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MR. SERJEANT COX ON THE ADMINIS-,
TRATION OF JUSTICE AS AFFECTED BY
THE LEGISLATION OF LAST SESSION.
THE Michaelmas Quarter Sessions for the borough
of Portsmouth commenced on Tuesday last. The
Recorder, in charging the grand jury, said that
since the last sessions some important statutes
had been passed, which would to some extent
affect the administration of justice in that court.
There was the law of conspiracy, and the law for
the protection of property, in both of which con-
siderable alteration had been made. However,
cases under the law of conspiracy did not come
forward very often; and when they did, they re-
ceived that attention at the hands of the magis.
trates which their importance demanded. There
was an important statute which had not yet come
into force in this county, although it was exten-
sively applied in London. He alluded to the law
of the falsification of accounts. Hitherto great
difficulty had been experienced in proving cases
of this kind, but now that difficulty was, to some
extent, got rid of, and the offence was made a
misdemeanour. There was no doubt that when
the law in question became known it would be
made as much use of as it was in London. It
involved considerable trouble and difficulty to
prove these cases because it had to be shown that
the falsification was not simply a mistake, but
was done designedly and with intent to defraud.
There was also a statute passed which extended
the age of young girls in cases of seduction.
Hitherto consent had nothing to do with the
offence where the girl seduced was under the age
of twelve years, but now the age was extended to
thirteen. There were also a number of other
statutes which would affect, more or less, muni-
cipal law; but it was not necessary for him
to refer to them then. With respect to the
crime in the borough, he might say that he
was very happy to congratulate the place most
heartily upon the manifest reduction in crime
which had taken place during the last two or
three years. The sessions which were then being
held were nearly a month after the time, but not-
withstanding that there were only fourteen cases
for trial, whereas two or three years ago, even
with the ordinary interval of three months between
the sessions, they used to get between twenty
and thirty cases. He was glad also to find that
this decrease was not confined to indictable
offences. Mr. Astridge, the Governor of the gaol,
had placed before him a statement of the sum-
mary convictions before the magistrates during
the past three years. It used to be said that it
was not fair to measure the state of crime by the
number of cases tried at the Quarter Sessions,
seeing that there were so many summary convic-
tions; but now he would give the numbers of
summary convictions. During the year ending
the 29th Sept. 1873, there were 108 convictions
under the Criminal Justice Act, and 30 under the
Juvenile Offenders Act. During the next year
ending the 29th Sept. 1874, there were 105 convic-
tions under the Criminal Justice Act, and 31 convic-
tions of juveniles. In that year there was only a
decrease of two. In the year ending the 29th Sept.
last only 68 persons were convicted summarily,
and only 25 juveniles were convicted, making 93
against 136 in the previous year. This he looked
upon as a very gratifying fact, seeing that the
diminution was under both heads. He hoped
that there were some active agencies at work to
account for this change. He then briefly called
attention to some of the cases in the calendar, and
dismissed the jury to their room.

Messrs. J. Griffin and C. B. Hellard (solicitor),
Major F. J. Conway-Gordon and Lieut.-Colonel
Owen, were sworn in as justices of the peace for
the borough.

SUFFOLK QUARTER SESSIONS.
Friday, Oct. 22.

(Lord HENNIKER, Chairman.) BUTTON (app.) v. THE MAGISTRATES OF THE WOODBRIDGE BENCH (resps.)

The Licensing Act-Sale during prohibited hoursEvidence-Consumption off the premises. THIS was an appeal against a conviction at Woodbridge Petty Sessions for selling beer in prohi bited hours.

Graham (instructed by Grimsey, Block, and Wenn) appeared for the appellant.

Sims Reeve and Frere for the respondents. The appellant keeps the Brickmakers' Arms, Seckford-street, Woodbridge, and on Sunday morning, 18th July, Police Sergt. Gray and Police Constable Clarke were watching the back of Button's house. Adjoining Button's garden is another occupied by Berry, a jobbing gardener, and about eleven o'clock (and, therefore, in prohibited hours) the watchers saw a son of Berry go from his father's garden to that of Button, go to Button's back door, where he waited while Button, who had been in his garden, went indoors and came out again with a can, which would hold about a gallon, and which Berry took to his

father's garden. The policemen went to young
Berry and found that the can contained beer
(Gray testing the contents by tasting), which
from the froth on the top appeared to have re-
cently been drawn. There were nine men in
Berry's garden, and the case for the respondents
was that the beer was supplied for their consump-
tion. Sergt. Gray went to Button and told him
he ought to know better than to send beer out on
a Sunday morning, on which Mrs. Button said,
"The beer was drawn on Saturday night." Gray
said he must report the case, and Mrs. Button
said she hoped he would overlook it. The magis-
trates convicted the appellant and fined him £2
and 10s. 6d. costs.

Graham, for the appellant, said the facts, as he
should prove them, were that the beer was sold to
Berry on the Saturday evening. It was the cus-
tom of Berry to buy beer on a Saturday, take it
away, and consume it on the Sunday on his own
premises. The learned counsel read the section
of the Act under which the appellant was con-
victed, and contended that to constitute an
offence there must be a selling or a consumption
on the premises during the prohibited hours.
There was no sale in prohibited hours in this case,
as the sale took place on the previous evening,
and there was no consumption on the premises.

Mrs. Button, Jacob Button (the appellant),
Lydia Kemp, and Isaac Berry were called, and
swore that the facts were as opened by Mr.
Graham.

The COURT Confirmed the conviction and granted
costs.

LAW STUDENTS' JOURNAL.

WE are still without any new rules in regard to
the notices necessary to be given by articled
clerks with a view to final examination and ad-
mission or the Rolls. That they are required
cannot be doubted in view of the Judicature Acts,
which will be in operation on Monday next.
As to the quarter from which they may be ex-
pected, we take it that the duty of issuing
them devolves on the Master of the Rolls,
who will alone for the future deal with these
examinations and admissions. The usual no-
tices have been entered in the Queen's Bench
Master's office, while it is clear that admission by
the Master of the Rolls will entitle gentlemen so
admitted to practise in all the divisions of the
High Court of Justice. There are 164 notices
of admission for the approaching sittings, besides
numerous renewed notices. Of course until the
issue of new rules students will proceed as here-
tofore. Calls to the Bar are entirely in the hands
of the Benchers of the Inns of Court; and so
great has been the advance made by the solicitors'
branch of the Profession during recent years, that
we feel the time is arriving when the government
of the solicitors should be left far more in
the hands of the Incorporated Law Society than is
at present the case. As it is, the business of ad-
mitting gentlemen on the Rolls, usually seriously
obstructs the other and ordinary work of the
court and the officers and officials. We have
already expressed the hope that the intended
issue of new rules may be regarded as a fitting
occasion to establish something like uniformity in
the mode and times for giving notices of examina-
tions and admissions; as it is, nothing is more
confusing, not to say embarrassing, to articled
clerks.

PRELIMINARY EXAMINATIONS BEFORE
ENTERING INTO ARTICLES OF CLERK-
SHIP TO SOLICITORS.
PURSUANT to the judges' orders, the preliminary
examination in general knowledge will take place
on Wednesday the 16th and Thursday the 17th
Feb. 1876, and will comprise :-

1. Reading aloud a passage from some English
author.

2. Writing from dictation.

3. English Grammar.

4. Writing a short English composition.

5. Arithmetic.-A competent knowledge of the
first four rules, simple and compound.

6. Geography of Europe and of the British Isles.
7. History.-Questions on English History.
8. Latin.-Elementary knowledge of Latin.
9. 1. Latin. 2. Greek, ancient and modern. 3.
French. 4. German. 5. Spanish. 6. Italian.

The special examiners have selected the follow.
ing books, in which candidates will be examined
in the subjects numbered 9 at the examination on
the 16th and 17th Feb. 1876:-

In Latin Cæsar, De Bello Gallico, I. II. or
Virgil, Book VIII.
In Greek: Eschylus, Prometheus Vinctus.
In Modern Greek : Βεντοτῆς Ιστορία τῆς ̓Αμερικῆς
Bißion".

In French: Xavier de Maistre, 1, Le Lépreux de
la cité d'Aoste; 2, La jeune Siberienne; or Vol-
aire, Zaire.

In German: Schiller, Abfall der vereinigte

Niederlande, books III. and IV.; or, Goethe,
Torquato Tasso.

In Spanish: Cervantes, Don Quixote, cap. xv. to
Xxx. both inclusive; or Moratin, El Sí de las
Niñas.

In Italian: Manzoni's I Promessi Sposi, cap. i. to viii. both inclusive; or Tasso's Gerusalemme, 4, 5, and 6 cantos, and Volpe's Eton Italian Grammar.

With reference to the subjects numbered 9, each candidate will be examined in one language only, according to his selection. Candidates will have the choice of either of the above-mentioned works.

The examinations will be held at the Incorporated Law Society's Hall, Chancery-lane, London, and at some of the following towns:-Birmingham, Brighton, Bristol, Cambridge, Cardiff, Carlisle, Carmarthen, Chester, Durham, Exeter, Lancaster, Leeds, Lincoln, Liverpool, Maidstone, Manchester, Newcastle-on-Tyne, Oxford, Ply mouth, Salisbury, Shrewsbury, Swansea, Worcester, and York.

Candidates are required by the judges' orders to give one calendar month's notice to the Incorporated Law Society, before the day appointed for the examination, of the language in which they propose to be examined, the place at which they wish to be examined, and their age and place of education. All notices should be addressed to the secretary of the Incorporated Law Society, Chancery-lane, W.C.(a)

(a) FORM OF NOTICE.-PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION. Notice is hereby given, that of aged who was educated at intends on the and days of next, to present himself for examination previous to entering into articles of clerkship, and that he proposes to be examined in the language.

at

Dated the day of

187. [Signature of candidate. Christian and surname, and the address at which letters will reach the applicants, must be inserted in the notice.

LAW STUDENTS IN THE ISLE OF MAN. THE following notice has recently been issued: "Students-at-law are required to take notice that in addition to such examinations as may for the time being be prescribed as to the fitness and capacity of any person to be admitted to the Bar, each application for admission will be referred to the Committee of the Isle of Man Law Society, who will inquire and report whether or not the applicant has complied with the requirements of the law as to the faithful performance of his service as a clerk, and whether or not his character be such as to justify a reasonable expectation that he will conduct himself as a member of the profession of the law with honour, integrity, and respectability. And each applicant will be required to furnish the said committee with such information as they may require to enable them to make their report.

"And all persons concerned are required to take notice that no future student-at-law shall be considered as having a claim for admission to the Bar unless before he enter into the contract as to his clerkship he make application for the approbation of the Governor, which application before the approbation be given will be referred to the Committee of the said Law Society for their report. "HENRY B. LOCH. "Government House, Oct. 21, 1875."

BANKRUPTCY LAW.

LEEDS COUNTY COURT.
Aug. 24 and Sept. 22.

(Before W. T. S. DANIEL, Q.C., Judge.)
Ex parte HOPKINSON; re HALLIDAY.
Purchase of piano by quarterly payments-Bank-
ruptcy-Order and disposition.

A piano was delivered by a piano maker and
seller into the possession of a trader, on the terms
of its belonging to him if he paid 371. 48. by
twelve equal quarterly instalments, the property
in the piano remaining meanwhile in the
maker, and if at any time default was made in
payment of any instalment, the maker was at
liberty to resume possession, and all instalments
previously paid to be forfeited. No instalment
was ever paid. The piano remained in the
trader's possessi on from July 1874 to April 1875
the possession was not resumed or attempted to
be resumed by the maker. In April 1875 the
trader was declared bankrupt, the piano was
Then in his possession at his private dwelling
house.

Held, that the agreement not having been enforced
by the maker before the bankruptcy the piano
passed to the trustee under the order and dis-
position clause, sect. 15, sub-s. 5 Bankruptcy Act
1869. See cases Re Hawkins (41 L. J. 20, Ch.);
Ex parte Lovering (43 L. J. 118, Ch.); Ex parte
Hill (LAW TIMES, 3rd April, 1875).
Gain (instructed by Pullan) for trustee.
West (instructed by Snowden) for Hopkinson
and Co.

His HONOUR.-This matter came before the price. To allow such agreements as the one set court upon a special case stated between the up here to remain secret and not to be acted upon parties, the facts agreed upon being as follows: except in cases of insolvency, would be to cause In the month of July 1874, the bankrupt, John the mischief which the order and disposition Holliday, hired a pianoforte from Messrs. Hop-clause was intended to prevent-the acquisition kinson Brothers and Co., upon the terms of an by a trader of false credit by means of the posagreement in writing, of which the following is a session and visible ownership of valuable procopy (the said agreement is duly stamped): "5 and perty which the real owners-perhaps with a view 6, Commercial-street, Leeds, 28th July 1874. No. to their own advantage-permit him to enjoy. Messrs. Hopkinson and Co. The undersigned This is not to be likened to a case of a bona fide hereby hires the pianoforte belonging to Hopkin- hiring of furniture, which may or may not be good son Brothers and Co., No. 3439 34, upon the terms according to the circumstances, as shown by the and conditions following (that is to say): On the cases, Re Hawkins (41 L. J. 20, Ch.); and Ex parte sum of £37 10. being paid to Hopkinson and Co. Lovering (43 L. J. 118, Ch). Consistently with in twelve instalments of £3 2s. each (the first Messrs. Hopkinson's contention an insolvent instalment to be paid this day, and each subse- trader might furnish his house from top to bottom quent instalment at the expication of each suc- with valuable furniture and articles of sumptuous ceeding three calendar months), the pianoforte luxury, and impose upon the honest tradesmen of to belong to the undersigned. In case of default his neighbourhood, who upon the faith of his posin the punctual payment of any instalment, the session of goods, apparently his own, would instalments previously paid shall be forfeited to supply him upon credit with the necessaries of Hopkinson Brothers and Co., who shall thereupon life, and afterwards find, to their serious injury, be entitled to resume possession of the instru- that neither the possession nor the ownership are ment. The understanding being that until the his. In my opinion, admitting such agreements full payment of the £37 43. the pianoforte re- as the present to be valid and effectual in law as mains the sole and absolute property of Hop- between the parties, they are not valid and effec kinson Brothers and Co., and is only lent on hire tual as against the bona fide creditors of the to the undersigned, who will take all reasonable quasi-purchaser or quasi-hirer unless they are care of it during the hiring, and in case of fairly and properly enforced according to their damage by fire or otherwise bear the loss or risk. tenor before the title of a trustee in bankruptcy Dated this 28th of July 1874. J. Halliday has accrued. The case of Ex parte Hill, referred to Wharfedale, Mount Bees, Rhydding. Witness, as reported in the LAW TIMES of 3rd April 1875, J. W. Benton. N.B.-All change of residence to appears to accord with the view I take of this case. be intimated to Hopkinson Brothers and Co." My answer, therefore, to the question submitted The agreement was not registered under the Bills to me is, that the right of the trustee to the piano of Sale Act. In pursuance of this agreement a prevails over that of Messrs. Hopkinson, and that pianoforte was delivered to the said John Halli. they are only entitled to prove as creditors upon day. No instaiment has been paid under the the estate for £37 43., the price of the piano. And agreement by the said John Halliday. He unless some arrangement to the contrary has been was adjudicated a bankrupt under a peti- made, Messrs. Hopkinson must pay the trustee's costs of this proceeding, to be taxed by the registrar.

tion filed in this court on the 28th of April 1875. Samuel Johnson Berwick, of Leeds, accountant, was duly appointed trustee of the property of the bankrupt, and as such trustee ! finding the said bankrupt in possession of the said piano, took possession, and now holds the same. The question for the opinion of the court is stated to be "Is the trustee entitled as against Messrs. Hopkinson and Co. to hold the piano under the circumstances aforesaid, as being in the

HOW BANKRUPTCY AFFAIRS ARE MANAGED.— At the October sicting of the Chelmsford County Court (before J. T. Abdy, Esq., judge), Mr. John Bath, of 40A, King William street, London accountant, attended before his Honour, as receiver, manager, and trustee in the estate of Walter Balchin, formerly a grocer in Tindal-street. Chelms

ing the amount. Mr. Bath, he said, had
charged extravagantly for what he did, and
he had charged for duties which it was no part of
his business to perform at all. He was also
of opinion that he had resorted to " an ingenious
way of making out apparent work."-Mr. Bath,
with some vehemence, contended that his charges
were fair and honourable, and said if they were to
be reduced as Mr. Gepp had reduced them it would
be impossible to find competent and honest men
to act in these matters.-His Honour differed
from him on this point, and told him that as re-
ceiver it was not his duty to carry on a business,
but to realise and wind-up as soon as possible.
What was the good of carrying on an estate as he
had done this?-Mr. Bruty: No good to the cre-
ditors, your Honour, that's certain.-His Honour:
I don't think the registrar has knocked a bit too
much off this bill of costs, and I refuse to send it
back to him for re-taxation. Mr. Bath intimated
his intention to appeal against this decision,
possible.-Mr. Bruty believed it was within his
Honour's discretion to refuse to allow an appeal,
and he hoped he would, as there had been great
delay already.-Mr. Bath retorted that Messrs.
Duffield and Bruty were responsible for whatever
delay and mismanagement there had been.-Mr.
Bruty: That is a monstrous thing to say. We
declined to have anything to do with you, Mr.
Bath.-His Honour said if it was within his dis-
cretion he should decline to allow an appeal, So
far as he was concerned he was determined to keep
down these costs in bankruptcy cases.

LEGAL NEWS.

THE Judge of the Admiralty division of the High Court, Sir R. J. Phillimore, will sit in the Exchequer Chamber, Westminster Hall, on the first day of Michaelmas Sitting, to hear admiralty causes and motions.

WE understand that Messrs. Waterlow and Sons, who are the publishers of Mr. W. T. Charley's work on the Judicature Acts, find the demand for their book so great that they are not able to meet it. This is not to be wondered at seeing that it had been obtainable at the marvel

order and disposition of the bankrupt, or on the ford, for the purpose of applying that the Registrar lously low figure of 3s. 6d.

ground that the bankrupt was the reputed owner thereof, or assuming (as is admitted) that there is a valid custom for the hiring of pianofortes, are Messrs. Hopkinson and Co. entitled to it?" The case was argued before me by counsel on the 24th Aug. last, and was treated as involving a question of importance to Messrs. Hopkinson and Co., as to the effect of their ordinary dealings with their customers, it being admitted that the transaction between them and the bankrupt as evidenced by the agreement set out in the special case, was a customary mode of disposing of pianofortes by pianoforte makers and sellers. Assuming the legal validity of the agreement, its affect as between the bankrupt and Messrs. Hopkinson and Co., appears to me to be this: By the first clause of the agreement the bankrupt acquired the right to become the purchaser of the piano upon paying the price, £37 48., by twelve equal quarterly instalments, the said instalments being payable on delivery, and the property in the piano meanwhile remaining in Messrs. Hopkinson, notwithstanding its delivery into the possession of the bankrupt. And assuming that the bankrupt had complied with the terms of the contract by paying the instalments as they became due, his possession of the piano could not have been interfered with by Messrs. Hopkinson and Co., although the property in the piano would still remain in them, and thus be a protection to them against a wrongful parting with the possession of the piano by the bankrupt. By the second clause of the agreement default being made by the bankrupt on payment of any of the instalments provided for by the first clause, Messrs. Hopkinson and Co. acquired the right to determine the possession of the bankrupt by resuming the possession of tho piano themselves. That default was made, no instalment (not even the one payable on delivery of the piano) was ever made, nor, so far as appears, ever demanded. For reasons of their own, Messrs. Hopkinson did not think it necessary for the protection of their interests as the owners of the piano to exercise their right under the agreement. As between themselves and the bankrupt, or any person claiming under him, their forbearance or omission to exercise their right would probably not operate in law to their prejudice, but as between them and the creditors of the bankrupt, now represented by the trustee, the consequences I apprehend are different. From July 1874, to April 1875, Messrs. Hopkinson being the owners of the piano, and entitled to its possession, permitted the bankrupt to have and enjoy his possession of the piano, and to acquire the reputation of being the owner thereof as completely as though he had acquired the true ownership by payment of the agreed

THE BLACK ASSIZE."-The Clerk of the Peace at Oxford (Mr. Davenport) has just placed a marble tablet at the outer entrance to the County Hall of that city, to commemorate a sad event which oc curred 300 years ago. The inscription on the tablet is as follows:-"Near this spot stood the ancient County Hall, unhappily famous in history as the scene in July, 1575, of the Black Assize, when a malignant disease, known as the gaol fever, caused the death within forty days of the Lord Chief Baron (Sir Robert Bell), the High Sheriff (Sir Robert Doyley, of Menton), and about 300 more. The malady from the stench of the prison. ers developed itself during the trial of one Robert Jenkes, a saucy, foul-mouthed bookseller, for scandalous words uttered against the Queen.' This tablet was placed here in 1875, exactly 300 years after the event which it records."

THE END OF THE LONG VACATION.-On Monday, the 25th, the Common Law offices were opened as usual, and on Thursday the Chancery Vacation terminated. The Judicature Act takes effect on Monday, the 1st Nov., and on Tuesday, the 2nd, the Lord Chancellor will receive the Judges and afterwards go to Westminster Hall in procession, where the new Court of Appeal will sit, and the other Courts in Divisions. On Wednesday, the 3rd Nov., each of the three Divisions will hold two courts for the trial of Special and Common Jury causes at Westminster. Before the Lord Chancellor's reception on Tues. day next the Judges will assemble at the Central Criminal Court and appoint the sittings for the ensuing year.

(Mr. Gepp) might be ordered to review his taxa-
tion of the applicant's bill of costs.
It ap-
peared that Mr. Bath had charged as receiver
£32 198. 7d., and as trustee £135 58. 2d., making
a total claim against the bankrupt's estate of no
less than £168 4s. 9d. On taxing this bill, the
registrar reduced the first claim by £13 93. 3d.,
and the second by £70 8s. 5d., leaving £84 13s. 1d.
as the total amount allowed. It transpired that
the debtor's assets were originally estimated at
£827, but Mr. Bruty said that not more than
£250 was actually realised, out of which Mr.
Bath now wished to take £168. His Honour
said that on the face of it he thought the charge
a monstrous one, and, before he had done with
the case, would examine into it closely. The fact
was that estates were eaten up with charges of
this description. He produced a copy of the
Grocer of the 9th Jan. 1875, in which there
were some strictures upon the way in which
this very case had been managed.-Mr. Bath
said he had seen the paragraph, and there was
not a word of truth in it. He had made strict
endeavours to find out the author of the para-
graph, but there was no man with moral courage
enough to own it. His Honour: I cannot
understand why people so eagerly wish to become
trustees in bankruptcy.-Mr. Bath: Nor can I.-
His Honour: I wish to know why people are so
anxious, especially in London, to be made trus-
tees in bankruptcy. There must be something in
it.-Mr. Bath's account was then submitted to a
somewhat detailed and rigid examination. He
pointed out that he and his clerks had carried on
the bankrupt's business for some time, both pur-
chasing and selling goods, in the hope of selling
the stock and goodwill at a respectable figure. In
this they were disappointed, and the estate, which ECCLESIASTICAL APPEALS.-There are several
went into liquidation in April 1874, was sold by ecclesiastical appeals pending before the Judicial
auction early in July.-Mr. Bruty said he inter- Committee of the Privy Council, and, by a pro-
fered in this matter not only as being concerned vision in the last Supreme Court of Judicature
for the London and County Bank, who were Act, Mr. Rothery, Her Majesty's Registrar of
among the largest creditors, but also because, in Appeal in Ecclesiastical and Admiralty Causes, is
an affidavit which he had made, Mr. Bath had continued in his office. He is, however, deemed to
made a most improper use of a letter which he be an officer attached to the Supreme Court; the
(Mr. Bruty) had written. The fact was that Mr. office he holds is to be separate, and he is to be
Balchin himself carried on the business at the compensated for any loss he may sustain by the
time another person was acting for Mr. Bath, and new law. Her Majesty, by order in council, on
both were paid officers. Mr. Bath also acted for the recommendation of the Lord Chancellor, with
Mr. Balchin prior to the filing of the petition, and the concurrence of tho Treasury, may make such
charged him for much of the work which he now
arrangements with respect to the duties of the
wished to charge against the estate.-Mr. Bath: office, either by abolition or otherwise, as may
My charges were £47, and I have not received one seem expedient, but such order is not to take
farthing. Mr. Bruty: Yes, because you don't get effect during the continuance in such office
it from Balchin you seek to get it from the cre- by the registrar at the time of the passing of
ditors.-His Honour strongly commented the last Act on Judicature without his consent.
the bill as he went through it, echoing with As the Judicial Committee is to continue in its
emphasis the Registrar's reasons for reduc- present condition until the 1st Nov., 1876, Mr.

on

The Courts at Westminster will be opened between one and two o'clock, the Lord Chancellor previously receiving the Lord Mayor elect at his mansion.

causes.

Rothery will perform the duties before their Lordships as heretofore in Ecclesiastical and Admiralty CONTEMPT OF COURT.-The following is an extract from the report in a Monmouthshire journal -the Star of Gwent-of the Monmouthshire Quarter Sessions, held at Usk on Tuesday, Wednesday, and Thursday, the 19th, 20th, and 21st of October:-"Final Sentence of Visiting Justices' Report. We think it desirable that the Court should bring to the notice of the Secretary of State that a prisoner has been incarcerated two years and eight months on Exchequer proceedings, being maintained at the cost of the county.' The Chairman (Mr. R. S. Bosanquet). —‘For what reason is the prisoner kept there?' Mr. Relph (Chairman of the Visiting Justices).- Contempt of court; upon an Exchequer process." He (Mr. Relph) communicated with the Home Office some time ago, and the then Home Secretary said he could not see his way clear to deal with the matter. He had called upon the Secretary of State several times with reference to the case, and on the last occasion there appeared to be a disposition to allow the man to go out. He was a very obstinate man, and would not pay what he was quite capable of paying, but the county was at the expense of keeping him. The Chairman :-'Punishment is very expensive, but it is very useful. I do not think we should grudge the expense if it will do him good.' Mr. Relph :- I do grudge it.' Mr. Granville Somerset, Q.C. (vice-chairman) :-'So do I. Mr. Relph:- I thought the court should know we had such a curiosity in the prison.' Mr. Somerset: I was told the prisoner was one who could pay but would not, and that he was recalitrant. I quite agree that he should not be kept there at the expense of the county, and if the court likes I will call about the matter when I am in London.' Major Milman, governor of the gaol :He is an illiterate horse doctor.' Mr. Relph: The solicitor showed me the account he had to pay, only £35, so that it would be much cheaper to get him out.' It was decided to communicate with the Secretary of State on the matter."

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MASTERS AND SERVANTS.-A case of importance to the Iron trade of the North of England has been determined by the Northumberland County Magistrates at the Moot Hall, Newcastle. workman named James Cushman was employed as a puddler at the Walker Iron Works, of which Messrs. Bell, Ridley, and Bell are proprietors. He went to the works on Monday morning, the 9th of August, to commence his employment for the week, when he found a notice on the door that the works would be closed till the Wednesday following, and on the Wednesday he saw a second notice intimating that they would be closed till the following Monday. It was contended on his behalf that he was entitled to his wages for the week, on the ground that he had not received proper notice, Rule 11 stating that any workman wishing to quit the service of the firm should give notice on the pay day fourteen days previous to the time of leaving, or forfeit his wages, and that a workman might demand an equal notice if he had not been guilty of misconduct. The defence was that it was not the custom to give notice to puddlers or pay the men if work was suspended for a few days through breakage of machinery, want of iron, a cessation of work, or want of specifications. This case would rule those of a number of other workmen who had been similarly placed. He asked £3 compensation. The B nch, in giving judgment, decided that the plaintiff was entitled to recover under the contract, and they assessed the sum of £1 as compensation for the breach and non-performance of the contract. The Bench intimated at the same time that the evidence as to custom was very slender, but had it been more satisfactory, after careful consideration they were firmly of opinion that it would not affect the case at all, as the action had been taken on a writtten contract. Costs were allowed to the plaintiff.

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THE COUNTY COURTS ACT 1875.-Mr. W. H. Burch Rosher, of Lincoln's-inn, writes to the Times.-"Upon the 2nd Nov. next, the above statute, 38 & 39 Vict. c. 50, which contains some very useful provisions, comes into operation. Sect. 4, however, as it now stands, seems to be so defective as to be of little or no practical utility until it has been amended by striking out the words on an ex parte application.' As it now stands- A judge of County Courts shall, whether within the district of any of his courts or not, have jurisdiction to make any order, or exercise on ex parte application any authority or jurisdiction in any action or proceeding pending in any of the courts of which he is judge, which if the same related to an action or proceeding pending in one of Her Majesty's superior courts might be given, made, or exercised by a judge of such last-mentioned courts in chambers, and, with the consent of both parties to an action or proceeding, to hear and decide any matter at any place, either within or without any such district.' By the above enactment, except by consent, the power of the County Court judges to exercise in relation to actions and proceedings pending in their courts

the authority and jurisdiction of a 'judge at chambers,' with regard to actions and proceedings pending in one of the superior courts-which is, I have reason to believe, what was intended to be the result of this new provision-is confined to such authority and jurisdic. tion as may be exercised by a judge at chambers on an ex parte application, and this, as will be seen, by reference to Chitty's 'Archbold's Practice,' 11th edit., p. 1588, is extremely limited and of little or no general value in County Court practice; it is as follows:-'There are some cases, however, where a judge's order may be obtained on an ex parte application. For instance, an order that the defendant may be held to bail, that plaintiff may sue in formâ pauperis, and to compel the attendance of a witness before an arbitrator may be thus obtained. If a party obtain an order ex parte without summons, where the opposite party ought to have had an opportunity of showing cause, the order will be rescinded on application to the court, and in some cases might, perhaps, be treated as a nullity.' It can scarcely be intended that all interlocutory orders of whatever nature which can now be made by a judge at chambers are to be made by County Court judges in proceedings before them, on an ex parte application, as this would be investing the latter with powers greater than those exerciseable by the judges of the Superior Courts, besides often operating injuriously to the party to the action or proceeding in whose absence such orders were obtained."

CORRESPONDENCE OF THE

PROFESSION.

NOTE.-This Department of the LAW TIMES being open to free discussion on all professional topics, the Editors are not responsible for any opinions or statements contained in it.

DAMAGES IN CASES OF COLLISION AT SEA.-A collision takes place between two ships, which results in the death of a seaman, and the personal injury of a passenger on board one of them. The personal representative of the seaman and the pas senger each bring an action in the High Court of Justice, the former proceeding under Lord Campbell's Act. At the trial of the actions both ships are held to blame for the collision. Are the plaintiffs in both actions, or is the passenger alone entitled to a verdict? See the Sylph (L. Rep. 2 A. & E. 24); the Beta (L. Rep. 2, P. C. 447); the Guldfaxe (L. Rep. 2 A. & E. 325); Smith v. Brown (L. Rep. 6 Q. B. 729); Thorogood v. Bryan (8 C. B. 115); Armstrong v. L. & Y. Railway (33 L. T. Rep. N. S. 228); The Judicature Act 1873, s. 25. This depends upon two questions-First, Is the action a "cause or proceeding for damages arising out of a collision between two ships"? This it surely must be unless the section is to be restricted to the case of injury to the ships themselves, and is not to be extended to injury to cargo, which would be a very inconvenient interpretation. Secondly, What are "the rules hitherto in force" in such a case in the Court of Admiralty which are to prevail over the Common Law rules? The Court of Admiralty held in the Guldface that it had jurisdiction to entertain a suit not only for personal injuries, but under Lord Campbell's Act for death. The Privy Council expressly upheld the jurisdiction as to personal injuries in the Beta, and never questioned the decision in the Guldfaxe. The Court of Queen's Bench in Smith v. Brown, prohibited the Admiralty Court from exercising jurisdiction in regard to proceedings under Lord Campbell's Act, and evidently considered that the Admiralty Court had no jurisdiction in case of personal injury. (See also James v. London and South Western Railway, L. Rep. 7 Ex., p. 196.) There is no Admiralty case reported in which the rule of dividing damages where both vessels are to blame is applied to damage caused by personal injury or death. But from the analogy of the Milan (Lushington 388), one would suppose that the rule would apply in such cases. The common law rule would seem to prevent the passenger as well as the representative of the seaman from the ship on board of which they were, for Churorecovering in the case of negligence in managing good v. Bryan (which was long doubted) was approved and followed. The whole matter appears to me to be a very pretty puzzle, but perhaps some of your readers can see their way more clearly to the solution than

Liverpool, 26th Oct. 1875.

G. H.

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of the 16th inst., writes to me from Wath-uponDearne, near Rotherham, for a copy of our monthly circular, and to know whether articled clerks paying a short visit to London might at tend one or two of our meetings? I wish to inform that gentleman (who unfortunately omits to sign his letter) that I shall be pleased to forward him a copy of our circular if he will kindly send me his name, and that the committee will be at all times pleased to see any law student as a visitor at any of our meetings.

NOTES

J. S. RUBINSTEIN, Hon. Sec.

AND QUERIES ON POINTS OF PRACTICE.

NOTICE. We must remind correspondents that this column is not open to questions involving points of law such as a solicitor should be consulted upon. Queries are excluded which go beyond our limits. N.B.-None are inserted unless the name and address of the writer are sent, not necessarily for publication, but as a guarantee for bona fides.

Queries.

166. MARRIAGE WITH DIVORCED WIFE'S SISTER.-J. C. has been divorced from his wite. Decree absolute has been granted. His divorced wife is still living. He desires to marry his divorced wife's sister. Can he legally do so? X. [No.-ED. SOLS'. DEPT.]

167. PREPARING FOR THE INTERMEDIATE EXAMINATION.-I was articled in the early part of October 1874. When is the earliest time I can preesent myself for the Intermediate Examinations? Bearing in mind the Judicature Act, will it be necessary to read "Hayne's Outlines of Equity"? And with regard to book keeping, should I get up single entry or double ? INQUIRER.

[Assuming that the Judicature Acts will make no difference, you can present yourself for the Intermediate in November 1876. It is still necessary to have a thorough knowledge of the principles of equity. Single entry in book keeping.-ED. SOLS'. DEPT.]

168 VALIDITY OF DEED.-A. (married woman) was en

titled to real property by virtue of a will (it is not settled to her separate use, nor has she a power of appointment over it), and having been desirous of giving it to her husband, conveyed the same to a trustee to hold to the use of her husband. The deed was duly acknowledged by A. The husband was made a party to the deed, and it states therein that his wife conveyed the property with his consent, but he did not convey the property to the trustee, nor is the deed executed by him (the husband). Is the deed a valid disposition of A.'s interest in the property to her husband. E. D.

169. EXAMINATION.-Will you kindly inform me when will my first opportunity be for presenting myself for examination for the Intermediate? I was articled during the latter end of July 1874, for five years.

A. C. WILSON. [May, 1876, assuming that the examinations are hed as heretofore notwithstanding the Judicature Acts.ED. SOLS'. DEPT.]

170. EXAMINATION.-I was articled on the 29th March 1874. Please inform me in your next issue of the LAW TIMES what is the earliest day on which I can go up for my Intermediate Examination. W. M. [April 1876, but see answers to similar questions.-ED. SOLS'. DEPT.]

171. BASTARDY.-A. was delivered of a bastard. She obtains an order against B. for maintenance; two years after she is delivered of another bastard, by another maintenance of C.'s child, or is she considered a prosF. X.

father, C. Will the magistrates make an order for the titute? Cases will oblige.

172. CONVEYANCING HONOURS.-Can you or any of your readers inform me whether the Broderip Gold Medal for the year 1874 has been awarded or not? I do not remember to have seen it announced in your paper, but if the medal has not been awarded it is quite time that it was, as we shall very soon be at the end of A LAW STUDENT. another year. We think not. Write to the secretary of the Incorporated Law Society.-ED. SOLS'. DEPT.]

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LAW SOCIETIES.

HULL LAW STUDENTS' SOCIETY. A PRE-SESSIONAL meeting of this society wa held on Wednesday, the 20th inst., A. M. Jackson, Esq, in the chair. Fourteen honorary and twelve ordinary members were elected. It was decided that the ordinary meetings during the ensuing session should commence at six p.m. The proceedings terminated with a vote of thanks to the

chairman.

UNITED LAW STUDENTS' SOCIETY. A MEETING of this society was held on Wednesday last at Clement's-inn Hall, under the presidency of Mr. J. T. Davies. About 100 students were present, attracted, no doubt, by the fact that Mr. W. T. Charley, D.C.L., M.P., had consented to deliver a lecture on the Judicature Acts. The secretary having read the minutes of the last meeting, and several new members having been nominated, the chairman introduced the learned lecturer to the meeting with a few appropriate remarks, after which

tion." The battery from which the Chancery judges
have kept up an incessant fire for centuries upon
the consciences of plaintiffs at common law will
thus, on Monday next, be dismantled and silenced
for ever. (Hear.) The defendant may rely upon the
equity on which the injunction would have been
grounded, either by pleading it in his defence, or
by applying to the division of the High Court
before which the cause is pending for a stay of
proceedings. This, I submit, is a great improve-
ment on the former practice, in theory,at all events.
I have referred to the confusion existing as to
the distinction between the Supreme Court of
Judicature and the High Court of Justice. Some
confusion is also likely to arise as to the distinc-
tion between a "division" and a "divisional
court." The Supreme Court of Judicature con-
sists of "two permanent divisions," the "High
Court of Justice" and the "Court of Appeal."
The High Court of Justice, again, consists of five
divisions, the Chancery divison, the Queen's
Bench division, the Common Pleas division, the
Exchequer division, and a division, which the
Council of Law Reporting have dubbed by the
somewhat eccentric name of the "miscellaneous"

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consecu

to an inversion, so to speak, on a miniature scale, of the bill of complaint indorsed with a notice to appear. A plaintiff may, if he likes, deliver his statement of claim at the same time with the writ of summons, a close approximation to the Chancery practice. The defendant who wishes to bring before the court a person not a party whom he attacks in his counter claim, serves him with a copy of his statement of defence, indorsed with a notice to appear, a process identical, mutatis mu tandis, with the service on a defendant in Chancery of a bill of complaint indorsed with notice to Mr. Charley, who was received with much apappear. The writ of summons is to be "tested" plause, proceeded as follows:-I have for my in the name of the Lord Chancellor, and to run in theme to-night the Supreme Court of Judicature the same form as the teste to the old writ of Acts. There are three measures relating to the subpoena in Chancery, thus: "Witness ourself at establishment of a Supreme Court of Judicature, Westminster the 1st day of November, the thirty. but one of them is merely a suspensory enactninth year of our reign. Cairns, C.," Writ books, ment, and may, with this passing notice, be disappearance books, and, to some extent, judgment missed from our consideration. It will be necesbooks are displaced, and the Chancery cause book sary to pass a fourth Supreme Court of Judicature is substituted for them. Service of the writ of sumAct next year, the Supreme Court of Judicature mons on infants, lunatics, and persons of unsound Act of last Session being confessedly, in some of mind not so found by inquisition, is effected in its details, a temporary measure. During the the same manner as in a suit in Chancery. The present interregnum, discussions like that which memorandum of appearance is, in effect, a præcipe is, I believe, to follow this paper, are peculiarly division, namely, the Probate, Divorce, and Ad- to the proper officer to enter an appearance, simi. well timed. It is most important to the Legis.miralty division. These five divisions of the High lar to the form in use in the Court of Chancery. lature, the lawyer and the suitor, that intelligent Court of Justice are not, like the two divisions of An application may be made to the court to apcriticism should be brought to bear upon our new the Supreme Court of Judicature, "permanent point a guardian ad litem, to an infant or a person system of Judicature, and its weak points be divisions." The Queen in Council may, on the of unsound mind, not so found by inquisition, explored and strengthened before the edifice recommendation of the council of judges of the where no appearance has been entered for him, in of judicial reform is finally crowned. What, Supreme Court (that deliberative assembly to the same manner as in a suit in Chancery. A then, is the Supreme Court of Judicature to which I have already referred) order that the freedom of action, similar to that enjoyed by which the Supreme Court of Judicature Acts number of the divisions of the High Court of plaintiffs, defendants, and judges in Chancery, relate? Viewed as a court, it is a very shadowy Justice shall be augmented or diminished. The is enforced upon the plaintiffs, defendants, and creation-an abstraction rather than a reality. Order in Council may also provide for the aboli- judges of the High Court, with regard to the It has no jurisdiction, and does not even profess tion on vacancy of the distinction of the offices of joinder of parties. The rules of the Court of to administer justice. Viewed as a deliberative the three Common Law chiefs and of the Master Chancery, as to suits by and against representaand legislative assembly it has powers in relation of the Rolls, the chancellorship alone being sacred tive parties acting on behalf of classes of persons, to practice and procedure hardly inferior to those from the levelling touch of the legislative wand of are incorporated bodily in the new practice. of Queen, Lords, and Commons. It can frame our gracious Queen. When the three chiefs of Married women, lunatics, infants, and persons of rules of court relative to practice and procedure, the common law division have sunk into puisne unsound mind, not so found by inquisition, sue which have the force of an Act of Parliament until judges, the re-distribution of the five divisions of in the manner practised in the Court of Chancery. annulled by Her Majesty. To enable Her Majesty the High Court of Justice will easily follow. At The statement of complaint is similar to a bill to annul them an address must have been pre- present it is well to remember that while of complaint. By sect. 10 of the Chancery sented to her by the House of Lords and the House the divisions of the Supreme Court of Judica- Amendment Act 1852, every bill of complaint of Commons praying her to do so; but the Queen ture are permanent, the divisions of the High shall contain, as concisely as may be, a narrative is not bound to act upon the address. Orders in Court of Justice are temporary only. Each of the material facts, matters, and circumstances council could only promulgate "additional" rules division of the High Court of Justice and on which the plaintiff relies, such narrative being by way of supplement to the rules of court in the the High Court of Justice itself may sit in divided into paragraphs, numbered schedule to the Supreme Court of Judicature Act divisional courts. Lord Selborne calculated that tively, and each paragraph containing, as nearly 1875, but the Supreme Court can, if it likes, repeal seven divisional courts might sit contempora- as may be, a separate and distinct statement the entire schedule to the Act of 1875 (just as the neously. Two judges are to form a quorum of a or allegation." By Order 19, rule 4, of the Act of 1875 repeals the entire schedule to the Act divisional court, and the number of judges of a schedule to the Supreme Court of Judicature of 1873), and can incorporate with the Act of 1875 divisional court is never to exceed three. As a Act 1875, 66 every pleading shall contain, as conan entirely new schedule. The deliberative func- divisional court is to exercise all the powers pre- cisely as may be, a statement of the material facts tions of the Supreme Court are exercised by a viously vested in a Superior Court at West- on which the party pleading relies, such statecouncil of the judges of the Supreme Court, which minster sitting in banco, it follows that as regards ment being divided into paragraphs numbered is to meet annually to explore the defects of the the common law divisions there will be a consid. consecutively; and each paragraph containing, as new system of judicature and report to the Secre- erable economy of judge power-a result which nearly as may be, a separate allegation." The tary of State. The Lord Chancellor may, also, the Judicature Commission specially aimed at. Chancery rules, forbidding "literal traverses convene an extraordinary council at any time. The provisions as to divisional courts are of the and "negative pregrants,' are imported bodily In considering the constitution of the new judicial most elastic description possible. There may be into the new practice. The same indulgence is hierarchy, the most satisfactory course, perhaps, divisional courts for the transaction of the busi- shown to infants, lunatics, and persons of unsound is to forget altogether that there is to be such a ness of the Chancery division, divisional courts mind not so found by inquisition, with regard to tribunal as the Supreme Court of Judicature. I for the transaction of the business of the Probate, admissions in pleading, as is shown to them by have found some confusion to exist even in well- Divorce, and Admiralty divisions; divisional courts the Court of Chancery. The pleadings, as well as balanced legal minds as to the distinction between for the transaction of the business of each of the the writ of summons, are to be printed, lettered, the Supreme Court of Judicature and the High three common law divisions; divisional courts for and numbered after the Chancery fashion. The Court of Justice. There is, no doubt, a certain the transaction of the business of the three common word "scandalous" has been imported into the similarity in the two names; but there is a wide law divisions; and divisional courts for the trans- new system of pleading, from the practice of difference in the things signified. Nominally, action of the business of the High Court the Court of Chancery, scandal in equity conindeed, the High Court of Justice is a division of of Justice. Any judge of the High Court sisting, as everybody knows, of the allegation the Supreme Court of Judicature; but, while the will be qualified and empowered to sit in any divi. of anything which is contrary to good man. Supreme Court of Judicature, quâ court, has no sional court. The judges of the High Court of ners, nothing material, however, oddly enough, jurisdiction at all, the High Court of Justice Justice are thus interchangeable, like the parts of being scandalous. A defendant desiring to gathers up into itself and "consolidates" (to use certain rifles. Any combination may be effected. demur to part of a statement of claim, and to a phrase of the Act of 1873), the jurisdiction of Kings, queens, bishops, knights, and pawns may put in a defence to the remainder, must combine the whole of the Superior Courts of Common be grouped in any form on the judicial chessboard, the demurrer and defence in one pleading. This Law and Equity, of the Court of Probate, of the (Hear.) Something like this already exists at the (which is rather startling to a special pleader) Court for Divorce and Matrimonial Causes, of judges' chambers in Rolls Gardens, where, as Mr. 18 copied from the Chancery practice. If the Court of Admiralty, of the Court of Common Justice Lush (B. II. c. XVII.) points out in his the judgment on demurrer at common law on Pleas at Lancaster, of the Court of Pleas at Practice, "every judge of the Superior Courts of a single issue were for the defendant, it was in Durham, and of the Courts created by Commis- common law may be said to represent all the three the nature of a final judgment against the plainsioners of Assize, of oyer and terminer, and of courts." (Hear.) The steps in litigation under the tiff of nil capiat per breve. In Chancery the degaol delivery. The imagination is staggered in new practice are as follows: Action by plaintiff com- fendant, after his demurrer was overruled, might the effort to grasp the vastness of the jurisdiction menced by writ of summons; appearance by de- by leave of the court make his defence by plea. vested in the High Court of Justice. The only fendant; statement of complaint by plaintiff; The Chancery practice on this head, which is cer exceptions of any importance from that juris. statement of defence by defendant; reply by tainly the more sensible, and, I may say, diction are the London Court of Bankruptcy, the plaintiff, joining issue on the defence; trial of one, has been imported into the new system of Chancery Court of Lancaster, the Courts of Appel. issue of fact by a judge and jury; entry of judg. pleading. The Chancery phrase, "dismissing & late Jurisdiction, and the inferior courts. All the ment; execution. If for "statement of complaint' bill for want of prosecution," is substituted for rest of the judicature of England is swept into the we substitute " declaration," for "statement of the more terse expression, familiar to common law High Court of Justice. The Courts of Chancery, defence" "plea," and for "reply ""replication,' men, of "judgment of non pros." The Chancery of Queen's Bench, of Common Pleas, and of the steps are those which are familiar to the practice is adopted relative to the " production Exchequer are no longer to be courts, but divi- humblest tyro in special pleading. Where an of documents on oath," and also to "answering sions-divisions, that is, of the High Court of issue of law is raised the steps will be action by further (only "exceptions cannot be taken to Justice. Proceedings in Chancery and at Common plaintiff commenced by writ of summons; appear- an answer, the party objecting to the answer Law will alike be intituled of the High Court of ance by defendant; statement of complaint by plain- must apply to the court on motion or sumJustice. However skeleton the consolidation may til; demurrer by defendant; joinder in demurrer mons). Inquiries and accounts may be directed be, it will, on Monday next, be a fait accompli. by plaintiff; argument; judgment; execution. in conformity with the Chancery practice. The connecting bones are very dry," but they The only unfamiliar phrase here is" statement Evidence by affidavit" is, I need scarcely point may yet "live," if the judges will only lay aside of complaint," in lieu of "declaration." But out, a title not likely to be found in any treatise any traditional jealousies and breathe life into while the outline of the common law procedure on common law, but an entire Order is devoted to them. One important result of the consolida- is thus retained, there is a strong dash of Chan- it in the schedule to the Act of this year. The tion of the Superior Courts is, thus stated in cery practice infused into these forms. A writ of Chancery practice of showing cause in the first the 24th section of the Act of 1873: "No cause summons indorsed with a statement of the nature instance is, in many cases, substituted for the or proceeding at any time pending before the High of the claim made, or of the relief or remedy recommon law practice of showing cause after the Court of Justice shall be restrained by injunc- quired in an action may not inaptly be compared expiration of the time fixed by a rule nisi; and

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this, I think, is an improvement. "Motion for judgment" has a family likeness to "motion for decree," although there is a considerable difference in their application. The elaborate procedure in the case of entering of judgments,is evidently borrowed from the Chancery practice in passing decrees and orders; and this, I confess, I do not think an im. provement. The common law divisions are fortified with two new writs of execution-the writ of sequestration and the writ of attachmentboth borrowed from the Chancery practice. The common law divisions will also be enriched with the useful powers enjoyed by the Court of Chancery for securing the interim custody and preservation of property, which is the subject of litigation, by the appointment of receivers, and by interlocutory injunctions. (Hear.) Rules of the Court of Chancery as to time, as to re-hearing on motion, and as to costs, have also been adopted. To these assimilations of the new Procedure to the Chancery practice must be added, in fairness, the complete subordination of legal to equitable principles by the 24th and 25th sections of the Act of 1873. "The rules of equity shall prevail." (Cheers.) This is the keystone of the arch of the new structure, the Alpha and the Omega of the principles enunciated by the Judicature Acts. And I gratefully recognise the benefits which suitors will derive from many applications of this new maxim, which Dr. Broom will be obliged to enshrine in the next edition of his "Legal Maxims"-(hear)-in lieu of the exploded maxim, "Equity follows the law." Take, for example, the case of Andrews v. Salt. Could anything be sadder than the language of Mr. Justice Archibald when granting a writ of habæus corpus to bring up the body of Ellen Andrews? "It is with great regret that notwithstanding the lateness of the application, and the apparent harshness of such a proceeding, we have no discretion to refuse the writ." A Protestant girl must be surrendered to her paternal uncle to be educated as a Roman Catholic, because by a scrap of paper, mis-called a will, disposing of nothing but of the girl, and written within a few hours of dissolution, the father named the paternal uncle guardian, nine years having since elapsed during which the existence of the will was carefully concealed from the maternal relatives. The Court of Chancery, however, steps in and says that it will consider the happiness and benefit only of the child, and will order her to remain in the care of those by whom she has been tenderly nurtured, and grants an injunction to restrain the paternal uncle from interfering with either her custody or her education Well may the Act of 1873 declare that, "in questions relating to the custody and education of infants the rules of equity shall prevail." Take, again, that common law doctrine, which Mr. Justice Buller said was "too absurd" for courts of equity to adopt, viz., that a chose in action is not assignable. The Act of 1873 has uprooted this preposterous doctrine, and established the sensible rule of equity that a chose in action is assignable as the law of the land. At the same time the Act surrounds the rule with every safe guard. The assignment must be an absolute one; it must be by writing under the hand of the assignor; it must not purport to be by way of charge only; and express notice of it must be given to the person from whom the assignor would have been entitled to receive or claim the chose in action. I have now given you a pretty long catalogue of illustrations of the application of Chancery practice, and of the principles of equity, to the new system. I think I have mentioned most of the salient points. In the face of these facts it is not a little curious to be told that the Chancery Bar are sulking over the Judicature Acts. The LAW TIMES has pointed out that "while the array of common lawyers who have grappled with the subject is quite formidable," "Mr. Clowes, one of the registrars of the Court of Chancery, is the only individual connected with equity who has appeared as an editor of the Acts." I cannot give you a list of the common law editors of the Acts, as my name appears amongst them, but it is a moderate estimate if we place them at a dozen. And yet the Acts bear the impress of a Chancery origin throughout. It is not merely that the two illustrious men who are the founders of the new system are one a Lord Chancellor, and one an ex-Lord Chancellor, but in the details of the Acts, and especially of the schedule to the Act of this year, the handiwork is plain of an equity draughtsman. Common law technical terms are carefully eschewed, and Chancery phrases substituted for them. The learned gentlemen who practise in the Divorce Courts have no reason to complain of the innovating hand of reform, the Acts-except that they make the judge of that court a member of the "Miscellaneous Division "-leave the principles, practice, and pleading of the Divorce Court entirely untouched. The principal rules of practice of the Court of Admiralty in actions in rem, and of the Court of Probate, are re-enacted verbatim by the schedule to the Act of this year.

The little advantage gained by the common law
in the adoption by Lord Selborne, in his Bill, of
the common law rule of distributing the loss in
collisions at sea, when both vessels are in fault, was
veryproperly upset by the timely intervention of Mr.
Rothery, who convinced Lord Selborne that the
rules of the Court of Admiralty on the subject
were far superior to those of the common law.
Of the common law practice preserved intact I
may mention the practice in interpleader, the
summary practice as to bills of exchange and pro-
missory notes, and the practice as to attachment
of debts. The common lawyers, by sheer hard
fighting in the House of Commons, saved the good
old common law rule that the costs in trial by
jury follow the event. They were unsuccessful
however, in their efforts to save wholly bills of
exceptions, but these will be continued in a very
modified form. All the elaborate provisions of
the Common Law Procedure Acts with regard to
proceedings in error will become obsolete under
the new system. The simplicity of the mode of
appeal is, I think, a remarkable feature of the
Acts. A single sentence has revolutionised
the common law practice. "All appeals to the
Court of Appeal shall be by way of re-hearing,
and shall be brought by notice of motion in a
summary way, and no petition, case, or other
formal proceeding other than such notice of
motion shall be necessary." I am speaking now,
of course, of appeals to the new Court of Appeal,
which is substituted for the Court of Appeal in
Chancery and the Exchequer Chamber. Error
will still lie to the House of Lords. I feel greatly
tempted to diverge here into a dissertation upon
a subject to which, for several years, I have
directed my poor efforts-the preservation of
the appellate jurisdiction of the House of
Lords as the Court of Final Appeal for Eng.
land, Ireland, and Scotland. I have had my
share of praise and blame for the part which
I have taken in forming the committee for
preserving the appellate jurisdiction, which
made its influence felt in both Houses of Parlia-
ment last session; but in the course that I have
taken I have acted according to the dictates of
my conscience, believing, as I do, that the main-
tenance of the appellate jurisdiction is intimately
bound up with the maintenance of the union
between the peoples of the three kingdoms; with
the maintenance of the balance of power between
the two chambers of the Legislature; with the
maintenance of the honour and dignity of the
profession of the law; with the maintenance of
the great principles that the ultimate Court of
Appeal should be raised above the petty jealousies
of Westminster Hall, and should sit in a calmer
and more judicial atmosphere than the courts
below, and be entirely severed from those courts
in its constituent parts. (Cheers.) In conclu-
sion, I must offer my sincere apologies to
the Society for the hasty and imperfect character
of these remarks. They have been thrown
together without any regard to arrangement of
topics, or methodical treatment of the subject, at
odds and ends of time, and are hardly deserving
of your consideration. The subject is simply an
inexhaustible one. It is nothing less than the entire
reconstruction of our system of judicature. The
Legislature has shattered to fragments the exist-
ing procedure, and yet it concedes to many of these
fragments places of honour in the new structure.
This is a thoroughly eclectic reform. Let us not
forget that the building, although its foundation
stone has been laid, and its walls are tower.
ing upwards, is still incomplete. Be it ours
to supply what is wanting in grace and
symmetry-in strength and solidity. I hope
that the Profession will not waste its time in idle
carpings at the undoubted defects in the struc-
ture, but, remembering that all human efforts
are necessarily fragmentary, and tentative, and
imperfect, will make allowances for the short-
comings of the Legislature in framing these
enactments, and will assist it, during the coming
session, in crowning the new edifice of judicial
reform.

The learned gentleman concluded his address
admidst loud applause, after which the chairman
invited discussion upon the subject, and expressed
the hope that some of the many visitors present
would also favour them with some remarks. He
was quite sure that the learned lecturer would be
happy to offer any explanation which might be
desired by anyone present.

Mr. William Dawson proceeded in a well
digested speech to offer some sever criticism upon
the measure of reform under consideration,
dwelling especially upon the doubt which existed
in his mind as to the efficacious working of the
district registries.

Mr. C. Swinfin Eady, LL.B., in a forcible speech pointed out that the County Court registrar would have to do the work of judge in chambers, chief clerk, taxing master, and registrar, and urged that the duties of chief clerks in Chancery were alone more important and more onerous than those of many County Court Judges. He dwelt upon the delay and expense conse

quent upon the present order of things and trusted that the Acts which were on the eve of coming into operation would do much towards curing these evils in our present system. He considered that the consolidation of the court the destruction of the procedure by which a decision for a suitor in a common law court could be upset in another, the simplification in pleading which were shortened under the new procedure were all redeeming features in the new enactments. He concluded, amid some expressions of dissent, by declaring that he did not believe that the district registries would prove beneficial to the public.

Mr. Round, L.L.B. (solicitor), said he had listened with pleasure to the observations of gentlemen in both branches of the profession, who had preceded him, he should confine his remarks to criticism of a practical character. The Court of Appeal was not constituted as it ought to have been, and he entirely disapproved of ex officio judges being appointed in such a court the dignity of which required that judges should have been appointed whose services were alone required in that court. As regards the rules and orders he was astonished to find how many of them had been taken from the Common Law Procedure Act and the Chancery Consolidated General Orders. There seemed to be great doubt as to what was meant by the provisions in regard to entering judgment, and many of the officials of the several courts were utterly in the dark as to their meaning. He concluded a valuable criticism of the rules by expressing the hope that the Palace of Justice would be soon erected, so that they might not have to be running from one part of London to another in order to find the several offices of the High Court of Justice, and he regretted that the professional allowances to solicitors in the shape of costs had been reduced rather than increased by the Act, (Cheers.)

'Mr. Glyn (Barrister) reminded those present that he was not long ago a member of the other branch of the profession, and he was excessively delighted to be present on the occasion. He came there an unhappy man in consequence of the great misgiving he had as to the probable operation of the Acts. The privilege of set-off allowed to a defendant as contemplated by the Act appeared to him to be fraught with danger and difficulty. After the learned gentleman had given several amusing illustrations, he concluded by expressing his belief that Mr. Charley's work on the Act was the one which could be most safely recommended to the Profession.

Mr. Whale (solicitor), was entirely opposed to the preservati on of the House of Lords as a final court of appeal, and dwelt upon the mysterious influence of the committee which controlled the Houses of Parliament when this grave question was under consideration. He concurred with Mr, Gregory in thinking that a successful party ought to have had costs between solicitor and client. The time had arrived too, when members of the Bar should be put on the same footing as solicitors in regard to contracting with clients, liability for negligence, (and a right to recover fees. When a brief was given to counsel no one ever thought of a honorarium, which was a complete delusion. He much regretted that the good intention of the Court of Exchequer had not been adhered to of having concurrent sittings in London and Middlesex, although it would have interfered with the monopoly of the leading members of the Bar, it ought to be insisted upon by the Government.

The chairman having invited visitors to address the meeting, and having no response, called on Mr. Charley to make some remarks in reply, which the hon. and learned gentleman proceeded to do, particularly in regard to practice. He apologised for the incompleteness of his paper, and explained that his work on the Judicature Act, also on the Land Act and Real Property Acts, and his Parliamentary labours had proved a great tax upon his time and attention. On behalf of the Legal Practitioners' Society, of which his friend on his right, Mr. Charles Ford, was honorary secretary, he had succeeded last session in securing an Act giving to solicitors a right to tax their costs) before the expiration of the statutory month under the Attorneys' Act, 1843. (Cheers.) He concluded by expressing the pleasure he felt in meeting the members of the United Law Students' Society.

The Honorary Secretary. Mr. J. S. Rubinstein, said he was sure before they separated they would approve a motion securing to Mr. Charley a hearty vote of thanks for his presence on the occasion. It was one of the most valuable papers which had been read to the Society. As to the Acts, he must candidly say that he felt the grestest doubt as to their working, and much depended upon the spirit in which the judges and the Profession entered upon their operation.

Mr. Charles Ford said he had been asked to second the resolution, which he did with unmixed pleasure. Athough now a visitor, he was formerly a member, and he hoped he might say an

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