International and for so special a distinction was, that as the municipal Municipal Law. law of that period interdicted only the rendering of aid to recognised states, it was no violation of the law, technically speaking, to give assistance to insurgents. Confederate States within of Act. Whatever might be the motives which led to the introduction of the paragraph in question it exists; reasons, unless recited, are no part of the statute, and here are two important facts-The Confederate States the definition of America do constitute a power falling precisely within one of the statutable definitions of the 7th section of the Foreign Enlistment Act; and the queen, by her royal proclamation, has recognised them as a belligerent power of sufficient importance to call forth a declaration of neutrality between the revolted and the unrevolted provinces of America. Equal treatment proper. Under these circumstances it is very questionable whether, consistently with the pure spirit of non-intervention, a municipal statute like the Foreign Enlistment Act can properly be put in force to the detriment of one belligerent for the benefit of the other. It appears reasonable that a government which has declared for impartial neutrality, ought not to refuse to one what it concedes to the other, or to grant to one what it denies to the other. In answer to this, it will be said that a neutral power is bound to act upon the first of these principles by restraining the subjects from supplying ships to either, and that in so doing, although it may be a great denial to the one that wants ships, and a great boon to the one that lacks none, the action of the neutral state is uniform, notwithstanding the inequality which the accident of the case works out. This reasoning, however, does not accord with the doctrines of Vattel and others before referred to (ante, p. 22 and 23). But assuming that it is the duty of this country to enforce the Foreign Enlistment Act as International and Municipal Lau. against both belligerents, the next question is what do the provisions of that act prohibit, and under what circumstances? It is clear that the act interdicts the engagement of persons in the British dominions to serve in Foreign service without license. About this there appears to be no doubt or dispute. This offence of enrolling in the hostile ranks of a foreign state, is a personal act of partisanship; but there is a wide distinction between actually taking up arms for one foreign state against another, and merely selling arms in the fair ordinary course of trade to any customer, regardless of the use to which the purchaser may intend to apply them; and it is important to bear this in mind. The 7th section is just one of those provisions which opens a large field of discussion as to its policy, and of argument as to its legal construction apart from the question of policy. Perhaps no better course can be adopted in the present juncture of affairs, than that of examining the section in question step by step with the light that has been thrown upon it in the case of the Alexandra. The consequences of an infraction of this 7th section are, that the offender is guilty of a misdemeanour, the ship is liable to forfeiture, and the course of prosecution is the same as in cases of forfeiture under the Customs Laws. The act points to no particular person or class of persons; but "if any person," no matter who, violates the law, the ship is forfeited. An important question as to the admissibility of evidence of statements by parties other than the claimants on the record, arose in the trial of the Alexandra. In conformity with the requirements of the 309th Evidence of per sons not par ties on the record questioned. International and section of the Customs Consolidation Act, 1853, the Municipal Law. attorney for the claimants appeared for them, claimed the ship, and made oath that he was authorized so to do, and that to the best of his knowledge and belief, the ship was their property, and gave security for costs. If such claim had not been made within the prescribed time, the vessel would by due course of law have been Object of oath forfeited in default of claim. The object of this law of ownership and security simply is to prevent speculative claims by persons for costs. having no interest whatever in the thing seized, and who but for this law might come in and claim, take the chance of the Crown's failing to establish the forfeiture by reason, for instance, of the death before trial of an essential witness or other accidental cause, whereby the fraudulent claimant might, on the Crown's failure, obtain delivery of that to which he had no previous title, and avoid the costs of his speculation if the forfeiture were proved. When this law was enacted, the Crown neither paid nor received costs in Customs cases; this rule of costs was altered by the Customs Consolidation Act, 1853, by the adoption of the rule which prevails in cases between subject and subject. The intention of this law of verification of claim and security for costs, was not therefore to determine the question of property in the thing seized; nor was it intended to be accepted as evidence of title on the trial Effect of reject- of the cause; nor does this preliminary form any part ing evidence of admissions of the record. On the trial of the Alexandra, however, it was contended against the Crown, that the parties who thus came in and claimed by their attorney, were the only true defendants in the cause, and that the statements and admissions of other persons not made in the presence and hearing of these nominal defendants, were inadmissible. If such a rule as this were allowed by non-claimants. Municipal Law. to prevail, a worse fraud than that which the law of International and claim and security for costs was designed to guard against might be perpetrated, as it would be competent for the real owners and offenders by collusive transfer of the thing seized to defeat the law by enabling a nominee, in no way connected with the matter in question, to instruct his attorney to appear, claim, make the required affidavit, and give security for costs, and by thus becoming the nominal defendant on the record, shut out all the evidence of admissions even by the wrong-doers, because they were not made in the presence of the collusive defendant. Now that the old rule of costs in Crown cases is abrogated, the sooner the law of claim, affidavit of ownership, and security for costs, is altered the better. 66 case. It would seem, however, that the common-sense Justice of the view of the matter is this: -If the illegal act of 'any person" having control over and dealing with the ship contrary to the statute be proved, it is immaterial in a proceeding in rem whether that person is by a technicality of law the nominal defendant or not; and common justice appears to demand that where the unlawful intent of the wrong-doer is an essential element in the case, proof of admissions by such a person, so having the control and actually doing the unlawful act, of his intent, should be receivable in evidence. The information, however, charged that persons named therein other than the nominal defendants were concerned, the actual builder of the Alexandra amongst others, and some evidence of admissions by them was received. But it is only reasonable to conclude that the object of enumerating and charging by name divers persons whose acts, sayings, and doings International and it was intended to prove as well as "divers and very many others," was to prepare the claimants against surprise. Beyond that, the charging of these persons could in itself avail nothing, as it would have been competent to the Attorney-general to have included by name the learned Chief Baron himself without vitiating the information. Bearing in mind that this was a proceeding in rem, it would seem that if an infringement of this act in respect of this ship had been proved against "any person" nominally on the record or not, the requirement of the act would have been satisfied. The Chief Baron put the case of a shoemaker employed to furnish a burglar with a pair of list shoes to enable him to prosecute his unlawful acts silently, and argued that a declaration by the shoemaker that he was manufacturing a pair of noiseless shoes, would not be evidence against the burglar on a charge of house-breaking. The analogy of the case put does not appear to satisfy the mind unless carried further. The law officers of the crown combined with the supply of the dangerous instrument the element of guilty knowledge and intention on the part of the person supplying it. But suppose A and B contemplate the murder of C, A undertakes to supply B with a pistol, an air-gun, or other dangerous weapon, with a common understanding that the latter is to kill C, though A may stand aloof, it can scarcely be contended that A is not a party to the crime, or a person who is not aiding, assisting, or concerned in the illegal act; and if an inquest were held on the body of C to ascertain the cause of death, or by whose hands he fell, it would be going a long way to say that proof of admissions by A of the culpability of himself could |