NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS. LANDLORD AND TENANT-GOODWILL-RIGHT OF OUTGOING TENANT UNDER A PROVISO GIVING HIM ALL SUCH SUMS OF MONEY AS SHALL OR CAN BE PROCURED FOR THE GOODWILL-MODE OF CALCULATING VALUE OF GOODWILL.-The plaintiff entered into occupation of a public house under a lease from the owner, to whom (she having been the previous occupier), he also paid £300 for the goodwill. The lease contained the following clause: "And it is hereby lastly agreed and declared that at the expiration or sooner determination of the said term hereby created, or such sum and sums of money as shall or can be procured for the goodwill of the business of a licensed victualler in respect of the said premises from an incoming tenant shall be received by and belong to the said William Llewellyn, his executors, administrators, or assigns." On the expiration of the lease the defendant re-let the house at an increased rent, and on payment of a premium by the new tenant of £1300. The defendant refused to pay anything to the plaintiff for the goodwill, and he brought this action against her to recover the value of it under the covenant in the lease. Held, that he was entitled to recover, as the defendant was bound to pay him either what was paid by an incoming tenant for the goodwill, or what she might have obtained in respect of it; and that the amount in the latter case was to be the sum which experienced valuers should deter. mine to be the proper value payable by an in(Llewellin v. coming to an outgoing tenant:Rutherford, 32 L. T. Rep. N. S. 670. C. P.) COMPOSITION BILL EXCHANGE DRAWER'S NAME INSERTED IN DEBTOR'S STATEMENT-RIGHTS OF HOLDER OF BILL OF BANKRUPTCY ACT 1869, s. 126.-A trader, who had accepted two bills of exchange, filed a petition for liquidation by arrangement, and in his statement inserted the drawer as his creditor for the amount of the bills, without stating that the debt was due on bills of exchange. The creditors resolved to accept a composition, and their resolution was confirmed on the 8th Oct. 1874. The holder of the bills, which had been negotiated without the acceptor's knowledge, received no notice of the meeting of the creditors, and on the 5th Nov. he commenced an action on one of the bills of exchange. Held, that the holder of the bills was not bound by the composition, and was entitled to pursue his remedies irrespective of it; and that, the first instalment of the composition having become payable two months after the action was commenced, and the debtor having taken no steps to correct the mistake in the list of his creditors, it was now too late for him to do so under the 126th section (sub-sect. 8) of the Bank. ruptcy Act 1869. (Ex parte Matthews; re Angel, 32 L. T. Rep. N. S. 631. Chan.) CLAIM FOR INTEREST UNDER 3 & 4 WILL, 4, c. 42, SECT. 28-WHAT SUFFICIENT DEMAND OF PAYMENT TO SUPPORT.-For a jury to allow interest upon a debt it is not necessary that the demand of payment should have specified the exact amount of such debt. By 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 42, s. 28, the jury may allow interest upon all debts payabe otherwise than at a time certain "from the time when demand of payment shall have been made in writing, so as such demand shall give notice to the debtor that interest will be claimed from the date of such demand until the term of payment." The defendant was indebted to the plaintiff in a large amount not payable at a time certain. In Oct. 1872 the plaintiff wrote to the defendant asking for "a good round sum" and giving notice that he would charge the defendant interest on whatever sum might be due to him on the 1st Nov. In Oct. 1873 the plaintiff again wrote stating that the defendant owed him over £1100 for balance of account and interest, and threatening legal proceedings if the account should not be settled by 1st Nov. The amount remaining unpaid, the plaintiff sued for it; whereupon the defendant pleaded never indebted as to interest, and in respect of the principal paid into court a sum which the plaintiff accepted, at the same time joining issue on the plea of never indebted. The plaintiff having been nonsuited: Held that the replication might be amended; that the letter of Oct. 1873 was a good demand within the statute; and a rule to set aside the nonsuit and enter a verdict for the plaintiff as from Oct. 1873 made absolute. Semble that, assuming the letter of Oct. 1872 was a demand of payment at all, such letter also was a good demand within the statute. Hall v. South Staffordshire Railway Company (L. Rep. 18 Eq. 154; 43 L. J. 556 Ch.) questioned: (Geake v. Ross, 32 L. T. Rep. N. S. 666. C.P.) £50, and where the cause of action arises either wholly or in part within the City, and by sect. 15 no defendant may object to the jurisdiction except by plea. The plaintiff's cause of action arose in part within the City, and the defendant pleaded to the jurisdiction: Held, that although a prohibition might be granted, the defendant was not entitled to plead to the jurisdiction, and a rule to set aside a verdict for the plaintiff refused: (Evans v. Nicholson (1), 32 L. T. Rep., N.S., 664. C.P.). CHANGE OF VENUE-LIBEL-PARTIES RESIDENT NEAR BRISTOL-VENUE LAID IN MIDDLESEX-CHANGED TO BRISTOL BY MASTER.-The plaintiff may lay the venue where he pleases, and it is for the defendant who seeks to change it to show a manifest preponderance of convenience in favour of such change. The action was for a series of alleged libels in a Bristol newspaper, and the plaintiff, defendant, and a large majority of the witnesses, resided in or near Bristol. The plaintiff laid the venue in Middlesex, and the The plaintiff's master changed it to Bristol. attorney deposed that the alleged libels had given rise to strong local prejudice, rendering it impossible that the cause could be fairly tried in Bristol. Held, that the venue must be restored to Middlesex, and a rule to rescind the changing order of the master made absolute: (Cossham_v. Leach and another, 32 L. T. Rep. N. S. 665. C. P.) PROPOSAL AND ACCEPTANCE OF CONTRACTWHETHER PARTIES AD ADDITIONAL TERM IDEM "GUARANTEE." - Two letters may be sufficiently identical to constitute a contract, although the letter of proposal may mention a term which is omitted to be mentioned in the The defendant signed a letter of acceptance. letter whereby he guaranteed to the plaintiffs 250 subscriptions to the Choir newspaper, of which the plaintiffs were proprietors, in onsideration of the plaintiffs giving him the free use of defendant also undertook to insert the name of one column of space in such newspaper, and the the Choir as his organ in a foreign newspaper. The plaintiffs signed a letter agreeing to insert the defendant's advertisements in consideration of the subscriptions being guaranteed, but omitting to mention the promise of the defendant as to the foreign newspaper, and afterwards added a postscript thereto to the effect that the payment of the subscriptions should be completed within a certain time: Held, that the two letters formed a good special contract between the parties, which the addition of the postscript did not invalidate : (Metzler v. Gounod, 32 L. T. Rep. N. S. 656. C. P.) MORTGAGOR AND MORTGAGEE-AGREEMENT TO LEND ON MORTGAGE.-Where the negotiations for a mortgage are broken off owing to the proposed mortgagee being dissatisfied with the security upon investigation, the proposed mortgagor has no claim upon the proposed mortgagee for the costs attending the investigation, but if the negotiations go off without such reason, the proposed mortgagee may recover his costs reasonably incurred: (Carter v. Merrion, 32 L. T. Rep. N. S. 663. C.P.) UNCLAIMED STOCK AND DIVIDENDS IN THE [Transferred to the Commissioners for the Reduction of the £2408 138. New Three APPOINTMENTS UNDER THE JOINT-STOCK CAPE BRETON COMPANY (LIMITED).-Petition for winding- HUET AND COMPANY.-Creditors to send in, by July 31, their MAYOR'S COURT, LONDON PLEA TO THE JURISDICTION-PROHIBITION.-The same facts CREDITORS UNDER ESTATES IN CHANCERY. which would allow a stranger to obtain a prohibition to the Mayor's Court will not entitle the defendant to plead to the jurisdiction of that court. By the 12th section of the Mayor's Court Act, no plea to the jurisdiction shall be allowed in cases where the plaintiff claims not more than LAST DAY OF PROOF. CRAWSHAW (Geo.), Dewsbury, woollen manufacturer. Sept. 1; Wm. Scholefield, solicitor, Dewsbury. Nov, 4; V.C. M., at twelve o'clock. ENDER (Jos.), formerly of Reading, Berks, late of Speenham. land. Aug. 31; Chas. Henderson, solicitor, Reading. Oct. 29; V.C. M., at twelve o'clock. GROVES (Chas. Geo.), 37, Sutherland-square, Walworth, Surrey, and 47, Mark-lane, London, corn dealer. Sept. 14; F. De Paula, solicitor, 6, Grocer's Hall-court, Poultry, London. Oct. 30; M. R., at twelve o'clock. HODGSON (Cecilia), Cheltenham, widow. Sept. 25; Wm. A. Blaxland, solicitor, 32. Lincoln's-inn-fields, London. Nov. 9; V.C. B., at twelve o'clock. KINGSTON (Rt. Hon. Robert King, Earl of), Holloway, Middlesex. Sept. 16; R. J. Pead, solicitor, 29, Parliamentstreet, Westminster. Nov. 2; M. R., at eleven o'clock. LUCAS (Rev. Jonas), Ilminster, Somerset, independent minister. Oct. 1; Lindsay, Mason, and Greenfield, solici tors, 84, Basinghall-street, London. No. 4; V.C. H., at twelve o'clock. METAXA (Jean B. Count), 32, Cleveland-square, Middlesex. Sept. 30; Wm. R. Scudamore, solicitor, 12, Dartmouthstreet, Great Queen-street, Westminster. Nov. 3; V.C. M., at twelve o'clock. MILLS (Elizabeth), 21, De Beauvoir-crescent, Kingsland, Middlesex, gas stove manufacturer. Aug. 24; E. W. and R. C. Mote, solicitors, 1. South-square, Gray's-inn, Middlesex. Nov. 5; M. R., at twelve o'clock. NELSON (John Henry), formerly of 30, Hyde-park-gardens, Middlesex, and late of Upton Court, Slough, Bucks. Esq. July 26; Wm. W. Comins, solicitor, 84, Great Portlandstreet, Middlesex. Aug. 6; V.C. H., at twelve o'clock. NIXON (Frederick), formerly of Beulah, Brecon, afterwards of Derrygimla Lodge, Galway, Ireland, late of South Moulton, Devon, Esq. Sept. 30; R. Petch, solicitor, 8, John-street, Bedford-row, London. Nov. 2; V.C.M. at 12 o'clock. OVERTON (Susannah), Astley Gill, Astley, Worcester, widow. OWEN (Jas.), Frog-street, Tenby, Pembroke, grocer. Oct. SMITH (Jonah), Adderley-street, Birmingham, licensed CREDITORS UNDER 22 & 23 VICT. c. 35. Last Day of Claim, and to whom Particulars to be sent. ABBOT (Henry), Abbot's Leigh, Somerset, Esq. Sept. 1; Abbot and Pope, solicitors, Albion Chambers, Bristol. ATTWOOD (Geo.), late of 9, St. George's-terrace, Windmillstreet, Gravesend, Kent, gentleman, formerly of Highstreet, Brompton, chemist and druggist. Aug. 10; M. S. Stephens, solicitor, 19, Gibraltar-place, Chatham, Kent. BACKEN (Jas.). Myrtle Cottage, Queen-street, Leamington Priors, Warwick, yeoman. Aug. 9; Wright and Hassall, solicitors, 3, Dormer-place, Leamington. BACON (John T.), 5, Clifton-road, Folkestone, Kent, gentleman. Aug. 17; Denton, Hall, and Barker, solicitors, 15, Gray's-inn-square, London. BELLARS (Elizabethi), Maxey, Northampton, widow. Aug. 30: Brown, Atter, and Brown, soliciters, Westgate, Peterborough. BBADLEY (Richard), Westgate Common, Wakefield, York, engineer. Aug. 20; Barratt and Senior, solicitors, Wakefield. BREWER (John), Ottery Somerset, farmer. Aug. 31; Reed and Cook, solicitors, Bridgwater. BROWN (Stephen), Chapel-street, Blue Town. Sheerness, BURGESS (Jos.), Vermont the Avenue, Upper Norwood, BUTLER (Mary Fowler), 16, Ingleby-road, Grove-road, CHAPLIN (John), Clarendon Hotel, Gravesend, Kent, hotel keeper. Sept. 1; A. R. Steele, solicitor, 9, Cook's-court, Lincoln's-inn, London. CHEETHAM (Richard), Wollaton-street and Angel-row, Nottingham, boot and shoe manufacturer. Aug. 1; Rothera and Sons, solicitors, High-street-place, Nottingham. CLACK (Henry T.), Chudleigh, Devon, Esq. Aug. 14; Kendall and Congreve, solicitors, Union Bank-chambers, Lincoln's-inn, London. CLINTON (Maria A.), Cokenach, near Royston, Hertford, spinster. Aug. 31; Woodrooffé and Plaskitt, solicitors, 1, New-square, Lincoln's-inn, London. COCK (Richard), Dawley Green, Dawley, Salop, publican. COLSON (John), Medina Villa Avenue, Southampton, Esq. COOMBE (Ann), 6, Trinity-terrace, Cheltenham, spinster- EVERETT (Henry), formerly of 17, Devonshire-road, Gree wich, and late of 416, New Cross-road, Kent, cooper, and carrying on his business of a cooper at Millwall, Middl sex. Sept. 22; H. J. Godden, solicitor, 168, Fenchurc street, London. FALCON (Chas.), Langs Hesketh-park. Southport, La caster, Esq. Aug. 14; Welsby, Hill, and Smallsha solicitors, Lord-street, Southport. FOGARTY (Mary), formerly of Woolwich, Kent, late of Carnbridge House, Aldershot, Hants spinster, Aug. 16: Arnold and Co., solicitors, 60, Care-street, Lincoln's-inn London. FREEMAN (Henry), Crooked-lane, London, and of 10, Canning-place, Gloucester-road, Kensington, Middlesex, timber broker. Oct. 1; Wootton and Son, solicitors, 2, Finsbury-circus, London. GALLAFENT (Edwd.), Colne, Engaine, Essex, farmer. Sep. 23; Harris and Morton, solicitors, Halstead, Essex. GARNER (Francis H.), Bittern hill, Teignmouth, Devon, Esq. Aug. 21; T. W. Denby, solicitor, 8, Frederick's-place, Old Jewry, London. GRAINGER (Geo. F. 8.), formerly of Newcastle-upon-Tyne, late of Rhymney Reef. Shire Ararat, Ripon, Colony of Victoria, Australia. Nov. 6; Rowley, Page, and Rowley, solicitors, 7, Great Winchester-street-buildings, London, England. GRANT (Sophia A.), 65, Queen's-gate, South Kensington, Middlesex, spinster. Sept. 4; Wilson, Bristows, and Carpmael. solicitors, 1, Copthall buildings, London. GRIFFEE (Jas. Thos.), Dorking, Surrey, innkeeper. July $1: Jas. D. Down, solicitor, Dorking, Surrey. HANDLEY (Jas.), Bury, gentleman. Aug. 31; Joseph Handley, bank cashier, Bury. HARP (John), Wood Villa, Longton, Stafford, colliery proprietor. Aug. 23; Clarke and Hawley, solicitors, Longton, Staffs. HEMMINGWAY (Mary), Alvethorpe, Wakefield, York, bone and manure manuftcturer. Aug. 17; Benjamin Watson, wholesale grocer, Westgate, Wakefield. HEMSWORTH (John), formerly of Broomhouse and Ladythorne, Northumberland, but late of Sanson Seal, Berwick-upon-Tweed. Aug. 28; E. and W. Willoby, solici tors, Berwick-upon-Tweed. HOWARTH (Thos.), Heap Bridge, Heap, Bury, provision and general dealer. Aug. 7; Wm. Howarth, grocer, Heap Bridge, Heap, Bury. ILES (Jas.), Codrington, Gloucester, yeoman. Sept. 1; John Trenfield, solicitor, Chipping Sodbury, Gloucester. JACQUES (Jabez), formerly of 68 and 92, Bartholomew-close, London, mantle manufacturer, late of 6, Valentin-road, Brixton, Surrey. Sept. 20; H. H. Poole, solicitor, 58. Bartholomew-close. London, JEWERS (Edwin A.), Plymouth, Devon, gentleman. Oct. 13; Rooker, Matthews, and Harrison, solicitors, Frankfort chambers, Plymouth. JOHNSON (Harriet), Teddington, Middlesex, spinster. August 21; H. W. M. Jackson, solicitor, 25, Lincoln's Innfields, London. JONES (Wm.), Lion House, Towyn, Merioneth, blacksmith. Aug. 20; Jones and Davies, solicitors, Dolgelly. LANE (Rev. Charlton), 14, St. John's Wood-park, Middlesex. Aug. 14; Chas. T. Lane, solicitor, 3, Lombard-court, London. LEATHER (Geo.), Hindley, Lancaster, labourer. Aug. 1; Thos. F. Taylor, solicitor, Wigan. LIGHTON (Rev. Sir Christopher R., Bart.) Ellaston Vicarage, Ashbourne, Stafford. Aug. 1; A. Robinson, solicitor, 114, Stephen's-green (West), Dublin. LUDGATE (Peter), 6, Artillery-court, Chiswell-street, Middlesex, gentleman. Aug. 12; Mills and Lockyer, solicitors, 2, Brunswick-place, City-road, London. LUSELL (Geo.), formerly of Stapleton, near Bristol, late of Weston-super-Mare, Somerset, Esq. Sept. 1; Abbot and Pope, solicitors, Albion-chambers, Bristol. LYLE (Josias), Artillery-place, Woolwich, Kent, saddler and harness maker. Aug. 31; W. Farnfield, solicitor, 19 and 21. Queen Victoria-street, London, and Parson's Hill, Woolwich. MACKLIN (Wm. H.), 92 and 93, Fleet-street, London, optician (trading under the style or firm of J. G. West and Co.). Sept. 6; R. Vining, solicitor, 16, Furnival's Inn, London MILES (Mary Ann), formerly of 109, London Wall. London, late of 14, Waterloo-street, Hammersmith, Middlesex, widow. Aug. 12; H. Hand, solicitor, 22, Coleman-street, London. MILNE (Rev. John G.), formerly of Upper Clapton, late of PARSON (John). Bitton House, Teignmouth, Devon, Esq. Sept. 1; Whidborne and Tozer, solicitors, Teignmouth. PAWLEY (Caroline), late of 78, Abingdon-road, Kensington,, and formerly of 11, Barnsbury-street, Islington, Middlesex, widow, Aug. 22; Jas. Grover, 87, Robert-street, Chelsea, Middlesex. PERKS (Edward), Newton Solney, Derby, and of Burtonupon-Trent, timber merchant. Aug. 20; Richardson and Small, solicitors, Burton-upon-Trent. PEYTON (Susanna), 41, Pembury-grove, Lower Clapton, Middlesex, spinster. Aug. 14; C. T. Lane, solicitor, 8, Lombard-court, London. PULLEN (WM. P., 224, Buckingham-street, Strand, Middlesex, wine merchant. Aug. 16; Stephen Camp, solicitor, Union Bank-buildings, Ely-place, London. RESTALL (Thos.), Chalford, Gloucester, land agent. Oct.1; Edwin Mitchell, solicitor, Lansdown, Stroud. RICKETT (Benjamin), Hill House Farm, Netteswell, Essex, farmer. Aug. 20: F. Parish, solicitor, 1 and 2, Great Winchester-street-buildings, London. ROBERTS (Elias), late of Sale, Chester, formerly of Wellington Inn, Stretford New-road, Hulme, Manchester, gentlewan. Sept. 8; Claye and Son, solicitors, 8, St. James'ssquare. Manchester. RODRICK (Thomas), Much Wootton, near Liverpool, and of Beachwood, Westmoreland, Esq. July 31; Thornely and Dismore, solicitors, 14, Water-street, Liverpool. ROWLANDS (MARY), Dwrnudon, Llanuwchyllyn, Merioneth, widow. Aug. 20; Jones and Davies, solicitors, Dolgelly. SERCOMBE (Edwin), 41, Brook-street, Middlesex, and of 59, Gloucester-gardens, Hyde Park, Middlesex, surgeon dentist. Sept. 1; Messrs. Parker, solicitors, 17, Bedfordrow, London. SHAW (John), Longton, Stafford, iron merchant. Aug. 4; Clarke and Hawley, solicitors, Longton. SLATER (Henry), formerly of Withington, near Manchester, late of The Abbey, Tyrvin, near Chester, gentleman. Aug. 15: Lingards and Newby, solicitors, 10, Boothstreet, Piccadilly, Manchester. TYRWHITT (Geo. B.), formerly of The Cedars, Brentford, Middlesex, late of The Lawn, Exmouth, Devon, Col. in the Bombay Staff Corps. Aug. 31; H. W. Trinder, solicitor, 4, Bishopsgate-street Within, London. WEBB (Julia Ann S.), Cadogan-place, Chelsea, Middlesex, spinster. Sept. 15; Norton, Rose, and Co., solicitors, 6, Victoria-street, Westminster, London. WILLIS (Rev. Robert), Parker's Piece, Cambridge. Aug. 15; Maples, Teesdale, and Co., solicitors, 6, Frederick's. place, Old Jewry, London. WOODERSON (James), 95, Tachbrook-street, Pimlico, Middle. sex, gentleman. Sept. 29; Geo. D. Byfield, solicitor, 15A, St. Helen's-place, London. YARBOROUGH (Rt. Hon. Chas. Maude W. A. Pelham Earl of). Aug. 31; Tallents, Burnaby, Griffin, and Co., solici tors, Newark. REPORTS OF SALES. Tuesday, July 13. By Messrs. FAREBROTHER, CLARK, and Co., at the Mart. Lincoln's-inn-fields.-No. 38, freehold-sold for £6150, Kent, Bromley.-Freehold residence and 3a. Or. 38p.-sold for £3400. Enclosures of land containing 24a. 2r. 8p.-sold for £7750. A freehold residence, with garden-sold for £500. By Messrs. CHINNOCK, GALSWORTHY, and Co., at the Mart. Essex, near Witham.-Farm, containing 298a. 3r. 4p.-sold for £16,200. Brewhouse Wood, containing 5a. 2r. 20p.-sold for £220. 11p., freehold-sold for £8350. freehold-sold for £17,000. Two enclosures, containing 3a. 1r. 22p.-sold for £360, By Messrs. NEWBON and HARDING, at the Mart. Dalston.-Nos. 2, 4, 6, and 8, Montague-road, term 86 years -sold for £1260. Holloway.-Nos. 4, 5, and 6, Blenheim-terrace, term 82 years -sold for £580. Islington.-No. 20, Lonsdale-square, term 34 years-sold for £570. Forest-hill.-No. 7, Westbourne-villas, term 77 years-sold for £150. By Mr. G. BRINSLEY, at the London Tavern. Peckham.-No. 83, Queen's-road, term 73 years-sold for Friday July 16. £455. By Messrs. NORTON, TRIST, WATNEY, and Co., at the Mart. City.-No. 12, Little Tower-street. freehold-sold for £21,400 Lower Tooting, High-street.-Freehold houses with shops, and 10a. 3r. Op.-sold for £7500. Surrey, Newdigate.-High Trees Farm, containing 82a. Ir. 30p.-sold for £3060. Enclosures of land, containing 14a. 2r. 19p.-sold for £610. Soho.-No. 31, Gerrard-street, freehold-sold for £1650. Upper Clapton, Warwick-road.-The Tors, term 27 yearssold for £760. of the Postmaster-General. The indictment contained four counts: First, for stealing a post letter, the property of the Postmaster-General; secondly, for embezzling and secreting a letter containing £2; thirdly, for stealing the sum of £2 from a post letter; fourthly, for stealing a letter and money, the property of Mary Ann Tigwell. From the facts, it appeared that the prosecutrix, Mary Ann Tigwell, was a servant living at the Basingstoke Union Workhouse, situate at Basingstoke, in Hampshire, and that the prisoner was letter carrier, whose duty it was to carry, deliver, and collect letters between Basingstoke and Sherfield. His duties were set out in a body of rules, which was supplied by the post office authorities, and amongst them was the following: "He will not be allowed to take for registration any letter handed to him." In the course of his duties he had to deliver at the workhouse the letters directed to that establishment, and to receive letters from there to be posted. On the 7th April he received a letter there from the prosecutrix, which contained two sovereigns, addressed to "Miss E. Tigwell, 4, Vine-oourt, Whitechapel, London." It was stamped with a penny stamp, and she, having informed the prisoner of its contents, gave him 4d., with a request that he would get it registered at Basing. stoke, which he promised to do. He promised to bring her the registration receipt, which, however, he did not do, making from time to time various excuses for omitting to do so. At last, upon inquiries being made, it appeared that he had never registered or posted the letter; and, upon being charged by the prosecutrix with his neglect, he excused himself by alleging that he must have mislaid the letter, and he returned her the £2, together with 5d. for the postage. Folkard, for the prisoner, contended that there was no case to go to the jury, because the letter was not a post letter, it not having been delivered to a person fulfilling the duty of a servant of the post office, for that as the rule forbids a deliverer of letters from taking any letter to be registered, he was not, when he took the letter in question, in the fulfilment of his duty, and so not acting as a post office servant: (Reg. v. Harley, 1 Car. & Kir. 89; Reg. v. Rathbone, 1 Car. & Kir. 220; 2 Moo. C. C. 242; 2 Russell on Crimes, 503.) [QUAIN, J.-The case, Reg. v. Rathbone, was a trap letter, here it is a genuine letter delivered to the prisoner in the ordinary course. He was right in taking the letter, but wrong in Regent's-park.-No. 29, Avenue-road, term 29 years-sold taking the 4d.] He took the letter, however, for for £1320. Redhill.-Prospect-cottage, freehold-sold for £530. By Mr. ROBERT REID, at the Mart. Grosvenor-square.-No. 123, Mount-street, term 3 years-sold Regent's-park.- No. 19, North Bank, term 37 years-sold for for £90. £465. Dorset-square.-No. 49, Park-street, and 12 and 13, Newstreet-mews, term 24 years-sold for £565. Brompton.-No. 7, Alfred-street, term 33 years-sold for £100. Portman-market.-Nos. 30 and 31, Nightingale-street, term 46 years-sold for £375. Clerkenwell.-An improved ground rent of £93 10s. per annum, term 33 years-sold for £900. Guildford-street.-Moiety of a ground rent of £21 per annum term 17 years-sold for £100. By Mr. R. STAPLETON, at the Mart. Crouch-hill.-Smith's Brickfield, freehold, with plant and machinery-sold for £3550. Hackney-Freehold ground rent of £4 12s. per annum-sold Leyton. Grange-park-road.-Portland-villa, freehold-sold Stamford-hill.-Freehold residence, with stabling-sold for for £170. WESTERN CIRCUIT, WINCHESTER. SMITH (John), formerly of Calcutta, Bengal, medical prac- Larceny by a servant of the post office of a post titioner, but late of 40, Talbot-road West, Bayswater, Middlesex, Esq. Aug. 31; Nicholson and Nicol and Son, solicitors. 48, Lime-street, E.C. STEWART (Rev. Alexander), late of Branbridges, East Peckham, near Tonbridge, Kent, formerly of 48, Camdenroad, and of Palmer House, Holloway, Middlesex. Aug. 31; J. J. Hubbard, Son, and Eve, solicitors, 24, Bucklersbury, London. STODART (Benjamin), 7, Montagu-street, Portman-square, Middlesex, Esq. Aug. 1; J. T. Simpson, solicitor, 62, Moorgate-street, London. SUTHERLAND (Alexander M.), Holybourne, Alton, Hants, Esq. Aug. 16; F. S. Gosling, solicitor, 20, Spring-gardens, London. SWOOTMAN (Mary), Diss, Norfolk, widow. Aug. 20; Wm. SYKES (Wm.), Weston-super-Mare. Aug. 18; Lakes, Beau- head, Lancaster, gentleman, and formerly of Tomlinsonstreet, Hulme Within, Manchester, druggist's sundryman. Sept. 1; Geo. Brett, solicitor, 3, Kennedy-street, Manchester. letter-Breach of duty-Liability of servant. The prisoner was a letter carrier, and it was his duty to collect letters and post them, but by one (6 not allowed to of the post office rules he was take for registration any letter handed to him." The prisoner, whilst collecting letters, received from C. J. a letter containing two sovereigns, with a request that he would get it registered at the post office, and for that purpose he received also 4d., being the fee upon registration. This letter not having been posted by him, he was indicted under the 7 Will. 4 & 1 Vict. c. 36, as a servant of the post office, for stealing a post letter. Held, that notwithstanding he was guilty of a breach of duty in taking the letter for registration, he was still acting in the capacity of a servant of the post office, and the letter was still a post letter within the meaning of the Act. THE prisoner was indicted under the provisions of the 7 Will. 4 & 1 Vict. c. 36, for stealing a post letter, he being a servant in the employment a particular purpose, namely, to have it registered, which he had no right to do. [QUAIN, J.The 47th section, which is the interpretation clause, is very strong. It says, "the expression, officer of the post office, shall include the Postmaster-General, and every deputy postmaster, agent, officer, clerk, letter carrier, guard, post boy, rider, or any other person employed in any business of the post office, whether employed by the Postmaster-General or by any person under him, or on behalf of the post office." How can it be said he was not a servant of the post office ?] Be that as it may, he was not acting as a servant of the post office in taking a letter to be registered, which was an act beyond the scope of his duties; and in so doing he was acting no more than in the capacity of a private person. Cole, Q.C. and Hooper, for the prosecution, argued that the letter was a post letter, and that the prisoner received it in his capacity of a postoffice servant, and that it mattered not that in undertaking to see it registered he exceeded his duty; for if that were otherwise, a post office servant might easily protect himself by committing some irregularity. The prisoner could not divest himself of his character of a post office servant. Suppose he had said he would not post the letter unless he received a gratuity for himself. This would be an unlawful condition; but if it were paid to him, he would not the less be receiving & post letter in his character of a post office servant. his own wrong. I certainly think that he cannot, QUAIN, J.-He would be taking advantage of by neglecting his duty and doing something which he ought not to do, throw off his character of a post office servant. He cannot in such a way absolve himself from liability. Here the prisoner was a post office servant, and in that capacity he received a post letter to register; he ought not, according to the regulations, so to have received it, but he was still a post office servant, I think the ob. and was acting as such servant. jection cannot be sustained. The prisoner was afterwards acquitted upon the merits. NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS. WATER RATE-SUIT IN COUNTY COURT FORBONA FIDE DISPUTE AS TO ANNUAL VALUEJURISDICTION.-Where the "annual value" of a tenement charged with water rate is bona fide disputed before action brought, it is a condition precedent to the right of suing for the rate that any ing authority: Upon demurrer to return to a mandamus, directing the justices of a county, in the prison of which an insane prisoner had been detained under a contract with a borough, to ascertain the settlement under sect. 2 of the said Act of 1840. Held by the Exchequer Chamber, affirming the Queen's Bench, that this section imposes a duty upon the proper justices to make this inquiry upon receipt of a requisition from the Home Secretary; and that there is nothing in the said two later Acts of 1864 and 1865 to transfer the duty of making this inquiry from the justices of the county in which the prisoner was actually in prison to the justices of the borough which contracted for the prisoner's detention: (Reg. v. The Justices of Sussex, 32 L. T. Rep. N. S. 673. Ex. Ch.) COMPANY LAW. EUROPEAN SOCIETY ARBITRATION ACT. AN Act (as amended in committee) for amending the European Assurance Society Arbitration that the water company should procure the distract, be deemed to be the prison of the contractpute to be determined by summoning before justices the party liable. The plaintiffs were a water company, whose special Act (the New River Act 1852) incorporated the Waterworks Clauses 1847, and the defendant occupied a house within their district for which he paid £20 a year. By the special Act the defendant was entitled to demand from them water for his house, as being under the annual value of £200, at a rate not exceeding 4 per cent. per annum on such annual value. By sect. 68 of the Waterworks Clauses Act 1847, which is incorporated with the plaintiffs special Act, water rates "shall be recoverable from the person requiring the water according to the annual value of the tenement supplied," and " dispute as to such value shall be determined by two justices," and by sect. 142 of the Railways Clauses Act 1845, which is incorporated with the Waterworks Clauses Act, either party to a question referrable to the determination of jus. tices may cause the other to be summoned, whereupon "it shall be lawful for the justices to hear and determine such question." By sect. 46 of the special Act, nothing therein, or in any Act incorporated therewith, "shall prevent the company from recovering any sum not exceeding £50, which shall be due to them for water rates, by action in such manner as is by law provided." The plaintiffs, in Jan. 1874, sued the defendant in the County Court for a balance of two years' water rate, due Christmas 1872. The defendant had from April 1873, up to the time of action brought, disputed the plaintiff's claim as excessive, on the ground that "annual value meant net annual value after deduction made for repairs, and paid into court a sum calculated upon an annual value of £18. The plaintiffs based their claim upon a gross annual value of £22. Neither party had summoned the other before justices for the purpose of having the dispute as to annual value determined: Held, upon appeal from the County Court judge, who had given judgment for the plaintiffs for an amount calculated upon an annual value of £20, being the rent paid by the defendant to his landlord, that the judge had no jurisdiction to determine the question as to annual value, and his judgment for the plaintiffs reversed. Quare. Whether it would be competent for a defendant to raise a question as to annual value after action brought: (New River Company v. Mather, 32 L. T. Rep. N. S. 658. C. P.) WRIT OF ERROR IN A CRIMINAL CASEWHETHER OF RIGHT OR OF GRACE-FIAT OF THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL.-Although a writ of error is, in cases of misdemeanor, ex debito justitie, and not, as in cases of treason and felony, ex gratia, yet the fiat of the Attorney-General is a condition precedent to the issuing of such writ, and the granting or refusing of such fiat is a matter entirely within the discretion of the Attorney-General, in the exercise of which discretion he cannot be controlled by the court. Accordingly, therefore, an action by a convicted misdemeanant against the Clerk of the Petty Bag, for refusing to seal a writ of error tendered to him by such convict, on the ground of the AttorneyGeneral's fiat not having been previously obtained, was held to be pretenceless and unmain. tainable; and a rule to rescind an order of a judge staying such action altogether, as frivolous and vexatious, and an abuse of the process of the court, was refused, there being no duty on the Clerk of the Petty Bag to seal the writ until the fiat had been issued. So held by Bramwell and Cleasby, B.B. (concurrentibus Kelly, C.B., and Pollock and Amphlett, BB.): (Castro v. Murray, 32 L. T. Rep. N. S. 675. Ex.) INSANE PRISONER INQUIRY CONCERNING SETTLEMENT-PRISON CONTRACT.-By sect. 1 of the Insane Prisoners' Act 1840, two justices of the peace of the county, city, borough, or place where an insane prisoner is imprisoned may in. quire, with the aid of two physicians or surgeons, as to the insanity of such person. By sect. 2, in all such cases as aforesaid, unless one of Her Majesty's Principal Secretaries of State shall otherwise direct, it shall be lawful for such two justices, or any other two justices of the peace of the county, city, borough, or place where such person is imprisoned, to inquire into and ascertain such person's legal settlement, with the object of ordering payment of the costs of his mainten ance. Sect. 1 of this Act is repealed by the Insane Prisoner's Act Amendment Act 1864, and other provisions are made for inquiring into a prisoners insanity by visiting or other justices, with physicians or surgeons, and in certain cases by physicians or surgeons only. The Prison Act 1865 provides for contracts between prison authorities for the detention of prisoners, and enacts (sect. 57) that every prison, wheresoever situate, shall, for all purposes be deemed to be within the limits of the place for which it is used as a prison; and also (sect. 65) that the prison of the receiving authority shall, for all the purposes of and incidental to the com. mitment, trial, detention, and punishment of the prisoners of the contracting authority, or any of such purposes, according to the tenor of the con. Acts 1872 and 1873 : Whereas by the European Society Arbitration Act 1872 (in this Act called the Arbitration Act of 1872) provision is made for effecting a settlement of the affairs of the European Assurance Society and of other companies by arbitration: And whereas Richard Baron Westbury, the first arbitrator, proceeded in the arbitration, and after his death John Baron Romilly, the second arbitrator, further proceeded therein, and is now deceased: And whereas in some cases of great importance, as affecting the liquidations of the companies sub. ject to the arbitration, the second arbitrator differed in opinion from and varied the determinations and orders of the first arbitrator, and difficulty has ensued therefrom in the conduct of the administrative business of the arbitration : And whereas the Arbitration Act of 1872 enacts to the effect that no order of the arbitrator shall be subject to review or appeal in any court of law or equity or elsewhere, and it is expedient that provision for an appeal in certain cases be now made: the several liquidations under the arbitration be And whereas it is expedient that the closing of expedited and facilitated, and that for that purpose provision be made for the absolute barring of claims and the final disposal of assets: And whereas the Arbitration Act of 1872 enacts to the effect that if any arbitrator dies, resigns, or becomes incapable of acting, or unwilling to act, the Lord Chancellor, being a person filling or an arbitrator shall be appointed in his place by having filled the office of a judge in one of the Superior Courts of law or equity in the United Kingdom, or being a member of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council : And whereas it is expedient that power be given for the appointment of a person not so qualified: divers consequent and other purposes it is exAnd whereas for the purposes aforesaid and for pedient that the provisions of the Arbitration Act of 1872 be in various respects enlarged or modified: And whereas the objects aforesaid cannot be effected without the authority of Parliament : May it therefore please your Majesty, that it may be enacted, and be it enacted by the Queen's Most Excellent Majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the Lords, spiritual and temporal, and Commons in this present Parliament assembled, and by the authority of the same, as follows: 1. This Act may be cited as the European Assurance Society Arbitration Act 1875. The European Assurance Society Arbitration Acts 1872 and 1873, and this Act may be cited together as the European Assurance Society Arbitration Acts 1872, 1873, and 1875, and are in this Act referred to together as the Arbitration Acts. 2. This Act as far as may be shall be read and have effect as one Act with the European Assurance Society Arbitration Acts 1872 and 1873. In this Act the arbitrator means the arbitrator for the time being under the Arbitration Acts. 3. The Court of Appeal in Chancery shall have jurisdiction and power to entertain an appeal from any determination or order of the arbitrator given or made before or after the passing of this Act and (subject to the provisions of this Act) to hear and determine the same as if it was brought in the course of the appellate jurisdiction of that court under the Companies Act 1862, save that it shall be heard and determined by no less than two judges of that court. An appeal shall lie from any determination or order of the arbitrator accordingly subject to the following provisions : (1.) As regards any determination or order given or made before the passing of this Act an appeal shall not lie therefrom unless the arbitrator expressly certifies in writing that by reason of differences between previous decisions on matters of principle relating to cases of novation or of liability of contri butories it is desirable that an appeal be brought. (2.) As regards any determination or order given or made after the passing of this Act an appeal shall not lie therefrom except on a matter of principle unless the arbitrator expressly certifies in writing that an appeal may properly be brought. (3.) An appeal shall not be heard in any case unless notice thereof in writing is given to the party respondent as regards any determination or order given or made before the passing of this Act within three weeks after the passing of this Act and as regards any determi nation or order given or made after the passing of this Act within three weeks after the same is given or made unless in either case such time is extended by the arbitrator before or after the expiration of such time. 4. Every appeal shall be on a special case un. less in any instance the Court of Appeal in Chancery otherwise directs, and the special case shall be approved and certified by the arbitrator, and his determination on the settlement of the case shall be final. 5. The rules and practice for the time being applicable to appeal under the Companies Act 1862, shall, subject to the provisions of this Act, and to any rules or orders of the Court of Appeal in Chancery to the contrary, extend and apply to appeals under this Act. 6. No appeal shall lie from a determination or order of the Court of Appeal in Chancery under this Act. 7. Where under a determination or order of the arbitrator given or made before the passing of this Act any payment has beem made out of the assets of any company in respect of the claim of any creditor, then notwithstanding anything in this Act the creditor shall not be required under any decision of the Court of Appeal in Chancery to repay the money so paid or any part thereof, but any money payable to the creditor out of the assets of any other company in respect of the same claim shall to the extent of the first-mentioned payment be retained against him. 8. Where any question of principle is brought before the arbitrator or Court of Appeal for decision the arbitrator and Court of Appeal may if he or they think fit on application made for that purpose allow any class or classes of persons having a direct pecuniary interest in such decision to be heard separately. 9. Where goods or chattels are taken or intended to be taken in execution under process issued under the Arbitration Acts and a claim is made thereto or to the proceeds or value thereof by any person other than the person against whom process was issued the arbitrator shall have in respect thereof the like powers authorities and jurisdiction for adjustment of claims and for protection and relief of the sheriff or other officer and otherwise as the Court of Chancery would have on a bill of interpleader or bill in the nature thereof duly filed in that court by competent par ties and the like powers authorities and jurisdiction as a superior court of law or a judge thereof would have in case the process had been issued out of a superior court of law and may direct in what court an issue directed shall be prepared and tried and the same may be tried accordingly. 10. Sect. 9 of the Arbitration Act of 1872 (conferring on the arbitrator all the powers, autho rities, and jurisdiction vested in or exercisable by the Court of Chancery or a judge thereof in court or at chambers in the liquidation of any of the companies scheduled thereto pending at the passing of that Act) is hereby extended so as to confer on the arbitrator, for the purposes of the liquidation of any of the companies subject to the arbitration, all powers, authorities, and jurisdic tion vested in or exerciseable by the Court of Chancery or a judge thereof in court or at chambers by or under any statute passed or to be passed before or after the passing of the several Arbitration Acts or otherwise. 11. The arbitrator may, if he thinks fit, by order, appoint a day on which claims arising on policies or otherwise in the arbitration, and not brought in and proved, shall be barred, and the same shall by virtue of that order and this Act be absolutely barred accordingly. 12. The arbitrator may, if he thinks fit, cause to be paid into the Court of Chancery any sums left unreceived by the parties entitled thereto by a day appointed by the arbitrator, including sums of the following kinds (that is to say): (a) Dividends allotted and directed to be paid. (b) Premiums received in the Court of Chancery on the term of being returned in certain events. (c) Sums received from contributories for calls and directed to be returned to them. (d) Sums received from contributories for calls and not required for discharge of claims, but too small in aggregate amount to be divided among and returned to the contributories. 13. Where any sums are so paid into the Court of Chancery there shall be filed in the court, under the direction of the arbitrator, a list distinguishing the sums paid in and the names, addresses, and descriptions of the several persons entitled thereto, as far as the same have been ascertained in the arbitration. The list shall be conclusive evidence of the title of those persons to those several sums. The court shall from time to time, on application at chambers, cause those several sums (subject to payment of any propeer costs or expenses) to be paid out to the persons entitled thereto, according to the list, or to their respective representatives or assigns. 14. The arbitrator may, if and as far as the provisions of this Act authorising payment into the Court of Chancery are not applicable, or are for any reason not applied, deal with and dispose of sums left unreceived as aforesaid, and may deal with and dispose of other undistributed assets or sums in such manner as with respect to those several classes of sums or assets he considers most equitable and expedient. 15. Any vacancy in the office of arbitrator happening after the passing of this Act may (notwithstanding anything in sect. 26 of the Arbitration Act of 1872) be filled by the appointment by the Lord Chancellor of a barrister of fifteen years' standing or upwards, and all the provisions of the Arbitration Acts relating to the arbitrator shall extend to any person so appointed subject to the following exceptions and qualifications: (1.) He may, if he thinks fit, state any question arising on a matter of principle in the arbitration in the form of a special case for the opinion of the Court of Appeal in Chan(2.) The question in a special case so stated by him may be heard and determined by any two or more of the judges of the Court of Appeal in Chancery. cery. (3.) His final award shall be made not later than the 31st Dec. 1876, or within such extended time (if any) as the Lord Chancellor, or one of the Lords Justices of the Court of Appeal in Chancery, by writing under his hand from time to time thinks fit to allow. (4.) The provision of the Arbitration Act 1872 relating to remuneration shall not apply to him, and his remuneration shall be such as the Lord Chancellor from time to time ap16. In proceedings before the Court of Appeal in Chancery under this Act, the court may have regard to the power and authority vested in the proves. first, that the chairman had not the absolute ACTION UPON CHEQUE-ABSENCE OF EFFECTS that the whole cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of the Mayor's Court, and a rule to MARITIME LAW. NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS. 66 circumstance of the CHARTER PARTY DEMURRAGE FOR DELAY - LIABILITY OF CHARTERER. BIRMINGHAM COUNTY COURT. Monday, July 12. (Before W. H. COLE, Q.C., Judge). Practice-Payment into court-Costs-Court fees HIS HONOUR delivered judgment as follows. arbitrator under sect. 8 of the Arbitration Act of affirming the Queen's Bench in an action for pay the difference between the court fees on the 1872. 17. On the Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1873 coming into operation, all jurisdiction and powers of the Court of Appeal in Chancery under this Act shall be transferred to and vested in Her Majesty's Court of Appeal, established by the Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1873, as amended by any subsequent Act, and for the purposes of this Act there shall be substituted for the Lords Justices of the Court of Appeal in Chancery such judges of Her Majesty's Court of Appeal as the Lord Chancellor from time to time thinks fit by writing under his hand to designate in that behalf. 18. All costs, charges, and expenses preliminary to and of and incidental to the preparing of applying for obtaining and passing of this Act (including the costs, charges, and expenses of Caroline Brooke and Samuel Patterson Evans, being certain of the petitioners against the Bill for this Act) shall be paid out of such money, subject to the arbitration as the arbitrator directs. NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS. LANDS CLAUSES ACT-PAYMENT INTO COURT -PETITION FOR RE-INVESTMENT-APPORTIONMENT OF COSTS.-Costs of payment out and reinvestment of moneys paid into court under the Lands Clauses Act 1845, directed to be paid rateably by the various bodies who had paid the money in, the amounts varying very largely: (Ex parte The Governors of St. Bartholomew's Hospital, 32 L. T. Rep. N. S. 652. V.C. M.) OVERBEARING OR FRAUDULENT CONDUCT OF DIRECTORS SUIT BY INDIVIDUAL SHAREHOLDER TO RESTRAIN.-Bill by shareholder on behalf of himself and other shareholders against a company and its directors alleging that in order to prevent discussion of a resolution proposed by the plaintiff a a general meeting, the chairman had, in collusion with other directors, and in order to stifle discussion, determined to carry, and had carried by show of hands, an adjournment of the meeting, and to refuse, and had refused, a poll on the question of adjournment, so as to prevent the use of proxies by the plaintiff: Held, on demurrer by a director who was not present at the meeting charter-party between plaintiff, the shipowner, COUNTY COURTS. BANBURY COUNTY COURT. (Before W. H. COOKE, Esq., Q.C., Judge). sum he demanded and on the lesser sum recovered when such reduction is not caused by a set-off, he is not to do so when the reduction is caused by a set-off; in which latter case he would be entitled to make the defendant pay the same. This appears quite consistent with sect. 82 of the original Act. But then, under the rules of 1867, issued by the five judges of County Courts appointed to frame rules and orders for regulating the practice of the courts, it is by Rule 73 provided that "When the defendant is desirous of paying money into court it shall, except where otherwise expressly provided, be paid five clear days before the return day, with court fees proportionate to the amount paid in, and the attorney's costs, if any." Form No. 29 to these rules gives the form of the notice to be served on the plaintiff by the defendant who pays into court, under sect. 82 of the Act of 1846, a sum less than the amount of the plaintiff's claim, and the plaintiff is thereby informed that the sum paid into court is the amount specified in the notice, "together with costs proportionate to that sum." It will be observed that neither rule 73 nor form 29 make any reference whatever to the case of a set-off. They manifestly intend to provide for such cases as this. For instance, where the plaintiff claims £25, and the defendant admitting £5, but not making any deduction for a set-off, pays £5 into court, It was not, with costs proportionate to that sum. in my opinion, intended by the rules that rule 73 or form 29, or the forma of indorsement on the summons itself as to payment into court, should apply to cases of set-off at all. The defendant has apparently been misled by the indorsement on the summons, which tells him that if he admits part only of the claim he is to pay into court the amount admitted with costs proportionate to the amount paid in. But this direction says nothing about set-off, which is the subject of the next direction in the indorsement. In the present case the defendant admits not part only, but the His HONOUR.-Certainly. In railway cases, whole of the plaintiff's claim. He says, however, which are of great difficulty, why don't the com- that he has a counter claim, which satisfies by panies do the same as anyone else, go to a respect-set-off part of the plaintiff's claim, and leaves a able attorney and pay the usual fee for his advice and assistance? (To the inspector).—I think you had better make your bow and gracefully retire. His HONOUR.-Will you show me any Act of The Inspector.-I appear here to conduct the His HONOUR.-I cannot allow it. You are a poacher on other men's preserves, and if I allow Crosby.-It was under my advice the plaint was balance of £1 188. only. But he was not entitled to pay costs on the £1 188. only. He was bound to pay costs on the whole of the plaintiff's claim as it stood, before the defendant put forward his Bet-off. The defendant has, by his set-off, got from the plaintiff a benefit equal to actual pay. ment thereof, without having had to bring an action for the amount. It appears to me that, as the plaintiff has recovered less than the amount of his claim through a reduction caused by a set off, he is not, under the County Court Act, to pay or bear the costs on the difference between the amount claimed and the amount recovered, and that the defendant was bound to pay into court the full amount of the costs incurred by the plaintiff up to the time of such payment-namely, the 118. for costs mentioned in the summons. Under such circumstances, there must be a ver. diet for the plaintiff for £1 18s., with the costs of the action, including the hearing, and the sum paid into court will go in reduction only of such debt and costs. READING COUNTY COURT. (Before J. SCOTT, Esq., Deputy Judge.) OAKSHOTT V. THE GREAT WESTERN RAILWAY COMPANY. Unpunctuality of Trains-In face of conditions on time table plaintiff being unable to prove ful misconduct must be nonsuited. THIS was a case arising out of the unpunctuality of one of the defendants' trains. " wil Martin appeared for the plaintiff. Wm. Wightman Wood, barrister, instructed by Robert Rogers Nelson, the defendants' attorney, appeared for the Great Western Railway Company. The facts of the case, as deposed to by the plaintiff, were as follows:-On Whit Sunday he received a telegram stating that a relative, who resided at Chichester, was very ill and summoning him to that place. He took a ticket at Reading Station for Basingstoke, which is a station on the Great Western Railway Company's line, and is the junction station between that line and the South-Western Railway Company's line. The train for which he took the ticket was advertised to leave Reading at 11 35, but owing to the extraordinary pressure of traffic on that day, and to the fact that the London trains had to be divided and sent off in two divisions, the second part of the 10 o'clock train from London, in conjunc. tion with which train the 11.30 from Reading to Basingstoke runs, did not arrive at Reading until 12.13 (on ordinary occasions the 10 o'clock train from London would reach Reading at 11.28). The branch train was therefore delayed, and did not leave Reading until 12.24. Owing to the lateness in starting he reached Basingstoke too late for the nominally correspond. ing South-Western Railway Company's train from Basingstoke to Portsmouth, by which he intended to travel, and which had left some minutes prior to the arrival of the Great Western Railway train at that station. He had to remain in the town several hours, eventually leaving by a train which reached Portsmouth at 9.50, too late for the last train from Portsmouth to Chichester. He had, therefore, to hire a conveyance, for which he paid £2 58. 10d., and eventually arrived at one o'clock on Whit-Monday morning. Had he not been delayed at Reading he would have got there at half-past four on Whit-Sunday afternoon. He incurred some expenses at Basing. stoke, and for these, amounting to 12s. 2d., and the above price for the conveyance, amounting in all to £2 188., he now claimed against the de fendants. Wood contended that the plaintiff had not proved his contract with the defendants, as he had not produced himself, or given any notice to defendants to produce, the ticket taken by him at Reading, and without it he did not know the nature of the contract between the plaintiff and the defendants. Martin said he had given due notice to the defendants to produce everything in connection with the case. Wood replied not the ticket, but that if his friend would admit that the ticket had words printed upon it to the effect that it was issued subject to the conditions printed on the company's time bills, he would waive the objection. Martin admitted the fact. Wood cross-examined plaintiff. No part of the sum claimed was for expenses incurred before he got to Basingstoke. He did not know of the conditions on the company's time tables. Wood thereupon contended that the company were entirely exempt from all liability by reason of the condition under which they carried plaintiff, as laid down in their time table, and which was as follows:-Train bills: "The published train bills of this company are only intended to fix the time at which passengers may be certain to obtain their tickets for any journey from the various stations, it being understood that the trains shall not start from them 'before' the appointed time; but the directors give notice that the company do not undertake that the train shall start or arrive at the times specified in the bills, nor will they be accountable for any loss, inconvenience, or injury which may arise from delays or detention, unless upon proof that such loss, inconvenience, injury, delay, or detention arose in consequence of the 'wilful misconduct' of the company's servants." The condition goes on to lay down the terms under which through tickets are granted, which was immaterial to the present inquiry, and that under this condition it was incumbent upon the plaintiff to prove wilful misconduct. Mr. Wood was proceeding to cite cases when His HONOUR interposed, and said he was quite satisfied that the plaintiff, in view of the condition just read to him, had failed to make out his case, and must therefore be nonsuited. Wood applied for costs. Martin opposed, and quoted Forsyth's and Becke's cases, against the same company, which the learned judge of the County Court had decided in plaintiff's favour. His HONOUR held that as the plaintiff had chosen to sue the company, and had failed, he must abide the usual result, and the defendants must have their costs. Plaintiff nonsuited, with costs. NORTH SHIELDS COUNTY COURT. (Before THOS. BRADSHAW, Esq., Judge.) POLETTI v. BECK. a sum of money, uncertain, for the same period. But the agreement does not disclose any consideration for either of these promises; it is, therefore, incapable of being enforced at law. Judgment for defendant, BANKRUPTCY LAW, NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS. BANKRUPTCY-LIQUIDATION BY ARRANGE. DEBTOR-AFTER ACQUIRED PROPERTY.-ProMENT-CLOSE OF LIQUIDATION-DISCHARGE OF perty acquired by or devolving upon a liquidating debtor, after he has obtained his discharge, but before the liquidation has been closed, is not divisible amongst his creditors under the liquidation. Re Bennett's Trusts (31 L. T. Rep. N. S. 720; L. Rep. 19 Eq. 245), overruled: (Ebbs v. Boulnois, 32 L. T. Rep. N. S. 650. Chan.) Simple agreement-Construction of-Considera- (Before Mr. Registrar MURRAY, sitting as Chief tion-Parol evidence not admissible to explain -Statute of Frauds. On the 27th Jan. 1873, the plaintiff and the defendant entered into the following agreement: "I hereby agree to pay to Charles Poletti, 10 per cent. on ten shares, in value £200, in Matthews and Co. (Limited), Crewkerne, for five years; and I, Charles Poletti, also agree D. F. C. Beck all sum or sums over and above the said 10 per cent. for the same period.". to pay The agreement was duly stamped and signed by the parties. The plaintiff alleged that he bought the ten shares in pursuance of the agreement. At the expiration of the first year (the company having paid no dividend) he applied to the defendant for £20, which for some reason or other was not paid. In the course of 1874 the company got into difficulties and went into liquidation; and in the beginning of the present year (two years having elapsed and no dividend having been paid) the plaintiff applied to the defendant for £40, being an amount computed at the rate of 10 per cent. for two years on an investment of £200. The defendant refused to pay, and there upon proceedings were taken to enforce the agreement. The question for the court was whether parol evidence was admissible to supply or suggest a consideration for the promise? Cur. adv. vult. At the next court his HONOUR gave judgment as follows:-I have turned this matter over in my mind since the last court day here, and I come to the conclusion that the plaintiff must fail. In my opinion, the agreement upon which the plaintiff rests his claim fails for want of consideration. I am further of opinion that parolevidence to supply not in terms or in effect a guarantee to pay the or suggest a consideration is inadmissible. It is debt of a third person. If it could be so construed evidence would be admissible under the Mercantile Law Amendment Act 1855, to supply the consideration, though not to explain the promise: (Holmes v. Mitchell, 7 C. B., N. S., 361). It is a simple agreement or promise to pay a fixed rate of interest for five years on in a company, and, being executory, or not shares to be performed within one year, the whole consideration must appear on the face of the instrument, or must be capable of being col. lected from it by fair and necessary inference. The case of Wain v. Walters (5 East, 17), stands unaffected in this respect by recent legislation as regards an agreement of the kind in question. And Lee v. Sweet (3 M. & G. 452) is an authority I was inclined to think at the hearing that an directly in point against the plaintiff's contention. escape might be found from the stringency of the Statute of Frauds by treating shares in a limited company as neither an interest in lands, or goods, chattels. But the language of the statute is express-the words are, "that no action shall be brought upon any agreement that is not to be performed within the space of one year," &c. If the latter promise could be rejected, the former one, upon which the plaintiff relies, might possibly be treated as a promissory note. But the document is one and indivisible, and must stand or fall as a whole, nor would this construction entirely avail the plaintiff on account of the wrong stamp and the penalty. Then what is it? In my opinion it is a simple agreement containing two separate and independent promises. There is on the part of the defendant a promise to pay the plaintiff in certain events a sum of money, certain, for five years; and there is also, on the part of the plaintiff, a promise to pay the defendant Judge). Wednesday, July 21. Ex parte Hook; Re CARTER. Leaseholds-Disclaimer-Failure to disclaimLiability of trustee-Jurisdiction. Semble, where a trustee omits to disclaim leasehold property of the bankrupt, the lessor may apply to the Court of Bankruptcy to compel the trustee to perform the covenants of the lease by payment of the rent. THIS was an application by Mr. Hook, landlord of certain premises occupied by the bankrupt under a three years' agreement, for an order directing the trustee of the bankrupt to pay three quarters' rent which accrued subsequently to the filing of the petition, amounting to £45. The petition was filed on 6th Oct. 1874, and the trustee was appointed on 1st Dec. Notice to disclaim was served upon the trustee's solicitor on the 13th April 1875, but no notice of disclaimer was served upon the landlord's solicitor until the expiration of twenty-eight days. Lord Bigham (of the Common Law Bar), for the trustee, took the preliminary objection that the court had no jurisdiction. The trustee by not disclaiming incurred a personal liability in respect of which he might be sued at law. It is provided by sect. 12, Bankruptcy Act 1869, that "when a debtor shall be adjudicated a bankrupt, no creditor to whom the bankrupt is indebted in respect of any debt proveable in the bankruptcy, shall have any remedy against the property or person of the bankrupt in respect of such debt except in manner directed by the Act." Now this was not a debt proveable in the bankruptcy, so that payment could not be enforced by the court. He cited Ex parte Lyons; re Lyons (L. Rep. 7 Ch. 494). There the application was to set aside a bill of sale executed by the debtor after a composition had been come to. Justice James said, "The world has already been startled at the extent of the jurisdiction assumed by the Court of Bankruptcy, under sect. 72, and it behoves us to be careful before we enlarge it, and before we allow every branch of the Court of Bankruptcy to set aside solemn deeds on equitable grounds, merely because they had their inception in, or were somehow connected with bankruptcy proceedings.... It does not follow because there has been a relation between two parties founded on bankruptcy proceedings that every dealing between them having any connection with that relation is drawn within the jurisdiction of the Court of Bankruptcy." This was clearly not a matter arising in a case of bankruptcy within sect. 72. The onus was upon the other side to show that there was jurisdiction. the applicant, submitted that the court had F. O. Crump (of the Common Law Bar), for jurisdiction. No doubt the trustee could be sued at law, but it was perfectly plain from the provisions of the Act and the rules that the trustee who was an officer of the court could be compelled by the court to perform the cove nants of the lease which he had not disclaimed. [The RREGISTRAR.-Do you say that as every quarter's rent becomes due you will be entitled to come here for an order for payment of the rent by the trustee ?] Certainly; he should go fully that length. [The REGISTRAR.-Suppose there was a forfeiture by the trustee and the lessor wished to bring ejectment, could he come to this court to recover possession ?] That was not within the |