The indicates the page at which a Rule is referred to in extenso. INTRODUCTION. OF JUDGMENTS AND ORDERS GENERALLY. UNDER the concurrent but to some extent conflicting systems of Law and Equity, as administered previously to the Judicature Acts, the forms of judgments at Common Law and of decrees in Chancery differed widely. Judgments at Common Law were uniform, simple, and invariable, and being limited by the form of the writ in the action to the recovery of land, goods, or money, could not conveniently be moulded so as to meet cases in which conditions were to be imposed or various interests dealt with. Decrees in Chancery, from the more comprehensive nature of the relief given, the number of the parties interested, the various claims asserted, circumstances to be dealt with, and questions to be finally determined, were, as a rule, necessarily more complicated. But notwithstanding the greater pliability of equitable jurisdiction and procedure, the forms of the decrees and orders by which the Court gave effect to its determinations were generally well established and, for the most part, uniform. Upon this ground they have been frequently referred to as regulating the practice and elucidating the law and procedure of the Court. The great utility of consulting them, and the advantages of adhering to the settled and well understood forms and language of decrees, have been repeatedly adverted to by some of the most eminent Judges in Equity: see Marriott v. The Anchor Reversionary Co., 3 D. F. & J. 177; Sherwin v. Shakspear, 5 D. M. & G. 534; Mills v. Slater, 8 Ves. 303; Cricket v. Dolby, 3 Ves. 13; Willan v. Willan, 19 Ves. 593; Holland v. Prior, 1 M. & K. 246; Blackford v. Davis, 4 Ch. 304, at p. 308; Rees v. Metropolitan Board of Works, 14 Ch. D. 372, 374; Re New Zealand Trust and Loan Co., (1893) 1 Ch. 403; Re Gregson, (1893) 3 Ch. 233, at p. 237. Under the Judicature Acts, 1873 and 1875 (36 & 37 Vict. c. 66; 38 & 39 Vict. c. 77), the same jurisdiction to pronounce judgments and orders-in which terms, unless there is anything in the subject or context repugnant thereto, are to be included decrees and rules (36 & 37 Vict. c. 66, s. 100)—in such form as may be required for doing justice between the parties, and determining all questions raised, has been conferred upon every branch of the Supreme Court; the result being that although, for the more convenient despatch of business, some kinds of litigation are assigned to particular divisions, law and equity are now administered in every branch of the Court. And having regard to the direction that in all cases of conflict or variance between the rules of Equity and of Common Law, the rules of Equity shall prevail-Judicature Act, 1873, s. 25 (11)-it is apprehended that the Forms contained in this work have lost no portion of their value and importance, but have rather become more generally applicable than heretofore. Since the Judicature Acts, the expression "decree," having lost its distinctive meaning, has been superseded in use by the more comprehensive word "judgment; " but is still properly and usefully retained in reference to the pre-existing procedure. The following classes of business have been assigned to the Chancery Division of the High Court by the Judicature Act, 1873, s. 34, viz.: (1.) All causes and matters pending in the Court of Chancery at the commencement of the Acts. (2.) All causes and matters to be commenced after the commencement of the Acts, under any Act of Parliament by which exclusive jurisdiction in respect to such causes, &c., has been given to the Court of Chancery, or to any Judge thereof, except County Court appeals. Under this head are included proceedings under the Lunacy Acts, the jurisdiction in respect of lunatics of the Lords Justices of Appeal in Chancery at the commencement of the Acts being reserved to them by the Judicature Act, 1875, s. 7, which latter section, however, was repealed by the Lunacy Act, 1890 (53 Vict. c. 5), s. 342, but with a provision that that repeal should not affect any jurisdiction established, confirmed, or transferred by any enactment repealed by that Act (a), and under the Solicitors Acts, the Trustee Acts, the Settled Land Acts, the Lands Clauses Acts, and the various Acts more particularly noticed in the course of this work. (a) By the Lunacy Act, 1890 (53 Vict. c. 5), s. 108, the jurisdiction of the Judge in Lunacy under that Act is to be exercised either by the Lord Chancellor alone or jointly with any one or more of such Judges of the Supreme Court as may for the time being be entrusted by Sign Manual with the care and commitment of the custody of the persons and estates of lunatics, or by any one or more of such Judges as aforesaid. The Judges so entrusted are the ordinary Lords Justices of Appeal, who take lunacy work by rotation. (3.) All causes and matters for the administration of the estates of deceased persons; dissolution of partnerships, or taking partnership or other accounts; redemption or foreclosure of mortgages; raising portions or other charges on land; sale and distribution of the proceeds of property subject to any lien or charge; execution of trusts, charitable or private; rectification, or setting aside, or cancelling of deeds or other written instruments; specific performance of contracts between vendors and purchasers of real estates, including contracts for leases; partition and sale of real estates; wardship of infants and the care of infants' estates. By the Judicature Act, 1873, s. 100, "cause" includes any action, suit, or other original proceeding between a plaintiff and a defendant, and any criminal proceedings by the Crown (which, by s. 34, are assigned to the Queen's Bench Division); “suit" includes action; "action" means a civil proceeding commenced by writ or in such other manner as may be prescribed by Rules of Court, but not a criminal proceeding by the Crown; and "matter" includes every proceeding in the Court not in a cause. originating summons under O. LV, 3, has been held to be an action: In re Fawsitt, Galland v. Burton, 30 Ch. D. 231; Gee v. Bell, 35 Ch. D. 160. An In judgments in Equity, the final working out of the particular question to be determined, or further consideration generally, is frequently adjourned. It is in many cases necessary, before the rights of the parties can be finally determined, to make inquiries as to facts, or parties, to take accounts between the parties, or take the accounts of the estate to be administered, or to get in the personal estate, and sell the real estate. In such cases the usual course has been to direct that the further consideration of the cause be adjourned; and when the inquiries have been answered, or the accounts taken, and the Master's certificate showing the result of such inquiries or accounts has been filed, the cause is brought on again. The further hearing was formerly termed the hearing upon further directions, or, after proceedings directed at law, the hearing upon the equity reserved. Now the direction is, "that the further consideration of the action be adjourned." And O. xxxvi, 21, directs that the cause when set down again be set down "for further consideration." The Judicature Act, 1875, distinguishes between final and interlocutory judgments by providing (s. 12) that where the subjectmatter of an appeal is a final order, decree, or judgment, the appeal shall be heard before not less than three Judges of the Court of Appeal, and when it is an interlocutory order, &c., before not less than two Judges of such Court; any doubt as to what judg |