was knocked down by a passing train. It appears that he had waited until one train had passed, and that the train which injured him was one which followed immediately upon the other, but from the opposite direction. Evidence was given to show that the plaintiff might have seen this train at the distance of half a mile; but the evidence was not conclusive. By the company's rules 174 and 175 it is ordered that unless a written order to the contrary be given by the engineer, the gates shall be kept shut across the carriage roads except when required to be opened to allow the railway to be crossed; and that when the railway is required to be crossed, the gatekeeper shall, before opening the gates, satisfy himself that no engine is in sight, he shall then show his danger signals, and keep them exhibited until the line is clear, when he shall close the gates and alter the signals. As far as can be gathered from the evidence, no signal was exhibited. The learned counsel for the railway company contended that by reason of the plaintiff's contributory negligence, there was no liability attaching to the company. The House of Lords thought otherwise, and by so doing upheld the judgment of the courts below. The fact to be noted in this case is, that the law had cast upon the appellants a certain duty, that was to keep closed the gates of the railway at level crossings at those times at which it would be dangerous to allow the public to cross the line. The Lord Chancellor remarked what is really self-evident, that the fact that the gates at this level crossing were open amounted to an intimation to the public that the line was clear.

The

The second case was one in which the Judges were of different opinions. The plaintiff's husband was a passenger in the last carriage of one of the company's trains from Broad-street to Highbury. On the London side of that station there is a tunnel, into which is continued a part of the platform, though narrower than the part within the station. The station was light, the tunnel was in darkness. When the train stopped, two of the carriages were within the tunnel, the last being opposite to a heap of rubbish which lay at the end of the narrow platform. The name of the station was called, some people got out, but a warning was given that passengers should keep their seats, and the train moved on. The deceased was heard to groan on the heap of rubbish after the stopping of the train and the invitation to alight. Mr. Justice Blackburn thought there was no evidence of negligence on the part of the defendants. No question of contributory negligence was raised. It may be worth while to examine some of the cases to which reference was made. It was held there was evidence of negligence, when there was an invitation to alight at a place which did not reasonably admit of safe alighting: (Foy v. Brighton Railway Co. (18 C. B., N. S., 225). In another case no invitation to alight was given, and the company were held not liable. One of the collateral questions in this case was the extent of the functions of the Judge in deciding whether there is, or is not, evidence for the jury. The remarks of Mr. Justice Brett upon this head form a clear and able exposition of the law: "The question of negligence," says his Lordship, "is one peculiarly within the province of a jury, and I apprehend that it is a question with the decision of which the Judge should not interfere, unless he is very certain that the question has been reduced to a mere definition of what is the defendants' legal duty in respect of the matters wherein negligence is alleged, upon a well ascertained and indisputable state of facts. The legal duty itself often depends upon the question-What would it be reasonable for a plaintiff or defendant to do under a complicated state of facts? And this also is a question not of law but of fact, and as such peculiarly within the province of the jury." The real question was whether Mr. Justice Blackburn was in error when he decided that there was no evidence of negligence to go to the jury. The House of Lords decided that there was such evidence. Lord Cairns, however, was careful to explain that he did not wish to ask their Lordships to lay down any positive rule of law as to the consequences of calling out the name of a station by the officers of the company. Clearly the invitation to alight will not always justify the step, but at the same time it is very reasonable to suppose that where the invitation occurs when the passengers are in a situation in which they cannot judge of the danger of acting upon it, the company should be responsible for any ill results that might follow.

Whilst we are upon this subject it may be well if something is said of the plea of contributory negligence of which so much is heard in actions of this kind. It was raised in the former of these cases, but without any good grounds. The law of contributory negligence as laid down in Lynch v. Nurdin (1 Q. B. 29), seems to be based upon principles of the strictest justice, although the case is itself a hard one. There the defendant left his horse and cart for a long time in the street. During his absence a number of boys who were at play got into the cart. One led the horse; whilst he was doing so another fell off the shafts and broke his leg. It was held that the defendant was liable, on the ground that the broken limb was the natural result of his misconduct in leaving the cart unattended, the boy, owing to his tender years, natural instinct for play, and want of reflection and forethought, not being legally responsible for the damage he had sustained, so as to be precluded from recover

ing compensation from the defendant. The principle which may be deduced from this and similar cases seems to be that where the immediate cause of the damage is the plaintiff's own carelessness or unskilfulness, no action lies, provided plaintiff's negligence be such as he is legally responsible for: (See Flower v. Adam, 2 Taunt. 314.) There are again other classes of cases of one of which classes Davis v. Mann (7 Q.B. 376) is a good example. The result of these cases is that the plea of contributory negligence is good only when the defendants could not, by ordinary skill and care, avoid the injury, or when, according to the other class of cases of which Swan v. The North Brit. Austr. Company (31 L. J. 437, Ex.; 32 Ib. 273, Ex. Ch.), the damage is a probable consequence of the contributory negligence. In the face of the fact that the court of appeal construed the opening of the gates in the case The North Eastern Railway Company v. Wanless, to be an intimation that the line was clear, it cannot be contended that a plea of contributory negligence should prevail. The value of the contention may be inferred from the fact that counsel were not called upon to address the court for Wanless. The questions upon which we have touched in this article would bear a far more exhaustive treatment than they have received at our hands, but we trust enough has been done to point out at least some aspects which the law of negligence may assume in questions arising between railway companies and passengers. At a future time we may again return to the subject, for, as we have already said, it is one quite broad enough to bear a long examination.

EFFECT OF FRAUD IN THE PERFORMANCE OF A CONTRACT.

WE are glad that the principles advocated by us in our review which appeared in the LAW TIMES of the 27th March, of the judgment of Vice-Chancellor Malins in the Panama and South Pacific Telegraph Company v. The India Rubber and Gutta Percha Works Telegraph Company, have received the approval of the Lords Justices. This took place the 27th April. The public cannot, under the present regime, accuse the Appeal Court in Chancery of delay. In the days of Lord Eldon the Chancellor might have doubted, have expressed his uneasiness, and then doubted as to his doubts. Now legal proceedings there are decided promptly. No longer, to use the words of Pope, "They like a wounded snake drag their slow length along." In the court below the effect of fraud in the execution of a contract, as giving a remedy at law or in equity, and the exact nature of the remedy was not clearly argued. The Vice-Chancellor himself, though arriving at the same conclusion as the Lords Justices, did not so distinctly or so tersely explain the positions of the parties as was done in the judgments delivered in the appeal. The legal effect of fraud at such a juncture is most clearly traced out by Lord Justice Mellisb.

Lord Justice James said, "As far as I am concerned the long and elaborate argument has been thrown away. From the moment I understood the mode of entering into the contract and sub-contract, I have been of opinion the plaintiffs are entitled to the relief they pray for. A knowledge of thirty years makes it a clear proposition to me that a surreptitious dealing by an agent enables the principals to have the contract rescinded, or to obtain such other relief as the court may give. It is said there is no authority or dictum in its favour. If a carrier's servant and veturino conspire to rob, if cogged dice or marked cards are used, no authority or dictum is necessary to show the illegality. Fraud gives the right at once to sever the connection; common sense, common justice, common honesty require that if the party comes in time he may demand relief. Lord Eldon's general principle must in all cases prevail, it being impossible in every case to ascertain the real truth. But I cannot content myself with this. When I put together the two contracts, the original and the sub-contract, I see that the money coming to Sir C. Bright under one contract is to be paid exactly when the instalments under the other contract become due; such conduct is worthy of the strongest disapprobation. I never could consent to reverse the judgment of the Vice-Chancellor."

The rule of Lord Eldon, which was cited by Lord Justice James, is to be found in Ex parte Bennett (10 Ves. 385). In that case it was held that neither the solicitor to a commission of bankruptcy, nor the commissioner, could purchase under it for himself or another. "The ground," said the Chancellor, "is that though in the particular case there may be the most satisfactory evidence that the transaction amounts to no more than that a person is employed to get it for as little as he can, the general interests of justice require that the solicitor is not to be permitted to buy for himself or for another; as in several cases the power of the court would not be equal to protect it against deception from the impossibility of knowing the truth in every case. That, in truth, is the principle on which courts of equity have held that trustees shall not buy. I mention it, as Lord Rosslyn said, more than once, that to affect the sale the trustee must make an advantage. That is not my opinion. The principle is deeper-viz., that if a trustee can buy in an honest case, he may in a case having that

appearance, but which, from the infirmity of human testimony, may be grossly otherwise; and I cannot otherwise account for the case where the trustee who applied for a renewal of a lease for an infant, which the lessor refused to grant if the infant was to have any interest, nevertheless did renew, and the court said he should throw back the lease to the lessor, for in no case should he purchase for his own benefit. The reason is that it would not be safe, with reference to the administration of justice in the general affairs of trust, that a trustee should be permitted to purchase, for human infirmity will in very few instances permit a man to exert against himself, that providence which a vendor ought to exert in order to sell to the best advantage, and which a purchaser is at liberty to exert for himself in order to purchase at the lowest price. As to undue use of information no court of justice could institute investigation to that point effectually in all cases, and, therefore, the safest rule is that a transaction which, under circumstances, should not be permitted, shall not take effect upon the general principle; as, if ever permitted, the inquiry into the truth of the circumstances may fail in a great proportion of cases."

Defen

Lord Justice Mellish said "The decrees of the Vice-Chancellor must be affirmed. The plaintiffs make out their case. dants had notice of the expectation of Sir Charles Bright that he would lay the cable. This reasonable expectation made it impossible that he should be the proper party to advise the plaintiffs. It is most difficult to imagine any position more confidential than that of an engineer to a telegraph company. They entirely depend upon him. With Lord Justice James, I cannot help expressing my astonishment that the defendants should say that there had been no breach of a moral obligation, but of a mere technical rule of the court. Had, then, Sir C. Bright a reasonable expectation that he might lay the cable? There were three companies with intimate relations." His Lordship then took the case of the West India Cable first and continued. "On 4th Feb. one contract came into execution, on. 8th Feb the other was entered into. He must have had the expectation in his mind. A charge of fraud must indeed be proved. But we must draw reasonable inferences from conduct. But the evidence does not rest with the dates. The depositions of Mr. Brandt and Mr. Mackenzie as to the arrangement of the times for laying the cable is not to be doubted. The advantage is obvious. What evidence is there on the other side? That of four directors of the defendant company. They ought, as reasonable men, to have assumed that Sir C. Bright would expect, and they ought to have required, notice to be given. Similarly, the directors ought to have assumed he would have applied to have the laying of the Pacific cable, and on this ground also the plaintiffs are entitled toa decree. I do not go quite so far as my learned brother, but the question is Can the plaintiffs receive relief short of that decreed by the Vice-Chancellor? At law would it be a defence that the acts of the defendants had rendered the performance of the contract with the plaintiff impossible? It would, such is the legal principle in Moens v. Heyworth (10 M. & W. 147), affirmed by Baron Parke, afterwards Lord Wensleydale, and by Baron Alderson. Even the impossibility of performance in a particular manner is at law sometimes a defence. But whether it is or not, if fraudulent conduct makes it impossible for the plaintiffs to have the full benefit, they may rescind. The contract is broken. It has been broken by the plaintiffs. It is at an end. Ought the defendants to keep the £40,000, and to be able to sue at law for damages for the non-completion? If plaintiffs had discovered the circumstances shortly after the sub-contract could they then have rescinded? I am of opinion they could. Sir C. Bright is to be engineer during life, but the sub-contract deprives them of his service, and on that ground, if they had found it out, they could have rescinded. The lapse of a year and a half in making the discovery does not better the case of the defendants. It makes it worse. The whole of that time the plaintiffs had an engineer who was not fit to advise them. It would be in the highest degree wrong to allow the defendants to retain the £40,000. Through whose fault was the contract broken off? Through that of Sir C. Bright. The plaintiffs are therefore entitled to a declaration against the action at law."

Moens v. Heyworth was the case in which Sir Henry Wotton's advice to a young diplomatist was cited by Baron Alderson to illustrate the rule of law as to representations. "I consider," he said, "that if a person makes a representation or takes an oath of that which is true, if he intend the party to whom the representation is made should not believe it to be true, that is a false representation; and so he who takes an oath in one sense knowing it to be administered to him in another, takes it falsely. This may be illustrated by the anecdotes of a very eminent ambassador, Sir Henry Wotton, who, when he was asked what advice he would give to a young diplomatist going to a foreign court, said, 'I have found it best always to tell the truth, as they will never believe anything an ambassador says, so you are sure to take them in.' Now Sir Henry Wotton meant that he should tell a lie. This, no doubt, was only used as a witticism, but it illustrates my meaning." The marginal note is as follows:-"A collateral statement made at the time of entering into a contract, but not embodied in it, must, in order to invalidate the contract on the ground of it being a fraudulent statement, be shown not only to have been false, but

have been known to be so by the party making it, and that the party was thereby induced to enter into the contract:" (10 M. & W. 147.)

A SOLICITOR'S CHARGE UNDER 23 & 24 VICT. c. 127, s. 28.

BIRCHALL v. PUGIN.

THE Legal Practitioners' Society has done much to purify the administration of justice by excluding unauthorised interlopers from acting as agents in the Courts, or as draftsmen of documents which ought to be drawn by persons whose professional skill has been tested by public examinations. Not only ought the country to be protected-ample remuneration ought to be secured to those who have spent many years in acquiring their status as legal practitioners, and whose outlay of money in education, stamps, and otherwise necessary to enable them to practise has been considerable. Parliament has for some time past admitted the justice of the plea that the labourer is worthy of his hire, and 23 & 24 Vict., c. 127, contains many beneficial enactments having this object. Section 28 has recently been the subject of judicial decision. We, therefore, propose to lay before our readers the most important of the cases of which the simple words employed here have been the groundwork. The wording is as follows: "In every case in which an attorney or solicitor shall be employed to prosecute or defend any suit, matter, or proceeding in any court of justice, it shall be lawful for the Court or Judge before whom any such suit, matter, or proceeding has been heard or shall be depending, to declare such attorney or solicitor entitled to a charge upon the property recovered or preserved, and upon such declaration being made such attorney or solicitor shall have a charge upon and against, and a right to payment out of the property of whatsoever nature, tenure, or kind the same may be, which shall have been recovered or preserved through the instrumentality of any such attorney or solicitor for the taxed costs, charges, and expenses of or in reference to such suit, matter, or proceeding; and it shall be lawful for such court or judge to make such order or orders for taxation of and for raising and payment of such costs, charges, and expenses out of the said property as to such Court or Judge shall appear just and proper, and all conveyances and acts done to defeat, or which shall operate to defeat such charge or right, shall, unless made to a bona fide purchaser for value without notice, be absolutely void, and of no effect as against such charge or right: provided always that no such order shall be made by any such Court or Judge in any case in which the right to recover payment of such costs, charges, and expenses, is barred by any statute of limi

tation.

In Bonser v. Bradshaw (7 Jur. N. S. 261), a suit was instituted by a next friend on behalf of an infant plaintiff, to recover real estate and a fund in court. The costs were directed to be paid by the defendant, but in consequence of his insolvency they could not be recovered from him. The Court, on petition for that purpose, directed that the fund in court should be applied in payment of the costs, pro tanto, the proceedings taken by the next friend being for the benefit of the infant, but refused to make an order declaring that the residue of the costs were under the 28th section of the 23 & 24 Vict. c. 127, a charge on the real estate recovered, as that Act only applied to suits instituted by persons who were sui juris. Still Vice-Chancellor Stuart "had no doubt that the lien remained, and when the infant attained twenty-one years of age, which he would do in the course of two or three years, he should be glad if the solicitor obtained payment of the residue of the costs either from the plaintiff or out of the estate." (3 L. T. Rep. N. S. 545).

66

The rights of the solicitor of a next friend of an infant were again discussed in Baile v. Baile (26 L. T. Rep. N.S. 283; L. Rep. 13 Eq. Ca. 497). In his judgment Vice-Chancellor Wickens said: The enactment under which this petition is presented applies only to solicitors employed to conduct suits, matters, or proceedings. The word 'employed' must have all reasonable weight given to it; but to say that it does not apply to a solicitor employed in good faith by a next friend on behalf of an infant, who, when he comes of age, adopts the proceedings, seems to me a narrow construction of it. It seems to me reasonable to hold that though an infant's estate is subject to no lien in respect of proceedings which he repudiates when he comes of age, his position, if he then adopts the proceedings, is in this, as in other respects, the same as if he had been an adult and originated the proceedings himself. This is strictly in accordance with what was done in Bonser v. Bradshaw, and affords, in fact, the only ground on which all that was done in that case can be supported." In this case the Vice-Chancellor also held-(1) That applying for leave to eject the receiver was an adoption of the proceedings. (2) That the Statute of Limitations did not run while the solicitor's name was on the record as the plaintiff's solicitor, and the receiver in possession. (3) That the right extends to the personal representatives of the solicitor. (4) That a voluntary conveyance before the charge does not defeat it. In Tardrew v. Howell and Parry v. Howell (26 L. T. Rep. N. S. 283; 7 Jur. 1120), Edward Lett, the petitioner, was as town agent mployed by a country solicitor in certain suits, in one of which the

country solicitor was himself the plaintiff. An unascertained balance for costs, which were the subject of taxation by a master of the Court of Common Pleas, was due to E. Lett, who had ceased to act as such town agent. The Court was of opinion that the 23 & 24 Vict. c. 127 applied to this case, and made a declaration that E. Lett was as town agent entitled to a charge for what should remain due to him from such country solicitor in respect of the costs in the suits in which he was employed, upon all sums of money and other property recovered or preserved in the suits, so far as such sums, &c., were chargeable to the country solicitor for his costs in respect of any order either made or to be made in the suits.

In Bailey v. Birchall Vice-Chancellor Wood held that a solicitor is entitled, under 23 & 24 Vict. c. 127, to a charge upon property recovered or preserved for the costs of the litigation, by which it is recovered or preserved irrespective of the client's interest in the property, and although it turns out that the latter has not, and never had, any interest therein : (2 H. & M. 371.) He illustrated the principles of his ruling by referring to the case of a simple contract creditor who, independently of any statute, if he institutes a suit for the administration of his creditor's estate is entitled to his costs in consequence of having taken steps to recover the property, although in the result no part of the assets is applicable to the satisfaction of his claim and that of other creditors in the same degree. How far the intended application of the illustration is sound law is open to question : (See Pinkerton v. Easton, 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 364; L. Rep. 16 Eq. 490).

The facts in Scholefield v. Lockwood (L. Rep. 7 Eq. 83) are as follows: S. and D. were respectively entititled to one-third and two-thirds of a moiety of certain real estates subject to mortgages thereon. S. was also entitled to a charge on the other moiety in respect of certain judgment debts due to him. S. filed a bill of redemption and foreclosure, to which D. was defendant. A decree was made whereby it was declared that certain sums ought to be charged upon the moiety of S. and D. Upon an appeal by D. the decree was varied in his favour, and he was also successful in resisting claims of S. in working out the decree. Before the general certificate in the suit was made D. became a bankrupt, and his solicitors presented a petition praying for a declaration that they were entitled to a charge on his estate and interest, for the amount of their costs, and for a sale of such estate and interest, and application of the proceeds of sale in payment of the costs. Lord Romilly said, "I have looked at this petition very carefully, and I think it comes within the Act. The words of the Act are recovered or preserved.' This interest is clearly not 'recovered,' but I think it may fairly be said to be 'preserved.' I think the Act is intended to be construed liberally, and solicitors ought not to be deprived of their lien in these matters where there has been a good deal of work done."

In Twynam v. Porter (21 L. T. Rep. N. S. 35; L. Rep. 11 Eq. 181) a suit was brought by a cestui que trust against a trustee of landed estates praying for an account and reconveyance. A receiver was ordered to be, and afterwards was, appointed, adversely to the defendant. Notice of motion for decree was served, but, before the time for closing evidence had arrived, the plaintiff, without consulting her solicitor, and without his knowledge, entered into an agreement with the defendant for a compromise of the suit on the terms, first, that a sum of cash should be paid to the plaintiff, then that the mortgages on the property should be paid off, and then that the costs of all parties, estimated at a fixed sum, should be paid. In his judgment Vice-Chancellor Bacon said: "I think, by the appointment of a receiver in this suit, the object of which was to recover possession of the estate which had been intrusted to Porter, that property was effectually preserved, and it came within the provisions of the Act. If that be so, it cannot signify in the slightest degree what the terms of the compromise were. Whether they were binding on the parties is wholly unimportant, because the right of the petitioners to have out of the property protected and preserved payment of the costs which have been incurred for the benefit of the plaintiff is a claim paramount to any title which can be asserted under the compromise, whatever it may be."

The Lords Justices in Jones v. Frost confirmed the doctrine of Twynam v. Porter, as to the effect of a compromise between the parties. They also held that a solicitor is entitled to a charge for his costs on property the subject of a successful suit conducted by him against an incumbrancer, although the incumbrance be entirely valueless, provided it formed a cloud upon the title.

They also held that there was no difference between the position of the plaintiffs and a purchaser. The purchaser knew that there was a pending suit, and that costs must have been incurred in it, and he ought to have inquired whether the solicitor had been paid; at all events, the purchaser ought not to stand in the way of the solicitor's right to a charge (L. Rep. 7 Ch. App. 773).

ln Foxon v. Gascoigne (31 L. T. Rep. N. S. 289; L. Rep. 9 Ch. App. 654) a bill was filed alleging that the defendant had built so as to obstruct the plaintiff's ancient lights, and was building so as further to obstruct them, and asking for an injunction against further building and a mandatory injunction to pull down part of what had been built. An interlocutory injunction was granted against building higher, and the suit was afterwards compromised on the terms that the building should remain of its former height. The defendant having become bankrupt, his solicitor petitioned to have his costs made a charge on the defendant's property to which the suit related. The Lords Justices held that no property had been recovered or preserved within the meaning of 23 & 24 Vict. c. 127, s. 28.

Lord Justice James merely stated that he was of the same opinion as Lord Justice Mellish. Lord Justice Mellish said: "The suit was one relating solely to an easement. Now first let us suppose that the plaintiffs entirely succeed in such a suit, that they sustain their right to the lights, and obtain an injunction preventing the defendant from obstructing them, could the plaintiffs' solicitor say that any property was recovered so as to entitle him to a charge upon it. Would it be possible to say that the house was recovered, or that the house was preserved ? It seems to me that it would be impossible to say so. The title of the plaintiffs to the property in these houses is not in question at all. All that can by any possibility be said to be recovered or preserved, whichever word you choose to employ, is the right to the lights. How is it possible to make a charge upon a right to the lights? A charge can only be made upon the property itself, which is recovered or preserved, and it cannot be made if the suit relates only to some incident of the property." Still, an incorporeal right is property.

In Pinkerton v. Easton (ubi sup.), a residuary legatee brought a suit against the sole surviving trustee of a testator's estate. An administration decree was made, and it was ordered that a new trustee be appointed. After the decree had been carried into chambers, and the amounts brought in, the plaintiff stopped all further proceedings. His solicitor sought to make his costs a charge on the plaintiff's interest in the estate. Lord Chancellor Selborne, sitting for the Master of the Rolls, thus delivered his judgment: "It has long been settled that the language of modern Acts of Parliament cannot be extended beyond its proper and natural meaning in order to meet particular cases. Here the Legislature has given not a charge, but a power to the court to create a charge for a solicitor's costs upon property recovered or preserved' when meritorious services of the solicitor have resulted in such recovery or preservation. This has, undoubtedly, received a liberal interpretation, and has been held to apply even to property not belonging to the client by whom the solicitor has been employed. It has also been applied to a case in which property was deemed to have been preserved by the appointment of a receiver upon an interlocutory motion before decree. The real question in such cases must be whether proof has been given to the satisfaction of the court, of the actual recovery or preservation of property, by means of the suit, which is always a question of fact. Here no proof whatever is offered of the recovery or preservation of any property except the mere fact that a decree of the most common kind in the most common of suits, for the administration of an estate, and the appointment of a new trustee was made, but not prosecuted beyond bringing in certain accounts as to which nothing special is alleged. I am of opinion that no property is shown to have been recovered or preserved, and I dismiss the petition."

The latest case on the section has not yet been reported, viz., that of Birchall v. Pugin; Molloy (garnishee). Birchall attached in execution a judgment due from Molloy to Pugin. Button, the defendant's attorney in the proceedings against Molloy, had obtained a summons for a charging order. Birchall's application had been ex parte under the Common Law Procedure Act 1854. Mr. Justice Brett said that a debt was property within the 23 & 24 Vict. c. 127, s. 28, and that Button was entitled to priority. This decision was upheld by the Court (April 28) who refused a rule.

has been paid by Mr. Coates.-I am, Gentlemen, your obedient servant,

W. H. MELVILL, Solicitor of Inland Revenue. Messrs. Fry and Clarke, Hon. Secretaries, Bristol Incorporated Law Society.

HEIRS-AT-LAW AND NEXT OF KIN. ANDREWS (Samuel), Wilton, Chester, tailor, next-of-kin, to come in by June 11, at the chambers of the M. R., June 24, at the said chambers at twelve o'clock, is the time appointed for hearing and adjudicating upon such claims.

CHAMBERS (Collins), Maryport, Cumberland, surgeon, nextof-kin, to come in by June 3, at the chambers of V.C. M., June 11, at the said chambers at twelve o'clock, is the time appointed for hearing and adjudicating upon such claims.

APPOINTMENTS UNDER THE JOINT-STOCK WINDING-UP ACTS.

in by June 11 their names and addresses, and the particu lars of their claims, and the names and addresses of their solicitors (if any) to Baker P. Daniels, 7, Poultry, London, the official liquida or of the said Company. June 25, at the chambers of the M. R. at eleven o'clock is the time appointed for hearing and adjudicating upon such claims. COMMON ROAD CONVEYANCE COMPANY, LIMITED.-Creditors to send in by June 2 their names and addresses, and the particulars of their cla ms, and the names and addresses of their solicitors (if any), to Charles G. Nichols, 1, Gresham-buildings, Basinghall-street, London, the official liquidator of the said company. June 16, at the chambers of V.C. H., at twelve o'clock, is the time appointed for hearing and adjudicating upon such claims. GENERAL SOUTH AMERICAN COMPANY, LIMITED.-Creditors to send in by Sept. 30 their names and addresses, and the particular of their claims, and the names and addresses of their solicitors (if any), to George A. Cape and J. A. Schwank, 8, Old Jewry, London, the liquidators of the said company. Nov. 1, at the chambers of V.C. M., at twelve o'clock, is the time appointed for hearing and adjudicating upon such claims.

We are really getting tired of giving publicity to communications from solicitors, complaining of the action and proceedings of " our invaders." We have done our utmost during the last three years to expose this evil, which is, we admit, of a serious character; nay, more, we have done all we possibly can to favour the formation of a society BREAM IRON MINING COMPANY (LIMITED). Creditors to send (the Legal Practitioners' Society), one of the objects of which is to protect the Profession against the encroachments of unauthorised persons. We appeal to solicitors to say if we can be expected to do more? Are we to assume the functions of prosecutors? Decidedly not; and yet we continue daily to receive complaints about our invaders," as though solicitors have done all they are called upon to do in the interests of their Profession, and for the protection of the public, if they ventilate their grievances through the medium of our columns. The subscription to the Legal Practitioners' Society is only nominal. We cannot see, therefore, how this society can be expected to undertake prosecutions; and it is perfectly evident that, as a rule, solicitors will not do so themselves. It really seems to us, therefore, that the best thing to do is to give to this new society more general, and, above all, more substantial, support in a pecuniary sense, even if such support is only of a temporary character, and we should be glad to hear that the council of the Incorporated Law Society and the Inns of Court encouraged this new society in its efforts to uphold the rights of the Profession. Elsewhere we deal with a case which clearly shows the absolute necessity for protecting the public against unauthorised persons acting as solicitors, who have no professional reputation to lose, and who are not answerable, as solicitors are, for their professional conduct and morality. We feel this I Try strongly; on the one hand, if the Profession is to exist intact by reason of the requirements of society, it must be protected on every side; on the other hand, if the legal Profession is not a necessity in the interests of the public and society, the sooner it ceases to have any existence the better. For the present, the legal profession should combine and with a strong hand unite to arrest an evil, noticing and dealing with, which in our columns has almost exhausted our patience.

NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS. PRACTICE-EVIDENCE-PROOF OF DOCUMENTS AT THE HEARING-ELECTION BY CONDUCT.-The court has a discretion whether it will allow documents to be proved at the hearing under an order of course. It will allow proof at the hearing for the purpose of curing an accidental slip or a purely technical defect, but will not allow a document affecting a material issue to be so proved. To establish a case of election by conduct it must be proved that the person alleged to have elected did so with full knowledge of his rights, and with the intention to elect. Decision of Malins, V.C., affirmed: (Wilson v. Thornbury, 32 L. T. Rep. N.S. 350. Chan.) LUNACY PRACTICE PROCEEDINGS TO IMPEACH SETTLEMENT BY LUNATIC.-A father executed a voluntary settlement of the bulk of his property in trust for himself for life, with remainder to four of his five children, and about two years after executing the settlement he was found lunatic. The fifth child, who took no interest under the settlement, desired to have it impeached on the ground that his father was of unsound mind when he executed it, and he adduced evidence in support of that view. The court declined to give any directions for trying the validity of the settlement at the expense of the lunatic's estate, but gave liberty to the excluded child to file a bill to set it aside at his own risk as the lunatic's next friend, and did not require him to give security for costs: (Re Gordon, 32 L. T. Rep. N. S. 348. Chan.)

UNCLAIMED STOCK AND DIVIDENDS IN THE BANK OF ENGLAND. [Transferred to the Commissioners for the Reduction of the National Debt, and which will be paid to the persons respectively whose names are prefixed to each in three months, unless other claimants sooner appear.] COHEN (Elizabeth), Christopher-street, Finsbury, widow; DEFRIES (Nathan), deceased, Fitzroy-square, Esq.; and LEVY (Alexander), Finsbury-square, Esq. Two dividends on the sum of £3000 Three per Cent. Annuities. Claimant, Baid Elizabeth Cohen, widow. MELLISH (Jas.). Edenbridge, Kent, miller. Two dividends on the sum of £700 Three per Cent. Annuities. Claimant, said James Mellish.

MORANT (John), Brockenhurst-house, Southampton, Esq.
EX 68. 8d. Three per Cent. Annuities. Claimant, said
John Morant.

SHARPE (John). Waltham-cross, Hertfordshire, surgeon.
£200 Reduced Three per Cent Annuities. Claimant, said
John Sharpe.
TEMPEST (John), Winyard, Durham, Esq. £75 Three per
Cent, Annuities. Claimants, the Official Trustees of
Charitable Funds, pursuant to an order of the Charity
Commissioners, dated 2nd Feb., 1875.

PEAT, COAL, AND CHARCOAL COMPANY (LIMITED). Petition for winding-up to be heard May 28, before V.C. M. SNOWDON SLATE QUARRIES COMPANY, LIMITED.-Creditors to send in by June 5 their names and addresses, and the particulars of their claims, and the names and addresses of their solicitors (if any), to B. Balfour, 11, Rood-lane, London, the liquidator of the said company. June 12, at the chambers of V.C. H., at twelve o'clock, is the time appointed for hearing and adjudicating upon such claims.

CREDITORS UNDER ESTATES IN CHANCERY

LAST DAY OF PROOF.

ATKIN (Wm.), 3, King's Bench-walk, Temple, London and

Primrose Hill, Little Hulton, Lancaster, barrister-at-law. May 21; J. N. K. Grover, solicitor, Manchester. May 28; V. Č. M., at twelve o'clock. CANNON (Wm.), Epsom, Surrey, and 9, Water-lane, Towerstreet, London, ship and insurance broker. June 1; Richard Plews, solicitor, 31, Mark-lane, London. June 10; V. C. H. at twelve o'clock. CAVALIER (Henry Wm.), Pendennis Castle Tavern, Lambstreet, Spitalfields, Middlesex, licensed victualler. June 10; Jos. Wm. Harling, solicitor, 93, Fleet-street, London. July 19; V. C. H. at twelve o'clock. Cox Chas. M.), Ivy House, Hanley, Stafford, coal proprietor. June 16; Llewellyn and Ackrill, solicitors, TunDANIEL (Thos.), Stoodleigh, Devon, merchant. stall, Stafford. July 8; V.C. H., at twelve o'clock. June 14; Osborne, Ward, Vassall, and Co., solicitors, Bristol. June 30; V.C. H., at ten o'clock. ELMORE (John R., M.D., 27, Harley-street, Cavendishsquare, Middlesex. June 10; Jos. Aldridge, solicitor, 27, Montague-place, Russell-square, Middlesex. June 18; M.R., at twelve o'clock.

FAWCETT (Jas.), Scaleby Castle, Cumberland. June 10; Richard H. Clutterbuck, solicitor, Carlisle. June 21; V.C. M., at twelve o'clock.

HARDING (Wm.), Swansea, Glamorgan, hay and corn merchant. May 31; Chas. H. Glascodine, solicitor, 4, Fisherstreet, Swansea. June 8; V.C. M., at twelve o'clock. HOPWOOD (Wm. H.), 42, New Bond-street, Middlesex, and Sunny Side, Henley, Surrey, music publisher. June 3; Burgoynes and Co., solicitors, 160, Oxford-street, London. June 15; V.C. H., at twelve o'clock. MARCHANT (Ambrose), 77, Gravel-lane, Southwark, Surrey. June 12; J. R. Mayo, solicitor, 16. Devonshire-square, Bishopsgate, London. June 26; M. R., at eleven o'clock. McDONALD (Courtenay E.), 9, Union-court, Old Broadstreet, London, and 6, Culworth-street, St. John's Wood, Middlesex, mineral agent. June 12; E. Kimber, solicitor, 22, Queen-street, Cheapside, London. June 21; V. C. M. PUGH (Edwd.), 195, Clapham-road, Surrey, Esq. June 4; at twelve o'clock. C. G. Scott, solicitor, 4, College-hill, Cannon-street, London. June 19; M.R., at eleven o'clock.

TANNER (Wm.), Patcham, Sussex, Esq. June 14; C. Dorman, solicitor, 23, Essex-street, Strand, London. 28; V.C. H., at twelve o'clock.

June

June

TORRENS (Robert), The Grove, Corsham, Wilts, Esq. 10; Dimond and Son, solicitors, 10, Henrietta-street, Cavendish-square, London. June 19; V.C. H., at twelve

o'clock.

WATER (John R. M.), Bangor, Issacoed, Flint. June 14; Henry Humphreys, solicitor, Wrexham. June 21; V.C.H., at twelve o'clock,

CREDITORS UNDER 22 & 23 VICT. c. 35. Last Day of Claim, and to whom Particulars to be sent. ATKINS (Wm. C.), Grove-cottage, Merton, Surrey, gentle. man. June 19; Geo. Presswell, solicitor, 8, Old Jewry,

London.

BELL (Richard), Southampton, gentleman. June 14; Hickman and Son, solicitors, 7, Albion-place, Southampton. BENTINCK (Lady Chas. C.). June 30; Farrer, Ouvry, and Co., solicitors, 66, Lincoln's-inn-fields, London. BILSON (David), Newark-upon-Trent, Notts, merchant. June 1; Percy and Co., solicitors, Wheeler-gate, Nottingham.

BIRCH (Lieut.-Gen. Sir Richard J. H.), K.C.B., formerly of South-street, Thurloe - square, Brompton, Middlesex, late of Venice, Italy. July 31; G. W. Crosse, solicitor, 7, Lancaster-place, Strand, London. BLEGBOROUGH (Jane), 46, Brunswick-square, Hove, Sussex, widow. June 21; Clarke and Howlett, solicitors, 8, Shipstreet, Brighton."

BRADBROOK (Geo. G.), formerly of 108, Park-street, Camden Town, Middlesex, plumber and house decorator, late of Myland Villa, near Colchester, Essex, gentleman. July 1; R. G. Marsden, solicitor, 20, Old Cavendish-street, Cavendish-square, London.

BRADLEY (Chas. J.), 17, Kensington-place, Bath, a majorgeneral in the army. Aug. 2; Maule and Co., solicitors, 7, Northumberland-buildings, Bath.

CHAPMAN (Rev. Edwin), Hyde Lodge, Durham Down, Bristol. July 1; H. Sowton, solicitor, 13, Bedford-row. London.

CHILLINGWORTH (Wm.), Cuddesdon, Oxford, farmer. July 3; T. and G. Mallam, solicitors, High-street, Oxford. COOKE (Rev. Jas. G.), Semer, Suffolk, clerk. July 6; Josselyn and Sons, solicitors, 10, Queen-street, Ipswich. DES VEUX (Lady Sophia K.), Berkeley-square, Middlesex, and of Drakelowe Hall, Derby, widow. June 20; Garrard, James, and Wolfe, solicitors, 13, Suffolk-street, Pall Malí East, London.

DEVONSHIRE (John), Northampton, rent collector. Aug.1; Wm. Dennis, solicitor, Northampton.

EDE (Chas. Wm.), 16, George-street, Mansion House, London, and 37, Granville Park, Blackheath, Kent, merchant. June 10; W. H. Bosanquet, solicitor, 22, Austin Friars, London. ETHERINGTON (Wm.), formerly of the Legacy Duty Department of the Inland Revenue, and late of 2, Edmund-street (previously of 8, Victoria-terrace), New Church-road, Camberwell, Surrey, gentleman. June 7; G. J. Ottaway, solicitor, 39, Essex-street, Strand, Middlesex. FIELD (Honoria), Binfield, Berks, spinster. June 18; Sidney Smith and Son, solicitors, 1, Furnival's-inn, London. FLETCHER (John C.), Dale-park, Sussex, and 88, Eatonplace, Middlesex, Esq. June 30; Gregory and Co., solicitors, 1, Bedford-row, London. FORD (Juliana M.), The Vicarage, Pagham, Sussex, widow. June 1; H. Tyrrell, solicitor, 14, Gray's-inn-square, London.

GARBURGH (Geo. J.), Heslington Hall, York, Esq. July 6; W. and E. Gray, solicitors, York.

GARNETT (Frances M.), 32, Lansdowne-place, Hove, Sussex, spinster. June 21; Clarke and Howlett, solicitors, 8, Shipstreet, Brighton.

GARNETT (Harriett), 32, Lansdowne-place, Hove, Sussex, spinster. June 21; Clarke and Howlett, solicitors, 8, Shipstreet, Brighton.

GILES (Edward), 19 (formerly 10), Park-walk, Chelsea, Middlesex. June 3; T. H. Rogers, 16, Peterborough-road, Fulham, Middlesex.

GILES (Edwd.), late of 19 (formerly 10), Park-walk, St. Luke, Chelsea, Middlesex. June 3; Thos. H. Rogers, 16, Peterborough-road, Fulham, Middlesex.

GLOCK (Christian P.), 5, Broadway, Deptford, Kent, pork butcher. July 5; John G. Glock, 3, Shardeloes-road, Amersham Park, Deptford, or to T. J. Coward, solicitor, 21, Moorgate-street, London.

GOWER (Lord Albert Leveson), late of 28, Dover-street, Piccadilly, Middlesex, formerly of H. M.'s 2nd Regt. of Life Guards. June 24; Wing and Du Cane, solicitors, 1, Gray's-inn-square, London.

HALL (John V.), formerly of 79, Tower-buildings, Liverpool, afterwards of Lyncroft House, near Lichfield, Stafford, late of Elderslie-villa, Holly-walk, Leamington, merchant. July 31; Smith and Mammatt, solicitors,

Ashby-de-la-Zouch.

HANDS (Benjamin), formerly of Hornsey, Middlesex, surgeon, late of Kirkdale Lodge, Sydenham, Kent, gentleman. June 12; Charles E. Strong, solicitor, 44, Jewinstreet, Cripplegate, London.

HOPKINS (Elizabeth), The Firs, Oldswinford, Worcester, spinster. June 11; Bernard and King, solicitors, Stourbridge, or to Gregory and Co., solicitors, 1, Bedford-row, London. HOPWOOD (Henry J. S.), Richmond, Surrey, chemist and druggist. June 24; Smith and Moore, solicitors, Richmond, Surrey. HUSTWITT (Wm. Thos.), 28A, Lonsdale-square, Islington, Middlesex, and the Stock Exchange, London. July 6; Hume and Co., solicitors, 10, Great James-street, Bedford-row, London.

JAMES (Lieut.-Gen. Haughton), formerly of Bedford, late of Brighton. June 30; Leverton Jessopp, solicitor, Bedford. JORDAN (Frederick W.), late of 59 and 61, Newingtoncauseway, and 3, Stanley-villas, Water-lane, Brixton, Surrey, tailor. June 30; Reed and Lovell, solicitors, 1, Guildhall-chambers, London. LACY (Susannah), Withdeane Hall, Sussex, widow. June 24; B. W. V. Powys, solicitors, 1, Lincoln's-inn-fields, London. LANE (John), formerly of 42, Montpellier-square, Brompton, Middlesex, afterwards of the Manor House. Little Missenden, Buckingham, late of Gatcombe-park, Isle of Wight, Esq., barrister-at-law, J.P. for Bucks. July 15; Rivington and Son, solicitors, 1, Fenchurch-buildings, London.

LEIGH (John G.), Luton Hoo-park, Bedford, and 138, Piccadilly, Middlesex, Esq. June 30; Gregory and Co., solicitors, 1, Bedford-row. London.

MANDER (Henry), jun., King-street, Coventry, schoolmaster. July 1; Wm. J Iliffe, Smithford-street, Coventry. MORRIS (Henry Wm.), Kingston, Hereford, druggist. June 5; Bodenham and Temple, solicitors, Kingston. O'LEARY, usually known as FREDERICKS (Frederick), formerly of Leicester, late of Canning Town, Barking-road, Essex, travelling comedian. June 28; G. Bailey, solicitor, 5, Union-street, Luton, Beds.

ONG (Aaron), Hatfield, Peverel, Essex, innkeeper. June 30; Duffield and Bruty, solicitors, High-street, Chelmsford, Essex.

PAXTON (Archibald F.), West Cholderton, Wilts, and 5, Devonshire-place, Portland-place, Middlesex, Esq. July 1; Wm. H. Oliver, solicitor, 64, Lincoln's-inn-Fields, London.

PECK (Frederick), late of 35, Gordon-square, Middlesex, architect, and afterwards of Gosford, Suffolk. July 20; R. L. Mayhew, solicitor, Saxmundham, Suffolk. PERULLO (Madame Eliza), 10, Ashley-place, Westminster, Middlesex. June 14; George F. Rooper, solicitor, 55, Lincoln's-inn-fields, Middlesex.

ROBINSON (Walter A.), Rainhill, near Prescot, gentleman. June 22; H. W. Collins and Robinson, solicitors, 4, Brunswick-street, Liverpool.

RODGERS (Hannah), Kingston-upon-Hull, spinster. June 26; Stamp and Co., solicitors, Quay Chambers, Hull. ROSE (Jas.), formerly of Calcutta, and a member of the firm of Pennington and Co., of the same place, merchants, and agents, and late of 6, Spring-gardens, Middlesex, England, Esq. Sept. 13; Mrs. M. Rose, 16, Norlandsquare, Bayswater, Middlesex, England. SMITH (Robert S.), late of Wilmington-sq., and formerly of 2, St. Peter's-terrace, Islington, Middlesex, clerk in the General Post Office. June 24; Watkins and Co., solicitors, 11, Sackville-street, London. SULLY (Susannah), late of 5, Montpelier-crescent, Brighton, Sussex, and formerly of Midhurst House, Barclay-road, Fulham, Middlesex, widow. June 1; Kingsford and Dorman, solicitors, 23, Essex-street, Strand, Middlesex. STEWART (Rev. Edward), Sparsholt, Southampton. June 24; M. Turner, solicitor, 42, Jermyn-street, St. James's, London. STOREY (Mary A.) late of Clayton Green, Lancaster, and formerly of Elilaw, Northumberland, spinster. June 10; Chas. D. Forster, solicitor, Morpeth.

SWINDELL (Thos.), 118, Aldersgate-street, London, upholsterer. June 30; Reed and Lovell, solicitors, 1, Guildhallchambers, 31, Basinghall-street, London.

TAYLOR (Fanny), 31, Devonshire-street, Portland-place, Middlesex. June 11; Surman, Henley, and Co., solicitors, 35, Lincoln's Inn-fields, Middlesex. TESSIER (Edwd.), sen., heretofore of 32, South Audleystreet, of 26, New Bond-street, of Bleak House, Turnham-green; and of 33, Addison-road, Kensington, all in the county of Middlesex, and late of 3, The Terrace, Clapham, Surrey, gentleman. July 31; Taylor and Co., solicitors, 28, Great James-street, Bedford-row, London. TUCKER (Walter), Horfield-road, Bristol, gentleman. July 1; Bush and Ray, solicitors, 9, Bridge-street, Bristol. TUCKER (Henry), 30, Gresham-street, London, and Bourton House Berks, Esq, July 10; Hughes and Sons, solicitors, 12, Chapel-street, Bedford-row, London. WALROND (Theodore H. M.), formerly of 37, St, George'sroad, Eccleston-square, Middlesex, late of 1, Leamingtonterrace, Beckenham, Kent, a clerk in the War Office. June 30; J. Hopgood, solicitor, 17A, Whitehall-place, London.

WARTON (Robert), 33, Highbury-place, Islington, Middlesex, Esq. June 15; H. C. Nisbet and Co., solicitors, 35, Lincoln's-inn-fields, London.