jurisdiction, the interference of the superior Court is discretionary: Chambers v. Green, 20 Eq. 552; Re Forster, 4 B. & S. 187; Reg. v. Twiss, L. R. 4 Q. B. 407; Mayor of London v. Cox, L. R. 2 H. L. 239, 280; Broad v. Perkins, 21 Q. B. D. 533, C. A.; but the rule does not affect the right of the Crown to claim a writ of prohibition at any stage: S. C., at p. 535.

But where total absence of jurisdiction appears on the face of the proceedings the Court is bound to issue prohibition, although the applicant has acquiesced in the jurisdiction of the inferior Court: Farquharson v. Morgan, (1894) 1 Q. B. 552, C. A.

And generally for a review of the authorities as to whether the grant of prohibition is discretionary, and if so, to what extent, see Shortt, 441 et seq.

Where the objection to the jurisdiction is capable of being waived, and has been waived, by the applicant, prohibition will not be granted: Moore v. Gamgee, 25 Q. B. D. 244; Mouflet v. Washburn, 54 L. T. 16; In re Jones v. James, 19 L. J. Q. B. 257.

As to the distinction between cases where there is a total want of jurisdiction, and where the jurisdiction is contingent (ex. gr., on leave to sue being obtained under the County Courts Act, 1888, s. 74), see Moore v. Gamgee, sup.

When the writ has been improperly granted in the first instance on the application of a stranger, and it does not appear that the inferior Court is exceeding its jurisdiction, both with reference to the facts and to the law, the superior Court has jurisdiction to set it aside: Chambers v. Green, 20 Eq.

552.

A prohibition to the Mayor's Court (formerly issued out of the Petty Bag Office, which is now merged in the Central Office: R. S. C. Jan. 1889), might be set aside on the ground that the order for the goods and the delivery both took place within the jurisdiction of that Court: see Taylor v. Jones, 1 C. P. D. 87 (following Dunlop v. Higgins, 1 H. L. C. 381; Evans v. Nicholson, 32 L. T. 778, that the letter containing an order speaks from the place where and the time when it was posted).

But though the writ has been improperly issued, it must be obeyed until superseded: Iveson v. Harris, 7 Ves. 225.

As to the jurisdiction of a Judge at Chambers to set aside a writ of prohibition issued out of the Petty Bag Office (merged since R. S. C. Jan. 1889, in the Central Office), see Amstell v. Lesser, 16 Q. B. D. 187; and see Shortt, 490.

Under the former procedure, the Courts of Chancery and Common Law had concurrent jurisdiction to grant the writ, but-except as to applications for prohibitions directed to the County Court Judges, which, by 13 & 14 V. c. 61, s. 22, might be made and determined in vacation as well as in term time-the application for the writ during vacation could only be made in Chancery: see Re Bateman, 9 Eq. 660, and cases there cited.

By Crown Office Rules, 1886, r. 229: "All writs on the Crown side shall be issued at the Crown Office Department of the Central Office."

As to the preparation, teste and return of such writs, see rr. 230-232.

FORM OF ORDER.

As to the form of order, see G. W. Ry. Co. v. Waterford and Limerick Ry. Co., 17 Ch. D. 493, 511; E. and W. India Dock Co. v. Shaw, Savill and Albion Co., 39 Ch. D. 524, 533.

In lieu of granting prohibition, the Court will, where it is "just or convenient," within Jud. Act, 1873, s. 25 (8), grant an injunction inter partes, e.g., to restrain a landowner from taking proceedings before justices on an irregular notice under the Land Drainage Act, 1861 (24 & 25 V. c. 133): Hedley v. Bates, 13 Ch. D. 498.

At Common Law a rule nisi in the first instance for a prohibition was granted on application to either of the superior Courts or to a Judge in Chambers: Chit. Arch. (Prentice) 1727; and see 19 & 20 V. c. 108,

s. 40.

COUNTY COURT.

For the practice as to prohibitions directed to the County Courts, see PittLewis, County Court Practice, 130 et seq.; Annual County Court Practice, p. 76; County Courts Practice, 216; Pollock & Nicol, 249; and for the cases in which the writ will and will not issue, see Chit. Arch. (Prentice) 1543; Shortt, 475 et seq.; Annual County Court Practice Index, tit. "PROHIBITION."

By the County Courts Act, 1888 (51 & 52 V. c. 43), s. 127, any Judge of the High Court, as well during sittings as in vacation, may hear and determine applications for writs of prohibition to any County Court, and make such orders as might have been made by the High Court."

By sect. 128, when an application is made to the High Court or a Judge thereof for a writ of prohibition to be addressed to a County Court Judge, the matter shall be finally disposed of by rule or order, and no declaration or further proceedings in prohibition shall be allowed.

The County Court Judge is not to be served with notice of the application, nor, except by order of the High Court Judge, to be required to appear, or liable to any order for payment of costs, but the application is to be heard in the same manner as a County Court appeal. As to service of the order on, or lodgment of the writ (if granted on an exp. application) with, the registrar of the County Court, see sects. 129, 130.

By O. LIX, 8a, every application for a prohibition to a County Court, other than an application by the A. G., shall be brought by notice of motion served on the parties to the proceedings in the County Court, or such of them as may not be applicants for the prohibition. The mode of procedure under this rule is alternative to that of applications in Chambers under sect. 127, sup.: King v. Charing Cross Bank, 24 Q. B. D. 27.

And by sect. 132, if the writ be refused by one Court or Judge, no other Court or Judge may grant it; but the right of appealing from the Judge to the High Court itself is not affected, nor the right to make a second application to the same Court on different grounds.

The decision of the Judge in Chambers, if not appealed from, is conclusive in the County Court on the question of value: Symons v. Rees, 1 Ex. D. 416. An appeal lies without leave from the decision of a divisional Court upon an application for a prohibition to a County Court, as sect. 128, sup., is to be read as referring solely to applications to the High Court: Lister v. Wood, 23 Q. B. D. 229, C. A.

A prohibition was granted against proceedings in the County Court to restrain an amalgamation of a friendly society under 38 & 39 V. c. 60, before any special resolution had been passed founding the jurisdiction under the Act: Jones v. Slee, 32 Ch. D. 585, C. A.; and for cases in which prohibition went in respect of excess of jurisdiction by a County Court, see Reg. v. Lincolnshire County Court, 20 Q. B. D. 167; Reg. v. Shropshire County Court, 20 Q. B. D. 242; Reg. v. Greenwich County Court, 37 W. R. 132; 60 L. T. 248; Kenyon v. Eastwood, 57 L. J. Q. B. 455.

Under the Cos. (Winding-up) Act, 1890 (53 & 54 V. c. 63), s. 1, sub-s. 6, the County Court Judge in a winding-up has the powers of the High Court, and therefore prohibition will not lie for an alleged excess of jurisdiction by him: New Par Consols, Ld., (1898) 1 Q. B. 669, C. A.

The City of London Court, notwithstanding the County Courts Act, 1888, has jurisdiction to try an action when the Deft has employment within the city though he does not dwell or carry on business there: Kutner v. Phillips, (1891) 2 Q. B. 267.

As to the jurisdiction of the Salford Hundred Court, where the want of jurisdiction is not pleaded under the Salford Hundred Court of Record Act, 1868 (31 & 32 V. c. cxxx.), see Payne v. Hogg, (1900) 2 Q. B. 43, C. A.

MAYOR'S COURT, LONDON.

The jurisdiction of the Mayor's Court has been somewhat restricted by recent decisions to the effect that in order to give that Court jurisdiction the cause of action must arise, and the garnishee reside within the city: Read v.

Brown, 22 Q. B. D. 128, C. A.; Cooke v. Gill, L. R. 8 C. P. 107, 110; Mayor of London v. Cox, L. R. 2 H. L. 239; Banque de Crédit v. De Gas, L. R. 6 C. P. 142; Robinson v. Emanuel, L. R. 9 C. P. 414.

Or, again, that to enable the Plt to resist prohibition, he must show that the whole of the cause of action, or every material fact essential to constitute it, occurred within the jurisdiction of the Mayor's Court: Gold v. Turner, L. R. 10 C. P. 149; Whinney v. Schmidt, L. R. 8 C. P. 120; Bowler v. Barberton Development Syndicate, (1897) 1 Q. B. 164, C. A.

And see Washer v. Elliott, 1 C. P. D. 169, for prohibition to the Mayor's Court from proceeding on an order for committal under the Debtors Act in respect of a debt on which judgment had been recovered in a Superior Court, the debtor not residing or carrying on business within the jurisdiction of the Mayor's Court when the summons issued.

On the other hand, the Superior Court is not bound to prohibit an action in the Mayor's Court unless satisfied that no one entire cause of action arose within the jurisdiction: Taylor v. Nicholls, 1 C. P. D. 242 (explaining Evans v. Nicholson, 32 L. T. 778; Wallace v. Allan, 23 W. R. 703).

An order by telegraph from without the city being accepted within it, there was a contract of agency made within the city: Cowan v. O'Connor, 20 Q. B. D. 640.

A clerk employed by a solr at offices in the city does not carry on business there within the Mayor's Court Procedure Act, 1857: Lewis v. Graham, 20 Q. B. D. 780; 22 Q. B. D. 1, C. A.

The process of foreign attachment in the Mayor's Court of London cannot be issued against a corp. aggregate as garnishees: Corp. of London v. London Joint Stock Bank, H. L. 6 App. Ca. 393. Such attachment, being merely process to compel appearance, does not suspend the operation of a garnishee order: Richter v. Laxton, 48 L. J. Q. B. 184; 39 L. T. 499; 27 W. R. 214.

When the Mayor's Court is proceeding without jurisdiction-notwithstanding the interpretation put upon the Mayor's Court Procedure Act, 1857 (20 & 21 V. c. clvii.), s. 15, in Manning v. Farquharson, 30 L. J. Q. B. 22; Baker v. Clark, L. R. 8 C. P. 121-the Deft in the Mayor's Court or even any stranger, may obtain a writ of prohibition: Jacobs v. Brett, 20 Eq. 1; Mayor of London v. Cox, L. R. 2 H. L. 259; and see Bridge v. Branch, 34 L. T. 905.

Sect. 89 of the Jud. Act, 1873, empowering inferior Courts to grant in any proceeding relief, redress, or remedy as fully as the High Court might in the like case, refers to the judgment, and not to the means of obtaining it. Thus, the Mayor's Court cannot, on motion for a new trial, direct judgment to be entered as a Judge of the High Court can under O. XL, 10; and where, judgment having been so entered in the Mayor's Court, there was an error on the face of the proceedings, appeal lay to the Court of Appeal (as successors of Exch. Chamber): Pryor v. City Offices Co., 10 Q. B. D. 504, C. A.

In cases within the Mayor's Court Procedure Act, 1857, s. 12 (debt under 50%., and Deft carrying on business and cause of action arising within the City), the jurisdiction of the Mayor's Court is extended so as to exclude prohibition: Hawes v. Paveley, 1 C. P. D. 418, C. A.

After the abandonment by Plt in the Mayor's Court of items in the action not arising within that jurisdiction, the prohibition may be discharged, but without costs: Ellis v. Fleming, 1 C. P. D. 237.

An action having been brought in the Mayor's Court and a counter-claim set up which is beyond the jurisdiction of that Court, that Court has no power to deal with the counter-claim to the extent of the amount of the Plt's claim: Davis v. Flagstaff Silver Mining Co., 3 C. P. D. 228.

And as to the practice in prohibition to the Mayor's Court, see also Chit. Archb. 1546; Shortt, 471.

COSTS.

The costs of proceedings in prohibition were regulated by 1 W. IV. c. 21, s. 1 (repealed by 46 & 47 V. c. 49). It was held that where the rule for a prohibition was made absolute without pleadings, there was no "judgment"

within that section, so as to entitle to costs: Exp. Everton Overseers, L. R. 6 C. P. 245; Rex v. Keeling, 1 Dowl. 440; but see Evans v. Wills, 1 C. P. D. 229; and though the Court was not bound to award costs on making absolute or discharging the order, it might do so if it thought proper: Wallace v. Allen, L. R. 10 C. P. 607; Shortt, 497.

As to the proper mode of procedure in a case where a police magistrate is exceeding his jurisdiction, see In re Briton Medical and General Life Associa tion, 39 Ch. D. 61.

The right to grant prohibition not being a jurisdiction belonging exclusively to the Crown side of the K. B. D., the High Court, in making a rule absolute for a prohibition without pleadings, may make an order for costs: Reg. v. Justices of County of London and London County Council, (1894) 1 Q. B. D. 453, C. A.; Dan. 1393.

CHAPTER XXXIV.

TRANSFER, CONSOLIDATION, AND REMOVAL.

SECTION I.-TRANSFER OF CAUSES AND ACTIONS IN THE HIGH

COURT.

1. Order for Transfer of Cause or Action from one Judge to another in Chancery Division-by Consent of Parties-0. XLIX, 1.

UPON the petition &c., and the solrs for &c., having subscribed the said petition signifying their consent to the prayer thereof, It is ordered that this cause [or action], which has been assigned to Mr. Justice A., be transferred to Mr. Justice B., and that the same, when so transferred, be hereafter considered as a cause [or action] originally assigned to Mr. Justice B.

For order with costs, on the motion of Plt in the first of two creditors' admon actions, for a transfer of the second action to the Judge by whom the decree had been made in the first action, see Re Sharp, Bentall v. S., L. C., 16 Nov. 1876, B. 1738.

For various forms of application for transfer, see D. C. F. 989 et seq.

2. Transfer from one Judge to another of the Chancery Division on Motion before the Lord Chancellor.

UPON motion &c., unto the Right Hon. the Lord High Chancellor, by counsel for the Deft, and upon hearing counsel for the Plt, Let this action, which has been assigned to Mr. Justice A., be transferred to Mr. Justice B.; And Let the same when so transferred be hereafter considered as an action originally assigned to Mr. Justice B.-HineHaycock v. Hamerton, L. C., 16 Feb. 1888, A. 158.

3. Order for Transfer of particular Matter in Chancery Division— on Ex parte Application-0. Xlix, 1.

UPON the petition of &c., this day preferred unto the Right Hon. the Lord High Chancellor, his Lordship doth order that the abovementioned matters, "The L. & S. Ry. Co.," "The B. & H. Ry. Act, 1845," and "The L. C. C. Act, 1845," which are now attached to the