be proved, by strong evidence, that the party acted upon that sort of encouragement. (Dann v. Spurrier, 7 Ves. 235, 236.) A plaintiff complained of an obstruction of the light and air to his ancient windows; of the raising and erecting of walls and buildings, whereby the smoke and vapour from the plaintiff's chimneys were prevented from being carried off; and that the defendant had deprived his house of the support which he was entitled to. The defendant pleaded, by way of equitable defence, that the grievances were occasioned by the pulling down and rebuilding of the defendant's house; that the plaintiff had notice, and that the old building was pulled down, and the new one erected, and large sums of money were expended thereon by the defendant, with the knowledge, acquiescence, and consent of the plaintiff, and on the faith that the plaintiff so knew of, acquiesced in, and consented to the so pulling down and rebuilding. The plaintiff replied, that he acquiesced and consented upon the faith of false representations made to him by the defendant and her agents, that the grievances would not result from or be produced by, the pulling down and rebuilding-it was held, that the plea afforded a good defence on equitable grounds. (Davies v. Marshall, 10 C. B., N. S. 697; 31 L. J., C. P. 61.) It was held, also, that the replication was a good equitable answer to the plea. (Ib.) An injunction to restrain the obstruction of ancient lights was refused on the ground of delay. (Cooper v. Hubbuck, 30 Beav. 160; Cocks v. Romaine, 14 L. T., N. S. 390.) As to the difference between the acquiescence which will justify the refusal of an interlocutory and of a perpetual injunction, see Johnson v. Wyatt, 2 De G., J. & S. 18; Turner v. Mirfield, 34 Beav. 390. Of the Right to Light and Air. The opening of a window, whereby the plaintiff's privacy is disturbed, is Privacy. not actionable; the only remedy is to build upon the adjoining land, opposite the offensive window. (Chandler v. Thompson, 3 Campb. 80; see 9 Rep. 58b; Cotterell v. Griffiths, 4 Esp. N. P. C. 69.) The intrusion upon a neighbour's privacy even by opening a new window overlooking the adjoining property, is not a ground for interference either at law or in equity. (Turner v. Spooner, 1 Drew. & Sm. 467. See also Re Penny and SouthEastern R. Co., 7 Ell. & Bl. 660; and the remarks of Lord Westbury in Tapling v. Jones, 11 H. L. C. 290.) An injunction was refused where the application proceeded on a particular Prospect. right to a long enjoyment of a prospect. (Att.-Gen. v. Doughty, 2 Ves. sen. 453. See Squire v. Campbell, 1 M. & Cr. 459.) So the building of a wall which merely intercepts the prospect of another, without obstructing his lights is not actionable." (Knowles v. Richardson, 1 Mod. 55; 2 Keb. 611, 642.) A covenant, however, not to obstruct a prospect will be enforced in equity. (Piggott v. Stratton, 1 De G., F. & J. 33; Western v. Macdermott, L. R., 2 Ch. 72.) The erection of a building will not be restrained because it injures the View of shop plaintiff by obstructing the view of his place of business. (Smith v. Owen, window. 35 L. J., Ch. 317; 14 W. R. 422; Butt v. Imperial Gas Co., L. R., 2 Ch. 158.) The owner of a house has a right at common law to wholesome and un- Rights with regard tainted air, unless the business which creates a nuisance has been carried on to air. for such a length of time as will raise a presumption of a grant from the neighbouring owners in favour of the party who causes the nuisance. (Elliottson v. Feetham, 2 Bing. N. C. 134; 2 Scott, 174.) Nothing less than an user of twenty years will afford such presumption. (Bliss v. Hall, 5 Scott, 500; Crump v. Lambert, L. R., 3 Eq. 413.) A right to the unobstructed passage of air through a window may be acquired by prescription at common law. (Aldred's case, 9 Coke, 58. Sec Gale v. Abbott, 10 W. R. 748; Dent v. Auction Mart Co., L. R., 2 Eq. 252.) But a right to the unobstructed passage of air to a windmill cannot be acquired by prescription under the statute. (Webb v. Bird, 13 C. B., N. S. 841.) An action will lie for pollution of air. (St. Helen's Smelting Co. v. Tipping, 11 H. L. C. 642; 13 W. R. 1083.) And the Court of Chancery will restrain such a nuisance. (Tipping v. St. Helen's Smelting Co., L. R., S. K Remedies for pollution of air, at law and in equity. Of the Right to Acquiescence. 1 Ch. 66; Crump v. Lambert, L. R., 3 Eq. 409. See Swaine v. Great Northern R. Co., 12 W. R. 391.) What constitutes a nuisance was thus defined by Knight Bruce, V.-C. : "Ought this inconvenience to be considered in fact as more than fanciful, more than one of mere delicacy or fastidiousness, as an inconvenience materially interfering with the ordinary comfort physically of human existence, not merely according to elegant or dainty modes and habits of living, but according to plain and sober and simple notions among the English people?" (Walter v. Selfe, 4 De G. & Sm. 322, adopted by Kindersley, V.-C., in Soltau v. De Held, 2 Sim., N. S. 133, and Lord Romilly, in Crump v. Lambert, L. R., 3 Eq. 413.) Where a man, by an act on his own land, such as burning bricks, causes so much annoyance to another in the enjoyment of a neighbouring tenement, as to amount primâ facie to a cause of action, it is no answer that the act was done in a proper and convenient spot, and was a reasonable use of the land. (Bamford v. Turnley, 3 B. & S. 66; 10 W. R. 803, overruling Hole v. Barlow, 4 C. B., N. S. 334.) See Carey v. Ledbitter, 13 C. B., N. S. 470; Luscombe v. Steer, 15 W. R. 1191; and St. Helen's Smelting Co. v. Tipping, 11 H. L. C. 642, where Lord Westbury distinguishes the cases where material injury is done to property, and those where personal discomfort is produced. A bill was filed by five several occupiers of houses in a town to restrain the erection of a steam engine, which would be a nuisance to each of them. It was held, that each occupier had a distinct right of suit, and that they could not sue as co-plaintiffs, for as each had a separate nuisance to complain of, that which was an answer to one might not be an answer to the other. (Hudson v. Maddison, 12 Sim. 416.) An injunction was granted to restrain brick burning, which interfered with the comfort and enjoyment of a mansion and with ornamental trees, which excluded the view of unsightly objects, and where such trees were in some cases destroyed, and in many instances injured by brick burning. (Beardmore v. Tredwell, 3 Giff. 683; 31 L. J., Chan. 892.) Injunctions to restrain brick burning were also granted in Walter v. Selfe, 4 De G. & Sm. 315; Boreham v. Hall, W. N. 1870, p. 57; Roberts v. Clarke, 18 L. T., N. S. 49, and see Luscombe v. Steer, 14 W. R. 1191. An injunction to restrain the emission of smoke and noxious vapours was granted in Imperial Gas Light and Coke Co. v. Broadbent, 7 H. L. C. 600. And it has been held that it is no answer to a complaint by a manufacturer of a nuisance to his trade, to say that the injury is felt only by reason of the delicate nature of the manufacture. (Cooke v. Forbes, L. R., 5 Eq. 166.) Nor does the fact of the plaintiff having come to the nuisance, disentitle him to equitable relief. (Tipping v. St. Helen's Smelting Co., L. R., 1 Ch. 66.) As to whether an injunction will be granted as a matter of course where a verdict has been obtained at law, see Imperial Gas Light and Coke Co. v. Broadbent, 7 H. L. C. 600; Crump v. Lambert, L. R., 3 Eq. 409; Luscombe v. Steer, 15 W. R. 1191. Acquiescence in the erection of noxious works while they produce little injury does not warrant the subsequent extension of them to an extent productive of great damage. Though a party may be disentitled by acquiescence to an injunction to stop another's manufactory, which is noxious to the neighbourhood, yet it does not consequently follow that the latter is entitled to an injunction to prevent the party who has acquiesced from recovering damages at law. Equity may leave both parties to their legal rights. (Bankart v. Houghton, 27 Beav. 425.) An injunction to prevent, on the ground of acquiescence, a party injured by copper works, from enforcing a judgment recovered by him for damages at law was refused with costs. (Ib.) See also, as to the effect of acquiescence in such a case, Williams v. Earl of Jersey, Cr. & Phil. 91; Savile v. Kilner, 26 L. T., N. S. 276. LIMITATION OF ACTIONS AND SUITS. 3 & 4 WILLIAM IV. CAP. 27. An Act for the Limitation of Actions and Suits relating to Real Property, and for simplifying the Remedies for trying the Rights thereto. [24th July, 1833.] I. Limitation of time for the recovery of land or rent. 1. Interpretation clause, 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 27, s. 1. 2. Period of limitation fixed, and when right first accrues, ss. 2 -15. 3. Savings in case of disabilities, ss. 16—19. 4. Concurrent rights, s. 20. 5. Operation of the statute in case of estates tail, ss. 21-23. 6. Limitation of time as to suits in equity, 88. 24-27. 7. Limitation of time between mortgagor and mortgagee, s. 28. 8. Limitation of time as to church property and advowsons, 88. 29 9. Abolition of real and mixed actions, &c., s8. 36-39. 10. Limits of act, ss. 43-44. II. Limitation of time for the recovery of money charged on land, III. Of the limitation of actions on specialties, 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 42. I. LIMITATION OF TIME FOR THE RECOVERY OF LAND OR RENT. 1. Interpretation Clause. Be it enacted, that the words and expressions hereinafter men- 3 & 4 Will. 4, tioned, which in their ordinary signification have a more con- c. 27, s. 1. fined or a different meaning, shall in this act, except where the Meaning of the nature of the provision or the context of the act shall exclude words in the act. such construction, be interpreted as follows; (that is to say,) the word "land" (a) shall extend to manors, messuages, and “Land." all other corporeal hereditaments whatsoever (b), and also to tithes (other than tithes belonging to a spiritual or eleemosynary corporation sole) (c), and also to any share, estate or interest in them or any of them, whether the same shall be a freehold or chattel interest (d), and whether freehold or copyhold, or held according to any other tenure; and the word "rent" shall extend to all heriots (e), and to all services and "Rent." c. 27, s. 1. Person through whom another claims. 3 & 4 Will. 4, suits for which a distress may be made (ƒ), and to all annuities and periodical sums of money charged upon or payable out of any land (g) (except moduses or compositions belonging to a spiritual or eleemosynary corporation sole); and the person through whom another person is said to claim shall mean any person by, through or under or by the act of whom, the person so claiming became entitled to the estate or interest claimed, as heir, issue in tail, tenant by the curtesy of England, tenant in dower, successor, special or general occupant, executor, administrator, legatee, husband, assignee, appointee, devisee or otherwise, and also any person who was entitled to an estate or interest to which the person so claiming, or some person through whom he claims, became entitled as lord by escheat (h); and the word "person" shall extend to a body politic, corporate or collegiate, and to a class of creditors or other persons, as well as an individual (i); and every word importing the singular number only shall extend and be applied to several persons or things as well as one person or thing; and every word importing the masculine gender only shall extend and be applied to a female as well as a male. "Person." Number and gender. Construction of statutes of limitation generally. Subjects not included in this act. Tithes. (a) The object of all statutes of limitation is to prevent claims at great distances of time when evidences are lost, and in all well-regulated countries the question of possession is held to be an important point of policy, (Trustees of Dundee Harbour v. Dougall, 1 Macq. H. L. C. 321, per Lord St. Leonards.) The several statutes of limitations being all in pari materia ought to receive an uniform construction notwithstanding a slight variation in phrase, the object and intention being the same. (Murray v. East India Company, 5 B. & Ald. 206, 215, per Abbott, C. J.) All these acts being, as they were emphatically termed by Lord Kenyon, statutes of repose, are to be liberally and beneficially expounded. (Per Dallas, C. J., in Tolson v. Kaye, 6 Moore, 558; 3 Bro. & B. 217.) See the maxims "Interest reipublicæ ut sit finis litium" (Broom's Legal Maxims, 343, 5th ed.) and “ Vigilantibus non dormientibus jura subveniunt" (Broom, 892). Turnpike tolls are not within this act; and consequently more than six years' arrears of interest may be recovered on a mortgage of turnpike tolls notwithstanding the 42nd section of the act, a share of the tolls of a turnpike road not coming within the meaning of the word land as defined by the first section of this act. (Mellish v. Brooks, 3 Beav. 22; 4 Jur. 739.) But quarries and limestone land do come within that word. (3 Ir. Law Rep. 521.) The limitation prescribed by the 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 27, does not apply to an action on a collateral covenant for payment of a rent charged on land, and the covenantee may recover damages for the breach of that covenant, notwithstanding his right to recover the rent-charge is barred by this statute. (Manning v. Phelps, 10 Exch. 59; 24 Law J., Exch. 62.) The word "rent" has an ambiguous meaning, being either the estate in the rent or the rent reserved under a lease. It has been confined in sect. 2 to the former meaning alone, so that a mere non-receipt of rent under a lease for more than twenty years does not deprive the lessor of his right to rent under the lease. (Grant v. Ellis, 9 M. & W. 113.) Lord St. Leonards said, rent, in the sense in which it is spoken of in the second section, means rent of inheritance, and it does not mean rent reserved by lease for example, or rent in the common and customary form of a render for property. (Dean of Ely v. Bliss, 2 De G., M. & G. 459. See p. 472.) The word "tithes," like rent, has an ambiguous meaning, signifying either the estate in the tithes or the chattel itself, the fruits of the estate. Tithes (other than tithes belonging to a spiritual or eleemosynary corpora c. 27, s. 1. tion sole,) are included in the word "land," which in its proper sense applies 3 & 4 Will. 4, only to cases in which there are two parties, each claiming an estate in the land adverse to each other. It has been held, that the statute does not prevent the tithe-owner from recovering tithes as chattels from the occupier, although none had been set out for twenty years, but that the operation of the statute is confined to cases where there are two parties, each claiming an adverse estate in the tithes. Therefore a person who has received no tithes for twenty years cannot recover the possession of them from another, who has for twenty years received those tithes from the terretenant. (Dean of Ely v. Cash, 15 M. & W. 617; Dean of Ely v. Bliss, 5 Beav. 574; 2 De G., M. & G. 459. See Lord Shannon v. Hodder, 2 Brady, Adair & Moore, 223, n.) The effect of time as between tithe-owner and occupier is determined by 2 & 3 Will. 4, c. 100. (See Salkeld v. Johnston, 1 Mac. & Gor. 242; 18 L. J., Ch. 493; 1 H. & T. 329, where Lord Cottenham expressed his opinion that under that act the proof of the enjoyment of the discharge claimed for the prescribed time is a sufficient answer to a demand for tithes. See 2 Ex. 256; 2 C. B. 749.) The cases on the construction of that act are collected, Shelford on Tithes, 391-398, 3rd ed., and Supplement, 47-86. Tithes, moduses or compositions, belonging to a spiritual or eleemosynary corporation sole, are excepted from the operation of 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 27. The time for recovering lands belonging to such a corporation is prescribed by 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 27, s. 29, post. Tithe rent-charge not belonging to a spiritual or eleemosynary corpora- Tithe rent-charge. tion sole appears to be within the meaning of the word "rent" in sect. 2. It has been held in Ireland that tithe rent-charge is not by virtue of this act extinguished by non-payment. (Shiel v. Incorporated Society, 10 Ir. Eq. R. 411.) See however Darb. & Bos. Stat. Lim. 212. Whether tithe rent-charge belonging to a spiritual or eleemosynary corporation sole is within the act is an open question. (See Darb. & Bos. Stat. Lim. 377.) As to the recovery of arrears of tithes and tithe rent-charge, see note to sect. 42, post. and tithe rent Arrears of tithes charge. Hereditaments. (b) Hereditament is a very comprehensive term, including whatever may be inherited, be it corporeal or incorporeal, real, personal or mixed. (Co. Litt. 6a; 3 Rep. 2; Shep. Touch. 91.) Hereditaments are of two sorts, corporeal, consisting wholly of substantial and permanent objects; all of which may be comprehended under the general denomination of land. (Co. Litt. 4; 2 Bl. Com. 17.) An incorporeal hereditament is a right issuing out of a thing corporate (whether real or personal) or concerning, or annexed to, or exercisable within the same. (Ib. 20.) Many of the latter are not within this act, but the periods of limitation for several incorporeal rights are prescribed by the stat. 2 & 3 Will. 4, c. 71 (ante, pp. 1-28). (e) Ecclesiastical corporations are those of which not only the members Different kinds of composing it are spiritual persons, but of which the object of the institution corporations. is also spiritual, such as bishops, some deans, and prebendaries, all archdeacons, parsons, and vicars, which are sole corporations; deans and chapters at present, and formerly prior and convent, abbot and monks, and the like, bodies aggregate. (Co. Litt. 150 a; 1 Bl. Com. 471; 1 Kyd on Corporations, 22.) Eleemosynary corporations are such as are constituted for the perpetual distribution of the free-alms or bounty of the founder of them to such persons as he has directed. (1 Bl. Com. 471.) These are of two general descriptions; hospitals for the maintenance and relief of poor and impotent persons, and colleges for the promotion of learning, and the support of persons engaged in literary pursuits, of which the greater number are within the universities, and form component parts of these larger corporations; and others are out of the universities, and not necessarily connected with them. Between hospitals having a common seal, and colleges in the universities or out of them, there is no difference in legal consideration, the difference is only in degree; for where in an hospital the master and poor are incorporated, it is a college having a common seal by which it acts, although it have not the name of a college. (Per Holt, Skinn. 484.) There are many hospitals not incorporated in which the succession is kept up by |