Government to which we have referred, and abstain from criticising the rules. We cannot think a complete abstention would be desirable. On the other hand, it would be obviously inconvenient, and it would perhaps be fatal to the Bill itself, if every little detail were to be considered open to discussion. And with all respect to the practising barristers in the House of Commons, although they number amongst them many able equity and many able common law practitioners, it is doubtful whether any single one of them possesses that combination of common law and equity knowledge which alone could make him a really competent critic of details. Still, by association of more minds than one, and by a careful selection of salient points, some useful improvements might no doubt be made, and we think that if à priori alterations are to be made at all, it would be much better that they should be made in Parliament than by the Judges. If the Judges are to make the alterations, the best plan would be to dock the 160 pages of rules from the Bill altogether, and to print them separately as "rules which the Judges at present propose, but may alter." Finally, we hope that no more time will be lost. We have heard many expressions of opinion, complimentary and otherwise, as to the Judicature Act, but on this point we believe the Profession to be unanimous. As it must now be considered to be settled that the Act is to come into operation, it only remains to pass the amending Bill with all reasonable speed.

THE decision of Vice-Chancellor HALL in the case of Gillett v. Thornton L. Rep. 19 Eq. 599) is of great importance with reference to the construction of the 11th section of the Common Law Procedure Act 1854. In July 1869, the plaintiff entered into partnership with the defendant in the business of millers, and articles were drawn providing that the partnership should be for one year, and fixing the amount of capital, shares of the partners, and certain other matters. The 15th section provided for a general account, within one calendar month, after the end of the partnership, and the 16th constituted a tolerably full abitration clause, whereby any doubt, difference, or dispute between the parties or their representatives in any way connected with the premises, or the rights, duties, or liabilities of either party, or whenever any valuation should be required, was to be submitted to arbitrators or their umpire. The partnership was continued by parol and at will from July 1870, to Dec. 1873, when, by mutual consent, it was ended. Questions of account arose, and defendant, who was a widow, gave notice that she would appoint an arbitrator under clause 16 of the articles. Negotiations went on, and payments were made without any final settlements being arrived at, until, in Dec. 1874, the defendant gave notice that as the plaintiff had not appointed anyone to act for him, her arbitrator would proceed with the partnership accounts, upon which the plaintiff filed his bill. The defendant applied for proceedings to be stayed, and that the arbitrator might take accounts, and appoint a receiver. The VICE-CHANCELLOR decided that in conformity with Willesford v. Watson (L. Rep. 8 Ch. 473; 28 L. T. Rep. N. S. 428) the jurisdiction should be exercised if the court saw no reason why the matters should not be referred to arbitration. He held that the arbitration clause was not confined to the one year, and was very inclusively expressed, and the court could subsequently appoint a receiver if it should be necessary. The judgment is based upon somewhat narrow grounds, but a very broad principle underlies it, and the case will, no doubt, be cited hereafter in support of the doctrine that where partnerships are entered into for a term of years under articles of agreement, and continued by parol beyond the term, they shall, primâ facie, be held to be subject to the original conditions, so far as they are applicable. An analogy is supplied by the case of a lessee holding on after the expiration of his lease as tenant from year to year. Though there seems to be no authority directly in point, it is generally held that the terms of the lease remain in force in so far as they are applicable to a yearly tenancy.

THE decision of Vice-Chancellor BACON in the case of Pryor v. Pryor (L. Rep. 19 Eq. 595; 32 L. T. Rep. N. S. 146) appears to us scarely reconcilable with the 4th section of the Partition Act 1868, as it has been judicially expounded. In this case there was an application to stay proceedings on the proposal of the defendants for the sale of an estate under a decree made in July 1864, on the ground that the court had no power to order such sale without the consent of the applicants. The suit of Pryor v. Pryor was instituted in May 1864, and the usual partition decree made, with the following addition, which it is important to note: "And any of the parties are to be at liberty before the commission shall be issued, to carry in proposals for a sale or for a partition of the said hereditaments before the Judge in chambers." Various proceedings in the suit took place subsequently; there were transmissions of interest, and in 1873 a supplemental bill was filed in order, amongst other things, that the decree of 1864 might be carried into effect. The question whether the court had power to direct a compulsory sale was raised by adjourned summons. Act says that if a party or parties interested to the extent of one moiety, desire a sale, the court shall, unless it sees good reason to the contrary, direct a sale accordingly. The case of Lys v. Lys

The

(L. Rep. 7 Eq. 126; 19 L. T. Rep. N. S. 409) decides that this section is retrospective, and a sale was directed, though the bill in that suit was filed in 1867, before the Act was passed. The result of the decision in the present case seems to be entirely negative. The application could not be granted. "In point of form," the VICE-CHANCELLOR says, "I cannot prohibit-unless they are content to take what I say nowthe plaintiffs from carrying in proposals for a sale, any more than I can prohibit the defendant from saying the court has no jurisdiction to make a sale." The decree which is pronounced does not countenance any such jurisdiction or give any such power. Partition alone can be the result of this decree. We cannot see, if Lys v. Lys be right, why the Judge should not have ordered a sale in this case. In each case the suit had been instituted before the Act. It is true that in Lys v. Lys no decree had been made, but a suit does not terminate with a decree, and in Pryor v. Pryor many proceedings took place subsequent to the decree, some of them after the Act of 1868. We cannot, therefore, understand what the VICE-CHANCELLOR means when he says, "This was a suit which was over and done with, and gone before the Act of Parliament was passed." Does the learned Judge mean by this elegant sentence that a Chancery suit is ended as soon as a decree of whatever kind, even if, as in this case, it is not definitive by its very terms, is made? He allows the Act to be retrospective, and if he does not mean this, why should he choose one period in a suit rather than another, to be the period beyond which the Act is not to look back. Lys v. Lys and Pryor v. Pryor certainly cannot stand together.

:

WHAT is the effect of an order of discharge in bankruptcy upon after acquired property? In Re Bennett's Trusts (L. Rep. 19 Eq. 245), Vice-Chancellor BACON held that such an order in liquidation protects the person of the debtor, but leaves all property acquired during the continuance of the liquidation liable for the existing debts. In Ebbs v. Boulnois, which was a suit for the specific performance of a contract to purchase property of the aforesaid description, the MASTER of the ROLLS held that he was bound by the authority of Re Bennett's Trusts, though he did not approve of the reasons or decision of ViceChancellor BACON. An appeal was made to the LORDS JUSTICES, and they, approving the opinion of the MASTER of the ROLLS, have reversed his decision. Sect. 15 of the Bankruptcy Act 1869, enacts, inter alia, that "The property of the bankrupt divisible amongst his creditors shall comprise the following particulars all such property as may belong to or be vested in the bankrupt at the commencement of the bankruptcy, or may be acquired by or devolve on him during its continuance." Now what is meant by continuance? In many cases, though the debts are speedily proved, the realisation of the assets takes a long time, perhaps some years. In such cases it is usual when the debtor appears to merit an order of discharge, to grant it before the termination of the realisation. Is there then such a continuance that newly acquired property of the debtor is liable for former debts? Vice-Chancellor BACON would hold that there is. On the other hand sect. 49, inter alia, says that an order of discharge shall be sufficient evidence of the bankruptcy and of the validity of the proceedings thereon, and in any proceedings that may be instituted against a bankrupt who has obtained an order of discharge in respect of any debt from which he is released by such order, the bankrupt may plead that the cause of action accrued before his discharge. It also enacts that it shall release the bankrupt with certain specified exceptions from all debts. The MASTER of the ROLLS considered that this section did release property acquired after the making of the order of discharge. The Lord Justice MELLISH held that sect. 15 is modified by sect. 47; that any other construction would seriously diminish the power of the creditors, and that although sect. 47 authorises the court, if satisfied that the whole of the property of the bankrupt has been realised for the benefit of his creditors, or so much thereof as can be realised without needlessly protracting the bankruptcy, to make an order that the bankruptcy has closed, yet such a authority would be nugatory without the aforesaid modification. Sect. 49, he said, " meant that an order of discharge is to operate as an actual release by the creditors. The plain and natural sense of the language is that the future property is to be a debtor's own; sect. 48 is really a proviso of sect. 15." And Lord Justice JAMES held that "If a debtor gave up to his creditors property worth half a million of money, and it happened to be detained in court for years by the existence of a suit like that of Powell v. Elliott, which commenced before his Lordship was Vice-Chancellor, and was not yet concluded, so that the assets could not be realised, and for that reason the bankruptcy or liquidation must be continued, it would be monstrous if, in such a case, the debtor must remain a pariah or an outlaw, incapable of acquiring anything but his wearing apparel until the bankruptcy or liquidation was closed." We have already remarked that the question was raised in a suit for specific performance. But as the decision is that of the LORDS JUSTICES, though not sitting in Bankruptcy, the CHIEF JUDGE will doubtless deem that he is bound thereby.

SPECIFIC LEGACIES.

Ir seems impossible to give such a definition of a specific legacy as will render the decision of each case as it arises simple and obvious. All that can be done is to examine a large number of authorities, and the precise terms used in each, and to decide in accordance with those cases in which language has been used most nearly resembling what has been employed in the case under inquiry. It is, in fact, a question requiring the most careful scrutiny of past decisions, but in general the difficulty is solved off-hand as one of first impression. This seems, at all events, to have been the case in Page v. Young, decided by Vice-Chancellor Malins (L. Rep. 19 Eq. 501). The words in the will were, "I give to my dear sister, A. M. Dendy, the interest of £4500, money in the funds, for her absolute use and benefit." The ViceChancellor held this to be a specific legacy, and as the testatrix at her death had only about £4000 Consols, the legatee was a considerable loser by the decision. It seems to us that the authorities are very strong against this view. There was no evidence to show that a precise sum in a particular investment was meant, and the word "funds" is vague and applicable to more than one species of investment. And there were no such words as my," or which I now possess," which have sometimes been decided to constitute a legacy specific. Moreover, it is not clear whether the testatrix meant £4500 stock in the funds, or £4500 worth of stock; the use of the word "money" seems rather to favour the latter construction, in which the legacy was clearly general.

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But apart from this last point, a large number of cases may be collected in which words similar to the present have constituted the legacy general and not specific. And the Vice-Chancellor is condemned by the words he used himself in Oliver v. Oliver (L. Rep. 11 Eq. 506; 24 L. T. Rep. N. S. 350). "If 1 give £10,000 Consols standing in my name, that is specific, and if I sell the stock in my lifetime, the legacy fails. If I give £10,000 stock, that is general, because the executors must buy stock to meet it, in case I do not leave stock for the purpose." Similarly £1000 capital South Sea Stock" (Partridge v. Partridge For. 226), "the interest of £100 New South Sea Annuities (Simmons v. Vallance 4 Bro. C. C. 345), “ £200 Four per Cent. Consolidated Bank Annuities (Wilson v. Brownsmith, 9 Ves. 180) "£8000 stock in the Five per Cent. Irish Fund, and £4000 in the Three per Cent. Reduced Stock," have all been held to be general and not specific legacies. In Sibley v. Perry (7 Ves. 522) the testator directed his executor to "transfer £1000 stock in the public funds commonly styled the Three per Cent. Consolidated, to each of my relations hereafter mentioned." Lord Eldon held the bequest to be general. "There is no case," he says, "deciding that it is specific, without something marking the specific thing, the very corpus; without describing it as standing in his name, or by the expression of my stock,' &c." In Deane v. Test (9 Ves. 146) a testator devised to his sister-in-law "the interest of £4000 stock in the Four per Cent. Consolidated Annuities in the Bank of England," for her life. In a subsequent part of the will he bequeathed" £2000 more to be paid out of " the said £4000 stock, and Lord Eldon held the latter a general legacy, notwithstanding the precise reference to the particular fund. In many of these cases there were much stronger grounds for holding the legacies specific than in Page v. Young, but they were all held general, and certainly that case is utterly inconsistent with Vice-Chancellor Malins's own remarks above cited, and with the strong disinclination at all times manifested by the Court to construe legacies specific if it can be avoided. See the cases cited 7 Ves. 529, and the remarks in 1 Roper and White on Legacies, 209. The true rule is stated in 1 Roper and White, 214, that where a legacy is "generally of stocks or annuities, or of stocks or annuities in particular funds without further explanation, the fact of the testator happening to possess stocks or annuities in the funds described will not make the bequest specific"; and that, secondly, a clear intention to bequeath the identical stock, &c., the testator was possessed of, constitutes the legacy specific. The judgment of the Vice-Chancellor, therefore, can scarcely be maintained, either upon principle or authority.

PENAL ACTIONS.

THE attention of the public having been lately directed to actions by common informers, it will be well to take a cursory survey of the law of the subject. The Statute Book is loaded with particular provisions conferring this peculiar right of action. One general statute has been passed in favour of plaintiffs, and four general statutes in favour of defendants. And divers particular statutes, of which we will give a few examples, have from time to time restricted or abolished the plaintiff's right ad hoc, in cases of peculiar hardship, such as that of the Brighton Aquarium, in which Mr. Cross was understood to meditate the application of a previously unheard of, and, we fully believe, a non-existing power, of remission by the Crown, under 22 Vict. c. 32.

The right of the informer upon a penal statute, if a party grieved, is at common law. See Com. Dig. tit. "Action upon Statute," where it is said, citing 2 Inst. 55, that " upon every statute made for the remedy of any injury, mischief, or grievance, an action lies by the party grieved, either by the express words of

the statute, or by implication." But very early in our history it became the custom, in creating an offence by statute, to prescribe at the same time the liquidated damages, so to speak, which the party grieved might recover from the offender. The most ancient instance of this practice (of which, however, the germ is to be found in still earlier statutes giving double costs) appears to be that of 8 Hen. 6, stat. 9 (Revised Statutes, vol. 1, p. 311), against defaulting sheriffs, which provides that the sheriff may be proceeded against as well by bill at the suit of the party grieved, as for the King by indictment, and that if the sheriff be duly attainted by indictment or by bill, then he who sueth for himself and the King shall have the one moiety of the forfeiture of £20, together with his costs. This, in lawyer's modern parlance, is qui tam by the party grieved. "Actions popular," as they came to be called, gradually split up into three different classes-the penal action pur et simple, the penal action qui tam, and the penal action, sometimes qui tam and sometimes not, by the party grieved. The first general statute passed respecting these actions was 4 Hen. 7, st. 20. The recital is historically instructive. "Whereas accions populers," says the Legislature, speaking English for the first time, "have been ordeigned by many gode actis afore this tyme made, for the reformacion of extorcions and wronges, which accions be verry penale to all mysdoers and offendours in suche accions condempned, and much profitable as well to your Highness as to each of your subgiettis that theym woll sue and maynteryn, if the same accions so sued and comenced might be truly pursued without coozne or collusion." We are then told in plaintive language how many instances of collusion there have been, causing the offenders "to be bolder to offend your Grace." The enactment follows that a plaintiff in such an action may reply "covin" to a plea in bar of judgment recovered, i.e., may prosecute his suit to judgment notwithstanding the defendant had procured another plaintiff in collusion with him. We will not pause to inquire how far a recent "friendly suit," in which a Treasury clerk was plaintiff, and the Brighton Aquarium Company defendants, could be held to contravene the spirit of this venerable but still unrepealed statute, which punishes a defendant condemned of covin with two years' imprisonment, but will pass on to the reactionary measure which succeeded it. This was 18 Eliz. c. 5, "For redressinge of divers disorders in comon informers" (18 Eliz. c. 5), which provides that the common informer must sue in person must iudorse his name and the act sued on upon his process, and not compound with defendant until after answer, nor without leave of the court, the penalty for compounding without leave being disability to sue in future," upon any statute populer or penal," and £10 penalty itself, also recoverable at the suit of a common informer. "So fleas have little fleas to bite 'em, And they have fleas ad infinitum." Soon afterwards, 31 Eliz. c. 5, which recited that "divers of the Queen's Majesties subjects be daylie unjustlie vexed and disquieted by divers comon informers upon penall statutes, notwithstanding any former statute that hath been made againste their disorders," restricted the right of action to the "party grieved" (this has no prospective operation) made the venue local, and fixed the period of limitation in case of qui tam to one year. As two years is given as the limit in case of penalties limited to the Crown only, and as no mention is made of cases where the penalty is limited to the informer only, the presumption is that these latter cases were of more modern date than the statute of Elizabeth. The next Act was 21 Jac. 1, c. 44, which after reciting that "the poore comons of this realme are grievouslie charged.... by divers troublesome persons commonly called relators, informers, and promotors," prescribed that the informer, should take a corporall oath that the offence was committed in the county where the action was brought. Finally, the Limitation Statute, 3 & 4 Will. 3, c. 3, gave the party grieved two years within which to bring his action. It is, perhaps, true to say that of late years the practice of giving the right of popular action has very much fallen into desuetude. In the present Public Health Bill however (see p. 154, sched. v., pt. 2) it has been thought proper to re-enact 11 & 12 Vict., c. 63, sect. 83, which prescribes that any person burying a corpse in a grave constructed "contrary to this enactment" shall for every such offence "be liable to a penalty not exceeding £50, which may be recovered by any person, with full costs of suit, in an action of debt "-a futile provision; for what common informer would take the trouble to recover a penalty which may be mitigated? The essence of popular actions is that the penalty should be a sum certain. The good old popular action of our ancestors has at all events appeared in a very debased form in this Bill of 1875. By the way, it is curious to find that the common informer has recently obtained a footing in the County Court. An Act passed only last year (37 & 38 Vict. c. 48, s. 3), provides that if any employer (in the hosiery trade) "shall bargain to deduct, or shall deduct, from the wages of any artificer in his employ any part of such wages for frame rent and standing," he shall forfeit the sum of £5 to be recovered in the County Court at the suit, not only of the workman injured, but "of any person who shall sue for the same."

It is not surprising that the sudden application of penal laws,

either obsolete or forgotten, should have led now and then to “a clipping of the wings," as Mr. Cross would say, of the common informer. A list of four instances previous to 1843 may be found in Grant v. Ridley (5 M. & G. 201), in which the defendant had vainly sought to have proceedings stayed in an action to recover penalties amounting to £21,500. The court met him with quotations from Magna Charta, and flatly refused to deny or delay the plaintiff's right to justice. But Parliament quickly interfered, and (by 6 & 7 Vict. c. 2) enacted that a Judge should, upon application by a defendant, order any action, brought either before or after the passing of the Act, to be discontinued "upon payment of the costs thereof incurred to the time of such application being made." This Act was retrospective.

Again, by 9 & 10 Vict. c. 33, which was not retrospective, it was enacted that the consent of the Attorney-General should be first obtained by any person wishing to bring a penal action under either 39 Geo. 3, c. 79, or 57 Geo. 3, c. 19, under which certain secret societies, "inconsistent with publick tranquillity and with the existence of regular Government," may still be vigorously suppressed, and unregistered lodges of Freemasons may be proceeded against as "unlawful confederacies," if the Government of the day should be inclined to prosecute. Similarly, the Larceny Amendment Act 1870 (which is retrospective), interposes the Attorney-General's consent as a condition precedent to suing for penalties incurred by the printers of newspapers inserting advertisements in which the advertiser promises a handsome reward, "with no questions asked," for the recovery of stolen goods.

It will be seen that in both these latter instances the statutory offence was one against public order in which case the law officer of the Crown would be an apt judge as to whether the penalties should be enforced or not, and in which the opinion of the public, so far as it has any, would probably be all on one side. Very different is the case of Sunday entertainments, upon the desirability of which people differ both fiercely and widely. Our sympathies are, with Lord Chief Baron Kelly, and Justices Blackburn and Field, strongly on the side of liberty, but we do not think it would be fair to either side to allow the question, now that it has been thoroughly raised, to be tossed over to the discretion of the Attorney-General for the time being. A well-known anti-Sabbatarian has recently suggested the formation of a league to prosecute offenders against all the various Sunday Acts which still remain upon the statute book. His proposal is, and he cites Bentham as an authority for its principle, and the repeal of the taxes upon knowledge as an instance of its success, to bring penal actions right and left with the view of directing public opinion adversely to the present state of the law. Common informers will then be divided into three more classes. There will be the Sabbatarian who will sue on principle, there will be the anti-Sabbatarian who will sue on principle also, but a different principle, and there will be the common informer par excellence who will sue for the sake of gain. An energetic gentleman of this latter description could, assuming the solvency of defendants, realise about £100,000 under the Sunday Entertainment Act. To have to draw the line between the different kinds of entertainment on the one hand, and between the different kinds of plaintiffs on the other, would be a strain greater than a law officer should be called upon to bear.

It now appears that Mr. Cross proposes to bring in a Bill to extend the operation of the Crown remission of penalties under 22 Vict. c. 32, to penal actions under the Sunday Entertainment Act. Perhaps a particular and temporary measure of the kind may be the best available means of meeting the present difficulty. But we must earnestly deprecate any general meddling with "popular actions" until a satisfactory Public Prosecutors' Act has been placed upon the statute book.

FALSIFICATION OF ACCOUNTS' BILL.

AT the last Spring Assizes held at Taunton one Edward Saunders was indicted for forgery and embezzlement under the following circumstances. Saunders was chief clerk and manager of a branch of Stuckey's Banking Company at Williton. He kept an ordinary current account with the bank which he overdrew by a sum of 15001. Afraid that this would be found out, he falsified the accounts by having recourse to the ingenious plan of debiting a customer with the sum of 1000l., and crediting himself with a like sum. In that way he reduced his liability to 500l. This was afterwards discovered, and he was indicted for forgery and embezzlement. It is certainly difficult to understand what could have induced such a prosecution, which evidently could not be sustained. Embezzlement there could not possibly have been, and in the face of the case, Re Windsor (34 L. J., N.S., 163, Mag. Cas.), it was clear he could not be found guilty of forgery. In that case Windsor, a clerk in the Mercantile Bank of New York, had made false entries in the accounts of the bank. He escaped into this country, were he was arrested, and an application was made by the Government of the United States for his extradition under the treaty. This application was based on the fact that by a statute of the State of New York it was enacted that, "Every person who with intent to defraud shall make any false entry.. in any book of account, kept by any monied corporation within

the State, shall upon conviction be adjudged guilty of forgery." The Court of Queen's Bench (Cockburn, C.J., Blackburn and Shee, JJ.) held, that it was not forgery within the meaning of the treaty. The Lord Chief Justice said, "There is no doubt that false entries were made by him for fraudulent purpsses, but it is also quite clear that according to the law of this country these entries did not amount to forgery, and I must take it that according to the general law of the United States, which in the aggregate corresponds with the law of this country, it would equally fail in amounting to forgery." Mr. Justice Blackburn also said, "The entries were false and wilfully false, but they do not amount to forgery..... Telling a lie does not become forgery because it is reduced into writing." This case practically was on all fours with the case of Saunders, and Baron Pigott before whom it was tried, decided that no case had been made out against the prisoner, and he was acquitted.

The case was one of considerable importance to the banking and commercial community, and it was hardly likely that the state of the law in this respect would be allowed to remain. It was with no surprise, therefore, that we observed introduced into Parliament a Bill to cure the defect in question. The Bill has already passed the House of Commons, and is safe to become law this session. It is a terse and concisely drawn Bill, which is said to have received the approval of the judges. Practically, the only section of importance is the first, which provides that "if any clerk, officer, or servant, or any person employed or acting in the capacity of a clerk, officer, or servant, shall wilfully and with intent to defraud, destroy, alter, mutilate, or falsify any book, paper, writing, valuable security, or account which belongs to or is in the possession of his employer, or has been received by him for or on behalf of his employer, or shall wilfully and with intent to defraud, make, or concur in making any false entry in, or omit, or alter or concur in omitting or altering any material particular from any such book, or any document or account, then in every such case the person so offending shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and shall be liable to be kept in penal servitude for a term not exceeding seven years, or to be imprisoned with or without hard labour for any term not exceeding two years." The allegation of a general intent to defraud in the indictment will be sufficient without naming any particular person intended to be defrauded.

LAW LIBRARY.

The Interpretation of Statutes. By Sir PETER BENSON MAXWELL, late Chief Justice of the Straits Settlements. London: William Maxwell and Sons.

FOR the publication of this work Sir Peter Maxwell considers that it might be supposed that some apology is necessary, having regard to the existence of the treatises of Dwarris and Sedgwick. We do not consider that the existence of treatises on any subject is a reason why other treatises should not be published, always assuming that the latter excel or improve upon the former. The only question is, therefore, whether Sir Peter has complied with this condition. We unhesitatingly express our opinion that he has not.

Shortly stated, our objections are that instead of by perspicuous language showing that he is capable of teaching how we should construe statutes, Sir Peter shows that he either has not the energy or is wanting in capacity to state rules clearly. Indeed we should have stated as a preliminary objection that he states no rules at all, using the word rules' as meaning governing principles. He has pursued the vicious system of gathering together the decisions on particular statutes, and so little has he thought of arrangement, that he does not hesitate to commence his sections with "but," and "it may be added," although such sections have fresh cross titles. And looking to the subject matter his treatment of recent cases is far from satisfactory. Taking that very interesting question raised by the decisions in Simpson v. Blues, Cargo ex Argos, &c., as to the admiralty jurisdiction conferred by the County Courts Admiralty Jurisdiction Acts, the treatment of the subject is far from satisfactory, and the light which it throws upon the construction of statutes is far from being clear. There are abundant test points in the work, which we have examined, and in which it has not satisfied us; but perhaps the most extraordinary performance is the index. We find, for example, "Audi alteram partem, 325." Turning to that page, we find the subject to be implied judicial duties," one of which is to allow a person accused an opportunity of defending himself. Authorities and examples are then furnished, and much space needlessly occupied. But why refer to the matter in the Latin phrase in the index and in plain English in the text? So imagine in a work of this kind putting in the index "Bankrupt, peer, or M.P. may be, 159." What canon of construction is necessary to convince the world of that fact ?

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We fear the book will prove of little or no value. The subject is one requiring careful and skilful treatment, neither of which does it appear to have received.

LEGISLATION AND JURISPRUDENCE.

HOUSE OF LORDS.
Monday, June 14.

MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS BILL.

THE Marquis of RIPON, in moving the second reading of this Bill, said that be the Act of 1872 the system of the ballot was applied to municipal as well as to Parliamentary elections, by a single clause in that Act. It had, however, been found by experience that some of the general provisions of the Act, although very applicable to Parliamentary elections, were not so well suited to municipal elections; and it was to meet that state of things that this Bill has been introduced. It was not a party measure, and it had received the support of members on both sides of the other House. The Bill was then read the second time. The report of amendments in the Landed Estates Act (Ireland) Amendment Bill was considered and agreed to. The Inns of Court Bill, the Public Stores Bill, and the Public Health (Scotland) Provisional Order Confirmation (No. 3) Bill were read the third time and passed.

Tuesday, June 15.

GENERAL SCHOOL OF LAW BILL.

ON the order of the day for going into committee on this Bill, the LORD CHANCELLOR presented a petition from the Treasurer of the Hon. Society of Lincoln's Inn, protesting against the measure. It represented that by superseding the system of legal education established by the Inns of Court, the Bill was obviously calculated to destroy those institutions altogether, inasmuch as it would be said, after it came into operation, that the very object of their existence had ceased, and that they had become mere instruments of call to the Bar. The noble and learned Lord, after read. ing the petition, observed that on the occasion of the second reading he had stated certain objections he had to this Bill, as distinguished from the Bill for the Regulation of the Inns of Court. The latter, he believed, ought to become law, and might be extremely beneficial to the Inns of Court themselves. As to the Bill at present before the House, it proposed that for the present there should be merely a body to conduct examinations in connection with call to the Bar, but at the same time it contemplated that as soon as funds could be obtained there should be really a school formed for the purpose of teaching law. Now, he held that a measure for that purpose was not only unnecessary, but entirely antagonistic to the other measure. By the Bill which had already passed their Lordships' House powers had been given to the Inns of Court, much in the same way as powers had some time ago been given to the colleges of Oxford and Cambridge, with a view to the improvement and development of legal education. It was provided that if within a limited time the Inns of Court did not provide an adequate system of legal education, the commissioners appointed by the Bill should have power to make the regulations necessary for that purpose. Now, look at the effect of the present measure in connection with the operation of the Bill which had already passed their Lordships' House. The Bill for the government of the Inns of Court proposed to establish the best and most judicious system of teaching law, whereas the present measure proposed to set

up an antagonistic and rival school of law, which must paralyse and bring to naught such efforts as the Inns of Court might make for the purpose of improving legal education. He entirely agreed with his noble and learned friend in desiring that some examining body should have the power of declaring who were properly qualified for admission to the Bar. Knowing as he did how anxious his noble and learned friend was to do what was most expedient in this matter, he felt extremely unwilling to appear to take issue with him on the subject of this Bill, and therefore what he proposed was that the noble any learned lord should rest satisfied with having passed this Bill through its second reading, or, at all events, with going into committee upon it pro forma, and should wait and see whether the Bill for the reorganisation of the Inns of Court was successful in passing the other House of Parliament. If the measure did not pass into law during the present session, it would be open to the noble snd learned lord to re-introduce this measure next year with such amendments as he might deem it necessary to make in it. (Hear, hear.) – Lord HATHERLEY thought that the Bar generally was much indebted to the noble and learned lord for bringing forward this measure,!which, in his opinion, ought to become law at some future period, unless in the meantime a suitable scheme for the improvement of legal education was adopted under the provisions of the Bill for the Regulation of the Inns of Court. He regarded it as an untoward circumstance that certain members of the Inner Temple should have presented a petition to that House in almost identical terms with that

which had been read to-night by the noble and learned lord on the woolsack. He regretted extremely that the terms of those petitions showed that some members of the Inns of Court, at all events, regarded this Bill as calculated to have a mischievous and damaging effect upon those institutions. At the same time, however, he trusted that the noble and learned lord would excuse him for expressing the opinion that, believing as he did that some larger measure would ultimately be necessary, it would be unwise to press this Bill forward at the present time, seeing that by doing so he might imperil the success of the Bill for the regulation of the Inns of Court, which he believed would prove a really useful measure.Lord SELBORNE had taken the greatest interest in the subject of the improvement of legal educa. tion for several years, but his experience in life had taught him that patience was one of the most valuable qualities a man could possess. Under the circumstances, therefore, he felt bound to adopt the suggestion of the noble and learned lord on the woolsack, and to withdraw the measure after it had passed pro forma through the committee of their Lordships' House. He hoped, however, that the Bill for the Regulation of the Inns of Court would pass into law in the course of the present session. Before he sat down he must defend the Bill against certain misconstructions which had been put upon it in the petitions that had been presented against it to their Lordships' House. The main object was to collect together and to give a corporation to the several learned bodies which were now separated. The interest the country had in proper provision being made for the best possible legal education for all persons, whether they practised the profession or not, ought not to be left out of sight in the consideration of the subject. He altogether denied the unworthy suggestion that the Bill was meant to be at all antagonistic to the Inns of Court. The object in view was that all the legal institutions should co-operate and become constituents of a legal university or school of law, he cared not by what name it was called. It would virtually be a university, and the relation of those bodies to it would be similar to that which existed between the universities of Oxford and Cambridge and the colleges they contained. He retained the opinion that it was desirous an aggregate body of the kind he contemplated should have power to contribute to the public teaching of the law. (Hear, hear.)--The Bill then went through committee pro formâ.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.
Monday, June 14.

JUDICATURE ACT AMENDMENT BILL.

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The adjourned debate was resumed by Mr. FORSYTH, who canvassed the main clauses of the Bill; and while urging the postponement of the whole appellate portion of the Bill, intimated his disapproval of the House of Lords as Supreme Tribunal.-Mr. Lowe animadverted caustically on the conduct of the Government in giving way to the outside pressure of an fluential body" in the House of Lords. Such pressure might justify a Government in giving up a Bill, but not in directly reversing the policy on which they had formerly acted. Both parties, he contended, had been committed to the abolition of the House of Lords' jurisdiction; but this Bill was a reversal of that course, and was intended to set up again the Lords' jurisdiction. That such a change should be brought about without any open expression of opinion, but by the silent act of a clique or a conspiracy, was contrary to all precedent.--Mr. HARDY disputed altogether the correctness of Mr. Lowe's chapter of contemporary history. It was notorious that a considerable change had come over the public mind, and this Suspensory Bill did not in any way prejudge the question of the Supreme Tribunal. If the final conclusion of public opinion should be in favour of the House of Lords, it was probable that the Government might propose to reconstitute this tribunal; but this Bill" would not preclude Mr. Lowe from endeavouring to persuade the House to reject it. To Mr. Lowe's satire on the withdrawal of the Bill in deference to outside pressure, Mr. Hardy retorted by mentioning the Savings Banks Bill, the Match Tax, and other stillborn measures for which Mr. Lowe had been responsible.-Sir H. JAMES travelled again over Mr. Lowe's ground, recapitulating the history of the Judicature Act, and condening the conduct of the Government in abandoning the first Bill of this Session without a public discussion in the House of Lords. He contended, however, that there had been no change of public opinion, and no change of opinion in the Goverment, for it was no secret that the Lord Chancellor had been coerced into giving up his Bill against his own consent. Sir Henry also canvassed the clauses of the Bill, strongly objecting to the constitution of the Appeal Court.--The SOLICITOR-GENERAL remarked that everybody who knew anything

about the lawyers was aware that a large majority were dissatisfied with the Appeal Tribunal as settled by the Act of 1873, and this opinion had spread among M.P.s, suitors, and the outside public. This was accompanied by an opinion that the House of Lords was a most excellent tribunal. The Government could not be charged with want of principle for taking notice of such a change of feeling. He replied also to the criticisms on the machinery of this Bill.Mr. HERSCHELL proclaimed himself as one of those who rejoiced that the appeal question had been reconsidered, for he was in favour of the House of Lords, and objected to parting with a good tool until he had the prospect of getting a better one than was proposed by the Act of 1873. At the same time he thought the first Bill of this year ought not to have been abandoned without a debate; and he urged that the appellate question ought either to be postponed altogether or important alterations should be made in it.Lord ELCHO defended the action of the St. James's-place Committee in a lively speech. The origin of the Judicature Act he traced to the mania for change which possessed the country in 1873; but if the House and the country had changed their minds, it would be cowardice to shrink from reversing their course.— -Mr. LAW denied the change of public opinion as well as the possibility of permanently retaining the House of Lords' jurisdiction; and followed Mr. Lowe and Sir H. James in dwelling on the party aspects of the question and the misconduct of the Govern-Mr. MARTEN argued that there was no such unanimity about the abolition of the Appellate Jurisdiction of the Lords as had been represented, and showed that the Bill proceeded on lines of reform previously traced. Mr. LEITH expatiated on the injury to the Privy Council by taking away two of its members for the Interme diate Appeal, and after the ATTORNEY-GENERAL had replied, Mr. W. WILLIAMS withdrew his amendment, and the Bill was read a second time.

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MERCHANT SHIPPING.

Majesty's Government intend to proceed with the In reply to Mr. Gourley, Mr. DISRAELI said her Merchant Shipping Acts Amendment Bill, but I cannot now fix a day for the purpose.

THE LAW OF REGISTRATION.

Mr. HAYTER asked the First Lord of the Trea. sury whether, after the vote given by all the members of the Government present in favour of the House Occupiers' Disqualification Removal Bill, which proposed to remove an anomaly from the existing law of registration, he would undertake to deal with the law of registration as a whole in order to remove other anomalies and to diminish the uncertainty consequent upon the state of the present law as declared from the The hon. member quoted an judicial bench. opinion of Mr. Justice Byles, pronounced in the Court of Common Pleas in 1868, to the effect that "the various existing enactments are such as to expose both voters, revising barristers, and the court to many difficulties of construction, in which they may be easily entangled." Justices Keating and Brett, said the hon. member, took a similar view. Mr. DISRAELI.-I do not see that because her Majesty's Government the other night supported the removal of a petty grievance with regard to the law of registration they are logically bound to deal with the law of regis anything that falls from the Bench with great tration as as a whole. I, of course, hear respect, but I must say that in my opinion Judges are a little too apt to criticise Acts of Parliament. We must remember the circum. stances in which many opinions of that kind are given by the judges. They sit in courts which are not properly ventilated (loud laughter), and in that respect they are not, perhaps, treated as well laughter.) Whatever other influences affect their as they ought to be by the country. (Renewed opinions I know not, but I fear it is a fact that the learned judges do not treat Acts of Parliament with the respect which I trust we shall always show towards themselves.

BRIGHTON AQUARIUM. Mr. Ashbury asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department whether, having regard to the judgment of the Lord Chief Baron and other judges of the Court of Exchequer delivered on Friday, the 11th June, in favour of the plaintiff in the case of Warner v. Brighton Aquarium Company, and their Lordships remarks thereupon, it was the intention of the Government to take any action during the present session for a repeal or modification of the Act 21 Geo. 3, c. 49.Mr. CROSS regretted that the matter had been brought before a court of law and a decision arrived at. The question was one on which a strong feeling existed on both sides, and with regard to which public opinion must be gradually and perhaps slowly formed. It would be almost impossible, therefore, to take up so great and important a question at this late period of the session. It was, however, the intention of the Government to take care, if