3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 74. IV. "And where, in either of the above cases, there shall be more than one acknowledgment, all such acknowledgments may be included in one certificate and affidavit. V. "In every case the acknowledgment of a lease and release shall be considered and paid for as one acknowledgment only." General Order, 24 November, 1862. GENERAL ORDER OF THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS. 24 Nov. 1862. [13 C. B., N. S. 2.] AFFIDAVITS of Verification of Certificates of Acknowledgments under 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 74. I. From and after the first day of Easter Term next inclusive, every affidavit of the verification of certificates of acknowledgments of deeds of married women, except as hereinafter provided, shall be drawn up in the first person and shall be divided into paragraphs, and every paragraph shall be numbered consecutively, and as nearly as may be shall be confined to a distinct portion of the subject; provided that this rule shall not be applicable to any such affidavits where the acknowledgments have been taken out of England and Wales under special commissions issued prior to the said first day of Easter Term next (a). (a) This rule as to the form of affidavits is directory only. (Ex parte Hall, 19 C. B., N. S. 369.) II. The officer with whom all such certificates are filed is empowered in the interval between the date of this rule and the said first day of Easter Term next to receive and file any affidavits of verification, whether drawn up in the first or third person. General Order, GENERAL ORDER OF THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS. 13 JAN. 1863. [13 C. B., N. S. 405.] AFFIDAVITS on Acknowledgments. With respect to acknowledgments of deeds by married women taken in any colony or foreign possession being part of the dominions of her Majesty, -It is ordered, that affidavits verifying the same made before any court or judge, magistrate, commissioner, notary public or other person authorized to administer an oath, and containing in the jurat a statement by such court or judge, magistrate, commissioner, notary public or other person of the name or title of the office or authority which he or they respectively hold and execute, shall be received as a sufficient compliance with the requirements of the 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 74, s. 85, relating to affidavits of verification. ALIENATION OF THE INTERESTS OF MARRIED 20 & 21 VICTORIA, c. 57. An Act to enable Married Women to dispose of Reversionary Be it enacted as follows: 1. After the thirty-first day of December, one thousand eight hundred and fifty-seven, it shall be lawful for every married woman by deed to dispose of (a) every future or reversionary interest, whether vested or contingent, of such married woman, or her husband in her right, in any personal estate whatsoever, to which she shall be entitled under any instrument made after the said thirty-first day of December, one thousand eight hundred and fifty-seven (b) (except such a settlement as after mentioned), and also to release or extinguish any power (c) which may be vested in or limited or reserved to her in regard to any such personal estate, as fully and effectually as she could do if she were a feme sole, and also to release and extinguish her right or equity to a settlement (d) out of any personal estate to which she, or her husband in her right, may be entitled in possession under any such instrument as aforesaid, save and except that no such disposition, release or extinguishment shall be valid unless the husband concur in the deed by which the same shall be effected, nor unless the deed be acknowledged by her as hereinafter directed: provided always, that nothing herein contained shall extend to any reversionary interest to which she shall become entitled by virtue of any deed, will or instrument, by which she shall be restrained from alienating or affecting the same. (a) For a married woman's power of disposition over reversionary interests in personalty settled to her separate use, see the note to 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 74, s. 78, ante, p. 378. As regards her reversionary interests in personalty not settled to her separate use, it was well established before 20 & 21 Vict. c. 57, that a husband could not assign his wife's reversionary choses in action so as to bind her surviving, and the fact of her joining in the assignment made no difference. (Purdew v. Jackson, 1 Russ. 1; Cresswell v. Dewell, 4 Giff. 460; see Winter v. Easum, 2 D., J. & S. 272; Bolitho v. Hillyar, 34 Beav. 180.) Nor could a married woman by election part with her reversionary choses in action. (Williams v. Mayne, I. R., 1 Eq. 519.) A husband and wife could not effectually dispose of the life interest of the wife in a fund not settled to her separate use beyond the duration of the coverture. (Stiffe v. Everitt, 1 M. & Cr. 37; Re Godfrey's Trusts, I. R., 1 Eq. 533.) A fund in court was subject to a trust for a husband for life, remainder to his wife for life, remainder to their son absolutely. The husband and 406 20 & 21 Vict. c. 57, s. 1. Effect of husband's release. Powers. Equity to settlement. Deeds to be acknowledged by married women in the manner required by 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 74, for disposing of interests in or powers over land in England or Wales; In Ireland, as by 4 & 5 Will. 4, c. 92. Alienation of Interests of Married Women in Personal Estates. son, by deed, surrendered and released their respective interests to the wife, for the express purpose of giving her a present absolute interest in the fund, and thereby enabling her to assign it at once to the son. But a petition by the three for the payment of the fund to the son was refused, on the ground that the Court of Chancery will not establish an equitable merger by analogy to law, where the effect would be to defeat its own rules and practice in the protection of married women from the marital control. (Whittle v. Henning, 2 Phill. C. C. 731; 11 Beav. 222; 12 Jur. 1079; Story v. Tonge, 7 Beav. 91; Hanchett v. Briscoe, 22 Beav. 496.) Shadwell, V.-C., had, in several cases under similar circumstances, ordered the transfer of trust funds. (14 Sim. 592-599; see Bishop v. Colebrooke, 16 Sim. 39.) Where a feme covert was entitled to a reversionary interest in a chose in action, the release of the husband was as inoperative as his assignment to bind his wife's right by survivorship. (Rogers v. Acaster, 14 Beav. 445.) Where a man gave a bond to secure an annuity to a single woman, and she afterwards married, it was once held that her husband might release the bond, and that if he released the security, there was an end to the annuity. (Hore v. Becher, 12 Sim. 465.) But this case has been disapproved. (Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald, L. R., 2 P. C. 87.) See further, as to the assignment of a married woman's reversionary choses in action, 2 White & Tudor, L. C., Eq. 783-794. Precedents of an assignment under this act by a married woman of a reversionary interest in personalty, and of a release under this act by a married woman of her equity to a settlement, are given, 1 Prideaux, Conv. 355, 6th ed. As to whether the act applies to a married woman's choses in action, which are capable of being, but are not actually, reduced into possession during her husband's lifetime, see Lewin on Trusts, 23, 5th ed. (b) B. had, under his marriage settlement, executed in 1839 a life interest in a fund vested in trustees, in trust (inter alia) to pay the same to the issue of the marriage in such shares as B. should appoint. In 1867 a daughter of B. married, and in 1868 B. appointed part of the fund to his daughter, to be held in trust for her, and assigned to her all his life interest in that part. Held, that the daughter was entitled under the settlement of 1839, and that the deed of 1868 was not, within the meaning of this section, an instrument made after the 31st December, 1857, so as to enable her to dispose of her interest in the sum appointed to her. (Re Butler's Trusts, I. R., 3 Eq. 138.) (c) As to the various kinds of powers, their suspension and extinction, see the note to 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 74, s. 77; and as to the execution of powers by married women, see the note to 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 74, s. 78. (d) As to a wife's equity to a settlement, see 1 White & Tudor, L. C., Eq. 445 et seq.; Daniell, Ch. Pr. 86 et seq. 2. Every deed to be executed in England or Wales by a married woman for any of the purposes of this act shall be acknowledged by her, and be otherwise perfected, in the manner by the act 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 74, prescribed for the acknowledgment and perfecting of deeds disposing of interests of married women in land; and every deed to be executed in Ireland by a married woman for any of the purposes of the act shall be acknowledged by her and be otherwise perfected in the manner by the act 4 & 5 Will. 4, c. 92, prescribed for the acknowledgment and perfecting of deeds disposing of interests of married women in land: and all and singular the clauses and provisions in the said acts concerning the disposition of lands by married women, including the provisions for dispensing with the concurrence of the husbands of married women, in the cases in the said acts mentioned shall extend and be applicable to such interests in personal estate, and to such powers as may be disposed of, released, or c. 57, s. 3. extinguished by virtue of this act, as fully and effectually as 20 & 21 Vict. if such interests or powers were interests in or powers over land (e). (e) An order was made under this act, enabling a married woman, without the concurrence of her husband, to dispose of a reversionary interest in government stock. (Re Alice Rogers, L. R., 1 C. P. 47.) a 3. Provided always, that the powers of disposition given to married woman by this act shall not interfere with any power which independently of this act may be vested in or limited or reserved to her, so as to prevent her from exercising such power in any case, except so far as by any disposition made by her under this act she may be prevented from so doing, in consequence of such power having been suspended or extinguished by such disposition. The powers of disposition given other powers. to settlements of 4. Provided always, that the powers of disposition hereby Act not to extend given to a married woman shall not enable her to dispose of any married women interest in personal estate settled upon her by any settlement or upon marriage. agreement for a settlement made on the occasion of her marriage (ƒ). (ƒ) An agreement in contemplation of marriage was executed by the husband and wife to settle a money fund of the wife's for her separate use -to return to the husband if he should survive. The court considered the meaning to be that the fund was to be preserved during the coverture, and the wife was to have the absolute interest in the event of her surviving; and it was held that her reversionary interest was taken under the agreement, and not as a resulting use, and that, therefore, the case fell within the exception contained in this section. (Clarke v. Green, 2 H. & M. 474.) 5. This act shall not extend to Scotland. Not to extend to C. MARRIAGE SETTLEMENTS BY INFANTS. 18 & 19 VICTORIÆ, c. 43. An Act to enable Infants, with the Approbation of the Court of Chancery, to make binding Settlements of their Real and Personal Estate on Marriage (a). [2nd July, 1855.] 18 & 19 Vict. WHEREAS great inconveniences and disadvantages arise in con43, s. 1. sequence of persons who marry during minority being incapable of making binding settlements of their property: for remedy whereof it is enacted, as follows: Infants may, with the approbation of the Court of Chancery, make valid settlements or contracts for settlements of their estate upon marriage. 1. From and after the passing of this act it shall be lawful for every infant upon or in contemplation of his or her marriage, with the sanction of the Court of Chancery, to make a valid and binding settlement or contract for a settlement of all or any part of his or her property, or property over which he or real and personal she has any power of appointment, whether real or personal, and whether in possession, reversion, remainder, or expectancy; and every conveyance, appointment, and assignment of such real or personal estate, or contract to make a conveyance, appointment, or assignment thereof, executed by such infant, with the approbation of the said court, for the purpose of giving effect to such settlement, shall be as valid and effectual as if the person executing the same were of the full age of twenty-one years: provided always, that this enactment shall not extend to powers of which it is expressly declared that they shall not be exercised by an infant. The words "Court of Chancery," in the above act, to include Court of Chancery in Ireland. Jurisdiction under this act. The act does not alter the legal status of an infant in respect of the alienation of pro perty. (a) By 23 & 24 Vict. c. 83, in the interpretation of the act 18 & 19 Vict. c. 43, and for all the objects and purposes thereof, the words "the Court of Chancery" shall include and be taken to include the Court of Chancery in Ireland, and all orders made and approbations already given by the Court of Chancery in Ireland in cases provided for and contemplated by the said act shall be as valid and binding in law as if the words "the Court of Chancery in Ireland" had been expressly contained in the said act in all the places where the words "the Court of Chancery" are mentioned therein. The Court of Chancery has no jurisdiction under this act to approve a settlement of an infant's property originally made without its concurrence (per Stuart, V.-C., Re Fuller's Settlement, 10 Feb. 1860; Morgan's Ch. Acts, 234, 4th ed.); nor to settle the property of an infant, not being a ward of court, who marries after attaining the age at which she is capable of contracting marriage (Re Potter, L. R., 7 Eq. 484); but the court may, under this act, sanction a post-nuptial settlement of the property of a ward of court, which has been made with its approbation. (Powell v. Oakley, 34 Beav. 575; see Re Hoare, 11 W. R. 181.) This act does not alter the legal status of an infant in respect of the alienation of property. Therefore, where, on the marriage of an infant, she executed a settlement of her personal property, with the sanction of the Court of Chancery in England, limiting funds in the Court of Chancery |