livery, by the statute of uses, or by actual entry; and, therefore, if any convey by lease and release who cannot stand seised to an use, as a corporation, the lease on which the release is to be grounded must not be in the common way of bargain and sale, but by way of demise and lease at common law, with actual entry by the lessee.

Care must also be taken that the premises in the lease, or bargain and sale, be at least commensurate with those in the release, as the release is only of the right to, or estate in, the premises of which the releasee is in actual possession; and, consequently, no more can pass.

A release is the proper mode of extinguishing a right to, or an equity, or contingency, or possibility, in the lands of the releasee.

66 re

The operative words in a release are, lease,” or “remise, release, and for ever quit claim and discharge."

CHAP. VII.

OF A CONFIRMATION.

A CONFIRMATION differs essentially from a release, as it only validates and establishes that estate or interest which the tenant already has; whereas a release is the relinquishment of a right which the tenant had not before. So far as the particular estate is increased, it is not a confirmation; it is not the strengthening of the tenant's estate, but the giving him a greater

one.

Estates which are void cannot be confirmed; but those which are voidable only may. Co. Litt. 295 b. Thus a lease by a tenant for life is absolutely void at his death, and admits of no confirmation by those in remainder. Doe v. Archer, 1 Bos. & Pul. 531. As to the distinction between void and voidable estates, see 1 Pow. Mortg. 209., 210 a. 2 Ibid. 723 a.

In reference to the effect of a deed of confirmation, it is laid down in Brabroke v. Inskip, 8 Ves. 417., that where a person is called upon to join in a conveyance for the purpose of obviating a specific objection to the title, he will not be bound by it as to any interest of which he has not been apprised. But if he consents to join in the conveyance upon being told generally that there are objections to the title, he must be taken to have inquired into the nature of those objections, and cannot afterwards raise a question as to the ex

Y

2 Bl. Com. 325. Touchst. 311.

Gilb. Ten. 75.

Litt. ch. 9.

s. 515, &c. Plowd. 397.

The operative words are, ratified and confirmed; though for safety, it is usual and prudent to insert the words " given and granted,"

also.

tent of his information. This rule has received a practical illustration in the great case of Cholmondeley v. Clinton, where a deed of confirmation, dated 1794, was held not to confirm the title generally, but only as to the particular point for which it was applied for and obtained. 2 Meriv. 355. A confirmation to a tenant of the freehold or inheritance cannot be so worded as to have a less operation than that of confirming the whole estate; and therefore a confirmation to such a tenant, either of the lands or of his estate in them for any term or period, is a confirmation of the whole freehold or fee. A disseisor always acquires by the disseisin a tortious fee simple; a confirmation therefore to him, however qualified, is a confirmation of the whole fee. It is otherwise in the case of a term of years. A confirmation may be made of part of the term. The reason of the distinction is, that an estate of freehold or inheritance is considered as integral and indivisible; but as years are several, the term which is composed of them is necessarily fractional and separable, and may consequently be confirmed in part by using proper expressions for the purpose. This confirmation, however, must be by apt words; for if a person confirms the lease, or demise, or estate of the tenant for years for part of the term, as the words 'lease,' ' demise,' or 'estate,' signify all the interest or term of years which the tenant has, the subsequent words are not considered as qualifications of the former words, but as absolutely repugnant to them; and as both cannot stand together, the law prefers the first, which are the principal, to the other, which are only sccondary, and thereby the whole term will be confirmed. The confirmation should be of the land for part of the term,' if it be intended that it should have a partial operation merely. Co. Litt. 297 a. and n. (1). 1 East, 502. Skin. 543.

CHAP. VIII.

OF A SURRENDER.

A SURRENDER is the yielding up, or returning, or relinquishing, of a smaller estate, to him who has a greater estate in the same lands in remainder or reversion immediately expectant upon such smaller estate; for if there be an estate to A. for life, remainder to B. for life, remainder to C. in fee, A. cannot surrender to C. by reason of B.'s mediate or intervening estate. If A. pass his estate to C. it will not be

It differs from a release in that the smaller estate is conveyed to the greater, (and for this purpose every estate in reversion is considered greater than the particular estate in possession) whereas in a release the greater estate is conveyed to the less. That a term for years in possession will merge 'in a term for years in reversion, has lately been distinctly acknowledged in Stephens v. Bridges, 1 Madd. & Geld. 66.; et vide Tamlyn on Terms, 200. Cro. Eliz. 302. 3 Pres. Conv. 193. [See Cru. Dig. Vol. 6. p. 476. s. 40. 6 ed. 1835.]

+ Therefore, where an estate was limited to A. for life, remainder to B. for life, remainder to C., the eldest son of A., in fee; and A. in the lifetime of B., in consideration of an annuity of 147. to be paid by the said C. to him out of the

a surrender, any more than if made to a stranger, who had nothing in the lands.

As a surrender is, generally, for the advantage of the surrenderee, the law will often presume his assent to it; but the particular tenant cannot enforce it upon him nolens volens, and so get rid of his obligations and it is therefore prudent to make the surrenderee a party, and express his consent, that it may be apparent on the very face of the deed.*

premises, and for other considerations, did, by deed, give, grant, surrender, and confirm unto the said C. and his heirs the said premises; it was held, that the deed could not operate as a surrender according to the intent of the parties, upon account of B.'s intermediate estate for life; but that there being a consideration of blood between the father and son, the conveyance should operate as a covenant to stand seised. Doe dem. Woolley v. Pickard, 1 Saund. 236. c. note.

This principle will also illustrate the common limitation to trustees to preserve contingent remainders. It is now settled beyond doubt, that the estate of the trustees, being confined to the life of the preceding tenant for life, is a vested estate of freehold; and, therefore, that the tenant for life cannot surrender to the ulterior remainderman on account of this interposed estate. Dormer v. Fortescue, 3 Atk. 123. 135.; 4 Bro. P. C. 353. 505.; Co. Litt. 337 b. (2.)

* As there is necessarily a privity of estate between the surrenderor and surrenderee, no livery of seisin is necessary to perfect a surrender. 2 Bl. Com. 326. In short, no other act is requisite to perfect a surrender than the bare grant: the consent of the surrenderee to accept the surrender is presumed till the contrary be shewn. Thompson v. Leach,

2 Salk. 618.