for "full speed astern" was given, and that almost immediately thereafter, the collision occurred. The schooner held her course, in obedience to the ordinary rule in that behalf, but it may well be doubted whether, in such conditions as then prevailed, with the whistle of a steamer sounding from a point to a point and a half on her port bow, she should not have parted her helm and thus steered clear of the course of the oncoming vessel. The libelant contends that the steamer was going at too high a speed, and that the signals from the schooner either were or should have been heard as soon as the steamer's signals were heard on the libelant's vessel. But those on board the steamer must be taken to know what occurred there, in the absence of any direct or collateral impeachment of their testimony. It is to be remembered, too, that the breeze was blowing from the steamer towards the schooner, and that the steamer's whistle was probably more powerful than the horn on the schooner. A careful review of the testimony convinces us that, on both vessels, the requisite care, under the circumstances, was taken to avoid accident, and that the collision was an unavoidable accident, for which no fault should be imputed to either vessel. In this, we agree with the opinion of the learned judge of the court below, when he says: "The testimony satisfies me that, as soon as the vessels came in sight of each other, everything that was possible was done upon the steamship to avert the threatened disaster. She had already slowed down upon hearing for the first time the fog signal from the schooner, and this, I think, was her full duty. As the supreme court of the United States has said in The Holberg, 157 U. S. 68, 15 Sup. Ct. 480, 39 L. Ed. 620: 'No case has ever held that a steamer was obliged to stop at the first signal heard by her, unless its proximity be such as to indicate immediate danger.' Clearly there was no such indication in the present case, and the steamship was not at fault, therefore, in doing no more than slowing down to a moderate speed, and thereafter proceeding with caution. As soon as the Siberian saw the schooner, she immediately had her engines put full speed astern, and put her helm astarboard in the effort to pass in safety. The schooner held her course, and in this I am unable to say that she was in error; for, if it be true, as was testified by some of the witnesses for the steamship, that the schooner's helm was put to port, the result would probably have been what those witnesses say that it actually was, namely: to swing the schooner's stern to port, and thereby bring her more directly across the bow of the approaching steamship. The bluff of the Siberian's port bow struck the schooner's port quarter well aft, and did a good deal of damage. Neither vessel, I think, was moving through the fog at a negligent rate of speed. The schooner's sails were 'all drawing, but the wind was so light that, as I have already said, she was not moving faster than two knots an hour, which gave her little more than steerage way; and the steamship had slowed her speed at the first intimation of danger, and thereafter proceeded with due caution." And we agree with the court below in thinking that the libel should be dismissed, leaving each party to bear his own costs. Let a decree be so drawn. SALEM IRON CO. v. COMMONWEALTH IRON CO. No. 41. 1. INSTRUCTIONS-REQUESTS-FEDERAL PRACTICE. In the federal courts a trial judge is not required to specifically and directly answer every point which may be submitted by counsel. If the instructions given, as a whole, fully, correctly, and clearly present the law, nothing further can be required. 2. CORPORATIONS-RATIFICATION OF CONTRACT-EVIDENCE. Evidence that a contract made on behalf of a corporation by its officers was not objected to by the directors, even if not sufficient, under the cir cumstances shown, to prove ratification, is admissible on that issue where the corporation subsequently seeks to repudiate the contract. In Error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Western District of Pennsylvania. N. B. Billingsley, for plaintiff in error. Harvey D. Goulder and Wm. Scott, for defendant in error. DALLAS, Circuit Judge. In the courts of the United States, whatever may be the rule in other jurisdictions, a trial judge is not obliged to specifically and directly answer every point which may be submitted by counsel. Improvement Co. v. Stead, 95 U. S. 166, 24 L. Ed. 403; Insurance Co. v. Ward, 140 U. S. 76, 11 Sup. Ct. 720, 35 L. Ed. 371; Railroad Co. v. O'Brien, 16 C. C. A. 216, 69 Fed. 223. If the court's instructions, as a whole, fully, correctly, and clearly present the law, nothing more can be required; and careful examination of all that was said by the learned judge in this case has entirely satisfied us that he explained the whole law applicable to it, in precise conformity with our decision, made about a year ago, in the similar case of Salem Iron Co. v. Lake Superior Consol. Iron Mines, 50 C. C. A. 213, 112 Fed. 239. We have not been convinced that that decision was, upon any point, erroneous, and nothing need now be added to what was then said. No error was committed in admitting the testimony that the contract in suit had not been objected to. Nonobjection may not, under the circumstances, have been equivalent to ratification; but, taken in connection with the other facts of which there was evidence, it was properly for consideration upon the question of ratification, which, with proper instructions, was rightly submitted to the jury. What has been said renders it unnecessary to refer to the specifications with particularity. None of them is, in our opinion, well founded, and therefore the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed. 119 F.-38 FARMERS' MFG. CO. v. SPRUKS MFG. CO. et al. (Circuit Court, E. D. North Carolina. December 23, 1902.) 1 PATENTS-INFRINGEMENT INDIVIDUAL LIABILITY OF OFFICERS OF CORPOKA TIONS. Officers of a corporation are not liable in equity for infringement of a patent by the corporation where they are not charged with having participated in the infringement otherwise than as officers of the corporation. 2. SAME-DETERMINING VALIDITY-MATTERS OF COMMON Knowledge. In determining the novelty of a patented device, the court will take Judicial notice of matters of common knowledge relating to the state of the prior art. 8. SAME-VALIDITY—InvenTION Patents are valid only when granted for a mechanically novel structure which involves invention, and not merely for an old thing in a better shape or of better material, or having its utility due to mechanical skill in adopting what was old. 4. SAME-PATENTABLE NOVELTY-VENTILATING Barrels. The East patent, No. 429,021, for a ventilating barrel made of a sheet of veneer provided with parallel slits arranged lengthwise the barrel, and terminating at a distance from the ends, leaving the edges of the veneer sheet integral, is void for lack of patentable novelty in view of the prior art which showed both barrels made of veneer sheets and bilged, and barrels and baskets having yentilating holes and slits in the sides. Claims 1 and 3 also construed, and held not infringed, even if conceded validity. In Equity. Suit for infringement of letters patent, No. 429,021, for a ventilating barrel, granted to John F. East May 27, 1890. On final hearing. E. T. Fenwick, S. C. Bragaw, and A. D. Ward, for complainant. H. T. Fenton and W. B. Rodman, for defendants. PURNELL, District Judge. Complainant filed a bill in equity as assignee of John F. East, on letters patent No. 429,021, May 27, 1890, for alleged improvement in ventilating barrels. The corporation defendant and its officers are jointly and severally charged with infringement by the manufacture and sale of barrels alleged to be substantially similar to the patented barrel. The answers filed by those defendants served with process set up the usual defenses in patent cases, but the proofs were directed to two issues only: (1) That the patent is invalid for want of novelty in the thing patented, if the claims are construed as the complainant contends; and (2) noninfringement, under any proper construction of the claims of the patent. Although complainant's patent contains four claims, it is alleged to be infringed by defendants' device only as to claims numbered I and 3, it being conceded that claims numbered 2 and 4 contain limitations which exclude defendants' device. Claims 1 and 3 alleged to be infringed are as follows: "No. 1. A barrel or receptacle having its sides composed of a sheet of veneer provided with parallel slits arranged lengthwise the barrel and terminating at a distance from the edges of the sheet and leaving the edges of the veneer sheet continuous or integral, as shown and described." "No. 3. A barrel or receptacle having its sides composed of a sheet of veneer provided with parallel slits arranged lengthwise the barrel and terminating at a distance from the edges of the sheet and expanded in the middle to a greater diameter than at the ends, substantially as shown and described." The defendant Geo. T. Leach, president of defendant corporation, answering the bill, denies that he has done or committed any act or thing in respect to the matter recited in the bill or alleged to have infringed any rights of the complainant in his individual capacity, and has not on his individual account made, used, or sold any ventilating barrels or co-operated with or acted for the said corporation codefendant in making, using, or selling any such barrel, except as an officer of said corporation, and that he is advised that the bill is defective and insufficient for lack of averment in charging him with the commission of any act, matter, or thing in his individual capacity. The objection of this defendant is sustained. As to him and the other defendants in their individual capacity, it is adjudged and decreed that the bill be dismissed. If it was intended in the bill to charge a conspiracy by the individual defendants served, the remedy would be at law, and not in equity. Ambler v. Choteau, 107 U. S. 556, I Sup. Ct. 556, 27 L. Ed. 322; Bowers v. Atlantic, Gulf & Pac. Co. (C. C.) 104 Fed. 887. This narrows the inquiry to the contention between complainant and the Spruks Manufacturing Company, defendant, on the merits of the bill. The first inquiry which naturally presents itself is, for what novelty or device was the complainant granted letters patent? The letters patent, it is admitted, have not been adjudicated, hence the state of the art and the novelty of the device or claim is necessarily involved, and this question is expressly raised by the issues on the pleadings as well as in the argument. In considering questions of this nature, a court will not shut its eyes to what may be termed common knowledge, but will take judicial notice of such matters without proof. Slawson v. Railroad Co., 107 U. S. 649, 2 Sup. Ct. 663, 27 L. Ed. 576; Phillips v. City of Detroit, 111 U. S. 604, 4 Sup. Ct. 580, 28 L. Ed. 532; Glue Co. v. Upton, 97 U. S. 3, 24 L. Ed. 985. The idea of a barrel is not new, nor is that of a ventilating barrel. The ordinary barrel with holes hacked in the staves for ventilation in shipping fruits, vegetables, and such articles of commerce which contain moisture, was used years prior to the East patent. The same may be said of veneering or thin sheets of wood veneer. This is not only common knowledge, but is proved in the record and admitted by all parties, which is unnecessary. In 1861, S. Roberts obtained letters patent, re-issued in 1874, No. 6,044, for a barrel made of a sheet of wood veneering, in which it is said the "invention relates to the formation of a barrel from volute sheets," etc. Roberts, it is claimed, is the first person to have made a barrel with a sheet of wood veneering. At all events, he did so, and obtained letters patent long prior to complainant's device. In 1887, letters patent, No. 7,289, were granted to E. B. Georgia for a stave barrel, with a bilge or curve having parallel slots cut longitudinally in the periphery, and not extending to the chine ends, for the purpose of ventilation in the shipment of perishable goods, fruits, vegetables, etc. In 1889, letters patent, No. 417,218, were issued to Henry C. Bailey for a wooden mat, described in the specifications as consisting of "wooden mats and similar articles from wooden blanks." This patent shows that slitted wood veneer sheets, with the slits held open, were used to make mats and other articles prior to complainant's invention. The Cook patent, 1859, No. 24,723, and the Mabbett patent, 1868, No. 73,352, the former for ventilated fruit baskets and the latter for berry boxes,-show the prior use of the idea of a receptacle of thin wood, slotted for ventilation. It will be seen from an examination of these patents that barrels made of a thin sheet of veneer, bilged or curved barrels made of a single sheet of veneer, barrels formed primarily in cylindrical form from a single sheet of veneer, and then given a bilge or curve by slotting the edges of the blank and contracting the ends; that ventilating barrels formed by a double series of parallel slots extending from near the center, and not out to the edge or chine end; that circular shaped berry baskets with ventilating slots; and that flaring baskets with wood strips, slotted and with terminal holes, expanded and held open by inside and outside bands, were in use, constituting the state of the art, and not novel, such as should have entitled any one to letters patent for either in 1890, the date of the East patent, upon which complainant by assignment bases its suit. A patent is a monopoly, generally denominated, the consideration. for which is the disclosure by the patentee of something not then within the domain of public knowledge, or the ability of mechanical skill of persons in the art having personal knowledge of anything which was then old, to produce as the result of such mechanical skill, when called upon to do so by the necessity of the trade. Dunbar v. Meyers, 94 U. S. 187, 24 L. Ed. 34; Hollister v. Manufacturing Co., 113 U. S. 59, 5 Sup. Ct. 717, 28 L. Ed. 901; Thompson v. Boisselier, 114 U. S. 1, 5 Sup. Ct. 1042, 29 L. Ed. 76; Mast, Foos & Co. v. Stover Mfg. Co., 177 U. S. 485, 20 Sup. Ct. 708, 44 L. Ed. 856. Patents are valid only when granted for a mechanical novel structure which involves invention, and not merely an old thing in a better shape or of better material, or having its utility due to mechanical 'skill in adapting what was old. Gardner v. Herz, 118 U. S. 180, 6 Sup. Ct. 1027, 30 L. Ed. 158. Tested by these and authorities of like trend, the East patent, when analyzed by reference to the patent itself and the claims thereunder, its scope, determined by the actual application of the invention claimed by the patentee, did not, in view of the extensive, prior art knowledge, involve anything more than ordinary mechanical skill,-a making by machinery instead of by hand, hence in a more marketable form at less cost, of what was then well known, and is anticipated under the rules in such cases. Smith v. Nichols, 21 Wall. 112, 22 L. Ed. 566. Possibly the end to be accomplished,-producing by machinery instead of by hand, at a less cost, and in a more marketable form,— |