(Hayward v. Smith, 20 L. T., N. S. 70; W. N. 1869, p. 37); and may direct the sale of the fee simple of an estate, subject to an executory devise over. (Groves v. Carbert, 55 Law Times, W. N. 165.) 4. In a suit for partition, where, if this act had not been passed, a decree for partition might have been made, then if the party or parties interested, individually or collectively, to the extent of one moiety or upwards in the property to which the suit relates, request the court to direct a sale of the property and a distribution of the proceeds, instead of a division of the property between or among the parties interested, the court shall, unless it sees good reason to the contrary, direct a sale of the property accordingly, and give all necessary or proper consequential directions (e). 31 & 32 Vict. c. 40, s. 3. Sale on applica tion of certain proportion of par ties interested. (e) Under this section, where the parties entitled to a moiety or upwards Effect of this secdesire a sale, the court must order it, unless some good reason is shown to tion. the contrary, or unless the persons objecting to a sale offer to purchase the shares of the parties desiring it, in which case the court has a discretion (under sect. 5) to authorize them to do so. (Per Lord Hatherley, Pemberton v. Barnes, L. R., 6 Ch. 694.) The onus is thrown on the person who says that the court ought not to order a sale to show some good reason why it should not do so: otherwise the court is bound to order it. (Id. 693.) The fact that the owner of one moiety of an estate is yearly tenant of the whole property, and occupies it for the purposes of his business, and also resides thereon, is no good reason" why a sale should not be ordered. (Wilkinson v. Joberns, L. R., 16 Eq. 14). In Lys v. Lys (L. R., 7 Eq. 126), Giffard, V.-C., held that the defendants had adduced no sufficient reason against a sale in their affidavit. And where the plaintiffs adduced evidence which was not contradicted, to show that the property would in all probability fetch a much higher price if sold as a whole than the allotted parts would sell for after a partition, Lord Hatherley, in spite of the strong objection of the defendants, ordered a sale of an estate comprising a first-class mansion, a park of 300 acres, 3,000 acres of agricultural land, and a manor. (Pemberton v. Barnes, L. R., 6 Ch. 685.) It has been said that the only "good reason to the contrary" is to show affirmatively that there is no difficulty in making an actual partition. (Re Langdale, I. R., 5 Eq. 572.) This section is retrospective. (Lys v. Lys, L. R., 7 Eq. 126.) 5. In a suit for partition, where, if this act had not been passed, a decree for partition might have been made, then if any party interested in the property to which the suit relates requests the court to direct a sale of the property and a distribution of the proceeds instead of a division of the property between or among the parties interested, the court may, if it thinks fit, unless the other parties interested in the property, or some of them, undertake to purchase the share of the party requesting a sale, direct a sale of the property, and give all necessary or proper consequential directions, and in case of such undertaking being given, the court may order a valuation of the share of the party requesting a sale in such manner as the court thinks fit, and may give all necessary or proper consequential directions (f). (f) Lord Hatherley considers that the provisions of this section apply to sales under both the 3rd and 4th sections. The court may think that a sale under the 3rd or 4th section is rather hard upon the parties who are Good reason to the contrary. Section is retrospective. As to purchase of share of party de siring sale. 31 & 32 Vict. c. 40, s. 5. Authority for parties interested to bid. Application of 13 & 14 Vict, Application of Parties to partition suits. Whether order for very anxious not to have a sale; and if they come forward and undertake to buy the share of the party who requests a sale, the court under this section can give them liberty to do so. (Pemberton v. Barnes, L. R., 6 Ch. 693.) 6. On any sale under this act the court may, if it thinks fit, allow of the parties interested in the property to bid at the any sale, on such terms as to nonpayment of deposit, or as to setting off or accounting for the purchase-money or any part thereof instead of paying the same, or as to any other matters, as to the court seem reasonable (g). (g) Under special circumstances the court will allow the party having the conduct of the sale to bid. (Pennington v. Dalbiac, 18 Ŵ. R. 684.) 7. Sect. 30 of the Trustee Act, 1850 (h) shall extend and apply to cases where, in suits for partition, the court directs a sale instead of a division of the property. (h) Ante, p. 660. 8. Sects. 23 to 25 (both inclusive) of the act of the session of the 19th and 20th years of her Majesty's reign (c. 120), "to facilitate Leases and Sales of Settled Estates," (i) shall extend and apply to money to be received on any sale effected under the authority of this act (k). (i) Ante, p. 695. (k) Where the only persons interested were an infant and a married woman, Wickens, V.-C., refused to order purchase-money to be paid to trustees, and directed it to be paid into court. (Higgs v. Dorkis, L. R., 13 Eq. 280.) And where the purchase-money had been paid into court, and some of the parties interested were married women and resident in Australia, Bacon, V.-C., refused to order payment out to trustees. (Aston v. Meredith, L. R., 13 Eq. 492.) 9. Any person who, if this act had not been passed, might have maintained a suit for partition, may maintain such suit against any one or more of the parties interested, without serving the other or others (if any) of those parties; and it shall not be competent to any defendant in the suit to object for want of parties; and at the hearing of the cause the court may direct such inquiries as to the nature of the property, and the persons interested therein, and other matters, as it thinks necessary or proper with a view to an order for partition or sale being made on further consideration (1); but all persons who, if this act had not been passed, would have been necessary parties to the suit, shall be served with notice of the decree or order on the hearing, and after such notice shall be bound by the proceedings as if they had been originally parties to the suit, and shall be deemed parties to the suit, and all such persons may have liberty to attend the proceedings; and any such person may, within a time limited by general orders, apply to the court to add to the decree or order. (7) Where in a partition suit a sale under this act was desired, James, sale will be made V.-C., at the hearing directed inquiries as to the parties interested in the property, but refused to make an order for sale; holding that such an order could not be made until further consideration, when the result of the at the hearing inquiries would be known. (Buckingham v. Sellick, 22 L. T., N. S. 370.) And where one of the parties interested was not before the court, although the plaintiffs who desired a sale represented a moiety of the property, Stuart, V.-C., directed the cause to stand over, with leave to amend by adding parties. (Dodds v. Gronow, 17 W. R. 511.) A decree has however been made at the hearing by Malins, V.-C., directing inquiries as to the persons interested, and for a sale of the property, if it should appear that all such persons were before the court. (Lester v. Alexander, W. N. 1869, p. 75.) And Wickens, V.-C., at the hearing directed inquiries as to the persons interested, and subject to its being shown that all such persons were before the court, and that a sale was desired by persons owning a moiety at least of the property, directed a sale, and ordered the proceeds to be paid into court. (Underwood v. Stewardson, 26 L. T., N. S. 688; 20 W. R. 668.) Where persons entitled to two-tenths of the property of which a partition was sought were not before the court, and it was uncertain whether they were or were not within the jurisdiction, James, V.-C., refused to make an order for sale at the hearing, and directed an inquiry as to the persons interested in the property and their shares therein, and whether such persons were out of the jurisdiction. (Silver v. Udall, L. R., 9 Eq. 227.) And where a person entitled to one forty-fifth part of the estate was out of the jurisdiction, and had not been served, and it did not appear that any attempt had been made to serve him, the same judge (on further consideration) refused to make an order for sale in his absence. (Hurry v. Hurry, L. R., 10 Eq. 346.) The Master of the Rolls, however, has made immediate decrees for sale in the absence of parties interested, who were out of the jurisdiction; but he has held that the decree must be served on the absent party before the sale is proceeded with, and it seems that advertisement of the decree in a newspaper is not sufficient service. (Peters v Bacon, L. R., 8 Eq. 125; Teall v. Watts, L. R., 11 Eq. 213.) 31 & 32 Vict. c. 40, s. 9. Where parties interested are out of the jurisdiction. 10. In a suit for partition the court may make such order costs in partition as it thinks just respecting costs up to the time of the hear- suits. ing (m). (m) The rule as to costs in partition suit before this act was that no costs were given until the hearing; and that the costs of the partition should be borne by the parties in proportion to the value of their respective interests; but not the costs of any subsequent proceedings. (1 Dan. Ch. Pr. 1032, 5th ed.) And in one case where a decree for sale was made under this act, the Master of the Rolls ordered each party to pay his own costs up to the hearing. (Landell v. Baker, L. R., 6 Eq. 268.) It seems, however, that when sales are directed under this act the costs of all parties will, as a general rule, be ordered to be paid out of the estate. (Osborn v. Osborn, L. R., 6 Eq. 338; Miller v. Marriott, L. R., 7 Eq. 1; Leach v. Westall, 17 W. R. 313; Simpson v. Ritchie, 21 W. R. 666.) And see Cannon v. Johnson (L. R., 11 Eq. 90), where the Master of the Rolls held, that in the absence of special circumstances the entire costs of a partition suit should be borne by the parties in proportion to their interests as declared by the decree. orders under this 11. Sections nine, ten, and eleven of "The Chancery Amend- As to general ment Act, 1858," relative to the making of general orders, shall act. have effect as if they were repeated in this act, and in terms 21 & 22 Vict. made applicable to the purposes thereof (n). c. 27. (n) Sects. 9-11 of 21 & 22 Vict. c. 27, are as follows:9. The Lord Chancellor of Ireland, with the advice and assistance of the Lord Chancellor, Master of the Rolls and the Lord Justice of Appeal in Ireland, or either of &c. in Ireland them, may and they are hereby required from time to time to make general may make rules rules and orders for carrying the purposes of this act into effect as regards for regulating the Court of Chancery in Ireland, and for regulating the times and forms fees. for procedure and 31 & 32 Vict. c. 40, s. 11. Sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of this act to extend to Court of Chancery of county palatine of Lancaster. Lord Chancellor, Jurisdiction of partition. 28 & 29 Vict. C. 99. and mode of procedure, and generally the practice of the said court in respect of the matters to which this act relates, and for regulating the fees and allowances to all officers of the said court and solicitors thereof in respect to such matters, and so far as may be found expedient for altering the course of proceeding hereinbefore prescribed in respect to the matters to which this act relates or any of them; and such rules and orders may from time to time be rescinded or altered by the like authority, and all such rules and orders shall take effect as general orders of the said court. 10. Sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of this act shall extend to, and all the powers therein contained may be exercised by, the Court of Chancery of the County palatine of Lancaster within the jurisdiction of the said court; and the Chancellor of the duchy and county palatine of Lancaster, with the advice and assistance of the Lords Justices of the Court of Appeal in the High Court of Chancery, or one of them, and of the Vice-Chancellor of the county palatine, may and they are hereby required from time to time to make such general rules and orders as may be necessary for assimilating the procedure and practice of the palatine court in respect of the matters aforesaid to those of the High Court of Chancery, and for regulating the fees and allowances in respect thereof. 11. The Lord Chancellor, with the advice and assistance of the Master of the Rolls, the Lords Justices of the Court of Appeal in Chancery, and the Vice-Chancellors, or any three of them, may and they are hereby required from time to time to make general rules and orders for carrying the purposes of this act into effect, and for regulating the times and form and mode of procedure, and generally the practice of the said court, in respect of the matters to which this act relates, and for regulating the fees and allowances to all officers of the said court and solicitors thereof in respect to such matters, and so far as may be found expedient for altering the course of proceeding hereinbefore prescribed in respect to the matters to which this act relates, or any of them, and such rules and orders may from time to time be rescinded or altered by the like authority, and all such rules and orders shall take effect as general orders of the said court. 12. In England the county courts shall have and exercise County Courts in the like power and authority as the Court of Chancery in suits for partition (including the power and authority conferred by this act) in any case where the property to which the suit relates does not exceed in value the sum of five hundred pounds, and the same shall be had and exercised in like manner and subject to the like provisions as the power and authority conferred by section one of "The County Courts Act, 1865.” APPENDIX. Forms for use on the Acknowledgment of Deeds by Memorandum to be indorsed on, or written at the Foot, or in the Margin of the Deed. This deed, marked B. [or some other letter or mark], was this day produced before us, and acknowledged by [christian and surname of married woman] therein named, to be her act and deed; previous to which acknowledgment the said [name of married woman] was examined by us, separately and apart from [name of husband], her husband, touching her knowledge of the contents of the said deed, and her consent thereto, and declared the same to be freely and voluntarily executed by her. Witness our hands, this 18-. day of [Signatures of two Commissioners.] (1). Where Acknowledgment relates to two or more Married Women. This deed marked A. [or some other letter or mark], was this day produced before us, and acknowledged by [christian and surnames of married women] therein named, to be their several acts and deeds; previous to which acknowledgments the said [names as above] were examined by us separately and apart from their respective husbands touching their knowledge of the contents of the said deed, and their consent thereto, and each of them declared the same to be freely and voluntarily executed by her. Dated the one thousand eight hundred and day of [Signatures of two Commissioners.] (1). (1) As to the acknowledgment of deeds by married women, see 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 74, s. 79, ante, p. 382; and as to the above memorandum, see 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 74, s. 84, ante, p. 387. Certificate of two of the perpetual Commissioners, of having taken the Acknowledgment of one Married Woman, to be written or engrossed on a separate piece of Parchment. These are to certify that on the day of January, 18—, before us, A. B. and C. D., two of the perpetual commissioners appointed for the county of for taking the acknowledgments of deeds by |