as absolutely dependent on the legislature, as they are on God for their personal creation, and continuance in being as men. For, whilst in this latter sense, they "live, move, and have their being in God:" so in the former sense, they live, move, and have their being, only by the power, and within the circle and extent of the legislature's jurisdiction.

But this absolute dependence of incorporate capacity, does not disable them from.exercising a self determining power over their own will, in enacting the laws of their society. Nor does this collective agent, in being thus the efficient of its own volitions, militate in any wise against either the honour or the authority of the supreme legislature. But on the contrary, its tendency is declaratively, to exalt, and magnify both; shining as the created image of that power, which invested it with ability to effect legislative volition, it glorifies the author of its incorporate being. The supreme legislature possesses within itself, allrequisite ability for willing and enacting in its legislative character. The incorporated legislature is, by derivation, possessed of similar powers of action. But the former legislates throughout all its wide dominion, and upon all subjects suitable for legislation: whilst the latter, by the law of the former, is restricted within circumscribed limits. Nor can it without incurring the penalty of a forfeiture of chartered rights, violate the prescribed bounds, or intermeddle with forbidden objects.

Pursuing this analogy of reasoning, from man dependent upon man, to man dependent upon God, we

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བས་ ་༣

are constrained thence to infer, that as incorporated ability, though derived and dependent, is nevertheless. capable of originating its own volitions, and of performing its own acts, without either infringing on the prerogatives, or requiring the exciting influence of the power whereby created and sustained; so, likewise, that man created in the image of the self determining Jehovah, and dependent on him, is nevertheless, rendered capable of originating his own volitions and actions, without either infringing on divine prerogatives, or being in all cases excited by divine influence to volition and action. And consequently, that as chartered societies perform actions which are wholly their own, and not the actions of the legislatures by whom created-so in like manner all men perform innumerable actions, which are wholly their own, and in no sense the actions of God.

Nor will it be insuperably formidable to object, that, for men to act independently of excitement from God, and independently of excitement from men, are things so entirely different in themselves, that whilst the latter may be possible, still the former must be wholly impossible, because in both cases, and in all others, God excites to every thing that is done, whether by men as individuals, or by them as composing, and constituting not merely the incorporate society, but even the supreme legislature itself. This objection is indeed specious, but not solid; because its foundation is sapped by its own fallacy; for its assertion of universal divine excitement causing all men to will and act, in all cases, is only begging the ques

tion, and proves nothing. And this objection is still further inconclusive, because, although, it adverts to an undeniable difference betwixt incorporate volition, considered merely as legal, and volition real and actual, yet it wholly overlooks the respective sources from whence these different kinds of ability are derived, the one being finite, and the other infinite: so that the inference from analogy still remains unimpaired.

In this view of the subject, we behold the independent and self determining Jehovah, ruling a world, not of machines, but of men. We behold him as Lord supreme, stamping his own image of self determining power, upon the dependent creature, man. And in this we recognize man's awful responsibility. For hereby we behold him become the proper subject of divine law, and of its penalties. Nor is he unconditionally rendered independent of control by divine, providence. For, at any moment, his liberty may be suspended, by the interposition of divine agency. But while so suspended, responsibility is also suspended. "The King's heart is in the hand of the Lord, as the rivers of water: he turneth it whethersoever he will."

(Proverbs XXI, 1.) As rivers of water are turned not by moral, but by natural influence, so the heart under such influence is no more accountable, than was the Euphrates when turned by the stratagem of the victorious Cyrus. But man, when enticed by his lusts, to yield himself up as a bond slave of satan, then judicially abandoned of God, his lost freedom will but ill excuse him; because he then only "Eats of the fruit of his own ways, and is filled with his

own devices." (Proverbs, 1, 31.) Having thus in the maintenance of human self ability of volition, endeavoured to vindicate divine creating power, against the imputation of impotency, to constitute other agency than that of mental machinery, I shall in my next, attempt to expose other errours no less pernicious and absurd.

LETTER XI.

SIR,

DOCTOR Emmons truly and justly ob. serves, that "the only wise God can no more require us to believe that which is absurd, than he can command us to do that which is sinful." Fully impressed with the self-evidence, and great importance of this proposition, as containing an interesting first principle of reason and knowledge, I cannot refrain from applying it to immediate use. And therefore am thus led to reason, viz. First. As God can no more require us to believe that which is absurd, than he can command us to do that which is sinful, therefore, He cannot require us to believe in Hopkinsianism, because it abounds in absurdities. And secondly. As God can no more command us to do that which is sinful, than he can require us to believe what is absurd; therefore, neither can he cause us to do that which is sinful: because for Deity to turn the corrupter of his

own creatures, and then to punish them for being so corrupt, is of all other absurdities the greatest: and if it were possible to be done, would be of all other sinfulness, the most sinful. But forbearing to press so disagreeable an application of the doctor's own discovered first principles; permit me, sir, to solicit your attention to his definition of moral agency, namely; "Were men destitute of conscience, they would be equally incapable of feeling moral obligation, and of

distinguishing the moral quality of actions; neither "perception nor reason could give them this moral "discernment. It is conscience which constitutes "them moral agents, and raises them to the rank of "accountable beings." (Emmons.)

This definition of moral agency strikingly resembles the mutilated ones of West and Edwards, already noticed. For, like them, though designed for human kind, it excludes affections, passions, will, imagination, and animal appetites. And which, if actually rooted out of our nature, would render us as incapable of volition and action, as the inventers of the new divinity could wish or desire. But these three distinguished divines differed each from the other as to moral endowment. For West in his definition of it, wholly omitted conscience. Edwards, in a mysterious manner, seemed to hint at it, as somewhat necessary. But Emmons constitutes it the all in all. For he says, as above inserted, "It is conscience which constitutes moral agents, and raises them to the rank of accountable beings."