obtained to proceed, and to stay the other unless such decree has been "snapped" or unfairly obtained, or the second action has been improperly instituted: Harris v. Gandy, 1 D. F. & J. 13; Frost v. Ward, 2 D. J. & S. 70; Rhodes v. Barret, 12 Eq. 479; or unless more complete and beneficial relief is sought by and can be obtained in the second action: Re McRae, Forster v. Davis, 25 Ch. D. 16; Budgen v. Sage, 3 M. & Cr. 683; Taylor v. Southgate, 4 M. & Cr. 203; Underwood v. Jee, 1 Mac. & G. 276; Pickford v. Hunter, 5 Sim. 122 (in which case the decree in the first suit, being less beneficial than that which could be obtained in the second, was not allowed to be pleaded in bar); Plunkett v. Lewis, 11 Sim. 379; Re Yates, 3 D. J. & S. 402; Hoskins v. Campbell, 2 H. & M. 43; Re Smith's Estate, M'Murray v. Mathew, 33 L. T. 804; or unless questions other than those of simple admon, e.g., breaches of trust or charges of wilful default, are raised in the action in which a judgment has not been first obtained: see Zambaco v. Cassavetti, 11 Eq. 439.

A second and more comprehensive suit has been stayed upon the Deft in the first (the admor) undertaking not to object to any additions to the decree thought fit to be made by the Judge in Chambers: Gwyer v. Peterson, 26 Beav. 83; Matthews v. Palmer, 11 W. R. 610; and see Vanrenen v. Piffard, 13 W. R. 425; 11 L. T. 766; and Form 6, sup.

And where infants are Plts, that suit will, cæteris paribus, be preferred in which the mother is next friend: Harris v. H., 10 W. R. 31; or that which is most for their benefit: Virtue v. Miller, 19 W. R. 406; and see Frost v. Ward, 2 D. J. & S. 70.

Two admon suits having been instituted, one in the Palatine Court in which a decree was first made, and the other in the Court of Chancery, the latter Court refused to stay the proceedings before it, as the entire property to be administered was not within the jurisdiction of the Palatine Court, though if it had been, a stay would, it seems, have been granted: Wynne v. Hughes, 26 Beav. 377; and see Bradley v. Stelfox, 1 N. R. 221.

Where an admon action and a partnership action by testator's surviving partner were in different branches of the Court, the partnership action was transferred: Davis v. D., 48 L. J. Ch. 40.

An admor whose title after obtaining an admon decree has been displaced, will be liable, by not submitting to an application to stay proceedings in his suit, to the costs of such application, and will not get the costs of his own suit: Houseman v. H., 1 Ch. D. 535.

CONDUCT OF ACTION.

After consolidation of actions for the same object, and difference of opinion between the joint Plts as to the course to be adopted, the conduct was given to those of the Plts who had not been the first to take steps for severance, though their interest in the subject-matter was smaller: Holden v. Silkstone Co., 30 W. R. 98; 45 L. T. 531.

If the first action is stayed by reason of a decree in a second action first obtained, the conduct of the proceedings will generally be given to the Plt in the first action: Zambaco v. Cassavetti, 11 Eq. 439; Kenyon v. K., 35 Beav. 300; Belcher v. B., 2 Dr. & S. 444; Frost v. Ward, 2 D. J. & S. 70; and this rule applies though the first action was in the Palatine Court, and the second (in which the decree was obtained) in the Chancery Division: Re Swire, Mellor v. S., 21 Ch. D. 647, 655, C. A.; and see Townsend v. T., 23 Ch. D. 100, C. A.

And the order has been made upon terms of adding to the judgment inquiries in respect of questions raised in the action stayed: see Matthews ▼. M., 34 L. T. 718; Townsend v. T., 23 Ch. D. 100, C. A.; Form 6, sup. p. 833; Drury v. Thorn, sup., Form 3, p. 831.

In applying the rule, special circumstances will be regarded, e.g., the amount of the interest of the Plt in the first action, and his object in bringing it: Re Swire, sup. ; but the fact that the first Plt was a purchaser of reversionary interests, and that some of the purchases were disputed, was not ground for depriving him of the conduct.

Or the first suit may be partially stayed, with liberty to Plt to prove under the decree in the second for what he might eventually establish in the first:

Dryden v. Foster, 6 Beav. 146; see also Smith's Estate, M'Murray v. Mathew, 33 L. T. 804; Crowle v. Russell, 4 C. P. D. 186.

And see, on this question, "ÁDMINISTRATION," Chap. XLIV., inf. p. 1524. In the case of cross actions, there is no inflexible rule in favour of the first Plt: Thomson v. S. E. Ry. Co., 9 Q. B. D. 320, C. A., where the action by the Plts, on whom the burden of proof lay, was allowed to proceed. For form of summons for conduct of action, see D. C. F. 538.

TEST ACTION.

The practice of selecting which of several suits shall proceed has been also adopted in patent cases, sup. pp. 649, 650; and when the patentee is suing several infringers simultaneously, one suit has been selected as a test suit, and proceedings in the others stayed upon an undertaking by the several Defts to abide the result of the selected suit: Foxwell v. Webster, 4 D. J. & S. 77; Amos v. Chadwick, 4 Ch. D. 869, sup. p. 833. Although the order contained no express provision to that effect, the Court has power to substitute another of the actions as the test action, where the original action has by some accident failed to be a real trial of the matters in issue therein: S. C., 9 Ch. D. 459; followed in Bennett v. Ld. Bury, 5 C. P. D. 339, where thirtyeight actions had been brought against the Defts as directors of a co. in respect of sums deposited for investment; and see Colledge v. Pike, 56 L. T. 124. Upon neglect of Deft in a test action to appeal, another Deft in another action was substituted: Briton Medical Life Assur. Soc. v. Jones, 60 L. T. 637. And see Bovill v. Crate, 1 Eq. 388.

PREVALENCE OF PRACTICE.

The practice of consolidating proceedings has also been adopted: -in the Privy Council, see Re A. G. of Victoria, L. R. 1 P. C. 147; Hiddingh v. Denyssen, 12 App. Ca. 107;

-in the Q. B. D.: see Chitty's Arch. 407;

-in the Probate and Admiralty Division: see The Melpomene, L. R. 4 A. & E. 129; The Helen R. Cooper, L. R. 3 A. & E. 339; The Never Despair, 9 P. D. 34;

-in the Court of Bankruptcy: see Exp. Mackenzie, 20 Eq. 758; and B. Act, 1883, s. 106; Lee and Wace, 536, 538; Wms. on Bkcy. 323; -in the House of Lords: Re Ooregum Gold Mining Co. of India, Roper v. Wallroth, Wallroth v. Roper, (1892) A. C. 125.

SECTION III.-REMOVAL OF CAUSES AND ACTIONS FROM AND TO INFERIOR COURTS-CERTIORARI.

1. Order for Removal of Cause from Equity side of Mayor's Court into Chancery, under 20 & 21 V. c. 157, ss. 20 and 52-Consolidation of Causes-Receiver continued in Consolidated Causes. "LET the above-mentioned cause of B. v. P., now pending on the Equity side of the Mayor's Court of London, and the decree made in the said cause, and all proceedings had therein, be, pursuant to the provisions in that behalf of the Mayor's Court of London Procedure Act, 1857, removed from out of the Equity side of the said Mayor's Court into the Chancery Division of this Court, and be assigned to the

V.-C.; And Let the original proceedings filed in the said Mayor's Court of London, or office copies thereof, be brought into and placed on record in this Court, and filed with the record in the said cause of N. v. P., 1875, N. 49; And Let the said cause be henceforth prosecuted, and the decree therein be carried into effect in this Court, as if the same had been originally made by this Court, and been intituled in both the said causes of B. v. P. and N. v. P.; And Let the said causes be consolidated, and be henceforth carried on as if they were one cause; And Let the conduct thereof and the carriage of the said decree be committed to the Plt N.; And Let the costs of all parties of both the said causes, including the costs of the motion of the Plt N. in B. v. P., in the Mayor's Court, be costs in the said consolidated causes; And Let E., the receiver appointed in the said cause of N. v. P., be continued as receiver in the said consolidated causes."-Directions that the receiver leave in Chambers his annual account as receiver, and pay his balances into Court to the credit of the said consolidated causes of N. v. P., 1875, N. 49, and B. v. P., instead of in manner directed by the order dated &c.; And that the receiver appointed in B. v. P. be discharged, and that he pass his accounts and pay any balance certified to be due from him into Court to the credit of the said consolidated causes of N. v. P. &c., and B. v. P.; And that upon such payment, or if no such balance is due, his recognizance be vacated.-Nothard v. Proctor and Blewitt v. Proctor (in the Mayor's Court), V.-C. B., 16 Nov. 1875, B. 2872; Vickers v. Stevens, V.-C. B., 29 W. R. 562.

The proceedings in Nothard v. Proctor were not stayed, but were consolidated in order not to disturb the continuing receiver's security already given in that suit.

For forms of application, &c., in reference to removal from Mayor's Court, see D. C. F. 1002 et seq.

2. Order for Writ of Certiorari on Ex parte Motion to remove
Proceedings from the Mayor's Court into Chancery.

UPON motion &c., Let a writ of certiorari issue directed to the Lord Mayor of the City of London and his brethren the Aldermen of the said city, commanding them to certify and remove (the bill of complaint in the Plt's bill mentioned), with the process and all proceedings thereon, into this Court, and to stand to, observe, and perform such order and decree therein as the circumstances of the case shall require.-Tracy v. The Open Stock Exchange, L. C., 12 Dec. 1870, B. 3035.

For like order, and for service of the writ, and of the bill on the Deft's solr, see Davies v. MacHenry, L. C., 25 Nov. 1867, A. 2258; 3 Ch. 200. For further order on ex parte motion that the writ and proceedings returned therewith be filed on the record; and that an inquiry be made whether the Plt is able to prove the suggestions made in the bill in Chancery, see Davies v. MacHenry, V.-C. W., 11 Jan. 1868, A. 41; 3 Ch. 202.

And for the final order, on summons, to vary the certificate and ex parte motion to retain the bill, that the certificate be considered as varied by stating that the Plt has proved the suggestion made in her bill that neither

the Plt nor the Deft were resident within the jurisdiction of the Mayor's Court; and that the said suit be retained, see Davies v. MacHenry, V.-C. W., 31 Jan. 1868, A. 202; 3 Ch. 202.

3. Further Order to retain Suit in Chancery, on return of Writ, without Inquiry.

UPON motion &c., Let the said writ and the proceedings returned therewith from the Mayor's Court of the City of London in a suit of Billing and others v. Tracy and others, instituted in that Court by the Defts F. B., G. H., and C. H., and the Open Stock Exchange, Limited, against the Plts &c., be filed on the record of this Court; and it appearing by the bill filed in the said Mayor's Court that the Plts (in that suit) are resident out of the jurisdiction of that Court, Let the said suit of Billing and others v. Tracy and others, be retained in this Court.-Tracy v. Open Stock Exchange, V.-C. M., 22 Dec. 1870, B. 3129; 11 Eq. 556.

For the like order, see Jones v. Hay, V.-C. J., 20 July, 1869, A. 1964; S. C., 17 W. R. 996.

For a further order by consent after the removal, for transfer of a fund in Court in the cause in the Mayor's Court, into Chancery, see Billing v. Tracy, V.-C. M., 11 Jan. 1871, A. 73; 11 Eq. 557.

4. Transfer from High Court to County Court.

UPON motion by counsel for the Deft, and upon hearing counsel for the Plt, Let, pursuant to the 51 & 52 V. c. 43, s. 65, this action, which has been assigned to the V.-C. Sir J. Bacon, be transferred to the County Court of &c., holden &c.; and for that purpose Let the Plt, on or before &c., lodge with the registrar the documents necessary under the County Court Rules, O. XXXIII, 1, to complete such transfer; And Let all original documents filed herein be transmitted to the said County Court.-Costs of application at discretion of County Court Judge. See David v. Howe, V.-C. B., 27 June, 1884, A. 904.

For forms of application, &c., see D. C. F. 994 et seq.

5. Re-transfer from High Court to County Court.

day of

-

LET this cause (or action), which was instituted in the County Court of holden at and which was transferred to this Court by the order dated the be re-transferred to the said County Court of holden atand be carried on and prosecuted in the said County Court [(if so) notwithstanding the subject-matter thereof exceeds the limit in point of amount to which the jurisdiction of the County Courts is limited].

For like order by consent, see Evans v. Hicks, Field, J., in Chambers, 22 Aug. 1876, A. 1627.

It is not necessary to add a direction to the Masters to return the papers: Hartley v. Barber, V.-C. M., 23 Jan. 1873, A. 61.

6. Certiorari Nisi to remove Action from County Court to High Court.

UPON the appeal of P. and L., this day made unto this Court from the order dated &c., and upon hearing counsel for the appellants, Let, unless the Plt S. do on the day of - 18-, or so soon thereafter as counsel can be heard, show sufficient cause to the contrary before the Court of Appeal, a writ of certiorari issue to remove this action into the Chancery Division of the High Court of Justice, on the ground that the said action raises a question of the validity of a certain contract for sale of real estate, and that an action is pending in the said Chancery Division, in which the appellants are Plts and the said S. is a Deft, for specific performance of the same contract.-Simons v. Pearce, C. A., 12 March, 1885, B. 343.

For forms of application, &c., for removal of action, see D. C. F. 997 et seq.

7. Certiorari to remove Plaint from County Court to the High Court.

UPON the application by originating summons of the Deft A., and upon hearing solrs for the applicant and for the respondents B. and C.; And the Judge being of opinion that it is desirable that the said matter should be tried in the High Court, doth, pursuant to 51 & 52 V. c. 43, s. 126, order that a writ of certiorari issue to remove the said plaint, No. &c., between &c., from the County Court of &c., holden at &c., into the Chancery Division of this Court; And the Masters of the Supreme Court of Judicature are to receive and file the same; And Let the said plaint when removed be assigned to Mr. Justice Chitty, and be continued and prosecuted in this Court in the same manner as if it had been originally commenced therein and assigned to the said Judge.-Haymen v. Cooper, Chitty, J., 20 May, 1890, A. 758.

8. Certiorari Absolute in the First Instance to remove Action after Judgment from County Court to High Court.

UPON the application of C. and B., and upon hearing the solr for the applicant, and upon reading &c., Let a writ of certiorari issue to remove the plaint between the said C. and B. as Plts against R. as Deft, from the County Court of Sussex, holden at Brighton, together with the record of the judgment thereon obtained in the said Court, into the Chancery Division of this Court, and the Masters of the Supreme Court of Judicature are to receive and file the same.Chipperfield v. Rüst, M. R. at Chambers, 18 Nov. 1879, A. 2174.

9. Cause to proceed in County Court notwithstanding Subject-matter exceeds Limit.

By consent, Let this suit be carried on and prosecuted in the County Court of &c., holden at, notwithstanding the subject-matter thereof