under the circumstances, he was not precluded from relying on the statute. Judgment of the Court of Appeal (74 L. T. Rep. 370) reversed.

[Brunning v. Odhams. H. of L. Nov. 24.-Counsel: Montague Lush Boxall. Solicitors; J. Gibson; E. Swain.] Ship-Collision-Damages-Special Contract excluding the Merchant Shipping Act 1862 (25 & 26 Vict. c. 63), s. 54.—The appellant entered his yacht for a race upon the condition that during the race he would obey and be bound by certain rules. One of the rules provided that, if any yacht, "in consequence of her neglect of any of these rules, shall foul another yacht, she shall pay all damages." While

sailing under the rules, and in consequence of a breach of one of them without the actual fault or privity of the appellant, his yacht came intocollision with, and sank, the yacht of the respondent, which became a total loss. Held, that the rules created a contract between the owners of the competing yachts, by which any one of them who infringed a rule became liable for all damages arising from such infringement, and that the limitation of liability contained in sect. 54 of the Merchant Shipping Act 1862 was excluded. Judgment of the Court of Appeal. (72 L. T. Rep. 316; (1895) P. 248) affirmed.

[Clarke v. Lord Dunraven; the Satanita. H. of L. Nov. 19.Counsel: Sir R. Reid, Q C. and Pollard; Sir W. Phillimore, J. Walton,, Q.C., and L Batten. Solicitors: T. Cooper and Co.; Waltons, Johnson, Bubb, and Whatton.]

COURT OF APPEAL. Bankruptcy-Contract to let out Goods to Hire and to keep in Repair for a fixed Period-Mortgage of future Payments under the ContractBankruptcy of Mortgagor -Validity of Mortgage as against Trustee in Bankruptcy Bankruptcy Act 1883 (46 & 47 Vict. c. 52), s. 44 (2) iii.A theatrical costumier entered into a contract with a theatrical company to design and supply the dresses for a ballet, and to keep them in repair for a period of twelve weeks in consideration of the payment to her of £40 a week for that period by the company. It was also a part of the contract that she should supply such wigs as might be required for the sum of £3 a week for the same period. After she had supplied the dresses she mortgaged all her beneficial rights under her contract with the company. Nine days afterwards a receiving order was made against her on her own petition, and she was subsequently adjudicated bankrupt. The theatrical company paid into court the money which became due from them under the contract subsequently to the bankruptcy, and an interpleader issue was directed in which the mortgagee was plaintiff and the trustees in bankruptcy were the defendants. Upon the trial of the issue before Lord Russell, C.J., without a jury, the Lord Chief Justice held, that the case was governed by the principle of Ex parte Nichols; Re Jones (48 L. T. Rep. 496; 22 Ch. Div. 782), anď he gave judgment for the defendants. The mortgagee appealed. case is reported 74 L. T. Rep. 813; (1896) 2 Q. B. 254. It was contended on his behalf that the bankrupt had in fact completed before her bankruptcy all her part of the contract, and had assigned all her rights under it to the plaintiff, so that the trustees had no claim under it. Held, that the judgment of the Lord Chief Justice was right, and that the mortgage gave no title to the mortgagee as against the trustees in bankruptcy to the moneys which became due after the commencement of the bankruptcy. Appeal dismissed.

The

[Wilmot v. Alton and others. Ct. of App.: Lord Esher, M.R., Lopes and Rigby, L.JJ.: Nov. 18.--Counsel: for the plaintiff, Cooper Willis, Q.C. and Hawtin; for the defendants, Herbert Reed, Q.C. and Scarlett. Solicitors: H. Reid; J. C. Button.]

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Bill of Sale-Statutory Form-Attesting Witness-Omission to state Description-Bills of Sale Act 1878 (41 & 42 Vict. c. 31), s. 10-Bills of Sale Act 1878 Amendment Act 1882 (45 & 46 Vict. c. 43), s. 9 and Schedule. In an interpleader issue directed to be tried between the claimant under a bill of sale and an execution creditor of the grantor of the bill, who had seized the household goods comprised therein, it appeared that to the name of the attesting witness nothing was added except his address, 5, Victoria-street, Westminster. By sect. 9 of the Bills of Sale Act 1882 a bill of sale given by way of security for the payment of money by the grantor is void unless it is made in accordance with the form in the schedule to the Act annexed. The form in the schedule directs that the attesting witness'3 name, address, and description" shall appear on the face of the bill. On the trial of the issue before Grantham, J. without a jury, evidence was given that the witness was of no occupation. The defendant, the execution creditor, contended that the bill of sale was not made in accordance with the form in the schedule to the Act, because no "description" of the witness was given, and that the bill was therefore void. Grantham, J. held that the bill of sale was not in accordance with the form, and was therefore void, and he gave judgment for the defendant. The plaintiff appealed. He contended that "description" in the schedule meant the same as the "description of the occupation" of the witness, which has to be mentioned in the affidavit filed upon registration under sect. 10 of the Bills of Sale Act 1878; and that, as the witness was of no occupation, it was unnecessary and useless to add that as his description. Ex parte Young; Re Symonds (42 L. T. Rep. 744) and Parsons v. Brand and Coulson v. Dickson (reported together 62 L. T. Rep. 479; 25 Q. B. Div. 110) were cited. Held, following the decision of the Court of Appeal in Parsons v. Brand and Coulson v. Dickson, that the omission to state anything by way of description on the bill of sale in the place where the form in the schedule to the Act of Parliament directed that it should be stated rendered the bill of sale void, becauseit was not made in accordance with the form. Appeal dismissed. [Sims v. Trollope and Sons. Ct. of App.: Lord Esher, M.R., Lopes and Rigby, L.JJ. Nov. 15.-Counsel: for the plaintiff, Jelf, Q.C. and A. Clavell Salter; for the defendants, Marchant. Solicitors: Alfred Slater; Trollope and Winckworth.]

Married Woman-Settled Funds-Separate Estate--Restraint on Anticipation-Removal by Court-Scheme for discharging Debts aud Liabili ties-Conveyancing and Law of Property Act 1881 (44 & 45 Vict. c. 41), 8. 39. The plaintiff, under the settlement executed in Feb. 1876 on her marriage with her former husband, was entitled to a life interest in the trust funds, but during her then intended or any future coverture for her separate use without power of anticipation: and after her death, and in the event of her former husband not surviving her, the funds were

settled in trust for the issue of the marriage as therein mentioned, and, in default of issue of the marriage, upon trust for such person or persons and for such purposes as her former husband should by will or codicil appoint. There was no issue of the marriage. In Nov. 1879 the plaintiff's former husband died, having by his will devised all his estate of which he should die possessed, or of which he had power to dispose by will, upon trust to pay the income to the plaintiff for life, and afterwards, in case he should have no issue him surviving, in trust for such persons as the plaintiff should by will or codicil appoint. In May 1880 an action was brought for the administration of his estate. In Dec. 1884 the plaintiff married a second husband, by whom she had several children. The second husband subsequently became bankrupt. In order to satisfy certain liabilities which the plaintiff had incurred, and also that she might be set free from all her existing debts, which caused her constant worry and anxiety, she was desirous of obtaining the sanction of the court under sect. 39 of the Conveyancing Act 1881 to the carrying out of a scheme. Accordingly, the plaintiff took out an originating summons against the surviving trustee of the will, asking that, notwithstanding she was by the settlement restrained from anticipation of her life interest, the following scheme might be approved and directed or authorised to be carried into effect: (1) The defendant to sell the investments representing the trust funds; (2) Out of the net proceeds of the sale, in the first place, a sum equal to the actuarial present value of the reversion in the trust funds expectant on the death of the plaintiff, plus a proper sum to provide for the costs of distributing the said sum, equal as aforesaid, to be paid by the defendant into court, to the credit of the administration action; (3) Out of the same proceeds, in the next place, such a sum as together with the surrender values of certain policies on the plaintiff's life would be sufficient to discharge all the existing debts of the plaintiff and the costs, to be applied by the defendant in effecting such discharge; (4) The ultimate residue to be resettled for the benefit of the plaintiff and her children. North, J. (sitting at chambers), before whom the summons came on to be heard, refused to make any order. The plaintiff appealed, The Court, being of opinion that the scheme would be for the benefit of the plaintiff, allowed the appeal and ordered minutes to be prepared approving the scheme, and directing the defendant how to deal with the trust funds. Decision of North, J. reversed.

[Re Stewart; Keown-Boyd v. Gilmour. Ct. of App. No. 2: Lord Russell, C.J., Lindley and Smith, L.JJ. Nov. 24.-Counsel: for the appellant, O. Leigh Clare; for the respondent, R. J. Parker. Solicitors: Busk and Mellor.]

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Poor Rate-Exemption-Occupation for Local Purposes-County Council -Joint Occupation with Quarter Sessions-Rateability. This was a case stated under sect. 40 of the Valuation (Metropolis) Act 1869 (32 & 33 Vict. c. 67). In a supplemental valuation list of the united parishes of St. Margaret and St. John the Evangelist, Westminster, in the St. George's Union, the name of the Middlesex County Council was inserted as that of the occupiers of that part of the Guildhall, Westminster, being the county hall, committee rooms, office of the county surveyor, vaults and rooms used by the caretaker, and such parts of the building as are used by the Middlesex County Council for administrative purposes as distinguished from Crown purposes." Certain parts of the Guildhall, such as the courts, witnesses' waiting-rooms, prisoners' cells, prison warders' rooms, counsel's and counsel's clerks' rooms and jurymen's rooms, are used exclusively by the quarter sessions. Other rooms in the building are used exclusively by the county council. Others are used jointly by the county council and the justices of the county, such as the offices used by the clerk of the peace, who is also ex-officio clerk of the county council, and by his deputy and staff. The use made of these last-mentioned rooms by the justices is purely in the exercise of administrative duties. The questions for the opinion of the court were: (1) Is the Guildhall, or any and what part thereof, rateable and within the description of rateable property, the subject of the Valuation (Metropolis) Act, 1869 ? (2) Upon what principle is the said Guildhall, or any rateable part thereof, to be valued and assessed for the purpose of the poor or other rates? and (3) Is the question whether the parts of the building used by the county council exclusively are capable of being let separately from the rest of the building material? The Queen's Bench Division (Cave and Wills, JJ.) were of opinion that the parts of the building used exclusively by the county council were fully rateable, and that the rooms used by the county council jointly with the justices were rateable in proportion to the use made of them for county council business. The case is reported 75 L. T. Rep. 153; (1896) 2 Q. B. 143. The county council appealed. Held, that the decision of the Queen's Bench Division was right. Appeal dismissed.

[The County Council of Middlesex v. The Assessment Committee of St. George's Union. Ct. of App.: Lord Esher, M.R., Lopes and Rigby, L.JJ. Nov. 20.-Counsel: for the County Council, Danckwerts; for the Assessment Committee, Bosanquet, Q.C., and W. C. Ryde. Solicitors: R. Nicholson; W. J. Fraser.]

HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE.-CHANCERY DIVISION. Company-Liquidation-Debentures — Charge on all the Company's Property present and future-Calls got in during Liquidation.-A company had, by its memorandum and articles, power to borrow money on debentures charged upon any of its property, both present and future, including its uncalled capital. The company issued debentures, by which it charged as security for the money owing on the debentures the undertaking and all the property of the company whatsoever, both present and future. The company went into liquidation, and the assets in the hands of the liquidator consisted solely of moneys representing

unpaid calls got in during the course of the liquidation. The debentureholders claimed that these moneys were included in the charge created by the debentures. Held, that the debentures did not include the uncalled capital got in by the liquidator, although they of course included anything becoming the property of the company by reason of calls made by the company before liquidation.

[Re Streatham and General Estates Company Limited. Ch. Div.: Chitty, J. Nov. 19.-Counsel: Robert E. Moore; Peterson; Rowden.. Solicitors: J. D. Arthur; Hugh Godfray.]

Partnership-Articles-Partnership in Brewery-Death of one PartnerOption to purchase by Survivor, which was exercised-ValuationTied Public-houses-Goodwill-Allowance to Survivor carrying on the Business-Time of exercising Option-Mode of Payment of Purchase Money-Partnership Act 1890 (53 & 54 Vict. c. 39), s. 42.-Two persons carried on the business of a brewery for twenty-one years under partnership articles, which provided that on the death of a partner the property, stock, goods, and effects were to be valued, and the surviving partner was to have the option to purchase at such valuation. The partnership was continued upon the same articles by a deed of covenant for a further period of seven years, and afterwards without any written or verbal agreement. One partner died, and the survivor exercised his option to purchase. The valuation of the tied public-houses forming part of the partnership property having been made on the basis of what a brewer would give at a public auction: Held (1), that that included good-will, and that no further sum was chargeable in respect thereof. The defendant, as survivor, having carried on the business up to the time of the exercise of the option, during which time considerable profits were made: Held (2), that, having regard to sect. 42 of the Partnership Act 1890 and the evidence, that a considerable portion of the profits was due to the exertions of the defendant and not to the share of the deceased partner's capital, and that the defendant was entitled to the sum he claimed in respect thereof. Article 16 provided that "the share of the deceased partner in the property, &c., of the partnership shall be ascertained by estimate and valuation, to be made in manner provided by clause 17, and the continuing partner shall thereupon have the option to become the purchaser." Held (3), that thereupon " meant on a valuation of the whole of the assets being made. Article 17 provided that the defendant should have the option to purchase," and, in case he shall determine to do so, then that he shall pay to the other partner one half part of the amount of the valuation so to be made as aforesaid by three equal instalments," at six, nine, and twelve months respectively, "from the date of the valuation, with interest upon the amount of such three instalments at the rate of 5 per cent. per annum, to be computed from the time of such valuation." The defendant, desiring to vary the terms of purchase on the ground of hardship to him: Held (4), that, having exercised the option, he was bound to pay at the time and in the manner prescribed by the deed.

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[Page v. Ratliffe. Ch. Div.: Stirling, J. Oct. 29 and Nov. 18.Counsel: Buckley, Q.C. and Micklem; Graham Hastings, Q.C. and E. P. Hewitt. Solicitors: Sharpe Parkers, agents for W. Shoosmith and Sons, Northampton; Preston, Stow, and Preston, agents for Brown and Haviland, Northampton.]

Railway Company-Deed of Arrangement-Railway Companies Act, 1867, 8.4-Construction Statutory Obligation-Contract.-An arrangement under seal was entered into between the M. and M. Railway Company and two other railway companies in the year 1861, and embodied certain terms which were, in fact, ultra vires of the several companies. By a private Act of Parliament passed in the year 1862, this arrangement was carried into effect, and the terms of the arrangement became binding on the companies, and certain works which were authorised by the private Act were carried out by the applicants, the C. Railway Company, who were parties to the arrangement. The M. and M. Railway Company never acted under the private Act, but had nevertheless been held liable to make certain payments under the provisions of the private Act, and judgments were recovered by the applicants in the year 1875 for arrears of such payments, but the judg ments remained unsatisfied. In the year 1880, on the application of the present applicants, a receiver and manager of the M. and M. Railway Company was appointed, and the undertaking still remained in his hands. The applicants now applied by summons for leave to issue execution under similar judgments recovered at various dates between the years 1883. and 1895 on the rolling stock and other chattels of the company in the hands of the receiver and manager. The question turned on the construction of sect. 4 of the Railway Companies Act 1867. It was contended that, by virtue of the private Act, the judgments recovered by the applicants were in respect of actions brought "on a contract before the Railway Companies Act, 1867, within the meaning of the section, and, consequently, that the rolling stock and other chattels of the M. and M. Railway Company could be taken in execution. Held, that the arrangement of 1861 did not give rise to any rights between the three companies; that the private Act of 1862 did not ratify such arrangement so as to make the same binding, but conferred rights and imposed obligations which were entirely statutory, and that the actions to enforce the liabilities were not actions on a contract, but were actions on a statute, and that the summons must therefore be dismissed.

[Re The Manchester and Milford Railway Company. Ch. Div.: Stirling, J. July 21 and Nov. 17.-Counsel: Graham Hastings, Q.C. and George Cave; Buckley, Q.C. and F. C. Norton. Solicitors: Le Brasseur and Oakley, agents for H. Christian Corfield; Young, Jones, and Co.] Will-Construction-Executory Devise on Death of Child without Issue to surviving Children equally--Sole survivor.-A testator by his will, dated in 1844, devised his copy hold lands (subject to a gift thereof to his wife during widowhood), as to property A. to his son Charles, as to

OUR LITERARY COLUMN.

property B. to his son Joseph, as to property C. to his daughter Sarah, as to property D. to his daughter Emma, and as to other property to his daughter Ann. The will then proceeded: "If any or either of my said children should happen to die without leaving lawful issue, their share or shares of such property to go to and be equally divided among the surviving children share and share alike." The testator died in 1844 and his widow in 1864. The testator's daughter Ann died in 1895 a spinster, and at her death the only child of the testator then surviving was his son Joseph, and the question was raised whether the property devised to Ann passed on her death to her brother Joseph, or to her customary heir. Held, following Hearn v. Baker (2 K. & J. 383), and distinguishing King v. Frost (63 L. T. Rep. 422; 15 App. Cas. 548), that the property passed to Joseph Brown as the surviving child of the testator.

[Re Brown; Brown v. Acomb. Ch. Div.: Chitty, J. Nov. 18.-Counsel: T. L. Wilkinson; G. Henderson. Solicitors: Long and Gardiner, for E. C. Browning, Redditch.]

QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION. Banker Crossed Cheque - Forged Indorsement Foreign Bank with Branch in England-Liability to true Owner-Bills of Exchange Act 1882 (45 & 46 Vict. c. 61), ss. 60, 80, 82.-Commercial cause tried before Collins, J. The action was brought against the defendants for having converted two drafts, one for £600, the other for £81 4s. 11d, of which the plaintiffs were the true owners. The defendants denied liability only as to the draft for £600. The admitted facts concerning that draft were as follows: It was drawn upon the defendants, the Crédit Lyonnais, in favour of the plaintiffs, and indorsed by them to the order of C. J. Hambro and Son, to whom it was posted in London, for collection on behalf of the plaintiffs. The draft never reached the hands of Messrs. Hambro, but was presented at the Crédit Lyonnais in Paris by a person named Ponché, who purported to be the last indorsee on the draft. Such indorsement had been forged. The bank in Paris received the draft for collection, indorsed it, and stamped it "Guichet d'Escompte," and appended the note "Sans compte de retour" to their indorsement. They then transmitted the draft to their bank in London, who credited their Paris bank with the value, and the Paris bank thereupon paid the proceeds to Ponché. When the draft was presented by Ponché at the defendants' bank it was crossed" and Co." Evidence was given that the French law recognises no distinction between crossed and uncrossed cheques, and it was contended on behalf of the defendants that there was therefore no conversion of the draft by the defendant bank in Paris, and that, as to the alleged conversion by the bank in England, they were protected by sect. 80 of the Bills of Exchange Act 1882, which provides that where a banker on whom a crossed cheque is drawn in good faith and without negligence pays it to a banker, the banker paying the cheque shall be placed in the same position as if payment had been made to the true owner. They relied also on sect. 82, which provides that, "when a banker in good faith and without negligence receives payment for a customer of a cheque crossed generally or specially to himself and the customer has no title or a defective title thereto, the banker shall not incur any liability to the true owner of the cheque by reason only of having received such payment." Held, that the defendants were liable for conversion of the cheque.

[Lacave and Co. v. The Crédit Lyonnais. Q. B. Div.: Collins, J. Nov. 11 and 19.-Counsel: for the plaintiffs, Joseph Walton, Q.C. and E. Forbes Lankester; for the defendants, Sir R. T. Reid and English Harrison. Solicitors: for the plaintiffs, Cheston and Sons; for the defendants, Harwood and Stephenson.]

PROBATE, DIVORCE, AND ADMIRALTY DIVISION.
ADMIRALTY BUSINESS.

Practice-Collision-Guarantee abroad-Arrest in England-Lis alibi pendens. A collision having occurred between an English steamship and a German steamship, from which damage resulted to both vessels, the owners of the vessels by their agents in Holland, whither both vessels proceeded, mutually agreed to guarantee payment, the one to the other, of any damages which might be found due. In the guarantees domicile was declared to be at the offices of the parties in Holland. No legal proceedings were ever taken in the Dutch courts, and neither of the vessels was arrested. Two and a half years after the collision the German steamship came into an English port, and was there arrested at the instance of the owners of the English steamship. The German owners now moved for the release of their vessel on the ground that bail, or its equivalent, having been given by them in Holland, the arrest in this country was vexatious and contrary to good faith. Held, that as no legal proceedings had been commenced in Holland, and there had been no previous arrest of the vessel, the owners of the English vessel in accepting the guarantee had done nothing to debar themselves from arresting the other vessel. The Christiansborg (53 L. T. Rep. 612) distinguished. Motion dismissed.

[The Mannheim. P. D. & A. Div.: Barnes, J. Nov. 17.- Counsel: for the defendants in support of the motion, Sir Walter Phillimore; for the plaintiffs, Aspinall, Q.C. and Butler Aspinall. Thomas Cooper and Co.; Botterell and Roche.]

Solicitors:

WARNING TO INTENDING HOUSE PURCHASERS AND LESSEES.-Before purchasing or renting a house have the sanitary arrangements thoroughly examined by an expert from the Sanitary Engineering Co. (Carter Bros.), 65, Victoria-street, Westminster. Fee, for a London House, 2 guineas; Country by arrangement. (Established 1875.)-[ADVт.]

STORIES FROM THE LAW REPORTS.
IV. THE STORY OF THE LUCKY CHIMNEY-SWEEPER'S BOY.
(From Armory v. Delamirie, 1 Strange, 504.)

TALK of sweeping crossings! When a man says, "I would sooner sweep a crossing," he alludes to this as being, in a way proverbially, the most extremely wretched calling which, in a civilised country, can be adopted by an honest and respectable human being. Whether this is even now a reasonable or an unreasonable view is open to some doubt; but certainly in the times of which we are about to speak-the eighth year, namely, of His Majesty King George I.-there was one calling at least unspeakably more miserable. This was the calling of the climbing boys employed by the master chimney-sweepers of that period as the scouring instruments of their dirty, though honourable, trade. There are many cotemporary accounts of the sufferings which these wretched lads suffered, and the Bishop of Exeter, speaking in the House of Lords, when many years later measures for their relief had come before Parliament, declared that the misery entailed by the work which these climbing boys were called upon to perform was only surpassed by the wickedness which it occasioned. Very early in the morning, one day in the year 1722, young Armory, the climbing boy, with unwashed and sooty face, was perambulating an important London thoroughfare. He was not a happy-looking youth, and, indeed, this was no wonder, since we have but hinted at the cruelty which he was compelled to endure, not to speak of the positive dangers which he had daily to incur for another's benefit. He dragged his feet along wearily as he walked, and seemed to look upon the world in general as a sort of Slough of Despond. Of all the persons who, during the last twentyfour hours, had passed along that way (and they might have been numbered in thousands), there was none that had presented an appearance more wretched for the present or more dispiriting and hopeless for the future. Yet within five minutes something was to happen which should raise young Armory's fortunes to an unlooked-for pinnacle, and which should make his name immortal, or at least as long-lived as England's greatness in the centuries to come.

On he plodded, his eyes always resting upon the ground, as was the habit of this downcast boy. And perhaps it was owing to this characteristic that the good luck befell him, which had been missed by any earlier passers by, who, perhaps, happy and light-hearted, carried their heads high. However this may be, something glittering in the mud beneath his feet caught the lad's attention, and he stopped a moment and stared. What was his amazement, when he realised that the gleam which he had seen was the gleam of gold and of precious stones. In an instant, little understanding at the moment all which it meant to him, but instinctively desirous to have the treasure in his own fingers before any other person could forestall him, be bent to the ground and possessed himself of it, unobserved by the surrounding multitude which had not seen it. This, he felt at once, was not the right time to examine his newly-acquired property. So he placed it in his pocket and came to his master's premises, where he received a cuff and a kick for not having arrived earlier, and then the two of them started upon their day's business together.

The work, as we have already intimated, was disagreeable, difficult, and dangerous, but at last it was done, and young Armory was free to investigate the value of what he had found in the early morning. He drew it out of his pocket, and found it was a gold ear-ring. Ladies in those days did not mind carrying a great weight of metal in their ears; and the most brilliant jewels worn by fashionable London not infrequently shone in these favourite pendants, and so it was in this case. The trinket which Armory drew from his pocket was a magnificent ear-ring, the gold of which alone was no inconsiderable treasure; and, though the boy knew little about stones, he thought that these must be diamonds, and valuable diamonds too.

owner,

He kept it about him for a few days, sedulously, of course, hiding it out of his master's sight and that of everybody else. He thought it possible that some reward might be offered for the gew-gaw by the who would assuredly be very disconsolate at its loss, but no notice of any such reward appeared. There was no public organisation in those days, such as those which are undertaken at our modern police-stations for the recovery of lost property, and one who lost anything so valuable in the streets of London was more apt than now to give up the search as hopeless. The London season, moreover, was just at an end, and in all probability the fair owner of the lost ear-ring was now far away in the country somewhere, and never so much as dreamed that she could even hope to hear of her treasure again. Nor did she ever hear of it again.

So soon, a few days afterwards, the climber of chimneys washed his face unusually clean, and made his way to Delamirie's, the goldsmiths, where he hoped to convert the bauble into money. He entered the shop somewhat timidly, like one who finds himself in a royal palace for the first time, and is possessed in consequence with nameless fears. A young apprentice, hardly older than himself, advanced to learn his business, supposing him doubtless to be a messenger from some customer in that station of life which accords with dealings at goldsmiths' shops. On seeing what Armory proposed to sell, he stared for a few moments, open-mouthed and then, remembering that business was business, in whatsoever form it might present itself, he addressed his nervous-looking applicant and suavely requested him to allow the ear-ring to be weighed and examined in the back of the shop. Armory hesitated a moment, and, then reflecting that no one was likely to become a purchaser without having an opportunity of closely examining that which he was asked to buy, yielded his treasure into the hands of the apprentice and waited eagerly for the result. The master goldsmith was in the front of the shop all the time, but he had

business of his own to attend to and did not interfere with this. Soon, however, the apprentice called to him, "Will you tell the boy, sir, that he is to receive three-halfpence for the ear-ring?" The master accordingly told the boy that this was all that he was to receive. The chimney-sweeper's boy was not so easily contented as the goldsmith's apprentice had thought. Three-halfpence! Was this to be the end of all the castles which he had been building in the air for the last few days? The goldsmith tendered him the money; but he indignantly refused it, and asked to have the ear-ring back. The apprentice, who now came back to the shop, tried to shake him off, and said he was very fortunate to get the three-halfpence, and he must take it and behave like a boy of sense. But the chimney-sweeper's boy was firm-very firm. He said: "Give me the ear-ring back. I shall stay here till you do so." The apprentice at last brought it back to him. But alas! the beautiful stones were gone, and though young Armory raged and stormed and was very indignant, they did not mind him. "It's not your ear-ring," said the apprentice. "I am assured of that. You'll never get back the stones, which you say I have taken, for they are no more yours than mine. You are very lucky to have the gold."

Armory thought otherwise, and he was a persistent young fellow. He came again to Mr. Delamirie, the goldsmith, another day, and insisted that he had a right to have the stones returned. The master goldsmith would not listen to him. He put him off with several different propositions, each of which he said in a short decisive voice as if he thought his words could not be questioned. He said Armory must have found the ear-ring himself, and, if so, that he had no more right to it than any other person. He said the stones which had come out of it could not be found, and that anybody would conclude that they were worthless. He said that anyway it was the apprentice's affair, and not his own, for he had never even touched the thing. He said that Armory was a very dirty little boy, and that he did not want to see him again.

Nevertheless, the Lord Chief Justice Pratt and a Middlesex jury, before whom the matter eventually came, made Mr. Delamirie wish that he had been more cautious in his conduct. The judge thought that Mr. Delamirie's conduct was abominable, that Armory might be a dirty little boy, but that Mr. Delamirie was a dirty man of business in another sense. He told the jury that Mr. Delamirie was quite wrong in saying that the finder of a jewel has no more right to it than any other person, but that he had a right to it superior to that of Mr. Delamirie, who had practically robbed him of it. At the trial, moreover, several of his trade were called as witnesses, and gave their opinion as to what jewels of the finest water which would fit the sockets from which the missing stones had been taken would be worth.

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"Let Mr. Delamirie produce these stones at once, and show that they are not of the finest water," said the Lord Chief Justice, or I shall tell the jury that they may presume they were of the finest water." Mr. Delamirie could not produce the stones, because he had sold them: so the jury gave the boy a sum which to him was a fortune, and which, after paying for his release from his old master the chimney-sweeper, started him in a business which, after scouring chimneys to the peril of his life, seemed to be all ease and luxury.

Legal Propositions. No less than three legal propositions were established in this case: (1) The finder of a chattel, although he does not by the finding of it acquire an absolute property or ownership, yet has such a property in the thing found as will enable him to keep it as against all the world except the rightful owner; (2) an action lies against a master who gives credit to his apprentice, for that the master thereby becomes answerable for his neglect; (3) Omnia præsumuntur contra spoliatorem-where one man deprives another of his property and refuses to produce it, the jury are to be told that the measure of damages is the value of the most costly property consistent with the evidence. All the three legal points are admirably illustrated in the notes to this case of Armory v. Delamirie in Smith's Leading Cases, 10th edit., vol. 1, p. 439.

LAW LIBRARY.

66

THE ninth volume of Ruling Cases (Stevens and Sons Limited) is out, and carries us only to "Dramatic." We cannot help expressing an opinion that there is room for greater condensation. This, of course, means much greater labour. We have rarely met with anything more confusing than the title "Defamation." A case and a rule; then the same case and its head-note-the rule and head-note being in effect the same, though differently worded, and both rule and head-note being insufficient for a definition. This is the rule: An action may be maintained for words written for which an action could not be maintained if they were merely spoken." Why "merely," and why not adopt Dr. Odger's definition: "False defamatory words, if written and published, constitute a libel; if spoken, a slander;" and the two following paragraphs on page 1 of his book? If it is said, Oh! the case as reported does not do that, we reply, Then get some case which does. The confusion which this style of thing leads to is shown in the first paragraph of the English notes: "In addition to the fact that libel is more permanent than slander, and that libel is also a criminal offence "

-what does that matter in point of law?" the chief (sic) difference between the two species of defamation is that slander, as a rule (!), requires proof of special damage, whereas libel does not." Then notes follow which we cannot say are models of legal statement. This subject has been so scientifically treated, that there was no excuse for the muddle which marks this subject in "Ruling Cases." Other cases, we think, are reported at undue length. Arguments of counsel might be altogether omitted and the judgments abridged. Any defects in this series are all the more regrettable, as, if carried out in the best manner, the scheme is one of rare excellence.

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Bradford (Yorks). Monday (R.), Tues- Monmouth, Tuesday, at 10

day, and Friday (Bky), at 9.45
Brentford, Friday, at 10
Brentwood, Wednesday, at 11
Bridlington,* Thursday
Bridport, Tuesday, at 11

Brighton. Tuesday, at 10: Thursday
(Reg., Bky), at 11; Friday, at 10
Bromsgrove, Wednesday, at 10
Bromyard, Friday, at 10
Buckingham, Monday, at 12
Burton, Wednesday, at 9; Thursday, at 11
Bury,* Wednesday (Reg.), at 9
Calne, Friday, at 10.15

Canterbury, Monday, at 11; Tuesday, at 10
Cardiff, Wednesday, Thursday, Friday,
and Saturday, at 10
Carlisle, Tuesday, at 9.30
Carmarthen, Friday
Cheadle, Saturday, at 10
Cheltenham, Friday
Chertsey, Thursday
Chesterfield, Friday, at 9.30
Chipping Sodbury, Saturday, at 10
Clerkenwell, Monday, Tuesday, Wednes-
day, Thursday, and Friday
Cockermouth, Friday, at 9.30
Colchester, Tuesday, at 11
Consett, Wednesday, at 10
Crewkerne, Friday, at 10
Derby, Tuesday, at 10

Dewsbury, Tuesday (Reg., Bky), at 10
Dorchester, Wednesday, at 11
Durham, Tuesday (Reg., Bky)

Edmonton, Friday and Saturday, at 11
Evesham, Friday, at 10
Great Driffield, Wednesday

Great Grimsby, Tuesday and Wednesday,

at 10

Greenwich, Friday, at 10.30
Hartlepool, Friday, at 9.30

Haverfordwest, Thursday

Hayward's Heath, Thursday

Hedon, Monday

Holmfirth, Wednesday, at 10
Holywell, Tuesday

Huddersfield, Thursday (J.S.), at 10
Keighley, Wednesday. at 10
Kingston-on-Thames, Friday, at 10
Leeds, Monday, Wednesday, Thursday,
snd Friday, at 10
Leek, Friday, at 9.30
Leicester, Thursday (Reg., Bky), at 10
Lichfield, Wednesday, at 10.30
Liverpool, Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday,
Thursday, and Friday

Narberth, Tuesday

Newcastle-under-Lyme,* Tuesday, at 9.30
Newport (I. of W.). Wednesday, at 11
Nottingham, Monday, Friday (Reg., Bky),
and Saturday (J.S ), at 9.45
Oswestry, Thursday, at lo
Oxford, Thursday (Reg., Bky), at 11.30
Pembroke Dock, Wednesday
Pocklington," Tuesday

Portsmouth, Monday (Reg, Bky) and
Thursday, at 12

Ramsgate, Wednesday, at 10
Redditch, Thursday, at 10
Redhill, Wednesday
Rhyl, Friday

Royston, Thursday, at 10
Ruthin, Thursday

Saddleworth, Friday, at 10
Salford, Thursday, at 10

Sandwich, Friday, at 10

Sheffield, Wednesday, Thursday, and Friday, at 10

Shipston-on-Stour, Tuesday, at 10 Shoreditch, Tuesday and Thursday Shrewsbury,* Monday and Tuesday,

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* Other sittings are specially fixed if necessary.

NOTICE TO SOLICITORS.-The Provincial Solicitors' Union Limited (93, Chancery-lane, W.C.) undertakes only such lay agency as is usually transacted by Law Stationers, and accepts the same scale of charges. The Union does not undertake any agency which legally requires the services of a London solicitor. All the members of the Union are solicitors. Established 1894.-[ADVT.]

PROCEEDINGS AFFECTING THE

PROFESSION.

In the Chancery Division on the 19th inst., before Stirling, J., an application was made for the release from prison of Samuel Tilley, a gentleman who was formerly a solicitor. It appeared that in 1887 the prisoner was employed by two persons in humble circumstances to administer an estate to which they were entitled. One of these persons had since died, and the other was now a pauper in the Hendon Union. The prisoner received the money constituting the estate, and it was not until 1895 that he paid over any substantial part of it, and when his accounts were taken and his bill of costs had been taxed, it was found that a sum of £113 was still due from him, which he was ordered by the court to pay. On the 27th March 1896, on the application of the guardians of the Hendon Union, an order for his attachment was made in consequence of his failure to comply with the order for payment. His affairs were in an embarrassed condition, and he had, since the making of the order for attachment, been adjudicated a bankrupt, and struck off the roll of solicitors. The attachment was not put in force until the 10th Nov. last, when he was arrested and imprisoned in Holloway Gaol.

Germaine now applied for his release, on the ground that he had been sufficiently punished, and that he was unable while in prison to comply with the orders of the Bankruptcy Court or to render any assistance to that court in the winding-up of his estate. Counsel also stated that the prisoner was fifty-eight years of age and in bad health, and that the only hope of his being ultimately able to comply with the order of the court was by his regaining his liberty.

English Harrison, for the guardians, opposed the application. STIRLING, J. said that, in his opinion, an imprisonment of nine days was not a sufficient punishment for so serious an offence as that which had been committed by the prisoner while he was an officer of the court. In order, however, to avoid the expense of a fresh application on his behalf, his Lordship would allow the motion to stand over until the applicant had been in prison for a period of six weeks.

IN Bankruptcy, on the 19th inst., before Mr. Registrar Hope, an adjourned sitting took place for the examination of Charles Gregory. The debtor, Charles Gregory, was a solicitor and managing director of the New Par Consols Limited, and he had also been connected with the New Park of Mines Limited. Upon the last occasion he declined to answer a question put to him with a view to the discovery of property.-Mr. H. Brougham attended as official receiver; and Todd appeared for a creditor.-His HONOUR now said that instead of referring the case to the judge he had restored it to the list, as it appeared to him that although the substance of the question was good the debtor might reasonably object to its phraseology as containing an innuendo which was not relevant to the case. The debtor denied that he had any property now or at any time at the place where he was on the 28th Oct. last, and he wrote down the address for the information of the official receiver.-Upon the application of the Official Receiver, the examination was adjourned to enable the debtor, to amend his accounts, which were alleged to be deficient in some respects.

GENERAL INTELLIGENCE,

THE DEATH-DUTY CLAUSES OF THE FINANCE ACT 1896.

THE following is the Preface to an annotated edition of these clauses by Mr. J Campbell Lorimer, Advocate, published by Messrs. Green and Son Edinburgh:

It is not the object of the Death duty clauses of the Finance Act, 1896, to depart from the principles of the legislation of 1894. Their main design and effect are to remove some cases of hardship which had become manifest in the working of the original Act, and did not form a necessary part of the new scheme of taxation. As the points dealt with involve a careful consideration of the original enactment as well as of the remedies provided, I have thought that some explanatory notes on the clauses in detail might be welcomed by the profession, and would so far complete my attempt to elucidate the legislation on this subject.

There have been few judicial decisions on the Act of 1894, and none in Scotland; but, for facility of reference, I have collected the English decisions in the Appendix. One of them has been superseded by the Act of 1896, and another does not apply in Scotland.

I take advantage of this opportunity to bring out the financial results, thus far, of the new scheme, as recorded by the Commissioners of Her Majesty's Inland Revenue in their thirty-ninth report, that for the year ended the 31st March, 1896. After stating that for the first time the Death Duties are treated under a separate heading, and that the total net receipt of Inland Revenue Duties shows an increase of £6,138,253 over the net receipt of the preceding year, whereof Death Duties (including Corporation Duty) amount to £3,194,223, or fully a half, the Commissioners make the following observations on the Death Duties generally :The great increase in the yield of the death duties is due to the fact that the financial year 1895-96 is the first complete year during which the Finance Act, 1894, has been in force.

The experience of the second half of 1894-95 was insufficient to afford any clear indication of the ultimate financial effects of those changes. The twelve months now under review show the new system, not, indeed, in full operation, but rapidly approaching it. Of the two duties which the

Act of 1894 doomed to extinction-viz., Probate (including inventory and account) duty, and the temporary estate duty imposed in 1889, the former fell during the past year from £1,108,000 to £90,000, and the latter from £665,000 to £162,000. These two duties will probably become comparatively inappreciable in the course of another year or two. Moreover, the succession duty, which, though not extinguished, was greatly curtailed by the Act of 1894, fell from £1,350,000 to £1,051,000. The falling off under this head will be progressive for some years to come. The legacy duty also, which was somewhat affected by the Act of 1894, though to a smaller extent than the succession duty, fell from £2,808,000 to £2,730,000. Under this head, too, there may be some further loss in the next few years, but it will be very slight.

All these losses, however, have been far more than counterbalanced by the large yield of the new estate duty, which rose from £2,781,000 to £7,564,000. Thus, taking the death duties as a whole, the gain to the Imperial Exchequer in 1895-96 as compared with 1894-95 £2,885,000; while the increase in the shares of these duties allotted to the relief of local taxation was £308,000.

was

It has been stated that, taking all the death duties together, the net gain to the Imperial Exchequer in 1895-96, as compared with 1894-95, was £2,885,000. This is on the top of a gain of £1,138,000 in 1894-95 as compared with 1893-94, of which £960,000 was attributable to the changes introduced by the Finance Act, 1894. Comparing 1895-96, a year during the whole of which the Finance Act, 1894, was in force, with 1893-94, the last year before the passing of that Act, the gain to the Imperial Exchequer is £4,023,000. With the exception of about £200,000, the whole of this increase may be regarded as due to the Finance Act, 1894. In introducing that Act, the then Chancellor of the Exchequer, Sir William Harcourt, estimated the ultimate net gain to the Exchequer from its provisions at between three and a-half and four millions. But he anticipated that it would take several years before this gain was fully realised. As a matter of fact, the anticipated increase was fully realised in 1895-96. It does not, however, follow that Sir William Harcourt's estimate will in future years be greatly exceeded. The receipts of 1985-96 were certainly much greater than was expected. But this is due partly to the fact that the amount of capital becoming subject to the new estate duty and the old probate duty in that year was probably larger than the average amount which will become subject to estate duty in the next few years, and in a still greater degree to the unexpected ease with which the duty has been collected on real property. It was thought that the owners of realty would, for the most part, avail themselves of the privilege of paying estate duty by instalments. In the great majority of cases, however, the estate duty due on real property has been paid in lump sums, and the increase under this particular head, which was expected to accrue gradually and not to reach its maximum till after the lapse of several years, has made itself felt at once. As far as it is at present possible to judge, there seems no likelihood that the average yield of the death duties for some years to come will greatly exceed, if it exceeds at all, the yield of 1895-96, and any further increase which there may be will probably be attributable rather to the normal growth of revenue arising from the increased wealth of the community, than to the provisions of the Act of 1894.

Referring to certain tables showing the operation of the several duties in detail, the Commissioners bring out the following interesting points :The point of principal interest is the total of capital paying, and becoming liable to estate duty in 1895-96, viz., £213,233,000. Of this sum, £183,262,000 was personalty, and £29,971,000 was realty. In order to arrive, however, at the total amount of capital paying death duties during the year, we must take account of the property still paying probate duty (including inventory and account duty). The amount of this was £6,256,000. The property subject to this duty is all personalty. Adding the property which paid probate duty to that which paid estate duty during the year, we arrive at the following figures:- Personalty, £189,518,000; realty, £29,971,000-total, £219,489,000.

In addition to this, there was £4,419,000 personalty and £18,255,000 realty belonging to estates which became subject to duty, on which no payment was made during the year. These latter figures, however are only approximate, and are in some cases subject to considerable modification before the payment of duty actually takes place.

Of the total personalty paying estate and probate (including account) duty during the year, amounting, as has been stated, to £189,518,000, the item "Personal estate situate in the United Kingdom passing under will or intestacy," which corresponds to the property formerly subject to probate duty, amounted to £162,569,000; personalty subject to account duty to £913,000. "Personal estate situate abroad" to £1,648,000, and all other personalty subject to estate duty to £24,388,000. Of the lastnamed amount (£24,388,000) upwards of £18,000,000 was settled personalty, while £1,700,000 consisted of donationes mortis causa and gifts made by the deceased, either within twelve months of his death or under other conditions rendering them liable to duty. Of the realty paying duty, which amounted, as has been stated, to £29,971,000, £28,816,000 paid the duty in a lump sum. The balance represents that portion of the capital value of realty paying by instalments, on which duty was paid during the year.

The amount allowed from the duty payable on property situate in British possessions abroad, on account of local death duties paid on such property, was £5168 in 1895-96, as compared with £5323 in 1894-95.

The total yield of Estate duty is £9,923,000. Of this £8,673,000 was paid by personalty (6,314,000 going to the Imperial Exchequer, and £2,359,000 to the local taxation account). £1,250,000 was paid by realty, and went entirely to the Imperial Exchequer.

The valuation of realty has, so far as agricultural property is concerned, been somewhat lower than in the preceding year. The capital value of agricultural property on which duty was paid in whole or in part during

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