formerly used and occupied by the St. George's Harbour Company for the purposes of their undertaking. The remaining items were constructed on land acquired by the appellants under their subsequent Acts.

After notice of appeal against the rate had been given, the respondents admitted that in respect of items 12, 13, and 14, the appellants ought only to be assessed at one-fourth of the full net annual value.

The questions for the opinion of the Court were whether the appellants were liable to be assessed and rated in respect of the properties mentioned in the schedule in the proportion of one-fourth of the agricultural value thereof, or in the proportion of one-fourth of the full net annal value thereof, or whether they were liable to be assessed and rated in respect of the properties mentioned in items 1 to 11 of the schedule at the full net annual value thereof.

POLLOCK, B. This is an appeal against a general improvement rate made by the Llandudno Improvement Commissioners upon property belonging to the London and North Western Railway situate within the area governed by their Improvement Act. The case is stated for our opinion in respect of certain particular portions of the railway property which are designated in the schedule to the case, being numbered from 1 to 14.

Now the substantial question which has been argued before us is one, no doubt, of considerable importance, and I must for myself say that but for the decisions that have already passed upon this subject I should have taken time to consider what would be the true and sound rule of dealing with the rating of railways and adjuncts to railways. But it seems to me that the matter is already established by decision.

The question arises under Section 68 of the Llandudno Improvement Act, 1854, and that provides, first, "That the owners and occupiers of houses, buildings, court-yards, and gardens, and all other property, shall be rated at the full net value of the same." That would include, by the specific mention of houses and buildings, all houses and buildings that were part of a railway station, because there is there a definite distinct denomination of the particular property which is rated, and that must be taken to govern, although in a minor sense those buildings may be said to be a part of the railway station. Therefore, so far as those buildings are concerned, no question can arise. But now comes this provision: "Provided always that the occupier of any land used" (I pass over the first part and go to the particular subject-matter in hand) " as a railway constructed under the powers of any Act of Parliament for public conveyance shall, so far as respects the said General Improvement Rate, be assessed in respect of the same in the proportion of one-fourth part only of such net annual value thereof." Then comes the question whether the different specified lands beginning with No. 1 and ending with No. 11-lands and things built upon the land-are within that provision a part of a railway constructed under the powers of an Act of Parliament, and so forth. I think the first decision in point of date on this subject is a decision in the year 1854, and that is the case of South Wales Railway Company v. Swansea Local Board. In that case the Court seems

to have come to a conclusion which, to my mind, is perfectly clear when the subject-matter is a road station, as it is commonly called, that is to say, where a railway is made upon an embankment, or made in a cutting so that there is at the side of the railway line the embankment in the one case and the bank of the cutting in the other, and upon that the station is built. Whatever may be the length of the platform, that station is obviously not only built for the purposes of the railway, and is of such a nature that without it the railway could not be properly used, but it is actually built upon land occupied by the railway-land without which the rails themselves could not be properly maintained. The Court there clearly to my mind could only come to the conclusion that, because the company added to that embankment or to that bank of a cutting some further accommodation in the nature of a station and platform, then, apart from any question of buildings, that which was put upon land which already was freed from rating at more than one-quarter of its net annual value, as being a necessary part of the railway, could not itself be rated on a higher basis. But that case was not in respect of a terminus. It is quite clear to my mind that the same ground of decision would hold in the case of a terminus with regard to the actual lines of railway, and the platforms on either side of those lines of railway, if they were built upon land of the same character as that which I have just designated. But if the decision stopped there, there would be a manifest inconvenience, because the question whether the platforms of a terminal station should be rated or not would depend upon whether the lines came into the particular station upon an embankment, or in a cutting, or upon a dead level. If they came in upon a level, a great part of the grounds of argument upon which the judgment of the Court is founded in that case would not apply. I cannot but think, supposing that had been the case of a dead level, that still the Court would have come to the same conclusion, though not exactly upon the same grounds. But it is unnecessary to consider that, because it is quite clear by a decision which was in the next year, namely, Adamson v. Edinburgh and Glasgow Railway Company (a decision of Lord Cranworth as Chancellor and Lord Brougham sitting with him), that any court dealing with the construction of an Act of Parliament for rating purposes in which the words "a railway" were used would be entitled to go beyond the mere physical rails and the land that those rails immediately rest upon. Without going through all the discussion that arose in that case and the different cases that are put by Lord Cranworth in his judgment, I think it is quite clear that this Court should obey the forcible reasoning of those two noble Lords in that decision. Beyond that I do not at all desire to give undue weight to that case, because there are many reasons why, when it is applied to the present case, it will be found that it is not a case in pari materia. Therefore I only cite it for the general ground of decision which is to be found within it. But there is another decision which, although it is very scantily reported, is one which I think we are bound loyally to obey, and one which is based to my mind on somewhat broader, and I cannot help thinking sounder, reasons than the South Wales Railway Company v. Swansea Local

Board. That is the case which arose upon a question as to how far this rule was applicable to the area occupied by the Scarborongh Railway Station: North Eastern Railway Company v. Scarborough Local Board. There three learned judges, Lush, Hannen, and Hayes JJ., all having the Swansea case before them, went further, and laid down the general doctrine that the word "railway" was not confined to the rails themselves and the land beneath them, but was to be applied to a case where there were platforms which it was not shown were built absolutely upon land which was necessary for the support of the railway. They used broader words-words which to my mind are of more general use in construing Acts of Parliament of this kind than any language that is to be found in the judgments in the Swansea Casefor they say that so much of the strip of land as is necessary to the use of the railway should be included as a part of the railway. That, of course, must be construed strictly. It must not be said that it is necessary to have a booking-office, and this, that, and the other, for many reasons. I think that directly a thing becomes a building it comes under another distinct category in the section, and therefore is disposed of and dealt with in another way. The exemption in the section does, to my mind, apply to land which is not only parallel with and ends with the rails themselves, but also to land which is beyond the buffers-between the buffers and the street or public place with which the railway station communicates. Of course there must always be in all cases the question of degree, namely, how much is necessary for the use of the railway and how much is necessary merely for the convenience of passengers and others. If a railway company sought to take any more land than was directly necessary for the convenience and use of their line, then in that case as a matter of fact that portion which was not necessary ought to be excluded from the exemption given by such sections by any court or arbitrator before whom the case came. The result, therefore, of my judgment is that (1) the roof covering railway, (2) the roof covering platform, (4) the roof covering the sidings, (6) the platform under the roof, and (7) the platform, uncovered-all those are included in the principle which I consider to be decided by these cases. But when you come (3) to the roof covering the cab-drive, (5) the roof covering the buildings, (8) the cab-drive under roof, (9) the cab-drive and horse-landing uncovered, (10) the cattle-landing and pens, (11) the crane in goods-yards, those are things to which, as it seems to me, those decisions do not apply; therefore they are properly rated upon the full net annual value.

Now with regard to the other part of the case, namely, the application of Section 79, I have very little to say, because it is clear to my mind that wherever the London and North Western Railway Company acquired land for the purpose of their undertaking, since the passing of that Act of Parliament they could not have the benefit of that section. That, of course. becomes much less important now, seeing what our judgment is with regard to the other part of the case.

WILLS, J. I am of the same opinion. I will deal with the two questions in the inverse order, because I think a person who had to rate this

property would begin by considering what land is to be treated as agricultural land and what is not to be so treated, and would then apply Section 68, relating to the assessment of certain lands and certain property at one-fourth of the net annual value. It seems to me, with regard to the application of Section 79, that the subject is really free from doubt. Section 79 is contained in the Llandudno Improvement Act, 1854, and it recites that the St. George's Harbour Company are about to become the owners and occupiers of land within the limits of the Act to be used for the purpose of their undertaking. Well, it is clear that means to refer to the fact that they had then obtained an Act of Parliament for carrying out their undertaking, but that the works remained to be constructed or be completed; and I think that it is quite clear that Section 79 meant to give the benefits which it does confer upon the undertaking to such works as should be constructed under that Act of Parliament, and to no others. It does not contemplate beforehand the possibility of other Acts of Parlia ment being applied for; and those words of the recital, that the St. George's Harbour Company are about to become the owners, confer an exemption or an advantage in respect of works to be constructed under their Act only. That disposes of the question as between the two classes of land. Then another question arises, namely, What is to be included under the term "line of railway" in Section 79? It seems to me that "line of railway" in that section is a very definite and specific expression, and that the use of the words "line of railway" shows that the advantage of being rated as agricultural land is confined to such land as is actually occupied by the rails. Of course I do not mean to say that it refers merely to the space between the outside rails, but I think it is confined to whatever reasonably belongs to the line, and is necessary for the physical use of the rails as a line of railway. That would include Nos. 13 and 14, the engine turn-table and the sidings, and nothing else. It seems to me those are the only subjects which are entitled to the benefit of the rating as agricultural land under Section 79. None of the other matters in the schedule can, it seems to me, by any possibility or by any stretch of language, be designated as part of the line of railway. That disposes completely of Section 79 and its applicability.

Now comes the question, How much of this property is to be rated at one-fourth of its net annual value under Section 68? The Act was passed in 1854, but legislation upon similar lines is considerably older. It is found in a general public Act of 1848 (11 & 12 Vict. c. 63), s. 88. I suppose that is the first time in which it appeared except in local Acts; but from 1848 this legislation has been general. Therefore the question has arisen upon exactly the same words in the two cases to which my brother Pollock has alluded. I certainly find a difficulty in understanding the Swansea Case. It seems to me that the ratio decidendi, if there be one, how much of the ground was necessary for the support of the rails, suggests a very unsatisfactory test. I cannot understand why the fact of the platform happening to be above a particular bit of land which is necessary for the support of the railway has anything to do with the matter, because different strata of property may be rated whether they are above or on or below the

ground with reference to their occupation, and they may be treated as different subjects of rating. There is no difficulty about that. But this much is quite clear, that it is in accordance with the principle of South Wales Ry. Co. v. Swansea Local Board, that whatever is absolutely necessary for the physical use of the railway is to be treated as railway. That, I think, seems to be a sensible view, because it is quite clear that the expression "land used as railway only," which is the interpretation which has been put upon the phrase used in Section 68, is a very different expression from "line of railway." If it had been intended to confine the exemption given by Section 68 to "line of railway" the Legislature would have said so in unmistakable terms. Now, "used as a railway" means, I presume, its physical use as a railway. It does not mean those adjuncts to a railway which are necessary for convenient business purposes, or anything of that kind, but it means those things, whatever they be, without which the railway could not be used as a highway. It must not be forgotten that in 1848, when the first Act of Parliament using this language was passed, the theory was still alive in all our railway legislation that a railway was a highway, like a turnpike road, to be used by the public on certain terms as to tolls and otherwise. It seems to me that a railway could not be "used," in the general sense of the term, without such things as platforms. Looking at the rate at which railway trains go, they cannot be stopped everywhere to take people up and set them down. There must be stopping-places, and at these stopping-places there must be physical convenience for people getting into and out of the carriages. It seems to me that a platform is reasonably included under the expression “land used as a railway." I quite agree with my brother Pollock that very often it may be a question of degree. No doubt in many of our great railway stations there are parts of the platform which are not at all necessary for the purposes of the physical use of the railway, but which are used as lounges and convenient places for people standing about, and to make the whole thing more attractive. But in the present case there is no finding that the platforms are beyond what is reasonably necessary. Therefore it seems to me that we should be acting consistently with the principle of the Swansea Case by holding that these platforms are part of the land used for the purposes of a railway.

The other case, the Scarborough Case (2), is certainly a definite decision in the same direction, and I think it is a decision notwithstanding that the point was given up by counsel. It was only given up in reply. It seems to have been argued, and the Court did not treat it as a matter of concession, but they say plainly that the appellants in that case were wrong in having claimed to treat the platforms and sidings as exposed to rating on their full net annual value. Certainly two of those learned judges had a very large experience in rating matters. I should suppose Hayes J. had as much experience in rating matters as any judge that ever sat on the bench; and therefore I do not think we are entitled to treat it, as Mr. Marshall says, as a case of no authority at all. I think the Court meant to decide what I have said, and I think they did decide it, although the point was given up by Mr. Manisty, who certainly was