the fact. It was still more unfortunate that both Mr. Austin and Mr. Crossley, the secretary, should have refused to explain, or to give the meeting any information with respect to the new rales. And it does not appear that there was even a motion made for an adjournment. Under these circumstances I think that the meeting took a legal and proper course. The only day fixed by the rules for the election of the governing body hal arrived. So far as the meeting could ascertain those rules were still unaltered and in full force, but the chairman refused to proceed under then. By that refusal he endangered perhaps the existence, and certainly the well being of the society; and he plainly abandoned his duty. The meeting, therefore, with manifest propriety, treated him as being absent, and by an unanimous vote placed Mr. Holt, the vice-chairman, in the chair. The election then went on, and the plaintiffs were respectively proposed, and were respectively elected by a majority of the members present. No other candidates were proposed, and the seventeen plaintiffs were declared duly elected members of the committee of management. From subsequent events it is perfectly clear that the meeting judged correctly. The Registrar of Friendly Societies has refused to certify that the new rules are in conformity with law, and they have been returned uncertified and unregistered to the society since the meeting. The plaintiffs have claimed to sit on the committee of management, but they have been opposed by Mr. Austin, and prevented from exercising their proper functions. They allege that it is necessary to seek relief from this court, and for that purpose these proceedings have been instituted. It must be remarked that, if Mr. Austin's contention is correct, the society is without a governing body; for the committee of management for the last year are unquestionably out of office, and cannot act. Now, at the hearing, the main question of fact in dispute between the parties was whether the plaintiffs or any of them had been proved to have been duly elected. It was insisted upon by Mr. Smyley that the requisites of the seventh rule should be proved to have been complied with. But a difficulty in such proof had arisen since the election. It was shown that nomination papers had duly come to the care of the secretary, Mr. Crossley, but Mr. Crossley was killed shortly after the meeting; and soon after that event it was discovered that he had defrauded the society to a large amount. His son, who has since been convicted for participation in his father's frauds, and is now suffering imprisonment, was shown to have entered the society's offices after his father's death, and to have taken away a quantity of papers. When search was afterwards made for the papers relating to the election in December last, none of them could be found. Direct evidence of their contents by their production was impossible. The plaintiffs called many witnesses, and the evidence tendered to show that the requisites of the seventh rule had been complied with ran to a great length. Various objections were taken to the proofs, most of which must be disallowed. It was objected that in most of the cases, if not in all of them, those members who had moved and seconded the respective candidates in the first instance, were not the same members who moved and seconded them at the election in December. Now, I think it was not necessary that such should have been the case. I consider it clear that the moving and seconding the candidates at the election was not an essential part of that proceeding, but must be considered as having been adopted merely for the purpose of conveniently bringing the respective candidates before the meeting. The effective moving and seconding had already taken place. Objections were also taken to the proof of the individual elections of six of the candidates. Those taken to the elections of Messrs. Whalley and Dewhurst, and one of the objections to the election of Mr. Culshaw rested on the same grounds, and may, therefore, be disposed of at the same time. It was objected that the names of their respective movers and seconders had not been written by them or properly authenticated on the respective nomination papers. I see nothing in the rules that makes it necessary they should be so. The name and address of the candidate is to be attested by the name and address of his mover and seconder. I look upon the word attest as having been used as a certificate, and the mode of such attestation is pointed out. Nothing is said of a writing or mark; and I consider that if such name and address is written by a third person with the express sanction of the mover and seconder, as these undoubtedly were, it is a sufficient compliance with the rule. In the instance put by Mr. Smyley, that of a will, the subscription by the attesting witnesses is directed. They are to attest and subscribe in the presence, &c. The evident end and purpose of the rule is attained when the secretary is enabled from the description of the parties to make inquiries. The next objections to be noticed are those to the elections of Messrs. Cowburn, Shaw, and Butterworth. Their nomi

nation papers were duly made out, but were shown to have got into the hands of one Parkington, a collector, but not the collector of the district, and Parkington was not called by either party to show what had become of the papers. No objection was taken on the day of the election to the candidature of those three members, and I think it may fairly be presumed in the absence of evidence to a contrary effect, that those papers had then come into the hands and care of the secretary. I am not able to say that the election of Mr. Culshaw was valid. It was proved that his nomination paper had been duly delivered to the proper collector, but it was also proved that the collector had returned the paper to Mr. Culshaw, and that he, probably under the idea that the new rules would come into operation before the election day in December, had destroyed the paper. I think on consideration that such an act must be taken to have been a virtual withdrawal of his candidature, and that he was incapable of being elected. With the exception of Mr. Culshaw, I consider that the plaintiffs were duly elected, and must be considered to be members of the committee of management. Each election was separate, and in my opinion those elected are perfectly competent to act under the rules. I therefore order and declare that John Cowburn, Thomas Butterworth, William Shaw, John Boothman, Thomas Haworth, John Blackshaw, Samuel Dewhurst, John Whalley, William Hadcroft, William Forrest, Thomas Edmondson, Alexander Airey, George Duckworth, William Edmondson, John Henry Ashworth, and Robert Taylor, plaintiffs and applicants in this matter, were duly elected members of the committee of management of the Blackburn Philanthropic Burial Society at the election held on the 15th Dec. 1874, and that they were and are now on and members of such committee, and entitled to, and may act thereon as such members without hindrance or interruption by or from the said Thomas Austin, or any other person or persons. And I declare that Abraham Culshaw was not duly elected a member of the said committee. As to the costs of these proceedings, I order that Mr. Austin pay the applicants' costs. But I decline to order the costs of the other defendants to be paid. They will pay their own costs of these proceedings.

Monday, May 24.

WALSH V. BROADBENT AND HUTCHINSON.

Husband and wife-Married Women's Property Act 1870, s. 5-Loan by married woman in her own name-Husband's right to recover.

Ar the last court'a man named Walsh brought an action against the secretaries of the Blackburn District Benefit Building Society, to recover certain moneys which had been invested in the society by his wife Betsy Walsh, in her own name. At the conclusion of the case, which lasted a considerable time,

His HONOUR deferred judgment, which he now delivered as follows:-This is an action brought under peculiar circumstances. The defendants are the secretaries of the Blackburn District Benefit Building Society, and certain moneys have been invested in the society by one Betsy Walsh in her own name. The plaintiff by this action seeks to recover those moneys from the defendants. The plaintiff is the husband of Betsy Walsh, and he is the father of eight children, some of whom are above twenty-one. In 1872 the five eldest children agreed to pay to their parents a certain sum weekly out of their respective wages for their board and lodging, and to pay a further sum weekly, from the same source, to their mother Betsy Walsh, to be accumulated for their respective benefit, and to be under her control; and they resolved that if their father, the present plaintiff, refused to accede to the arrangement, they would leave their parents' house, and live elsewhere. This resolution was communicated to the father. He acceded to it, and the arrangement was carried out. The children paid over their wages to their mother, in pursuance of the agreement, and the father also paid over to her a portion of his own wages. Mrs. Walsh invested the trust savings in different funds, with the plaintiff's sanction. At the end of 1874 the accumulation from those sources amounted to a considerable sum. She had invested £72 in the East Lancashire Building Society, £52 in the Blackburn Savings' Bank, and the remainder, namely, the sum sued for by this actlon, was lent to the Blackburn District Benefit Building Society by Mrs. Walsh, in her own name. The principal part of these accumulated trust funds arose from the wages earned by the children in their several trades, and paid over by them to their mother under the agreement. Comparatively speaking, a small part of the accumulations were derived from the plaintiff's wages. The plaintiff has obtained and holds the moneys so invested in the East Lancashire Building Society, and in the Blackburn Savings' Bank, and by this

action he seeks to recover the remainder of the accumulated trust fund. I hoped at the hearing that an arrangement between the different members of the family might have been effected, but the attempt was unsuccessful. I regret this, as I fear that this action may prove to be the begining of a conflict between the father and his children. He has already, in direct violation of the agreement of 1872, forced himself into the trusteeship of a considerable portion of the trust fund, and has substituted himself as a trustee thereof in the place of his wife, the trustee agreed upon between himself and the children. He now seeks by this action to recover the balance of the trust fund from the defendants. It was not shown at the hearing that the requirements of the 5th section of the Married Women's Property Act 1870, had been complied with, and I think that ought to have been done to oust the plaintiff's marital power. Under these circumstances he has a right to ask for the transfer of the fund into his name, that he may be enabled to perform the duties of a trustee of this trust fund (see Lewin on Trusts, 5th edit., pp. 29-31), and the verdict must be in his favour. I give, however, leave to the defendants to move for a new trial if the requirements of sect. 5 of the Married Women's Property Act were in fact complied with before the commencement of the action.

LEEDS COUNTY COURT. Friday, May 28. (Before Mr. Serjt. TINDAL ATKINSON, Judge.) Witness-Subpama-Loss of time. A witness subpoenaed by the plaintiff or defendant to depose to facts in a cause cannot recover for his attendance in court for loss of time. HIS HONOUR, who on the hearing had reserved judgment, said: The plaintiff in this case sues the defendant in this court for the sum of £1, which, in his particulars, he claims for attending as a witness upon the defendant's subpoena at a trial in the Dewsbury County Court, in which the now defendant was then plaintiff. Inonsuited the plaintiff at the hearing, on the ground that no action can be supported in law by a witness who is called to depose to facts in a court of justice for loss of time. The plaintiffs now seeks to set aside the nonsuit, and enter a verdict for the amount or for a new trial, on the ground that the case of Hale v. Bates (28 L. J. 14, Q. B.) is an authority to show that the action is maintainable. As the case is of considerable importance to a great number of persons who are called to give evidence in these courts, I have taken the opportunity of consulting the authorities and decisions on this subject. In an early case (Dixon v. Adams, Croke's Reports, in the time of Elizabeth, p. 538), where the claim that was the same as the present, the court held as the plaintiff had not done any act whereto the law would not have compelled him, he could not recover." This decision was fully upheld in Collins v. Godefroy (1 B. & Ad. Reports, 956). There the plaintiff, an attorney, sued the defendant, for attending six days on his subpoena. He was not, however, called, and he sued the defendant for 6 guineas for loss of time. It was contended for the plaintiff that being a professional man, and having been required by the defendant to attend a trial in which the defendant had an interest, the law would raise an implied promise on his part to make compensation to the plaintiff for his loss of time, that it differed from the case of an indictment for felony or misdemeanour, in the prosecution of which the public had an interest, and it was the duty of every person to give evidence in such cases; but a party who attends a court of justice to give evidence in a civil cause does it, not in the discharge of a public duty, but in order to confer a benefit upon an individual. Lord Tenterden, in giving judgment, however, said, "That if it be a duty imposed by law upon a party duly subpoenaed to attend from time to time to give his evidence, then a promise to give him any remuneration for loss of time incurred in such attendance is a promise without consideration, and on consideration of the 5th Elizabeth c. 9, s. 12, and of the cases which have been decided upon this subject, we are all of opinion that a party cannot maintain an action for compensation for loss of time in attending a trial as a witness." This case was approved of and acted upon in equity by Kindersley, V.C., in Nokes v. Gibbons (26 L. J. 208, Chan.). There no doubt exists a distinction as to the right to demand compensation between a witness who is called upon to depose to a matter of opinion depending on his skill in a particular trade and a witness to facts, and this was clearly pointed out by Maule, J., in Webb v. Page (1 Car. & Kirwan, 23) in which he says, "There is a distinction between the case of a man who sees a fact and is called to prove it in a court of justice, and that of a man who is selected by a party to give his opinion on a matter with which Le is peculiarly conversant from the nature of his employment in life; the former is bound as a matter of public duty to speak to a fact which happens to have fallen within his knowledge.

Without such testimony the course of justice would be stopped. The latter is under no such obligation; there is no such necessity for his evidence, and the party who selects him must pay him. The case of Hale v. Bates (28 L. J. 14, Q. B.), cited by Mr. Pullen in favour of the plaintiff, goes no further than to show that an attorney called as a witness is not within this rule, but an exception grafted upon a principle is merely an exception, and does not alter the law. I am bound, therefore, by the cases cited, and until they are expressly overruled, am compelled to hold that a witness in a civil suit called to depose to facts cannot recover from the party who subpœnas him a compensation for his loss of time in attending the court for that purpose, but if called as an expert to give a scientific opinion, or to matters which require the evidence of professional skill merely, he may then recover. In the present case the plaintiff was a witness to facts merely, and on this ground I find that he cannot recover. The nonsuit must remain with costs.

Pullen for the plaintiff.
Malcolm for the defendant.

BANKRUPTCY LAW.

NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS. PURCHASE AFTER SERVICE OF PETITION-CONCEALMENT-MISREPRESENTATION. - On the 1st Dec. 1874, a trader knowingly committed an act of

bankruptcy, upon which a bankruptcy petition was filed against him. It was served on the 3rd, and he gave no notice to dispute. On the 5th he bought some wool at an auction without disclosing his circumstances, and the wool was delivered to him without payment being demanded, the auctioneer being ignorant of his circumstances. On the 14th he was adjudicated bankrupt. The vendor, becoming aware of the bankruptcy on the 19th, claimed the return of the wool from the trustee in the bankruptcy upon the ground that the concealment of the bankruptcy petition by the trader at the time of the purchase was such a frand as entitled him to rescind the contract: Held (affirming the decision of the Chief Judge in Bank.

ruptcy), that the trader was under no obligation to disclose his circumstances; that, as there had been no misrepresentation on his part, the contract could not be rescinded; that the contract was perfected by the delivery of the goods to the trader, and that the legal title to them, being then vested in him, passed to the trustee upon adjudication: (Ex parte Whittaker; Re Shackleton, 32 L. T. Rep. N. S. 443. Chan.)

COURT OF BANKRUPTCY.
Monday, June 7.

(Before the CHIEF JUDGE.) Ex parte ROBERTSON; Re MORTON. Scotch creditor-Jurisdiction of English court. THIS was an appeal from an order of the Newcastle County Court, and involved a question as to the jurisdiction of the English Court of Bankruptcy over a Scotchman.

De Ger, Q.C., and Finlay Knight were counsel for the appellant.

Little, Q.C. and Colt for the respondent. The debtors, Messrs. W. and E. Morton, who were fruit and potato merchants at Newcastle-onTyne, had been in the habit of purchasing potatoes from Mr. Donald Robertson, a merchant, residing at Mayfield, Cupar, Fifeshire, and on the 17th Feb. 1874, the debtors owed to Robertson a considerable sum of money. On that day they sent to Mr. Robertson a cheque for £120, which was presented at their bankers on the 19th, and paid. On the intervening day the debtors filed a petition for liquidation by arrangement with creditors, and on the 13th March a first meeting was held, when a resolution was passed that the estate should be liquidated by arrangement, and trustees were appointed. The trustees subsequently applied to the County Court for an order directing Robertson to refund the £120 which he had received, and also £36 12s. 9d., being the value of certain potatoes of which he had taken possession after the presentation of the petition. The application was resisted on the ground that Robertson being a Scotchman the court had no jurisdiction to deal with him, and on the further ground that the service was irregular, but the learned judge made the order. Robertson, who had proved for the balance of his debt in the County Court, appealed. After hearing the arguments of counsel,

His HONOUR held that the County Court had jurisdiction to make the order. The appellant received the £120 as part of the estate of the debtors. He came in under a compact for the due administration of the estate, and the court had ample jurisdiction to decide all questions. The appellant was bound to submit as much as if he lived on this side the Border. As to the alleged irregularity of the service, his Honour thought there had been a complete waiver.

COURT OF BANKRUPTCY (IRELAND. Jan. 15, and Feb. 2, 23.

(Before MILLER J.)

Re WOODS; Ex parte JAMES AND OTHERS. (a) Proof of Debis-Double proof-B. and I. Act 1857, s. 248-Outstanding bills of exchange-Bills passed in payment of goods sold-Accommodation acceptances.

Where a bill of exchange has been accepted by a bankrupt for a debt due by him, only the actual holder of the bill can prove as against the bankrupt's estate.

The bankrupt has accepted bills of exchange, to the amount of £26,265 9s. 8d., for L. V. and K., which had been endorsed over by them and discounted for cash with third parties. Of those bills, a portion, to the amount of £12,329 4s. 8d., was so accepted in payment of goods sold by L. V. and K. to the bankrupt-the remainder being accommodation acceptances. The bills were not taken up at maturity by L. V. and K., and remained outstanding in the hands of the persons who had discounted them. L. V. and K. presented a petition for arrangement under the court; and their trustees having claimed to prove for the said sum of £12,329 4s. 8d., as against the estate of the bankrupt: Held (affirming the ruling of the Chief Clerk), that the proof should be rejected. Ex parte Macredie, re Charles (L. Rep. 8 Ch, 535), followed.

MOTION to review, rescind, or vary rulings made by the Chief Clerk, rejecting a proof of debt tendered as against the bankrupt's estate. The facts are fully detailed in the judgment of the

court.

Andrews, Q.C. (with him Carton), in support of the application.

Porter, Q.C., for the assignees, contra, cited Ex parte Macredie, re Charles (L. Rep. 8 Ch. 535); Re London, Bombay, and Mediterranean Bank, Ex parte Cama (L. Rep. 9 Ch. 686).

MILLER, J.-It appears from certain rulings of the Chief Clerk made in this matter, on the 4th Jan. 1875, that a proof on behalf of the trustees of and Kirk, claiming to be creditors of the bank the estate of the late firm of Lowry, Valentine, rupt for £12,327 48. 8d., was tendered to and rejected by the Chief Clerk, and that by the same rule he directed the assignees in this matter not to take any steps for distribution of the assets in in order to enable the trustees of Lowry, Valen: this matter until the expiration of fourteen days, tine, and Kirk, if so advised, to apply to the court to review, rescind, or vary the present order. Accordingly, the trustees of Lowry, Valentine, and Kirk, served a notice of application to this court, dated the 11th Jan. 1875, that such order of the Chief Clerk of the 4th. Jan., might be reviewed and rescinded, and that such proof as so tendered might be received. The facts as presented to this court, upon the hearing of that application, had been rather assumed, and admitted on both sides, than brought before the court in the form of strict proof, but sufficient direct evidence is afforded by the proof on the the holders of the acceptances of the bankrupt, file, as made on behalf of the Provincial Bank as which had been discounted by Lowry, Valentine, and Kirk, to enable me to dispose of that applica tion without waiting for further evidence, and without further postponement; and the facts as thus obtained are, as accurately as I can state them, as follows:-It appears that the bankrupt accepted various bills for, and passed such bills, when accepted, into the hands of the late firm of Lowry, Valentine, and Kirk, trading at Belfast, to an amount altogether of £26,265 98. 8d., and that the firm of Lowry, Valentine, and Kirk discounted all of those several bills thus accepted, and endorsed them over to third parties in whose hands all of such bills are now outstanding, and further that all such bill are now long since overdue. It further appeared, that of those acceptances of the bankrupt, amounting to the gross sum of £26,265 9s. 8d., a portion to an amount of £12,329 48. 8d., were passed by the bankrupt to Lowry, Valentine, and Kirk, in direct payment for goods which had been delivered by Lowry, Valentine, and Kirk, to the bankrupt, and that such sum of £12,329 the proof was tendered on behalf of Lowry, was the same in amount as that for which Valentine, and Kirk, to the Chief Clerk, and, as was stated in the argument, represented the extent of the reality of the transactions between Lowry, Valentine, and Kirk, and the bankrupt, and that the remaining portion of the acceptances comprised in that sum of £26,265 98. 8d. were solely passed by the bankrupt for the accommodation of Lowry, Valentine, and Kirk. If there had been any serious controversy about any of the facts which I have stated, I would have postponed still further the disposal of this motion, and would have caused proper inquiries to be made as to the accuracy of the statements in

(a) (From the Irish Law Times)*

these respects, as it was stated that the present application was representative in its nature, for the purpose of having a principle determined which would regulate not only the proof as to the claim in the present case, but also the proofs as to other claims in this matter, which are similar in character, to a much larger amount. If the late firm of Lowry, Valentine, and Kirk, had not failed in their circumstances, and had taken up and retired all the acceptances of the bankrupt, when the bankrupt had failed to take them up on their arriving at maturity, and if Lowry, Valentine, and Kirk, were now, under such circumstances as supposed, the actual holders of such bills thus retired, the utmost extent to which any proof on behalf of Lowry, Valentine, and Kirk, could, in such case, have been admitted against the bankrupt's estate would have been for that sum of £12,329 48. 8d., for which the proof had been tendered to the chief clerk, as stated, and which represented the entire value of the goods delivered by the late firm of Lowry, Valentine, and Kirk, to the bankrupt, and for which such bills had been given by the bankrupt. But it appears that Lowry, Valentine, and Kirk, have failed in their circumstances, and are at present arranging traders in this court, and that, as a consequence, none of the acceptances of the bankrupt, which had been so discounted by Lowry, Valentine, and Kirk, as I have stated, to that amount altogether of £26,265 98. 8d., have been at all taken up or retired by Lowry, Valentine, and Kirk; and that, on the contrary, all of such acceptances are at present outstanding in the hands of third parties. The holders of the acceptances for the full amount of £26,265 98. 8d. either have proved, or, as the holders, upon the production of those bills, possess an unquestionable right to make proofs in respect of them against the estate of the bank. rupt; and if I should now admit the proof as tendered on the part of the trustees of the estate of Lowry, Valentine, and Kirk, for the sum of £12,329 4s. 8d. as the value of the goods delivered by Lowry, Valentine, and Kirk to the bankrupt against the estate of the bankrupt, it is plain to demonstration that I would thereby necessarily admit a double proof against the estate of the of the trustees of Lowry, Valentine, and Kirk, bankrupt to the extent of £12,329 4s. 8d. in favour although the late firm of Lowry, Valentine, and Kirk, whom those trustees represent, had already received cash for the acceptances for that same amount, when they had previously discounted the hands of the present holders. I scarcely such acceptances, whereby they had passed into know how it has happened that such a motion as the present has been brought forward before this court after the expression of his views by Lord Selborne, when sitting in the Court of Appeal in England, in the case of Ex parte Macredie, re Charles, which must carry conviction to the mind of every person upon a supposed state of facts much more strongly in favour of the admission of the proof as tendered by the trustees of Lowry, Valentine, and Kirk, than the facts at present before this court, in which case-after stating (what I most cordially adopt) "That the true principle to be applied in such cases as the pretained by one party against the other, if the bills sent is that proof should only be admitted for that sum for which an action could have been mainhad remained in the situation in which they are actually found and there had been no bankruptcy" -he added:-"Suppose the bills in question in the present case had been given in payment (i. e., in the present case by the bankrupt) of goods delivered (i. e., in the present case by Lowry, Valentine, and Kirk), and the bills had been nego. tiated by the seller of the goods (i. e., in the present case, Lowry, Valentine, and Kirk), and were still outstanding, and there had been other transactions as to other bills in respect of which the person who bought the goods (.e., in the present case, the bankrupt), and so paid for them, was in the situation of one who practically received accommodation as between the same parties (whereas, in the present case, it was the person who sold the goods who received the accommodation), could an action at law have been maintained for the goods as goods sold and delivered and not paid for ?" And then he added "No such action could possibly have been mainfor by these acceptances, which would not have tained upon the facts which he had supposed, because the goods would have been actually paid been returned to the vendors (i. e., in the present case, the trustees of Lowry, Valentine, and Kirk), and taken up by him, but would then be outstanding in the hands of these parties." I stated that the facts of the present case were stronger against the admission of the proof, as tendered on the part of the trustees of Lowry, Valentine, and Kirk, than in the case supposed by Lord Selborne; and this must be apparent, inasmuch as all the acceptances of the bankrupt beyond those passed for the goods delivered by Lowry, Valentine, and Kirk, to the bankrupt, were thus passed for the accommodation of Lowry, Valentine, and Kirk which could be proved by the holders, in addition

to the acceptances which had been given in payment of the goods sold, against the bankrupt's estate. Founded upon that sound test, as put by Lord Selborne, the unvarying rule in bankruptcy has been that where a bill has been passed for a debt, and thus fully represents that debt, proof can alone be made by the actual holder of that bill, representing that debt, against the estate of the party who passed such bill as so representing that debt; and if any different rule was adopted, this bad consequence must inevitably follow-namely, that one proof must be admitted against the estate of the person who passed such acceptance in payment of his debt, from the actual holder of his acceptance, and a second proof against the same estate from the person with whom such debt was originally contracted to whom such acceptance was passed in payment of that debt, and who by endorsing and discounting such acceptances with the holders had received 20s. in the pound in payment of such original debt; or, in other words, that a double proof would, in such case, necessarily be admitted against the same estate. It cannot be denied that all the bills for the entire £26,265 9s. 8d. may be proved by the present holders, and rank for dividend against not only the estate of the bankrupt, but also against the estate of Lowry, Valentine, and Kirk; and if (as has been alleged) the estate of the bankrupt in this matter would in such case, have been increased by the value of the goods delivered by Lowry, Valentine, and Kirk to the bankrupt, on the other hand the estate of Lowry, Valentine, and Kirk, before it reached the present trustees, had been' increased by the amount which that firm had received on discounting these bills with the present holders; but, on the other hand, if the proof as tendered on the part of the trustees of Lowry, Valentine, and Kirk, was now admitted, such trustees, in addi. tion to Lowry, Valentine, and Kirk, whom they represent, having received 20s. in the pound upon those acceptances which had been discounted by that firm would, in the same right thus receive out of the bankrupt's estate also a dividend upon the price of the goods, for which such acceptances had been passed to the extent of their proof for £12,329 48. 8d. The ruling of the Chief Clerk is, upon every principle, and upon decided authority, right; and the motion must be refused with costs, to be paid by the trustees of the estate of Lowry, Valentine, and Kirk, such trustees to have such costs, along with their own costs of this motion, out of the estate of Lowry, Valentine, and Kirk, so far as I have power to order them in this matter; but I make that declaration here as the expression of my opinion upon the motion, as before the court in this matter, that there was a fair question to bring before the court, and that the trustees were quite justified, by the largeness of the amount involved alone, in bringing that question before the court.

Ruling of the Chief Clerk affirmed.

BEDFORD COUNTY COURT.
Thursday, June 3.

(Before EDMOND BEALES, Esq., Judge).
Re JOHN ROBARTS (in Liquidation).

HIS HONOUR, at the sitting of this court, address.
ing Mr. Clare (who at the last court had made
an application in this matter), said: Mr. Clare,
I have, since the last court, more carefully con-
sidered the 8th rule in Bankruptcy of 1871, and
am of opinion that it does not support, as I then
thought it did, your contention that where the
estimated assets exceed £200 the higher scale of
costs is to be allowed, although the provable
debts do not exceed £750. My present construc-
tion of the rule, which is in accordance with that
of the registrar, would not have affected the
decision in your case, if, as you stated, both the
provable debts in Re Robarts exceeded £750, and
the estimated assets exceeded £200; but, as you
further stated, that you did not rely upon that
double fact, and that in the interest of the Pro-
fession you raised the point whether it was not
sufficient to show assets exceeding £200, I think
it right to state the conclusion I have come to
after a more careful consideration of the rule than
I was able to give on a former occasion. To sup-
port your contention the language of the rule, that
"where the provable debts of the debtor do not
exceed £750, or the estimated assets do not exceed
£200, a lower scale of attorney's costs shall be
allowed," must be interpreted to mean that such
lower scale is not to be allowed, and that the
costs are to be on the higher scale when either
the debts £750 or the assets exceed £200.
am of opinion that the words of the rule do not
admit of that interpretation, but that they ex-
pressly require the lower scale of costs to be
allowed when either the provable debts do not
exceed £750 or the estimated assets no not exceed
£200, and that the rule applies where the provable
debts do not exceed £750, although the estimated
assets exceed £200, and vice versa when the
estimated assets do not exceed £200, although

I

IN the last financial year the pensions for judicial services in Great Britain amounted to £58,681 38. 3d., and in Ireland to £17,258 188. 3d. THE Scotsman states that one of the Duke of Argyll's sons has just joined the Middle Temple, on Saturday night. and began to "eat his terms THE BOSTON ELECTION INQUIRY.-The 20th Aug. has been fixed by the commissioners for holding the inquiry into the alleged corrupt practices at Boston, when Mr. M'Intyre, Q.C., Mr. Wyndham Slade, and Mr. Douglas Straight will proceed to take evidence.

:

A PIECE of French wit: The will of a lawyer "to the idiots, "I give all my goods," said he, the lunatics, and the fools of my native town." "Why do you act thus ?" asked one of the testamentary witnesses. "It is from them that I have gained my fortune," replied he; "and it is only just that I should return to them that part which I have not spent myself."

If a pauper be nonsuited the usual practice is to tax the costs, and for non-payment to order him to be whipped. Bac. Ab. Pauper D. Salkeld reports: "I moved that a pauper might be whipped for nonpayment of costs upon a nonsuit, and the motion was denied by Holt, C.J., saying, 'he had no officer for that purpose, and never (2 Salk. 506, pl. 1.) knew it done.'"

Ar a meeting of the Artisans and Inventors Patent Law Committee (Mr. Thomas Paterson in the chair) it was resolved, "That this committee have heard with much regret, especially at the present crisis, of the sudden death of Mr. Thomas Webster, Q.C., F.R.S., who has done so much for patent law reform, and they are desirous of presenting their respectful sympathy and condolence to his family."

MR. JUSTICE BRETT has expressed an opinion in the Court of Common Pleas that persons who have committed several distinct acts of bribery at an election are liable to be prosecuted for each offence. Leave was given to proceed with fresh actions against defendants already convicted of corrupt practices at the municipal election at Kidderminster.

A CURIOUS omission is said to have been discovered in the Federal laws. A man was charged with personating a deputy United States marshal in New York, and a warrant for his arrest was applied for. A United States commissioner and two assistant district attorneys, after a long search through the statutes, discovered that there was no law making it a crime for a man to personate a deputy United States marshal, and the warrant

was refused.

IN the Court of Probate Sir James Hannen has sanctioned the appointment of a receiver to the estate of the late Lord St. Leonards and the grant of an annual allowance to an unmarried daughter. He took time to consider a further application by the Rev. Frank Sugden for a grant to maintain Boyle Farm, the family mansion, until it could be ascertained whether there was a valid will or an intestacy. It was stated in court that eight codicils had been discoved but no will.

FOUND AT EPSOM.-A pocket-book on the cover a monogram of "W. L.," over the helmet of a baronet), containing the following articles :Notes for a speech against the adjournment of the House of Commons over the Derby-day; notes for a speech in favour of the Permissive Bill. A brief inscribed," With you the Guik war of Baroda." A note-book, bound in canvas, and initialed "B.P., R.N., Barrister-at-Law," containing ma terials for a work to be called" Every sailor his own Lawyer.”—Punch.

A LITIGATION which commenced in 1868 ter. minated in the House of Lords on Tuesday, when the Lord Chancellor allowed the appeal of the Ashbury Railway Carriage and Iron Company from a judgment of the Exchequer Chamber holding them liable under a contract respecting the construction of a railway in Belgium, though it was alloged to be ultra vires, and outside the articles of association. The plaintiff, who had contracted to build the railway, relied upon a subsequent ratification of the transaction by the shareholders of the Ashbury Company, but the Lord Chancellor held that the evidence fell far short of what was required for ratification. AT the distribution of prizes in connection with the Evening Class Department at King's College, London, on Friday, 4th June, the following prizes and certificates in law were awarded: Special prize of £10 given by the Right Hon. Lord Selborne, to Mr. George Edward Teale; special prize of law books to the value of £3 38., given by Messrs. Butterworths, law publishers to the Queen, to Mr. H. W. Harding; the College prize to Mr. R. A. Roberts; the Professor's prize to Mr. A. A. Toms. Certificates of high distinction to Messrs. G. E. Teale, T. Welch, H. W. Harding, and W. Coates; and certificates of merit to Messrs. T. A. S. Keeley, B. Ward, G. Ennis, J. T. Edmonds, F. T. Green, T. H. Dicker, and J. Hayward.

THE following story is a good example of Lord Plunket's wit. Lord Wellesley's aide-de-camp Keppel wrote a book of his travels, and called it his personal narrative. Lord Wellesley was quizzing it, and said, "Personal narrative? What is a personal narrative? Lord Plunket, what should you say a personal narrative meant ?" Plunket answered, "My Lord, you know we lawyers always understand personal as contradistinguished from real." Parsons was another Irish barrister of that day who was noted for his caustic wit. Lord Norbury on some circuit was on the bench speaking, when an ass outside claimed, "Do stop that noise ?" Parsons_said, brayed so loud that nobody could hear. He ex

66

My Lord, there is a great echo here." Somebody said to him one day, "Mr. Parsons, have you heard of my son's robbery?" "No; 'whom

has he robbed ?"

THE ELECTION OF COUNTY CORONERS.

Among other subjects of legislation this session of Parliament we may mention the election of county coroners. Hitherto, the appointment of these public officers has been vested in the freeholders, and many a stout contest has been fought when a vacancy occurred. This, however, is now sought to be changed. We learn that it is proposed by a Bill in the House of Commons, issued recently, that on any vacancy of a county coronership in England the Lord Chancellor shall issue his precept for the election, on which the clerk of the peace is to give public notice to the justices and candidates, and the justices are to elect from among the candidates a fit and proper person to fill the office of coroner. The object of the measure is to remove the election from the freeholders, and to confine the power to the justices of each county. The Bill was introduced by Mr. Cole, Q.C., and Mr. Jenkins, the Liberal members for Falmouth, and it will meet with strenuous opposition.

THE Court of Exchequer has decided that the Royal Mail Steam Packet Company was not liable for the value of a passenger's box under the following circumstances: The plaintiff was a pas. senger from Southampton to Colon in the Elbe. The box in question was placed in the hold and labelled "Colon." Some days after the Elbe sailed the plaintiff was taken ill with typhoid fever, and was landed at Kingston, Jamaica, insensible. His box was also landed on the wharf by the defendants, but the plaintiff never saw or heard of it afterwards. One of the conditions printed on the face of the ticket, which the plaintiff signed, was that the company would not be answerable for loss, damage, or detention of baggage under any circumstances. The Lord Chief Baron, in delivering judgment, would not say there was not some degree of negligence in this case.

Whether or not, he would not hold the company liable without the authority of the House of Lords that such stipulations were wholly void.

EPPING FOREST.-We have reason to believe

that the unanimous judgment of the Epping Forrest Commissioners-one of whom was put on the commission to represent the interests of the lords of manors-being entirely in accord with that of the Master of the Rolls, on the important and vital point of common of pastures, claimed by the Corporation over the entire wastes of the forest, the City solicitor has requested the various lords of manors forthwith to remove the fences round the lands they have enclosed in the forest. The importance of this step will be understood by drawing attention to the fact that of the 6000 acres of land remaining to the public in the forest, a shortsighted and narrow minded policy has parted with the Crown rights over no less than 3556 acres for the paltry sum of £18,000 or there. abouts, so that the greater part of the forest is protected only by the right of common, which the corporation have sought for and successfully established before both tribunals, and by the exercise of which the step now taken by the City solicitor will restore to those who are entitled to enjoy it, and at the same time keep the forest open as one of the lungs of London for ever.-City Press.

It was

AMENITIES OF THE BENCH.-At the borough police court, Southampton, Joseph Dodman, and William Galley, in his employ, were charged with assaulting Isaac Perren. After hearing evidence pro and con. the Mayor said they considered the balance was in favour of the defendant Galley, and they dismissed the summons against him; but they thought Mr. Dodman had not pursued the course he ought to in a case like this, for instead of doing his utmost to repress the disturbance in which his workmen were engaged, he appeared to have taken some part in it. certainly a most unseemly affair, and Mr. Dodman had taken a part in it which he thought was very reprehensible. However, the bench thought the justice of the case would be met by a nominal fine of 58. and costs.-Mr. S. M. Emanuel: I must say that to this decision I object, because I consider Mr. Dodman did no more than his duty in the protection of his men.-The Mayor: I must ask Mr. Emanuel to obey the rules that govern the bench. A magistrate may be allowed to say he differs from the decision given; but to give an expression of opinion upon the case afterwards is very unseemly. Mr. Emanuel: I've had more experience on the bench than you have, Mr. Mayor, and I think I'm justified in making the remark.-Mr. Dodman: Now, will the magistrates kindly allow me to appeal against the decision? Mr. Killby (who happened to be in court at the time), will you be kind enough, now our little affair is amicably settled, to undertake this appeal on my behalf? (Laughter).-Mr. Cooksey: I'll save you 68. 8d., Mr. Dodman, by telling you that you cannot appeal unless the fine is 40s.-Mr. Dod. man: Will you, then, be kind enough to make it a 40s. penalty, gentlemen ?-The Mayor: We can't have any more of this. Will you remove Mr. Dodman from the court, Inspector Harris ?-Defendant then left the court.

of the Society of Gray's-inn, and among the visee a good one, the result being that wills conguests were the Right Hon. the Lord Chieftaining devises of land will not now require Justice of England, Vice-Chancellor Malins, Vice- registration where an immediate sale by the Chancellor Bacon, Vice-Chancellor Hall, Mr. devisee is contemplated, and no purchaser will at ston, the Treasurer of the Hon. Society of the Justice Lush, Baron Amphlett, Baron Huddle- any distance of time be able to require the will to be registered. The Act is objectionable both Inner Temple, the Lord Advocate of Scotland, the to purchasers from devisees and also to heirs-atHon. D. R. Plunket, Solicitor-General for Ireland; law; to the former, because they will have first Mr. Serjeant Sargood. The following Masters then to search for dealings by them; and secondly, Colonel Bulwer, Mr. E. Gibson, Q.C., M.P., and of all to ascertain who the heirs-at-law are, and of the Bench were present: Sir John Holker, and more particularly, to heirs-at-law, because it Solicitor General, Treasurer; Masters Man- will be quite impossible for them to satisfy puristy,, Q.C., Stephens, Q.C., Southgate, Q.C., chasers except by searches of all the memorials Ffooks, Q.C., Joyce, Q.C., Henniker, Q.C., which have been registered since the testator's Blunt, Tatham, Bayly, Streeten, Jolliffe, Carr, Edwards, Q.C., Wilde, Parker, Wigg, Whishaw, death, that there has not been a conveyance by some possible devisee, whose name of course would Arden, and Griffith. Previous to dinner the be unknown, of the property, it being remem Studentship in Jurisprudence and Roman Civil bered that, so far as regards real property, proof Law of 100 guineas, to continue for two years, at the Probate Court of a will is unnecessary. awarded by the Council of Legal Education in The Act of course only extends to freeholds, Trinity Term 1875, was presented by the treasurer the only persons entitled to deal with leaseholds to Miles Walker Mattinson, a student of the being those referred to in the documents, whether society. The society's scholarships for the present grant of probate or letters of administration, year were awarded as follows:-The Bacon issued by the Probate Court. The Registration Scholarship, £45 per annum, tenable for two Acts refer to the several Ridings of Yorkyears, to E. C. Thomas, B.A. of Oxford; and the shire and the town and county of Kingston. Holt Scholarship, £40 per annum, tenable for upon-Hull. The late Act altogether ignores two years, to W. E. Ball, LL.B., London, student the last-named place. Perhaps some Act of which of the society. The subject for the Lee Prize, an I am unaware has the effect of making the late Exhibition of £25, founded by John Lee, Q.C., Act extend to Kingston-upon-Hull. If not, the LL.D., late a bencher of the Inn, for next year is registry office for the East Riding and Kingston"The Judicature Act 1873, stating its object and upon-Hull now has two distinct practices, accordprovisions generally, and its probable effection on ing to the locality of the property. The object of the administration of the law in England." the Act is expressed to be "to simplify the title to land." Sect. 7 is not a step in that way, but very much in the contrary direction; and sect. 8 is not much better than the previous section. Both sections seem to have been formed with a view to render compulsory registration more desirable than the state of affairs which must arise from their effect. ROBERT LUNN.

CORRESPONDENCE OF THE

PROFESSION.

NOTE. This Department of the LAW TIMES being open to free discussion on all professional topics the Editors are not responsible for any opinions or statements contained in it.

THE VENDORS' AND PURCHASERS' ACT 1874. -Some months ago I gave you my views upon the probable evil effect of sect. 7. Now, if you will allow me, I will point out a few difficulties connected with sect. 8, which runs as follows: "Where the will of a testator, devising land in Middlesex or Yorkshire, has not been registered within the period allowed by law in that behalf, an assurance of such land to a purchaser or mortgagee by the devisee or by some one deriving title under him, shall, if registered before, take precedence of and prevail over any assurance from the Act (7 Anne, c. 20) provides (sect. 8) that all testator's heir-at-law." The Middlesex Registry after the death of a testator dying in Great memorials of wills registered within six months Britain, or within three years after the death of a testator dying elsewhere, shall be as valid and effectual against subsequent purchasers as if they had been registered immediately after the testathrough the concealment or suppression or contor's death; and (sect. 9) that in case the devisee, testing of the will, or other inevitable difficulty without his default, is unable to exhibit the memorial within the times before stated, and enters

a memorial of the contest or other impediment within two years after the death in Great Britain of the testator, or within four years after his death elsewhere, the registry of the memorial of the will within six months after the attaintment by the devisee of it, or of probate of it, or removal of the impediment is to be a sufficient registry within the meaning of the Act. No purchaser is to be disturbed unless the will be actually registered within five years of the testator's death (sect. 10). The Acts relating to the East, West, and North Ridings of Yorkshire, and the town and county of Kingston-upon-Hull, require wills to be registered in the same time as in the Middlesex Registry; but the time for registering the memorial of an impediment is fixed at six months, where the testator died in Great Britain, and three years when he died elsewhere. Except in the case of the North Riding Registry Act, where a purchaser from the heir-at-law is protected, unless the will is registered within three years of the testator's death, there is no protection to purchasers. From the above it will be seen that under ordinary circumstances a will should be registered within six months of the testator's death, and that in default the title of a purchaser from the heir-at-law, who duly regis tered his conveyance before the registration of the will, would prevail over the title of the devisee, but I am unable to come to the conclusion that there is any period allowed by law in which a will must be registered. Undoubtedly, under the former law, the title of a purchaser who registered his conveyance, from a devisee who did not register the will, would not prevail over that of a subsequent purchaser from the heirat-law, because the Acts make the will, which is the foundation of the title of the purchaser from the devisee, void against subsequent purchasers. The Vendors' and Purchasers' Act now steps in and makes the title of the purchaser from the de

- In your

"

LEGAL PRACTITIONERS' SOCIETY. number of 15th May, "A Country Solicitor desires that "solicitors or counsel only should be allowed to appear in the registration courts." Such a rule would in many cases amount to a practical denial of justice. I have found, after some years' experience as an honorary officer of registration societies, that solicitors often do not care to accept any political employment at all, and but very rarely when it is purely honorary. For some years past I have represented my party interests at the county, borough, and municipal revision courts, holden within the district watched because, otherwise, in many of these courts, there over by the organisations to which I refer, and objections, we not being in a position to fee would have been no one to support our claims solicitors or counsel. I am bound to say that I have always been treated with the utmost cour tesy by the revising barristers before whom I have appeared, and by the solicitors to whom I have been opposed, and who one and all knew well that I was not a professional man, but only AN HONORARY SECRETARY. [Our correspondent would no doubt adopt your views as to honorary services.-ED.]

THE STAMP ACT. I should be glad of a reply to the following question by any of your readers. By the Stamp Act 1870, sect. 96, all agreements for leases under thirty-five years are to be stamped as leases, and leases made in pursuance of such agreements are to be charged 6d. stamp duty only. What is there to show when such a lease is produced in court that it is properly stamped? Must one of two things be done, either the original agreement, duly stamped, be produced, or a denoting stamp on the lease? for if this is so it is a matter of great inconvenience. Who thinks of keeping an agreement for a lease with any particular care when the lease is once granted, and if to avoid having to do this one has to obtain a denoting stamp, who will take the trouble at Somerset House to check the lease with the agreement to see that the one is granted in conformity with the other? The case appears to me to be one of the jumbles created by those who find it easy to draft a clause, but have little idea of the practicability of carrying it out.

C. E. W.

extraordinary document which has to-day come TOUTING.-I inclose for your perusal a most into my hands. (A circular note signed by a Solicitor.) I was concerned for the plaintiffs in a small action in the City of London Court, and obtained a verdict. It seems that judgments Perry or Stubbs. This of itself is highly improper, are registered in some paper or other, I suppose because any defendant resisting an unjust claim is open to be considered in difficulties. Perhaps no objection could be taken to the attorney issuing a circular and touting for business if the circumstances he states are correct. But in this case it is clear that, if execution had been issued pre

viously to the filing of a petition, the execution creditors could not be restrained, as stated in the circular, the amount being under £50; this the attorney must have known as he calls it a County Court judgment. I may mention that the attorney has only recently been admitted, having been previously an accountant in Basinghall-street. W. F. N.

[The circular is similar to that published in our issue of the 29th ult. It would seem as if the advertiser sends his circular to all persons against whom he finds judgments have been signed, without regard to whether such persons have solicitors of their own or not.-ED. SOLS'. DEPT.]

HONOURS AND AUTHORSHIP NOTICED IN LAW LIST.-Though unable to agree with one of your correspondents in your paper of the 22nd ultimo, that it would be advisable for solicitors to wear a semi-clerical attire, I quite agree with him that solicitors should be entitled to add the letters S.S.C. after their names, though I fancy few would care to avail themselves of the privilege. I wish, however, to draw your attention to a matter which I think is of somewhat more importance, and one on which, so far as I know, the Profession has not yet had the advantage of receiving your opinion namely, the advisableness of the compilers of the Law List stating, after the description of barristers and solicitors who have taken honours in their examinations, what honours they have taken. I have little doubt this would stimulate more students to read for honours than do so at present, and would only be fair to the succesful ones. At present there is no very great inducement to young men to read for honours, as the monetary value of the prizes is very small indeed (a Clifford's-inn prizeman obtains books to the value of £5, less a very large per-centage for binding), and few beyond the student's immediate friends ever hear of his success, or, at all events, remember it in six months' time, and he certainly reaps no advantage in his Profession from it. If it were mentioned in the Law List it might be of great service to him in obtaining clerkships and in numerous other ways. I would also suggest that where any gentleman mentioned in the Law List is an author of published works the fact should be mentioned there, as it is in the case of doctors and surgeons in the Medical Directory. X. Y. Z.

OF

THE RATING ACT 1874.-VALUATION SPORTING RIGHTS.-The 6th section of this Act enacts that where any right of sporting is severed from the occupation of the land and is not let, and the owner of such right receives rent for the land, the right shall not be separately valued or rated, but the gross and rateable value of the land shall be estimated as if the said right were not severed. The section further enacts, that, subject to the foregoing provisions, the owner of any right of sporting when severed from the occupation of the land, may be rated as the occupier thereof. I shall be glad to know the views of some of your correspondents upon the powers of the assessment committee with reference to the rating of shooting. Must every occupier be separately rated, and the rate show separately the amount on the land and the amount on the sporting? Is the sum each particular tenant may care to give for the sporting over his occupation to be considered the value, or is the value to be that which the general public would give for the sporting over the lands? If the owner (where the right of sporting is severed from the land and not let) elect to be rated as occupier, can the committee rate his lands in one amount (such as 1s. an acre over the whole), or must they, notwithstanding such election, rate the sporting on each occupation separately, as if the right were not severed from the tenant's occupation? A SUBSCRIBER.

NOTES AND QUERIES ON POINTS OF PRACTICE.

NOTICE.-We must remind our correspondents that this column is not open to questions involving points of law such as a solicitor should be consulted upon. Queries will be excluded which go beyond our limits. N.B. None are inserted unless the name and address of the writers are sent, not necessarily for publication, but as a guarantee for bona fides.

Queries.

45. ARTICLES.-A. was articled to B. on 28th Decem ber 1871 for five years. B. died 11th January 1873. On 21st February 1873 A.'s articles were assigned to C. (1) When will A.'s service be complete? And in what term previously to the expiration of service may A. attend for examination? (2) A 10s. stamp was affixed to the assignment of articles. Should the stamp have been a £1 one, i.e., 10s. for assignment of orignal articles, and 10s. for further articles of the forty-one days, the time which elapsed between the death of B. and the P. B. assignment to C. P

[(1) a. on the 6th of February, 1877; b. in Hilary Term 1877. (2) We believe the deed stamp is considered sufficient.-ED. SOLS'. DEPT.]

She

49. WILL-CHARGES ON PROPERTY.-A. B. by his will devised certain heriditaments to his daughter R. R. for life, and after her death to her husband E. R. for his life, and after the death of the survivor of them to their daughter M. R., her heirs and assigns for ever. paying thereout within twelve months after the determination of the prior estates herein before given or limited therein, the sum of £100 each to her three sisters then living next to her in seniority of age. R. R., the wife, is dead. M. R., the daughter, died under the age of twenty-one years. There are no words in the will charging these sums of £60 each upon the hereditaments. Can any of your correspondents inform me whether E. R., as heir-at-law of his daughter, can make a title to the property to a purchaser free from these charges, or whether they still attach? A reference S. E. H. to any case will oblige.

Answers.

(Q. 18.) PROTECTION ORDER.-The case of D in the goods of Ann Elliott (L. Rep. 2 P. & D. 274) decides that the protection order operates upon all property obtained by the woman since the date of the desertion. See also the case of Re Kingsley's Trusts (28 L. J. N. S. 80, Eq.). S.

(Q. 24.) DESCRIPTION OF DIVORCED WOMAN.-On dissolution of marriage the respective parties may marry

again as if the prior marriage had been dissolved by death (20 & 21 Vict. c. 85, s. 57; 31 & 32 Vict. c. 77, s. 4). A marriage, therefore, by a divorced person with his divorced wife's sister or any other person within the prohibited degrees, &c., through the wife would be illegal. (Br. & Had. Comms., vol. 3, p. 412.) The inference from this is that a divorced woman is not considered as a spinster, and should not be described as such; widow would not do either, perhaps a divorced woman might.

A. B..

(Q 25.) SALE OF LAND.-I think that D. would be entitled to compel specific performance against B. and the trustee of C.'s bankruptcy upon payment of the balance of the purchase money. It is not necessary that equitable interests should be dealt with by docuS. ment under seal.

I

There

The bankrupt has in effect contracted to let D. have the benefit of his first contract at a premium. do not think the trustee can disclaim any part of the transaction, as it does not seem unprofitable. fore D. should pay the remainder of his purchase money to the trustee, or as he shall direct, and take a conveyance from B. by the direction of the trustee. J. M.

(Q. 26.) CASE WANTED.-The case I presume that "S. B. E." requires in his query is Moule v. Garrett and others (22 L. T. Rep. N. S. 343; 39 L. J., 69 Ex.; L. Rep. 5, Ex. 132).

A

(Q. 35.) LEGACY DUTY-is clearly payable under the will of A. as if the deceased nephews had survived. legacy duty is also payable under the wills of such deceased nephews. Q. K.

(Q. 36.) PROBATE DUTY.-If there be no trust for sale, but only a discretionary power, and no sale is intended to take place, no probate duty is payable. If, however, a sale actually takes place, I fear the Court of Exchequer would hold that probate duty would be payable as suggested in the question. See articles on "Duties payable by reason of death," in December 1873 and S. following month.

-I think there is a conversion from the testator's death, and that the words "in their discretion" give the trustees authority to postpone the actual sale without prejudicing the equitable conversion. J. M.

(Q. 37.) STAMP ACTS.-Contracts under seal are not to be stamped as agreements under the Stamp Act 1870, but as deeds. (Chitty, Cont., 9th edit., p. 112.) I may direct the attention of "A. H. H." to 30 & 31 Vict. c.

131, s. 37, which says any contract which if made between private persons would be required to be in writing, and signed, &c., may be made on behalf of a company in writing. signed by any person acting under the express or implied authority of the company. A. B.

(Q. 38.) AUDIENCE BEFORE MAGISTRATES.-Without doubt magistrates have the power to prevent a person from appearing before them as an advocate, unless such person be admitted and enrolled, &c., and on the roll at the time of his so acting. (6 & 7 Vict. c. 73, s. 2.) By 23 & 24 Vict. c. 127, s. 26, every person who acts as an attorney or solicitor, not being one, is liable to a penalty of fifty pounds, and every clerk who acts as an attorney or solicitor, in the name of his employer, would, I imagine, render him liable to the above mentioned penalty. C. C. H.

In "Oke's Magisterial Synopsis," vol. i., p. 68, it is said that by s. 2 of the Attorneys and Solicitors Act (6 & 7 Vict. c. 73) no person can act as an attorney or solicitor before justices unless he has been admitted and enrolled; but by a rule at the Mansion House, London, gentlemen who are neither barristers nor solicitors, representing public departments, or the articled clerks of solicitors retained for a party, are permitted to act as advocates. A. B.

The conveyance referred to by " Amicus" is, according to Williams on Real Property, an effectual conveyance of the fee simple, absolute in the property to the husband, for although a man and wife are in law considered as one person, and cannot directly convey the one to the other, yet this object may be effected by the aid of the Statute of Uses. With regard to the second point, I am of opinion that (in this case) no consideration was necessary, as E. F. was not intended to take any estates, and was merely a conduit pipe to pass the estate to C. B. the husband. Had it been intended that he should take the legal estate, and the deed was made before 1845, a consideration of 5s. or 10s. would have been necessary to raise a use. As to this point, I refer "Amicus to page 153 Williams on Real Property, T. E. L.

ninth edition.

(Q. 41.) BILL OF SALE.-"It is impossible for a man to make a valid grant in law of that in which he has no actual or potential property. The property in goods to be hereafter acquired may, however, be effectually passed by an assignment thereof of in equity, coupled with a license to seize them :" (Wms. Pers. Prop. 8th ed. p. 34.) A. B.

(Q. 42.) MORTGAGE-DEVISE.-C. and D. are the parties to receive the money. I do not think payment to A. and B. would discharge the mortgagor. 37 & 38 Vict. c. 78, s. 4 enables C. and D. to re-convey the estate, as well as give a proper receipt for the money. If the testator died after the passing of that Act 7th August 1874, it may be a question whether his devise of mortgaged estates to A. and B. is not inoperative, and whether C. and D. are not entitled to them in spite of the will. J. M.

LAW SOCIETIES.

BRADFORD LAW STUDENTS' SOCIETY. A MEETING of this society was held in the Society's Room on Wednesday, the 2nd June instant. Mr. Saville occupied the chair. The subject for discussion was as follows: "A. contracts a debt with B. in March 1865 to the extent of £20. In Jan. 1870 A. writes to C. as follows: Lend me £20 to pay B. the debt I owe him of that amount,' C. refuses, and in 1872 B. sues A. for the amount. Is the letter an acknowledgment within the Statute of Limitation, provided B. can prove it to be in the handwriting of A." Mr. Taylor and Mr. Wheelwright (the latter gentleman appearing in the absence of Mr. Barlow) supported the affirmative, and Mr. Holmes, who was supported by Mr. Junnicliffe and Mr. Clough, the negative. After a very interesting debate, the question was decided in the negative by the casting vote of the chair

man.