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proved to have been brought under the actual notice of the person contracting with the company, and that the mere fact of conditions of this nature being endorsed on a ticket, or a document of such a nature, will not be sufficient as proof of such notice being brought home to him. Such seems in substance to be the effect of Henderson v. Stevenson, and certainly, had it then been reported, it would seem to have applied to the previous action of Burke v. The Midland Great Western Railway Company, assuming as we do that the condition there (as such conditions of that company usually are) was printed in type so microscopic as to be almost undecipherable, although, perhaps, a distinction might be taken on the ground that the conditions so endorsed are expressly referred to on the face of the delivery note. However that may be, we have no hesitation in fully approving of the decision of Mr. Justice Barry, that the defendants were rendered liable by the contract made for them by the Midland Great Western Railway Company as their agents.-Irish Law Times.

BANKRUPTCY LAW.

COURT OF CHANCERY. Thursday, July 29. (Before the LORDS JUSTICES OF APPEAL.) Ex parte COKER; re BLAKE. Bankruptcy-Injunction-Bankruptcy a bar to THIS was an appeal from a decision of Mr. Registrar Roche, acting as Chief Judge in Bankruptcy.

the action.

In Oct. 1871, Mr. E. H. W. Swete, a medical practitioner at Leamington, entered into an agreement with Mr. R. H. Blake, who had been for some years practising at Leamington as a physician and surgeon, to purchase a share of his business and to carry it on in partnership with him. Swete paid a premium of £1500 for a half share of the business. Differences afterwards arose between the parties, and in Aug. 1873, Mr. Swete filed a bill in Chancery, by which he alleged that he had been induced to enter into the partnership agreement by the fraudulent misrepresentations of Mr. Blake, and praying that the agreement might be cancelled; that the defendant might be ordered to repay the £1500 with interest; and that an account might be taken of all moneys received and paid by the plaintiff under the agreement; and that the defendant might be ordered to make good to the plaintiff what should appear to be due to him. The defendant put in an answer denying the truth of the charges made against him. Before the suit came to a hearing the defendant filed a liquidation petition, under which Mr. Frederick Coker was appointed trustee of his property. In January lasan order was made to revive the suit against him. On the 15th June the trustee applied to the Court of Bankruptcy for an order to restrain the plaint tiff from taking any further proceedings in the suit. The Registrar refused the application, and the trustee appealed. By his notice of appeal he only asked that the proceedings in the suit might be restrained as against him.

Romer, for the appellant, argued that the debtor's interest was now entirely vested in the trustee, and that the suit was, in truth, merely a money demand, which could be more properly dealt with in the Court of Bankruptcy.

Clarke, for the plaintiff in the suit, urged that, as the claim made by the suit was in respect of a debt contracted by fraud, the proceedings in the liquidation would not discharge the debtor from it. The plaintiff was, therefore, still entitled to enforce his right against the debtor personally, and the suit ought to go on for that purpose. The trustee would be a mere formal, but still a necessary party.

Romer replied.

Lord Justice JAMES said that, having regard to the nature of the suit, in which, if the plaintiff succeeded, he would be entitled to a personal remedy against the debtor, the Registrar's order was right. The trustee need not defend the suit. He need do nothing at all, but leave it to the debtor to fight it. Whatever amount might be found to be due to the plaintiff, of course he would be entitled to prove for it in the liquidation, and the debtor would also remain personally liable for it. The appeal must be dismissed, with costs. Lord Justice MELLISH was of the same opinion. He thought that the Court of Bankruptcy ought not to restrain the proceedings in any suit or action against a bankrupt or liquidating debtor in any case where the bankruptcy or liquidation would not be a bar to the claim made in the suit or action. If, as was the case here, the bankrupt or debtor would remain personally liable, notwith. standing his discharge in the bankruptcy or liquidation, then the proceedings ought not to be restrained.

Monday, Aug. 2.

(Before the LORDS JUSTICES.)
COBHAM v. DALTON.

Bankruptcy-Liability of bankrupt to arrest for
debt.
THIS appeal from an order made by the Master of
the Rolls on Saturday raised a question of con-
siderable importance with regard to the power of
arrest for debt under the Debtors' Act 1869. On
5th June an order was made upon the defendant
to this suit for payment of a sum of £94 14s.,
trust money received by him and not accounted
for. The order directed that he should make the
payment by the 30th June. He failed to do so,
and on the 15th July he was adjudicated a bank-
rupt. On the 16th July an attachment was issued
against him by the Court of Chancery for con- |
tempt in disobeying the order. On the 30th July
he was at the Court of Bankruptcy, in Portugal.
street, to attend his public examination, and
after he left the court he went into a public-
house in Chancery-lane to obtain some refresh-
ment before returning to his home, and while
there he was arrested under the attachment.
He applied to the Master of the Rolls for his
release, which his Honour declined to order, being
of opinion that the bankruptcy proceedings did not
protect him from arrest. The defendant appealed.
Sect. 4 of the Debtor's Act 1869 abolishes im-
prisonment for debt, with certain exceptions, one
of which is "default by a trustee or person acting
in a fiduciary capacity, and ordered to pay by a
court of equity any sum in his possession or
under his control." Sect. 12 of the Bankruptcy
Act 1869 provides. "Where a debtor shall be adju-
dicated a bankrupt, no creditor to whom the bank-
rupt is indebted in respect of any debt provable
in the bankruptcy shall have any remedy against
the property or person of the bankrupt in respect
of such debt, except in manner directed by this
Act." And by sect. 49 an order of discharge is
not to release the bankrupt from any debt in-
curred by breach of trust.

E. C. Willis, for the appellant, contended that sect. 12 gave the bankrupt freedom from arrest, at least until he had obtained his order of discharge in the bankruptcy, or the bankruptcy had been closed. At any rate, the appellant had been improperly arrested when he was on his way home from the Bankruptcy Court.

Dune, for the plaintiff in the suit, argued that the Bankruptoy Act and the Debtor's Act ought to be read together, and that the Legislature had thus in effect directed that for a debt of this kind the bankrupt should be liable to arrest, notwithstanding the bankruptcy proceedings.

Lord Justice JAMES thought the appellant was entitled to be discharged from custody. The words of the Bankruptcy Act did not give the power to arrest him. The Act said that after the adjudication no creditor for any debt provable in the bankruptcy should have any remedy against the person of the bankrupt except in manner directed by the Act. The Act contained no direction on this point. This section appeared to have been intended as a substitute for the protection order which was given under the former Acts. When the bankrupt had obtained his order of discharge, or the bankruptcy was closed, the special right of this particular creditor against any further assets which the bankrupt might acquire would accrue, while the other creditors would have lost all remedy against the bankrupt's estate, and this creditor, in order to enforce his right, would then be able to proceed with his attachment. This might, perhaps, be the reason for the provisions of the Act; but whether that were so or not, his Lordship could not find that the Act had directed any manner in which process against the person of the bankrupt could be enforced. His Lordship also thought the appellant was entitled to his release on the other ground raised. The attachment must, therefore, be discharged.

Lord Justice Mellish was of the same opinion. Section 12 was expressed in very plain terms. It was quite clear that this debt was one provable in the bankruptcy, though it was one from which the order of discharge would not release the bankrupt. It would require very strong reasons to induce the Court to depart from the plain words of the section. But his Lordship was not at all certain that this was not the intention of the Legislature. The bankrupt's property was to be divided equally among his creditors, and this particular creditor was not to have any preference until after the order of discharge. Arrest for debt under the Debtors' Act, as, indeed, before that Act, was not by way of punishment, but as a means of compelling payment of the debt. If the man paid the debt when he was in prison, he would be entitled to his release. Therefore it seemed to his Lordship that there was nothing unreasonable in saying that, so long as the debtor's property remained equally liable to all his creditors, this particular creditor was not to use his own special remedy. But as soon as the order of discharge had been obtained, the creditor might enforce his remedy against the after acquired property or again e person of

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A POINT of some nicety and importance arose in this case. The bankrupt formerly carried on busi. ness as a goldsmith at 12, Charles-street, Middlesex Hospital, and on the 4th May, W. A. Bendelow, a creditor, recovered judgment against him for £30 158. 3d., and £4 costs. On the 4th June, the bankrupt committed an act of bank. ruptcy by failing to comply with the terms of a debtor's summons issued under sect. 7 of the Act, at the suit of other creditors. Before any petition was presented, and without any notice of an act of bankruptcy, Mr. Bendelow levied an execution upon the goods of the bank. rupt for £20 3s. 3d., being the amount due to him upon the judgment, after deducting a payment made on account. On the 15th June a petition for adjudication was filed against the bankrupt, and on the 23rd an interim injunction was granted, and afterwards continued, restraining a sale. On the 3rd July, the court adjudicated upon the peti tion, and on the 20th a trustee was appointed under the bankruptcy.

Bagley, for Mr. Bendelow, the creditor, now appeared in support of an application to dissolve the injunction. He contended that a creditor for a sum under £50, having levied upon the goods of his debtor without notice of any act of bank. ruptcy, was entitled to the benefit of his execu tion, notwithstanding the fact that bankruptcy had ensued before a sale could be effected.

Sydney, for the trustee, urged, on the ether hand, that the adjudication, when made, had relation back to the date of the act of bankruptcy, and that the execution in this case having been levied subsequently, the title of the trustee must prevail, although the creditor had not any notice of the act of bankruptcy.

His HONOUR held that the creditor having levied an execution for a sum under £50, without notice of any prior act of bankruptcy, became a secured creditor under sect. 12 of the Act, and was entitled to realise his security. The act of bankruptcy committed in this case was a secret act, and available to those creditors only who sued out the debtor's summons. The execution creditor being, therefore, entitled to the goods, the injunction would be dissolved, with costs.

COUNTY COURTS.

BRISTOL COUNTY COURT.
July 20 and 21.
(Before R. A. FISHER, Esq., Judge.)

SHERBORNE v. SHERBOrne. Jurisdiction-Breach of covenants in a farming lease-Land situate and parties resident in a foreign_district-Execution of lease within dis trict-Trover and conversion of trees excepted by lease-Waiver of jurisdiction by defendant's demand of jury subsequently to his having filed answers to plaintiff's interrogatories "On ex ception to the jurisdiction." THIS was an action for damages by the plaintiff (the lessor) for breaches of covenants in a farm ing lease to repair and to cut hedges, and cleanse ditches, and general breach of covenant. Plaintiff also claimed damages for the wrongful conversion of timber reserved to him by the lease, and for the refusal of the defendant to hang certain gates according to verbal arrangement made upon the locus in quo.

Norris (instructed by Benson and Thomas) for plaintiff.

Poole (instructed by Perham) for defendant. It was proved that the plaintiff and defendant resided together upon the locus in quo at Nempnett, in the county of Somerset, and that they there arranged the terms of the lease, and went to the nearest solicitor, who resided at Wrington, and gave him instructions to prepare the lease, subsequently signing the deed at the solicitors. It was admitted that Nempnett, where the lands were situate, and the alleged breaches occurred and the tort was committed, and subsequent agreement made, was within the jurisdiction of Temple Cloud and Wrington, in that of Bristol.

Poole contended that the cause of action arose

without the jurisdiction of his Honour's court, the land comprised in the lease being situate in another district, and the alleged breaches having necessarily arisen upon the land itself. In reply to his Honour, he stated he had been unable to find a case in point, all the decided cases having reference to purely personal or transitory actions. As to the trover, the timber being reserved to the lessor by the lease, made it a distinct question from the first point, and that it was a tort committed out of his Honour's jurisdiction. And as to the parol agreement as to gates being made, and the parties residing, and the alleged breach Occurring wholly out of the Bristol district, there was no jurisdiction; and that if his Honour were against him upon the execution of the lease the action must fail on the other points.

Norris contended that the action was personal and not local, and cited the case in the Court of Exchequer of Green v. Beach (W. N. L. T. 21st June, 1873, p. 139.)

His HONOUR, after considerable deliberation, decided that the execution of the lease within the district gave him jurisdiction upon the ground that the action being between lessor and lessee, there was privity of contract, and such actions had been held to be transitory. As to the objection to his jurisdiction upon the trover and conversion, and the separate agreement as to the gates, he considered that the defendant had admitted the jurisdicdiction by giving the notice for a jury.

The case then proceeded upon the merits, and after two days' hearing resulted in a verdict for the defendant.

IPSWICH COUNTY COURT.
Wednesday, July 21.

THE GREAT EASTERN RAILWAY COMPANY V.

MASON.

Navigable channel-Tolls.

annexed to the lease by a cross and my initials J. W." down to the stream which passes under the Seven Arches on the London-road, and that Handford Lock was constructed at the same time, and I may here add that I have had a view of the locality, and that the inference I draw from the view is the same I have drawn from the language of the second section of the Act above quoted. And if so no barges could ever before the works authorised by the Stowmarket Navigation Act were carried out, have got to Handford Mill by the route by which Mr. Mason's linseed and oilcake were conveyed to and from the mill, and no right right or privilege could then have existed for merWeb-chandise to be conveyed toll free by that route, as there was then no waterway along that line, and no tolls had before that been imposed. As therefore no right or privilege such as is now claimed existed, or could have existed before the passing of the Stowmarket Navigation Act, such right or privilege cannot come within the saving clause of the 21st section of the Act. And it would seem to me a very extraordinary construc. tion to put upon a saving clause, which only saves the then existing rights and privileges, to hold that it exempts the parties named in it from burdens first imposed by the Act itself. Again I observed above that the 18th clause imposing the tolls uses the expression, "For all corn and other grain, hops, &c.," without exception. Had the Legislature intended to exempt the Corporation of Ipswich and their tenants from the tolls imposed by that section, one would have expected to have found the clause run thus: "For all oorn, grain, hops, &c. (except corn, grain, hops, &c., belonging to the Corporation of Ipswich or their tenants)." It remains to notice the argument derived from the very slight evidence of the payment of any tolls. Mr. Orford stated that the plaintiffs became the owners of the Stowmarket Navigation in 1862; but upon reference to my judgment in the former case between the same parties, I find that by a lease dated 31st Dec. 1846 the trustees of the Stowmarket Navigation, under a statutory power, demised the navigation to the Ipswich and Bury Railway Company for a term of fortytwo years from the 1st Jan. 1846, and which lease became vested in the Great Eastern Railway Company, the plaintiffs, under their Act 25 & 26 Vict. c. 223, for the residue of that term of fortytwo years. Therefore, for the last thirty years the navigation has been in the bands of the railway companies, and their object doubtless in acquiring the control of the navigation was to drive all traffic from the river to the rail, and for years, I believe, no barges were ever seen upon the navigation waters, and there were no tolls, therefore, to collect. But within the last few years Messrs. Packard and others have put barges upon the river again, and the plaintiffs have since that time been enforcing their right to and the nonpayment of tolls under such circumstances I consider of but little weight, and it cannot possibly be held to override the position and direct right to them given by the Act of 1790. Upon the above grounds I am of opinion that neither the Corporation of Ipswich nor their tenant, Mr. Mason, are exempt from the payment of the navigation tolls. The judgment of the court must, therefore, be for the plaintiffs for £36 19s. 5d., the amount claimed, with costs. Judgment for plaintiffs.

1790, when the Stowmarket Navigation Act passed.
Mr. John Orford, who appeared for the defendant,"
admitted that the plaintiffs now are, and were
during all the term that the tolls claimed are al-
leged to have become due, the owners of the Stow-
market Navigation, and that if the defendant is
liable to any one of the tolls claimed he is liable
to the plaintiffs, and that the amount claimed
is correct according to the 18th and 19th sec-
tions of the Stowmarket Navigation Act. Beyond
the above admission, the case was left very bare
of evidence on both sides. During the life of
John Henry Hedge, and after his death till the
assignment of his lease to Barber, the business
at Handford Mill was carried on by a firm,
ber, Hedge, and Co., and it was proved by Thomas
Toynbee, ledger clerk to the plaintiffs, that he
applied to Webber, Hedge, and Co. for tolls
alleged to have become due from them from Dec.
1868, but that they did not pay, giving, however,
no reason for non-payment; and Mr. Toynbee
further proved that down to May 1872, there was
standing in the plaintiff's ledger against Webber,
Hedge, and Co., and Barber, the sum of £82 and
upwards as being due for tolls and other things,
and on the 13th or 14th July 1872, Toynbee and
Barber met at Lowestoft and came to a settle.
ment, Barber agreeing to allow £10 for the tolls,
which became due from him while he was occupier
of the mill, and to raise no further question about
the plaintiff's right to the tolls in question. But
it must be observed at that time Barber had
really very little or no interest in the matter, as
although the assignment to Mr. Mason is dated
the 31st July 1872, the treaty for the assignment
had been in progress for sometime before that,
and the terms had been arranged a fortnight,
or three weeks before the 31st July 1872. There-
fore, the only payment of these tolls really proved
was the allowance by Barber of £10, and two
other small sums in account, but the payment
by him can in no way affect either the Corpora-
tion of Ipswich, or the defendant, the present
tenant of the mill. Mr. Orford then, on behalf
of the defendant, relied upon the absence of proof
of payment of the tolls in question, either by the
corporation or their tenants, and upon the 71st
section of the Stowmarket Navigation Act, as
exempting the corporation and their tenants from
toll. Now this 71st section of the Act is in these
terms: "Provided always, and be it further
enacted that nothing herein contained shall ex-
tend, or be construed to extend to take away,
lessen, or diminish any of the rights and privileges
of the bailiffs, burgesses, and commonalty of the
town and borough of Ipswich, aforesaid; but
that the said bailiffs, burgesses, and commonalty
shall have, hold, and enjoy all such rights and
privilege in as full and ample a manner as they
have heretofore held and enjoyed the same, and
as if this Act had not been made, anything herein
contained to the contrary thereof notwithstand-tolls,
ing." I may observe, in passing, that the ancient
title of the Corporation of Ipswich before the
passing of the Municipal Corporation Act was
The bailiffs, burgesses, and commonalty of the
borough of Ipswich." And Mr. Walker, on the
other hand, who appeared as counsel for the
plaintiffs, contended that the rights and privileges
saved by the 71st section of the Act were only
rights and privileges as were in existence, and
which the corporation were in the enjoyment of
in 1790, when the Stowmarket Navigation Act
passed, and that there was no evidence that at
that time the corporation enjoyed any exemp-
tion from tolls, and that no exemption from the
tolls in question could have existed before the
Act, as the Act itself first imposed them;
and further that granting the corporation may be
exempt, the exemption does not extend to their
tenant, the defendant, as "tenants" of the bailiffs,
burgesses, and commonalty are not named in the
71st section. Now no evidence was given on the
defendant's behalf to show what the course of the
Gipping or of the Orwell was before the passing
of the Stowmarket Navigation Act, or before the
works authorised by it were carried out, and it
must be borne in mind that the tolls claimed
are the tolls upon Mr. Mason's linseed, being
carried in barges from below Stoke bridge up the
Orwell, and thence through Handford Lock, and
along the channel marked on the plan annexed to
the lease of 29th Jan. 1872, "River Gipping" to
the mill, and on the oilcake carried back again in
barges by the same route to below Stoke Bridge.
Now the 2nd section of the Act empowers the
trustees, among other things, "also to make a
navigable cut from the said river Gipping below
the said Handford Bridge, of such dimensions,
and in such line to join and communicate with
the river Orwell at such place as they shall think
proper above Stoke Bridge." Now the reason-
able inference to be drawn from the portion of the
2nd section which I have just cited is in my opinion
that before this year 1790, when the Act passed,
there was no navigable communication whatever
between the Gipping and the Orwell below Hand-
ford Bridge, and that the new cut was made from
the point which I have indicated on the plan

HIS HONOUR gave judgment in this case, which
was heard at the last court. He said: This, ac-
cording to the particulars annexed to the sum-
mons, is an action brought by the plaintiffs against
the defendant, a merchant in this town, to recover
the sum of £31 19s. 5d., for tolls alleged to be
due from the defendant to the plaintiffs for the
navigation, carriage, or conveyance, and tonnage
of barges and goods and other things belonging
to or under the control of the defendant or his
servants of and through a certain lock and canal
called or known by the name of the Stowmarket
Navigation. The following are the facts of the
case: Under and in pursuance of an Act passed
in the 30th year of the reign of King George III.
(1790), c. 57, entitled, "An Act for making and
maintaining a navigable communication between
Stowmarket and Ipswich, in the county of
Suffolk," the river Gipping (in the Act called
Gippen) was made navigable from Stowupland
Bridge, near Stowmarket, to Handford Bridge, in
Ipswich, and for a certain distance below Hand-
ford Bridge, and a cut was made from the Gipping"
to the Orwell, and the Orwell scoured and cleaned
out from the point where the New Cut joined the
Orwell, so as to make it navigable down to the
Common Quay. The above works were authorised
to be done by the 2nd section of the Act, and in
the absence of any absence of any evidence to the
contrary, I assume they were done. Then sect. 18
of the Act empowered the trustees to demand,
take, and recover certain rates for the tonnage of
all corn and other grain, hops, coal, &c., which
should be navigated, carried, or conveyed upon
or along the said rivers and cuts, or any of
them, viz., upon all the articles enumerated
(except coal) id. per ton per mile, and on coal
4d. per ton per mile. It will be observed that the
section just referred to imposes the tolls upon all
corn, &c., and contains no exception in favour of
the corn, &c., of any individual or body corporate.
By the 19th section of the Act the trustees were
empowered to increase the rates so as not to exceed
twice the above amounts. Sect. 30 of the Act
enacted that the navigation should be free upon
payment of the above rates, and by sect. 71, to
which it will be necessary to advert more fully
hereafter, the rights and privileges of the Cor-
poration of Ipswich are saved. The defendant is
tenant of the Corporation of Ipswich of a mill
called Handford Mill, standing upon and across
the river Gipping, for the remainder of a term of
twenty-one years, from October 11th 1860, under
a lease originally granted by the Corporation of
Ipswich to John Henry Hedge, and dated the 29th
of January 1862, and which lease was on the 10th
of March 1870, assigned by Elizabeth Maria Hedge,
the widow and executrix of John Henry Hedge,
to Mr. John Lee Barber, and was by him duly as-
signed to Mr. Mason, the defendant, on the 31st
of July 1872. Handford Mill is undoubtedly a
very old mill, Mr. Mason, according to his evidence,
having known it fifty years, and for the last thirty
years it has been used as an oil mill, and before
that as a flour mill; and I believe and find as a
fact that the Handford Mill was in existence in

CARLISLE COUNTY COURT.
Tuesday, June 22.
(Before T. HASTINGS INGHAM, Esq., Judge.)
SHARROCK บ. THE LONDON AND NORTH
WESTERN RAILWAY COMPANY.

Unprotected siding-Injury to a mare-Liability of

a company.

Brown (solicitor) appeared for the plaintiff.
Saul (solicitor) for the defendant company.
The plaintiff, with one of his men and two
horses and carts, went to Southwaite Station on
the company's line, to receive hay which had
On the arrival at the
arrived from Preston.
station the plaintiff found the yard, where it was
usual to unload, very full. The trucks containing
plaintiff's hay were on a siding on the opposite
side of the line. Station master told plaintiff to
unload at the siding. Plaintiff objected to this,
and requested station master to have the trucks
shunted to the yard where it was usual to unload.
This was refused, and plaintiff ultimately took
his carts to the siding. The siding is on the top
of an embankment, the side of which was totally
unprotected. Plaintiff and servant were unload-
ing first cart, when the horse in the cart behind
(which was tethered to the cart in front) turned
a little round, and got its feet on some telegraph
posts which were lying on the edge of the embank-
ment. The mare fell over the embankment, but
the cart was kept back by the telegraph posts.
Assistance being procured the mare was released
from the cart, and she then rolled to the bottom
of the embankment, and received such injur es
that she was rendered permanently unsound.

Plaintiff deposed to the mare being quiet, accustomed to work about railways, and to the noise of trains.

Two witnesses spoke as to the dangerous character of the embankment. Saul, for the defence, said that there was sufficient room on the embankment, supposing the mare was quiet; and contended that the mare swerved, being frightened by a passing train.

His HONOUR pointed out that not only was there no protection at this place, but something very dangerous (referring to the telegraph poles) was placed there. Railway companies were not liable for horses being frightened, but they were bound to afford to the public proper protection. Presuming they had had a wall or fence, and the mare had broken that down, the company would not have been liable. The probability was that the mare did, to some extent shy, but the company actually put a lot of poles there on which the mare set her foot and frightened her still more.

Saul.-Do you find that the mare shied? His HONOUR.-There is no direct evidence to rely upon for that, but she must have moved her foot to the poles. I cannot say she shied, but she

moved from some cause or other.

Verdict for the plaintiff for £50, with costs. Saul gave notice of appeal.

COUNTY COURT JURISDICTION. LAST week the County Courts Bill was read a third time in the Commons and passed. As the measure originated in the Lords, the Commons' amendments will have to be considered in the Upper House; but this will be a brief work, and we may expect to see the Bill take its place amongst the next batch of measures which receives the Royal assent. We have called attention to this Bill, and particularly to the amendments proposed by Mr. Russell Gurney relative to appeals from the Admiralty side of County Courts, and to that proposed by Mr. Whitwell for giving a jurisdiction in other matters concurrent with the High Court of Justice as constituted under the Judicature Act. The latter proposal has not obtained the assent of the Government, and Mr. Whitwell's amendment was withdrawn; but Mr. Gurney's amendments have been adopted in their entirety, and now stand part of the Bill, and we may be quite certain that they will be accepted by the Lords. It will be remembered that Mr. Gurney's proposals, now embodied in this Bill, were threefold. By the first it was asked that where decrees or orders from the admiralty side of County Courts are affirmed by the High Court on appeal, there shall be no appeal from such decision of the High Court, unless by express permission of the learned judge; next, that where the decision of the court below is reversed or varied on appeal, no leave to appeal to Her Majesty in council shall be necessary-in other words, that an appeal to the Judicial Committee shall lie as of right; lastly that where an admiralty cause has been heard in the County Court with the assistance of nautical assessors, and that cause is appealed, Trinity masters shall be summoned at the instance of either party if the judge shall be of opinion that their assistance is desirable. We have already expressed our views upon the importance of these amendments. Suitors, henceforth, in admiralty causes tried in the County Courts will know that, if there is an appeal to the Court of Admiralty, and the decision of the court below is not affirmed, they will not require the consent of the judge of the High Court to carry the case further; and that, so far as the advantage of technical assistance is concerned, the Court of First Instance and the Court of Appeal will be placed on an equal footing. We believe we are correct in stating that Mr. Russell Gurney's amendments were at once adopted by the Government. The Bill containing these amendments was committed pro forma, and, as a matter of course, the amendments will be supported in the Lords. It not too much to say that this salutary and necessary change in the law has resulted directly from the case of the Galathea, and to the comments thereon which we felt it our duty to make. The result is one on which we venture to congratulate our readers. We have been friendly from the first to the exercise of an Admiralty Juris diction by the County Courts, and the anticipations which we formed of the utility of the Act of 1868 have been fully justified. A large number of maritime cases are annually disposed of in County Courts, as may be seen by a parliamentary return recently issued; and these cases are disposed of promptly, and at a comparatively trifling cost. Even in the exercise of the power of arrest and detention of shipping property-which, when the Act of 1868 was before Parliament, was regarded with apprehension-there has been little to complain of, and the proposal in the Merchant Shipping Bill to authorise the Board of Trade to send inquiries into wrecks and casualties, and into the conduct of masters, mates, and engineers, to the local Courts of Admiralty, is a further proof of the growing estimation in which the conduct of

Admiralty business by the County Courts is held. It is, therefore, of great consequence that the decisions in Admiralty of these Courts should, when they become the subject of appeal, be properly reviewed and tested, and that when the High Court is at issue with a Local Court, an authority superior to both, and whose decision is final, should decide between them. This right is now happily reserved to suitors by the Bill before Parliament. It is proper, and even necessary, that this should be so, and we are not likely to regret the share we have had in bringing about this very important amendment in the law.-Shipping and Mercantile Gazette.

LEGAL NEWS.

The

"plea of insanity" to be made available for defence in so many cases of persons charged with capital crimes does, I feel thoroughly convinced, act upon the minds of persons of both sound and unsound mind, not as a preventive or deterrent to the commission of murder and other offences, but in many cases as an incentive to them to yield to their unholy passions and impulses. Death is richly merited in all those cases where there is a deliberate exaction of human life as a penalty for small offences where the offender is a responsible agent; and in my opinion George Blampied and many others have escaped the extreme penalty of the law by the childish straining of a maxim good if properly applied, but, like all good things, subject to abuse.-I am, Sir, your obedient servant, W. P. KIRKMAN, M.D. Kent County Asylum, Barming-heath.

A VERY NEW CLAUSE. The following has been addressed to the editor of the Times :-"Sir,-Being unable to be in my place in Parliament when the report on the Agri. cultural Holdings Bill is considered by the House, I shall not have an opportunity of bringing for. ward the clause which I now enclose. I leave those who favour this kind of legislation to determine whether this clause is intended as a satire on or as a natural corollary to the Bill. But, inasmuch as some of those to whom I have shown it have taken it as seriously meant, it is evident that some provision of the kind is required when, under a highly artificial and scientific system of agriculture such as prevails in this country, the State thus attempts to do for full-grown men what they can best do for themselves.-I remain your obedient servant,

ELCHO.

"St. James's-place, July 30." "Clause 49.-Where a valuer, referee, umpire, or County Court Judge under this Act shall not have reagriculture, and shall not be in possession of a certif ceived a proper education and training in scientific cate of competency from one of the agricultural colleges or public bodies mentioned in the schedule of this Act, and whenever the decision of such valuer, referee, um. pire, or County Court Judge, as to the proper outlay on the improvements specified in clause 5 is not in accordance with the latest discoveries in chemistry as properly applied to the cultivation of the soil, and as suited to the various soils, subsoils, climates, seasons, and crops in England and Wales, it shall be competent for the landlord or tenant who may think himself aggrieved

such decision to appeal to the High Court of Justice, and such appeal shall be decided upon the sole evidence Agricultural Society." of the chief chymist for the time being of the Royal

AN application is to be made for a new trial of the Beecher-Tilton case.

MR. JUSTICE FIELD has given the three vacant revising barristerships on the Midland Circuit to Mr. Gibbons, Mr. Simpson, and Mr. Soden. THE House of Lords Committee for Privileges has decided that Mr. James Hamilton, of Leith, has established his claim to the Belhaven and Stanton peerage.

RESPONSIBILITY OF THE INSANE. THE following observation appears in one of the daily papers:-" Blampied, it is now obvious, ought never to have been discharged from the asylum in which he was detained so long." With reference to such an assertion, I may mention that when released he was of sound mind in the opinion of myself and my two professional colleagues, all of us having had him under our special and daily observation for a period of just four years. His fitness for release had also been proved to the satisfaction of two magistrates, who authorised his removal, and confirmed sub. sequently by Mr. Buchanan's certificate, and by two visits which the man paid afterwards to the patients and attendants in the asylum, on one of which occasions he joined cheerfully in a game of cricket with his late chums. His last visit was on Jan. 31 of this year, and on neither occasion was there any reason to suppose but that he was in good mental and bodily health. For about two years and a half, moreover, before his discharge he was employed daily in the carpenter's shop, having free access to, and being in constant use of, all the dangerous instruments (including an adze) common to the trade, and on no occasion for that period did he offer violence to anyone. As regards the criminal responsibility of the insane and the "uncontrollable impulses" to which they are subject, there is no doubt that there is much danger of alarming consequences resulting from the forcing of theories in place and out of place. Many lunatics are capable of appre-by ciating right from wrong, have a thorough and sound knowledge of the quality of sinful acts, and are morally and physically able to resist their impulses to commit them. I could produce hundreds of instances to support my statement. doctrine of "uncontrollable impulses" has been ridden so hard that the public will soon begin to think that all the "mad doctors" are "hoist with their own petard," and that not one can give evidence in a case of criminal magnitude without betraying his delusion. Upon one occasion, when reproving Blampied for having assaulted a harmless fellow-patient for some trifling offence, he told me that he would strike him, and that if I attempted to prevent him he would murder me. I pointed out to him that the punishment for murder was death according to the English law, when he replied with much prompitude, "Oh! no, not for me, as I am a lunatic, I am not responsible for my actions, and if I do commit murder you cannot punish me for it, because it is contrary to the law to punish an insane man.' I told him that if he could argue in that manner, whether sane or insane, he was morally responsible to the Almighty for his actions, and that if he committed an offence of the kind he ought to be punished. His reply was, "Yes, I know that; but you cannot punish me, whatever I do." Threats of this nature he was constantly holding out to attendants, patients, and others; and this kind of threat is common among the insane. After such a conversation as this, few would (unless their minds were perverted by the " trollable impulse" mania) question the propriety of Blampied's being held responsible for his actions. On another occasion, when remonstrating with him for a series of assaults upon harmless patients-for he never used to attack any patient who he knew could return the blow with interest-his behaviour was most threatening to myself and every one around. I then told him that, knowing better, I should hold him responsible for his future behaviour as regards personal assaults, and that for every blow he must forfeit a week's allowance of tobacco. What was the result? How many weeks' allowance of tobacco did he forfeit ? One only. At the close of the week (Friday being the day for issuing the tobacco) he placed in my hand a well-indited penitent letter, promising, amend ment, and giving me his "word and honour" that he would not strike again. I took his word, removed him to a quieter ward, restored his tobacco the following week, and had no occasion again to withdraw it.

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Now, Sir, cases I say of this kind are of frequent occurrence among the insane, and for the

THE death is announced of Mr. Henry Duncan Robinson, the learned Registrar of the Settle County Court (circuit No. 3), which office is a cordingly vacant.

LIEUT.-COLONEL DU CANE, C.B., R.E., Chair. man of Directors of Convict Prisons, has accepted the chairmanship of the Repression of Crime section at the forthcoming Social Science Congress at Brighton.

JUDGE BARRETT, of the New York Supreme Court, has refused to "vacate" the order for the re-arrest of Mr. Tweed at the suit of the State, or to reduce the amount of bail which was fixed at 3,000,000 dols.

THE office of Town Clerk to the borough of Preston is vacant by the resignation of Mr. Robert Ascroft. Candidates must be practising solicitors. The election is appointed to take place forthwith. We understand there were a large number of candidates. The office is worth £850 per annum.

SOME amunement was created at the Ports mouth Court, during an application for the temporary transfer of an ale-house licence, in consequence of a wife, though married twentythree years, declining to swear positively to her husband's signature, he having sent a letter from London authorising the transfer.

THE Railway Commissioners have declined to allow the Central Wales and Carmarthen Junction Railway Company to appeal against the recent decision on their application against the Great Western Railway Company, the matters on which they wished to appeal not being matters of law within the meaning of the Railways Regulation Act.

66

IN an appeal from an order of the Judge of the Stonehouse County Court, the Chief Judge in Bankruptcy on Monday confirmed the decision of the lower court that a firm of corn merchants was entitled to prove for the loss on 'particular averages after accepting a composition on a proof put in for losses through breach of contract by a debtor to whom they had sold a cargo of wheat.

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MR. C. COURT, Chief Examiner, General Post Office, has been appointed auditor of the London Guarantee and Accident Company (Limited), in place of the late Solicitor of the Admiralty, Mr. A. R. Bristow, deceased.

MR. HULBERT, solicitor, Clerk of the Peace of Devizes, and the recognised Conservative agent of that borough, died last week. So great a shock was the melancholy event to his brother, Mr. Robert Hulbert, who had been several times Mayor of Basingstoke, that on the following morn. ing he was found in bed unconscious, and soon afterwards he died.

THE Lords Justices have decided that a bankrupt is not liable to arrest under an attachment pending the settlement of his affairs. They ruled, however, that when the bankruptcy proceeedings were closed the creditor might enforce his attachment in order to compel the bankrupt to pay the debt (resulting from a breach of trust) out of his subsequently acquired property.

THE PROPOSED NEW LAW COURTS AT LIVERPOOL.-A communication from the First Commissioner of Works was read before the Liverpool town council, stating that so soon as the estimates for the next financial year were brought forward, the Board of Works would consider the erection of the proposed new law courts at Liverpool. The site chosen is that at present occupied by the Victoria Hall, where the Moody and Sankey services were held.

LECTURERS AND READERS FOR THE YEAR 1875-76.-The following gentlemen have been appointed as Lecturers and Readers for the year 1875-76: Conveyancing-Mr. Richard Marrack, of 9, Old-square. Equity-Mr. Samuel Dickinson, of 6, Store-buildings. The appointment of a Lecturer and Reader in Common Law will be filled up at the next meeting of the council. The announcement in the Times that it is filled by Mr. T. E. Holland is incorrect.

THE question of the claim to the title of "Reverend" has been decided by the Dean of Arches, who, in his judgment, lays down that a churchyard is the freehold of the incumbent, subject to the right of the parishioner or stranger happening to die in the parish to simple interment and no more, the incumbent having a primâ facie right to prohibit altogether the placing of any gravestone, or to permit it upon proper conditions, such as those which relate to the size and character of the stone, the legality or propriety of the inscription upon it, or the payment of a proper fee.

THE death is announced at the age of 79, of Mr. Rigby Wason, who eight years ago presented to the House of Lords a petition charging Lord Chief Baron Kelly (then recently appointed) with having in 1835, while pleading before an election committee, pledged his honour to statements which he knew to be false. A debate took place on the subject, and Mr. Wason afterwards brought an action for libel against the Times for publishing in its Parliamentary report the speeches of several noble lords, who made some severe comments on Mr. Wason's conduct, but the Court of Queen's Bench gave judgment in favour of the defendant.

LIVERPOOL ASSIZES. To-day the commission will be opened at Liverpool, and the list of prisoners is beyond doubt the blackest on record. There are no fewer than seven cases of murder, all of a very bad class. They include murder by shooting in the street, wife murders (one being kicked to death), a fatal stabbing case, that of a chief mate for throwing overboard a captain in Bonny River, shooting on the high seas, &c. Besides these there are seven cases of manslaughter, five of feloniously wounding, twenty. three robbery with violence, ten of burglary, five of forgery, three of bigamy, and about half-a. dozen for minor offences.

THE STATUTE BOOK.-The Statute Law Revision Bill of this session, "for further promoting the revision of the Statute Law by repealing enactments which have ceased to be in force or have become unnecessary," fills 265 folio pages. It comes down to the year 1868, and repeals the whole or part of above 1400 Acts, all but sixteen of them being statutes of the present reign, but which are already expired or really spent, exhausted, or superseded, though not expressly repealed. It may serve to show how much the Statute Book needs weeding if we give a brief account of one of the Acts in the schedule to this Bill, the 13 & 14 Vict. c. 69, "An Act to amend the Laws regulating the Qualification and Regis. tration of Parliamentary Voters in Ireland, and to alter the Law for Rating immediate Lessors to the Poor-rate." This Act has been amended by six subsequent Acts; parts of it have been repealed (part only temporarily) or virtually repealed by seven other Acts: part is expired, part spent, part applied by a later Act; and now it takes six folio pages to describe the various parts to be formally repealed by Parliament. section after section has to be dealt with in this style: "section thirty-three from on or before

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the ninth' to 'fifty, and' (where those words next occur), the words after One thousand eight hundred and fifty-one' (wherever they occur), from 'and shall in the year' to such city, town, or borough:', from on before the thirtieth' fifty, or', from 'to the thirty-first' to succeeding year' (where those words next occur), from 'to the ninth' to 'succeeding year', the word 'respective' (where it next occurs), and from 'on or before the twelfth' to 'fifty, and.'' This is not edifying.

At the Lincoln Assizes an action, Lloyd v. Perry, was tried. It was brought by the plaintiff, who the proprietor of the Weekly Bankrupt Gazette, for is a timber merchant at Great Grimsby, against not supplying information in pursuance of his promise contained in a prospectus or advertisement in the Gazette. Plaintiff wrote to defendant for information concerning a firm of timber merchants at Derby, and, on the strength of the information supplied, plaintiff let the firm have £421 worth of timber. Shortly after the affairs of the firm went into liquidation, and one of the alleged partners, named Cotterell, was sentenced to six months im. prisonment as a fraudulent bankrupt. His assets were £300, and his liabilities £2000. There was Cotterell had not been a foreman to a builder as no company nor any partner whatever, and was stated in the information given by defendant, but had been a working sawyer. The judge said it was clear that three guineas were paid by the subscribers not only for the paper called the Gazette, but also for the additional information to be supplied upon inquiry. The question for the jury was whether a contract was made that defendant would furnish to subscribers of three guineas important information, and did the defendant comply with that contract? If he did not, what were the damages? Then, apart from the question of contract, was the defendant guilty of negligence in the execution of the duty he had taken upon himself? The jury found that the contract had been made, that the information supplied was untrue, that there had been negligence, and found as damages £250. It is difficult to exaggerate the importance of this decision, and solicitors especially will do well to consider it in the interest of their clients.

AVERAGE ADJUSTMMENT.-At the monthly meeting of the Liverpool Chamber of Commerce, held on Wednesday last week, Mr. P. H. Rathbone reported that he had attended the general meeting of the Association of Average Adjusters in London in the course of last month. when the following rules were adopted: 1. That the direct lia. bility of an underwriter on goods for the value of goods insured by him which have been jettisoned or sacrificed for the common safety, or of an underwriter for ship's materials sacrified for the common safety, be treated as particular average. 2. That claims for Particular average on ships shall not be stated unless the policies, or copies of policies, of insurance, for claiming on which the statement is required, be produced by the adjuster. 3. That such statements shall give the names of the underwriting firms and companies interested, and the amounts payable on the respective policies produced. 4. That goods in a ship which is on fire, or the cargo of which is on fire, affected by water voluntarily used to extinguish such fire, shall not be the sub. ject of general average if the packages so effected be themselves on fire at the time the water was thrown upon them. The first of the foregoing rules was confirmed unanimously. The second rule was also confirmed, with the understanding that all the policies ought to be produced to the adjuster, to enable him to apportion the payments on a proper footing; when the policies are now produced the adjustment to apply only to the policy or policies produced. Upon the third reso. lution an amendment was moved but lost, the votes being eighteen against and two in favour. It was contended, in support of the amendment, that shipowners objected to the rule because it would assist underwriters in banding together to dispute the claims, and that the system of insurance adopted by the assured would be, without their desire, exposed to rivals in trade. The rule, however, was held to be desirable in order to guard against possible fraud. The fourth rule was also, after a short discussion, confirmed nem. con., and Mr. Rathbone, the reporter of the Chamber at the meeting, concluded his report with an expression of opinion that the rules disposed of at the gathering were such as met the exigencies of every-day mercantile transactions, and their tendency would be to prevent unnecessary legislation.

THE NEW MERCHANT SHIPPING BILL.-The Bill introduced in the House of Commons by Sir Charles Adderley is entitled, “A Bill to make provision for giving further powers to the Board of Trade for stopping Unseaworthy Ships," and bears the names of Sir Charles Adderley, Mr. Disraeli, and Sir Stafford Northcote. The following is the text of the measure:-Be it enacted by the Queen's most Excellent Majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the Lords

Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons, in this present Parliament assembled, and by the authority of the same, as follows:-1. The Board of Trade may forth with and from time to time by special order appoint a sufficient number of fit and proper persons, from their own staff or otherwise, to be officers hav ing authority to detain unseaworthy ships and may from time to time revoke any such apappointment. If any officer so appointed bas reason to believe upon inspection or otherwise that any British ship is by reason of the defective condition of her hull, equipments, or machinery, or to proceed to sea without serious danger to human by reason of overloading or improper loading, unfit life, he may order that the ship be detained for the purpose of being surveyed. Any such order shall have the same effect as if it were an order

of the Board of Trade under sect. 12 of the of ascertaining whether a British ship is fit to Merchant Shipping Act 1873. For the purpose proceed to sea, any officer so appointed may go on board the ship and inspect the same, or any part thereof, or any of the machinery, boats, equipments, or other articles on board thereof, not unnecessarily detaining or delaying her from proceeding on her voyage; and any person who wilfully impedes him in the execution of his duty shall be liable to the same penalties, and may be dealt with in the same manner as if the officer were an inspector appointed by the Board of Trade under the Merchant Shipping Act 1854. When any officer so appointed orders a ship to be detained, he shall forthwith report his proceedings to the Board of Trade. An officer so appointed shall receive such remuneration for his services under this Act as the Treasury from time to time direct, and such remuneration shall be paid out of moneys to be provided by Parliament. 2. Whenever a complaint is made to the Board of Trade or to any officer so appointed by one-fourth of the seamen belonging to any British ship, or, if the number of such seamen exceed twenty, by not less than five such seamen, that the ship is by reason of the defective condition of her hull, equipments, or machinery, or by reason of overloading or improper loading, unfit to proceed to sea without serious danger to human life, it shall be the duty of the board or officer, as the case may be, if the complaint is made within time sufficient for that purpose before the sailing of the ship, without requiring any security for the payment of costs and expenses, to take proper steps for ascertaining whether the ship ought to be detained for the purpose of being surveyed under the Merchant Shipping Act 1873. 3 This Act may be cited as the Merchant Shipping Act

1875, and shall be construed as one with the Merchant Shipping Act 1854, and the Acts amending the same, and the said Acts and this Act may be cited collectively as the Merchant Shipping Acts 1854 to 1875. 4. This Act shall continue in force until the 1st Oct. 1876.

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83. ARTICLED CLERK.-Would an Articled Clerk prejudice himself by undertaking to give Latin lessons to two or three pupils. There to be only two lessons of an hour's length per week, and all the pupils being present at the same time. Is the consent of his principal sufficient, or would it be necessary to obtain a judge's order, and would there be any difficulty in W. obtaining such order?

order, but if the lessons are given out of office hours, There would be no difficulty in obtaining such an and the Principal consenting, there seems little or no occasion for making the application.-ED. SOLS.' Døpt.]

84. QUESTIONS AT THE INTERMEDIATE EXAMINATION.— Are the examiners at the Intermediate Examinations bound to confine thefr questions to the matter contained in the books specified by them as being the elementary works selected for that examination, or can they ask questions upon more recent enactments which are not noted in the same elementary works. If the question be considered by you as one upon which I am entitled to an answer, you would greatly oblige by informing upon the same through your paper. M. B.

[The examiners cannot properly, and indeed, would not purposely test the knowledge of students in regard to acts of Parliament at a later date than the works selected by them, and on the contents of which alone

the examinations are founded. Instances have occurred in which the examiners have gone out of their own appointed limits in this respect, but these must be attributed to accident.-ED. SOLS.' DEPT.]

85. ARMORIAL BEARINGS.-What are armorial bearings? I shall feel obliged if any of your readers can inform me whether a monogram is or is not included under the heading of "Armorial Bearings or Ensign," in the act 16 & 17 Vict., c. 90, schedule K, and the rules for charging the duties thereunder. A GUILTY CONSCIENCE.

CORRESPONDENCE OF THE

PROFESSION.

NOTE. This Department of the Law TIMES being open to free discussion on all professional topics the Editors are not responsible for any opinions or statements contained in it. THE LAW CLUB.-I suppose it is little use discussing the affairs of this club; it seems to be, from the admissions of its own members, in such a hopeless Slough of Despond. At all events there is one point one can discuss that was referred to at the meeting of the Law Society, and as to which a motion was made, viz., that the club accepts and occupies the present premises without paying any rent. The value of these premises is stated to be about £2000 a year. So that the law club accepts gratuity of the Law Society of £2000 a year, and yet gets into debt to the extent of £2000, accord. ing to a statement of one of its members. This, I believe, is the second time they have got into debt. Even if the club agreed to let in members of the society, nobody would join until all the debts were paid.

H. S.

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DISCLAIMER.-We shall be obliged by your allowing us to state in the next LAW TIMES that the letter alleged to have been written by " Mr. Kimber, a Solicitor," to Mr. Gladstone, on the subject of the Tichborne case, was not written or authorised by any member of our firm. In making the very sensible remarks which appeared in your paper of Saturday last, you probably had not seen our disclaimer in the Times of the previous day, and will therefore kindly extend to us this further opportunity of disclaiming the whole subject. HENRY KIMBER AND COMPANY.

LEGAL EXTRACTS.

THE COURT OF CHANCERY.

(From the Times, of Aug. 3.) THIS great Court will to-day or to-morrow rise for the Vacation, and will never sit again. It has been for ages known so entirely as a Court of Equity that it is difficult to realise that it was originally a Court of Law-that it was the source of the Common Law, and the origin of the Courts of Common Law. Yet it was originally the fountain of justice, the officina justitie; and justice in ancient times was deemed to include Equity as well as Law, or rather Equity, as Bracton said, was regarded as a quality of Law. Hence the original writs which gave the Courts of Common Law jurisdiction in civil actions issued out of Chancery. As Chief Baron Gilbert said, the Chancellor, when there was as yet but one great Court (as now, after the lapse of ages, there is to be again), held the scal, and after the division into several Courts he retained it, and so the original writs which gave them jurisdiction were sealed by him and issued from the Chancery. Thus the Court of Chancery was originally the source and fountain of the Common Law; and for ages-when men's relations, transactions, and affairs were simple in their nature the writs and remedies provided by that Court for the Courts of Common Law were sufficient; and equity was infused into them as incident to justice. It was only in after ages, when the nature of men's relations and transactions altered and were no longer provided for by these simple remedies, that equitable jurisdiction was exercised by the Court of Chancery, The jurisdiction of the Court was at first exercised in the same classes of cases as now come within the jurisdiction of the Courts of Common Law. This was illustrated long ago in the learned works of Spence, of Seton, and of Palgrave, and it did not escape the acute perception of Mackintosh. When the Courts of Common Law were established the suitors were sent there for redress, and then, upon the other hand, they afforded redress in all cases that arose, some of which at a later age were sent into the Court of Chancery. This is manifest from ancient records which have been preserved, and some of which are mentioned by Lord Hale. There are records of bills in the King's Bench for what would now be called suits in equity, as by mortgagors for " redemption;" and in the reign of Edward IV. the Common Law Judges avowed that if it had not been for ignorance of law the King's Bench could have exercised equitable jurisdiction, and could have granted an injunction.

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As, however, the jurisdiction of the Courts of
Common Law became exercised under fixed forms
of remedies, many which they did not include, or
which afterwards arose, were sent into the Court
of Chancery for relief, and hence the "equitable
jurisdiction of that Court, as it was called, in order
to distinguish it from that of Courts of Common
Law, though it was in truth quite as much a legal
This is the
jurisdiction as the Common Law.
account given by Sir John Strange, a great master
of Law and Equity in the last century, and it is
verified by the records and documents of legal
history. From the very first exercise of this
equitable jurisdiction, it was rigidly kept by
Statutes and by Royal ordinances in harmony with
the Common Law. It was again and again de-
clared by Parliament that the Court of Chancery
should not exercise jurisdiction in any matter
determinable at Common Law, and this cardinal
rule has only thus far been relaxed that the
Court would entertain jurisdiction in cases in
which though determinable at Common Law, in the
sense of being within the jurisdiction of Courts of
Law, those Courts could not from the defect of
their proceedure or remedies afford adequate re-

dress.

Thus it was that the Court came to
cases determinable at

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mon Law to contradict it or conflict with it; for
this, it was said, would be to make a new law, and
it was necessary, therefore, in order to raise a case
for Equity to show some new matters of fact other
than those which the Court of Common Law would
have before it, for on a different state of facts the
rule would not be contradicted. And this was not
left merely to the Chancellor's choice. It was
made incumbent upon him by an imperative
Royal ordinance. In the reign of Edward IV., at
the time the Equitable Jurisdiction was growing,
the practice of Common Law Judges sitting with
the Chancellor having already arisen, a Royal
ordinance made it incumbent upon the Chancellor
to consult them whenever any question arose as to
whether Equity would interfere with the Common
Law, and this practice was always adhered to. On
the other hand, the Chancellor was acknowledged
as the head of the Common Law Judicature, and
as such sat in any Court of Law. Thus, in the
reign of Edward III. a Chief Justice being made
Chancellor used to sit in the Court of Common
Pleas. It could hardly be otherwise, because for
ages, and until the Equitable Jurisdiction was
firmly fixed, the Judicature of the Court of Chan-
cery was chiefly a Common Law Judicature. It is
true that for ages the Chancellors were eccle-
siastics, but for that very reason, and because,
being addicted to the civil law, they might lean to
it too much, and infringe upon the Common Law,
the Chancellor was, from the earliest exercise of
the Equitable Jurisdiction, assisted and consulted
by Common Law Judges. It was stated in a paper
drawn up by the Crown counsel in the reign of
James I., "We find that there hath been a strong
current of proceeding in Chancery in cases where
there was no remedy at the Common Law in the
times of the several Chancellors, whereof divers
were great and learned men in the law. We find
that the Judges themselves within our Courts,
when there appeared unto them matter of equity,
because they could not stay the judgment, have
directed the parties to seek relief in Chancery.
And we find that it hath been done by the Judges
themselves while they sat in Chancery, "in the
vacancy or absence of the Chancellor "—as they
constantly did by commission.

Down to the time of the great controversy between Coke and Ellesmere as to the jurisdiction of the Chancery, the Chancellor had been regarded as the Chief Judge of the Common Law. In the reign of Edward III., when a Chief Justice was made Chancellor, it appears from the Yearbooks-and Lord Coke calls attention to it-that he used to sit in the Court of Common Pleas and take part in the discussion and determination of the cases there; and from that time to the reign of Elizabeth, and throughout her reign, the same practice continued. Egerton, while Chancellor, again and again sat in Courts of Common Law, and took part in the discussion of cases there or called the Judges into the Exchequer Chamber to consider and determine questions of Common Law. In the memorial presented to the Crown in the reign of James I. by the most eminent limes, it was stated:-"It can not be denied but that the Lord Chancellor is above all Judges of the laws, both here, in France, and elsewhere. The Lord Mayor of London is presented to him as to the Chief Justice of Eng. land. He giveth the oath to all the Judges. He admitteth all the judges into all their places, and sitteth above them in their own Courts, and calleth the Chief Justices themselves to assist him in Chancery, as Lord Coventry did the Lord Chief Justice Bramston, where he had no voice, but was an assistant only. And when all the Judges are assembled in the Exchequer Chamber the Lord Chancellor sitteth above them and delivereth his opinion as Lord Ellesmere did. And if the Chancellor did not grant out writs, the Courts of Common Pleas and King's Bench would have nothing to do, from which it will follow that the Chancery is the most ancient Court, for all the writs were framed and sealed in the Chancery. and without such writs the other Courts could not proceed.'

exercise jurisdiction in
Common Law, in order to afford discovery or other
assistance not then obtainable in a Court of Law
on an injunction. Very early it was settled that
the Court of Chancery should not exercise jurisdic-
tion in cases cognizable in a Court of Common
Law, unless some relief was required which the
Court of Chancery alone at that time could give
as a discovery, or cancellation of a deed. In an
an action at Common Law a party could not have
discovery of evidence of his case in his adversary's
knowledge and possession, and it was of the
essence of Chancery jurisdiction to give it; and so
a Court of Common Law could only decide that a
deed could not be sued upon and could not, as the
Court of Chancery could, direct it to be cancelled.
Even in cases in which there was no remedy at all
in Courts of Common Law, as cases of special
trusts such as required the management of
property and the like-the Court of Chancery
never proceeded contrary to Common Law, and its
jurisdiction was supplemental, not_contradictory
to that of the Courts of Common Law, and was
quite in harmony with it. All this was fully ex-
plained at the time when the nature of Law and
Equity came first to be discussed, in conse-
quence of the use of those terms having arisen in
order to describe and distinguish the law adminis-
tered in the Court of Chancery and in the Courts
of Common Law. In the time of Sir Thomas More,
when the equitable jurisdiction of the Court was
rising, it was carefully and clearly pointed out
that Law is not different from Equity, though now
and then a rule of Courts of Common Law might
not be enforced in the Court of Chancery. Thus
it was a stupid rule of the Courts of Common Law,
arising from a mere blunder of the Common Law
Judicature, that payment of a bond debt could not
be proved unless by an acquittance under seal.
This was not, however, it was said, the law; it
was simply a rule of the Courts of Common Law
as to proof; and so the party went into the Court
of Chancery for relief, and the relief was called
"Equity;" but it was simply good law. The
Common Law Judges had misunderstood the law,
and the law was set right in the Court of Chancery
This was shown by the result; for the Common
Law Judges in a later age, dropped their stupid
rule, and so Equity and Law upon the subject were
acknowledged to be the same; and Finch used to
taunt the Common Law Judges with their former
ignorance, in holding anything so absurd to be
law. So in every instance in which it was supposed
that Law and Equity differed. But the general
rule was that when there was a remedy in a Court
of Common Law, there was none in the Court of
Chancery. In the reign of Elizabeth it was re-
solved by all the Judges, on a reference to them
by the Queen, that whether lands were parcel of
a manor or not ought to be tried at Common Law
and not in Chancery; and the same doctrine was
adhered to in all subsequent times, that a party The jealousy between Coke and Ellesmere-re-
who had a remedy-that is an adequate remedy at presenting the Common Law Judicature and the
Common Law-i. e., in a Court of Common Law Chancery-led to the great controversy as to the
could not have recourse to Equity or have a remedy supremacy of the Chancellor; and that unfort
in Chancery. It was well understood and agreed nate controversy did infinite mischief in implant.
by Lord Bacon himself that a matter properly de- ing the seeds of a spirit of estrangement between
terminable by a Court of Common Law ought to the jurisdictions; and hence the practice of the
be determined there and not in the Court of Chan- Chancellor sitting in Courts of Common Law died
cery; and so, when the question was whether a out, though the Common Law Judges to our own
conveyance had been revoked or not, Lord Bacon time continued to sit in Chancery. In the great
and the Master of the Rolls and Chief Justice contest between the Common Law Judicature and
Hobart agreed that the cause was not fit for Chan- the Court of Chancery, under Lord Coke and Lord
cery, but for the Common Law, unless it was said, Ellesmere, the conflict was not between Law and
"all causes that were triable naturally at the Equity, but only as to the administration of
Common Law and by jury should be made examin- Equity. It was only a contest between the Com-
able and determinable in Chancery, which were to mon Law Judges and the Chancellor as to who
confound jurisdictions and make the Common Law should administer it, and whether it should be
and the course thereof useless." In the reigns of administered in Courts of Law or in the Chancery;
James I. and Charles I. it was repeatedly agreed There was no dispute as to the Equity, but Lord
by the Chancellor and Common Law Judges sitting Coke objected to its being allowed by the Chancellor
with him that the Court of Chancery should not after judgment in the Court of Law, and apparently
relieve a man against a rule or maxim of the Com-in opposition to it. It ought, he said, to be applied

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