the same, and the fees and allowances in respect thereof, shall be subject to such orders and regulations as may, under the provisions of that act, or of any other act then in force, or under the general authority of the Court of Chancery, be made with reference to the proceedings and practice of the said Court of Chancery. (See Order of Court, 17th November, 1841, as to distringas.) The statute 5 Vict. c. 5, s. 4, has conferred on the court no new summary jurisdiction with respect to granting injunctions; but the remedy provided thereby was intended only for limited and interim purposes, viz., to protect stock until the party having a claim to it can have time to assert that claim by bill. (In re Suisse, 6 Jur. 597.) It seems that the remedies given by the 4th and 5th sections of the act 5 Vict. c. 5, are cumulative, and consequently that a party who has sued a distringas, under the 5th section, is not thereby precluded from afterwards applying for an injunction under the 4th section. (Ex parte Marquis of Hertford, 1 Phill. 129; 1 Hare, 584. See Lewin on Trusts, pp. 719-724, 5th ed.,; Dan. Ch. Pr. 1540, 5th ed.; Morgan, Ch. Acts and Orders, 508, 4th ed.) 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110, s. 15. "Victoria, by the grace of God of the United Kingdom of Great Britain Form of writ. and Ireland Queen, defender of the faith, to the sheriffs of London, greeting: We command you that you omit not by reason of any liberty, but that you enter the same and distrain the governor and company of the Bank of England by all their lands and chattels in your bailiwick, so that they, or any of them, do not intermeddle therewith until we otherwise command you; and that you answer us the issues of the said lands, so that they do appear before us in our High Court of Chancery on the day of to answer a certain bill of complaint lately exhibited against them and other defendants before us in our said Court of Chancery by -, complainant ; and further to do and receive what our said court shall then and there order in the premises, and that you then leave there this writ. Witness ourself at Westminster, the year of our reign. day of in the The following is the form of the affidavit which has been substituted by the judges of the Court of Chancery by an Order dated 10th December, 1841, for the form set out at the foot of the Orders of the 17th November, 1841 : A. B. [the name of the party or parties in whose behalf the writ is sued out] v. The Governor and Company of the Bank of England. I, of -, do solemnly swear, that, according to the best of my knowledge, information and belief, I am [or if the affidavit is made by the solicitor, “A. B., of is"] beneficially interested in the stock hereinafter particularly described, that is to say [here specify the amount of the stock to be affected by the writ, and the name or names of the person or persons, or body politic or corporate, in whose name or names the same shall be standing]. EFFECT OF TAKING THE BODY. realized to be the person be taken in execu relinquished if tion. 16. If any judgment creditor, who under the powers of this Securities not act shall have obtained any charge, or be entitled to the benefit of any security whatsoever, shall afterwards, and before the property so charged or secured shall have been converted into money or realized, and the produce thereof applied towards payment of the judgment debt, cause the person of the judgment debtor to be taken or charged in execution upon such judgment, then and in such case such judgment creditor shall be deemed and taken to have relinquished all right and title to 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110, s. 16. the benefit of such charge or security, and shall forfeit the same accordingly (p). (p) In Wells v. Gibbs (3 Beav. 399), a question was raised whether an order to pay money into court to the credit of a cause is an order within the meaning of the 18th section of this act; and if so, whether a taking under an attachment for contempt would, under this section, invalidate a charge obtained under the 13th section. The court said, it certainly is not the same thing as a taking under a ca. sa. at law; nor is this court bound by the decisions of courts of law, which in some cases prohibit a party proceeding against the property and person at the same time. (See Hide v. Pettitt, 1 Ch. Ca. 91.) A creditor recovered a judgment in this country, and obtained a charge on his debtor's lands, &c., under this act. He afterwards arrested the debtor in Jersey upon mesne process for the same debt. It was held, that the charge on the lands here was not thereby forfeited under this section. (Houlditch v. Collins, 5 Beav. 497.) The seizure of the person of the debtor for contempt of court is not a release of the debt against the debtor's property. (Roberts v. Bull, 3 Sm. & Giff. 168.) A solicitor's lien for his costs, upon costs ordered to be paid to his client by the opposite party in a suit, remains notwithstanding that such solicitor has taken the client's body in execution under a judgment against him for the amount of his costs. (O'Brien v. Lewis, 3 De G., J. & S. 606.) As to imprisonment for debt, see now 32 & 33 Vict. c. 62: and as to enforcing the decrees and orders of the Court of Chancery by attachment and sequestration, see Dan. Ch. Pr. 906 et seq., 5th ed. Judgment debts to carry interest. INTEREST ON JUDGMENTS. 17. Every judgment debt shall carry interest at the rate of four pounds per centum per annum from the time of entering up the judgment, or from the time of the commencement of this act in cases of judgments then entered up and not carrying interest, until the same shall be satisfied, and such interest may be levied under a writ of execution on such judgment (9). (1) Formerly a judgment did not carry interest, but interest might be recovered at law in the shape of damages by an action on the judgment. (Gaunt v. Taylor, 3 Myl. & K. 302.) A judgment given for securing an annuity carries interest under this section. (Knight v. Bowyer, 4 De G. & J. 619.) Interest runs on a judgment debt, under this section, from the time of the entry of the incipitur, and not merely from the final completion of the judgment after the taxation of costs. (Newton v. Grand Junction R. Co., 16 Mees. & W. 139.) Under this section a plaintiff is entitled to interest upon a judgment from the day on which it is signed, the words "entered up" in that clause having reference to the entry of the incipitur in the master's book; and this right is not varied by an abbreviation mark in the amount at a subsequent period, upon a review of the taxation. (Fisher v. Dudding, 3 Scott, N. R. 516; 9 Dowl. P. C. 979.) The judgment carries interest until satisfaction. As to when a judgment at law is satisfied for the purpose of carrying interest, see Sinclair v. Great Eastern R. Co., L. R., 5 C. P. 391. This section, allowing interest on judgments, applies as well to judgments for costs as for the subject-matter of the action. Therefore, where it was sought to set aside a writ of ca. sa., upon the ground that it commanded the sheriff to levy the amount of the defendant's costs upon a nonsuit with interest: it was held, that the motion could not be sustained. (Pitcher v. Roberts, 12 L. J., Q. B. 178. See Newton v. Conyngham, 17 L. J., C. P. 288.) Under the 17th and 18th sections of this statute, interest is recoverable on costs which one party is ordered to pay to another, but not on costs directed to be raised out of an estate. (Attorney-General v. Nethercote, 10 Sim. 529.) As to interest where error is brought at common law, see Chitty's Archbold, 580, 12th ed.; and as to interest where the judgment of a colonial court is reversed by the privy council, see Rodger v. The Comptoir d'Escompte de Paris, L. R., 3 P. Č. 465. 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110, s. 17. Costs. Under the Common Law Procedure Act, 1852, the following rules have Rules as to recobeen made as to the recovery of interest on writs of execution :-76. Every very of interest. writ of execution shall be endorsed with a direction to the sheriff, or other officer or person to whom the writ is directed, to levy the money really due and payable, and sought to be recovered, under the judgment, stating the amount, and also to levy interest thereon, if sought to be recovered, at the rate of four pounds per centum per annum from the time when the judgment was entered up, or if it was entered up before the 1st of October, 1838, then from that day; provided that, in cases where there is an agreement between the parties that more than four per cent. interest shall be secured by the judgment, then the endorsement may be accordingly to levy the amount of interest so agreed. 77. In cases of an assessment of further damages, pursuant to the statute of 8 & 9 Will. 3, it shall be stated in the body of the writ of execution that the sheriff, or other officer or person to whom the writ is directed, is to levy interest on the damages assessed and costs taxed in that behalf, at the rate of four pounds per centum per annum from the day on which execution was awarded, unless execution was awarded before the 1st of October, 1838, and in that case from that day. (Reg. Gen. Hil. T. 1853; 1 Ell. & Bl. App. xv.) Decrees and Orders in EQUITY. 18. All decrees or orders of courts of equity, and all rules of courts of common law, and all orders of the Lord Chancellor or of the court of review in matters of bankruptcy, and all orders of the Lord Chancellor in matters of lunacy, whereby any sum of money, or any costs, charges or expenses, shall be payable to any person, shall have the effect of judgments in the superior courts of common law, and the persons to whom any such monies or costs, charges or expenses, shall be payable shall be deemed judgment creditors within the meaning of this act; and all powers hereby given to the judges of the superior courts of common law with respect to matters depending in the same courts, shall and may be exercised by courts of equity with respect to matters therein depending, and by the Lord Chancellor and the court of review in matters of bankruptcy, and by the Lord Chancellor in matters of lunacy; and all remedies hereby given to judgment creditors are in like manner given to persons to whom any monies or costs, charges or ex Decrees and orders of courts judgments. 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110, s. 18. Orders in matters of bankruptcy. Decrees and orders in equity. Rules of courts of common law. penses are by such orders or rules respectively directed to be paid (r). (") This section is extended to the common palatinate courts and to the equity court of Durham. (18 & 19 Vict. c. 15, s. 2.) The provisions of the act 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110, so far as the same relate to orders of the Lord Chancellor, or of the court of review therein referred to in matters of bankruptcy, and the powers given by the same act to the Lord Chancellor and the said court of review in matters of bankruptcy, were extended to orders of the Lord Chancellor and of the court of appeal in chancery, sitting in bankruptcy, under the Bankruptcy Act, 1861. (24 & 25 Vict. c. 134, s. 214.) A provision to the same effect was contained in 12 & 13 Vict. c. 106, s. 248; and see 14 & 15 Vict. c. 83, s. 7. The Bankruptcy Repeal and Insolvent Court Act, 1869, has now repealed 12 & 13 Vict. c. 106; 14 & 15 Vict. c. 83, s. 7, and so much of 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110, s. 18, as relates to orders of the Lord Chancellor or of the court of review in matters of bankruptcy (32 & 33 Vict. c. 83, s. 20). The Bankruptcy Act, 1869, enacts that the orders of the chief judge in bankruptcy shall be of the same force as if they were judgments in the superior courts of common law, or decrees in the High Court of Chancery. (32 & 33 Vict. c. 71, s. 65.) It was held that (notwithstanding 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110, s. 18) the obligation to pay a sum of money under an order of a court of equity was merely an equitable debt, and could not be made the ground of a petition for adjudication in bankruptcy under the Bankruptcy Act, 1861. (Ex parte Blencoe, L. R., 1 Ch. 393.) A decree directing payment to the credit of a cause does not constitute the plaintiff a judgment creditor of the defendant under this act. (Ward v. Shakeshaft, 8 W. R. 335; 1 Dr. & Sm. 269; Wand v. Docker, 5 Jur., N. S. 1287; comp. Re Leeds Banking Co., L. R., 1 Ch. 150; Johnson v. Burgess, L. R., 15 Eq. 398, post; see, however, Gibbs v. Pike, 8 M. & W. 223; 9 M. & W. 351.) A decree for specific performance with a reference to the master to compute interest and tax costs, and ordering the defendant to pay the purchasemoney and interest and costs when ascertained, was held to constitute a judgment debt. (Duke of Beaufort v. Phillips, 1 De G. & Sm. 321.) But a decree which orders an account against a defendant's estate and directs the plaintiff to join and prove for the amount found due by a previous decree, and continues the account, does not operate so as to create a judg ment debt. (Garner v. Briggs, 6 W. R. 378.) A decree for an account of what is due to a person and payment of what shall be found due, is not a decree for the payment of money within this section (Chadwick v. Holt, 8 De G., M. & G. 584); nor is the chief clerk's certificate, finding money to be due to a party, though adopted by the judge. (Earl Mansfield v. Ogle, 4 De G. & J. 38.) Where a plaintiff, whose bill was dismissed with costs, died after the date of the order but before the costs had been taxed, it was held that the order was a judgment against the plaintiff's estate for an amount which could not be ascertained except by taxation; and as there could be no revivor for costs only, the judgment could not be worked out. (Troup v. Troup, 16 W. R. 573.) An order for payment of costs operates only as against purchasers, mortgagees and creditors from the registration of the certificate of taxation. (Hargrave v. Hargrave, 23 Beav. 484.) Writs of execution upon decrees and orders of courts of equity, under this section, must issue out of the court in which such decrees and orders are made, and cannot be awarded by a court of common law. (Stanford v. Robinson, 3 Mann. & G. 407; Re Stanford, 4 Scott, N. R. 23.) An order of the Court of Chancery for the payment of money, though a judgment debt within this section, cannot be attached under the garnishee clauses in the C. L. P. Act. 1854. (Re Price, L. R., 4 C. P. 155. See Re Frankland, L. R., 8 Q. B. 18.) A. B. had obtained an order in the Exchequer for payment of costs, against a party to a suit in Chancery, who was tenant for life of certain property over which a receiver had been appointed, with directions to pay her the rents. Such an order having the effect of a judgment under this section, Lord Langdale, M. R., gave leave to A. B., notwithstanding the appointment of a receiver, to sue out and execute such writs as he might be advised. (Grooch v. Hayworth, 3 Beav. 428.) A bill in equity to charge lands under the 13th and this section, with sums payable by virtue of a rule of court of common law, was held to be demurrable on the ground that the party filing the bill was not the person to whom the money was payable under the rule, but only the person for whose benefit such money was payable. (Crowther v. Crowther, 2 Jur., N. S. 274; 25 L. J., Ch. 511; 4 W. R. 351.) A rule for taxation of costs, and an allocatur of the master, do not amount to a judgment within this section. (Shaw v. Neale, 6 H. L. C. 581; 6 W. R. 635; 20 Beav. 157.) After verdict in ejectment, the successful party may sue out execution on the consent rule for the amount of his taxed costs, under this section, without any previous rule, calling upon the opposite party to pay such amount. (Doe d. Pennington v. Barrell, 10 Q. B. 531.) It seems that where a rule has the force of a judgment, under this section, it is not necessary that a rule should be served, calling on the party in default to show cause why he should not pay the amount mentioned in the rule. (Doe d. Harrison v. Hampson, 5 Dowl. & L. 484; 4 C. B. 745.) A rule calling on a party to pay money pursuant to an award, with a view to execution under this statute, is a rule nisi only; and the court refused to make such rule absolute without personal service, where it appeared that such service might be effected. (Winwood v. Holt or Hoult, 3 Dowl. & L. 85; 14 Mees. & W. 197; 15 Law. J., Exch. 10.) A judge's order for payment of money obtained ex parte cannot be made the foundation of an execution under this section. (Rickards v. Patterson, 1 Dowl. P. C., N. S. 52; 8 Mees. & W. 313; 5 Jur. 894. See Neale v. Postlethwaite, 8 Dowl. P. C. 100.) A party to whom a sum of money has been made payable by a rule of court is entitled under this section to sue out execution for the amount without any leave obtained from the court for that purpose. (Wallis v. Sheffield, 3 Jur. 1002.) A judge at the assizes made an order to postpone a cause to the next assizes, the defendant forthwith to pay to the plaintiff the costs of the day, to be taxed. This order was afterwards made a rule of court, before which, however, the suit having abated by the defendant's death, the court refused to order the costs to be taxed, with a view to the plaintiff's issuing exccution under this section. (Hill v. Brown, 11 Jur. 290; 16 Mees. & W. 796.) A judge's order under the 6 & 7 Vict. c. 73, s. 43, ordering judgment to be entered up for the amount found by the master's allocatur to be due on an attorney's bill of costs, has the same force as a rule of court for the payment of money under this section. No action, therefore, need be brought on such order, and if brought, the costs of the writ, declaration and appearance will not be allowed. (Griffiths v. Hughes, 11 Jur. 313; 16 Law J., Exch. 176; 16 Mees. & W. 809; 4 Dowl. & L. 719.) The words of this section, "monies or costs, charges or expenses," mean money decreed or ordered to be paid, together with the costs, &c., to be ascertained on taxation by the officer of the court, and no order to pay costs is requisite. (Jones v. Williams, 8 Mees. & W. 349; 9 Dowl. P. Č. 702; 5 Jur. 895.) Costs having been taxed upon a rule of court, the court refused to make an order upon the party to pay the ascertained amount, to found an execution under this section. (Hodgson v. Patterson, 5 Scott, N. R. 76; see Rickards v. Patterson, 8 Mees. & W. 313; Jones v. Williams, 8 Mees. & W. 349; 9 Dowl. 702; Neale v. Postlethwaite, 1 Ad. & E., N. S. 243; Doe v. Amey, 8 Mees. & W. 365.) A party entitled to costs under an interpleader order is not bound to take out execution under the Interpleader Act, 1 & 2 Will. 4, c. 58, s. 7, but may make the order a rule of court, and take out execution under this section. (Cetti v. Bartlett, 9 Mees. & W. 840.) Where an order of court was made for payment of costs of a motion to set aside an award, and a 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110, s. 18. |