ing vessel "under way," including, it seems, the case of a sailing vessel "having way upon her," and that of a sailing vessel "stopped and having no way upon her." Such a vessel must be deemed to be (1) on the starboard tack, or (2) on the port tack, or (3) with the wind abaft the beam. No fourth case is supposed possible, for, if there were a fourth case, it would not be provided for by the rules. Clause "d" deals with any vessel at anchor, whether a steam or a sailing vessel. Thus far all is plain. The doubt is introduced by clause "e." This deals with three vessels. All come within the general classification of clauses "a" and "c," but they are by clause "e". specially excepted therefrom. With the first two exceptions—that of a vessel towing and that of a vessel laying or picking up a cablewe are not here concerned. Is a vessel lying to, with some of her sails up, "a vessel under way, which is unable to get out of the way of an approaching vessel through being not under command, or unable to maneuver as required by the rules"? Such a vessel is not wholly without ability to maneuver. Her condition is not the result of an accident, within the terms of article 4, cl. "a." On the other hand, she is not able to maneuver rapidly, and she is not under immediate command. Article 9, cl. "d," shows that the situation of a vessel, fishing like the Story, is recognized to be unlike that of a vessel sailing in the ordinary way; but the application of that clause is specifically limited to the coasts of Europe, and American fishermen must govern themselves as if that clause did not exist. Upon the whole, I think that clause "c" of article 15, rather than clause "e," applies, and that a signal of one blast is proper in the case supposed. See the earlier form of article 15, cl. "e" (29 Stat. 888). I am disposed to agree with Mr. Marsden (page 430) that article 15, cl. "e," must be read in connection with article 4, cl. "a," which deals with a vessel "which from any accident is not under command." The signals required by article 4, cl. "a," "are to be taken by other vessels as signals that the vessel showing them is not under command, and cannot therefore get out of the way." Article 4, cl. "d." It follows that the signal of the Story, when given, was proper. The interpretation thus put upon the international rules is, I believe, that generally followed in practice. In this article, as in some others, the international rules are loosely and ambiguously expressed. Decree for half damages and costs. COLLIER V. MUTUAL RESERVE FUND LIFE ASS'N. (Circuit Court, W. D. Arkansas, Ft. Smith Division. December 30, 1902.) 1. FOREIGN CORPORATIONS-SERVICE UNDER ARKANSAS STATUTE-ATTEMPTED WITHDRAWAL FROM STATE. Sand. & H. Dig. Ark. § 4137, requires foreign insurance companies, as a condition to the doing of business in the state, to file a stipulation with the auditor, agreeing that any legal process may be served upon the auditor or upon an agent designated, with the same effect as though served upon ¶ 1. Service of process on foreign corporations, see note to Eldred v. American Palace Car Co., 45 C. C. A. 3. the company within the state. It further provides that, "so long as any liability of the stipulating company to any resident of the state continues, such stipulation cannot be revoked or modified, except that a new one may be substituted, so as to require or dispense with service at the office of said company within the state." Held, that a foreign life insurance company, which entered the state and did business therein, filing the required stipulation designating an agent, was bound by the statute, which became a part of its contracts, and could not, after securing a large number of policies in the state, withdraw itself from the jurisdiction, and deprive the holders of such policies of the right to sue it therein by canceling the appointment of such agent, and revoking the authority of all its other agents; and that, in an action on one of such policies it was bound by service made on its agent so designated and on the state auditor. On Motion by Defendant to Quash the Service of Summons. Rose, Hemingway & Rose, for defendant. ROGERS, District Judge. This suit was brought in the state court, and removed by the defendant to this court. A motion is now filed by the defendant to quash the service, for the reason, as alleged, that at the time of said service it was not doing business in the state of Arkansas, nor did it have any agent therein. The record shows that the return of the sheriff is in due form, and was made both upon Geo. B. Rose and upon T. C. Monroe, auditor of the state of Arkansas. A stipulation has been filed by which it is agreed: "That the defendant company complied with the statutes of Arkansas in regard to doing business in the state, and appointed Geo. B. Rose as its agent upon whom service of process might be served, and gave bond to the state as required by statute, and while so doing business in the state issued the policy sued upon. That subsequent to the issuance of said policy the company revoked the power of its agents in the state of Arkansas, and revoked the appointment of said Geo. B. Rose, and after it revoked the appointment of its agents it collected its premiums on policies through local banks from its policy holders; and prior to the institution of this suit it ceased to collect through local banks, and sent notices direct to its policy holders to pay at the home office in New York, and the policy holders have done so under the direction of the defendant. That the defendant company has a large number of outstanding policies in the state, some ten of which are in the city of Ft. Smith, Ark., and it is regularly collecting premiums therefrom; and all of said policies were issued while said company was authorized to do business in the state. That no appointment of agents has been made since the revocation heretofore referred to, and no agent has been kept within the state for the service of process, unless the auditor of state and the said Geo. B. Rose are its agents under and by virtue of the statutes in such case." Section 4137, Sand. & H. Dig. Ark., provides as follows: "No insurance company, not of this state, nor its agents, shall do business in this state, until it has filed with the auditor of this state a written stipulation, duly authenticated by the company, agreeing that any legal process affecting the company, served on the auditor or the party designated by him, or the agent specified by said company to receive service of process for the company, shall have the same effect as if served personally on the company within this state. And if such company should cease to maintain such agent in this state, so designated, such process may thereafter be served on the auditor; but so long as any liability of the stipulating company to any resident of this state continues, such stipulation can not be revoked, or modified, except that a new one may be substituted, so as to require or dispense with service at the office of said company within this state, and that such service, according to this stipulation, shall be sufficient personal service on the company. The term 'process' includes any writ, summons, subpoena, or order, whereby any action, suit or proceedings shall be commenced, or which shall be issued in or upon any action, suit or proceedings." By the stipulation of the parties it appears that, when the policy sued on was issued, the defendant company was regularly doing an insurance business in the state. After it ceased to solicit business further in the state, for a time it collected its premiums upon policies issued while it did business in the state through the instrumentality of banks, and at the time the suit was brought premiums upon policies issued at the time the company was doing business in the state were collected by written notices sent to the assured through the mails, who made their remittances to the head office at New York. It is contended by the defendant company that it was not doing business at the time this suit was brought in the state; that it had previously revoked its agencies; and that under those circumstances no service could be made upon the auditor or Geo. B. Rose, who had been appointed its agent under the statute above quoted. The contention amounts to this: That, after the company ceased to do business in the state, and undertook to revoke the power of its agents, no suit could be brought against the company, even if service might be had upon one of its general agents, who might be found within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. The court is of the opinion the contention is not tenable, and the motion is overruled, upon the authority of Insurance Co. v. Spratley, 172 U. S. 603, 19 Sup. Ct. 308, 43 L. Ed. 569; Magoffin v. Association (Minn.) 91 N. W. 1115. See, also, Pervanger v. Surety Co. (Miss.) 32 South. 909; Cotton Co. v. Yates, 69 Ark. 396, 63 S. W. 997. In the opinion of the court the defendant company, having gone into business in the state of Arkansas while the statute hereinbefore quoted was in full force, and the policy sued on having been executed while said company was so doing business in the state, it cannot now, in the face of the provisions of that statute, revoke the authority of its agent, Geo. B. Rose, so as to deprive the holder of the policy of the right to make service upon him and bind the company thereby; and, moreover, that the service either upon the auditor of state or upon the said Geo. B. Rose was ample, and binding upon the defendant to give this court jurisdiction over the company. The statute quoted, under the circumstances stated, became a part of the policy sued on,-as much so as if it were written on its face. Moreover, it was an irrevocable contract, which the company could not avoid until it satisfied the terms of the statute, which could not be done so long as any liability to any resident of this state, entered into while the company was doing business in the state, continued. The motion is therefore overruled. In re SIMPSON. (District Court, D. Maine. December 22, 1901.) 1. SEAMEN-OFFENSES-REPEAL OF STATUTE BY IMPLICATION. The provision of Rev. St. § 5359 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3639], which makes it a criminal offense "if any one of the crew of an American vessel on the high seas, or other waters within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States, endeavors to make a revolt on board such vessel," was not repealed by implication by the provision of the shipping commissioners' act of June 7, 1872 (Rev. St. § 4596, par. 7 [see U. S. Comp. St. 1901, pp. 3113, 3115]), which makes it an offense for any seaman to "combine with any others of the crew to disobey lawful commands." On Petition of William Simpson for a Writ of Habeas Corpus. The defendants were indicted for a violation of section 5359 of the Revised Statutes of the United States while seamen on the American schooner Helen M. Atwood, and while that vessel was lying at anchor in the Kennebec river, near the city of Bath, in the district of Maine. The indictment contained three counts, each alleging an endeavor upon the part of the defendants to create a revolt. The jury returned a verdict of guilty as to each defendant, and they were sentenced to imprisonment. One of the defendants immediately filed an application for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that section 5359, so far as it related to the offense charged in the indictment, had been repealed by paragraph 7 of the act of June 7, 1872 (17 Stat. 273; section 4596 of the Revised Statutes of the United States), and that the latter act had been repealed by the act of December 21, 1898 (30 Stat. 760 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3114]). On the trial of the criminal, HALE, District Judge, charged the jury as follows: No higher duty devolves upon the citizen of a representative government, a government of the people, than the duty of serving upon a jury; that is, the duty of standing between man and man in the controversies that come into the courts of justice. And especially is this true when you are standing between the government and persons accused of crime. Now, gentlemen, this is your first case, and you will have only criminal cases this term; so that, without giving you any general instructions as to the rules of evidence pertaining in civil matters, I will give you some general instructions as to the rules in criminal cases. In the first place, without going into the reason for the rule, the first primary rule to govern your conduct in criminal cases is that every man is presumed to be innocent until the contrary is proved. And, if there be reasonable doubt of his guilt, the jury are to give him the benefit of such doubt; that is, if there be any reasonable doubt of his guilt, he cannot be held. Now, a doubt that requires an acquittal must be far more serious than the doubt to which all human conclusions are subject. It must be a doubt so solemn and so substantial as to produce in the jury grave uncertainty as to the verdict to be given. It is not a mere possible doubt. To instruct you in the language of Chief Justice Shaw, "A reasonable doubt is not a mere possible doubt;" but you, as reasonable men, are to weigh all the testimony in the case, and decide whether there is any real reason to doubt or not. And I, of course, wish to emphasize that a reasonable doubt is not a frivolous doubt, but is such a doubt as I have just explained. Now, in passing upon a case like this, all the facts in the case are for your consideration. It is for you to judge of the credibility of the witnesses. It is for you to judge as to the weight that shall be given to any evidence 11. Repeal of statutes by implication, see note to Bank v. Weidenbeck, 38 C. C. A. 136. presented in the case. You may credit the whole or only a part of any evidence that is offered; and in this I can give you no rule to govern you, except to say that in all questions of fact you are the judges. As Chief Justice Parker has put it: "You can believe the whole, you can discredit the whole or any part, of the testimony of any witness that has testified in the case, according as the testimony of such witness shall impress your minds as being worthy or unworthy of belief. You may consider the age, the intelligence, the interest in the case, the apparent prejudice, if any, and all other circumstances in evidence before you in the determination of the credibility of witnesses." And in that regard it is not for me to tell you what evidence is or is not sufficient to establish a given fact, but it is for me to tell you whether the whole testimony is sufficient to sustain the government's burden. To quote further from Chief Justice Parker and I do so because it is so excellently stated-in giving the distinction between the power of the judge and the power of the jury, he says: "It is the privilege of the jury to ascertain the fact, and that of the court to declare the law. And, should the judge interfere with his opinion upon the testimony in order to influence the minds of the jury, he would step out of the province of a judge into that of the advocate." So that, gentlemen, I instruct you that on all questions of law you are to take the law from the court, and, if the court is in any way incorrect, and does not give you sufficient and ample instructions, it will be corrected by the appellate tribunal. Coming to this case, gentlemen, the section of the statute under which this indictment is drawn is brief, and I will read it: "If any one of the crew of any American vessel on the high seas, or other waters within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States, endeavors to make a revolt or mutiny on board such vessel, or combines, conspires, or confederates with any other person on board to make such revolt or mutiny, or solicits, incites, or stirs up any other of the crew to disobey or resist the lawful orders of the master, or other officer of such vessel, or to refuse or neglect their proper duty on board thereof, or to betray their proper trust, or assembles with others in a tumultuous and mutinous manner, or makes a riot on board thereof, or unlawfully confines the master, etc., he shall be punished," etc. Now, this indictment charges that these defendants who are named here in the indictment-I will not read it in full-have violated the provisions of this statute. The first count sets forth simply an endeavor to make a revolt within this statute. The second count sets forth likewise the endeavor, and describes the endeavor as being made by a conspiracy to do certain things alleged. The third count charges distributively a conspiracy to endeavor to do the things set out by the indictment. So that you have three counts in the indictment. Now, you have heard the evidence offered under the allegations in the first count, and, as I say, you are the judges of the fact. And, gentlemen, from the fact that there is no evidence offered upon the other side, you are not relieved from the responsibility of finding beyond a reasonable doubt all the facts necessary in order to sustain a ver dict, although it may or may not render your task an easy one. It is alleged by the government that these men upon this vessel, being the crew of an American vessel, endeavored to make a revolt. In the first place, you must find, in order to bring the case within this statute, that they are the crew of an American vessel. You have heard the testimony on this point. You cannot find them guilty unless you find beyond a reasonable doubt that they are the crew (that is, persons pertaining to the conduct of the vessel), and that it is an American vessel (that is, that it is a vessel owned by American citizens). You have heard the testimony of the captain in that regard,which is competent testimony,-that the owners are American citizens, and I know of no evidence in any way to contradict that statement of the captain. It is for you to say, however. That is one of the elements for you to find before you can convict,-that these respondents are of the crew of an American vessel. You must further find that the offense was committed within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States. In that regard I do not remember any conflict in the testimony; and if you find, from the testimony, that the alleged offense was committed when the vessel was in the tide waters of the Kennebec river, I instruct you that that is within |