to America; that he left home without any suspicion that an application for an order of affiliation was about to be made against him, and without any intention of avoiding service of any summons for such a purpose; that he remained in Liverpool until the 11th Nov., when the ship sailed with him to America; that on the 15th Nov. a constable called at his father's house with the view of serving him with a summons to appear before the justices to answer the charge of being the putative father of a bastard child, and left the summons; that the constable was informed that the defendant had gone to America; that on the 3rd Dec. the justices made an order adjudging him to be the father, and directing him to pay a certain sum for its maintenance. The defendant remained in America until the end of the year 1852, and arrived again at his father's house in Jan. 1853, when he first learned that the order of affiliation had been made, and in two days afterwards he was arrested for not having complied with the order. Upon the argument, the former case of Reg. v. Evans and Yale was referred to, but upon its being asked by the court if the defendant swore that he was not the father of the child, and it appearing that there was no allegation to that effect, Wightman, J., refused the rule, saying, "It may then be that the proceeding is well founded, and that no injustice has been done. The proceedings are perfectly in form according to the statute. To furnish any ground for setting aside any proceedings regular on the face of them, your case should be that an unjust charge has been attempted to be fastened on him by reason of his absence. But your affidavits do not show that the charge is unfounded." Now here it is clear that the learned judge was of opinion that, notwithstanding the absence of the defendant, the service was regular, so much so as to give the justices jurisdiction, and that the only ground for setting aside the proceeding would have been that a fraud had been perpetrated by taking advantage of the defendant's absence.

In the more recent case of Reg. v. Brown (1 L. T. Rep. N. S. 29) a summons had issued against the defendant, a farmer's son, and was left for him during his absence, at his father's house, which was his home. It appeared that he left home on the 3rd July (which was before the summons was issued) without any notice or intimation that such a proceeding was about to be taken. It was also stated that he was in the habit every year of taking a month's trip, and that on the occasion in question he left home for that purpose, not leaving any address, as he was going on a tour, and did not know where he might be during the time. The summons was for his appearance on the 18th of the month, and on that day his mother attended at the petty sessions, and stated these facts to the justices, and that her son for that reason had not had notice of the summons, and asked for an adjournment. They, however, refused to adjourn, and made an order. Upon a motion for a certiorari, on the ground of insufficiency of service of the summons,Cockburn, C.J. said: "The order is regular upon the face of it, and the requirements of the statute have been complied with. The justices might have exercised a discretion which we may regret that they did not exercise. But there is no irregularity, and the court cannot interfere." So too Hill, J. said: "Everything appears to be regular according to the statute. The summons was left at the defendant's last place of abode, but he was temporarily absent, and the justices may have treated this excuse of the mother as an idle one.' ""

The still more recent case of Reg. v. Damarell (37 L.J. 21, M.C.) is yet a stronger one upon the point. There it appeared that, on the 3rd Oct., a woman applied for and obtained a summons against the defendant as the father of her bastard child. On the 4th the summons was left at a house in which he had lived up to the 1st of the month, on which day he went away to go to America. He sailed on the 14th, and did not hear anything of the proceedings until about two months after he arrived in America. On the 6th Dec. the mother appeared in support of the summons, and the justices made an order upon the defendant. The order recited that it was proved that the summons had been duly served, the same having been left at the last place of abode of the defendant. The defendant having returned to England, the order was brought up for the purpose of being quashed, on the ground of insufficient service of the order, but the court refused to quash it, holding that they could not interfere, there being nothing to show that it was illegal, although the defendant had no opportunity of objecting to its being made. In his judgment, Cockburn, C.J., said: "It is very true that the order has been made behind the back of the defendant, when he was on his passage to America, or when he had arrived there, which is certainly more or less contrary to natural justice, he having no opportunity of being present at the hearing.... We have only to see whether the summons was shown to have been left at the last place of abode of the defendant, and when we look at the facts, we find that that cannot be disputed

for the defendant had no place of abode subse-siderably enlarged the house. Held, that the quently to going to Letcott, which he left before right of drainage given by the lease had reference going to America. The decision of the justices is, to the house in its then existing state, and could therefore, within the very terms of the statute.' not be extended so as to allow the whole of the So, too, Mellor, J., says: "I do not think that we drainage from the enlarged house to flow into the have any jurisdiction to set this order aside, cesspool: (Wood v. Saunders, 32 L. T. Rep. N. S., unless we see that it was one which ought not to 363. V.C. H.) have been made. The statute does not contain any provision to meet the case of a man who is gone abroad, and is out of the way of being served with the summons. The justices are, upon proof of the summons being left at the last place of abode, to proceed to adjudicate; they do adjudicate, and what jurisdiction have we to say that they are wrong in making the order? It would be a hardship upon the mother if we were to quash the order, and I see nothing to show that it has been illegally made."

Now from these latter decisions it is abund. antly clear that if the summons issued in the case of Re William Smith, had been one in bastardy under the 35 & 36 Vict. c. 65, instead of one under the 11 & 12 Vict, c. 43, for an assault, the service would have been perfectly good, and the justices would have had perfect jurisdiction to have proceeded ex parte and have made a valid order. The decision, therefore, in Re William Smith must not be taken as of general application, and we think we may safely lay down the following propositions:

1. Where the proceedings are not governed by the practice laid down by the 11 & 12 Vict. c. 43, and nothing is enacted as to the mode of service, then the service of the summons must be personal. 2. Where the proceedings are governed by such practice, then the service should be of such a nature as to lead to the reasonable belief that the summons has come to the knowledge of the defendant, though it may not actually have come to his hands.

3. Where the service of the summons may, under the provisions of the Act of Parliament, be made by leaving the same at the defendant's last place of abode, then, if so served, the justices have jurisdiction to hear ex parte, though the defendant may be in entire ignorance of any proceedings having been taken.

With reference to this last proposition it may be observed, that in such a case it will be well for the justices to issue a fresh summons, or to issue a warrant if the case be one which will justify that process, bearing in mind that even in cases of bastardy, no ultimate prejudice will affect the woman, inasıauch as, if she make her application for a summons within a twelvemonth of the birth of the child, the summons itself may issue at any time afterwards.

We have dwelt at considerable length upon this subject, on account of its paramount importance in the administration of justice at petty sessions, and from the belief that the recent decision, if not well explained, is likely to give rise to considerable difficulty and embarrassment.

REAL PROPERTY AND CONVEYANCING.

INJUNCTION ANCIENT LIGHTS-ALTERATION oF EASEMENT DAMAGES-RELIEF IN EQUITY. -Bill filed to restrain the defendant from building so as to interfere with the access of light to the plaintiff's dwelling. The defendant intended to erect on an adjoining piece of land a building 36ft. high, within 5ft. of the plaintiff's messuage. The alleged ancient lights were eight windows, some of which were on the ground floor, and the remainder on the first floor, and it appeared that in 1846 the windows in question had been enlarged. Held (affirming the decision of the Master of the Rolls), that the right of an owner of ancient lights to protection is not affected by the circumstance that he has altered or enlarged his ancient windows, or opened new ones near them. The Prescription Act has not taken away any of the modes of acquiring easements which existed before the statute was passed; and where the evidence is clear of a right to the light from time immemorial, that right is not taken away by the statute. Wherever an action can be maintained at law, and really substantial damages can be recovered, an injunction will generally be granted in equity: (Aynsley v. Glover, 32 L. T. Rep. N. S. 345. Chan.)

PRACTICE-LEASES AND SALES OF SETTLED ESTATES ACT-NOTICE.-A person of unsound mind, not so found by inquisition, whose consent is required to an application under the Leases and Sales of Settled Estates Act, may be served with a notice under the 2nd section of the Leases and Sales of Settled Estates Amendment Act 1874. A copy of the notice should be served on the person of unsound mind personally, and another copy upon the person in whose charge he is: (Re Crabtree's Settled Estates, 32 L. T. Rep. N. S. 349. Chan.)

LEASE OF WIFE'S FREEHOLD-SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE.-W. was lessee in possession of freehold premises belonging to E.'s wife for a term of ten years. On the expiration of the term W., who continued in possession, verbally agreed with E.'s wife for a new lease for thirty years. W. then verbally agreed to grant to L. an underlease of the new term at an increased rent. L. entered and expended money on improvements; the im provements consised of a wooden stable, boiler, and gas and water pipes, all of which were moveable. E., having refused to grant the lease to W., W. filed a plaint against E. alone in the County Court for specific performance of his agreement with E.'s wife. Held, on appeal, that the expenditure by L. was not such as would have been made by a mere tenant from year to year, and that it must be considered as made by W., or by his authority, and that W. was entitled to a decree for specific performance. Observation on Frame v. Dawson (14 Ves. 386). The objection that E.'s wife was not made a party to the plaint was not taken in the court below, and the only question submitted by the County Court judge for the opinion of the appeal court was whether the expenditure by L. entitled W. to specific perREVERSION.-In 1861 B., a young man of twenty-formance. Held, that the point not submitted by six years of age, being in great pecuniary distress, the County Court judge could not be argued: borrowed £85 of a money lender, on his promis. (Williams v. Evans, 32 L. T. Rep. N. S. 359). sory note for £100, payable at six months' date, STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS-SEPARATE SUMS and as a collaterial security he gave a mortgage of OF MONEY SECURED BY ONE BOND-SEPARATE a bond for £600, payable on the death of his CAUSES OF ACTION.-By an agreement, a sum of father, then aged fifty-four, which bond he had £1000, part of the purchase-money of real estate, taken from his elder brother on releasing a portion was secured by a bond. The arrangement was to which, as a younger son, he was entitled under that £750 was to be paid to a person named on a the settlement of the family estate. The mortgage given event, and the remaining £250 to another provided that if default should be made in pay-person on another event. The event upon which ment of the note when due (which event happened) the £100 should thenceforth bear interest at 5 per cent. per month. B. died in 1872. The bond became payable in Oct. 1873, by the death of his father, and B.'s executrix thereupon filed her bill to redeem: Held (affirming the decision of the Master of the Rolls) that B., if not an expectant heir, was a reversioner, and as such entitled to relief against an unconscionable bargain, and that the securities must be delivered up upon payment of the amount advanced, with interest at 5 per cent. per annum : (Beynon v. Cook, 32 L. T. Rep. N. S. 353. Chan.)

NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS. USURY-EXPECTANT HEIR-MORTGAGE OF

RIGHT OF DRAINAGE FROM HOUSE.-A lease contained a demise of a house and grounds, together with the free passage and running of water and soil in and to the existing cesspool, and in and through all the drains then constructed, or thereafter to be constructed, through the adjoin ing property of the lessor. The cesspool was on such adjoining property. The lease also contained a stipulation against the enlargement of the house, or the erection of new buildings, without the consent of the lessor. The lessee subsequently purchased the reversion, the conveyance of which contained a similar grant of the right of drainage; and shortly afterwards con

the £250 became payable happened more than twenty years before the filing of the bill, and it was alleged that that sum had never been paid. The event on which the £750 became payable happened within the twenty years, and the £750 was then paid. Held (affirming the decision of Hall, V.C.), that where two separate sums are secured by one bond, a payment in respect of one sum does not prevent the Statute of Limitations running in respect of the other. The payment of the £750 did not prevent the £250 being barred by the statute: (Ashlin v. Lee, 32 L. T. Rep. N. S. 348. Chan.)

THE LATE CANON KINGSLEY, in his interesting Lectures on Health and Education, points out the indispen sability of good light and good ventilation, both being essential to health and comfort. For ventilation, lower

the upper and raise the lower part of the windows (say a couple of inches). Fresh air will then be allowed to enter, and the hot air will escape outwards. This will be a step towards ventilation. As to light, instead of burning gas in daytime, have one of Chappuis' Daylight Reflectors fitted to your window or skylight, and at night economise one or two burners by means of shades or reflectors fitted to your brackets, &c. By paying a acquainted with the best mode of obtaining good and visit to the Factory, 69, Fleet-street, you will become cheap light.-[ADVT.]

ELECTION LAW.

CORRUPT PRACTICES AT ELECTIONS. THE Select Committee appointed to inquire into the operation of the Corrupt Practices Prevention Act 1854, the Parliamentary Elections Act 1868, and the Corrupt Practices Commissioners' Expenses' Act 1869, and the several Acts by which these have been respectively continued and amended, have agreed to the following report:"1. That every election petition which alleges corrupt practices against a sitting member or his agents shall be tried by a tribunal consisting of two judges of the Superior Courts, and that no member shall be unseated, nor shall any person declared guilty of a corrupt practice except upon the joint decision of the judges.

be

"2. That immediately after the decision of the judges has been pronounced upon an election petition, or as soon thereafter as may be, all persons with respect to whom there has been evidence in the course of the trial that they have bribed, treated, or unduly influenced, shall, in case there be sufficient evidence available to warrant

their being put on their trial, be brought by summons before the election judges to be summarily tried for such offences, and such persons, if convicted, shall be sentenced to imprisonment for a term not exceeding three calendar months, with or without hard labour.

"3. That in order to insure the due summoning and prosecution of such persons as aforesaid, it is desirable that an officer to be appointed by the Attorney-General should attend the trial of every election petition charging corrupt practices, and that it should be his duty to summon such persons as aforesaid, and take the necessary steps for the due prosecution of all such persons. Provision should be made for the payment of the costs of such prosecution in the same manner as the costs of an inquiry were defrayed under the 5th & 6th Vict. c. 102.

"4. That by consent of the parties to an election petition an election judge may order that the trial of such petition shall be held in the metropolitan town of that part of the United Kingdom to which such petition relates, or to any other convenient place.

"5. That when the disqualification or incapacity arises from the person having been guilty of corrupt practices within the meaning of the 31 & 32 Vict. c. 125, no vote should be deemed to be thrown away unless the person for whom the vote is given has been declared guilty of such corrupt practice by some tribunal having jurisdiction to entertain and determine the question.

"6. That no votes should be deemed to be thrown away unless the alleged cause of disquali. fication be so notorious, at the time of nomination, as to lead to the presumption that the voters gave their votes wilfully and perversely for a candidate incapable of being elected.

7. That the following addition be made to Clause 11, sub-section 14, of the Act 1868:'Whether he is of opinion that the inquiry into the circumstances of the election has been rendered incomplete by the action of either of the parties to that petition, and that a further inquiry is necessary.'

"8. That upon such report the House of Commons may order an inquiry to be held forthwith before one of the judges forming the tribunal, to be conducted by an officer appointed by the Attorney-General; the costs to be defrayed according to the provisions of the Act 5 & 6 Vict. c. 102, now repealed.

"9. That every person reported by the Judges to have been guilty of any corrupt practices within the meaning of the Corrupt Practices Act 1854, shall be disqualified from voting for the county or borough in which the same are proved to have occurred, and such disqualification shall be continued for the full term of seven years from the time that the report was made against him.

10. That whatever may be the ultimate decision of Parliament as to the composition of the tribunal which is to try election petitions, it is, in the judgment of this committee, most advisable that the law should be altered in reference to the penalties imposed by the 43rd section of the Act of 1868, by providing that they shall not be incurred except on conviction of the offender after trial in due course of law or by the decision of at least two judges.

"11. The attention of the Committee has been drawn to the provision of the Representation of the People Act 1867, so far as it forbids the payment by or on behalf of the candidate of any money on account of hiring vehicles for the conveyance of any voter to the poll in borough elections. "The law appears to some extent broken. While it may be desirable that the list of boroughs to which the provision in question does not apply should be extended, the committee are of opinion that in most boroughs the polling places can be so conveniently selected as to render the employment of vehicles unnecessary, and that some sufficient penalty should be attached to the violation of the law in this respect."

LAW STUDENTS' JOURNAL.

QUESTIONS FOR THE INTERMEDIATE
EXAMINATION.
TRINITY TERM, 1875.

I. PRELIMINARY.

Questions 1 to 5 inclusive.

II. FROM CHITTY ON CONTRACTS. 6. What are the different kinds of contracts ? State them.

7. What is a simple contract? 8. Is the release of an equity of redemption a good consideration to support a promise?

9. Is the giving up of an action instituted to try a question, respecting which the law is doubtful, a good consideration to support a promise to pay a stipulated sum?

thereon, though the covenant be made expressly 10. Can a third person, a stranger to a deed, sue for his advantage.

Arathoon, Arathoon, Esq., of the Inner Temple; Barnes, John Gorell, Esq., of the Inner Temple; Baylis, William Mortimer, Esq., of Lincoln's-inn; Beresford, Cecil Hugh Wriothesley, Esq., of the Middle Temple;

Beven, Thomas, Esq., of the Inner Temple ; Beverley, James, Esq., of the Middle Temple; Birrell, Augustine, Esq., of the Inner Temple; Brown, James Algernon, Esq., of the Inner Temple;

Burnie, Robert William, Esq., of the Middle Temple ;

Butler, George Russell, Esq., of the Inner Temple;

Chandler, Samuel Whitty, Esq., of the Middle Temple;

Churchill, Cameron, Esq., of the Inner Temple ; Clarke, Fielding, Esq., of the Middle Temple; Cross, John Ashton, Esq., of the Middle Temple; Esq., of the Inner Temple; De Balaine, Jacques Henry Charles Durup,

De Castro, Daniel, Esq., of Lincoln's-inn; Elgood, Edgar John, Esq., of Lincoln's-inn; Flemyng, William Westropp, Esq., of the Middle

11. What is an implied contract? Give an instance. 12. What is the distinction between an expressed Temple; and an implied contract?

III.-FROM WILLIAMS ON THE PRINCIPLES OF
THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY.

13. State the consequences of one of the attest-
ing witnesses to a will being also (1) an executor,
and also (2) a legatee under the same will.
14. By what mode can a married woman convey
her interest in freeholds ?

15. Can an infant make a binding settlement on his or her marriage, and by what means? 16. How are copyholds conveyed?

17. What is the meaning of covenants "running with the land?"

18. To what extent is a direction for the accumulation of income valid ?

19. What statutory powers are now made incident to every mortgage by deed?

IV.

FROM HAYNES' OUTLINES OF EQUITY. 20. A man dies insolvent. His creditors comHow mence actions and proceed to execution. would you advise his executors to act so as to ensure an equal distribution of his assets? 21. What do you understand by the following expressions:

A decree passed and entered;"
A Chief Clerk's certificate;

Time shall be of the essence of the contract;
Motion for decree ?

22. What is the meaning of the saying that a court of equity relieves against penalties? Give cases in which penalties are relieved against.

23. A married lady dies intestate, leaving a husband and two sons her surviving. At the time of her death she was entitled absolutely to her separate use to the following items of property, each of which stood in the names of trustees for her : (1) A freehold farm';

(2) A leasehold house;

(3) Great Western Railway Stock; To whom will each item of property belong? 24. Show by imaginary cases that on a man's death a fund in Court may sometimes pass to his

heir.

25. You receive instructions to obtain an immediate injunction against the storage of gunpowder, the matter being very urgent. State in paragraphs the steps you would take.

26. How does it happen that cases of trade mark are more frequently before courts of equity than before courts of law ?

V.-BOOK-KEEPING.

27. What is the meaning of keeping an account as an interest account, and give a specimen of such an account (three entries on each side will suffice ?)

28. What is the distinction between ruling off an account and carrying the balance over to a suspense account ?

29. What is understood by a trader entering his remittances or acceptances in the short line?

30. If you sell goods to a customer, take pay. ment of his acceptance, and afterwards discount the bill with your bankers, how does the rate of discount enter into the account between yourself and the customer?

31. What is the meaning of sundries as used in mercantile accounts?

Fryer, George Edmund Septimus, Esq., of the Inner Temple;

Goldie, John Haviland Dashwood, Esq., of the Inner Temple ;

Hall, Edward Allecock, Esq., of Lincolns-inn; Hutchinson, John Haller, Esq., of the Inner Temple ;

Leach, Andrew John, Esq., of Lincoln's-inn; Lempriere, Reginald Raoul, Esq., of the Inner Temple;

Llewellin, John George, Esq., of the Inner Temple ;

Mallik, Manmath Chandra, Esq., of the Middle Temple;

McIntyre, Angus George Milward, Esq., of the Middle Temple;

Muir, Robert Burleigh, Esq., of the Middle Temple ;

Norton, Eardley John, Esq., of Lincoln's-inn; Paterson, John, Esq., of the Inner Temple; Puckle, George, Esq., of the Middle Temple; Radford, Arthur, Esq., of the Inner Temple; Rant, George Herbert, Esq., of the Inner Temple;

Reynardson, William John Birch, Esq., of the Inner Temple;

Sayer, John, Esq., of Lincoln's-inn;

Slingsby, Frederick William, Esq., of Lincoln'sInn;

Smith, Oliver, Esq., of the Inner Temple; Smythies, William Gordon, Esq., of the Middle Temple;

Spiller, William Hutchinson, Esq., of the Middle Temple;

Spokes, Arthur, Hewett, Esq., of the Middle Temple;

Sutton, Edward Egremont, Esq., of Lincoln'sInn.

Tarleton, Arthur Mills, Esq., of the Inner Temple ;

Todd, Thomas Frederick D'Arcy, Esq., of the Inner Temple;

Udal, John Symonds, Esq., of the Inner Temple; Urmson, George Harold, Esq., of the Inner Temple;

Vawdrey, Daniel, Esq., of Lincoln's-inn; Vincent, Charles Edward Howard, Esq., of the Inner Temple;

West, Stephen Henry, Esq., of the Inner Temple; and

Wilson, John James, Esq., of the Middle Temple; Certificates that they have satisfactorily passed a public examination.

Chairman.

By Order of the Council, (Signed) S. H. WALPOLE, Council Chamber, Lincoln's-inn, 21st May, 1875.

COUNTY COURTS.

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KINGSTON COUNTY COURT.
Friday, May 7.

(Before H. J. STONOR, Esq., Judgo.) BOWMAN v. BRADFORD AND OTHERS (EXECU TORS OF JAMES BRADFORD, DECEASED.) Landlord and tenant-Nuisance-Covenant for quiet enjoyment. HIS HONOUR delivered judgment in the following terms-In this case the plaintiff held a lease for twenty-one years from the testator, dated the 4th May 1863, of a house and premises contiguous to another house and premises belonging to the testator, and let to a yearly tenant. In the plaintiff's ""general lease there are contained the usual words," and the usual "covenant for quiet enjoyment," by the landlord, but no covenant by the tenant to cleanse the drains, &c. The drain of the plaintiff's house runs into a cesspool under the land held with the adjoining house, and such drain and cesspool were undoubtedly necessarily

BANKRUPTCY LAW.

NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS.

PLEADING Demurrer - BANKRUPTCY ACT 1869 (32 & 33 VICT. c. 71) s. 94, SUB-8. 3-CONTRACTS FOR SALE AND DELIVERY OF GOODSBONA FIDES.-The plaintiff, as trustee under a liquidation by arrangement of the affairs of a debtor, by the first count of the declaration,

sued the defen lants on a contract made between them and the debtor, for a breach of the said contract of the defendants in not delivering either to the debtor before liquidation or to the plaintiff as such trustee after the said liquidation, a quantity of iron according to the terms cf the contract. The second count charged that it was agreed between the defendants and the debtor as in the first count stated, and further, that before the said liquidation the defendants delivered a portion of the iron under the contract to the debtor, who made default in payment of the price; and afterwards the plaintiff as such trustee elected to take the benefit of the contract, and was ready, &o., to pay in cash the full amount for the portion of iron so delivered as aforesaid, and to pay for the residue thereof in cash on delivery, and to perform the contract in all things on his part, whereof the defendants had notice, and waived formal tender of such amount. Averment that all conditions, &c., were fulfilled, &c. Yet the defendants did not nor would deliver to the plaintiff as such trustee the residue of the said iron, but neglected and refused so to do, and wholly refused any further to perform the said contract on their part, whereby the plaintiff as such trustee lost the benefit of the said contract. Plea, that after the making of the said agreement and before any breach thereof on the part of the defendants, and before the commencement of the said liquidation, or the filing by the said debtor of a petition for liquidation, and before notice to the defendants of any act of bankruptcy, by the said debtor, he exonerated and discharged the defendants from the said agreement, and from any further performance of the same, and the defendants say that the said dealing and transaction was made in good faith. On demurrer it was held by the Court of Exchequer (Bramwell and Pollock, BB.) that the plea was good, and that the exoneration thereby shown was a "dealing for valuable consideration" between the parties within the protection of sect. 94, sub-sect. 3 of the Bankruptcy Act 1869. Per Pollock, B.-Whenever anything like mala fides is excluded by the allegation that the exoneration was bona fide, the sound and reasonable construction to be put upon the word "exoneration" is that it was such an exoneration as would be effectual in law, and it is not necessary to allege that it was done "for valuable consideration": (Checkland v. McNiel and another, 32 L. T. Rep. N. S. 367. Ex.) APPEAL TIME FOR COMPUTATION PRACTICE SUNDAYS. - -The twenty-one days within which an appeal must be entered under rule 143 of the Bankruptcy Rules 1870, must be reckoned exclusive of Sundays: (Ex parte Hicks; re Ball, 32 L. T. Rep. N. S. 432. Bank.)

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DERBY COUNTY COURT.
Monday, April 12.

(Before W. F. WOODFORD, Esq., Judge.) CRANE v. SLINN.

OF

Sale of books-Contract with canvasser. THE plaintiff, Henry Crane, is a bookseller at Manchester, and the defendant, Arthur Slinn, a fireman in the employ of the Midland Railway Company, living in John-street, Derby. The action was brought to recover £3 5s., the price of a Bible in two volumes, which it was alleged the defendant had agreed to purchase.

The plaintiff's traveller stated that he sold the books about a year ago to the defendant, but the latter did not sign the usual agreement, as he had no pen and ink in the house. He had declined to make any payments when applied to. In crossexamination, he denied having ever said that the defendant signed an agreement to purchase the books, or that the defendant's wife ever told him her husband had not bought the books and he would not pay for them.

The defendant said that the last witness called at his house one evening, and said he had two books which he wanted the witness to purchase, and would fetch a sample. The witness told him he did not want to buy any books, but the traveller left the house and returned in a few minutes, having a Bible in two volumes with him. He told the witness he must pay 58. down, and could pay the balance by instalments of 5s., but the witness declined to purchase them, and told him to take them away. The traveller then named some of the witness's friends, who, he said, had agreed to purchase the work, and requested the witness to sign an agreement to take them, and he again

declined, but the man ultimately placed the books on the table and went away. He denied having neglected to sign the agreement because he had no pen and ink, for that was not the case, and said that two months ago a man called for his subscription, but was told that the witness would not pay for the books, as he had never agreed to take them. The man replied that the matter lay between the witness and the canvasser, who had sent the witness's signature to the firm.

Mrs. Slinn corroborated her husband's evidence, and said that when the traveller called for the subscription he said he had sent her husband's signature to the firm, and had paid 5s. out of his own pocket for him.

His HONOUR said he considered the plaintiff had not made out his case. No doubt it was a very extravagant price for the Bible, and servants and other people were induced to buy the books because of the small payments which were required, when they really could not afford to buy them. He should give a verdict for the defendant with costs.

KING'S LYNN COUNTY COURT.
Thursday, May 13.

(Before W. P. PRICE, Esq., Q.C., Judge.) FREEMAN V. THE GREAT EASTERN RAILWAY COMPANY.

Carriage of coals-Contract-Right of railway T. M. Wilkin, of Lynn, for the plaintiff. company to make regulations. Edward Moore, from the law department of the company, for the defendants.

Wilkin, in opening the case, stated that the action was brought to recover from the company the cost of carting eight tons of coals from the Lynn Docks to the plaintiff's coal yard, near the Lynn station, in consequence of the company refusing to deliver his coals at the Lynn Station. The action was brought as a test case to try the right of the company to decline to carry the coals tiff gave the company's agent at Lynn a written to the station. On the 16th March last the plainnotice that he would have consigned to him at the Lynn Station a truck of coals, and that he required these coals delivered at the station and not at the docks, and that if the company pergisted in delivering the coals at the docks instead carting them from the docks to the station. The of the station, he should sue them for the cost of coals were forwarded on the 24th March last, but, notwithstanding this special notice, the coals were taken by the company to the docks insteadof the station, and the plaintiff had incurred charges amounting to 9s. 4d. for the carting of the coals. His and other merchants' coals were taken to the docks, which caused them considerable expense in carting them away, whilst at the same time the company allowed two other merchants to have their coals delivered at the station, which he considered was unfair.

he could not deal with any question of undue His HONOUR here interposed, and said that preference, but only with the question-had the company delivered the coals according to their contract with the plaintiff? He saw from the consignment note that the coals were handed in the first in stance to the Midland Company, how then could the plaintiff sue the Great Eastern ? Moore said that the facts would not be dis. puted, and for the present he would waive the right of the company to contend that they were not the parties to be sued. He wished the case to be heard on its merits, as the directors were anxious that his Honour and the public should have before them all the facts of the case, and be shown that what the company had done was for the benefit of the public generally, and to facilitate the carrying on of the traffic. Although his Honour could not deal with the question of undue preference, he would, with his permission, state why the company declined to allow the plaintiff to unload his coals at the Lynn Station. The traffic of three companies ran into that station (the traffic srrangements in which are worked by the defendants), and in consequence of complaints made by the public of delay to goods and trains, which was caused by increase of traffic, it was found necessary to make some alterations, and thereby prevent the daily delay that occurred to the passenger trains and to the ordinary goods traffic. The cause of the delay was because the coal merchants were allowed to unload their coals in the same yard as that at which the ordinary goods were delivered, so a notice was issued to the coal merchants in Dec. 1873, and put into force in Nov. 1874, that no coals would be carried for them after that date to the Lynn Station, but that they could unload them either at the docks or the harbour, where the company have sidings. That arrangement had been since carried out, so the company had now more room to carry on their ordinary goods traffic, and tho public were benefitted by the delivery of their goods and by the running of the passenger trains not being delayed.

His HONOUR again stated that the only question with which he could deal was whether the company had broken their contract, and after what he had heard from the company's solicitor, he was of the opinion (unless Mr. Wilkin could change it) that the notice given by the company was quite sufficient to justify him in giving a verdict in the company's favour.

Wilkin said that the company had no right to make such a regulation, and that the plaintiff was entitled to have his coals delivered at the

Lynn station after the notice of the 16th March, given by him to the company, which created a contract between his client and the company to deliver the coals at the station.

the contract between the parties, the notices Moore contended that in construing what was given by the company to the coal merchants must be read with that given by the plaintiff to the company, and then it would be found that the by the plaintiff. Further, that if the traffic of company declined to carry the coals as required the company required it, they had a legal right to make any rules and regulations as to the carriage of coals they might deem necessary.

After some further legal arguments, and evi. dence had been taken,

His HONOUR said that if the plaintiff thought the company were chargeable with favouritism in the case of two merchants who seemed to have the use of certain ground at the railway station, which had been allotted to them previous to the notice served upon the plaintiff in Dec. 1873, he might go before the Railway Commissioners, but with that he (the learned judge) had nothing to do. The Great Eastern Railway company, like every other railway company, had a perfect right to conduct their business so as first to secure the comfort and safety of passengers, and next the greatest attainable regularity in their other traffic, and if they found that these were interfered with by such large quantities of coals arriving at Lynn, they were justified in doing what they had done, viz., giving the plaintiff notice of an alteration in their mode of delivery, and having had that notice he (the plaintiff) had no ground for complaint against them. There would, therefore, be

a verdict for the defendants.

Moore said that as this was a case of great importance to the company, and interest to the public, he should not ask for any costs, and hoped that the general public would be of the opinion that the company were doing the best they could to get their goods delivered without delay.

Wilkin observed that now the case was ended, he was quite of his Honour's opinion, and had said so from the moment he was consulted, but as thirteen coal merchants were desirous of having the matter tested, he had done the best he could for them. Verdict for the defendants.

NORWICH COUNTY COURT.
Friday, April 16.
(Before E. P. PRICE, Q.C., Judge.)
Re ROBERT HALL JEFFries.
Transfer of goods-Fradulent preference—
B. A. 1869, s. 95.

THE bankrupt was an innkeeper carrying on business at Plumstead, near Holt, and formerly a farmer and dealer at Morton-on-the-Hill. His liabilities amounted to about £2000, and his assets to about £500. There had been an ex parte inquiry at the registrar's office relative to some cattle given by plaintiff to Mr. R. Stroyan, dealer, one of his creditors, a short time before the filing of his petition.

Reeve, on behalf of the trustees, now came before His Honour to ask him to declare that the cattle or the value of them given to Mr. Stroyan should belong to the trustees, and be appropriated to the benefit of the creditors generally; and C. Cooper represented Mr. Stroyan.

Reeve opened the facts, which were briefly these: Bankrupt, aged 28, who had for the last two or three years been getting into difficulties, lost his farm at Morton at Michaelmas in consequence of a distress, and took a public-house soon afterwards at Plumstead. During last summer, bankrupt was pressed by several attorneys for money-by Mr. Coaks, Messrs. Winter and Francis, Messrs. Tillet and Co., by Mr. Chittock, and Mr. Clabburn. To carry on the business of a farmer and grazier during the summer, the bankrupt had bought cattle from time to time of Mr. Stroyan, giving in one instance a bill for £90 for three months that was renewed when it came to maturity, and another bill for £250 for three months. Neither of those bills was ever met. The cattle bankrupt purchased of Mr. Stroyan were subsequently sold by bankrupt to meet the pressing demand of Messrs. Lacon, the bankers, made through Mr. Chittock. But though bankrupt, on the 10th and 12th Sept. and the 5th Oct., paid the proceeds of the sale of the cattle to Mr. Chittock on behalf of Lacons, on the 24th Oct. he went to Messrs. Bullard, brewers, and borrowed £165 in