the meaning of the Metropolis Management Acts and repairable by the vestry, as was held in Kershaw v. Taylor ([1895] 2 Q. B., 471). The vestry resist the application mainly on the ground which they contend was overlooked in Kershaw v. Taylor-that previous approval of the construction of the sewer does not appear to have been obtained from the Metropolitan Board of Works as was required by section, 69 of the Metropolis Management Act, 1855, and other portions of that and the amending Acts. After the lapse of thirty years such consent ought perhaps to be presumed in the absence of clear disproof; but, even assuming it to be clearly disproved, we think that the objection must fail. The mere fact that the requisite consent was not obtained for the making of the sewer does not prevent it from being a sewer when made. Further, we think that, from the circumstances stated in the affidavits and from the nature of the case, it ought to be inferred that the vestry knew and approved of the making of the sewer and of its connection with their principal sewer in the adjoining street, and cannot now raise the objection. Another ground of less general importance is also taken-namely, that this sewer is within the exception from the general enactment of section 250 of the Metropolis Management Act, 1855, as having been made “under the order of any vestry." As to this objection, it is enough to say that there is no evidence to support it. As we have said, we think the sewer must have been made with the knowledge of the vestry and without disapproval by them, but there is nothing to show that it was made by their order. No such facts are proved as in Bateman v. Poplar District Board of Works (33 Ch. D., 360) were held to be equivalent to an express order. The rule for a mandamus will be made absolute, with costs.-(T. L. R. [1896], 12 Q. B., p. 448.) (764.) COUNTY COUNCIL OF MIDDLESEX v. ASSESSMENT [JUNE 5TH, 1896.] Rating-Poor Rate-Rateability-Sessions House used partly for Judicial Business and partly for County Business. A Sessions House was used partly for holding Courts of Quarter Sessions and for other judicial business, and partly by the County Council for the public business of the county. Held, that so far as the building was used for local and administrative purposes connected with the county, the County Council were rateable in respect thereof.—(L. T. R. [1896], 12 Q. B., p. 454.) (765.) [QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION.] THE MAYOR OF EASTBOURNE v. BRADFORD. [MAY 14TH AND 15TH, JUNE 18TH, 1896. Local Government-Drain or Sewer-Expenses of Repairing-Drain connecting with Public Sewer two or more Houses belonging to different Owners-" Single Private Drain "-Public Health Act 1875 (38 39 Vict. c. 55), s. 41; Public Health Acts Amendment Act 1890 (53 & 54 Vict. c. 59), s. 19. A drain, passing through private property, connected several houses belonging to different owners with a public sewer, and received and conveyed to the public sewer the drainage of these houses. Sect. 19 of the Public Health Acts Amendment Act 1890 having been made applicable to the district: Held that this drain was a "single private drain connecting two or more houses belonging to different owners with a public sewer," within the meaning of Sect. 19 of the Act of 1890; and that therefore the local authority was entitled to proceed, under Sect. 41 of the Public Health Act 1875, against the owners of the houses in respect cf a nuisance in the drain. Self v. The Hove Commissioners (72 L. T. Rep. 234; (1895) 1 Q. B. 685) approved and followed. Hill v. Hair (72 L. T. Rep. 629; (1895) 1 Q. B. 906) disapproved of —(L. T., vol. lxxiv., p. 751.) (766.) BATES v. DONALDSON. [JUNE 11TH and 20TH, 1896.] Landlord and Tenant-Lease-Forfeiture-Covenant not to Assign without Licence-Licence not to be Unreasonably Withheld. The plaintiff was the assignee of the reversion of the lease of a house for fourteen years, expiring in 1902, which contained a covenant not to assign without a licence which was "not to be unreasonably withheld in the case of a respectable and responsible person," and also a proviso for re-entry on breach of covenant. The plaintiff had bought the reversion for the purpose of providing a residence for his wife and grandchildren after his death, and was very desirous of getting immediate possession. The lessee wished to sell his interest for £400. The plaintiff was willing to pay that sum. The lessee agreed to sell to the defendant for that sum, and applied to the plaintiff for a licence to assign. The defendant was a respectable and responsible person, and did not intend to use the house in any manner to which objection could be made. The plaintiff refused his licence because he wished to obtain a surrender to himself. He was always willing to pay the lessee £400, but he did not offer that or any sum when he refused his licence, or at any time before the trial. The lease was assigned to the defendant, who entered into possession. The plaintiff sued to recover possession of the house upon the ground that the lease was forfeited by assignment without licence. Held (affirming the judgment of Mathew, J.), that the licence had been unreasonably withheld, and that a forfeiture had not been incurred. -(L. T., C. A. vol. lxxiv. p. 751.) (767.) [IN THE HOUSE OF LORDS.] CONQUEST AND ANOTHER v. EBBETTS AND ANOTHER. [JULY 30TH, 1896.] Landlord and Tenant-Breach of Covenant to Keep in RepairMeasure of Damages-Underlease. Decision of Court of Appeal affirmed. This was an appeal from a judgment of the Court of Appeal (11 The Times L.R., 454) affirming a decision of one of the Official Referees as to the amount damages payable by the appellants for breach of covenant to keep in repair. The premises in question were known as the Grecian Theatre, in the City Road, and they are now occupied by "General" Booth for the purposes of the Salvation Army. The original lease of the premises was granted in 1840, by trustees for the parish of St. Botolph, Bishopsgate, to one Rouse for 61 years, from Michaelmas, 1837. Rouse, in March, 1851, granted an underlease to one Oliver for the original term less the last ten days thereof. The respondents now represented Rouse; the appellant Conquest now represented Oliver. "General" Booth was assignee of the underlease, which contained a covenant by the underlessee to keep the premises in repair. The respondents sued Conquest and "General" Booth for damages for alleged breach of the covenant. Mr. Justice Romer, in December last, held that there had been a breach of the covenant, and referred it to the Official Referee to assess the amount of the damages. The Official Referee assessed the damages at £1,305. The appellant Booth appealed. The respondents contended that the proper measure of damages was the sum which it would cost to put the premises in proper repair, allowing a discount for the period for which the sublease had yet to run. It was admitted that on this principle the sum of £1.305 was the right amount. The appellants contended that the proper measure of damages was the amount of the depreciation in the value of the respondents' reversion. The appellants alleged that the buildings would be of little or no value at the end of the term in their existing condition, and that the owner would then have to pull them down, sell the material, and erect buildings of a different character. And it was contended the proper measure of damages was the difference between the selling value of the materials as matters stood and that which would have been their selling value if the covenant had been performed. This difference it was said would be only £200. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. The appellants then brought the present appeal to their Lordships' Honse. The case was argued some time ago, when judgment was reserved, Lord HERSCHELL.-The appellants in the present case contend that the damages for the admitted breach of a contract to keep certain demised premises in repair have been assessed on a wrong principle. The facts may be very shortly stated. In May, 1840, the then Bishop of London demised certain premises to Thomas Rouse for a term of 61 years from Michaelmas, 1837, at a rent of £350 a year. In March, 1851, a portion of these premises was demised to Benjamin Oliver, by way of underlease, for the original term less ten days at the same rent, being in effect an improved rent of about £100 a year. The covenauts to keep the demised premises in repair and to deliver them up in good repair were in substantially the same terms in the lease and underlease. The respondents are the present trustees under the will of Thomas Rouse, the original lessee. The one appellant is the personal representative of Oliver, the sub-lessee, and the other is an assignee of the sub-lease. The premises comprised in the sub-lease not having been kept in repair pursuant to the covenant contained in it, the action in which this appeal arises was brought. The assessment of damages was referred to Mr. Ridley, one of the Official Referees, who fixed them at the sum of £1,305. At the time when the case was heard there were about 3 years of the term unexpired. He arrived at the sum named by ascertaining how much it would require to put the premises in the state of repair in which they would have been if the covenant had been observed, and then allowing a rebate from that sum in consideration of the fact that the lease had still some years to run. The Court of Appeal considered that, there having been notice to the sublessee of the original lease and of the covenants contained in it, it was right to take into account in assessing the damages the liability of the respondents on those covenants, and that the damages had been properly assessed on the basis of awarding to the respondents a sum which represented the diminution in the value of their reversion due to the breach of covenant by the appellants. Where an action for non-repair had been brought during the currency of a lease it was said by Lord Chief Justice Holt, in Vivian v. Champion (2 Lord Raymond, 1,125), in answer to the objection that it was a hard action, for may be the lessee might leave the premises in repair at the end of the term and that therefore it was usual to give but small damages :-" We always inquire in these cases what it will cost to put the premises in repair and give so much damages, and the plaintiff ought in justice to apply the damages to the repair of the premises." In the case of the Trustees of Worcester, &c., v. Rowlands (9 Cas. and P., 734), Mr. Justice Coleridge said:"In estimating the damages in cases where the lease has a long time to run it is not fair to take the amount that would be necessary to put the premises into repair as the measure of damages. The true question, therefore, is, To what extent is the reversion injured by the non-repair of the premises? If the lease had 99 years to run it could not make much difference in the value of the reversion whether the premises were now in repair or not. This lease. however, will expire in about six years." I may observe that what the learned Judge said with regard to a lease having 99 years to run would not be applicable in all cases. There are circumstances in which it might be of the utmost importance to the reversioners that the buildings should be in a proper state of repair. Chief Justice Holt's statement of the law has been subjected to criticism in other cases, and notably by Barons Parke and Alderson in Turner v. Lamb. I do not think any hard-and-fast rule can be laid down as to the damages which may be recovered by the covenantee during the currency of a lease in respect of the breach of a covenant to keep the demised premises in repair. All the circumstances of the case must be taken into consideration, and the damages must be assessed at such a sum as reasonably represents the damage which the covenantee has sustained by the breach of covenant. I quite agree with the criticism to which Lord Holt's view has been subjected if that learned Judge intended to lay down that, whatever the circumstances and however long the term had to run, the damages must necessarily be what it would cost to put the premises into repair. On the other hand, I think it would be equally wrong to hold that this could never be the measure of damages whatever the circumstances and however nearly the term had expired. But in the present case, if the test be applied of inquiring how much the value of the respondents' reversion has been diminished by the breach of covenant-a test for which I understand the appellants to contend-I cannot see that there has been any error in the assessment of damages. If the premises were now in good repair the reversion of the respondents would secure them the improved rent of £100 a year to the end of the term, without any liability on their part, unless it were to the extent to which repairs subsequently became necessary. As matters stand they can only receive this rent subject to the liability of restoring the premises to good repair, so that they may in that condition redeliver them to their lessor. The difference between these two positions represents the diminution in the value of their reversion owing to the breach of covenant, and on this basis the damages seem to me to have been properly assessed. It was contended for the appellants that the respondents would not be bound in any case to spend upon the premises the sum necessary to put them in repair or at the expiration of the term to pay that sum to their lessor. It was said that, owing to the nature of the premises and the changed circumstances of the neighbourhood, the freeholder would make an entirely different use of the site when the term he had created came to an end; that he would not desire to have the buildings |