Section 13 of the Metropolis Management and Building Act, 1882 (45 Vict. c. 14), forbids the erection of temporary structures without the written licence of the London County Council. Section 215 of the London Building Act, 1894 (57 & 58 Vict. c. ccxiii.), which came into operaration on the 1st January, 1895, repeals the Metropolis Management and Building Act, 1882, but enacts that the repeal shall not affect any right or liability "acquired, accrued, or incurred under or in accordance with any enactment hereby repealed," or any legal proceedings or penalty in respect of any such liability "as aforesaid." A. before the 1st January, 1895, erected a temporary structure without the licence of the London County Council, and thereby made himself liable under the Metropolis Management and Building Act, 1882, to a penalty for erecting it, and also to a penalty for each day he continued it. A. continued this structure until less than six months immediately preceding the 17th May, 1897, on which day the London County Council applied for a summons against him for an offence under Section 13 of the Metropolis Management and Building Act, 1882. The magistrate refused the summons on the ground that the only liabilities saved by Section 215 of the London Building Act, 1894, were liabilities actually incurred on or before the 1st January, 1895, and that proceedings for these were barred by Section 11 of the Summary Jurisdiction Act, 1848. On appeal: Held, that the magistrate's decision was right.-(L. T. [1897], Q. B. D., vol. lxxvii. p. 439.) (857.) [QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION.] MORLEY v. CARTER. [OCTOBER 29TH, 1897.] Landlord and Tenant-Compensation for Improvements-Notice— Determination of Tenancy-Agricultural Holdings Act, 1883 (46 $47 Vict. c. 61), ss. 1, 7, 9 (6), 54, 61. In order to entitle the tenant to claim compensation under the Agricultural Holdings Act, 1883, two months' notice must be given by him to the landlord before the determination of the tenancy. Where a holding consisted of buildings and land, which were to be given up at different times, the tenant gave a notice of his intention to claim two months before the buildings were to be given up, but it was out of time with regard to the land. Held, that the buildings did not constitute a holding within the meaning of the Act, and that therefore the notice was bad.-(L. T. [1897], Q. B. D., vol. lxxvii., p. 337.) (858.) [QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION.] LEWIS, APPELLANT; v. POOLE, RESPONDENT. [NOVEMBER 2ND, 1897.] Local Government-Tithe Map-Custody-Order of County Council — Power of Justices to enforce-Tithe Act, 1836 (6 & 7 Will. 4, c. 71), 8. 64-Tithe Act, 1846 (9 & 10 Vict. c. 73), 8. 17-Tithe Act, 1860 (23 & 24 Vict. c. 93), s. 28-Local Government Act, 1894 (56 & 57 Vict. c. 73), s. 17 (8). The appellant L. was the chairman of the Parish Council of West Meon, and was interested in the tithe apportionment and map of that parish. In 1894 these documents were in the custody of one A., and kept at his house. In March, 1895, the parish meeting passed a resolution that he should still retain the custody of these documents. He died in May of that year, and they still remained in the possession of his family till August, when the respondent, who was the rector of the parish, obtained them. In October of the same year the parish council passed a resolution that they should be handed over to them for custody, but the respondent refused to part with them. In April, 1896, the parish council applied to the county council, under Section 17 (8) of the Local Government Act, 1894, and they ordered that these documents should be placed in such custody as the parish council might direct. In February of the present year the order was drawn up, sealed, and served on the respondent, but he refused to comply with it. The appellant then moved before the justices, under Section 28 of the Tithe Act, 1860, for an order that these documents should be moved from the custody of the respondent and deposited in the custody of the parish council. The magistrates refused to make the order on the ground that they had no power. Held, that the magistrates had power to make such an order.-(L. T. [1897], Q. B. D., vol. lxxvii. p. 369.) (859.) [IN THE COURT OF APPEAL.] THE MAYOR, ALDERMEN, AND BURGESSES OF ASHTONUNDER-LYNE v. PUGH. APPEAL FROM THE QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION. [NOVEMBER 2ND, 1897.] Local Government-Street Repairable by Inhabitants at large-Paving Expenses-Liability of Frontagers-Local Act-Effect of Subsequent General Legislation-Ashton-under-Lyne Improvement Act, 1849 (12 & 13 Vict. c. 35.)-Public Health Act, 1875 (38 & 39 Vict. c. 55), ss. 149 and 340. A local Act passed in 1849 gave power to the municipal corporation of a borough to recover from the frontagers of streets within the borough the expenses incurred by the Corporation in paving and otherwise completing such streets. The Public Health Act, 1875, provides that the urban authority shall level, pave, metal, flag, channel, alter, and repair, as occasion may require, streets which are highways repairable by the inhabitants at large. Held, that this provision of the Public Health Act did not repeal the provisions of the local Act, and, therefore, the municipal corporation was entitled to recover from a frontager a share of the expenses incurred by them in paving a street within the borough.-(L. T. [1897], C. A., vol. lxxvii. p. 583.) (860.) [QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION.] THE LONDON COUNTY COUNCIL, APPELLANTS; THE AYLESBURY DAIRY COMPANY, LIMITED, RESPONDENTS. [NOVEMBER 2, 1897.] Metropolis - Buildings-Notice to Set Back-Forecourt or Space— Boundary Wall-London Building Act, 1894 (57 & 58 Vict. c. 213), s. 14 (Local and Private). Section 14 of the London Building Act, 1894, does not empower the London County Council to give notice requiring the owner or occupier of land, upon part of which he has erected a new building, to set back an old boundary wall forming the boundary of a space left between the new building and a street so that the wall shall not be at less than the prescribed distance from the centre of the roadway of the street. Case stated under the Summary Jurisdiction Acts by one of the metropolitan police magistrates sitting at the Marylebone Police Court. The respondents appeared before the magistrate on a summons to answer a complaint that they had, contrary to ss. 14 and 200, sub-s. 2, of the London Building Act, 1894 (57 & 58 Vict. c. 213), neglected to comply with a notice duly served upon them by the London County Council requiring them to cause the space between the external wall of a new building and the roadway of a road called Moscow Road to be set back, so that every part of the external fence or boundary of such space should be at a distance in every direction not less than the prescribed distance from the centre of the roadway. The following material facts were proved at the hearing of the complaint: : The respondents had, since the London Building Act, 1894, came into force, erected a new building with a frontage to and entrance from Moscow Road. The external wall of the building fronting Moscow Road was at a distance of not less than twenty feet from the centre of the roadway, twenty feet being the distance prescribed under the Act. Moscow Road is a highway and a street used for the purposes of carriage traffic. At the time when the building was erected, and for many years prior thereto, there existed a boundary wall which had been the boundary wall of a garden. A portion of this wall was left standing, and after the completion of the new building the space between it and the old boundary wall was inclosed by the respondents by means of iron railings affixed to the wall. This wall had for many years formed the external fence or boundary of the space between the external wall of an old building and the roadway of Moscow Road, and was at a distance of thirteen feet from the centre of the roadway. The appellants' complaint was in respect of the old boundary wall only, and not in respect of the iron railings. The respondents were the occupiers of the premises in question at the time the notice requiring them to cause to be set back the old boundary wall was given by the appellants. The respondents refused to comply with the requirements of the notice for twenty-eight days after the service thereof upon them, and no consent had been given by the appellants to the erection of the new building with any forecourt or space between the external wall of such building and the roadway of Moscow Road in the manner complained of. The magistrate dismissed the summons, being of opinion that, under the circumstances, Section 14 of the London Building Act, 1894, did not apply so as to entitle the appellants to give the notice. The question for the opinion of the Court was whether the magistrate's decision was right in law. WRIGHT, J.-I think that counsel for the appellants was perhaps right in saying that Section 14 was probably intended to cover such a case as the present, and probably was also intended to cover the case, not merely of the erection of new buildings, but of an extension of old buildings, although it has not been necessary to argue that question to-day. But the mere fact that it may have been better to extend the section to those cases, or that one can apparently gather that such an intention was probable, is not enough to justify us in putting a construction upon the section which would necessitate reading into it the words which the appellants' counsel has invited us to read in. It is clear to my mind that we should, as the Court of Queen's Bench said in Underhill v. Langridge, "be taking upon ourselves the office of the Legislature." We should be doing that which the Court, in In re Sneezum, Ex parte Davis, declined to do with respect to a provision which, it was suggested, ought to be read into Section 23 of the Bankruptcy Act, 1869 (32 & 33 Vict. c. 71). James, L.J. said: "That is a provision which might perhaps be very properly made by the Legislature, but, to my mind, to insert it in this way by implication would not be to construe the Act of Parliament, but to alter it; it might be to improve it, according to the view which some persons take of the matter, but it would certainly be altering the Act of Parliament, and enlarging still further the provisions which the Legislature has thought fit to make with respect to such contracts." I am the more strongly driven to this conclusion because the proceeding here is penal, involving penal consequences, and without making the alteration in Section 14 which we are asked to make, it could not be prosecuted at all. I have certainly always understood the rule to be that where there is an enactment which may entail penal consequences, you ought not to do violence to its language in order to bring people within it, but ought rather to take care that no one is brought within it who is not brought within it in express language. I am of opinion that the learned magistrate was right, and that if there be mischief consequent upon the ruling which we are bound to give, that mischief is something which must be removed by application to Parliament. I may add, though we are not asked to decide the point in the present case, that it is doubtful whether Section 13 applies. It may be that no wall of a forecourt or space is within that section unless it is erected at the time when the building in question is erected or altered. KENNEDY J. concurred. Judgment for the respondents.—(L. R. [1898], Q. B. D., vol. i. p. 106.) (861.) [QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION.] THE QUEEN v. MEAD. [NOVEMBER 2, 1897.] Summary Metropolis-Building-Service of Notices-London Building Act, 1894 (57 58 Vict. c. 213), s. 188 (Local and Private) · Jurisdiction Act, 1848 (11 & 12 Vict. c. 43), s. 1. By Section 188 of the London Building Act, 1894, any notice, order or other document required to be served under that Act, the service of |