2 Burr. 1148. Prec. in Chanc. to appoint, with the approbation of her husband, testified by his being party to and executing the deed in the presence of three witnesses, &c. the approbation of the husband, his being a party, his executing the deed in the presence of three witnesses, &c. must be scrupulously complied with, and may be even stated. And as the excess only, in the execution of an appointment, will be bad", and a deficient execution cannot be extended, it is prudent to be very full in the execution, as the surplusage shall not, at least in equity, vitiate what would otherwise be good. If power of revocation and re-appointment be 474. Touchst. given, and the appointor execute, he may reserve 524. & Booth's in such appointment a new power of revocation, Opin. ibid. & 1 Coll. Jurid. 421. Butl. n. (1.) to with power also to appoint new uses; for without this express reservation of future [power of] revocation and new appointment, the first may often be absolute. Powers appendant may be destroyed by lease Co. Litt. 271 b. and release, bargain and sale, and feoffment, to 342 b. [1 P. [and previously to the stat. 3 & 4 Will. 4. c. 74, s. iv. & n. (1.) Wms. 777. 3 Bing. 31.] Smith v. Death, 5 Mad. 371. [West v. Ber ney, 1 Russ. & Mil. 431. Bickley v. Guest, Ib.440.] Adams v. * Thus, where a partial interest is given to an object of the power, with remainder to a person not an object, that part only is void which the power does not authorize. Adams, Cowp. 651. Brudenell v. Elwes, 7 Ves. 382. supra, p. 265 n. Vide as to England, and 4 & 5 Ib. c. 92, as to Ireland, might have been destroyed by] fine, or recovery; those in gross by the three latter species of conveyance, or they may be released. Powers simply collateral cannot be destroyed by the act of the person to whom they are given. And note, as the appointor is merely an instrument, the appointee shall be in by the original deed.* v. Jones, 10 Barn. & Cress. 459.] [2 Prest. Conv. 482. 3 Ib. 265. 493.] * It was stated in a preceding page, 89., that the case of Ray v. Pung, 5 Mad. 310., 5 B. & A. 561., has decided that where a conveyance was made to A., his heirs and assigns, to [See also Doe such uses as B. should appoint, and in default of appointment to B. in fee, B.'s appointment deprives his wife of dower. But it is apprehended, that if the conveyance had been to B. in fee to such uses as B. should appoint, and in default of appointment to B. in fee, the power would have been nugatory, as B. would take by the common law, and his wife would become entitled to dower. The ordinary mode of conveying an estate to a purchaser to uses to bar dower is free from objection. The conveyance should be to him to such uses as he shall appoint, and in default of appointment to him for life, &c. He being the releasee, the covenants are properly entered into with him, and on his appointment the benefit of them will be carried over to his appointee; and to render the concurrence of the trustee in future conveyances unnecessary, it may be contended that he is a volunteer, and therefore that his estate is void as against a subsequent purchaser for value. [In Goodill v. Brigham, 1 Boss. & Pull. 192., an estate was devised to a married woman in fee, with a power, notwithstanding coverture, to give, sell, or dispose of the same as she should think proper, and also to give acquittances and discharges, so as not to be under the control of her husband. The Court of C. B. decided that the power was nugatory and merged in the fee; and that the devisee could not convey, by an exercise of the power, without a fine. This decision has frequently been disapproved, and must be considered as of doubtful authority. It has been settled by recent cases that a general power of appointment and the fee may, under limitations of uses according to the statute, co-exist in the same person; and there seems strong ground to contend that a devise, such as that in Goodill v. Brigham, or the more technical devise to such uses, &c. as A. should appoint, and in default of appointment to A. in fee, would be supported as a good devise under the statute of wills. See also 1 Sug. Pow. 110. ed. 1836. CHAP. XXII. OF RENTS. 41. Gilb. on Rents. A RENT (Reditus) is, properly a sum of money 2 Bl. Comm. or other thing, to be rendered periodically, in consequence of an express reservation in a grant or demise of lands or tenements, the reversion of which is in the grantor or person demising.* Co. Litt. 47 a. Parker v. 79. Harris, 4 Mod. * A rent must be a profit, but it may be either in money 2 Bl. Com. 41. or money's worth, and either by payment, render, or corporeal service. But, being a compensation or equivalent, it must not be part of the thing itself, although it may be of its future produce: it must also be certain, or capable of being reduced to a certainty by either party. Rent (unlike interest which accrues de die in diem) becomes payable only on the accomplishment of the full period at which it is made payable. If therefore a tenant for life, or the owner of any other limited estate, grants a lease, reserving rent payable half-yearly, and dies in the interval between the rent days, at common law the lessee was bound to pay rent only up to the last rent day, and none from that time up to the determination of the lease. But now, by the statute 11 Geo. 2. c. 19. s. 15., the personal representatives of tenants for life are entitled to an action on the case for a proportionate part of the rent accruing in their ancestor's lifetime. This act has been extended by con T Cro. Jac. 500. Cro. Eliz. 380. 565. 4 Leon. 247. Paget v. Gee, A rent, therefore, necessarily supposes a reception of such lands or tenements from another struction to the executors of tenants in tail dying without issue, in the case of leases being made by them, which are not Vernon, 2 Bro. binding on the remainderman or reversioner. And it is pre Vernon v. C. C. 659. 8 Ves. 308. sumed that the executors of a husband seised in right of his wife are also entitled within the act, in the case of a lease granted by him alone, so as not to operate under the enabling statutes; et vide 1 Swanst. 337. 454. [The statute 4 & 5 Will. 4. c. 22. was passed to obviate the doubts which have arisen upon the stat. 11 Geo. 2. as appears by the preamble of the former act. Section 1. enacts, That rents reserved on leases determining on the death of the person making them, (though not strictly tenant for life), or on the death of tenant pur autre vie shall be considered as within the provisions of the stat. 11 Geo. 2. The 2nd section enacts, That all rents-service reserved on any lease by a tenant in fee or for any life interest, or by any lease granted under any power, and which leases shall have been granted after the passing of the act, and all rents-charge and other rents, annuities, pensions, dividends, moduses, compositions, and all other payments of every description in England and Ireland, payable or coming due at fixed periods under any instrument executed after the passing of the act (16 June, 1834), or being a will or testamentary instrument coming into operation after the passing of the act, shall be apportioned, so that on the death of any person interested in any such rents, annuities. &c., or in the estate, fund, office, or benefice, from or in respect of which the same shall be issuing or derived, or on the determination by any other means whatsoever of the interest of any such person, he or she, and his or her executors, administrators, or assigns, shall be entitled to a proportion of such rents, annuities, &c., according to the time which shall have elapsed from the commencement or last period of payment thereof respectively, including the day of the death of such person, or |