a certain appeal by the East London Waterworks against the quinquennial valuation list for 1895 for the parish of St. John at Hackney. The real question in the case was whether the fact of the notice of objection to the Assessment Committee being only in respect of the rateable value and not of the gross value of the premises, prevented the Quarter Sessions, to whom the appeal from the refusal of the Assessment Committee to give relief came, from entering into the question of the gross value. The facts were these. The Appellants gave notice of objection to the Assessment Committee against the rateable value of their works. The Committee, to put it shortly, refused to alter the figures. It was asserted, on behalf of the appellants, that the Committee considered both the rateable and the gross value, and gave a decision in respect of both values, the overseers not taking objection to this course. This was not, however, conceded by the other side. There was said to be certainly no express consent by the overseers. The appellants then gave notice of appeal to Quarter Sessions against the gross value and the rateable value. When the appeal came on at the Quarter Sessions that Court refused to enter into the consideration of the gross value. The mandamus was sought for to compel them to hear and determine the appeal on both the grounds set forth in the notice of the appeal. The COURT refused to grant the mandamus. Mr. Justice WRIGHT said the rule must be discharged. The notice of objection given to the Assessment Committee only purported to apply to the rateable value. The Committee primâ facie could not on that inquire into the gross value. It was said that they did enter upon it, but he thought that that had not been made out. If their decision was on the rateable value only, the appeal to Quarter Sessions could only be against that. Mr. Justice BRUCE concurred. He could not say that the Assessment Committee had been shown to have decided as to both values. There was no express waiver on the part of the overseers, or consent that the Assessment Committee should decide matters not in the notice of objection. (T. L. R. [1897], Q. B. D., vol. xiii., p. 160.) (807.) [QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION.] WORCESTERSHIRE COUNTY COUNCIL v. WORCESTER UNION AND OTHERS. [JANUARY 20TH, 1897.] Rating-Poor Rate-Rateability. Part of a shire-hall was solely occupied for Crown purposes, and was not rated. Part was used for mixed purposes--for the Crown and for administrative business by the County Council. Held, that the part used for mixed purposes was rateable. This was a special case stated by consent, after a notice of appeal to Quarter Sessions of Worcestershire, raising a question as to the rating of the Shire Hall, Worcester. The recent case of the Middlesex County Council v. St. George's Union Assessment Committee (reported ante. p. 61, and [1896], 2 Q. B., 143; [1897], 1`Q. B., 64) was sought to be distinguished, but was held to govern the present case, and make the premises rateable. The COURT upheld the rating. Mr. Justice WRIGHT said there was no suggestion that the County Council did not occupy the buildings. He could not see any ground why the rateability which the case cited showed to exist in respect of an occupation for administrative purposes should be affected by the fact that the premises were used for Crown purposes from time to time. That might affect the quantum of rateable value, perhaps, but that question was not raised in the present case. The appeal must be dismissed. Mr. Justice BRUCE concurred.-(T. L. R. [1897), Q. B., vol. xiii. p. 162.) (808.) [IN THE COURT OF APPEAL.] THE DEAN AND CHAPTER OF ST. ASAPH v. THE OVERSEERS OF THE PARISH OF LLANRHAIADR YN MOCHNANT. [JANUARY 25TH, 1897.] Rating-Poor Rate-Assessment - Tithe Rent-charge-Deductions— Validity-Tenant's Profits-Repair of Chancel. This was a appeal from the judgment of a Divisional Court (Mr. Justice Wills and Mr. Justice Wright) on a special case stated for the purpose of bringing an appeal from the Quarter Sessions of the county of Montgomery. The appellants were the Dean and Chapter of St. Asaph ; the respondents were the overseers of the parish of Llanrhaiadr yn Mochnant and the Assessment Committee of Llanfyllin Union. The appellants were in the year 1895 assessed by the assessment committee to the poor rate in respect of certain tithe rent-charge at the gross estimated rental of £280 28. 2d., and the rateable value of £233 58. The gross amount payable to the appellants in respect of the tithe rent-charge for the year 1895 was £280 2s. 2d., and the question in the appeal related solely to the deductions which ought to be made therefrom in order to arrive at the net rateable value. The quarter sessions allowed the following deductions:(4) The sum of £30 13s. 2d., being the amount of poor and other rates calculated on the tithe rent-charge for 1894; (B) A deduction of £4 per centum upon the gross estimated rental to cover—(a), remuneration of collector, (b) legal costs and out of pocket expenses, (c) bad debts and irregularity in payments, (d) tenant's taxes, if any; (C) a further deduction of £1 per centum of the gross estimated rental for tenant's profits; (D) a further £1 per centum in respect of the liability of the appellants to maintain the chancel of the parish church of Llanrhaiadr yn Mochnant. The principal questions argued were whether the Quarter Sessions were right in making an allowance for tenant's profits, and in making an allowance in respect of the liability to maintain the chancel of the parish church. The Divisional Court held that the Quarter Sessions were wrong in making such allowances. The dean and chapter appealed to the Court of Appeal. The COURT dismissed the appeal. The MASTER of the ROLLS said that the Court of Quarter Sessions, after rightly making certain deductions, proceeded to make two more deductions. With regard to the deduction for tenant's profits, there was nothing to justify it; the special case as stated did not contain any facts to support the allowance of such a deduction. So also with regard to the liability to repair the chancel. The hypothetical tenant had nothing to do with the chancel; he could never be charged with the repair of it, or have to pay for such repair. There was, therefore, no ground for making a deduction in this respect. The judgment of the Divisional Court was right, and the appeal must be dismissed. The LORDS JUSTICES delivered judgments to the like effect.-(T. L. R. [1897], C. A., vol. xiii. p. 168.) (809.) [CHANCERY DIVISION.] FLETCHER v. NOKES. [JANUARY 28TH, 1897.] Landlord and Tenant-Forfeiture-Breach of Covenant-Notice of "Particular Breach"-Sufficiency of Notice-Action to Recover Possession-Damages-Conveyancing and Law of Property Act, 1881 (44 & 45 Vict., c. 41) s. 14, sub-s. 1. The notice to be served by a lessor on his lessee, under section 14, subsection 1, of the Conveyancing Act, 1881, "specifying the particular breach of covenant complained of," to entitle the lessor to enforce by action a right of re-entry for the breach, must be given in such detail as will enable the lessee to understand what is complained of, so that he may have an opportunity of remedying the breach before action brought. A mere general notice of breach of a specified covenant is not sufficient. A notice by the lessor to his lessee that "you have broken the covenants for repairing the inside and outside of the houses" (describing them) contained in a specified lease : Held to be insufficient, and on this ground an action by the lessor to recover possession of the demised houses for breach of covenant was dismissed with costs. Held also, that the lessor could not maintain the action for damages for the breach.-(L. R. [1897], C. D., vol. i., p. 271.) (810.) [QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION.] BRETT v. ROGERS. [JANUARY 21ST AND 29TH, 1897.] "all Taxes, Landlord and Tenant-Lease-Covenant by Lessee to pay The defendant, who was the lessee of the plaintiff, covenanted to "pay the land tax, sewers rate, and all other taxes, rates, duties, assessments; and impositions, parliamentary, parochial, or otherwise, which now are or shall at any time during this demise be assessed or imposed on or in respect of the said demised premises." Very shortly after the commencement of the lease the sanitary authority served a notice on the plaintiff as owner, under the Public Health (London) Act, 1891, directing him to abate a nuisance on the premises, and for that purpose to take up a defective drain and lay a new drain throughout the premises. The plaintiff incurred expenses in complying with the notice, and sued the defandant to recover the amount : Held, that the obligation to lay the new drain was a "duty imposed in respect of the premises," and that the defendant was liable to pay to the plaintiff the amount expended by her in complying with the notice of the sanitary authority.—(L. R. [1897], Q. B. D., vol. i. p. 525.) (811.) [QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION.] HOLLAND . LAZARUS. [FEBRUARY 11TH, 1897.] Metropolis-Sewer-Drain-Nuisance-Liability to Repair. The plaintiff carried on the business of a lodging-house keeper at 18a, Dyssell Street, Dalston Lane, and the defendant is the owner of of Nos. 20, 22, 24, and 26, Dyssell Street, adjoining the plaintiff's premises. The plaintiff claimed damages for a nuisance created by sewage matter percolating through the soil into his premises, and an injunction. The claim for an injunction was subsequently withdrawn and also a counter-claim by the defendant. It appeared that a drain from the defendant's four houses, constructed under the order of the vestry in 1884, ran under the plaintiff's lodging-house. It was alleged that, owing to the defective construction of this drain, the lodging-house was, in the earlier months of 1896, rendered partly uninhabitable by the percolation of sewage and noxious gases, and that this resulted in serious loss of lodgers to the plaintiff. The defence was that the nuisance was caused by the plaintiff, or his predecessor in title, having a 3-in. rainpipe improperly connected with the drain by means of a 6-in. pipe. Evidence was given that there was absolutely no fastening in the connections, and that the smells and leakage resulted, at any rate in great part, from this fact, though it was alleged that leakages had also occurred from other portions of the defendant's pipe. His LORDSHIP was at first inclined to hold that the pipe was a drain," but subsequently held that, though it had been a "drain" for the defendant's four houses, the junction of the rainpipe in the plaintiff's house, had made it a sewer. He cited "The Queen v. the Vestry of St. Matthew, Bethnal Green," as an authority for his decision. He also held that the plaintiff could not recover for nuisance, on the ground that whatever nuisance there was arose from the imperfect joining of the plaintiff's own pipe on his own premises. But he held that a certain amount of leakage from the defendant's pipe, as it passed under the plaintiff's house, had been proved, and that, on the authority of "Humphries v. Cousins" (2 C.P., 239), the defendant was technically liable for a trespass. Mr. Robinson submitted that, the leakage being from a sewer which was reparable by the vestry, the defendant could not be liable for the escape of his sewage from the sewer, but his Lordship gave judgment for the plaintiff with one farthing damages for the trespass, but directed that he should pay all costs save such as should appear to the Taxing Master attributable to the trespass, and he gave the plaintiff costs on the counter claim.-(T. L. R., [1897], Q. B. D., vol. xiii. p. 207). (812.) [IN THE COURT OF APPEAL.] [FEBRUARY 18TH, 1897.] THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL v. TOD-HEATLY AND OTHERS. (For a previous stage of this Case, see p. 321 ante.) Metropolis-Nuisance-Owner of Waste Land-Liability— Public Health (London) Act, 1891, яs. 13 & 35. (Decision of Kekewick, J. reversed.) Lord Justice LINDLEY said that their Lordships had been considering what they ought to do, and that the order which they suggested was this; Discharge the order appealed from and allow the appeal. Declare that the defendant Sir H. M. Brownrigg was legally bound to prevent the piece of land in question from continuing to be a public nuisance, and that the Attorney-General was entitled to an injunction to enforce the performance by him of such duty. Liberty for the Attorney-General to apply to the Judge for such an injunction if necessary. The defendant to pay the costs of the action so far as it was dismissed against the defendant without costs, and also to pay the costs of the appeal. Lord Justice LINDLEY, in delivering judgment, said that, looking at the matter from the point of view of the public, the case was of the simplest possible description. The defendant, Sir H. M. Brownrigg, was |
