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afterwards we received from the same accountant a letter in these terms: As I have not heard from you, plaintiffs have requested me to say that unless the terms of their letter are complied with they would put an execution into defendant's house.' We have every reason for believing that Mr. Lucas is a thoroughly-respectable accountant, but it is perfectly clear that he has, in this instance, at all events assumed the duties of a solicitor, perhaps, in ignorance of the law on the subject. Your publishing this may, operate as a general caution. We have communicated with the Legal Practitioners' Society. Perhaps you will allow us to refer Mr. Lucas to the 35th and 36th

sections of 6 & 7 Vict. c. 73, which, with other statutory enactments, renders him liable to penalties for thus acting in such cases. We trust that solicitors will persistently avoid entering into correspondence such as that to which we were evidently invited. The wording of Mr. Lucas's letters points to the conclusion that he is aware of the statutory provisions to which we refer, but knowing something of him as an accountant, we prefer to believe otherwise, and acquit him of all improper motives."

c. 72, which provides that a solicitor allowing his
name in any way to be made use of by an un-
qualified person for the profit of the latter in
legal business, shall be liable to be struck off the
Rolls, and the unqualified person is by the same
section made liable to imprisonment for a term
not exceeding one year, and it is quite clear that
where a person who has been struck off the Rolls
continues to undertake legal work and conduct
legal proceedings such a person is liable to all the
penalties which attach to other unauthorised
persons so acting.

SHERIFFS' officers have usually a most confused
notion in regard to what they consider are their
rights against solicitors whose names appear upon
writs of fieri facias, as having issued the same.
Solicitors are constantly put to the annoyance of
being sued by these persons to recover possession
money and fees for levying, &c. In another
column we publish a note of a case of the kind
which came before the Chichester County Court,
and in which the learned judge found for the
defendants, who were solicitors of an execution
creditor. The sheriff's officer acts on the sheriff's
warrant, and except in cases in which a solicitor
chooses to take some special responsibility on his
own shoulders by direction of his client, solicitors
ought not to be, and we may say are not, liable
to pay such claims.

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UNDER UN

special occurrence. The mere promise of a brother
to pay the stamp duty out of a legacy is in-
sufficient. Ex parte Blades (32 L. T. Rop. N. S.
dissented from: (Ex parte Bryan, 32 L. T. Rep.
N. S. 563. Bail.)

TELEGRAPH ACT 1868 (31 & 32 VICT. c. 110), s.
8, SUB-SECT. 7-SUPERINTENDENT OF TELE-
GRAPH COMPANY-RIGHT TO COMPENSATION
FOR LOSS OF OFFICE.-Sub-sect. 7 of sect. 8 of
the Telegraph Act 1868 (31 & 32 Vict. c. 110)
applies only to the three telegraph companies
named at the beginning of sect. 8; and, there-
fore, the telegraph superintendent of a railway
company is not entitled to compensation for the
loss of his office, when the telegraphic business
of the company is acquired by the postmaster-
general. The superintendent of one of the three
named telegraph companies was held entitled to
compensation in respect of profits on allowance
for expenses while travelling on the company's
service: (Reg. v. The Postmaster-General, 32
L. T. Rep. N. S. 559. Q.B.)

A FIRM of solicitors in forwarding to us a circular
letter, addressed by another firm of solicitors, to
creditors of an insolvent client, observe as fol-
lows:-The system of touting for proxies and
proofs in bankruptcy matters is becoming so
serious, and is of itself so highly objectionable and
improper, that we send you a copy of a circular sent
NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS.
to one of our clients, and which we trust you will ARTICLED CLERK SERVICE
copy in your next publication, and make such
STAMPED ARTICLES ENROLMENT NUNC PRO
condemnatory observations as it seems to you just TUNC-6 & 7 VICT. c. 73 s. 8.-The court will
and proper.
We trust that your powerful only allow articles of clerkship to be enrolled
censure and the publicity given to the matter will nunc pro tunc, and the service under them to be
be the means of checking a system that is unfair reckoned as from their date when the omission to
and unprofessional. The circular is in the follow-stamp has been the result of some unforseen and
ing form:-"In consequence of several creditors
having adopted legal proceedings against Mr.-
of this town, to recover accounts which he is
unable to pay, he has, in order to obviate his
estate being wound-up under a petition in bank-
ruptcy which has been filed against him, been
compelled to file a petition for liquidation of his
affairs by arrangement or composition with his
creditors. You will receive from us, through the
court, a form to prove your debt, and of proxy to
vote in the appointment of trustee at the first
meeting of creditors, to be held on the-
which please have completed and return to us,
with any bills of exchange given you by the
debtor, with as little delay as possible. Should
you not be able to attend personally, please to
complete the proxy at the foot of your proof in
the names of- "(we feel strongly that here
the words " your solicitors" should have ap-
peared, but instead of this we find the names
of the solicitors issuing the notice), "and
we will represent you at the meeting.' This
is a matter to which we have on more than
one occasion referred, and the more
we de.
liberate upon it the more we appreciate the diffi-
culties that present thmselves. It cannot be
objected that a solicitor commits a breach of
etiquette if he, acting on the instruction of his
client, threatened with bankruptcy, puts a liqui-
dation petition on the file, and communicates with
the creditors. The very nature of the business
often requires that this should be done in the
interests of the client, while professional usage
imperatively requires that such a solicitor should,
(where he knows that a certain creditor is usually
professionally represented by a certain other
solicitor), send the notice also to, or otherwise
communicate with, the solicitor to such a creditor.
Frequently these applications for proxies are
made by persons styling themselves accountants,
and we think it far better that, where really neces-
sary in the interests of a client, these circulars
should be issued by solicitors, provided always
that the solicitors of creditors are, as far as possi-
ble, consulted on behalf of their clients; any breach
of this rule would deserve and receive from us the
strongest condemnation.

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In our issue of the 29th of May last, we stated that we did not know the name of the firm of solicitors, as a representative of whom, Mr. E. L. Levy appeared in a case at Bow-street Police Court, as reported in that issue, and to whose appearance Mr. Merriman objected, seeing that Mr. Levy had then only recently been struck off the Rolls, for reasons which hardly left the Court of Queen's Bench any discretion, so serious were the offences proved to have been committed by Mr. Levy. We understand that he appeared in the police court on that occasion to represent Messrs. J. C. Fisher and Co., of 28, Leicester-square. Mr. J. C. Fisher, who is an old practitioner, cannot have known of the circumstances connected with Mr. Levy's past career, and his then present position. Mr. Levy is the person who for some years really used the name of an attorney named Lind, thus offending against the 22nd section of 6 & 7' Vict.

ARTICLED CLERK SERVICE UNDER UN-
STAMPED ARTICLES-6 & 7 VICT. c. 83, ss. 8, 9.-
S. was articled under unstamped articles. He
was then expecting payment of a debt due to him
from B. B. did not pay, and S. sued him, but was
unable to get judgment and obtain the money
until more than six months after the execution
of the articles. The articles were then stamped
and left for enrolment. Held that S.'s service
could not be allowed to count from the execution
of the articles: (Ex parte Sayer, 32 L. T. Rep.
N. S. 560. Q.B.)

GIFT TO
A STRANGER-PRESUMPTION OF
INTENTION-RESULTING TRUST-LOCO PAREN-
TIS.-S. B., widow, at various times between the
years 1843 and 1850, purchased sums of stock in
the name of the defendant Pascoe, who was the
son by a second marriage of the widow of a de-
ceased son of S. B., and transferred other sums of
stock into the names of herself and Pascoe. S. B.
died in 1850, having appointed Pascoe and a
gentleman named Thompson executors
trustees of her will.
and
A bill was filed by parties
interested under the will against Pascoe and
Thompson, and prayed a declaration that the sums
of stock belonged to the testatrix's estate, and
consequential relief. Pascoe, by his answer,
stated that the testatrix always took as much
interest in him as she could have done if he had
been her own child, and that her intention in
making the investments of stock in the joint
names of herself and Pascoe was that the stock
should at her death become absolutely his pro-
perty, and he claimed to be absolutely entitled to
the stock for his own benefit. Held (reversing
the decision of the Master of the Rolls), that the
evidence in favour of gift and against trust was
absolutely conclusive. Where evidence to rebut
the presumption of a resulting trust is adduced,
the court is put in the position of a jury, and must
consider all the circumstances and weigh the pro-
bability of the presumption, and such evidence
cannot be disregarded when brought forward by a
person in support of that which is his indisputably
at law, and of which he is sought to be deprived.
The selection of particular persons as the sole or

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principal objects of a testator's bounty, accom panied by acts and expressions about adoption in a quasi-parental sense, is not sufficient to place the testator in loco parentis to such persons, so as to raise the question of ademption in respect of gifts made after the date of the will: (Fowkes v. Pascoe, 32 L. T. Rep. N. S. 545. Ch.)

OWNER OF LANDS AND BUILDINGS-OccuPIER OF LAND-HAYSTACK-EXPENSE OF FIRE ENGINE-THE TOWNS POLICE CLAUSES ACT 1817 (10 & 11 VICT. c. 89), s. 33.-The respondent was owner of a haystack, which caught on fire and was entirely consumed. During the burning a fire engine was sent from the neighbouring town, and played upon the fire until the water supply was exhausted. Held, that the respondent was liable for the expense of the engine's attendance, as the owner of the lands and buildings where such fire shall have happened," under 10 & 11 Vict. c. 89, s. 33, if he was occupier of the land on which the haystack stood; but not if he was merely permitted to keep the haystack on the v. Arnold, 32 L. T. Rep. N. S. 553. Q. B.)

ground where he had lately purchased it: (Lewis

BILLS OF SALE-RENEWED WITHIN TWENTYONE DAYS-REGISTRATION-SEIZURE-CLAIMS OF HOLDERS.-A debtor renewed bills of sale on

his goods to plaintiff from time to time, so as to evade the necessity for registration under the Bills of Sale Act 1854; and after seizure by the sheriff on a judgment against the debtor, plaintiff duly registered his last bill. Before the execution of this last bill, but after that of plaintiff's previous bill, the defendants had, without the plaintiff's knowledge, obtained and registered another bill of sale from the debtor. Held, upon an interpleader issue, that plaintiff was entitled to the goods, notwithstanding the defendants' previously registered bill of sale: (Hunter v. Turner, 32 L. T. Rep. N. S. 556. Q. B.)

PUBLIC LIBRARIES ACT 1855 (18 & 19 VICT. C. 70)-MEETING OF RATEPAYERS-RIGHT TO DEMAND A POLL.-Where the question is put to a meeting of ratepayers held under the Public Libraries Act 1855 (18 & 19 Vict. c. 70), s. 8, whether the Act shall be adopted for the parish, a poll can be demanded as of right. At a meeting so held a resolution was proposed that the Act be adopted. The chairman put the question, and declared the resolution carried by show of hands. Certain ratepayers demanded a poll, which the chairman refused. At a subsequent meeting the vestry declared the resolution invalid in consequence of such refusal, and declined to act upon it. Held, that a poll was demandable of right, and a rule for a mandamus to compel the vestry to carry out the resolution discharged: (Reg. v. The Vestry of the parish of St. Matthew, 32 L. T. Rep. N. S. 558. Q.B.)

OCCUPIER OF A WORKSHOP-EMPLOYER OF A CHILD SUB-CONTRACT THE WORKSHOPS REGULATION ACT 1867 (30 & 31 VICT. c. 146), s. 16.-Respondent was the occupier of and rated for a brickyard, and had sole control over the sale of the bricks. He received a sum per annum for the use of the yard from a contractor, who gave his exclusive services in making bricks at a certain price per thousand; the respondent found the coal, but exercised no control over the management of the brickyard or of the manufacturing process, nor was he party or privy to any contract with any other person employed in the yard. Held, upon a case stated by justices, that the respondent was not liable, as an occupier of a workshop who has employed a child, for neglecting the provisions of sect. 16 of the Workshops Regulation Act 1867, with respect to a child employed by the contractor: (Fitton v. Wood, 32 L. T. Rep. N. S. 554. Q. B.)

COMMON CARRIER-SPRING VAN PROPRIETOR -REMOVAL OF FURNITURE BY-SPECIAL CONTRACT FOR.-The plaintiff applied to the defendant, the proprietor of vans for removing furniture without packing, to remove his household furniture from Paignton to Plymouth, and the defendant, having sent his foreman to inspect the furniture, wrote to the plaintiff as follows: "The terms for removal of your furniture, as seen by my foreman, will be £22 10s. with risk of breakages in transit, including the use of all necessary mats, cases, and packing materials, and every expense. In the event of your accepting this estimate, be kind enough to sign and return to me the annexed memorandum, by which I am liable to the amount therein specified." This memorandum, which the plaintiff signed, was as follows: "I hereby agree to pay you the sum of £22 10s. for removal of my furniture from P. to P.; you undertaking risk of breakages (if any) not exceeding £5 on any one article." The defen dant undertook the removal of the goods in his vans accordingly, and in the course of their transit by rail they were accidentally destroyed by fire, without any negligence or default of duty on the defendant's part. On the trial of an action to recover damages against the defendant as a common carrier, for the loss of the goods, he in evidence described his business thus, "I carry

goods for all that ask me to all parts of the kingdom, they paying me the price, and I receive furniture of customers on contract;" and on his business cards were printed the following words: "Contracts entered into for the removal of furni. ture to and from all parts of the kingdom": Held by the Court of Exchequer, Bramwell, Pollock, and Amphlett, BB. (making absolute a rule to enter the verdict for the defendant), that the defendant was not a common carrier in the general understanding of that term; and that, having by contract expressly limited his liability to damage arising from " breakages" only, he thereby, on the principle of "Expressum facit cessare tacitum,' and "Expressio unius exclusio alterius," excluded any other or larger liability, and consequently that he was not liable for the loss occasioned by a fire occurring without any negligence or default of duty on his part: (Scaife v. Farrant, 32 L. T. Rep. N.S. 563. Ex.)

THE MAYOR'S COURT OF LONDON PROCEDURE ACT 1867 (20 & 21 VICT. C. CLVII., s. 48)-PROCEDURE.-Under sect. 48 of the Mayor's Court of London Procedure Act 1857 (20 & 21 Vict. c. clvii., local and personal), a plaintiff who has recovered a judgment in an action in the Mayor's Court, against a defendant having goods within the jurisdiction of that court, is entitled, as of right, to remove such judgment into one of the superior courts, and to issue execution thereout against the goods of the defendant; and such execution will not be set aside as an abuse of the process of the court, notwithstanding that execution could have been issued out of the Mayor's Court with as full effect as out of the superior court, and that the only object of removing the judgment into the superior court may have been to obtain the increased costs of such execution. So held by the Court of Exchequer (Bramwell, Cleasby, and Amphlett, BB.): (Haywood and another v. Saint, 32 L. T. Rep. N. S., 566. Ex.)

HEIRS AT LAW AND NEXT OF KIN. HARRINGTON (Robert), late of 72, afterwards of 238, Old Kent-road, Surrey, gentleman. Heir-at-law to come in by July 17, at the chambers of V.C. H. July 30, at the said chambers, at twelve o'clock, is the time appointed for hearing and adjudicating upon such claims.

UNCLAIMED STOCK AND DIVIDENDS IN THE BANK OF ENGLAND.

[Transferred to the Commissioners for the Reduction of the National Debt, and which will be paid to the persons respectively whose names are prefixed to each in three months, unless other claimants sooner appear.] BROUGHTON (Sarah), Fountain-court, Strand, spinster. £250 New Three per Cent. Annuities. Claimant, said Sarah Broughton, spinster.

CUSSONS Thos.). Beverley, Yorkshire, tanner; PAY (Rev. Henry Dee), 18, Kilburn-priory, St. John's-wood, Middlesex, clerk; and CLABON (John Moxon), 21, Great Georgestreet, Westminster, gentleman, one dividend on the sum of £1732 14s. 10d. Three per Cent. Annuities. Claimant, said John Moxon Clabon.

HORWOOD (Rev. Edw. Russell), Vicar of Maldon, Essex, and DRAKE (Francis Gully), a minor, £81 178. 7d. Three per Cent. Annuities. Claimant, said Rev. Edw. Russell Horwood and Francis Gully Drake, now of age. ROSE Quin), Land's End, Fulham, gentleman. £210 Three per Cent. Annuities. Claimant, Augusta Matilda Rose, sole executrix of Quin Rose, deceased.

APPOINTMENTS UNDER THE JOINT-STOCK WINDING-UP ACTS.

DAVIS MAESTIC MERTHYR COLLIERY COMPANY (LIMITED). Creditors to send in by July 30 their names and addresses and particulars of their claims, and the names and addresses of their solicitors (if any), to Jas. W. Sully, 23, Gresham House, Old Broad-street, London, the official liquidator of the said company. Nov. 4; at the chambers of V.C. B., at twelve o'clock, is the time appointed for hearing and adjudicating upon such claims. SANTA CLARA SILVER LEAD MINING COMPANY (LIMITED). Creditors to send in by July 19 their names and addresses, and the particulars of their claims, and the names aud addresses of their solicitors (if any), to John H. Tilly, Victoria-buildings, Queen Victoria-street, London, the official liquidator of the said company. Aug. 3; at the chambers of V.C. B., at twelve o'clock, is the time appointed for hearing and adjudicating upon such claims. TYNEMOUTH (BOROUGH) TRAMWAYS COMPANY (LIMITED).—Creditors to send in by July 10, their names and addresses and the particulars of their claims, and the names and addresses of their solicitors (if any), to Wm. Mayor, 97, Malpas-rond, New Cross, Kent, the official liquidator of the said company. July 14, at the chambers of V.C. M., at twelve o'clock, is the time [appointed for hearing and adjudicating upon such claims.

CREDITORS UNDER ESTATES IN CHANCERY
LAST DAY OF PROOF.
BARNAD (Alexander B.), 58, Conduit-street, Regent-street,
Middlesex, jeweller and watchmaker. July 20; A. Leslie,
solicitor, 57, Conduit-street, Regent-street, Middlesex.
July 27; at twelve o'clock.

BARROW (John), 35, Westbourne-terrace, Middlesex, and of
Normanton Hall, Southwell, Nottingham, and of Ring-
wood Hall, Chesterfield, Derby, Esq. July 30; Geo. E.
Spencer, solicitor, 3, Verulam-buildings, Gray's-inn, Lon-
don. Aug. 6; V.C. H.. at twelve o'clock.
CADE (Richard H.), Helston, Cornwall, auctioneer and
inanure agent. July 26; Gryll, Hill, and Hill, solicitors,
Helston. Aug 5; M. R., at twelve o'clock.
CADBURY (Susan), 6, Seymour-street, Bath, widow. July
30; Charles Titt, solicitor, 12, Old Jewry-chambers, Lon-
don. Nov. 2; V.C. H., at twelve o'clock.
CASSON (John), Blaengyddol, Festiniog, Merioneth. July
21; Thomas Jones, solicitor. Portmadoc, Carnarvon.
Aug. ; M R., at eleven o'clock.
DALE Chas.), the elder, Mill-street, Dockhead, Bermondsey,
Surry, carrier. July 23; Edwin Hughes, solicitor,
Gresham House, Basinghall-street, London. Aug. 6;
M. R., at eleven o'clock.
ENGLAND (Nicholas), late of Gables in Colne Co. Palatine
of Lancaster, formerly of Spring House, Colne, cotton
spinner. July 24; Thomas M. Weddall, solicitor, Selby,
York. Aug. 7; M.R., at eleven o'clock.

FANE (Lady Cecily Jane G.), 5, Upper Brook-street, Middlesex, spinster. July 24; Bartle J. L. Frere, solicitor, 28, Lincoln's-inn-fields, London. July 29; V.C. M., at twelve

o'clock.

HARRINGTON (Robert), 72, afterwards of 238, Old Kent-road, Surrey, gentleman. July 17; D. Burt, solicitor, Town Hall Chambers, Southwark, Surrey. July 30; V.C. H., at twelve o'clock.

HOLMES (John), Dalbury, near Derby, farmer. July 6; John Moody, solicitor, Derby. July 20; V.C. H-, at twelve o'clock.

HOWARD (Samuel), Stratford, Essex. July 19; James,
Curtis, and James, solicitors, 23, Ely-place, Holborn,
Middlesex, July 29, V.C. H., at twelve o'clock.
KENT (Benjamin), 28, Great Russell-street, Brighton,
Sussex, coppersmith. July 25; Wilson A. Stuckey,
solicitor, Brighton, Aug. 3, V.C. H., at twelve o'clock.
LAWRENCE (Edward), Salisbury, gentleman. July 22;
Charles Dew, solicitor, Salisbury, July 31, M. R., at twelve
o'clock.

LEGGETT (Jas.), formerly of Talbot-yard, 186, Gray's-inn-
road, Middlesex, cab proprietor, late of Barnet. July 10;
G. R. Jaquet, solicitor. 15, South-street, Finsbury-square,
London. July 17; V.C. M., at twelve o'clock.
NEWBY (Abraham R.), formerly of Dorking, Surrey, late of

47, Camden-square, Camden Town, Middlesex. Aug. 5; V.C. H., at twelve o'clock.

NEWTON (Thos.), Staindrop Lodge, Ecclesfield, York, iron and coal master. July 23; Wm. Smith, solicitor, 15, Campo-lane, Sheffield. Aug. 6; M. R., at eleven o'clock.

PHILLIPS (Louisa E. K.), 19, Alexandra-terrace, Bootle, Lancaster, widow. July 20; R. W. Rutter, solicitor, Wolverhampton. July 27; V.C. M. at twelve o'clock.

WARWICK (Chas.), 25, Bucklersbury, London, and of 85,
Queen's-road, Dalston, Middlesex, public accountant.
July 31; Jas. C. G, Bennett, solicitor, 0, Friday-street,
London. Aug. 7; V.C. H. at twelve o'clock.
WATSON (Chas.), Kilburn, Middlesex, gentleman. July 31;
T. J. Coward, solicitor, 21, Moorgate-street, London. July
26; V.C. H. at twelve o'clock.

WELLINGTON (Jas.), Bristol, Esq. July 20; Park Nelson, solicitor, 11, Essex-street, Strand. July 27; V.C. M. at twelve o'clock.

CREDITORS UNDER 22 & 23 VICT. c. 35.

Last Day of Claim, and to whom Particulars to be seni. APPLEBY (Wm.), Boxted, Essex, baker, brewer and farmer. Aug. 16; Smythies, Goody, and Son, solicitors, Col-, chester.

BABER (Marion), 2, South-place, Knightsbridge, Middlesex, widew. July 17; J. H. Kays, solicitor, 2, New-inn Strand, London.

BEAZELEY (Geo.), formerly of Charlotte Town, Prince Edward Island, North America, and latterly of Hadley-villa, Dartmouth-park, Upper Holloway, Middlesex, and late 8, Tillington-terrace, Ashburnham-road, Hastings. Oct. 12; Gresham and Sons, solicitors, 24, Basinghall-street. London. BROWNE (Colonel John D.), Charlton Barrow, near Blandford, Dorset. July 21; Cope, Rose, and Pearson, solicitors, 26, Great George-street, Westminster, London. CORBETT (Henry), Aston Hall, Salop, Esq. July 26; Walters, Young, and Co., solicitors, New-square, Lincoln's-inn, London.

DUGDALE (Thos.), Griffin Lodge, Whitton, Blackburn, Esq. Aug. 7; John Bolton, solicitor, Blackburn.

FARRER (Thos.), formerly of Ozendyke, Ryther, York, and late of Ullekelf, York, farmer. Aug. 23; Thos. L. Bickers, solicitor, Tadcaster.

FIELD (Mary Ann), Wellington-crescent, Ramsgate, Kent, widow, Aug. 1; G. H. K. Fisher, solicitor, 24, Essex-street, Strand, London.

FOORD

(Jas. Jno.), Trafalgar-terrace, Hilderthorpe, East Riding, York, Commander Royal Navy. July 31; Sandys and Trevenen, solicitors, 22, Chancery-lane, London. GILES (Wm. H.), formerly of the Crown and Sceptre, Brixton Hill, Surrey, licensed victualler, but late of 3, Albert-villas, Twickenham, Middlesex, geutleman. Aug. 31; C. G. Scott, solicitor, 4, College-hill, Cannon-street, London. GREENWOOD (Anne), Cheltenham, widow. July 15; Brydges and Mellersh, solicitors, Cheltenham. HARMAN (Geo.), Uxbridge, Middlesex, brewer. Aug. 1; Woolls, Paterson, and Garner, solicitors, Uxbridge. HAWLEY (Sir Jos. H.), Bart., Leybourne Grange, Kert, and of 34, Eaton-place, Middlesex, and Hoove Lea, Brighton, Sussex. Aug. 1; Frere, Forster, and Frere, solicitors, 28, Lincoln's-inn-fields, London.

HAYWARD (Frederick), formerly of Artichoke Tavern,
Newington Causeway, Surrey, hotelkeeper, late of New
Windsor, Berks, gentleman. Oct. 1; Darvill, Darvill,
and Last, solicitors, New Windsor.
HOLLOWAY (Mary E. B.), 29, Denmark-villas, Ealing,
Middlesex, spinster. Aug. 24; Dod and Longstaffe, soli.
citors, 16, Berners-street, London.
HOYES (Alexander), Bitterne-grove, South Stoneham,
Hants, Esq. Aug. 1; A. F. and R. W. Tweedie, solicitors,

5, Lincoln's-inn-fields, London. HOWARD (Henry), Greystoke Castle, Cumberland, and of Thornbury Castle, Gloucester, Esq. Ang. 2; Few and Co., solicitors, 2, Henrietta-street, Covent Garden, London. JOHNSON (Samuel), late of 8, Fellowes-road, Haverstockhill, Middlesex, but formerly of Highbury New Park, and of Aldersgate-street, London, Esq. Aug. 11; S. Potter, solicitor, 36, King-street, Cheapside, London. LEWIS (Edw.), Rye Bank, Chorlton-cum-Hardy, Lancaster, gentleman. Sept. 1; Ashworth and Jaman, solicitors, Whalley Chambers, 88, King-street, Manchester. LIGHTON (Rev. Sir Christopher R.), Bart, Eccleston Vicarage Ashbourne, Stafford. Aug. 1; A. Robinson, solicitor, 111, Stephen's-green West, Dublin. MACKAY (Elizabethi), Petham House, Petham, near Canterbury, widow. Aug. 12; Wing and Du Cane, solicitors, 1,

Gray's Inn-square, London.

MILLER (Jas.), 27, Mansell-street, Aldgate, London, corn chandler, carman. and contractor. Sept. 1; Thomson and Son, solicitors, 60, Cornhill, London."

O DWYER (Hon. Richard), Princes-park, Liverpool, merchant. Oct. 6; Whitley and Maddock, solicitors, 6, Waterstreet, Liverpool.

PEEL (Geo.), jun., formerly of Manchester, late of 48, Seymour-street, Portman-square, Middlesex, engineer. July 31; Slater, Heelis, and Co., solicitors, 75, Princess-street, Manchester.

PENN (Maria), Blakeney, Gloucester, widow. Aug. 16; J. Etches Gawing, solicitor, 11, Coleman-street, London."

TOYNE (Charles), West-street, Dunstable, whitening mann facturer. Aug. 14; S. J. Robinson, solicitor, 53, Gresham House, Old Broad-street, London. VILLA (Áchille), Milan, Italy, engineer. July 30; Sutton and Ommaney, solicitors, 80, Coleman-street, London. WALL (George A. E.). Worthy Kennels, Worthy, Southampton, Esq. Aug. 25; W. and P. Flower and Nussey, solicitors, 1, Great Winchester-street-buildings, London. WILLIAMS Edwd.), Maesygarn, Llanigon, Brecon, gentleman. July 31; David Thomas, solicitor, Brecon." WUCK (Antoinette T.), 33, Marine Parade, Brighton, spinster. Aug. 1; Keary, Stokes, and Goldney, solicitors, Chippenham, Wilts.

REPORTS OF SALES.

Tuesday, June 22.

By Messrs. C. and H. WHITE, at the Mart. Stockwell.-No. 25, Stockwell-green, freehold-sold for £630. Kennington.-No. 99, Park-street-sold for £100. Nos. 114, 115, and 116, Park-street-sold for £560. No. 202, Kennington-park-road, copyhold-sold for £1560, Borough-road.-Nos. 1 to 6, Earl's-place, and 38 and 40, Earlstreet, term 16 years-sold for £190.

Kennington.-Nos. 27 to 30, Gilbert-road, term 52 yearssold for £1335.

Wandsworth.-Nos. 10 and 11, Mount-pleasant, term 77 years -sold for £290.

By Messrs. DEBENHAM, TEWSON, and FARMER, at the Mart. City. The lease of No. 17, Change-alley, term 29 years-sold

for £9000.

Clapham.-The freehold residence, Cornwall-villa-sold for

£1400.

East Barnet.-The residence, Oakdene, with stabling, &c., freehold-sold for £2500.

A plot of building land-sold for £410.

City of London.-Earl-street, Leasehold Warehouses, term 71 years-sold for £1000.

Stoke Newington.-Nos. 16 and 17, Stoke Newington-green, term 76 years-sold for £1100.

By Messrs COBB, at the Mart. Essex, near Barking.-Enclosures of freehold land, 32a. Or. 17p.-sold for £3130. Enclosures of land, containing 18a. Or. 38p.-sold for £1345. By Messrs. FAREBROTHER, CLARK, and Co., at the Mart. Berks, near KintburyStation.-The freehold manorial estate known as Barton Court, comprising mansion and 24738. 1r. 2p.-sold for £120,000.

Southwark, Henry-street.-The premises called Spratt's Patent Dog Biscuit Manufactory, with 13 cottages in Griffith's-rents-sold for £11,300.

By Mr. H. H. CHURCH, at the Mart. Walworth.-Nos. 291, 338, 340, and 312, Walworth-road, freehold-sold for £4370.

Walworth House, with stabling-sold for £3710.
Charlotte-row, freehold, stabling-sold for £200.
Nos. 1 to 22, Carter-street, freehold-sold for £4380.
The freehold public-house called the Bee Hive-sold for £6.
Nos. 34 to 42, Carter-street, freehold-sold for £4095.
Nos. 46 and 47, Carter-street,-sold for £15.
Clapham.-No. 46, Clapham-road, freehold-sold for £240.
Clapham-common.-Freehold residence, with stabling, &c.
-sold for £1800.

Walworth.-No. 290, Walworth-road, copyhold-sold for £700. New Kent-road.-An improved rent of £63 per annum, term 34 years-sold for £100.

Camberwell.-No. 81, Camberwell-road, term 2 years-sold

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66

for £153,

MARITIME LAW.

NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS.

DAMAGE TO CARGO-BILL OF LADINGQUALITY AND QUANTITY UNKNOWN"BURDEN OF PROOF.-A bill of lading, stating goods to have been shipped in good order and con dition, but indorsed by the master with the words "quality and quantity unknown," does not admit as against the shipowner that the goods were shipped in good order and condition. There is no rule of law by which the consignee of goods under a bill of lading, stating goods to have been shipped in good order and condition, but containing the words "quantity and quality unknown," is bound to show that the goods were shipped in good order and condition, cr fail in his suit against the shipowner for damage done to the cargo; but failing proof of the condition of the cargo when shipped, the consignee is bound to show that the damage which it sustained is traceable to causes for which the shipowner is responsible: (The Ida, 32 L. T. Rep. N. S. 541. Priv. Co.) INSURANCE SALE

OF CARGO SHIPPING DOCUMENTS-ASSIGNMENT OF POLICY.-Where the interest of the insured has ceased before loss, a subsequent assignment of the policy is ineffectual. V. insured a cargo of linseed for a voyage, including risk of lighters; during the voyage V. sold the cargo to the plaintiffs, to be

PRETTYMAN (Mary), 6, Crescent, Taunton, widow. Aug. 9; paid for in fourteen days from being ready for de

Chas. Francis, solicitor, 22, Austin Friars, London. ROBERTS (Edmund G.), Turlake, Upton Pyne, Devon, Esq. Sept. 1; E. H. Roberts, solicitor, Gandy-street, Exeter. ROBERTS Wm.), Kingston-upon-Hull, linen draper. Aug. 11; J. J. Thorney, solicitor, 10, Parliament-street, Hull. ROSE Mary Ann), 26, Milton-road, South Hornsey, Middlesex, widow. Aug. 3; Mercer and Mercer, solicitors, 1, Copthall-court, London.

SLEE (Henry), late of Ashfield Villas, College Park, Lewis. ham, Kent, formerly of Eastbourne, Sussex, gentleman. Aug. 22 Wm. G. Wheatcroft, solicitor, 147, Leadenhall

street, London.

STANTON (Ven. Archdeacon Thos.), Wilts, and of Burbage. Aug. 31; W. W. and R. Wren, solicitors, 50, Fenchurchstreet, London.

STODART Benjamin), 7, Montagu-street, Portman-square, Middlesex, Esq. Aug. 1; J. T. Simpson, solicitor, 62, Moorgate-street, London.

livery, or at seller's option on handling shipping documents (which option was not exercised). The cargo was landed in public lighters employed by the plaintiffs, one of which sank. After the loss V. assigned the policy to the plaintiffs. Held, that the policy had not passed to the plaintiffs by the contract of sale, that V.'s interest ceased on delivery into the lighter, and, therefore, that the subsequent assignment was void, and the plaintiffs could not recover on the policy: (North of England Pure Oilcake Company v. Archangel Maritime Company, 32 L. T. Kep. N. S. 561. Q. B.)

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MAGISTRATES'

BOROUGH QUARTER

When holden.

Monday, July 5
Saturday, July 10.
Tuesday, July 6...
Saturday, July 3
Monday, July 5.
Thursday, July 22..
Thursday, July 15...
Monday, June 28
Monday, July 12
Saturday, July 3
Monday, July 5
Tuesday, July 13
Tuesday, July 6...
Saturday, July 10.
Thursday, July 8
Monday, July 5

Tuesday, July 6.........
Monday, July 5
Wednesday, July 14...
Friday, July 16
Wednesday, July 21...

Recorder.

LAW.

SESSIONS.

.........

W. W. Ravenhill, Esq.
A. S. Hill, Q.C., M.P.,D.C.L.
Charles Jerom Murch, Esq.
Thos. Wm. Saunders, Esq.
Charles Jerom Murch, Esq.
Samuel Pope, Esq., Q.C.
Horatio Lloyd, Esq.
John J. Johnson, Esq., Q.C.
George Boden, Esq., Q.C....
H. T. Cole, Esq., Q.C., M.P.
Harry B. Poland, Esq.
C. S. Whitmore, Esq., M.P.
Robert Henry Hurst, Esq..
Robert John Biron, Esq.
D. Brown, Esq., Q.C.
A. M. Skinner, Esq., Q C....
Arthur J. H. Collins, Esq..
Mr. Serjeant Cox
Bobert Henry Hurst, Esq..
Thomas Gunner, Esq...
James Fallon, Esq..
Joseph Catterall, Esq.

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Essery having applied for bail, Major Castle said, "Certainly not; no bail except under the orders of the judge."

Another man was then charged with attempting to commit a rape upon another woman in company with the complainant in the former case. The complainant repeated almost similar evidence The same witnesses were called as in the previous case, and after the evidence had been given the bench said they should commit the prisoner for trial.

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of consecration, before the reception of the elements by the people; thirdly, to do any act of private devotion which either conflicts with a direct order of the rubric, or introduces any new rite or ceremony to the congregation. But to cross himself as an act of private devotion does not fall under either of these categories, and is not an ecclesiastical offence. The law of evidence as formerly administered in the Court of Arches is modified by 18 & 19 Vict. c. 41. It is competent for the judge of a court of first instance, in his discretion, to have points decided by a court of appeal reargued before him, when the judgment of such court has been delivered on the hearing of an Ex parte case, is founded on a mistake of fact, and is irreconcilable with other decisions: (Martin v. Mackonochie, 32 L. T. Rep. N. S. 568. Arches.)

resolution that any security should be given for the money, and no security was given. The total liabilities of the debtor were £4923, and the assets £5.

Walton, in support of the present motion, repeated arguments against the resolutions which he adduced before the registrar in opposition to the registration. Looking at the nature of the composition, at the terms of the resolutions, at the fact that the resolutions were carried entirely by proxies held by the debtor's solicitor, and that these proxies were, substantially, proxies of the debtor's intimate relations, his Honour could not, he submitted, come to the conclusion that this was a bona fide arrangement for the benefit of the creditors; and if it was not so it could not be sustained. It was an arrangement under which the friends of the debtor intended, by the leverage of 1d. in the pound, to release the debtor from all liability. An agreement to pay 1d. in the pound was no composition at all, but an insult to the non-relatives, who held claims to the amount of £1812. He objected to the proof of the debtor's wife, who, as administratrix of John Barclay, could not prove without her husband. He also con

tended that Messrs. G. and H. Lee and Co. were legally present at the first meeting; and, if his Honour was with him on these two points, then the resolutions were not properly passed, and on technical as well as general grounds they must fail.

Downham argued that Messrs. Lee were not legally present at the meeting. Whilst Mr. Walton represented creditors to the amount of £200, he represented independent, non-relative creditors to the amount of £827. It is true that without the relatives he should not have had a sufficiently large number of creditors in support of the resolutions, but the course taken by the relatives was not simply out of kindness to the debtor. The debtor had absolutely no assets. The debts were contracted in the course of his business, in which he failed. He had been out of business for some time, and had been dependent upon the income of his wife, which, in consequence of the dulness of the shipping trade, had been little or nothing. He (Mr. Downham) submitted that the composition was a perfectly good one within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Act, and that it was the only course open to the debtor.

His HONOUR held that the resolutions were

Essery said that if that had not been their Elizabeth had ascended the throne some months of the creditors. The assets were very small, but

worships' decision he was going to address the bench upon one or two points. Mr. BROOKE SMITH: The prisoner is committed

for trial.

Essery: I must say that the way in which the court have treated both of these cases is some. thing scandalous. I am not only stopped in making any remarks, but was stopped before in my crossexamination; and by only one individual member of the bench.

Mr. BROOKE SMITH: Mr. Latcham, please take that down.

Mr. Latcham (magistrates clerk): What, sir?
Essery: Yes, I say it again.
Mr. BROOKE SMITH: Mr. Supt. Rawle, please
turn Mr. Essery out of court.

Essery: I should like to see him do it.
Mr. Rawle I will do it.

:

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Essery: I should like to see your authority to do so.

Mr. BROOKE SMITH: I can do it, and I will if you don't mind.

Eventually, the breeze between the defendant's advocate and the bench terminated by Mr. Latcham's cautioning the prisoner and telling him he was committed for trial.

Essery applied for bail, but it was refused.

ECCLESIASTICAL LAW.

NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS.

CONVOCATION OF CANTERBURY. PREBENDARY JOYCE ON THE USE OF VEST MENTS.-The first point he had to show was that vestments were in use in the second year of the reign of Edward VI., and here the difference of style was essential to be noted, the ignoring of which had led it to be judicially stated that Queen prior to the marriage of her parents. ward VI. ascended the throne on Jan. 28, 1547, new King Edstyle (the Acts of Parliament were dated according to old style), and the Act referred to was read in the Lords a third time on Jan. 15, and in the Commons on Jan. 21, 1549, a very few days before the close of the second year of Edward's reign. In 1552 the vestments were entirely forbidden. In 1604 they were made compulsory. In 1662 the rubric was "shall be retained and be in use' viz., that they were permissible. Looking at the contemporaneous expositio of the law, he contended that a narrow vote of that House in 1563, when their compulsory use was carried by 59 to 58, the appointment of a committee of the House of Lords in 1641, as well as the famous answer of the bishops to the Puritans in the Savoy Conference of 1661, that "reason and experience| teach that decent ornaments and habits preserve reverence," as in courts of justice so in churches, all show that the use of vestments was legal. He then quoted Lord Coke, Justice Vaughan, and other authorities to show that usage could not govern statute law, and argued that shall be retained and be in use" simply affirms that they are permissible.

BANKRUPTCY LAW.

BIRKENHEAD COUNTY COURT. Monday, June 7. (Before WYNNE FFOULKES, Esq., Judge.) Re WOOD.

Composition-Registration of resolutions-Proxies of relatives of debtor-Bona fides. Walton, barrister, instructed by Thomas Goffey, moved the court on behalf of several dissentient creditors to set aside the registration of the extraordinary resolutions filed in the matter of John ECCLESIASTICAL LAWRITES AND CERE. Brearley Wood, 38 Chesnut-grove, Tranmere, MONIES OF CHURCH-LIGHTED CANDLES-HYMN who had instituted proceedings for the liquidation DURING COMMUNION-SIGN OF CROSS-PRAC- of his affairs by arrangement or composition with TICE-PERSONAL ANSWER-RE-ARGUMENT OF his creditors. POINTS DECIDED BY COURT OF APPEAL.-It is Downham appeared for the debtor. unlawful for a clergyman of the Church of Eng. land, first, to use lighted candles on the communion table, or on a ledge above the same, during morning prayer, when such candles are not necessary for giving light; secondly, to cause the hymn called the "Agnas" to be sung after the prayer

It will be remembered that the resolutions were that a composition of 1d. in the pound should be accepted in satisfaction of the debts due to the creditors, and that the composition should be paid within three months after the registration of the resolutions. There was no

properly passed, but said that he need not give hold that the resolutions were not for the benefit any formal decision on that point, since he should there might be a possibility of the debtor acthat the creditors should be shut out from the quiring more property, and it would be very hard possibility of getting the benefit of any increase of the assets hereafter. The offer was in almost the smallest coin of the realm, and he could not think that it would be right, looking to the interests of the creditors, that the resolutions should be allowed. He, therefore, should set aside the registration.

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L. Warren, barrister, applied for an order for the release from the borough gaol of Isaac Kempner, of the firm of Kempner and Goldman, formerly jewellers, of South Shields, but now bankrupts.

The application was opposed by Fitter on behalf of the trustee to the bankrupt's estate.

Warren stated that the bankrupt was arrested on the 2nd inst. without a warrant, by direction of the high bailiff, who, on the following day, obtained a warrant from the court and transferred the bankrupt from the Moor-street Police Station to the borough gaol. The arrest was made on the ground that the bankrupt had failed to attend the meeting called for his public examination on the 30th Oct. He (Warren) contended that the arrest was illegal-first, because the bankrupt had received no notice of the meeting in question; and, secondly, because he had originally been apprehended without a warrant, and without having had an opportunity of stating the reason why he had absented himself from the public examination.

Fitter having replied,

His HONOUR, in giving judgment, said in this case Isaac Kempner, one of the bankrupts, had been arrested under an order issued by this Court on the 3rd May, upon an application signed by Mr. Fitter, as solicitor to the trustee. He had to consider whether the warrant made by the trustee was correct or not. Power to issue it was given under the 6th section of the Bankruptcy Act, and the warrant stated the ground upon which it was applied for and issued

namely, by evidence given upon oath, to the satisfaction of the court, that the bankrupt did without good cause, fail to attend the County Court in Northumberland, held at Durham, on the 26th Sept., and that he did also fail to attend at the Birmingham County Court on the 30th Oct. 1874, being the day fixed for the public examination of the bankrupt. Then the warrant directed the High Bailiff to take the bankrupt and deliver him into custody. There were two grounds which he had to consider, and a third ground had also been referred to. It had been stated to him verbally, but not admitted, and he did not find it clearly established on the affidavit, that, at the time the warrant was put in force, the bankrupt was, in point of fact, in illegal custody, and that the custody he was now held in was merely a continuation of an imprisonment which was originally illegal. He should give no opinion upon the subject, because the facts were not admitted and did not clearly appear on the evidence. He should confine his judgment to the warrant. What appeared to be the case was this: Rule 90 of that court expressly provided that an order for the attendance of the bankrupt at the first meeting, and the production of his statement of affairs should then be made by the court, and a sealed copy of the order should be served upon him personally, or left with some adult inmate at his usual place of residence or business. In order to bring a bankrupt into court for not attending the first meeting, there must be a sealed copy of the order served upon him or left for him in the manner prescribed by the order; and on looking through the proceedings on the file, it appeared that there was no evidence of any sealed copy of such order having been served upon him. Therefore, upon the evidence before him, it would appear that the bankrupt was not in point of fact in default for non-attendance at the first meeting on the 26th Sept. It was quite clear he did not attend that meeting; but upon the evidence it was equally clear that there was an omission upon the part of the solicitors in Northumberland to serve him with a sealed copy of the order. He therefore thought the warrant could not be supported. There was more difficulty about the second ground-namely, the failure to attend at this court on the 30th Oct. 1874, being the day fixed for the public examination. He could not find any evidence that the order fixing the date of the public examination, or any notice thereof, had been sent to the bankrupt, as required by Rule 19. But what the bankrupt had been committed for was the failure to attend an examination ordered by the court, but it was new to him that they could commit a man for failure to do something required by an order until they could prove that they had served him with the order. Unless it appeared that in some way authorised by the Act of Parliament or the practice of the court, the bankrupts had been served with that order or with a notice so as to bind them, there was an absence of any default on his part to justify his personal liberty being interfered with. It seemed to him, therefore, that the trustee in this case, endeavouring to do his duty-no other motive being even suggested-had applied for a warrant on grounds which he thought were not sufficient to support the warrant. Under these circumstances, upon the present application, he thought it his duty to make an order discharging the bankrupt out of custody; and inasmuch as the irregularity was one for which the trustee was responsible in having applied for a warrant without the proper ground to justify the application, he must order him to pay the costs.

BRADFORD COUNTY COURT.
May 4 and 21.

(Before W. T. S. DANIEL, Q.C., Judge.) Ex parte ACKROYD; Re FOSTER. Bankruptcy-Partners-Joint and separate estate -Secured creditors-Right of proof against each estate. Creditor holding security on separate estate of one partner for joint and separate debts of the individual partner and the partnership, on bankruptcy of the partners, entitled to appropriate his security to the joint estate, and to prove against the joint estate for the whole amount of the debt, and to prove against the separate estate for so much of that debt as the surplus (if any) of the separate security shall be insufficient to pay upon the joint debt has been paid in full: (Ex parte Johnson; Re Bulwer, 22 L. J., N. S., 61, Bank.; 4 D. M. & G. 218). Creditor entitled under sect. 104 B. A. 1869, to an order that the trustee declare a dividend on the joint estate before declaring a dividend on the separate estate, that the creditor may know how much of the separate security is required with the dividend on the joint estate to pay the joint debt in full, and to regulate his proof against the separate estate accordingly. Gardiner, Bradford, for the motion.

Watson (Watson and Dickons, Bradford), opposed.

:

His HONOUR.-This was an application by Geo. Ackroyd, the registered public officer of the Bradford Banking Company, that the decision of Henry Dickin (the trustee of the estate of John Foster, the liquidating debtor), rejecting the proof of the said Geo. Ackroyd as such registered public officer as aforesaid, may be varied or reversed, and that the said Henry Dickin may be ordered to admit the said Geo. Ackroyd as such registered public officer to prove on behalf of the said bank ing company against the estate of the said debtor for £1628 198. 2d., or such other sum as the court shall direct. And that the said Henry Dickin do pay out of the estate of the said debtor the costs of this application, and the order to be made thereon, and for such other order in the premises as to the court shall seem reasonable. For some time previously to Sept. 1873, the debtor, John Foster, carried on business in Bradford in copartnership with Robert Hining, as woolstapler, and as such partners kept a banking account with the said Bradford Banking Co., and in Sept. 1873, the said John Foster opened a banking account with the said banking company in his own name, and on his own separate account The said John Foster on the 31st Oct. 1873, executed under his hand and seal, and delivered to the banking com. pany an indenture of that date, made between himself (described as of Bradford, woolstapler) of the one part, and the said Geo. Ackroyd and Richard Fawcett, Esq., trustees of the said Bradford Banking Co., of the other part. After reciting that for better and more effectually securing the payment of the balance of account due, and to become due from the said John Foster, either alone or together, with any person or persons with whom he is or may be in partnership, to the said company; the said John Foster had deposited with the said company the deeds and writings specified in the 1st schedule thereunder written, and had agreed to execute the now stating indenture:It is witnessed that in pursuance of the said agreement, and in consideration of the premises, the said John Foster, for himself, his heirs, executors, and administrators, covenanted and declared, with and to the said Geo. Ackroyd and Richd. Fawcett, their executors, administrators, and assigns, that the deeds and writings specified in the said 1st schedule, and also all building lands and hereditaments described in the said schedule thereunder written, should be a security for and charged with the payment unto the said Ackroyd and Fawcett, of all such sums of money as on the balance of account there were, or was, or should or might thereafter be or become due and owing to the said company for or in respect of money lent or advanced, paid or disbursed, or liabilities incurred in any manner howsoever by the said company, for and on account, or to or for the use of the said John Foster, either alone or together with any other persons, as aforesaid, together with interest, commission, charges, and expenses incident to the said transactions, or any of them. And further, that the said John Foster and his heirs, and all other necessary parties (if any) would, whenever required, by or on behalf of the said company, convey and assign all the said hereditaments and premises therein before referred to, unto and to the use of the said Geo. Ackroyd and Richd. Fawcett, or others the trus. tees of the said company, their heirs, and assigns, free from all charges and incumbrances, but subject to redemption on payment of all such principal, money,interest, and commission and expenses, as aforesaid. And that in such mortgage there should be contained all usual clauses and covenants, including a power to sell by public auction or private contract the said hereditaments and premises, in case default should be made in payment on demand of the money thereby secured, or any part thereof. And that until such mortgage should be executed the said John Foster and his heirs would stand seised of and interested in the said hereditaments and premises, in trust for the said Geo. Ackroyd and Richard Fawcett, their heirs and assignees, for the purposes aforesaid. And it was further declared that the said John Foster, either alone or together, with any such his partner or partners as aforesaid, and all other persons, should remain personally liable for the balance due, or to become due, as aforesaid from him, them, or any of them, to the said company, as if those presents had not been made; and that the deposit of deeds and writings therein before mentioned, and these presents, should be only a collateral security, and in addition and without prejudice to any other security or securities then or thereafter to be held by the said company for such balance of account or any part thereof, and should be a continuing security to the said company, notwithstanding any settlement of account or other matter or thing whatever. The first schedule contained the title deeds relating to a certain mill and house and buildings called Nether Cape Mill at Farsley, in the parish of Calverly, including the conveyance thereof to the said John Foster, dated the 29th Oct. 1873. The

were

second schedule contained a description of the said mill, house, and building. The joint and separate estates of Foster and Hining were being wound-up under liquidation, and Dickin is the trustee of all the estates. At the date of the petition for liquidation the firm of Foster and Hining was indebted to the Bradford Banking Company (after deducting liabilities on bills discounted, and since paid in full) in the sum of £13,602 4s. 7d., and Foster was at the date of the petition indebted on his separate account to the banking company (after making a similar deduction) in the sum of £1458 10s. 7a. Hining did not keep any separate account with the banking company, and was not indebted to them otherwise than on the joint account of the firm of Foster and Hining. Hining deposited with the banking company title deeds relating to property of his own as security for the joint debt. All the properties have been sold, and have produced a sum of £12,597 193. 6d., of which Hining's property produced £1135, Foster's property produced £11,462 19s. 63. The whole together insufficient to satisfy the joint debt. The proceeds of Foster's property were much more than sufficient to satisfy his separate debt. The banking company have proved for the whole amount of their joint debt against the joint estate of Foster and Hining without deducting any of the securities which they held upon the separate properties of Foster and Hining respectively, and such proof has been admitted. No dividend has yet been declared upon either the joint or separate estate of the debtors, or either of them. The banking company have tendered a proof upon the separate estate of Foster for the sum of £1628 19s. 2d., that amount having been arrived at by apportioning the £11,462 19s. 2d. (the proceeds of Foster's separate property mortgaged to them) rateably between the joint debt of £13,602 48. 7d. and the separate debt of £4458 10s. 7d. The trustee has rejected the proof altogether, contending that the proceeds of the separate property of Foster in the hands of the banking company ought to be applied in discharging the separate debt; and being more than sufficient for that purpose, the banking company has no right of proof against the separate estate for any sum, but must be treated as having been fully paid their separate debt. This contention raises the questions, "What are the rights of the banking company against Foster under the security of 31st Oct. 1873, and have those rights been varied by Foster's insolvency to the prejudice of the banking company? Suppose that while Foster remained solvent the banking company had called upon him to pay off the joint debt, and on his neglecting to do so the banking company had proceeded to enforce their security by sale, I apprehend it is perfectly plain that, having realised their security, the company would have had the right to apply the proceeds to the liquidation of the joint debt if they found it for their interest to do so, and that Foster would have had no right to control this application. He could only have redeemed the property by paying off both debts; he would have no right to insist that the proceeds should be first applied to pay the separate debt and the surplus only be applied towards the joint debt, which is the trustee's present contention. Now, has the insolvency of Foster made any difference, treating the liquidation as equivalent to bankruptcy? No proposition of law is clearer or more settled than this, that (when no question of order and disposition arises, and none can arise here, a trustee in bankruptcy takes subject to all the debtors' contracts, and to all the equities which bound the debtor, whose estate he represents, and what the debtor could not do the trustee could not do except as specially provided by the Bankruptcy Act 1869. In the only case cited before me (Ex parte Johnson; re Bulmer, 22 L. J., N. S., 64, Bank.; 4 D. M. & G. 218.) the Lord Chancellor treats the right as clear, he says "where there is no special agreement regulating the appropriation of the fund, the doctrine of the court is clear that the creditor holding a security is entitled to apply it in discharge of whatever liability of the bankrupt he may think fit." And that rule I am of opinion must be applied here in favour of the Banking Company. It was then suggested by Mr. Watson that as Foster's separate account was opened contempora neously with his purchase of the mill at Farsley, the title deeds of which were deposited under the agreement of 31st Oct. 1873, it might be inferred that it was intended that the security then created should be applied in the first instance in payment of the separate debt, which it was alleged was connected with that purchase; but I am of opinion that suggestion not being warranted by anything to be found in the security itself, cannot be attended to, the effect would be to add to the security a most material term not to be found in it, nor to be implied from any provision contained in it. I am of opinion, therefore, that the trustee's total rejection of this proof was wrong, whether the sum of £1628 19s. 2d, is the sum for which the proof ought to be allowed to stand, I cannot

now decide because no dividend has yet bee declared. The banking company have arrived at the sum for which they claim to prove by taking a course which I conceive is not according to their right, though probably more favourable to the separate estate. The right of the banking company, in my opinion, is this, to have a dividend declared upon the joint estate, and then out of £11,462 19s. Cd. the proceeds of Foster's separate property, to apply so much as together with the proceeds of Hining's separate estate, and the dividend on the joint estate, will pay the joint debt in full, and to prove on the separate estate of Foster for so much of the £4458 10s. 7d. as shall remain after applying what shall remain of the £11,462 19s. 63. after paying the joint debt in fall. This sum, therefore, cannot be ascertained until the dividend on the joint estite has been declared. And as far as the trustee is concerned the 104th section of the Bankruptcy Act 1869 has hitherto prevented his declaring such a dividend, because it enacts that where joint and separate properties are being administered, dividends of the joint and separate properties shall, subject to any order to the contrary that may be made by the court on the application of any person interested, be declared together. This is a case in which I think the banking company, as a party interested, is entitled to call upon the court to order the trustees to declare a dividend on the joint estate separately, from and before declaring a dividend on the separate estate, and I shall therefore direct this motion, so far as it relates to the sum for which the banking company are entitled to prove against the separate estate, to stand over until after the banking com. pany shall have made such application with reference to the declaration of a dividend on the joint estate as they may be advised; and I reserve the costs of this motion, with liberty to apply, in case no such application be made on or before the 8th June next.

COUNTY COURTS.

BATH COUNTY COURT.
Wednesday, June 16.

SANGER v. HOLMES. Illegal distress-Costs-Higher or lower scale. HIS HONOUR gave judgment in this case, which was an action on the part of the plaintiffs, the well-known circus proprietors, to recover £50 for unlawful distraint, and £50 for damages resulting therefrom. The plaintiffs took the Alhambra Palace Music Hall from Mr. Fisher, of Bristol who held it on a lease from the defendants. They allege that the defendants undertook, on their entering the house, not to distrain for rent overdue from Fisher, but this was denied. They also state that £40 was paid by them through Fisher for eight weeks' rent at the time they took the Alhambra, but that this amount was appropriated, contrary to directions sent, to the pay. ment of promissory notes and back rent due from Fisher. On the 21st Dec. the defendants distrained for £26 12s. It was denied, on Messrs. Holmes' behalf, that there was any agreement not to distrain, and further contended that they were authorised to apply the £40 cheque as they did by a letter from Fisher. His Honour said he had not been able, without great difficulty, to understand the mass of figures introduced in the case, but had now decided upon the main issues. The first question was whether or not there was a special agreement of the defendants that they would not distrain during the tenancy of the plaintiff. The onus probandi was clearly upon the plaintiff, and upon the whole balance of the evidence he (his Honour) was not satisfied that such an agreement had been made. So far he was in favour of the defendants, and this was a most material issue, seriously affecting their credibility and, if the agreement had been proved, their character, but he was of opinion that they did not make any such agreement. They came next to what he had called the figures. It seemed from the evidence that before Fisher's letter of instruction was sent there were two weeks' rent due at £5 a week. Fisher's letter, dated 14th Nov., read thus: "Enclosed please find cheque, value £40, for rent to 18th April, of Alhambra building. Please leave out receipt of three weeks for which rent has been paid to Holmes, jun." Fisher did not say what three weeks he referred to in the letter. Messrs. Holmes already held acceptances of Fisher's for back rent and three weeks' rent was due. The question arose whether there was an agreement or understanding that the prospective rent should be paid by the money sent, and his Honour said he did not think there was. The acceptances given of course did not deprive of the right to distrain. The defendants took £10 for two weeks' rent due on the 17th, and applied £14 12s. to the back rent. That left £15 88. to meet future rent. Then came the distress levied on the 21st Dec., for rent for eight weeks. But

from the 7th Nov. there were only six weeks due, which was £30. They held £15 8s. in their hands to be applied towards this amount, and ought therefore only to have distrained for £14 12s., instead of which they distrained for £29 48. The excessive distraint left a verdict for the plaintiff of £14 12s., to which he thought he might, without being in the slightest degree severe on the defendants, who he held to have acted with perfect bona fides in the matter, add 40s. as damages, thus making the verdict £16 12s. The question of what amount of costs should follow the verdict being raised, his Honour decided to leave them on the lower scale, and to disallow those of the witnesses Young and Croueste, whose evidence referred entirely to the alleged agreement. Bartrum asked his Honour to stay execution, as he had never had an opportunity of studying the figures in the case.

His HONOUR said he had decided for the de. fendants on the substantial merits of the case, and made an order for payment in three weeks.

BIRMINGHAM COUNTY COURT.
Thursday, June 17.

HOLLAND V. MATCHETT.

Sale of real estate-Breach of contract-Rescission -Damages-Conditions. HIS HONOUR delivered judgment in this case, which was an action brought by Mr. Geo. Robin son Holland, conveyancer, Ann-street, Birmingham, against Mr. Frederick Matchett, ironfounder, George-street, Parade, Birmingham, and Mr. Thos. Brittle, corn factor's manager, Ryland-road, for rescinding a contract of sale of real estate to plaintiff, and for substantial damages for loss of bargain. The plaintiff, who was a certified conveyancer, practising in Birmingham, claimed from the defendants, who were trustees of the will of the late Mr. Empson, £40, as damages occasioned by the plaintiff having rescinded a contract for the sale by them to him of a ground-rent of £17 a year, being part of the testator's real estate, and for refusing to complete their bargain with him. On the 28th Oct. 1874, the defendants, as trustees for sale, offered this ground-rent of £19 a year for sale by public auction, and plaintiff thereupon purchased the same, at the price of £342 10s., subject to the conditions of sale, and signed the contract, and paid a deposit of £34 5s. The fifth condition of sale provided that as to the lot in question (lot 5) the title did commence with an indentare dated the 10th Dec. 1870. The only other condition material to be stated Was the eleventh, which was as follows:"If for any cause the vendors shall not

be able to make out a good marketable title of any lot they shall refund the deposit money paid thereon, but shall not be liable to any suit or return for damages or otherwise, for non-performance of the contract for sale thereof, or to compel the performance thereof, as if any requisition upon or objection to the title to any lot which shall be made by the purchaser hereof, the vendors shall be at liberty to refuse to comply with such requi. sition, and to rescind the contract when the vendors shall return the deposit paid on such lot, but shall not be liable to any suit, action, proceeding, costs, damages, or expenses whatsoever, or to pay interest on such deposit." Notwithstanding the stringency of the 11th condition, which if construed literally authorised the vendors to rescind "if any requisition upon or objection to the title to any lot should be made," the plaintiff on 21st Nov. sent into the defendants a document, headed "requisitions on the title." There were in all four requisitions, but the fourth was the most important. It would be observed that by this requisition the purchaser informs the vendor that under a deed in 1870 not appearing in the abstract he was himself entitled to a right of way over the property which had been stopped up by a wall. In a few days afterwards the vendors replied that they could give no information respecting the fourth requisition. The plaintiff was not satisfied with the answers, and be sent a further requisition inquiring whether the deed of 1854 was a conveyance or mortgage. He proposed to ask for this information as to the earlier title in order to enable him to judge whether the abstract would cure what he called the present very defective, because very recent title. But it appeared to his Honour that he was not in strictness entitled to ask for any information whatever as to the earlier title unless he was prepared to have such information, and he made no offer to bear the expense of the search into the earlier title which would enable his question to be properly answered. In reference to his fourth requisition, the plaintiff thus expressed himself :-"The purchaser, as at present advised, objects to the title on the ground that the right of way herein referred to having been stopped, a right of action has accrued for this trespass against the vendors by the present owners of the right of way; and thus there is an incumbrance

on the property which must be removed before a good title can be shown." It was to be observed that the plaintiff objected to the title on the ground which, if well founded, must have been known to him before he entered into the contract. The objection was a very singular one, and appeared to indicate an intention to claim compensation, because there was, as he represented, a right of way over the land out of which the ground-rent issued. Mr. Baker, in his evidence, had stated that there was no pretence that he knew of for such right of way. The plaintiff wrote a letter on the 27th Nov., in which he did not withdraw the objection to the title founded on his own alleged right of way; but expressly asked for replies to his requisitions, and contented himself with saying that if the three first were satisfactorily answered, the last, which did not affect the title, might probably be withdrawn. He reserved to himself the right to insist on the objection if he thought proper, even if the first three queries should be answered to his satisfaction. Thereupon, on the 20th Nov., Mr. Baker gave formal notice, on behalf of the vendors, of rescinding the contract, and offered to return the deposit. It was admitted that subsequently, on the 5th March, the vendors resold the property for £350, being at an increased price of £7 10s. only, and that they had since completed such sale. Mr. Baker had sworn that he had no reason for rescinding; excepting that the plaintiff had insisted on the fourth requisition, and that at the time of giving the notice, which he said was given in good faith, the vendors had no wish to get rid of the contract for the purpose of obtaining a higher price, and had no person who to their knowledge would have given more for the property than the plaintiff had agreed to give. Now, although the vendor who relied on a condition like the fourth condition could not act arbitrarily, and rescind without giving the purchaser the opportunity of withdrawing his objection, especially where the power to rescind was expressly made contingent on the purchaser insisting on his objection, yet he was entitled to do so when, after a warning on the subject, the purchaser still reserved to himself the objection, and it appeared to him that the vendors in this case were entitled to rescind by the letter of their solicitor of the 20th of Novem

ber. When once the rescinding had been duly completed no subsequent offer on the purchaser's part could effect its validity. The further correspondence was, therefore, of minor importance, but he observed that the plaintiff up to the present time expressly and in unequivocal terms, withdrew his objection as to the alleged right of way. Under the circumstances, it had become unnecessary for him to give an opinion as to whether the plaintiff, if he recovered anything, could recover more than nominal damages; and he should merely give a verdict for the defendant

BRADFORD COUNTY COURT. Tuesday, June 15. (Before W. T. S. DANIEL, Esq., Q.C., Judge.) HOPE v. THORNTON.

Town council-Councillor acting whilst interested in corporation contract-Jurisdiction of County Court. THIS was an action brought by Mr Thomas Campbell Hope, architect, of Bradford, as a burgess of the borough, to enforce a penalty of £50 against Mr Israel Thornton, contractor, of Bradford, on the ground that he had acted as councillor of the borough during such time as he had a share or interest in a contract or employment under the corporation.

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Watson appeared for the plaintiff. Jordan, barrister, Manchester instructed by Wood and Killick, solicitors), for the defendant. Watson proceeded to open the case, when Jordan said that he had to take a preliminary objection that the court had no jurisdiction in the case. The 53rd section of the Act under which the action was brought (5 & 6 Will. 4, c 76) enacted That if any person shall act as mayor, alderman, or councillor, or auditor or assessor for any borough, without having made the declaration hereinbefore required in that behalf, or without being duly qualified at the time of making such declaration, or after he shall cease to be qualified according to the provisions of this Act, or after he shall have become disqualified to hold any such office, he shall for every such offence forfeit the sum of £50, such sum to be recovered, with full costs of suit, by any person who will sue for the same within three calendar months after the commission of such offence, by action of debt, or on the case, in any of His Majesty's superior courts of record"; and there was a provision that any defendant may "by judge's order, to be obtained within fourteen days after he shall have been served with process in such action, require the plaintiff to give security for costs"; and there was a further provision "that no such action shal be brought except by a burgess of such borough" nor unless the burgess bringing the same shall'

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