school in the immediate neighbourhood) is not enough: Harrison v. Good, 11 Eq. 338. And see White v. Cohen, 1 Drew. 312; Biddulph v. St. George's Vestry, 3 D. J. & S. 493. Circumstances of locality will be taken into consideration: Sturges v. Bridgman, 11 Ch. D. 852, C. A.; and although a man by "coming to the nuisance" (of noxious vapours) in a manufacturing district does not lose his right to relief, the injury to his property must be such as sensibly to diminish its value; and a fortiori a much stronger case of personal discomfort will have to be shown by a Plt residing in a manufacturing district: St. Helen's Smelting Co. v. Tipping, 11 H. L. C. 643; and see Salvin v. Brancepeth Co.. sup. Where the Deft claims the right to do the act complained of, and refuses to give an undertaking, the Court infers that there will be a repetition of the nuisance: Phillips v. Thomas, 62 L. T. 793. If there is no exceptional risk, and the injury is accidental or occasional only, and precautions have been taken, there will be no injunction: Cooke v. Forbes, 5 Eq. 166; nor where a mere decision on the legal question will give the Plt all the relief he is really entitled to: Jenkins v. Jackson, 40 Ch. D. 71. And generally, if the nuisance is not continuous, but temporary and occasional only, the Court will not interfere: Gaunt v. Fynney, 8 Ch. 8; Swaine v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 4 D. J. & S. 211; A. G. v. Cambridge Gas Co., 4 Ch. 71; A. G. v. Sheffield Gas Co., 3 D. M. & G. 304; Cooper v. Crabtree, 20 Ch. D. 589, C. A.; Rust v. Victoria Graving Dock Co., 36 Ch. D. 113, C. A.; Harrison v. Southwark and Vauxhall Water Co., (1891) 2 Ch. 409; and if the nuisance has ceased before trial, the Plt will only recover damages and costs: Carr v. Bath Gaslight Co., W. N. (00) 265; Dunning v. Grosvenor Dairies, Ib. (6) Material interference with the reasonable ordinary comfort of human existence see Walter v. Selfe, 4 D. & S. 315; Crump v. Lambert, 3 Eq. 409; Robinson v. Kilvert, 41 Ch. D. 88, C. A.; Bellamy v. Wells, 39 W. R. 158; 63 L. T. 635. To give a right of action (including summary relief by injunction) in respect of nuisance or annoyance, it is not necessary to prove pecuniary loss, or direct injury, or actual risk to health; it is enough if the nuisance be such as to interfere with the ordinary comfort or enjoyment of life and property; as, e.g., by causing a reasonable apprehension of risk from infectious disease: Tod-Heatley v. Benham, 40 Ch. D. 80, C. A.; Rex v. White, 1 Burr. 333; Gaskell v. Bayley, 30 L. T. 516; or if it (the nuisance) be offensive to the senses: Rex v. Neil, 2 Car. & Pay. 485; and if such annoyance is caused, reasonableness of user by the Deft is not per se a defence: Reinhardt v. Mentasti, 42 Ch. D. 685; Sanders Clark v. Grosvenor Mansions Co., (1900) 2 Ch. 373; A. G. v. Cole, (1901) 1 Ch. 205. As to the meaning of the words "annoyance" and "grievance" in a covenant against nuisance, see Tod-Heatley v. Benham, 40 Ch. D. 80, C. A.; and as to the operation of a covenant for quiet enjoyment as protection to covenantee against nuisance by covenantor, see Robinson v. Kilvert, 41 Ch. D. 88, C. A.; Sanderson v. Mayor of Berwick, 13 Q. B. D. 547, 551; Dennett v. Atherton, L. R. 7 Q. B. 316. 326, 327; Tebb v. Care, (1900) 1 Ch. 642 (erection of buildings by landlord on adjoining land causing chimneys of tenant to smoke). A Plt is entitled to the enjoyment of pure air by night as well as by day: Knight v. Gardner, 19 L. T. 673. On this branch of the subject the following cases may be consulted:Brick-burning.-Walter v. Selfe, 4 D. & S. 313; Pollock v. Lester, 11 Ha. 275; Luscombe v. Steer, 15 W. R. 1191; Roberts v. Clarke, 18 L. T. 49; Bamford v. Turnley, 3 B. & S. 62 (overruling Hole v. Barlow, 4 C. B. N. S. 334, and deciding that brick-burning by which nuisance was occasioned was not a reasonable use by Deft of his land); A. G. v. Tossell, V.-C. W., 2 Aug., 19 Dec. 1867 (deciding that brick-burning within certain limits (180 yards) is a nuisance, and that the remedy in penalties, given by the Public Health Act, 1848, s. 140, does not affect the right of the Plt to file an information at the relation of the local board to put a stop to a public nuisance); A. G. v. Hussey, Kay, J., 26 June, 1890. And see Wanstead Local Board v. Hill, 13 C. B. N. S. 479, on the question whether brick-making is an offensive trade within the Public Health Act, 1848 (11 & 12 V. c. 63), s. 64 (re-enacted by the Public Health Act, 1875, s. 112). Calcining.-Shotts Iron Co. v. Inglis, 7 App. Ca. 518. Carpet beating.-Lüsher v. Gibbs, Kay, J., 14 May, 1884, B. 719. Chemical or gas works, noxious vapours and smoke.— Barlow v. Bailey, W. N. Chimneys.-The non-consumption, so far as is practicable, of smoke in any manufacturing or trade process, and the emission of black smoke in such quantity as to be a nuisance from any chimney (not of a private dwelling-house) are nuisances to be summarily dealt with by the local authority. See Public Health Act, 1875 (38 & 39 V. c. 55), s. 91 (re-enacting, with some alterations and additions, Nuisances Removal Act, 18 & 19 V. c. 121, s. 8; and Sanitary Act, 1866 (29 & 30 V. c. 90), s. 19). And for cases on these enactments, see Cooper v. Woolley, L. R. 2 Ex. 88; Barnes v. Akroyd, L. R. 7 Q. B. 474; Norris v. Barnes, Ib. 537; Gaskell v. Bayley, 30 L. T. 516; Barnes v. Eddleston, 1 Ex. D. 102; Weekes v. King, 53 L. T. 51; 15 Cox, C. C. 722. Dangerous trade.-McMurray v. Cadwell, W. N. (89) 216; W. N. (90) 63 (manufacture of amorces; injunction suspended for a fortnight to enable appellant to apply to Home Office for leave to make protective alterations). Dangerous works on highway.-As to the duty of persons who undertake such works, to take care that those who execute them do not negligently cause injury to the public, see Holliday v. National Telephone Co., (1899) 2 Q. B. 392, Č. A. Fried-fish shop.-Wood v. Miles, V.-C. H., 1 Dec. 1880, B. 2249; that such a business is not per se an offensive trade within the Public Health Act, 1875, s. 112, see Braintree Local Board v. Boyton, 52 L. T. 99. Heating premises.-Robinson v. Kilvert, 41 Ch. D. 88, 97, C. A.; Reinhardt v. Mentasti, 42 Ch. D. 685. Hospital for infectious diseases.—Metropolitan Asylums v. Hill, 6 App. Ca. 193; Tod-Heatley v. Benham, 40 Ch. D. 80, C. A.; Bendelow v. Wortley Union, 57 L. J. Ch. 762; 57 L. T. 849; 36 W. R. 168; A. G. v. Hanwell Urban Council, (1900) 2 Ch. 337, C. A.; (1900) 1 Ch. 51. A small-pox hospital is not an 66 other noxious or offensive business" within sect. 112 of the Public Health Act, 1875, and under sect. 131 a local authority may establish such a hospital outside their district without the consent, under sect. 285, of the local authority of the district in which it is to be erected: Withington District Local Board v. Manchester Corporation, (1893) 2 Ch. 19, C. A.; Dalton v. St. Mary Abbots, Kensington, 47 L. T. 349. Malicious interference with servants.-Action held maintainable by employer against persons who, to his damage, maliciously conspire to induce his servants to break their contract of service, and also conspire together to injure him by preventing persons from entering into contracts with him: Leathem v. Craig (1899), 2 I. R. 667, C. A., distinguishing Allen v. Flood, (1898) A. C. 1, and following Temperton v. Russell, (1893) 1 Q. B. 715, C. A. Manure works, and carting night soil.—Knight v. Gardner, 19 L. T. 673. Noise and vibration.—Steam-hammer, &c.—Roskell v. Whitworth, 5 Ch. 459; Goose v. Bedford, 21 W. R. 449; Eaden v. Firth, 1 H. & M. 573; Crump v. Lambert, 3 Eq. 409; Fenwick v. E. Lond. Ry., 20 Eq. 544; Sturges v. Bridg man, 11 Ch. D. 852, C. A. (pestle and mortar); Webb v. Bacher, W. N. (81) 158 (alteration of premises, hammering at night); Harrison v. Southwark and Vauxhall Water Co., (1891) 2 Ch. 409 (temporary use of lift pumps); Lambton v. Mellish, (1894) 3 Ch. 163 (noises caused by acts of different individuals). -Bell-ringing.-Soltau v. De Held, 2 Sim. N. S. 133; Hardman v. Holberton, V.-C. S., 30 June, 1866, A. 1373 (dissolved 5 Dec. 1866, A. 2502; see W. N. (66) 379). -Keeping horses on ground-floor of a London dwelling-house.-Ball v. Ray, 8 Ch. 467; Gullick v. Tremlett, 20 W. R. 358; Broder v. Saillard, 2 Ch. D. 692. Musical Instruments.-Christie v. Davey, (1893) 1 Ch. 316 (semble, constant playing in dwelling-house not a nuisance; secus, if done to annoy neighbour). ! Noisy entertainments, collecting disorderly crowds.—Walker v. Brewster, 5 Eq. 25; Inchbald v. Robinson, 4 Ch. 388; Bostock v. N. Staff. Ry. Co., 5 D. & S. 590; 3 Sm. & G. 283; Crofts v. Hume, V.-C. B., 6 Mar. 1885, A.; Cox v. Baker, V.-C. B., 11 June, 1886 (noisy exhibition in Edgware Road);_Allen v. Vokes, 15, 31 Aug. 1888, ex relatione orders not drawn up; 32 Sol. Journ. 734 (noisy entertainments, swings, rifle gallery); Phillips v. Thomas, 62 L. T. 693 (noisy show in market square); Jenkins v. Jackson, 40 Ch. D. 71 (dancing in room over that of Plt); Bellamy v. Wells, 63 L. T. 635 (club causing noise at night), sup. p. 606, Form 6; Barber v. Penley, (1893) 2 Ch. 447 (performance causing crowd to collect in street); Seaward v. Paterson, (1897) 1 Ch. 545, C. A.; Dewar v. City and Suburban Racecourse Co., (1899) 2 I. R. 345 (racing on Sunday). Use of garden as a skittle or bowling alley.-Barham v. Hodges, V.-C. H., 2 July, 1876, A. 1391; W. N. (76) 234. Use of a rifle-range so as to be a nuisance to adjoining houses.—Banister v. Bigge, 34 Beav. 287; Darvall v. Dougall, sup. Form 11, p. 608. See, however, Hawley v. Steele, 6 Ch. D. 521, that the reasonable use for military purposes of land acquired by authority of Parliament, and vested for such purposes in the War Secretary, will not be restrained. Urinal.-Vernon v. St. James' Vestry. 16 Ch. D. 449; Sellors v. Matlock Bath Local Board, 14 Q. B. D. 928; Chibnall v. Paul, 29 W. R. 536 (where the Deft, by so disposing his premises as tacitly to invite the nuisance, was held responsible); Pethick v. Corp. of Plymouth, 42 W. R. 246 (where an injunction was refused to restrain an urban authority from placing a urinal in a public park near the Plt's houses, and queere whether under sect. 39 of the Public Health Act, 1875, the decision of the urban authority is not conclusive). Vacant land. The owner of a piece of land is under a duty at common law to prevent it from being so used as to be a public nuisance, and this duty may be enforced by injunction at the suit of the A. G.: A. G. v. Tod Heatley, (1897) 1 Ch. 560, Č. A. Watching and besetting premises.-For a case in which a perpetual injunction was granted to restrain the defendants from watching or besetting either the plaintiffs' works or the works of a sub-manufacturer for them for any purpose except merely to obtain or communicate information, see J. Lyons & Sons v. Wilkins, (1899) 1 Ch. 255, C. A.; sup. Form 13, p. 609. To watch or beset a man's house, with a view to compel him to do or not to do that which it is lawful for him not to do or to do, is wrongful, as being both an offence within sect. 7 of the Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act, 1875 (38 & 39 V. c. 86), and a nuisance at common law, as interfering with the ordinary comfort of human existence and the ordinary enjoyment of the house beset: S. C., referring to Bamford v. Turnley, 3 B. & S. 62; Broder v. Saillard, 2 Ch. D. 692, 701; Walter v. Selfe, 4 De G. & Sm. 315; Crump v. Lambert, L. R. 3 Eq. 409. Watching or besetting a place where a person "resides, or works, or carries on business, or happens to be," under sub-sect. 4 of sect. 7 of the Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act, 1875, does not necessarily imply any lengthened watching, and is not limited to places which he habitually frequents: Charnock v. Court, (1899) 2 Ch. 35; sup. Form 14, p. 610. As to the right under the section and O. XVI, 1, of several members of an association of master builders to combine in bringing an action against the officials of various trade unions, see Walters v. Green, (1899) 2 Ch. 696. Waterworks.-Injunction to restrain the laying of pipes. amounting to a constructing" of waterworks within sect. 52 of the Public Health Act, 1875 (38 & 39 V. c. 55), within the limits of supply of an established water company, without previous notice to them: Huddersfield Corp. v. Ravensthorpe Urban District Council, (1897) 2 Ch. 121, C. A. No legal right under the Prescription Act (as in the case of obstruction of light) can be acquired in respect of noise: Sander v. Manley, W. N. (78) p. 181; but the right to an injunction against nuisance may, as in other cases, be lost by acquiescence (e.g., by allowing expense to be incurred, or a trade to be carried on, without taking proceedings): Williams v. E. of Jersey, Cr. & Ph. 91; Gaunt v. Fynney, 8 Ch. 8; and see Turner v. Mirfield, 34 Beav. 390. But acquiescence in the erection of works which, though noxious in themselves, produce but little injury at first, does not warrant their development to the extent of causing great damage: Bankart v, Houghton, 27 Beav. 425; Sturges v. Bridgman, 11 Ch. D. 852, C. A.; and see Baxendale v. McMurray, 2 Ch. 790. The lessor or reversioner of property cannot, it seems, though his tenants the actual occupiers might, maintain an action in respect of a merely temporary nuisance, e.g., from smoke or noise: Jones v. Chappell, 20 Eq. 539; Simpson v. Savage, 1 C. B. N. S. 347; Mott v. Shoolbred, 20 Eq. 22; Cooper v. Crabtree, 19 Ch. D. 193; Sandford v. Clarke, 21 Q. B. D. 398; but where, from change of interest by letting the property since action brought, the Plts have become reversioners, amendment by adding the new tenants as co-Plts has been allowed: House Property Co. v. H. P. Horsenail Co., 29 Ch. D. 190. In the case of apprehended nuisance, Plt seeking an injunction must prove imminent danger of a substantial kind, or that the injury, if it does come, will be irreparable: Fletcher v. Bealey, 28 Ch. D. 688; A. G. v. Manchester Corporation, (1893) 2 Ch. 87, where the principles on which the Court proceeds in granting or refusing in injunctions quia timet against nuisance are discussed. Although persons entrusted with statutory powers are bound to exercise them so as not unnecessarily to create a nuisance (Geddis v. Bann Reservoir, 3 App. Ca. 430; Canadian Pacific Ry. Co. v. Parke, (1899) A. C. 535, P. C.; Jordeson v. Sutton, &c. Gas Co., (1899) 2 Ch. 217, C. A. (Form 8, sup. p. 564)), yet where the user of premises in a particular way is incidental and necessary to that which the statute authorizes, such user cannot be restrained on the ground of nuisance: L. B. & S. C. Ry. v. Truman, 11 App. Ca. 45, where a railway co. were held justified in using land as a depôt for cattle as being incidental to the authorized use of their railway for cattle traffic; and see Harrison v. Southwark and Vauxhall Water Co., (1891) 2 Ch. 409; National Telephone Co. v. Baker, (1893) 2 Ch. 186, where a tramway co. using electrical traction under a provisional order of the Board of Trade were held to be protected from liability for electrical disturbance caused thereby in the wires of a telephone co.; but persons authorized by statute to erect a small-pox hospital could not do so in a place where a nuisance would be caused to the neighbourhood: Met. Asylums v. Hill, 6 App. Ca. 193; nor a vestry the like as to a urinal: Vernon v. Vestry of St. James', 16 Ch. D. 449, C. A.; nor a gas co. in the erection of a gasometer: Jordeson v. Sutton, &c. Gas Co., (1899) 2 Ch. 217, C. A.; and see other cases, sup., and so the statutory powers of a drainage board afford justification only for acts done with due care, and not for negligent acts, as e.g., by deepening a river bed and failing periodically to cleanse it: Bligh v. Rathangan River Drainage Board (1898), 2 I. R. 205; and a tramway co. having power to construct" works and conveniences were liable for nuisance caused by stables erected by them: Rapier v. London Tramways Co., (1893) 2 Ch. 588, C. A.; and see Ogston v. Aberdeen District Tramways Co., (1897) A. C. 111, H. L. (Sc.), where a tramway co. were held to have committed a nuisance by heaping up snow in the streets and scattering salt upon the track of the tramway; and see Canadian Pacific Ry. Co. v. Parke, (1899) A. C. 535, P. C. (injunction to prevent user of the water in disregard of common law obligation to do no damage to the land). Where an Act of Parliament contains a special provision for the protection of an individual, he may sue without joining the A. G., or showing particular damage: Mayor of Devonport v. Plymouth Tram. Co., 52 L. T. 161. The Public Health Act, 1875 (38 & 39 V. c. 55), s. 91, defines nuisances (see also Nuisances Removal Act 1855, (18 & 19 V. c. 121), s. 8; Sanitary Act, 1866, (29 & 30 V. c. 90), s. 19), which may be dealt with summarily by the local authority in the manner provided by the Act (sects. 94-106). If such summary proceedings would afford an inadequate remedy, proceedings may be taken in the Superior Courts to enforce the abatement or prohibition of any nuisance under the Act, or for the recovery of any penalties, or for the punishment of persons offending against the Act (sect. 107). Actions cannot be brought by a local board in respect of a public nuisance under the last-mentioned section, except with the sanction of the A. G., or by some person who has suffered damage: Wallasey Local Board v. Gracey, 36 Ch. D. 593; Tottenham Urban District Council v. Williamson & Sons, (1896) 2 Q. B. 353, C. A. Without evidence of actual injury an action may be maintained by the A. G., and injunction obtained, restraining illegal acts tending to the injury of the public: 4. G. v. Shrewsbury, &c. Bridge Co., 21 Ch. D. 754; e.g., to make a railway co. run their trains at the pace of four miles per hour as required by statute, along a level crossing over a highway: A. G. v. L. N. W. Ry. Co., (1900) 1 Q. B. 78, C. A.; following A. G. v. Shrewsbury (Kingsland) Bridge Co., 21 Ch. D. 752. The provisions of the Act relating to nuisances are to be in addition to, "and not to abridge or affect any right, remedy, or proceeding under any other provisions of the Act, or under any other Act, or at law or in equity but no person shall be punished for the same offence both under the Act and under any other law or enactment (sect. 111). A highway authority, when altering the level of a street pursuant to sect. 98 of the Metropolis Management Act, 1855 (18 & 19 V. c. 120), are not bound to exercise at their own expense the power of altering the position of underground pipes for the benefit of a water co.: Southwark and Vauxhall Water Co. v. Wandsworth District Board of Works, (1898) 2 Ch. 603, C. A. By the Arbitration Act, 1889, s. 13, which is substituted for part of sect. 56 of the Jud. Act, 1873, questions may be referred for inquiry and report to any official or special referee; and, at the trial or hearing, the assistance as assessors of persons specially qualified may be obtained under sect. 56. For the exercise of this power in nuisance, ancient light, and mineral trespass cases, see Broder v. Saillard, sup. p. 401; Cartwright v. Last, sup. p. 401; Craven v. Kaye, sup. p. 402; Bendelow v. Wortley Union, 57 L. J. Ch. 762, sup. p. 605. And see sup. Chap. XXVI., “ARBITRATIONS." A surveyor so appointed acts in a quasi-judicial capacity, and is not subject to examination as a witness: Broder v. Saillard, 24 W. Ř. 456. In cases of nuisance, unless it plainly appears that the conclusion of the Court below upon the evidence was wrong, the Appeal Court is unwilling to reopen the investigation by directing an issue or employing experts to examine and report: Salvin v. North Brancepeth Co., 9 Ch. 705; and see Inchbald v. Robinson, 4 Ch. 388. In an action to restrain sewage nuisance, a general order as to documents in the possession of the Deft board was refused, but an order was made limited to certain resolutions and correspondence with the Local Government Board: Downing v. Falmouth United Sewerage Board, 37 Ch. D. 234, C. A. As to the liability of a landlord for nuisance committed by his tenant, see Jenkins v. Jackson, 40 Ch. D. 71; and that an action for an injunction to restrain the fouling of a stream cannot be maintained against exors in respect of acts done by their testator more than six months before his death, see Kirk v. Todd, 21 Ch. D. 484, C. A. The acts of two or more persons may, taken together, constitute such a nuisance that the Court will restrain all from doing the acts constituting the nuisance, although the annoyance occasioned by the act of any one of them, if taken alone, would not amount to a nuisance: Lambton v. Mellish; Lambton v. Cox, (1894) 3 Ch. 163. Where an inquiry as to damages was directed as well as an injunction, the Plt had the general costs, but the costs of the inquiry were reserved, so that the Judge might exercise control over them if unreasonably exaggerated: Slack v. Midland Ry. Co., 16 Ch. D. 81. Where the nuisance had been abated before the hearing the Court refused an injunction, but gave the Plt costs: Barber v. Penley, (1893) 2 Ch. 447; but see Dean of Chester v. Smelting Corp., W. N. (01) 179. As to the form of the order, and that the Court will not thereby, as in the case of breach of covenant, specify the particular acts to be restrained, see Walker v. Brewster, 5 Eq. 25. For a collection of cases relating to nuisances, see Chambers' Public Health, &c. Act, Digest of Cases, 526-572; Kerr, 166-294; Joyce, 99-130; Garrett on Nuisances, passim. (II.)-POLLUTION OF WATER. 1. Injunction restraining Pollution of River by Town Sewage. LET the Defts, the mayor &c., of the borough of &c., their servants &c., be restrained, from and after the second day after the close of the |