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appears, have built a new weir in a fresh position, and I fail to see on what ground they withstand their liability.

C. SIMMONS, Fellor.


If it is clear beyond doubt that the land has been washed away through the Conservators' negligence in building the retaining wall of insufficient length to prevent the water from the weir they had constructed doing damage to the riparian owner's land, which would not otherwise have arisen, I should say the Conservators might be held liable.

The Tiames Conservancy Act of 1894 consolidated and amended the Conservators' statutory powers. The Section (62) embodying inter alia the powers to make and alter weirs makes no mention of compensation for damage arising in consequence of the works, but by the saving clause (Section 238) it is expressly enacted that, except where otherwise stated, the Act shall not alter or abridge any right, claim, &c., of any occupier or owner of land on the banks of the Thames. This would appear to leave. the matter to be dealt with under the common law.

W. H. WELLS, Fellon.


Presumably, the Conservaturs, in constructing the new seir, were acting under their statutory powers. In such case, if the tutes enabling them to construct the weir provide for the compensation of persons who suffer damage from the exercise of the powers conferred by such statutes. and the Conservators have not been negligent in what they have done, the remedy of the riparian owner is by claiming compensation. If, on the other hand, the Conservators were guilty of negligence in constructing the weir in the way in which it was constructed, or were acting outside their statutory powers, the riparian owner has a right of action to recover damages for the wrongful acts of the Conservators.


Replies to Query CCCLVII. (Vol. VIII., p. 280.)




The lease and supplementary agreement containing no clause providing for a valuation, I am of opinion that the memorandum appointing an ampire is a submission to arbitration, under the Arbitration Act, 1889.



I should certainly say that the terms of memorandum appointing the umpire come under the provisions of the Arbitration Act, 1889. (See definition of submission in Section 27 of that Act.) Failing this, the best course would, I think, be to sue the outgoing tenant for all rent and arrears due. This would bring him to book at once, and he would have to pay up or make a counterclaim for tenant right, which would of course result in a reference.

WM. WRIGHT, Fellon.


The proceedings seem to be in order, provided the delivery of the letter to the outgoing tenant's valuer can be proved. All notices of this kind should be served by registered letter through the post. The tenant can claim either under the Act of 1883 or by custom of the estate or locality. The fact of claims and counterclaims having been admitted, although the tenant's valuer declined to sign the umpire's appointment, the landlord can apply either to the County Court or the Land Commissioners to appoint a single valuer to settle the case. The delivery to a referee of his appointment must be deemed a submission to a reference by the person delivering it, and neither party has power to revoke a submission or the appointment of a referee without the consent of the other.


Replies to Query CCCLVIII. (Vol. VIII., p. 280).



In the metropolis, bay windows may project beyond the general line of building, in conformity with Sub-section 5 of Section 73 of the London Building Act, 1894.

WM. WEAVER, Fillon.


The question of building line is one absolutely for the decision of the local authority. See Public Health and Streets Act, 1888, also Section 156 Public Health Act, 1875, which the 1888 Act repeals.

C. JONES, Fellow,


The question being put with a singular lack of precision and meagreness of detail, this reply must be taken for what it is worth, and read with respect to the presumptions necessary to be made before any kind of reply can be given. “It is contended that the bays should not have projected.” Contended by whom ? The situation of the estate not being given, I assume the question has no relation to the local authority, but is between the owner of the estate (or the owner or lessee of some vacant building plots thereon) and the owner or lessee (or owners or lessees) of the two plots of land on the estate on which plots the two houses with the offending bay windows are built. Reference should be made to the estate plan, and the agreements, conveyances, or leases, to ascertain the meaning of the term “ building line," and the covenants and obligations of the contracting parties in connection therewith. If it is stipulated that no buildings or any portion of them are to project beyond the “ building line," then, of course, the bays should not so have been projected. Where a general building scheine is disclosed by the conveyances or leases, the purchaser or lessee has his remedy in the Chancery Division against the owners or lessees offending against the scbeme if the offence be committed subsequent to the acquisition of the plaintiff of his, the plaintiff's, plots. But if the matter of complaint be trivial, cansing no substantial damage to the plaintiff, the result of his action might be nothing more than the pleasure of paying his own costs.



These are apparentiy the first houses erected on the estate, therefore the question of line of frontage from the local authority's point of view does not arise.

In many districts it is customary for the face of the main front walls to be considered the “building line." Should the face of the bay windows be thus considered, these projections would probably vary in measurement, and involve a very irregular line of house fronts.

This case seems to be a matter for arrangement between the owners of the estate and the building owner, which arrangement might be influenced by the clauses (if any) referring to the subject in the conveyance or lease.

C. H. LOWE, Fellone.

Reply to Query CCCLIX. (Vol. VIII., p. 281.)

ADJOINING OWNER. It appears to me that a formal notice is only necessary when the building owner proposes to exercise the rights defined in Section 88. The case mentioned would come under the provisions as set forth in Section 87, and the adjoining owner is protected by Section 95, Subsection 2 (a).


Replies to Query CCCLX. (Vol. VIII., p. 281).




Assuming that the tenant is not under notice, there is no obligation on either landlord or tenant to follow any other than the ordinary course. The tenant may carry on the usual system of cultivation, and will be awarded compensation on account of his tenancy being determined and for any matter incidental to the hiring of the land by the Council, which will include tenant-right. Should, however, the tenant be already under a notice expiring at Lady Day, I think the landlord cannot relet, but can claim for loss of rent and for any tenant-right he may have to pay the quitting tenant; but what remedy he may have in the event of the negotiations finally dropping I do not know. One would suppose that the order of the Local Government Board would constitute a contract by which the Parish Council would be bound, and that if they go to arbitration they must subunit to and be bound by the award.

J. H. SABIN, Professional Associate.


There can be no doubt that all the points contained in the four questions are to be deiermined by the arbitrator when appointed. By Section 10 (2) of the Local Government Act, 1894, everything connected with the terms by which the Parish Council shall take land is left to the determination of the arbitrator, who is to decide the rent and terms of the holding, and also the compensation payable to the dispossessed tenant. The Allotments Act of 1887 brings any such arbitration within the terms of the Lands Clauses Act, so that the award can be made a rule of Court by either party, and is not liable to be set aside for irregularity or errors in form. I should say “yes” to the questions Nos. 1, 2, and 3, and that the arbitrator will necessarily in his award fix the time when the Parish Council shall take possession and commence to pay rent. As to the last question, the tenant, until the date of possession is fixed, ought to proceed in the ordinary course with the cultivation and cropping of his land. The assumption that the Parish Council can draw back if they do not like the terms fixed by the arbitrator does not seem to be at all justified by any. thing in the Acts of Parliament.

WM. WRIGHT, Fellow.


I should consider the tenant would have the right to cultivate the field in the ordinary course of husbandry as though the order was nonexistent, unless, of course, there is something in the order to prevent him doing so, and if he does so cultivate the land he will be entitled to a fair tenant-right valuation. As to giving up the land immediately upon any award being made, this is a legal question, but I think there is no doubt that, in whatever position he may be placed, he must be fairly compensated.

JOHN SHAW, Fellon.

Replies to Query CCCLXI. (Vol. VIII., p. 282).




If A is the owner of the freehold of the road and B has the right of way over it only, and concurrent with such right of way would go the power to repair it for his own benefit if he so desires, no joint liability for repair being proved

1. I am of opinion that A is not bound to repair the road damaged by his user.

2. Unless done by special agreement, I think that if A repaired the road he might establish a joint liability to repair.



This inquiry should give further particulars, and the proper answer will depend largely on the facts. The tenants of B's land may have a right of way over the soil only, or subject to making good any damage. Probably the counsel's opinion is given with full knowledge of facts not disclosed in this question, and is a correct statement of the law. If A repair for his own purposes, he should take care that he is not prejudicing his rights against the tenants of B.

A. VERNON, Fellor.


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1. Assuming that counsel's opinion is correct, a good deal must depend upon the ground and extent of B's tenants' liability. If they repair “ ratione tenuræ," or to maintain an easement, I should consider A's obligation would be to leave the road after his user no worse than he found it.

2. If A's obligation is as stated above, it would, of course, be coextensive with his user.


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