1857. March 25, 26. WOOD, V.-C. [ 465 ] CHANCERY. DAVIS v. ABRAHAM. (5 W. R. 465.) A solicitor contracts to purchase from A. B., not at that time his client and being ignorant of his legal position, an estate at a low price, informing A. B. that the nature and title of the property were such as that no one but a professional man would purchase it-such representation not being justified by the state of the property, and no solicitor having been employed on behalf of A. B. in the transaction. Specific performance of the contract refused to the solicitor. THIS was a claim filed by Mr. Sackville Davis, a solicitor, for specific performance of a contract for the sale of certain leasehold property to him by the defendant, who resisted completion of the contract upon the ground that the relationship of solicitor and client existed between the parties at the time, and that the sale had been made at a great undervalue, the defendant being then in very embarrassed circumstances. Willcock, Q.C., and E. B. Lovell for the plaintiff. Daniel, Q.C., and Southgate for the defendant. WOOD, V.-C., after going through the evidence, which was very voluminous (but not necessary to be stated in detail), said that although the relationship of solicitor and client did not appear to have been established before the contract was really signed by the defendant (and indeed there seemed to have been on the part of the plaintiff a careful attempt not to put himself into the position of solicitor to the defendant until after it had been signed), yet the bargain that had been made was undoubtedly a snatched bargain, and although the Court might absolve the plaintiff from wishing to do anything positively improper, his claim could not be sustained. The defendant, though undoubtedly wishing to sell the property, had evidently no more idea than a child of his legal. position, and had first quarrelled with his family solicitor, and had not had the advantage of any solicitor to protect him in his bargain with the plaintiff: moreover, the plaintiff, choosing to become the purchaser, had offered legal advice and information to the defendant as to his rights, the result of that information being that the nature of and title to the property were such as to make it improbable that he would find any but a professional man to buy it a representation which (his Honour observed) there was nothing in the state of the property to justify. If the case had depended on the fact of the plaintiff being a solicitor, and a vendor simply proposing to sell, then the inadequacy of price would not have been sufficient to set aside the contract. But the case was very different to that, and the circumstances were such as to make it impossible for this Court to give the plaintiff specific performance. IN THE COURT OF EXCHEQUER. CRISP v. GILL. (5 W. R. 494; 3. C. 29 L. T. O. S. 82.) The defendant, who had purchased a piece of lamb from a butcher, went into the butcher's shop on the following day, and in the hearing of several persons said to the butcher, "I meant to have dealt with you in future; but you changed a piece of lamb I bought yesterday and substituted a coarse piece of mutton: Held, that if used honestly the words were privileged by reason of the occasion. THE declaration alleged that the defendant falsely and maliciously spoke and published of the plaintiff, in the way of his trade as a butcher, the words following: "I meant to have dealt with you in future, but you changed a piece of lamb I bought yesterday and substituted a coarse piece of mutton." Pleas-first, Not guilty; secondly, a justification. At the trial before Pollock, C. B., in London, the words were proved to have been spoken as alleged, in the shop of the defendant, who was a butcher at Bath, several persons being then present, by the defendant, a gentleman residing in the neighbourhood, who upon the previous day had purchased a piece of lamb of the defendant, which he had himself selected. The learned Judge told the jury that, although the charge of substituting mutton for lamb were false, yet if it was made under a mistake, and without malice, they ought to find for the defendant on the general issue. The verdict was entered for the plaintiff on the plea of justification, and for the defendant on the issue on the first plea. Slade, Q.C., moved to set the verdict aside, and for a new The plaintiff was entitled to recover at least nominal damages. The occasion of speaking the words was not privileged, and they are clearly slanderous; the question was therefore merely one of damages. (POLLOCK, C. B.: It occurred to me that where two persons have had any business together, and a complaint is honestly made by one to the other of something connected with that business, what he so says is privileged.) He had no right to make the charge in the presence of others. (POLLOCK, C. B.: Have you no right to blame a servant in the presence of other servants? The jury found that the statement was made bonâ fide.) (He referred to Toogood v. Spyring (1).) (1) 40 R. R. 523 (1 Cr. M. & R. 181). 1857. April 20. [494] This falls within the class of cases referred to by Lord WENSLEYDALE in Toogood v. Spyring, where the statement is privileged because the occasion of the speaking of the words fairly calls for their utterance, although the person happens to labour under a mistake. A man has a right to complain of a thing he has bought; he must not take advantage of the transaction maliciously to impute anything injurious to the seller, but if he bonâ fide complains to him about it he is not liable to an action. BRAMWELL, B.: I also think the occasion made the speaking of the words complained of privileged. The only doubt which as it appears to me may exist, is whether the defendant had a right to speak them in the presence of third parties; but that point does not appear to have been made. CHANNELL, B., concurred. Rule refused. IN THE QUEEN'S BENCH. PHILLIPS v. GIBBONS (1). An instrument reciting a sale of certain chattels by A. to B, of which sale however there was no other evidence, purported to be a demise of the chattels by B. to A. at a certain rent payable quarterly, with a proviso entitling B. to enter and take possession if the rent should be unpaid for ten days after any of the quarterly days of payment, or if execution should issue against the goods of A.: Held, that the instrument was a bill of sale requiring registration under 17 & 18 Vict. c. 36 (2). THIS was an interpleader issue to try whether certain goods and furniture seized by the defendant under an execution against one Michael were the goods of the plaintiff. At the trial before Lord Campbell, Ch. J., at the sittings in London after Hilary Term, the defendant had a verdict, leave being reserved to the plaintiff to move to have it entered for him if the Court should be of opinion that an instrument, under which the plaintiff claimed the goods, did not require registration under 17 & 18 Vict. c. 36, the Bills of Sale Registration Act. The instrument, which was dated the 12th November, 1856, was between the plaintiff of the one part, and Michael and his wife of the other part; and after reciting that the plaintiff had on the 11th November agreed to purchase from the Michaels the under-mentioned goods and chattels (being the goods in question) for the sum of 100l., the said goods having been previously purchased by the separate estate of Mrs. Michael; and that it had been agreed that out of the said sum of 100l. the sum of 411. 2s. should be applied in discharge of a bill of sale of the said goods to the London Loan and Advance Company; and that the plaintiff had paid to the Company the sum of 41l. 2s. in discharge of the said bill of sale, and had paid the balance of the 1007. to the parties thereto of the second part; and that Mrs. Michael had applied to the plaintiff for leave to use the said goods: the instrument then witnessed that the plaintiff agreed to let to hire to the said R. Michael the said furniture, chattels, and effects on the premises, 5, City Terrace, at the rent of 201. per annum, payable quarterly on the usual quarterly days of payment, the first of such quarterly payments to be made on the 25th December then next; and that to put an end to the agreements it should only be necessary for either party to give to the other three months' notice of such intention. There then followed a provision that Michael (1) Ex parte Odell (1878) 10 Ch. Div. 76, 48 L. J. Bk. 1, 39 L. T. 333; Cochrane v. Matthews (1878) 10 Ch. D. 80, 81, n.; North Central Wagon Co. v. M. S. & L. Rail. Co. (1887) 35 Ch. Div. 191, 208, 56 L. J. Ch. 609, 56 L. T. 755 (affd. 13 App. Cas. 554, 58 L. J. Ch. (2) Rep. (with saving) 41 & 42 Vict. 1857. April 30. [ 527 ] PHILLIPS ት. GIBBONS. 1857. May 1. [ 536] and his wife should supply other articles in place of such as might be broken or destroyed; and that if the said rent should be unpaid for ten days after any of the quarterly days of payments, or in case of Michael or his wife becoming bankrupt or insolvent, or permitting an execution to be levied on their goods, it should in any of such cases be lawful for the plaintiff to enter and take possession of the said chattels and effects. Petersdorff showed cause: There was no evidence of any sale of the goods to the plaintiff except by this document, which is admitted to have been expressly framed to avoid, if possible, the expense of registration under 17 & 18 Vict. c. 36. Although in form a demise of the goods to the Michaels, its real operation was as a bill of sale to the plaintiff; and it comes, therefore, within the mischief intended to be remedied by that statute, which in the interpretation clause gives a very extended signification to the expression "bill of sale.' D. Seymour, in support of the rule: This is not a bill of sale, for it recites the sale as res acta. There was no evidence of a sale except by this instrument, which is a mere colourable bill of sale. The rule must be discharged. ERLE and CROMPTON, JJ., concurred. Rule discharged. GETTRING v. MORGAN (1). (5 W. R. 536.) The owner of a dog which to his knowledge has formerly attacked and bitten human beings is liable for subsequent worrying of sheep by the dog. THIS was an appeal from the decision of the Judge of the County Court of Monmouthshire, holden at Usk, when the plaintiff had a verdict. It appeared at the trial that the defendant was the owner of a dog which had worried and destroyed 30 of the plaintiff's sheep, for which damage the action was brought. It was proved that four years before the same dog had during the day time. attacked and bitten a child of eight years old, who had come into the fold yard where the dog was. The defendant appealed to this Court on the ground that the above evidence did not disclose any cause of action. Gray, for the appellant: There is here no sufficient evidence of the ferocious habits of this dog, or of the master's knowledge of it, so as to render the defendant liable; certainly not such reasonable evidence as ought to satisfy a jury that the master is liable, and if so there was no (1) See now Dogs Act, 1906, s. 1. |