The order under this rule may be obtained on application in Chambers: London Steam Dyeing Co. v. Digby, 57 L. J. Ch. 505; 36 W. R. 497; 58 L. T. 724; but the usual course is to move for judgment, unless there are special reasons for proceeding in Chambers: Cook v. Haynes, W. N. (84) 75. Where the Defts wrote a letter containing admissions which would have enabled the Plts to obtain an order by summons, extra costs occasioned by proceeding by motion were disallowed: Allen v. Oakey, W. N. (90) 121; 62 L. T. 724. Where there is no actual admission, but only a constructive admission by default, the motion must be set down: Caroli v. Hurst, 31 W. R. 839; 48 L. T. 759.

A Deft cannot set down the action on motion for judgment under this rule: Litton v. L., 3 Ch. D. 794; but see Pascoe v. Richards, 29 W. R. 330; 50 L. J. Ch. 337; 44 L. T. 87.

As to the meaning of the words, "at any stage," see Brown v. Pearson, 21 Ch. D. 716, where Plt was allowed to move after joinder of issue and notice

of trial given.

or

Whether admissions contained in an affidavit are within the words, otherwise," or whether those words refer only to cases in which notice to admit has been given under O. XXXII, 1 or 4, quære: Landergan v. Feast, 34 W. R. 469, 691; 55 L. T. 42.

Under the Rules of 1875, O. XL, 2 (not revived by Rules of 1883), the indorsement on a writ was held not to be a pleading: Wallis v. Jackson, 23 Ch. D. 204; 31 W. R. 519.

Unless the allegations in a statement of claim are specifically denied by the defence, the Plt is entitled to move for judgment: Rutter v. Tregent, 12 Ch. D. 758; and that allegations in a counterclaim must also be specifically dealt with, see Benbow v. Low, 13 Ch. D. 553; Green v. Sevin, 13 Ch. D. 589. Where the motion was made in an action for infringement of patent, on the admission of an infringement in ten instances, the Plt was confined to an inquiry as to damages in respect of those ten instances: United Telephone Co. v. Donohoe, 31 Ch. D. 399, C. A.

Where in an action for a liquidated demand the Defts admitted the claim, but counterclaimed for a larger sum, and the counterclaim was not shown to be frivolous or unsubstantial, the Plt could not sign judgment on admissions: Mersey Steamship Co. v. Shuttleworth, 10 Q. B. D. 468; 11 Q. B. D. 531, C. A.; but see now O. XXVII, 9, providing that where defence goes to a separable part of Plt's claim, and judgment is entered, if there is a counterclaim execution shall not issue without leave of the Court. In Showell v. Bouron, 52 L. J. Q. B. 284; 31 W. R. 550; 48 L. T. 613; Plts were held entitled to judgment, but on terms that, if counterclaiming Deft brought the debt into Court, execution should be stayed.

0. XXXII, 6 is to be read as if the words "if any" were inserted after the word " question; so that the Plt may move for the whole relief sought by his statement of claim: Clutton v. Lee, 24 W. R. 607; 7 Ch. D. 541, n. ; 45 L. J. Ch. 684. Where the order is equivalent to a decree, further consideration should be adjourned: Bennett v. Moore, 1 Ch. D. 692.

Husband and wife having put in a joint defence, which was no defence as regarded the husband, Pit was entitled to final judgment against him; Jenkins v. Davies, 1 Ch. D. 696; 24 W. R. 690; W. N. (76) 49.

Orders have been made on motion under this rule-for partition: Gilbert V. Smith, 2 Ch. D. 686; against Defts admitting a partnership, and that they had not accounted, but alleging that Plt was indebted to them: Turquand v. Wilson, 1 Ch. D. 85; in a partition action for sale and an account of rents and profits received by the Plt in possession: Burnell v. B., 11 Ch. D. 213; against an agent on his admission of the agency: Rumsey v. Reade, 1 Ch. D. 643; and in a suit against a trustee for a breach of trust, his statement that he did not know and could not set forth whether the Plts were, &c., was a sufficient admission of title of the Pits as cs. q. t., and payment into Court of the amount was ordered: Symonds v. Jenkins, 24 W. R. 512; 34 L. T. 277; Bennett v. Moore, 1 Ch. D. 692; Dan. 468, 469.

In an action for specific performance of an agreement for purchase of land the Plt, after reply, moved for judgment upon admissions of fact in the statement of defence, and was held not to be too late, but to be entitled to the order: Brown v. Pearson, 21 Ch. D. 716.

As to setting down the action against one Deft, under this rule, and against

others on default of pleading, see O. XXVII, 12, and Bridsdon v. Smith, 24 W. R. 392; Gillott v. Ker, 24 W. R. 428.

By O. XXIV, 3, where a Deft pleads a ground of defence which has arisen after the action commenced, Plt may confess it, and, unless otherwise ordered, claim costs up to that time. See form of judgment, sup. p. 169, Form 8.

SETTING DOWN-MARKING "SHORT."

After some conflicting decisions as to hearing motions for judgment as interlocutory motions (see Bowen v. B., 24 W. R. 246; Pearce v. Spickett, W. N. (76) 109; Hale v. Snelling, ib. 77), the Judges directed that "motions for judgment in actions shall not be brought on as ordinary motions, but shall be set down in the cause book.

"They can be marked short on production of the usual certificate of counsel, and will then be placed in the paper on the day for which notice is given, if a short cause day, or on the first short cause day after the notice expires. If not marked short, they will come into the general paper in their regular turn.

It will be advisable that the notices of motion for judgment should, if it is intended to mark them short, contain a statement to that effect, and also a statement that no further notice will be given of their having been so marked. Such statements will dispense with the necessity for giving Defts further notice that motions for judgment have been marked short: Judge's Notice of 11th April, 1876. In Meakin v. Sykes, 24 W. R. 293, the Court fixed an early day for the hearing on motion for judgment in default of pleading.

The expression "first short cause day after the notice expires" has been considered to mean the first available short cause day; so that if notice were given for a day which was a short cause day, the case might be placed in the paper for that day: Green v. Moore, 39 W. R. 421; W. N. (91) 68.

An action for rectification of a settlement will not, it seems, be heard as a short cause: Clennell v. C., W. N. (84) 14.

Where an action proceeds in a District Registry, and it is necessary to set it down on motion for judgment, the proper course is for the District Registrar to forward to the senior Chancery Registrar a formal notification or certificate that he has set down the action on motion for judgment, together with a copy of the notice, and the two copies of the pleadings, which have to be left on setting down (v. sup. p. 150): see Birm. Waste Co. v. Lane, 24 W. R. 292.

By O. XL, 9, except by leave, no motion for judgment is to be set down after the expiration of one year from the time when the party seeking to set down the same first became entitled so to do.

And by r. 10, upon a motion for judgment, the Court may give judgment, or may direct the motion to stand over for further consideration, and direct such issues or questions to be tried or determined, and such accounts and inquiries to be taken and made, as it may think fit.

For form of counsel's certificate, &c., see D. C. F. 365.

As to motions for judgment generally, see Dan. 505; and as to motions for judgment where issues or questions of fact have been tried, v. inf. Chap. XXII., "ISSUES," p. 384.

CHAPTER XIV.

USUAL DIRECTIONS.

SECTION I.-FURTHER CONSIDERATION ADJOURNED-
LIBERTY TO APPLY.

1. Usual Directions adjourning Further Consideration.

AND let the further consideration of this action [or matter] be adjourned; And let any of the parties be at liberty to apply [to this Court, or to the Judge in Chambers] as they shall be advised.

The rule that an order carries with it liberty to apply, although not expressly reserved, only applies where the order is not of a final character: per Chitty, J., in Penrice v. Williams, 23 C. D. 353; and see Dan. 629.

2. The like-with Liberty to apply in Chambers as to particular Matter.

AND let any of the parties be at liberty to apply in Chambers for the appointment of a receiver [or for, or as to &c., as the case may be], and otherwise (generally) to apply as they may be advised.

3. The like-where Order is made on Interlocutory Motion under 0. XXXII, 6.

AND this Court, not requiring any trial of this action other than this motion, Let the further consideration &c.-Liberty to apply.-And see Brassington v. Cussons, 24 W. R. 881.

4. The like-on Application in Chambers under 0. xv, 1, where Order equivalent to a Judgment.

"AND the Judge not requiring any trial of this action other than the hearing of this application," Let the further consideration &c.-Liberty to apply.

For observations on the use of the words "the Judge not requiring, &c.," see Gatti v. Webster, 12 Ch. D. 771.

5. The like-Liberty to Trustees to apply in Chambers as to

Indemnity against Tenant for Life.

AND the Deft E. H. in person, and the Defts J. M. H., A. G. H., and E. N. by their counsel respectively, requesting, It is ordered that they be at liberty to apply in Chambers with reference to enforcing such rights (if any) as they may have to impound the interest of the Deft H. E. H. in the indentures dated &c., by way of indemnity to the estates of the said G. H. and S. F. R. Plt's subsequent costs of action and costs of Defts E. H., J. M. H., A. G. H., and E. R. reserved until further consideration of the action. Let the further consideration of this action be adjourned to be heard in Chambers.-Liberty to apply. See Re Holt, Holt v. H., Byrne, J., 9 July 1897, A. 1073, (1897) 2 Ch. 525.

6. If Costs are partly dealt with by the Judgment.

AND let the further consideration of this action, and of the costs of this action not hereinbefore [otherwise] provided for [or disposed of] be adjourned.-Liberty to apply.

NOTES.

ADJOURNMENT.

The adjournment of further consideration will be continued from time to time, if necessary; and see O. xxxvi, 21.

Notice of setting down on further consideration need not be given, in the absence of special reason, to persons served with the judgment who have not appeared: Re Rolfe, W. N. (94) 77; 70 L. T. 624.

For the mode of setting down causes for further consideration, v. r. 21. Where on further consideration there are further accounts and inquiries to be taken, but no further question of law to be decided, the practice is not to adjourn the further consideration for the Court, but to give general liberty to apply in Chambers: Gilbert v. Russell, W. N. (75) 225.

Where under O. XXXII, 6, a judgment or order is made, the further consideration may be adjourned, although such judgment or order is made on interlocutory motion: Bennett v. Moore, 1 Ch. D. 692. So, also, where an order is made on summons under O. xv: Form 4, sup. p. 183.

The usual direction for the adjournment of the further consideration of the action, pending an account or inquiry directed to be made in Chambers, does not in terms include the reservation of costs; but they are in effect thereby reserved.

Where, however, the question of costs is partly disposed of at the hearing, the further consideration of the costs undisposed of should be expressly reserved: Horsfall v. Garnett, V.-C. W., 5 March, 1858, Regr. Min. 246; Chilton v. Crosby, V.-C. W., 6 March, 1858, Regr. Min. 270; Form 6, sup.

Trustees were held entitled to their proper costs of carrying out transactions after order on further consideration, though without the sanction of the Court Re Mansel, Rhodes v. Jenkins, 54 L. J. Ch. 883; 33 W. R. 727; 52 L. T. 806.

Where costs are given by the judgment or order generally, subsequent costs are included: Quarrell v. Beckford, 1 Mad. 286; Krehl v. Park, 10 Ch. 236; and see Clutton v. Pardon, T. & R. 304; and this notwithstanding a reservation of subsequent costs "not provided for by the judgment or order," there being other costs by which these words might be satisfied: Quarrell v. Beckford, sup. ; and where subsequent costs are not intended to be given, the direction should be confined to costs up to the judgment or order: S. C.

Liberty to apply is, in the absence of express reservation, implied in all orders which are not of a final nature: Penrice v. Williams, 23 Ch. D. 353; Fritz v. Hobson, 14 Ch. D. 561.

The usual direction for liberty to apply did not extend to an application for costs, as to which no express direction was given in the judgment or order: Kendall v. Marsters, 2 D. F. & J. 200.

But where accounts or inquiries are directed, and the further consideration is adjourned, the Court rarely gives any costs until the further order; except where some part of the action or some of the Defts are dismissed at the hearing, or an improper defence has been set up by the Defts or some of them; in such cases it is the more usual course at once to deal with the costs relating to those matters: see inf. Chap. XVII., "Costs."

SECTION II-DIRECTIONS FOR PAYMENT.

1. Payment of Money by one Party to Another.

day of

LET the (Deft) B., on or before the (or [if so, subsequently] within- days after service of this judgment [or order]) pay to the (Plt) A. the sum ofl. appearing by &c. [or certified &c.] to be due to him in respect of &c. [or on taking the accounts directed by &c.].

2. Payment of Money by Instalments, the whole to become due on

Default.

UPON the application of the Plts, and upon hearing the solrs for the applicants and for the Deft, Let the Deft J. pay to the Plt M. the sum of 50%. by the several instalments mentioned in the first column of the schedule hereto on or before the several dates set opposite to the amounts in the second column thereof, but, on default being made by the Deft in payment of any one of such instalments, Let the Deft J. forthwith pay to the Plts M. the whole balance of the said sum of 501. then remaining unpaid.-Morris v. Jones, M. R. at Chambers 21 Jan. 1878, B. 154.